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Formal Mechanisms for Reduction in Science 
Terje Aaberge, Sogndal, Norway 
1. Introduction 
There is a well known story about Victor Hugo who after 
having submitted Les miserables to his editor, went on 
holiday. He was anxious to know about its reception how-
ever, and sent the editor a telegram with the single sign 
“?”. Shortly thereafter he received the response “!” from the 
editor (Gion 1989). Clearly both telegrams carried a mean-
ing for the receivers. The reason was the existence of the 
common context determined by the particular situation in 
which the messages could be interpreted. 
The story exemplifies the difference between data 
and information and how sufficient background knowledge 
makes it possible to interpret data and turn them into in-
formation. The background knowledge defines a context in 
which to interpret the data. There are two mechanisms for 
this, either the condition of coherence imposes an interpre-
tation or the context already contain definitions of the data. 
In any case, the story indicates that if the context is rich 
then the amount of data needed to describe a state of 
affairs is smaller than if the context is poor. It thus gives a 
clue to a preliminary definition of reduction with respect to 
context: a reduction of a context is an enrichment of the 
context. 
In a formal linguistic setting a context is represented 
by an ontology, i.e. a set of implicit definitions of the words 
of the vocabulary used to describe the domain in question. 
The ontology provides the formal language with a seman-
tic structure that pictures structural properties of its domain 
of application. The ontology in itself does not furnish the 
language with a full semantic. It must be supplemented by 
an interpretation that relates some of terms of the ontology 
to external ‘objects’, i.e. objects of its domain of applica-
tion. The other terms are then given meaning by the defini-
tions. A choice of terms whose interpretation is a sufficient 
basis for the semantic of a language are said to be pri-
mary. All the other terms are defined by the primary terms 
by means of the definitions. The definitions that only con-
tain primary terms are called axioms (Blanché 1999). An 
ontology can thus be considered to be constituted by an 
axiom system or axiomatic core providing implicit defini-
tions of the primary terms and a set of terminological defi-
nitions of the additional vocabulary.  
An axiom system for the ontology resumes the syn-
tactic and semantic information in the ontology. It is mini-
mal with respect to both. The syntactic structure repre-
sented in the axiom system permits the deduction of all the 
theorems of the theory and the interpretation of the pri-
mary terms gives meaning to the terms introduced by the 
terminological definitions.  
The language is used to describe objects or sys-
tems of the domain. The data necessary for a complete 
description of a system depends on the information con-
tent of the axiom system of the ontology. An extension of 
the system and thus of the ontology provides more infor-
mation. Accordingly, an extension of the axiomatic system 
is a formal expression for reduction. 
There are two kinds of reductions, ontological and 
theoretical reduction. Examples of both will be discussed in 
the following, however, limited to the case of formal scien-
tific languages. By formal I will mean a language whose 
syntax is provided by first order predicate logic. 
2. Structure of a formal scientific language 
Any exposition of the structure of scientific theories is 
based on a number of distinctions representing ontological 
commitments. Those I have chosen are partly exhibited in 
the following figure:  
 
 
Figure 1 
Here Domain W and Domain T stand for two different per-
ceptions of reality; the Domain W corresponds to logical 
atomism and Domain T to the more elaborate set theoreti-
cal conception. The Figure 1 does not fully represent the 
relations between Language and Domain. It must com-
plemented by the following diagram,  
 
 
Figure 2 
expressing the two interpretations of the correspondence 
between the structure of language and the reality: that the 
structure of reality is projected onto language or that the 
structure of language is projected onto reality. These inter-
pretations are reflected in Wittgenstein’s (Wittgenstein 
1961) and Tarski’s (Tarski 1944, 1985) semantic theories 
respectively: Wittgenstein’s semantic is represented by 
maps from the domain to language, while the Tarskian 
semantic is defined by a map from the language to the 
domain.  
In a science there is a need to quantify over sys-
tems and properties, however, not both at the same time. 
Thus, the a priori second order language is naturally rep-
resented by a juxtaposition of two first order languages, 
the Object Language (OL) and the Property Language 
(PL). OL serves to give empirical descriptions of the sys-
tems of the domain and PL serves to describe the proper-
ties of the systems and to formulate models of systems. 
Formal Mechanisms for Reduction in Science — Terje Aaberge 
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They are both endowed with semantic structures defined 
by ontologies. Their vocabularies consist of the logical 
constants and three kinds of terms, the names, variables 
and predicates, each kind having a particular syntactic 
role. A name refers to a unique system or property, a 
predicate to a property (predicate of the first kind) or a 
category of systems or properties (predicate of the second 
kind), or a relation between systems or properties. A vari-
able refers to any of the elements in a given category. 
There is no syntactic difference between predicates of the 
first and second kind; the distinction is semantic. It is 
based on the ontological distinction between system and 
properties. A system is observed and thus conceived as a 
bundle of properties possessed by the system (bundle 
theory of substance). 
The distinction between the two languages captures 
scientific practises. In OL the systems are directly referred 
to, while in PL the reference is indirect; it is given by 
means of identifying properties that are possessed by the 
system. Thus, while in OL Newton’s second law is ex-
pressed by 
the acceleration of a body equals the net force act-
ing on the body divided by its mass 
in PL the same law is represented by the mathematical 
formula 
a = F/m 
which is without any explicit reference to the body. “Body” 
is not a term in PL. The body in question is implicitly re-
ferred to by the mass m that denotes a property of the 
body (system).  
Figure 1 indicates that the set of properties/relations 
is represented by an abstract property space in the PL. In 
this language the relation between the property space and 
the names of the properties are also included. They are 
represented by maps that simulate the observation of 
properties. For example, the set of possible locations in 
real space is represented by the points of abstract three 
dimensional Euclidean space and the names of the points 
by their co-ordinates. This relation is formally represented 
by a map that relates the points of the abstract space with 
their co-ordinates. The ontology of the property language 
incorporates these relations. In the property language it is 
thus also possible to simulate the act of observation. 
A model of a system is a representation of the sys-
tem in the property language. From the model we can 
extract a description of the system modelled. The degree 
of correspondence between the empirical description in 
the object language and the theoretical description in the 
property language determines the correctness of the 
model. 
3. Object language and ontological  
reduction 
A domain consists of a set of (physical) systems that pos-
sess properties and relations. A system is uniquely identi-
fied and described by the properties it possesses. This is 
done by means of the atomic sentences that attach prop-
erties to the system, i.e. they are concatenations of the 
name of the system and the predicates that refer to the 
properties of the system. The basis for such a description 
is logical atomism. Each atomic sentence stands for an 
atomic fact. The conjunction of atomic sentences that ap-
plies to a system provides a description or picture of the 
system and serves to distinguish it from the descriptions of 
other systems. 
Some properties are mutually exclusive in the sense 
that they cannot simultaneously be possessed by a given 
system; for example, a system cannot at the same time be 
red and green. This relation of exclusiveness of properties 
serves to categorise the predicates of the first kind. Each 
such category is then the range of a map from the set of 
systems of the domain to the predicates of the first kind. 
The map, called an observable, relates systems to the 
predicates denoting properties. Colour is thus an observ-
able. Other examples of observables are form, tempera-
ture, position in space, mass, velocity etc.  
One distinguishes between two kinds of observables 
referring to two kinds of properties, properties that do not 
change in time and thus serves to identify the system, and 
properties that change. The corresponding observables 
are identification and state observables respectively. The 
state properties form a space called the state space of the 
systems.  
The systems can be classified with respect to the 
identification observables. One starts with one of the ob-
servables and uses its values to distinguish between the 
systems to construct classes. Thus, one gets a class for 
each value of the observable, the class of systems that 
possess the particular property, e.g. the class of all red 
systems, the class of all green systems etc. The procedure 
can be continued recursively until the set of identification 
observables is exhausted. The result is a hierarchy of 
classes with respect to the set inclusion relation. The basic 
entities of the classification are the elements of the leaf 
classes. The discovery of new independent observables 
will then lead to a refined classification and create new leaf 
classes and thus new classes of basic entities. 
The classes are referred to by predicates of the 
second kind which thus are ordered naturally in a taxon-
omy that constitute a linguistic representation of the classi-
fication. The taxonomy together with the definitions of the 
classes is an ontology for the object language. The class 
definitions impose a semantic structure that mirrors the 
class inclusion relations and create semantic relations 
between the predicates. An extension of an ontology due 
to a refined classification is thus an example of an onto-
logical reduction. Moreover, the domain of application of 
the new language is extended to incorporate the new sys-
tems to which some properties of the old systems can be 
referred. The axiom system for the ontology is given by the 
definitions of the leaf classes. 
An example of a classification is that of material 
substances. They can be classified in terms of their chemi-
cal properties. In particular, the pure chemical elements 
are given by the periodic table. Taking into account the 
physical properties however, we get a refined classification 
distinguishing between isotopes of the same kinds of at-
oms.  
The classification hierarchy can be given a 
mereological interpretation, i.e. the elements of the differ-
ent classes may be identified by their composition in terms 
of elementary constituents (Smith et al. 1994). The pas-
sage from one level of granularity in terms of elementary 
constituents to a finer one which in the example above 
going from the atoms of the periodic table to the constitu-
ents of atoms (electrons, protons and neutrons) is an ex-
ample of ontological reduction. 
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4. Property language and theoretical  
reduction 
Physics offers many examples of theoretical reduction. We 
will consider one from classical mechanics. It has several 
equivalent formulations of which we will discuss two, the 
Newtonian and Hamiltonian mechanics. 
The structure of Newtonian mechanics is defined by 
a set of axioms covering 
 
Euclidean space and time (abstract) 
Action of the Galilei group 
Operational definitions of velocity, length and time 
measures determining coordinatisations 
Calculus  
Newton’s second and third laws 
The set of axioms supplemented with terminological defini-
tions constitute an ontology for the property language of 
Newtonian mechanics. 
A model is defined by the specification of a set of 
equations, the equations of motion. The equations of mo-
tion implement Newton’s second law and include quanti-
ties representing the identification properties of the system 
modelled and empirical constants, i.e. the masses of the 
objects and the gravitational constant. The solutions, 
moreover, depend on another set of empirical quantities 
defining initial conditions. 
Hamiltonian mechanics is a formulation of classical 
mechanics that is a more restrictive way of looking at clas-
sical mechanics. It is based on the following elements 
 
Phase space and time as a differential manifold 
Action of Galilei group 
Operational definitions of momentum, length and 
time determining coordinatisations 
Hamilton’s principle of least action 
The set of axioms supplemented with terminological defini-
tions constitute an ontology for the property language of 
Hamiltonian mechanics. 
A model of a system is defined by a function on 
phase space, the Hamiltonian, which includes reference to 
identification properties of the system modelled. Given the 
Hamiltonian, the equations of motion are derived from the 
hypothesis that the dynamics satisfies Hamilton’s principle. 
The passage from Newtonian mechanics to Hamil-
tonian mechanics is a theoretical reduction; the axioms of 
Hamiltonian mechanics impose more structure than those 
of Newtonian mechanics but at the same time they define 
a more restrictive theory. The definition of a model is thus 
more compressed in Hamiltonian mechanics than in New-
tonian mechanics. In fact, while the definition of a model of 
a simple system needs the specification of three functions, 
the force, in Newtonian mechanics, it is defined by only 
one function, the energy, in Hamiltonian mechanics. The 
domain of application of Hamiltonian mechanics is how-
ever, smaller than that of Newtonian mechanics. In fact, 
while Newtonian mechanics can model dissipative sys-
tems, Hamiltonian mechanics can only handle conserva-
tive systems. 
It should be noticed that the terms reduction is also 
used to denote the limit of physical theories for parameters 
going to zero.  
Literature 
Blanché, Robert 1999: L’axiomatique. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France  
Gion, Emmanuel 1989 Invitation à la theorie de l’informatique, 
Paris: Éditions du Seuil 
Smith, Barry and Casati, Roberto 1994 Naive Physics: An Essay in 
Ontology, Philosophical Psychology, 7/2, pp. 225-244. 
Tarski, Alfred 1985 Logic, Semantic, Metamatematics (second 
edition), Indianapolis: Hackett  Publishing Company  
Tarski, Alfred 1944 The Semantic Conception of Truth and the 
Foundations of Semantic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 4, pp. 341-375 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1961: Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Lon-
don: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
 
 
  14 
Wittgenstein on Counting in Political Economy  
Sonja M. Amadae, Columbus, Ohio, USA 
This paper follows Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics to investigate the source of 
the purported necessity delineated in mathematical 
statements and proofs. It suggests that this “normativity” 
has a similar structure to that underlying promising, 
contracting, and political obligation. Whereas many 
philosophers have abdicated the project of defending that 
empirical science can yield necessary truths or universal 
laws,1 still it is typical that mathematical truths are 
conceived to be necessary. Therefore the philosopher 
W.V.O. Quine, although a thorough-going empiricist who 
attempted to defend mathematics on the grounds of 
sensory perception, still faced the burden of explaining 
“why mathematics was (and is) thought to be necessary, 
certain, and knowable a priori.”2 If we understand 
“normativity” to convey some sort of structural 
indispensability that may guide judgment and action, then 
mathematical knowledge represents perhaps the 
paradigmatic case of a codified, law-like system that 
embodies non-negotiable relations and claims, that may 
be intuited by the human intellect.  
There is an arresting debate at the foundations of 
mathematics over whether mathematical objects, or 
numbers, have an objective existence independent from 
the mind. To simplify various positions on this question into 
two varieties, on the one hand are the “realists,” who hold 
that the truth of mathematical statements is externally 
determinate, even if its status is undecidable within a set 
theoretic or formal system: “We employ such a conception 
if we hold that the statement may be determinate in truth-
value irrespective of whether we can recognize what its 
truth-value is.”3  
A second school of mathematics, referred to as anti-
realism or intuitionism, accepts that mathematical truths 
exist only in the mind of mathematicians: they are 
constructed. Such an acceptance of the imaginative work 
done by mathematicians would seem to be on par with 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis of the social character of the 
normativities of counting, calculating, and proving. 
“Wittgenstein’s general treatment of the topic of rule-
following entails that the status of a proof, or calculation, is 
always in need of ratification.”4 By this account, human 
counting practices retain their shape, or consistent 
patterns, over time not because they are laid down by iron-
clad procedural rules, but because we commit ourselves to 
interpreting and acting on the rules as consistently as our 
contingent intersubjective context makes possible. 
This lack of agreement about the foundation of 
mathematics, over whether the objects of its investigation 
actually exist or not, stands in parallel to debates over 
whether moral systems represent truths independent from 
                                                     
 
1 For example, W.V.O. Quine, for discussion see Shapiro, Thinking About 
Mathematics, 218, 
2 Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics, 218. 
3 Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 7; even philosophers of mathematics 
who hold a naturalistic position that ultimately mathematics should be verifia-
ble through scientific (empirical) means, endorses numeric realism: “As a 
realist [P.] Maddy (1990: cha. 4, ss 5) agrees with Gödel that every unambi-
guous sentence of set theory has an objective truth-value even if the sentence 
is not decided by the accepted set theories” (Shapiro, 224). 
4 Wright, Wittgenstein, 128. 
the cultures in which they are expressed. There is a 
symmetry between the assertion of the existence of 
deontological moral truths, such as the Kantian categorical 
imperative, and the claim of independent validity of 
mathematical truths; either case, so far as we know, 
cannot in principle confirm its verification-transcendent 
authority. Even if this parallel is striking, it is further 
apparent that whereas deontology in morals is a position 
marginalized by mainstream scientific approaches to 
human behavior, 5 realism in mathematics is the more 
widely accepted status quo in philosophies of science and 
math.6 This realism essentially accepts that humans have 
“the capacity to grasp a verification-transcendent notion of 
truth”7 in matters of mathematics, but doubts the same in 
matters of morals or ethics. We routinely accept 
verification-transcendence in mathematics but not in 
ethics. 
Granted this general privileging of the normativity of 
mathematics as evincing necessary, a priori, yet 
verification independent, truths, a philosophy of 
mathematics is called upon to “account for the at least 
apparent necessity and priority of mathematic[al 
knowledge].”8 Indeed, it seems that much of the present-
day celebration of scientific naturalism, that casts doubt on 
the reality of moral and ethical judgment, strives to present 
a position on mathematics that navigates the notoriously 
unbridgeable chasm between a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge. Quine, Hilary Putnam and P. Maddy are 
leading philosophers who have attempted this line of 
argumentation, ultimately seeking to preserve the 
nonnegotiable quality of math while grounding it on 
knowledge derivable from empirical observation.9 
However, this line of inquiry consistently concedes both 
that empiricism is irrelevant for the actual practice of 
mathematics, and that mathematical truth is independent 
from our procedures of knowing it.10 Rather, it suggests 
that mathematics will finally be vindicated in scientific 
application.11 Conveniently, Wittgenstein presents an anti-
realist philosophy of math, consistent with intuitionism in 
many of its details and implications, but with the added 
benefit of not advocating any need to revise mathematical 
practice.  
In exploring the character of mathematics as a 
language game that perhaps best represents our 
paradigmatic case of “rule-following,” Wittgenstein 
suggests that the laws of mathematics stand as 
imperatives and commands, and not as objectively 
verifiable truth claims: “Mathematical discourse is not fact-
stating; its role is rather to regulate forms of linguistic 
practice.”12 If we distance our understanding of the source 
of mathematical normativity as flowing from objective 
objects and relations that exist outside our minds and 
practices, then we may understand that mathematical 
statements have the character of declarations, 
                                                     
 
5 Jean Hampton, The Authority of Reason (Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
6 Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, “Numbers Exist,” 201-225. 
7 Wright, Wittgenstein, 10. 
8 Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics, 23. 
9 See Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics, “Numbers Exist,” 201-225. 
10 Shapiro, 220, 224. 
11 Shapiro, 220. 
12 Wright, Wittgenstein, 157. 
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imperatives, or commands in the form of admonishing 
adherence to rules that we assent to follow. The intuitionist 
Dummett, whose position Wittgenstein’s resembles, refers 
to mathematical statements as quasi-assertions:  
 
Quasi-assertions are declarative sentences which 
are not associated with determinate conditions of 
truth and falsity but share with assertions properly 
so-called the feature that there is such a thing as 
assenting to them; where such assent is 
communally understood as a commitment to some 
definite type of linguistic or non-linguistic conduct, 
and receives explicit expression precisely by the 
making of the quasi-assertion.13 
The subtle aspect of understanding the distinction between 
mathematical statements as in principle verifiable against 
an objective reality, versus having the character of being 
ratified by voluntarily acceptance, is that although we seek 
to preserve some sense of non-arbitrary structure, we 
must locate its apparent “necessity” in our discretionary 
compliance rather than in some facet of extra-mental 
reality. This necessity has the form of willingly binding 
ourselves to a normative correctness that we enact in our 
practice. Hence we have the sufficient leverage to not only 
ask “[o]f someone who is trained [in a specific type of rule-
following] ‘How will he interpret the rule in this case?’”, but 
further to raise the question, “How ought he to interpret the 
rule for this case”?14  
This view of mathematics as having a humanly 
devised command structure instead of a structure insured 
by objective reality alters our picture of the type of 
normative guidance underlying mathematical judgment. 
Instead of being guided in making mathematical 
statements by facts, we consider that “all mathematical 
propositions [are] expressed in the imperative, e.g., ‘Let 10 
x 10 be 100.’”15 The significance is that this depiction of 
mathematics makes the consistency of its structure 
dependent on our voluntary commitment to uphold 
conceptual relations in specific ways:  
 
Such an account is exactly what we should 
intuitively propose for sentences expressing the 
making of a promise. No one would ordinarily 
suppose that the use of sentences of the form, ‘I 
promise to …’ is best understood as the making of a 
statement, true or false; though their being prefixed 
by ‘it is true that …’ is grammatical sense.16 
The promissory quality, then, of mathematical normativity 
is that mathematical rules suggest what we “ought to 
conclude,” and in participating in these rule-following 
exercises we accede to draw the conclusion implied by the 
rule. It is not that some feature of an objective world of 
numbers intercedes to form the basis of our judgment in a 
necessary fashion. Rather, in mathematical rule-following, 
we agree to abide by the rules as prefiguring or 
commanding our judgment. If we consider the role proofs 
play in mathematics, “it marks not a discovery of certain 
objective liaisons between concepts, but something more 
like a resolution on our part so to involve them in the 
future.”17 
                                                     
 
13 Wright, Wittgenstein, 155. 
14 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. by 
G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. By G.E.M. Ans-
combe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) (RFM), V-9, p. 267. 
15 Wittgenstein, RFM, 155. 
15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, RFM, V-17, p. 276. 
16 Wright, Wittgenstein, 157. 
17 Wright, Wittgenstein, 135. 
If our understanding of the normativity structuring 
apparently necessary truths in mathematics rests on our 
commitment to follow the rules of mathematics, then it is 
possible to see that the rule-following nature of math is 
little different from other rule-following institutions 
throughout our society. This opens the possibility of 
considering that social-norms that stand as a system of 
rules have as much sanctity as do the rules of 
mathematics. Typically, social norms are regarded as 
subject to preference; either an individual prefers to follow 
a social norm or not; if she chooses to follow a social 
norm, this is because she prefers to do so. However, in the 
case of mathematical judgment, preference is seldom 
invoked as a source of decision over the result of a 
calculation or proof.  
This recasting of the foundation, as it were, of 
mathematics from fact and objective truth to socially 
constructed and ratified laws suggests the possibility for 
drawing a parallel between legal systems of rule-following 
and mathematical systems. In his essay, “The Groundless 
Normativity of Instrumental Rationality,” Donald Hubin 
argues that neo-Humean instrumentalists “must engage in 
the same ‘lowering of expectations’ [of the source of 
normativity of instrumental rationality to the same level] 
that the legal positivist must.”18 For Hubin, practical 
rationality, of which instrumentality is part, is not an 
objective matter. In making his point, he draws on legal 
positivism’s retreat from natural law theory, and draws on 
H.L.A. Hart to expand on this view. 19 Hubin is making the 
point that even though a legal system provides a 
normative basis for action, it cannot ground its ultimate 
principles. I am reworking Hubin’s parallel between 
positive law and instrumental reason to contrast a realist 
account of math with an alternative declarative 
understanding. In an anti-realist mathematics, the binding 
quality of rules only holds insofar as we assent to them. 
It has traditionally been the case the social and 
political normativity has been viewed as of a lesser 
pedigree than instrumental and mathematical normativity 
insofar as the former is conditional, and the latter is non-
negotiable. For example, Phillip Pettit provides an 
explanation for how social norms may be derived from 
instrumental agency as the former is conditional on 
individual rational self interest.20 In his Theory of Justice, 
John Rawls was widely criticized from within rational 
choice theory for placing action according the “the 
reasonable,” which included the political theoretic concept 
of fair play, on par with agency conforming to the dictates 
of expected utility theory.21 It was not automatically 
obvious from within rational choice theory that agents had 
a duty to uphold the rules of government if they did not 
further an agent’s ends in each and every circumstance of 
action.22 Therefore, without some sanctioning device that 
alters payoffs, the rule of law does not in and of itself 
provide a reason for action that trumps agents’ 
preferences over end states. Rawls concludes of his 
contrasting approach to justice as fairness, “There is no 
thought of trying to derive the content of justice within a 
                                                     
 
18 Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality", 
The Journal of Philosophy 98:9(2001), 445-468, 466. 
19 Hubin, “Groundless Normativity,” 463. 
20 Philip Pettit, “Virtus normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives,” in his Rules, 
Reasons, and Norms (Oxford University Press, 2002), 308-343. 
21 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971); John 
Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 14:3 (summer, 1985), 223-51. 
22 This is the problem David Gauthier faces in Morals by Agreement (Oxford 
University Press, 1985). 
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framework that uses an idea of the rational as the sole 
normative idea.”23 
I am suggesting that mathematics, in any form, but 
even more specifically as it is harnessed to anchor all 
manners of institutions in political economy that depend on 
“accurate counting” for their functioning, embodies the 
normativity of Rawls’ “reasonable” as opposed to the 
rational.24 By Rawls’ description, “if the participants in a 
practice accept its rules as fair, and so have no complaint 
to ledge against it, there arises a prima facie duty…of the 
parties to each other to act in accordance with the practice 
when it falls upon them to comply.”25 Most of us accept the 
normativity of mathematical rule-following automatically out 
of habit or a sense of duty. We do not at first perceive that 
this virtually innate compliance cuts across the grain of the 
competing, and supposedly more basic, normativity of 
instrumental agency which recommends counting in one’s 
favor when one can get away with it. In fact, 
considerations of expected utility do interrupt counting  
 
                                                     
 
23 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” 237. 
24 For a discussion of the distinction between the rational and the reasonable 
in Rawls, see Rawls’ “Justice as Fairness,” and S.M. Amadae, Rationalizing 
Capitalist Democracy (Chicago University Press, 2003), 271-3. 
25 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” 60. 
practices in cases of embezzlement, fraud, bribery, and 
ballot box stuffing. The normativity of counting and 
calculating represents the logic of appropriateness and not 
the logic of consequences. Adherence to mathematical 
rules confines judgment; judgment is not a function of 
preferences over outcomes.  
Counting practices throughout political economy 
resemble the rule of law insofar as they do not have an 
independent object or autonomous truth-value separate 
from the rules constituting them. Although most of us do 
not actually determine, or even consent to, the rules 
governing these procedures in banking, insurance, 
taxation, inheritance, or elections, still there is an evident 
presumption that one counts in accordance to the rules 
free from considerations of our obvious interest in the 
outcomes. Much like Rawls’ formulation of “the 
Reasonable,” most of us have been conditioned to accept, 
or even to reflexively consent to, an inherent necessity of 
counting in accordance with the rules directing the activity. 
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Referential Practice and the Lure of Augustinianism  
Michael Ashcroft, Melbourne, Australia 
This paper is an examination and defence of 
Wittgenstein's thesis that language itself promotes an 
Augustinian picture of its workings. Let us define 
Augustinianism as the thesis that the meaning of an 
expression is its referent, and distinguish a strong variant 
that restricts the referents of expressions to ostensively 
indicatable material objects. In this paper I will argue that if 
Wittgenstein is correct about reference talk, linguistic 
practice tempts us to (incorrectly) adopt both positions. I 
shall begin by describing a naïve notion of reference. Then 
I will examine the role of reference in contemporary 
meaning theories and draw parallels with Wittgenstein's 
own account in order to elucidate the latter. Finally I will 
explain why the resulting practices can lead us to accept 
both forms of Augustinianism, and why these positions are 
mistaken. 
At first blush, Wittgenstein's ‘meaning is use’ thesis 
seems to offer a simple account of reference. As he noted 
at PI 10: 
 
What is supposed to shew what [words] signify, if 
not the kind of use they have? 
I take Wittgenstein to accept that, in one sense of ‘refers’ 
or ‘signifies’, the referential link between a sign and its 
referent lies in the fact that the rules for some signs use 
are such that their correct use intimately involves (a) par-
ticular ostensively indicatable material entity/entities which 
are thereby the referent(s) of the sign. It is this sense that 
captures what I shall term ‘naïve referential practice’.  
But, Wittgenstein points out, it is not this sense of 
reference that motivates the question of what the 
expressions of his simple language refer to. Since he had 
explained the use of the expressions he was at that point 
dealing with, in its naïve sense the question is already 
answered. Thus, Wittgenstein continues, the question 
must be a request ‘for the expression “This word signifies 
this” to be made part of the description’ of the expressions 
use. There must, alongside our naïve referential talk, be a 
sophisticated variant wherein the uses of expressions are 
explicated via referential claims. Certainly, even in ordinary 
language, ‘refers’ has a much broader role than the naïve 
practice allows. We talk of our expressions referring to 
abstract objects like numbers, fictional objects like 
Sherlock Holmes, properties like blue, and many other 
things besides. The only hypothesis here seems to be that 
this broader use of ‘refers’ is involved in elucidating the 
use of expressions. For the purposes of this paper I shall 
assume this is correct. For what I wish to argue is that it is 
the way Wittgenstein believed that expressions such as 
‘This word signifies this’ and ‘This word refers to this’ are 
made part of the description of words’ uses that leads to 
the conclusion that language itself tempts us to understand 
it in an Augustinian fashion. 
To explain this, let us begin by turning to the role of 
reference in formal meaning theories. Presuming a 
Fregean syntax and ignoring complications required to 
deal with quantifiers, a typical meaning theory attributes 
semantic values to names and treats predicates as 
functions from names to the semantic value of sentences – 
where an expression’s semantic value is that which 
indicates the contribution the expressions make to the 
meanings of the sentences it can be part of, whilst a 
sentence’s semantic value is its meaning. The theory then 
gives a functional account of the logical connectives which 
permits the production of semantic values for complex 
sentences, and lastly (and most problematically) provides 
a theory for how the use of sentences can be deduced 
from the semantic values the meaning theory attributes to 
them. In attributing semantic values to (the sub-sentential 
expressions the theory parses as) names, the names are 
said to refer to objects, which, in a deliberately set-
theoretic construal of what is going on, we can take to be 
grouped in the meaning-theory’s domain. The theoretical 
relation of reference thus introduced can be expanded 
such that one might also say that definite descriptions and 
predicates refer to the objects that satisfy them and 
(possibly empty) sets of objects respectively. The latter 
case looks very akin to saying that predicates refer to 
properties, and to assist this exposition let us explicitly 
accept that properties are sets. In this case, a set-theoretic 
construal of the quantifiers permits us to understand them 
as referring to properties (sets) of sets – taking ‘all’ to refer 
to the property of being identical to the universal set and 
‘some’ the property of not being identical to the empty set. 
Importantly, the single criterion for a successful meaning 
theory (as a descriptive account of the meanings we do 
attribute to others) lies in its getting its theorems correct. In 
the rarefied air of theoretical semiotics, it makes no sense, 
Davidson pointed out, to complain that a meaning theory 
comes up with the right theorems time after time, but has 
the logical form (or deep structure) wrong. [Davidson; 
1977] The objects to which an expression refers are 
therefore not something that can be examined directly, but 
are determined by the legitimacy of the theorems the 
referential axioms produce. 
One might object that referential axioms are not so 
thoroughly unconstrained, for they relate singular terms to 
objects. Therefore only those things that actually exist are 
kosher referents in the theory. So, for example, since there 
is no object Atlantis, a meaning theory ought not to accept 
the axiom ‘‘Atlantis’ refers to Atlantis’. One might reply that 
by the criterion given above what is important is merely 
that the meaning theory produces the correct theorems. 
So whilst one could, there is neither need nor justification 
in restricting the axioms of a meaning theory such that one 
ought to include as referents only objects one is 
ontologically committed to. But this reply is too quick. For 
the objection’s motivation is likely not the given criterion for 
determining a correct meaning theory, but Quine’s thought 
that accepting any theory requires ontological commitment 
to the objects it quantifies over (or, since a theory may be 
satisfied by models with different domains, it requires 
existential ontological commitment to there being one such 
domain). Insofar as, for any singular term of a theory, t, the 
theory implies (∃x)(x=t), a theory’s singular terms refer to 
objects of its domain of quantification – to objects which 
we therefore ought to be ontological committed. 
There are reasons to object to this claim. But I shall 
not pursue them here. Let us accept that a theory requires 
ontological commitment to the objects its quantifiers range 
over. In the case of a meaning theory, these objects are 
the semantic values of (expressions parsed as) names. 
But these objects have not been shown to be the middle-
sized dry goods we would, in the aforementioned naïve 
reference talk, say are the referents of most of the 
Referential Practice and the Lure of Augustinianism — Michael Ashcroft 
 
 
 18 
mentioned expressions in the referential axioms. On the 
contrary, formal semantics is a mathematical discipline: 
First order set theory. Given the possibility of a set-
theoretic construal of formal meaning theories, as well as 
their historical development from Tarskian model theory, 
we might think the same is true in their case; or more 
weakly, we might think it possible to interpret them in this 
way. If so, then although we owe ontological commitment 
to the members of a meaning theory’s domain, these 
would, or at least could, be urelements. In which case the 
axiom ‘‘Atlantis’ refers to Atlantis’ demands ontological 
commitment to nothing more than an (existent) urelement, 
not a (non-existent) continent. 
This foray into formal meaning theories casts light 
on how the expression “This word signifies this” can be 
made part of the description’ of the word’s use. As in 
formal meaning theories, so in folk practice: It occurs 
through reference talk coming to be used to indicate at 
least certain aspects of the expression’s semantic role. 
This indication can be wider or narrower. We have, for 
example, numerals in our language that are characterised 
as referring to natural numbers. They are characterised 
this way both en masse, in that referring to natural 
numbers is what numerals do, and individually, in that 
each numeral has a specific natural number it refers to. 
Presuming the practice does not also describe complex 
arithmetical equations as referring to numbers (or numbers 
alone), to say that a person uses a particular expression to 
refer to a natural number is to indicate that they mean it as 
a numeral. To indicate that they use it to refer to a 
particular natural number is to indicate that they give it the 
same meaning as a particular numeral. Let us assume, as 
seems plausible, that natural language has the semantic 
vocabulary – expressions denoting the categories of 
objects, properties, relations, truth functions, properties of 
properties, etc, and the means to provide indefinitely many 
names of the individuals entities of the various categories 
– to allow us to think of every sub-sentential expression 
(as parsed in the canonical syntax, which we can assume 
to be Fregean) as referring to particular referents of a 
particular category. Let us call these the canonical 
referents of the language's sub-sentential expressions. 
This permits information about the meaning a person gives 
a sub-sentential expression to be expressed by the class 
of entity that the expression is said to refer to: to learn that 
someone uses a sub-sentential expression to refer to an 
object is to discover that they mean it as a name (or 
definite description), whilst to learn they use it to refer to a 
property is to find they mean it as a predicate, etc. 
Referents, via the referential relation, provide a model for 
language on the basis of referential claims of the form ‘‘a’ 
refers to b’ and ‘There is some x such that ‘A’ refers to an 
x’. To those familiar with the practice, this model 
categorises the correct use of expressions. Explaining the 
model a person utilises helps explain the meaning they 
provide their expressions. Telling others the model they 
ought to use helps to teach them to use language as we 
wish them too. Since such a model provides referents that 
suffice, within the practice, to entirely represent the 
contribution the expressions make to the meanings of the 
sentences they can be part of, then knowledge about what 
a person refers to by an expression will provide knowledge 
of what the person means by the expression. 
It is but a short step from believing our language 
and canonical syntax permits such a referential practice to 
thinking we possess the same. Such a sophisticated 
referential practice would not be redundant. As well as 
facilitating learning, it permits translations from one 
language to another; indeed it permits extremely subtle 
translations that can elucidate the similarities and 
differences in structures between the two languages (cf PI 
10). But when applied to one’s own language in the 
presence of competent users the practice idles, it produces 
trivial substitution instances of the schema ‘‘A’ refers to A’, 
or ''A' refers to the property (of) A', etc (perhaps with small 
amounts of declination or conjugation to produce 
appropriately reified canonical referents). This is harmless 
enough, but note that reference is simultaneously 
important in elucidating meaning and every expression is 
(given a recursive categorisation system and an ability to 
provide names for previously undiscussed members of 
categories) tautologically provided with a referent, and this 
referent is (also tautologically) the meaning (semantic role) 
of the expression.  
Thus, as in formal meaning theories, saying that an 
expression possesses a particular referent, or possesses a 
referent of a particular type, provides information about the 
expressions’ semantic value. (And certainly, Wittgenstein 
exorcises any concern about the legitimacy of the used 
expressions on the right of reference claims. We can think 
of this sophisticated reference talk as a sui generis 
linguistic practice whose utility lies in its creation of this 
referential model. The objects of this model, which we 
arguably need to be ontologically committed to, are 
nothing more than other expressions of the language.) 
Such, I think, is Wittgenstein’s understanding of how 
expressions such as ‘This word refers to this’ are made 
part of the description of the use of words. 
It is clear how such a linguistic practice lures us 
towards Augustinianism. For in the sophisticated practice 
every expression possesses a referent which is, in some 
sense, the expressions meaning (semantic role). Two 
points elucidate the lure and problems of the weak and 
strong Augustinian accounts respectively: 
 
(i) Within sophisticated referential practice, refer-
ence talk provides a model of the semantic role 
of expressions in that referential claims repre-
sent, to those familiar with the practice, the se-
mantic role of expressions. It is a mistake to 
think that the possession of a referent in this 
sense causes an expression to have a seman-
tic role.  
 
(ii) Within sophisticated referential practice, all ex-
pressions possess (their canonical) referents 
which represent their semantic role. But, as 
noted, we also naïvely talk about expressions 
referring in the sense that their correct use inti-
mately involve (a) particular material entity/  
entities which are thereby their referent(s). It is 
a mistake to think that the fact that all expres-
sions possess referents in the sophisticated 
sense entails that they possess referents in the 
naïve sense. It is likewise a mistake to think 
that the referents expressions may possess in 
the naive sense represent the semantic role of 
the expression.  
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The Augustinian account confuses modelling with explain-
ing and, in its strong variety, conflates the naïve concept of 
reference with the sophisticated. But the ease of these 
mistakes is why Wittgenstein felt that, given a sophisti-
cated referential practice, our language itself attempts to 
foist an Augustinian understanding upon us. In searching 
for what Wittgenstein described as the 'life' of our expres-
sions we immediately confront a picture of meaning pro-
vided by a practice wherein the semantic role of expres-
sions is given by their referents. To paraphrase his charac-
terisation, this picture holds us captive. We cannot get 
outside it, for it lies in our language and languages repeats 
it to us inexorably. But we can equally see why the Augus-
tinian accounts are mistaken, confusing modelling with 
explanation and, in the strong case, trading on ambiguity. 
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The Date of Tractatus Beginning 
Luciano Bazzocchi, Pisa, Italy 
1. Tractatus and Prototractatus 
I suggest considering the so-called “Prototractatus” note-
book (MS104) not as “an early version of the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus”1, but as the effective manuscript of 
Wittgenstein’s book. We know that the ultimate typescript 
was dictated in August 1918; it’s considered a final writing, 
despite a dozen of later inserted propositions2. Well, the 
MS104 notebook (if we look at the whole of it and not only 
at its published part) contains in its turn all the material of 
that typescript, including title, dedication, motto and Pref-
ace, with the exception of only five propositions.3 In par-
ticular, the first fifty remarks of the manuscript, the back-
bone of the work, passed almost unaltered into the final 
book, and 41 of them maintained also the same decimal 
number: so we can consider the date of composition of 
these first pages as the real starting date of the Tractatus 
itself. Unfortunately, there isn’t any agreement on Proto-
tractatus’ composition date.  
The content similarity between Prototractatus and 
Tractatus was just what led von Wright in error when he 
advanced “the conjecture […] that work on the ‘Prototrac-
tatus’ immediately preceded the final composition of the 
book in summer of 1918” (Wittgenstein 1971, p.9). This 
may perhaps be true for the last part of the notebook, i.e. 
pp. 103-120, not edited and not considered “Prototrac-
tatus” by von Wright; but most of MS104 was written a long 
time before. The decisive philological proof was found by 
McGuinness in 1989, when he published a list taken from 
the correspondence of Hermine Wittgenstein and dated 
January 1917. It mentions some of Wittgenstein’s manu-
scripts; the fifth entry of the list (“a large chancery volume, 
containing the revision of [the first three notebooks] for 
publication”) seems to refer precisely to the Prototractatus 
notebook. McGuinness argues that at the end of 1916 the 
notebook was filled at least until page 71, in correspon-
dence with proposition 7 insertion, or perhaps until the end 
of the successive layer of text at page 78 (McGuinness 
2002). 
2. Prototractatus first 70 pages 
While we can accept his conclusion, it’s not so much clear 
in which circumstances these pages were composed. 
McGuinness expects that from Hermine’s list we can de-
duce the non-existence of an eventually lost diary connect-
ing the three we have (MS101, 102 and 103 of von 
Wright’s catalog); the period between MS102 and MS103, 
from June 1915 to March 1916, would instead be dedi-
cated to the Prototractatus compilation, until the line traced 
at page 70. This hypothesis is very uncertain. The work 
around the Prototractatus is utterly unlike the work on the 
diaries. Compared with the structured and formal aim of 
                                                     
 
1 See the subtitle of (Wittgenstein 1971). 
2 These were added by hand to the typescript, generally on the overleaf of its 
sheets, during Wittgenstein’s permanence in the Montecassino camp.  
3 They are the remarks 3.251 (derived from a note of June 19th 1915), 4.0311 
(taken from Nov 4th 1914 ) and the second paragraph of 4.01 (from Oct 27th 
1914): perhaps these were already in a supposed parallel version of MS104 
notebook, requested by the so-called ‘Korrektur’ . Instead, 3.22 (from Dec 29th 
1914) and 3.221 (from May 26th and 27th 1915) were added directly during 
the process of dictation. On the other end, one of the later twelve insertions, 
the proposition 5.2523, had already appeared as last entry of MS104.  
the Abhandlung, their date-ordered arrangement (which is 
identical before and after the interleaving period: left pages 
with encoded personal notes, right pages with philosophi-
cal free entries) answers to very different needs. Besides, 
it’s likely that an intermediate lost diary existed, as Gesch-
kowski arguments in his book4. Finally, it’s probable that 
the third entry of the Hermine’s list just refers to this (now 
lost) notebook, and not to the successive MS103, as 
McGuinness thought.5 But from his objections to McGuin-
ness, without any cogent reason, Geschkowski concludes 
that the first 70 pages of the Prototractatus were filled only 
in the autumn of 1916, on the basis of a gathering of mate-
rial on loose sheets. 
3. Prototractatus first 28 pages 
On the contrary, as I elsewhere discussed (Bazzocchi 
2007a and 2007b), I think that the method of composition 
of the notebook’s first layer, until p. 28, reveals a typical 
first writing, where the decimal numbers play the role of 
heuristic guide. It seems improbable that the proposition 
numbers were added later, as instead Geschkowski is 
forced to assert (if the decimals were present at the mo-
ment of the supposed copy from the loose sheets, the 
notebook wouldn’t be in such disorder as it is). We can 
prove, indeed, that the decimal numbers were in use from 
the beginning. In fact, the proposition 2.23 in second page 
was deleted by pencil and transferred to the fourth page 
under the new decimal 2.181: at the moment of deletion, it 
already had its number, perfectly coherent with all the oth-
ers. 
In short, I think that the first 28 pages were filled be-
fore the letter to Russell of October 22nd 1915, because 
from the letter we can deduce that some time before a 
copy of the notebook first stratum into a “last summary on 
loose sheets” was made (see Bazzocchi 2006). So we can 
date this first layer compatibly with McGuinness’ dating 
(although by different reasons), i.e. around 1915 summer. 
4. Prototractatus first 12 pages 
Now I want to introduce a new argument, that until now 
critics haven’t noticed.    
In the diary entry of June 18th 1915, one can find a 
very baffling passage. In the middle of a long discussion 
on generality and particularity, illustrated by an example of 
a picture and its dots, there is an incongruous reflection: 
“Not: a propositions follows from another one, but: the truth 
of a proposition follows from the truth of the other”. Then 
the text continues about pictures and dots. What is the 
sense of this mention? Why such sudden inspiration? One 
idea is that Wittgenstein, incidentally remembering some 
other remark, decided on a new way of expression and 
                                                     
 
4 See (Geschkowski 2001), chapter “2.1 Reasons for the existence of a further 
diary”. Passing, I add that the lost diary can be even partially reconstructed. 
Presumably, Prototractatus pages 79-81 contain selected propositions from its 
second part in perfect continuity with pages 81-86, that systematically contain 
all the good propositions of the consecutive MS103 diary. 
5 McGuinness himself argues that at the time the notebook in question had 
been “in part” reversed in the Prototractatus; but MS103 notebook was exploi-
ted only later, starting from page 81 of the manuscript. 
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hurried to fix it on the page. The remark to be modified is 
not in the diary. But if we look at page 12 of the Prototrac-
tatus notebook (a page that as in McGuinness’ as in my 
hypothesis takes place around that period), we find exactly 
the contested expression: “5.041 In particular a proposition 
follows from another one if all the truth-grounds of the first 
are truth-grounds of the second”6. Well, the remark is 
emended with the precise insertion of “the truth of”: “the 
truth of a proposition follows from the truth of another 
one”.7 
Here we have two indubitable facts: on June 18th 
1915 Wittgenstein fixed a correction, and at Prototractatus 
page 12 the same correction took place. There are only 
two possibilities: or first Wittgenstein stated the amend-
ment in abstract, and then the case took place and he 
corrected it exactly as stated some time before, or first he 
wrote the previous form on the Prototractatus, and then 
reviewed it and remarked the adjustment on the diary. The 
first case is very unlikely. It’s hard to believe that Wittgen-
stein decided in abstract such a particular (and indeed not 
so clear) correction of his thought; that then (a few weeks 
later, in McGuinness’ hypothesis) twice
8
 he made just the 
“mistake” he had already criticized; and that finally he cor-
rected it following a previous such foresighted purely theo-
retical amendment. The only effective possibility is that the 
compilation of Prototractatus page 12 precedes the dis-
covery of the inaccuracy and its record on the diary. Note 
that the question does not concern only the wording of 
propositions 5.04 and 5.041 – that at the time, one may 
think, could have been recorded on some other slip of 
paper – but properly Prototractatus page 12, because the 
correction is unquestionably on it. 
Hence we can conclude that the Prototractatus 
notebook started before (and not after) the end of the 
MS102 diary, that in fact contains a reference to its page 
12. McGuinness’ hypothesis seems to fall off anyway, but 
onto the opposite side compared to what Geschkowski 
argued.  
5. Prototractatus first page 
The Prototractatus compilation was indeed a very slow 
process, at an average speed of three or four pages a 
month: the total 120 pages of August 1918 were already 
71 as the end of 1916, at least 28 in October 1915, and 12 
in June9. So we can presume that the starting point was in 
April or May 1915. In this case, the letter to Russell of May 
22nd 1915 assumes a definite sense. In the previous com-
munication to Russell, in November 1914, Wittgenstein 
said: “If I should not survive the present war, the manu-
script of mine that I showed to Moore at the time will be 
sent to you, along with another one which I have written 
now, during the war” [Wittgenstein 1974, p. 62]. The sec-
ond manuscript is evidently the 1914 diary, whose first 
                                                     
 
6 As I discuss in (Bazzocchi 2005), this proposition is surprising recurrent in 
Tractatus’ story. It is quoted, in a double allusive manner, in a note at Proto-
tractatus’ head; besides, it maintains an embarrassing logical error, whose 
correction involved a correspondence between Ramsey and Wittgenstein, and 
determined an unsatisfactory adjustment of the entire pass.  
7 In German, from: “Insbesondere folgt ein Satz aus einem anderen…” into: 
“Insbesondere folgt die Wahrheit eines Satzes aus der Wahrheit eines ande-
ren…”.  
8 The same correction appears also in the previous statement, 5.04, whose 
ending (“so sagen wir dieser Satz folge aus der Gesamtheit jener anderen”) 
becomes: “so sagen wir die Wahrheit dieses Satzes folge aus der Wahrheit 
der Gesamtheit jener anderen”. The four insertions “die/der Wahrheit” are very 
evident on the page. 
9 I refer to Wittgenstein’s page numeration. Note that the first page of text, 
with the first fifteen propositions, is numbered as page 3. 
notebook was completed in October 30th. But in May the 
reference is quite different: “I’m extremely sorry that you 
weren’t able to understand Moore’s note – Wittgenstein 
writes – Now, what I’ve written recently will be, I’m afraid, 
still more incomprehensible. […] If I don’t live to see the 
end of this war, […] you must get my manuscript printed 
whether anyone understand it or not”.  
Here Wittgenstein refers to only one coherent 
manuscript [“mein Manuskript”], started in the last period 
[“in der letzten Zeit”], very different and more incompre-
hensible than the one showed to Moore. This recent writ-
ing can hardly be identified with the two wartime note-
books MS101 and MS102, already cited in the previous 
letter and presented as similar to the pre-war notebook. 
Besides, this is the first time, despite Russell’s frequent 
solicitations, that Wittgenstein speaks about printing some 
work of his – or rather, insists it “must” be printed. After his 
reluctance to publish anything that is less than perfect, his 
diaries seem the less indicated works for publication.10 But 
the most puzzling reference is the final clause: “The prob-
lems are becoming more and more lapidary and general 
and the method has changed drastically. –”11. Wittgenstein 
wasn’t in the habit of telling something without a good rea-
son. Such a relevant change of method is not detectable in 
the diary entries, nor in the passage from MS101 to 
MS102. The method here remains discursive and dubita-
tive, without any increasing “lapidarity”. On the contrary, 
everyone would say that with the first pages of the Proto-
tractatus “problems become more and more lapidary and 
general”. Here Wittgenstein cannot refer to the diaries, but 
to new records (may be also in other sheets or notebooks) 
which in brief will converge (or are in the process of con-
verging) into the Prototractatus notebook. No doubt that 
starting from its first page the method does “change drasti-
cally”, adopting Tractatus’ top-down numerical structure. 
So we aren’t far from the truth if we think that the first page 
of the notebook, the proper Abhandlung starting point, was 
filled between April and May 1915.12   
This conclusion is not without consequences. If in 
general the 1915-16 notebooks do not precede the 
definition of the Abhandlung propositions on the 
Prototractatus register, nor are they independent and 
alternative, but accompany it, as a counter-song that 
discusses its apodictic statements, it’s useful to read the 
two documents in parallel. It’s essential to hypothesize a 
definite date scansion of the Prototractatus notebook, and 
above all to follow the sequence of its itinerary, which – it’s 
convenient to repeat here – doesn’t have anything in 
common with Tractatus’ arrangement in sequential order of 
decimal number. The notebook privileges a top-down 
process, from high-level sequences to ever deeper 
reflections; all the skeleton of the arguments is stated 
before the successive waves of specific comments.13 In 
particular, the first twenty-eight pages of the Prototractatus 
                                                     
 
10 Compare with Hermine’s list, where not the diaries, but only Prototractatus 
notebook is marked: “for publication”. 
11 “Die Probleme werden immer lapidarer und allgemeiner und die Methode 
hat sich durchgreifend geändert. –”. Surprising, in the “Historical introduction” 
to the Prototractatus von Wright quotes almost the whole letter, except this 
revealing conclusion. So von Wright can argue: “What he here calls ‘my ma-
nuscript’ is, I conjecture, the manuscript he had shown to Moore and the first 
two wartime notebooks” (Wittgenstein 1971, p.6).  
12 After a consistent period of non-productivity and depression, until April 15th 
(“Es fällt mir nichts Neues mehr ein! […]Ich kann auf nichts mehr Neues 
denken”), the encoded journal shows a turn in April 16th (“Ich arbeite”) and 
17th (“Arbeite”). A period “of grace” is testified with unusual emphasis at the 
end of the month: “Ich arbeite” (April 24th), “Arbeite” (26th), “Arbeite! In der 
Fabrik muß ich jetzt meine Zeit verplempern!!!” (27th), “Arbeite wieder!” (28th), 
“Die Gnade der Arbeit!” (May 1st). 
13 So the Prototractatus structure is very alike the Tractatus hypertext arran-
gement, in the sense illustrated in [Bazzocchi 2008]. 
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do not correspond to recorded propositions on the diaries, 
but are in general their structural ancestors. So, it 
becomes clear how could the 1915-16 notebooks contain 
so many propositions of detail which will find place, without 
corrections, in the final work, since at the moment of their 
first conceiving, the entire structure of reference was 
already fixed on the contemporary Abhandlung. The 
Prototractatus stratification sets a series of nuclear 
prototypes, in some way discussed and commented in the 
diary, whose inspection can improve the comprehension of 
the whole enterprise.  
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The Essence (?) of Color, According to Wittgenstein 
Ondřej Beran, Prague, Czech Republic 
Wittgenstein’s treatise of the topic of colors can be seen as 
an interesting development of the view on the nature or 
essence of color (colors), but such development that ends 
with a considerable weakening (not to say deconstruction) 
of the conception of any essence. 
Wittgenstein was attracted to the question of colors 
in Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1993) where he deals the first 
time with the color exclusion problem. His conception of 
elementary propositions is such that any elementary 
proposition is true or false independently on any other 
elementary proposition (or all of them). This independence 
can be seen from the fact that a conjunction of two 
elementary propositions can be neither tautology, nor 
contradiction. This is not the case of the conjunction of two 
ascriptions of color to the same point in space and time (to 
say of some point that it is green and it is red, is a 
contradiction – see 6.3751). Hence ascriptions of color 
seem not to be elementary. Does it mean that the essence 
of color is to be found somewhere deeper that in what 
shows to us as “color”? Wittgenstein provides no clear 
answer. What is confusing here is the fact that color 
ascriptions serve to many empiricist philosophers 
(including Vienna Circle (but, presumably, not including 
Wittgenstein)) as notorious examples of a primitive 
observation. 
This problem becomes clearer and more insistent in 
the later texts, beginning with “Some Remarks on Logical 
Form” (1929). Wittgenstein discusses here possible ways 
of the analysis of color ascriptions. What is it that is 
ascribed when we say that something is “red”? The 
concept “red” seems to be not primitive, reducible. Where 
can one find the elementary propositions constituting the 
allegedly complex color ascription? Wittgenstein proposes 
an analysis into mathematized elements – that in a color 
ascription we ascribe n (certain number of) elements 
(quantities) of color (so that what we usually call “color” is 
a complex of such elements). However, there is a problem: 
since in mathematics any n includes also n-1, and n-2, 
then when we say (as an “elementary” proposition) that 
something possesses n elements (quantities) of “red”, it 
implies that it possesses also any lower number of these 
elements (and so all the lighter (or darker?) tones of the 
ascribed “color”). Which is counterintuitive – the essence 
of color thus cannot be analyzed this way, going under the 
surface of what we see as “color”. In this sense, and in 
opposition to what Wittgenstein says in Tractatus, color 
ascriptions are elementary. But on the other hand, there is 
the problem with their interdependence (any ascription of 
color excludes ascriptions of any other color). It seems that 
there are some types of elementary propositions that are 
interdependent. The logical form of our language is thus 
not uniform, it must respect the diversified shape of worldly 
phenomena. 
This quite strong phenomenological sketch (that the 
structure of phenomena influences and grounds the logical 
form of language) is quickly revoked in Philososophical 
Remarks (Wittgenstein 1964). But not so that language, 
previously seen as “realistically” based on worldly 
phenomena becomes now “arbitrary” (this is what Austin 
(1980) suggests). That language cannot be 
straightforwardly compared with the world, doesn’t mean 
that it doesn’t or needn’t respect its conditions (the world is 
still an environment whose claims and needs must 
language cope with, though it cannot be treated 
independently on language – compare Lance 1998 and his 
conception of language as a sport). Phenomenology now 
becomes identical with grammar. That is to say: the 
regular structure of the possibilities of experience 
(phenomenology) cannot be distinguished from the regular 
structure of what can be meaningfully said (grammar). 
How does this concern colors and their essence, if any? 
As for their essence, nothing changed much. Colors are 
still primary, elementary, irreducible, and their ascriptions 
are still interdependent (exclude each other). What is 
substantial for colors (for what “colors” are), the 
constitutive, normative relations among them, in this sense 
their “essence”, can be demonstrated by means of certain 
schemes. 
Wittgenstein introduces here the scheme of color-
octagon, or two octagonal pyramids joint in their bases. 
The points of the octagon are red, violet, blue, blue-green, 
green, yellow-green, yellow and orange, the vertices of the 
pyramids are black and white. This scheme encloses the 
phenomenology, i.e. grammar of colors. It is normative, 
since the relations between concepts of colors (the laws of 
experience) are not liable to a subjective licence. Of 
course, the shape of the particular language is contingent, 
but for its respective speakers it is a priori. A contingent a 
priori (see Rorty 1991), pragmatically well-functioning. 
A bit later The Big Typescript (Wittgenstein 2000) 
Wittgenstein makes the scheme a little more complicated. 
He tries to distinguish between so called basic (primary) 
colors – red, blue, green, yellow, and the other four, that 
are “mixed” colors. The octagon (or the double pyramid) is 
replaced by the color-circle, where the basic colors are 
fundamental (within their continuum the “pure” color is 
identifiable as a point), whereas mixed colors are not 
identifiable as points and represent only a continuum. 
Wittgenstein is led to this distinction by the different status 
of color mixtures. As he shows, the mixture of red and 
yellow is not a mixture in the same sense, as the one of 
violet and orange. The latter one just doesn’t produce the 
color which stands in the circle between the constituents 
(i.e. red). That is to say: all colors are not of the same kind 
(or the relations among colors are not always the same or 
symmetric). What is even more disquieting is 
Wittgenstein’s consideration about the exclusive 
ascriptions: of course, to say that something is red and that 
it is green doesn’t make sense (in a sense), but an 
average speaker needn’t necessarily feel it this way. What 
is decisive for the conclusion whether something makes 
sense or not, is whether any speaker can (feel that she/he 
can) use the “sentence” meaningfully in some situation. If 
she/he can, then philosophy cannot forbid it to her/him. It 
is linguistic practice, not philosophical generalization that 
decides what does make sense and what doesn’t. The 
essence of color is expressed in grammar, i.e. meaningful 
use, and even if it includes that ascriptions of colors 
exclude each other, it doesn’t mean that anyone cannot 
make the exclusive conjunction meaningful. In this sense, 
the essence of colors can seem “illogical” (in the usual, 
everyday sense of the word “logic”). 
This gap becomes much wider in The Brown Book. 
Whereas previously the four-polar color-circle was the 
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ultimate authority; for example for the conclusion that any 
red-green combination doesn’t make sense, here 
Wittgenstein presents another perspective: If for example 
some social class (“patrician”) is characterized by red and 
green clothes, the combination red-green will be perfectly 
meaningful, in the sense of “patrician”. An analogous 
example is: if some culture doesn’t have a common name 
for our “blue” and calls dark blue “Oxford” and light blue 
“Cambridge”, these people’s answer to the question what 
Cambridge and Oxford have in common will be: Nothing 
(see Wittgenstein 2005, p. 134f). Of course, this sense of 
color combination is quite different from the problematic 
idea of one point in space time having two different colors, 
or the one of “reddish-green” color (which is such “in itself”, 
so to speak). Hence, the purpose of these 
counterexamples of “patrician” colors or the distinction 
Cambridge/Oxford is not to refute the older statements 
about the color exclusion. The notion of what are the 
constitutive relations among (i.e. phenomenology of 
possibilities of) colors, hence, what is the essence of 
colors, is only broadened this way. It is not easy just 
exclude anything from the essence of color (from what is 
meaningful to say about colors and relations among them, 
in whatever sense – all this belongs to their “essence”, as 
Wittgenstein sees). 
These examples, though fictitious, introduce 
relativistic questions: is it possible that various people or 
rather various cultures have various systems of colors? 
And can we decide which system is “true”? For now, 
Wittgenstein answers nothing. Later, he will admit the 
possibility, but with certain (to so speak Davidsonian) 
limitations; but the decision, if any, will have to be done 
otherwise than by a straightforward comparison of the 
color concepts with colors “in reality”. 
Wittgenstein then had left the topic of colors for 
more than ten years, and returned to it in Remarks on 
Colors (Wittgenstein 1992), his response to Goethe’s 
Farbenlehre which incited his great interest. The main 
purpose of Goethe’s analysis of colors is to provide a 
criticism and alternative of Newton’s optical experiments. 
For Goethe, the nature of colors in general cannot be 
conceived by one optical experiment, unjustly generalized. 
White doesn’t consist of all the rainbow-colors, except of 
the context of light fraction. A color-theorist, claims 
Goethe, must respect the variety of color laws and 
relations among them, which differ from context to context. 
If there is any medium within which what is essential for 
colors is available, it is the medium of our experiencing 
(Erleben) – which includes the regular impact of colors and 
their combinations on the perceiver, as well as all the 
conventional (allegoric, symbolic etc.) constituents of the 
meaning of colors (Goethe 2003). 
Wittgenstein’s late return to colors, inspired by 
Goethe, proves his slight weakness with respect to the 
temptation of phenomenology (for the problematics of 
Wittgenstein’s “phenomenology” see Gier 1981 or Kienzler 
1997). However, he is well aware of the disparate 
character of the “essence” of colors. Either 
“phenomenologically”, or “grammatically”, one cannot find 
a simple, unite “essence”. 
The central question he asks – and the central 
problem he sees – here is the one of the “sameness” of 
color. He discusses several problematic examples: 1) We 
call “red” both the autumn leaves and some red clothes – 
however, “in a sense”, it is not the same color. Actually, all 
the things we call “red” can seem quite different (and the 
difference is not only the one of light/dark). 2) One can 
paint both “white” things and “illumined grey” things (things 
usually conceived and seen as such), using the same 
palette color. 3) When one paints a dark room in the full 
light, how can she/he then compare the colors of the 
painture painted and seen in the full light with the colors of 
the room seen in the dark? 
All these examples show that it is not at all easy to 
state how can two things have the same color, how to 
compare it, and what does this “sameness” mean. The 
universal, unum versus alia, seems here to be nothing 
more than one word standing against all the disparate 
phenomena. But it would be a philosophical error to search 
for some one thing (in whatever sense of “thing”) hidden 
behind the one word (“craving for generality” – 
Wittgenstein 2005, p. 17ff). In this sense, Wittgenstein 
seems to be a kind of nominalist – the universal shared by 
all the particular things is a word, nomen. But there is no 
further analysis of what this universal word capturing the 
“essence” is. The universality of the word means nothing 
more and nothing less than the universality of use (just the 
fact we use the one word in all the different contexts). And 
that we know that something is red, cannot be further 
explained (the only possible explanation is that we have 
learned English – see Wittgenstein 1958, § 381). 
The relations among colors become still more 
diversified. In one context (optical) colors differ: some can 
be seen-through, and some cannot (white, black, brown); 
in another context (colors of a paper) all the colors are of 
the same sort. However, philosophy shouldn’t try to explain 
away these differences and reduce them on a simple 
essence and simple essential relations among colors, but 
on the contrary to try to conceive as many such differences 
as possible. The essence of colors lies in the meaning of 
the words for colors; there is no better (in fact no other) 
way how to conceive the “essence” of colors than by a 
description of this variety. 
As for the relativistic problems with alternative 
systems of colors, Wittgenstein introduces two types of 
anti-relativistic argument. One of them is so speak 
Davidsonian (cf. Davidson 1974): in order that we are able 
to state that something is a concept of color, though 
differing from our concepts and not quite understandable 
for us, it must be somehow akin to our concepts. We must 
always have some auxiliary evidence to discover whether 
something is a concept of color (a bit like the evidence of 
whether someone is a good tennis or chess player which 
doesn’t require that the author of the judgment is 
himself/herself a good tennis or chess player). After all, we 
have no better criterion for being a color than that it is one 
of our colors. The other argument is: if we are to decide 
between two different conceptions (lists) of the primary 
colors (one of them includes green among them, one of 
them considers it as a mixture of blue and yellow), we 
must look at which one of them works better in practice. 
I.e. which one of them enables us to fulfill more tasks (or 
more complicated tasks). Wittgenstein thinks, which is not 
without problems, that the conception of four basic colors 
is better in this sense. But whatever is the answer here, 
the only acceptable relativism is the relativism of systems 
that are akin and that function equally well in practice. 
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Wittgenstein’s Externalism – Getting Semantic Externalism  
through the Private Language Argument and  
the Rule-Following Considerations 
Cristina Borgoni, Granada, Spain 
I.  
Since Kripke has defended that “the real ‘private language 
argument’ [P.L.A.] is to be found in the sections preceding 
§ 243” (Kripke, 1982, p. 3) of Philosophical Investigation 
[PI], it has become an imperative – for those who want to 
enter the discussion - to figure out its relation to the rule-
following argument [R.F.A]. 
In this paper, I will maintain that both arguments are 
connected to each other, but not in the Kripkean sense. By 
doing this, I will be able to offer a double externalist inter-
pretation to them. On the one side, the P.L.A., when con-
sidered as independent from the R.F.A, will lead us to a 
negative formulation of the externalist thesis, through a 
reductio ad absurdum of the internalist conception of the 
mental. On the other side, when both arguments are con-
sidered as concerning to the same question, they will lead 
us to a positive defence of the externalism. 
I will take externalism as the position that defends 
that mental contents are individuated with reference to 
external factors to the mind. 
II. 
A great part of the discussion about the P.L.A. is centred in 
the case proposed by § 258. A case where we are asked 
to imagine ourselves writing in a diary the occurrence of a 
certain “private” sensation. In this diary, we should write 
the sign “S” every time we had that sensation. Wittgenstein 
warns us with respect to the traits of this exercise: “(…) 
The individual words of this language are to refer to what 
can only be known to the person speaking; to his immedi-
ate private sensations. So another person cannot under-
stand the language (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 243). 
The notion of private language criticized by Wittgen-
stein involves several questions; the question about com-
pletely private experiences (in the sense that no one could 
have access to them but its owner), the question about the 
development of a language able to describe such experi-
ences, and, the question about the possibility of a lan-
guage understood only by its creator. When Wittgenstein 
argues against the idea of a private language, he is argu-
ing against such notions. Furthermore, he is arguing 
against a specific theory of language, that one which sup-
poses that an ostensive connection between a word and a 
sensation (or between a word and an object) is sufficient to 
establish a meaning. § 258 leads us to the ultimate conse-
quences of thinking in those terms: 
(…) A definition surely serves to establish the mean-
ing of a sign. —Well, that is done precisely by the concen-
trating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself 
the connexion between the sign and the sensation. —But 
"I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings 
it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. 
But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. 
One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to 
me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk 
about 'right' (Wittgenstein, PI, § 258).  
There are those who have interpreted such an ar-
gument as dealing with a skeptical problem about memory. 
Such an interpretation says that, although an ostensive 
definition can be made plausible, the problem is how to 
warrant the future connection between the sensation “S” to 
its name. However, it seems that this kind of skeptical 
problem is not the core of Wittgenstein’s argument (Gert, 
1986, p. 429). In the case proposed by § 258, the problem 
is not to apply the same word I am using now in the future, 
nor it is about how to remember the way I have used it in 
the past; more than that, the problem is that even in the 
current case we are not allowed to say that any meaning 
was established at all. 
Another interpretation of the P.L.A. is the known de-
fence by Kripke, that P.L.A. is not but a particular case of 
the R.F.A., an argument that leads us to another skeptical 
paradox.  
The R.F.A. can be exemplified with the case pro-
posed in § 185. In such a case, a pupil is taught to write 
down the series of cardinal numbers of the form 0, n, 2n, 
3n, etc, at an order of the form “+n”. “So at the order ‘+ 1’ 
he writes down the series of natural numbers” (Wittgen-
stein, PI § 185). We are asked to suppose that the pupil 
has been tested up to 1000. Then, the pupil is asked to 
follow the series beyond 1000 and following the order “+2”. 
He writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. 
We say to him: "Look what you've done!"—He 
doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to add two: 
look how you began the series!"—He answers: "Yes, isn't 
it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it."—Or 
suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on 
in the same way."—It would now be no use to say: "But 
can't you see....?" —and repeat the old examples and 
explanations (Wittgenstein, PI § 185). 
Kripke indicates that the core of the R.F.A. is to 
demonstrate that “[a]dequate reflection on what it is for an 
expression to possess a meaning would betray (…) that 
that fact could not be constituted by any of those”; by any 
“available facts potentially relevant to fixing the meaning of 
a symbol in a given speaker’s repertoire” (Boghossian, 
1989, p. 508). Under this interpretation, § 185 proposes a 
skeptical paradox in similar terms to what seems to be 
suggested in the following aphorism: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be 
determined by a rule, because every course of action can 
be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if 
everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it 
can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would 
be neither accord nor conflict here (…) (Wittgenstein, PI § 
201). 
Although this aphorism continues saying that “It can 
be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the 
mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one 
interpretation after another” (Wittgenstein, PI § 201), 
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Kripke insists on the skeptical scenario. A scenario that 
spreads to the P.L.A.: nothing could fix the meaning of the 
sign “S”, as well as nothing could fix the meaning of the 
sign “+2” in the pupil’s case. 
The solution found by Kripke to the supposed skep-
tical paradox is the communitarism; if there is nothing as a 
“semantic fact” to determinate the difference between look-
ing right and being right, to decide about this difference is 
something that belongs to the community.  
McDowell (1984), however, who disagrees with 
Kripke’s interpretation, offers us not just an important criti-
cism to that interpretation, he also shows us another way 
of understanding Wittgenstein’s position. What McDowell 
does is to stress the conditions to the very perception of 
the skeptical paradox, insisting on the continuation of the § 
201: 
(…) What this shows is that there is a way of grasp-
ing a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "go-
ing against it" in actual cases (Wittgenstein, PI § 
201). 
McDowell maintains that “Kripke’s paradox” occurs 
only if we keep considering meaning as an interpretation. 
The necessary step, therefore, would be to change the 
idea that understanding always supposes offering an in-
terpretation. That would be Wittgenstein’s lesson. If the 
R.F.A. does not concern the desperation of how to estab-
lish the difference between right and wrong, the Kripkean 
conclusion is not maintained either. If McDowell is right in 
his diagnosis, it is not the case that the P.L.A. is just an-
other instance where we can verify the skeptical paradox. 
In the case of the sign “S”, we are not allowed to say that 
we have established any meaning at all, but this is not the 
case with the sign “+2”. In a sense, both arguments are 
connected because they both dismiss the idea of meaning 
as being the univocal relation between a sign and an ob-
ject, or between a sign and a mental image. However, they 
set apart in the sense that, the case of “+2” has a correc-
tion criterion, thought not established by a semantic fact, 
while in the case of “S” it has not. In this sense, we could 
say that the P.L.A. establishes a specific criticism to the 
idea of mental entities giving meaning to our language. So, 
I propose to reformulate the P.L.A. in the following terms: 
 
(i) Possessing a correction criterion is a condition 
of possibility to a language; 
(ii) A private language lacks correction criteria; 
(iii) A private language is impossible. There is no 
such a thing as a private language because it is 
not a language. 
“Having a meaning is essentially a matter of possessing a 
correctness condition” (Boghossian, 1989, p. 515). The 
first premise seems to be widely accepted. A statement is 
meaningful if it can be true or false. 
The second premise appears clearly at the end of § 
258. The attempt to point privately to a certain sensation, 
to a private one, leaves us without a correction criterion. 
The very sensation can not itself give me such a criterion, 
as it seems to be supposed by an ostensive definition 
between the sensation and the name I give to it. 
Wittgenstein rejects this image, not only here, but in most 
parts of his work. The R.F.A. is an example of this 
rejection, but it appears also in the earlier aphorisms of PI, 
when Wittgenstein criticizes the Augustinian image of the 
language. 
Given the two first premises, the immediate 
conclusion of such an argument is that the “concept of a 
private language is one that cannot be defended, at best, 
and is incoherent, at worst” (Preti, 2002, 56). 
The P.L.A. has a deep externalist character. The 
notion of private language could indeed be elaborated in 
opposition to an externalist position: the components of 
such a “language” are not identified by external factors to 
the mind, but purely by internal ones. Because of that, to 
argue for the incoherency of such a notion opens the way 
to reach externalism through a reductio ad absurdum. And 
the conclusion is that it becomes unintelligible to talk, at 
the same time, about instances of language (it does not 
matter if we are talking about the world or about our 
subjective experiences) and about private correction 
criteria. 
If, by arguing the P.L.A., we show the incoherency 
of internalism, we could consider this path as a kind of 
motivation to reach externalism, though a negative one. It 
is possible, however, to also find a positive motivation in 
Wittgenstein’s arguments, but taking both P.L.A. and 
R.F.A. as working together. And this is possible if we think 
that, more than a criticism, they offer us an alternative 
option to think about meaning which does not need the 
idea of semantic facts. 
Kripke defends that the Wittgensteinian argument 
leads us to communitarism. We could understand him as 
saying that the premise (ii) is true because any correction 
criterion is to be established by a community. In this sense, 
one could find in Kripke’s interpretation some externalist 
appearance if we could retain the idea that individuating 
mental contents belongs to the community and never to 
oneself privately. However, the Kripkean position is much 
stronger than that; the community is provided with full 
powers to the very establishment of meanings. While this 
position could sound as an externalism, it would also 
sound as the complete isolation of the community inside 
itself. At this moment, “[o]ne would like to say: whatever is 
going to seem right to us is right. And that only means that 
here we can’t talk about ‘right’” (McDowell, 1984, p. 49, n. 
12) 
As I have tried to defend, not only the Kripkean 
interpretation does not seem to be the most satisfactory 
one, but his solution also causes a discomfort to which 
McDowell calls our attention. If in an internalist position we 
could be isolated from the community, now we could, all 
together, be isolated from the world. And this does not 
seem to be Wittgenstein’s position, as Preti warns: 
From the fact that our fellows in the community play 
a constitutive role in determining content it will not follow 
that content is not the “queer”, inner mental process that 
Wittgenstein is concerned to deny. (…) Perhaps, that is, it 
is true that what determines meaning or content must be 
partly constituted by the minds of others – but it won’t 
follow from this that the content in other minds in the 
community isn’t determined by their inner mental 
processes. Merely being other is not enough to thwart the 
inner state conception of meaning, and it may be that 
Wittgenstein appreciated this (Preti, 2002, p. 60). 
There is, however, another way of making plausible 
the idea that correction criterion can only belong to the 
public sphere without the commitment to the 
communitarism. And that is possible when we realize that 
the institution and the application of meanings are not 
distinct activities. If the moments of application of 
meanings are so important in Wittgenstein approach, this 
is so because they are not separated from the moments of 
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institution of meanings. The externalism here would follow 
a more positive way than the one that was reached with 
the accusation of incoherence of the notion of private 
language. Here the meanings would be established with 
relation to external factors to one’s mind, but also, with 
relation to external factors to any mind.  
The positive character of Wittgenstein’s argumen-
tation is, without doubt, which brings with itself the dispute 
about the interpretation of his arguments. The dispute, for 
example, about which notion of meaning Wittgenstein 
defends at all. I believe, however, that it is important to 
point to the sense of “internal” Wittgenstein is rejecting. As 
Preti points well, one could understand the notion of 
“private” only as in opposition to “social”, as Kripke does. 
But such a notion does not exhaust in fact all that is being 
rejected by Wittgenstein: “the hidden, the inner, the 
introspectively accessible, the mentalistic (Preti, 2002 p. 
60). It seems that the externalism reached through 
Wittgenstein’s arguments involves the rejection of all this 
set of notions. 
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Informal Reduction 
E.P. Brandon, Cave Hill, Barbados 
This paper was provoked by Horst’s recent book (Beyond 
Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist 
Philosophy of Science) that argues for a metaphysical 
pluralism largely on the basis of claims about the status of 
what one might call the reductionist programme in 
philosophy of science. 
Horst’s position is that the idea that the mature 
physical sciences display extensive, metaphysically signifi-
cant reductions is an illusion that philosophers of science 
have exposed but which too many of us in other areas of 
philosophy mistakenly cling to. Whatever the formal obsta-
cles that Horst points to, I am not convinced that they con-
stitute a refutation of a metaphysically important reduction-
ism, so my aim is to try to clarify, informally, what that kind 
of reductionism is concerned with, and to suggest that our 
best bet in identifying successful, and unsuccessful, reduc-
tions of that type remains with the scientists themselves, 
rather than with the models we have created of what ideal 
reduction should involve.  
Ernest Nagel provides, for many, the standard ac-
count of what the reductionist programme aspired to. My 
strategy is to briefly review what Nagel actually claimed for 
reduction, and then to consider the type of issue that more 
recent specialists have urged against it. 
Very roughly, the formal ideal Nagel set out involves 
the laws and predicates of two theories. Theory one is 
reduced to theory two just in case there are bridging prin-
ciples linking the predicates of theory one with those of 
theory two, and the laws of theory one can be deduced 
from those of theory two with the help of such bridging 
principles. While writing of deduction here, Nagel is clear 
that these deductions should embody explanations of the-
ory one in terms of theory two, so the relationship is de-
duction plus whatever other constraints explanation re-
quires. 
Rather than focussing on Nagel’s formal account it-
self, I want to stress that methodologically he was a natu-
ralised epistemologist avant la lettre: his discussion de-
rives from the positions of practising scientists on whether 
reduction has been successful; he takes reduction as a 
fact accepted by most scientists in the relevant fields and 
aims to characterise it. It is important for him also to stress 
the many failures of reduction, perhaps most notably the 
impossibility of a mechanical reduction of electromagnet-
ism, as well. His is not the style of argument that shows 
that a putative reduction fails to fit a formal model and so is 
shown not to be a case of genuine reduction. While formal, 
his model is recognised to be a model, an ideal case, and 
so inherits the messiness of models throughout the sci-
ences. 
So, for instance, Nagel supposes that the Boyle-
Charles’ law were the only thing derivable from the kinetic 
theory of gases and says “it is unlikely that this result 
would be counted by most physicists as weighty evidence 
for the theory … For prior to its deduction, so they might 
maintain, this law was known to be in good agreement with 
the behavior of only “ideal” gases, … Moreover, physicists 
would doubtless call attention to the telling point that even 
the deduction of this law can be effected only with the help 
of a special postulate connecting temperature with the 
energy of the gas molecules—a postulate that, under the 
circumstances envisaged, has the status of an ad hoc 
assumption, … In actual fact, however, the reduction of 
thermodynamics to the kinetic theory of gases achieves 
much more than the deduction of the Boyle-Charles’ law. 
There is available other evidence that counts heavily with 
most physicists as support for the theory and that removes 
from the special postulate connecting temperature and 
molecular energy even the appearance of arbitrariness” 
(Nagel 1961, 359-60). He notes that the special assump-
tions can be replaced by others known to be closer to real-
ity, and that the reducing theory can “augment or correct” 
the currently accepted body of laws of the reduced theory. 
The same methodological point can be derived from 
an article quoted by Horst (from Silberstein), though nei-
ther author goes on to elaborate on it, that most scientists 
would think that the errors of philosophers show they have 
a bad model of reduction rather than that there are no 
reductions. “Focus on actual scientific practice suggests 
that either there really are not many cases of successful 
epistemological (intertheoretic) reduction or that most phi-
losophical accounts of reduction bear little relevance to the 
way reduction in science actually works. Most working 
scientists would probably opt for the latter claim” (Silber-
stein 2002, 94). 
I suggest that the main point1 of the reductionist 
programme is to claim that some particular area of interest 
can be comprehended, explained, by certain entities, fea-
tures, ways of working, and no others are needed. The 
area of interest is then nothing but the entities, features 
and their ways of working used in these explanations. 
These claims are rough, they constitute a scientist’s infor-
mal patter, rather than the technical, strict derivations she 
might offer within a theory. They indicate the wider signifi-
cance of the theory, and of course they may prove to be as 
fallible as anything else, but they are not groundless. If this 
idea is on the right lines, it casts considerable doubt on the 
salience of the points that have been made against Nagel, 
and relied upon by Horst in his application to the philoso-
phy of mind. 
This account can be defended by looking at Scerri’s 
discussion of the relation between chemistry and quantum 
mechanics, in particular the role of the latter in accounting 
for the periodic table. Scerri insists that we cannot rely on 
the quantum mechanical theory and the approximations it 
allows ab initio but rather we accept them when they yield 
what are known empirically to be the right results and 
complicate them when we have empirical evidence that the 
first approximation is mistaken. I am in no position to deny 
that this is what happens, nor I think is his commentator, 
Friedrich, but our point is that there is absolutely no sug-
gestion that these cases where the theoretically derived 
structure is known to be mistaken involve inexplicable 
emergent properties or new theoretical notions. They sim-
ply show that our approximations have left out something 
important which we already knew about. So, for instance, 
                                                     
 
1 As with virtually every philosophical position, there are a number of variants. 
The historically informed account of emergent properties (Timothy O'Connor 
and Hong Yu Wong 2006, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-
emergent/) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for example, distin-
guish between ontological/metaphysical and epistemological construals of the 
same issue, and then further subdivides those approaches.  
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Scerri’s says about the case of chromium: “It appears that 
both non-relativistic and relativistic calculations fail to pre-
dict the experimentally observed ground state which is the 
4s13d5 configuration” (2004, 101), but he immediately 
goes on to admit “Of course I do not deny that if one goes 
far enough in a more elaborate calculation then eventually 
the correct ground state will be recovered. But in doing so 
one knows what one is driving at, namely the experimen-
tally observed result. This is not the same as strictly pre-
dicting the configuration in the absence of experimental 
information.” Right, it isn’t; but that failure has not revealed 
anything new at work. 
As Galison says of a different case, “The reduction-
ist physicists reply that it is true that you might not guess 
these collective behaviors; but if you ask why very cold 
copper superconducts, the answer includes nothing other 
than electrons and electrodynamics-there's no magical 
supplementary thing over and above these” (2008, 121). 
We can see the point at issue in a case even Horst 
acknowledges is not decisive: the mathematical intractabil-
ity of the three-body problem for Newtonian theory is no 
reason to suppose that anything new has entered a New-
tonian system when a third mass is introduced. The cases 
Horst thinks are more significant than this do not seem to 
involve anything very different, however. I appeal to Az-
zouni’s authority in agreeing with Nagel that the idealising 
assumptions required in the thermodynamics case are not 
a barrier to the worthwhile kind of reduction she calls “sci-
entific”. She says “Imagine, contrary to fact, that a genuine 
derivational reduction is available, but only if constraints 
are placed on gas states that are—given the physics of 
micro-particles—quite probabilistically low. In such a case 
… physicalism fails: emergent phenomena, indicated by 
physically inexplicable constraints on the probability space 
of micro-particles, show this” (2000, 45). She comments in 
a footnote: “Garfinkel (1981:70-1) seems aware of this 
possibility, but seems also, falsely, to think that the actual 
derivation of the Boyle-Charles law from the statistical 
behavior of the ensemble of molecules illustrates it just 
because of the use of the conservation of energy (in 
closed systems) and the assumption of a normal distribu-
tion of velocities.”  
There are, of course, contentious issues in what 
scientists consider successful or unsuccessful reductions 
(e.g. the temporal isotropy of statistical mechanics as 
against the directedness of phenomenological thermody-
namics). But the types of idealising assumption that Horst 
is appealing to are not usually something that should un-
dermine our confidence in a reduction. 
While I have been happy to call upon Azzouni for 
support, and indeed find her account of scientific reduction 
very close to what I have been urging myself,2 I will close 
with one quibble. If we can legitimately see scientific re-
duction as not requiring formal derivations but simply “all 
that is desired is an extension of the scope of an underly-
ing science in a way illuminating both to that science and 
the special science above it” (2000, 40), I would like to 
suggest that we can extend the same sympathy to Nagel’s 
own derivational model of reduction. As I indicated at the 
start, Nagel saw the relation as explanatory. Working with 
the tools available to him he took that to involve formal 
derivation, though actual cases, of explanation and of re-
duction, might well only exhibit the elements that Hempel 
called an “explanation sketch” (Hempel 1965 [1942], 238,). 
Allowing for Nagel’s clear recognition that his account is 
indeed an idealisation of the reductions we actually find, 
we may resist agreeing with Azzouni that the concern for 
derivation has been altogether a mistaken “obsession with 
words”. It provides a picture that we can adjust to get 
closer to the realities we are interested in, as indeed her 
own explorations reveal. 
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2 She says, for instance, “talk of there being a scientific reduction in this sort of 
situation is still legitimate because we really do take As, and what is going on 
with them, to be nothing more than Bs, and what is going on with them; we 
recognize and expect that if, in certain cases, we overcome (particular) tracta-
bility problems (as we sometimes do) in treating As as Bs, we will not discover 
recalcitrant emergent phenomena. Scientific reduction is a project with metho-
dological depth: the idealized model is one where deviations from what is 
actually going on are deviations we can study directly, extract information 
from, and, when we're lucky, minimize. This is the full content of the claim that 
As, and what is going on with them, are really just Bs, and what is going on 
with them” (43-44). 
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An Anti-Reductionist Argument Based on Spinoza’s Naturalism 
Nancy Brenner-Golomb, Bilthoven, The Netherlands 
In this paper I wish to concentrate on one aspect of an 
anti-reductionist view, namely on the central idea 
underlying the so called ‘bottom-up’ principle of the 
structure of science. This idea says that although the 
behaviour of any structured entity is governed by laws 
which apply to this kind of structure alone, these laws are 
the result of, or emerge from, the properties of its basic 
elements. The most important aspect of this view is the 
relationship it establishes between the unity of science and 
the unity of nature. Feynman, for example, argued that the 
greatest success of the quantum theory is in increasing the 
unity of science. He claimed that the advantage of the 
possibility to explain the whole of chemistry in terms of 
quantum mechanics is weighed against the previously 
accepted empirical principle, that in order to accept a 
theory, a detailed understanding is required of what goes 
on in every experiment. This advantage of quantum 
mechanics, he says, shows that we are on the right track. 
And he adds that this advantage is accentuated by the fact 
that if chemistry can be so reduced to physics, then the 
whole of life can be reduced to it as well. According to him, 
the most important hypothesis in biology is that there is 
nothing that living things do, that cannot be understood by 
seeing them as made of atoms acting according to the 
laws of physics [Feynman 1989, 3-3 and 3-6].  
In other words, Feynman’s conception of science is 
that of physicalism, understood as everything that can be 
explained by physics, including non-material things, like 
laws of nature, the geometry of space or abstract concepts 
like energy. He emphasizes that we do not know what 
energy is (the emphasis is his). All we know is that this 
abstract quantity has many forms; that it can be calculated 
in each of them, and that their sum total is constant, which 
is The Law of Conservation of Energy [Feynman 1989, 4-
1]. And ‘explained by physics’ means ‘explained by a 
hierarchy of natural sciences which are ultimately reducible 
to physics.’ The ‘bottom-up’ principle says that this 
hierarchy reflects the evolution of the structure of the 
universe.  
My first claim in this paper is that although Spinoza 
argued against Descartes’ conception of science, his 
arguments apply also to physicalism. This is because the 
unity of science has remained the same as Descartes 
claimed in the seventeenth century,, namely that all that 
science can do is to explain the physical world, in spite of 
the fact that most scientists do not accept Cartesian 
dualism.  
My second claim is that starting from Spinoza’s view 
of nature, the ‘bottom-up’ principle cannot be sustained as 
a universal law. This is because by the ‘bottom-up’ 
principle the properties of a structure which emerges from 
the properties of its basic elements have no effect on the 
structure of its elements. For example, the machinery of a 
cell includes a process for the production of proteins. The 
first step in this process is performed by an RNA molecule 
which selects that part of the DNA which prescribes its 
production. The ‘bottom up’ principle in this case says that, 
although this selection depends on the shape of this 
molecule, its biological function in the cell has no role in 
determining this shape. Its shape is exclusively determined 
by the laws of chemistry. In order to disprove the rival 
hypothesis, that it was a vital force of the cell that was 
responsible for determining the shape of this molecule, 
molecular biologists who adhered to the ‘bottom-up’ 
principle removed the RNA molecule into a test tube, 
heated it so that it lost its shape, and allowed it to cool 
down outside the cell. As a result, the molecule regained 
its 3-dimensional shape, proving that there was nothing in 
the structure of the cell that contributed to its formation 
[Cairns 1997. pp. 101and 94]. However, according to 
Spinoza’s naturalism this independence cannot be 
maintained if the scientific hierarchy includes the structure 
of society emerging from the properties of individual 
people as its elements.  
Spinoza’s naturalism does not reject the idea that 
biology underlies a theory of mind. On the contrary. He 
explains that in order to recognize Peter the mind must 
abstract some essence of his by which he appears to us 
as the same person every time we see him. Yet, it is only 
by reflection on our factual recognition that we know that 
this must be the case. In fact, our brain derives this 
essence while we remain ignorant of it and of the process 
by which it is derived [Spinoza 1979 p.237]. In general, he 
says “no one has yet been taught by experience what the 
body can do merely by the laws of nature in so far as 
nature is considered merely as corporeal or extended, and 
what it cannot do save when determined by the mind.”And 
he explains further that “the body can do many things by 
the laws of its nature alone at which the mind is amazed... 
when men say that this or that action arises from the mind 
which has power over the body, they know not what they 
say..." [Spinoza 1979 p.87]. 
Spinoza agreed with the empirical scientists of his 
time that whenever possible we must seek evidence for a 
theory of mind as much as we must do so for knowledge of 
the physical world. An argument to this effect we find in his 
comment on the idea that a person cannot judge 
something to be bad for him and yet want it. This, he says, 
is contrary to experience. As philosophers, we should 
acknowledge the fact that a person can very well want 
what is bad for him, and look for a natural explanation for it 
[Spinoza 1998, p.138].  
I emphasize the phrase ‘whenever possible’ 
because Spinoza agreed with Descartes that we have 
some knowledge for which we cannot find evidence in the 
sense acceptable to empirical scientists. In fact, his own 
claim that there is nothing outside nature is not provable in 
this way. But according to him, this assumption is essential 
for creating a correct science. It is essential because it 
serves the best guide for research and the best standard 
of truth for its judgements [Spinoza 1979 p.241]. Of 
course, physicalism is also held to be the best guide and a 
standard of truth for research. The question is whether 
biology, which takes the theory of evolution as its guide 
and standard of truth can accept the ‘bottom-up’ principle 
as advocated by physicalism, or whether its inclusion of 
humanity in the evolving animal world is better explained 
by accepting Spinoza’s conception of the human mind as 
part of natural evolution.  
According to Spinoza, Descartes’ assumed 
distinction between Thought and Extension is in fact a 
distinction between two ways by which the world can be 
understood. Either according to its conceived abstract laws 
or by its causal relations as they are observed in 
An Anti-Reductionist Argument Based on Spinoza’s Naturalism — Nancy Brenner-Golomb 
 
 
 32 
space.[Spinoza 1979, p.7 (note to proposition X)]. The 
distinction, he explains, must be made only because none 
of these ways of understanding can be derived from the 
other. Taking an example from physics, instead of his own 
[Spinoza 1966, p.7], the abstract law of gravitation cannot 
be derived from observed movements alone, and 
knowledge of this law is not sufficient for explaining a 
particular movement in space. But the world they explain is 
clearly the same.  
Again we should note that although not many 
scientists or philosophers adhere to Cartesian dualism, 
Spinoza’s argument is still relevant because this dualism 
has been replaced by a new one, namely of culture versus 
nature. Being beyond the permitted length of this paper, I 
can only point out that in spite of the influence of Darwin, 
his followers only included the human body in their study 
of evolution. And an influential scientist like Richard 
Dawkins, or philosophers like Charles Peirce, Quine, 
Wittgenstein and Daniel Dennett, among many others, see 
in rational thinking a cultural invention, where a culture is 
largely independent of nature. But by Spinoza’s view a 
culture cannot be independent of nature. Anything which 
can affect human behaviour must be explained in natural 
terms because there is nothing outside nature.  
Spinoza’s conception of substance is his conception 
of Nature as a whole. Its definition says that substance is 
its own cause and is to be conceived through itself, namely 
by nothing outside itself [Spinoza 1979 p.1, definitions I 
and III], implying that the laws of nature are not imposed 
by God on inert matter, as Spinoza's contemporaries, and 
even Newton, believed. These definitions say that the laws 
of nature express the internal dynamic force of material 
existence – which is the meaning of his equating God to 
Nature, and that every thing which comes into existence is 
a modification of substance, and its own internal forces 
must be understood in terms of the internal forces of 
Nature.  
In his Metaphysical Thoughts [Spinoza 1998 p.120] 
Spinoza argues that the essence of life should be 
understood as "the force through which things persevere in 
their own being." It is because this force can be 
conceptually distinguished from the things themselves, he 
explains, that the idea arose that things have life, namely 
souls, as if life was distinct from the living things 
themselves. In the Ethics he generalizes the idea to all 
structured things. All things, he says, behave so as to 
sustain their own survival [Spinoza, 1979 p.91 (proposition 
VI)].  
    Commenting on Descartes’ "I think therefore I 
am" Spinoza says that Descartes indeed discovered an 
essence of man. But this essential feature is part of the 
internal forces by which people persevere in their natural 
existence [Spinoza 1998 pp.9-10]. Spinoza explained the 
function of reason, as a corrective mechanism by which 
ideas are accepted or rejected by a balance of reasons, 
akin to the balance of forces in the body [Spinoza 1979 
p.255]. He explains the necessary inclusion of this 
mechanism in human nature as a result of his other 
explanation that the more a body can perceive and 
respond to many things at the same time, the more it 
depends on understanding [Spinoza 1979 p.48].  
This explanation is given in a note to proposition xiii 
in part II of the Ethics, which in a slightly different 
formulation says that an idea always reflects either an 
objective state of the human body or a certain mode of 
existence outside the body, and nothing else [Spinoza 
1979 p.47]. In order to understand this proposition we may 
start by noting that ‘ideas’ should be understood as 
including everything of which we are conscious. For 
example, feeling hungry is also an idea. The objective 
state, or as he says, the object of this idea, in the body is 
comparable to a biologist saying that this feeling is the set 
of processes in the body which produce it. A feeling is 
clearly not the same as these processes. But if it is what 
we are conscious of when certain changes occurs in the 
body, in terms of which feeling hungry is fully explained. In 
this sense we may talk of a reduction of this mental state 
to a physical one. However, according to Spinoza, this 
explanation is not complete because a feeling is 
categorized as a kind of pain – a general term describing 
transitional states of the body by which its power of action 
is reduced [Spinoza 1979, p.128 (definition III and the 
explanatory note)]. And it follows from his conception of 
life, that this feeling must be combined with a desire to 
restore the body to its natural capacities, which in this case 
means a desire to assuage the pain of hunger.  
While the objective state in the body underlying 
feeling hungry is a universal state reducible to biology, the 
actual behaviour for restoring the body to its natural 
capacities depends on the knowledge how to do it. Hence, 
the objects of the ideas constituting this knowledge are 
‘certain modes of extension actually existing’ outside the 
body. This knowledge cannot be universal. If it were 
universal to our species, it would have meant that 
perception of these objects outside the body together with, 
as he says, the amazing laws of nature that move the body 
without the mind’s interference, would have been sufficient 
for survival. And a theory of mind would be reducible to 
biology, even if environmental influence includes learning 
by imitating other animals of the same species. In this 
case, the ‘bottom-up’ principle might have been saved. 
The reason why this is not so for human beings is that the 
objects outside the body which affect behaviour are the 
behaviours of other people whose desire is to live 
according to their natural drives. 
Again, Spinoza’s naturalistic approach does not 
reject the assumption that the laws which govern a social 
structure emerge out of the properties of its elements, 
namely the properties of individual human beings. In the 
first chapter of his Political Treatise he says that his 
intention is to demonstrate that a sound political science 
can and ought to be based on what is known both of 
human nature and of political practice. This, according to 
him, agrees with other branches of science which verify or 
reject their theories by available evidence. What his study 
of human nature taught him is that passions are stronger 
motives of behaviour than reason. It follows that when 
people in power design rules for preserving the integrity of 
their community, they can never be free from the influence 
of their passions. Yet, he also learned that all people know 
that if they want to pursue their own plans of life they must 
surrender a great part of their power to the state [Spinoza 
1951 pp.296-297 (15-16)]. This knowledge, according to 
him, is not a result of using reason – as Hobbes argued at 
the time – but is an intuition, which stated in modern terms 
means innate knowledge, that we need each other’s help. 
People could not have discovered this essence of political 
life if they were not already living in societies [Spinoza 
1966 p.269]. This he says, applies to all knowledge of a 
true essence of a thing, even to mathematics. We would 
not be able to know the essential equation of a parabola, 
for example, without first knowing parabolas. And we know 
parabolas because they exist [Spinoza 1998, p.99].  
Spinoza explains that the basic political problem is 
not the imposition of law and order but the tendency of 
people in power to suppress the tendency of other people 
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to use reason, so that they passively accept these leaders’ 
ideas, as if they necessarily provide the best way to satisfy 
everybody’s desire to live according to their nature in 
peace and security [Spinoza 1951 pp.215-216 and 313-
315]. Spinoza’s intention with developing his political 
science was to show that the best way to satisfy this basic 
desire was to design civil laws which would encourage 
rationality and thereby prevent this behaviour of leaders. 
But my purpose in this paper is only to show that, at least 
when the study of the human mind is included in the 
scientific project, it is impossible to maintain that a 
structure has no effect on the structure of its elements. 
This is because, as Spinoza maintained, to say that 
something is natural does not mean that it cannot be 
distorted [Spinoza 1979 pp.139-140]. For example by the 
influence of the natural behaviour of leaders.  
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Did I Do It? – Yeah, You Did! 
Wittgenstein & Libet On Free Will 
René J. Campis C. / Carlos M. Muñoz S., Cali, Colombia 
1. Libet 
RP is a concept developed by neuroscience to give an 
account of intentional action. It is basically ‘brain electrical 
activity found to start increasing about 0,8 seconds before 
voluntary movement’ (Cf.: Kornhuber and Deecke 1965, 
Deecke et al. 1969 and Libet et al. 1983). Libet involves 
the concept in an experiment (fig. 1) attempting to estab-
lish a temporal distinction between the onset of RP and 
“conscious wish”. 
Libet’s main presupposition is: “If the moment of 
conscious intention preceded the onset of the RP, then the 
concept of conscious free will would be tenable: the early 
conscious mental state could initiate the subsequent neu-
ral preparation of movement.” (Haggard & Libet 2001, p. 
48). Since motor act is not a direct effect of conscious 
intention (CInt), but of an indirect one of cerebral potential 
for unconscious initiation of the action (RP) -he concludes, 
free will (FW) should be revised. 
On Libet’s viewpoint, intentional actions begin with 
RP followed by conscious intention. Libet did not register 
electrophysiological evidence of brain states associated 
with the content of W-judgments (verbal reports just at the 
moment of awareness of a choice –W-j) or, according to 
his analysis, with the “first awareness of wish to act” (Libet, 
1999, p. 49) –Libet registered the onset of CInt when W-j's 
was reported. 
Two types of data were used by Libet to arrive to his 
hypothesis, namely, introspective and electrophysiological; 
the former was constituted by W-j and M-judgments (ver-
bal reports just at the moment we think that our motor act 
begins), and the latter by EEG and EMG evidence (fig. 1). 
His conclusions both combine and depend on these 
sources of evidence. 
The study of FW from Libet’'s perspective requires 
to track causal estimations between two types of data: ‘if 
the moment of conscious intention followed the onset of 
the RP, then conscious FW cannot exist: a conscious men-
tal state must be a consequence of brain activity, rather 
than the cause of it’ (Haggard & Libet 2001, p. 48). We 
reject this approach to the explanation of human inten-
tional actions and FW. 
Libet's findings have led to a new model (fig. 2) that 
emerges from a causal approach in opposition to the clas-
sic model, where intentional action was supposed to be an 
indirect effect of CInt. 
 
After Libet’s rejection of the classic concept of FW, 
he posits that there is a “free won´t” (FWN), since an 
individual can stop the motor act before its completion –
overriding the RP and blocking the triggering of its 
associated action (Cf.: Libet 1985 and 2003). He claims 
that FW still stands since the subject's intentions are 
involved in his act of FWN as an act of intentional control. 
 
 
2. Wittgenstein 
It is hard to state what Wittgenstein would say about the 
above mentioned issues – it is difficult enough to summa-
rize what one could consider to be his actual stance on 
FW. The multiple opinions proposed by him in different 
occasions in respect to FW make it virtually impossible to 
draw clear conclusions, but there is some previous work in 
relation to this concept (remarkably, Hacker 1996, Vol. 4, 
part V). What then, comes out clear about will? Our first 
claim is that Wittgenstein –though being obscure on will 
himself- wasn´t all that wrong compared to the trap in 
which Libet falls into by rejecting the classic concept of FW 
based upon the temporal precedence of RP over the motor 
act. 
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Two concepts can be appreciated in his early works: 
«will as an act» and «will as a content of thought» (i.e. an 
idea). Such concepts reflect the terms of traditional discus-
sion in philosophy: “The will seems always to have to re-
late to an idea” (8/11/1916; also 11/6/1916) and “The act 
of the will is not the cause of the action but is the action 
itself” (id.). 
Wittgenstein claims that intention (after e.g., flexing 
your wrist) is properly the act of the will in itself, not merely 
a propositional attitude1. This analysis goes from behavior 
to thought (not inversely). However, Wittgenstein seems to 
accept that will begins with our desires and with our 
thought in general (Cf.: 21/7/1916); thus, will is not merely 
a cognitive condition for intentional actions, but also repre-
sents the possibility to assign specific contents to 
thoughts. In Wittgenstein´s words: “this is clear: [...] One 
cannot will without acting. If the will has to have an object 
in the world, the object can be the intended action itself. 
And the will does have to have an object.” (Wittgenstein, 
08.11.16). In this way, a human being lacking of will seems 
impossible (see Id.): “The will is an attitude of the subject 
to the world. The subject is the willing subject.” 
(4/11/1916). 
Traditionally, one is a free agent if one has inten-
tional actions -if one's actions depend on one's will. Two 
concepts are problematic here: ‘agent’ and ‘will’. We reject 
Libet's conclusions because they imply to mistakenly iden-
tify subjective choices as being equal to beliefs; for Libet, 
beliefs are not the cause of intentional actions, since the 
actual cause is the RP (a state over which the agent has 
not conscious control of). We claim that the concept of 
‘agent’ in Libet’s study is inadequate. For us, RP could 
mainly be related to prior fixation of the reference for our 
intentional actions and 'agent' to the relevant domain in the 
scrutiny of what we call 'efficient causal agent' (an agent 
that could be accurately accounted for as an actual causal 
relation avoiding domain confusions). 
3. RP Revisited 
3.1. Content Approach and Cognitive Path 
FW debate differs from that of free actions (vid. Tugendhat 
2006). The latter is about conditions of conscious inten-
tions and choices as a particular aspect of volition, while 
the former is about conditions of intentional actions i.e., 
actions made and consciously controlled by an agent 
(someone doing something). We shall focus now on cogni-
tive conditions of conscious intentions; in §4 we will focus 
on domain conditions of intentional actions. 
In the square-in-the-mirror example Wittgenstein 
posits that FW might be intrinsically related to the focus of 
attention (Cf.: 4/11/1916). Picking potential stimuli inten-
tionally plays a role in the individuation of an act of the will. 
This conception seems to derive from an intension-
ality-centred-perspective (ICP) for intentional actions –for 
which “What is the relevant mental content to perform in-
tentional actions?” is the main question. An ICP standpoint 
leads to a question: «What is the relevant mental content 
controlled by an agent while performing intentional ac-
tions?» 
From a naturalized view of cognition, we propose 
that focusing attention is a neurocognitive-process de-
                                                     
 
1 For will as a thought, see 14/7/1916. 
pending on an agent's intentions. Agents have control of 
this process; FW depends on our dispositions to selec-
tively choose contents of thought and to fixate intentions. 
Temporal precedence of RP over motor acts leads not to 
conclude that RP does not depend on attentional fixation; 
otherwise, RP is content-dependent and, therefore (in 
optimal conditions –excluding, say, hallucinations), con-
text-dependent. 
Once we have falsely discarded classic FW, we still 
would need to explain why we think about our actions as 
effects of our beliefs (why we fall in the “illusion of FW”. 
See Fig. 4). The resulting analysis is not that our intentions 
are completely isolated epiphenomenal facts, but our at-
tentional processes precede our intentions, and plausibly, 
our RPs. The contrary would depend on evidence of RP 
associated with the fixation of attention. 
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3.2 Ourselves: Agents 
You arrive to your neighbor´s house, knock on the door, he 
opens and welcomes you. Who do you think it was the one 
that opened the door? His brain? Is your neighbor a brain 
or a bunch-of-RPs? Do you actually greet his brain or, 
rather, a person? There is an apparent confusion between 
common understanding of FW and that of neuroscientific 
approaches. 
Paradox: for a radical monist –accepting physical 
world's causal closure-, brain processes are not uncon-
scious per se, but rather are part of a neurobiological flow 
that generates a physical event called conscious aware-
ness; for a phenomenist or an anti-reductionist, the type of 
relevant objects that give content to intentional actions are 
those that you know as a person –not as a brain: the door, 
the doorbell, your friend. Libet’s analysis is somewhere 
between these two domains. 
RP is not an agent, but a factor involved in motor 
acts of an agent. The tension arises when an apparently 
monist stance is mixed with the domain in which our con-
cept of will makes sense. 
An obstacle is the fact of the vagueness of tradi-
tional use of concepts such as 'will' and 'wish' and similar 
in German (for instance, 'wollen', 'möchten') and Spanish 
('querer', 'pretender'). Hacker 1996 speaks of “ambiguities 
that have characterized the efforts of philosophers to illu-
minate the nature of the will and of human action” and 
Bennett & Hacker 2005 draw a similar diagnosis in the 
case of some neuroscientific explanatory efforts. 
Hacker also points out that “philosophers have in-
vented a new use for the words 'will', 'want' and 'volition'.” 
Following Wittgenstein: “How is "will" actually used? In 
philosophy one is unaware of having invented a quite new 
use of the word, by assimilating its use to that of, e.g., the 
word "wish". It is interesting that one constructs certain 
uses of words especially for philosophy, wanting to claim a 
more elaborated use than they have, for words that seem 
important to us.” (RPP I §51). 
To bring meanings of terms from natural language 
to technical domains is a common habit. Such concepts 
begin to lose their initial meanings and uses and start to be 
wrapped by presuppositions of the new domains. Although 
common, it has not been proven as the best strategy since 
it seems to be a result of 'traditional anxiety for generality'. 
We do not need to track causal connections be-
tween a partial state of an agent (e.g. a belief) and his 
intentional action to destroy the concept of FW; what we 
need is to undo the causal connection between the agent 
–be it a whole of neurobiological states or a subject- and 
his intentional actions. Adopting Libet's approach, the con-
scious agent seems an epiphenomenal factor reduced to 
beliefs (registered as W-j) in the causal flow that generates 
motor act (see Hacker 1996, Id. §2). 
There are a lot of processes that biologically com-
pose an agent. The agent does not have control over most 
of them, but they are causally involved in its actions. One 
standpoint against FW lies in identifying an agent’s state 
isolated from the rest of the agent's mental states. This is 
not Libet’s path: neither he, nor others have demonstrated 
yet that RP is isolated from other brain states involving 
conscious content. 
In 1963 Walter turned electric brain states (EBS, 
perhaps RPs) into agents: he connected EBS recorders to 
the brains of subjects and these to a slide-viewer. Slides 
were changed by this efficient, but bizarre-electric-agent. 
In this experiment the efficient causal agent was not hu-
man and the subjects' conscious states seemed to be 
mere epiphenomenal facts, but we are not epiphenomenal 
states placed somewhere between electric-agents and 
actions. 
4. Conclusions 
Libet´s conclusions on FW represent an instance of 
mereological fallacy (vid. Bennett & Hacker 2005). The 
notion of agent is not the same in his works as the one 
relevant in the dispute for FW. Our (neuro)cognitive con-
jecture is that the processes that lead to fixating our atten-
tion are prior to the appearance of RP (Kornhuber & 
Deecke 1965); fixating our attention is an intentional activ-
ity, whereas RP is not such by definition –at least, further 
research is necessary to settle the dispute (e.g., Kilner et 
al. 2004). Reducing conscious intentions to W-j reports is 
also inappropriate. Subjective conscious choices and in-
tentional cognitive processes are not to be reduced to 
beliefs -though beliefs, intentions and desires have classi-
cally been considered as propositional attitudes with the 
same logical form-. Finally, a causal account based upon 
tracking temporal precedence between events pertaining 
to two sources of evidence is wrong; thus, an ICP seems 
to bring us to prudent conclusions –for empirical reference 
on a similar direction see Haggard & Eimer 1999. 
Again, we are not epiphenomenal states. Neither 
Libet, nor others have demonstrated that RP is isolated 
from other brain states involving conscious content. Phi-
losophers such as Wittgenstein have contributed with ele-
ments that neuroscientists are compelled to consider. Phi-
losophical hypothesis seem to give meta-theoretical feed-
back to scientific theories of mind and brain, despite the 
associated despise for them and the frantic and systematic 
ignorance derived from 'traditional anxiety for generality'. 
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Mental Causation and Physical Causation 
Lorenzo Casini, Canterbury, Kent, England, UK 
1. Introduction 
The recent debate between Antony and Kim on the nature 
of mental causation offers the possibility to evaluate the 
reason underlying two up-to-date physicalist positions: 
Kim’s Reductive Physicalism and Antony’s Non-Reductive 
Physicalism. Despite differences, both share a common 
metaphysical task. They look for a systematic account of 
the relations between the physical and the mental, which is 
needed, so they say, because higher-level properties can 
enter into ‘genuine’ laws only if they inherit the causal 
power of ontologically prior lower-level entities. This means 
that there could not be regularities concerning mental 
states without underlying physical mechanisms. In particu-
lar, only the physical mechanisms at work at the microlevel 
can secure and explain the truth of psychological generali-
sations. Only at the microlevel, Antony and Kim argue, we 
find the entities involved in ‘genuinely’ causal phenomena. 
I show that if the paradigmatic feature which the 
microphysical is to display is that it conforms to a particular 
model of causal production, as Kim explicitly suggests, this 
prevents Reductive- and Non-Reductive Physicalism to 
achieve their tasks. In fact, certain quantum mechanics’ 
phenomena cannot be described in terms of causal pro-
duction. If we accept a statistical-regularist approach to 
describe phenomena in the quantum domain, then quan-
tum mechanics and psychological phenomena are on a 
par with respect to their causal features. The physicalists, 
who claim the necessity to account for the mental in physi-
cal terms, is to clarify what peculiar feature microphysical 
mechanisms possess, and the mental is to inherit, for psy-
chological generalisations to be secured and explained. 
2. The Metaphysical Picture: Physicalism 
and Reductionism 
Both Antony and Kim conceive the world as layered, i.e., 
made of different levels organised in a hierarchical struc-
ture. The determining level, the physical bottom level, is 
ontologically prior to all the other higher levels, because its 
entities stand with those of the higher levels in a part-
whole relation, such as that which occurs between one 
oxygen and two hydrogen atoms and a H2O molecule. 
However, at each level there are properties which make 
their first appearance at that level. For instance, properties 
like density or viscosity of H2O molecules were not present 
at the lower level of their atomic constituents. In particular, 
(i) the entities of psychology, such as sensations and pro-
positional attitudes, are nothing over physical complexes, 
such as patterns of neurons; (ii) each mental property 
(e.g.: a toothache, the belief that ‘the water is wet’, etc.) is 
a property of some physical entity or system of physical 
entities (e.g.: an underlying pattern of neurons). The ques-
tion, then, is: How can mental properties have the causal 
power they have in a world ultimately constituted by physi-
cal entities and mechanisms? 
Antony’s and Kim’s answers, however, are different. 
The former does, whereas the latter does not, accept that 
systems of lower-level entities can acquire mental proper-
ties, i.e., mental causal powers, which are emergent from 
the lower base, and non-ontologically-reducible to it. For 
Kim and Antony, a property at a given level is emergent, iff 
non-ontologically-reducible to the lower-level property it 
emerges from. For Antony, the properties of the psycho-
logical domain are like H2O with respect to its atomic 
constituents. This would legitimate the autonomy of psy-
chology, whose properties must inherit their causal power 
from lower-level physical entities but are not to be reduci-
ble to the properties of these entities, on pain of identifying 
psychology with branches of physics. In order to meet 
these desiderata, she wants reductive explanation without 
ontological reduction. In contrast, Kim claims that psycho-
logical properties do not constitute a proper scientific do-
main, given that they can be ontologically reduced to 
physical properties. In fact, so he reasons, they are not, 
strictly speaking, emergent as H2O is, insofar as they apply 
to precisely the same objects as do their realiser proper-
ties—i.e., mental properties and their realisations are 
properties of entities at the same level, and have the same 
causal powers (Kim 1998, 82-3). The difference between 
their positions depends on whether or not multiple realis-
ability (MR) holds. According to MR, each mental property 
can be realised by many distinct physical properties—
therefore is not identical to any of them. If MR is true, then 
no reduction is possible, and psychology is autonomous 
(Antony 2007, 154-5). 
Kim does not accept the idea that there is in princi-
ple an indefinite number of realisers among the individuals 
of the same species or structure type. That is, he chal-
lenges the truth of MR, and claims that a structure-specific 
reduction is—in principle—possible, granted that the 
physical realisers the psychological properties are reduced 
to are sufficiently similar to one another (Kim 1993, 89, 
313). Mental properties can be identified with physical 
properties which play the same causal role—for each men-
tal property there is also a physical property which is nec-
essary and sufficient for the mental property to arise, given 
that they are, in fact, one and the same (Kim 2006, 280). 
Mental terms which stand for disjunctions of different 
physical properties, instead, have no ontological corre-
lates—therefore no scientific value (Kim 1993, 334-5). As a 
consequence of reduction, psychology loses its proper 
subject matter, and together its autonomy. 
For Antony, in contrast, ontological reduction is im-
possible because of MR. In order to vindicate mental cau-
sation as mental and justify the autonomy of psychology, 
whilst consistently holding that the physical is ontologically 
prior, she advocates the possibility—in principle—of a 
reductive explanation of every mental property in terms of 
physical properties, such that some physical property is 
sufficient but not necessary for a mental property to 
emerge. Mental properties are properties of some physical 
system or other—therefore ontologically acceptable, and 
proper scientific kinds, because they enter into realisation-
independent regularities, i.e., regularities which do not 
depend necessarily on one specific physical property (An-
tony, Levine 1997, 92-4). 
 
3. Back to Basics 
I do not explain the differences between Kim’s model for 
ontological reduction and Antony’s model for reductive 
explanation. Instead, I stress a fundamental similarity be-
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tween the two approaches. The task of both Antony’s and 
Kim’s metaphysical projects is “back to basics”. 
For Antony, reductive explanation of psychological 
regularities in terms of basic physical entities and 
mechanisms constitutes the necessary metaphysical 
condition for an explanation to be true. We need ‘a 
systematic account of mental phenomena in terms of 
physical microstructures’ (Antony, Levine 1997, 94-ff.). 
Although—for Antony—there are regularities that cannot 
be apprehended at more basic levels of descriptions, such 
as those of psychology, these ‘entail the existence of some 
ultimately physical mechanism’, ‘a pattern of lower-level 
events that guarantees, contingent on features of the 
background, the emergence of some higher level 
regularity’ (Antony 1995, 441). 
The same holds for Kim. In fact, whether or not 
reduction succeeds depends on the possibility to identify at 
least the sufficient condition for the higher-level property to 
inherit its causal power from its lower-level realiser, in 
order for higher-level generalisations to be linked with 
“real” entities and mechanisms: ‘The psychological 
capacities and mechanisms posited by a true 
psychological theory must be real [italics mine], and the 
only reality to which we can appeal in this context seems 
to be physical reality’ (Kim 2006, 161). Macrocausation, 
i.e. causation at any higher level, can be proved to be 
“real” only if systematically linked to microcausation, i.e., 
the causation at work at the bottom physical level, out of 
which it emerges (Kim 1993, 100). 
For both Antony and Kim the real causal job is only 
done by “real” entities, i.e., entities which belong to the 
ultimate ontology of the layered world. Any higher-level 
observed regularity is maintained by some “genuinely 
causal” interaction between ontologically prior physical 
entities. Thus, mental laws describing these regularities 
have explanatory force only if linked to microphysical 
causal mechanisms. Some interesting questions arise. 
First: What is the “genuine” feature of the mechanisms at 
the microlevel which guarantees the truth of explanations 
at higher levels? Secondly: What are the “real” entities 
involved in these mechanisms? 
Antony claims that a ‘physical model of causation’ is 
to be applied to mental events (Antony, Levine 1997, 102), 
but, regrettably, she does not go much further. It is clear, 
however, that this model of physical causation is neither 
regularity-based nor counterfactuals-based, insofar as 
these are exactly the kinds of causation—holding for the 
mental—that she is not satisfied with. 
Kim shares the same perplexities but he is much 
more explicit (Kim 1998, 45, 71; Kim 2007, 230-5). The 
problem of mental causation cannot be resolved by 
invoking a regularist-nomological or a counterfactual-
dependence approach to causation, real causation being 
“production”, or generation. What Kim means by model of 
causal production is something close to a Salmon-Dowe 
conservative quantity theory of physical causation (CQ) 
(Kim 2007, 240 n.13; Dowe 1992; Salmon 1994). Kim’s 
reasons for preferring this kind of causation are that only 
the notion of causal production (i) permits the distinction 
between real causal processes and pseudo-processes—
i.e., processes generating accidental, non-lawlike, 
regularities, rendering dispensable the use of nomological- 
and counterfactuals-based regularities (Kim 1993, 93-ff.; 
Kim 1998, 45; Kim 2007, 231) and (ii) has the 
characteristic of locality, for which ‘causes are connected 
to their effects via spatiotemporally continuous sequences 
of intermediaries’—i.e., generate their effects via 
processes which propagate in spacetime along a 
continuous trajectory (Hall 2004, 225; Kim 2007, 235). As 
Kim puts it, human agency, i.e., the capacity to perform 
actions in the physical world on account of beliefs, desires, 
etc, ‘requires the productive/generative conception of 
causation’ (Kim 2007, 236). Thus, mental causation can be 
secured and explained only by backing psychological 
regularities to causally productive mechanisms. 
4. The ‘reality’ of microcausation 
Unfortunately, there are strong reasons to doubt that pro-
duction can do the job. In fact, this model does not apply to 
those phenomena where action-at-a-distance seems to 
occur (Hall 2004, 226, Salmon 1984, 210, 242-59; Salmon 
1998, 23, 224, ch. 16). In fact, there are quantistic phe-
nomena, where no continuous spatiotemporal process can 
be identified, such as the well-known problem of EPR 
causal anomaly—it takes the name of Einstein, Podolsky, 
and Rosen, who formulated it in 1935, charging quantum 
mechanics of incompleteness. Consider a quantum system 
consisting in an atom of positronium—a positron (positive 
electron) and a negative electron orbiting about one an-
other. The system’s total intrinsic angular momentum, or 
spin, is zero. Let the particles be separated from one an-
other without affecting the angular momentum of the total 
system or of either parts. The EPR problem is that a 
measurement performed upon the positron seems to influ-
ence the physical state of the electron, even if there is no 
physical interaction between the two at the time of the 
measurement. The enigma is how the remote parts of the 
system can react instantaneously, i.e., without the medium 
of a causal process in spacetime, to a local interaction with 
one of the parts. This is the ground for Einstein’s opposi-
tion to quantum mechanics: either quantum mechanics is 
incomplete—i.e., there are “hidden variables” explaining 
the phenomenon, or the relationship between momentum 
and position is “non-real” (Mehra 1974, 70-1). However, no 
later studies have discovered the presence of hidden vari-
ables and dissolved the problem. As Salmon himself ad-
mits, a single consistent description that explains what 
happens in terms of spatiotemporally continuous causal 
processes and local causal interactions cannot be given 
for the quantum domain (Salmon 1984, 245). 
Quantistic phenomena are currently considered 
genuinely and irreducibly stochastic. Obviously, this does 
not exclude that quantistic laws are incorrect, or that 
quanta are not the ultimate microparticles, but I do not see 
how it can suggest that causal production is at work at the 
microlevel. Interestingly enough, Kim’s desideratum of 
locality, as a continuous sequence of causal intermediaries 
in spacetime, cannot be met exactly with reference to 
mechanisms involving the physical entities of the 
microlevel. Appeals to regularities or counterfactuals are 
not dispensable at the microlevel. Does this mean that we 
have to deny the ‘reality’ of the phenomena of quantum 
mechanisms and treat them as pseudo-processes? Or can 
we be content with a causal explanation in terms of 
statistical correlations, i.e., a regularist approach? 
Notice that Kim (2007, 232) concedes that only 
regularities and Humean “constant conjunctions” may be 
present at the microlevel. For him, this means either that (i) 
‘it makes no sense to speak of “underlying” mechanisms, 
or “real” causal processes at a lower level’, or that (ii), 
‘although only “constant conjunctions”, but no causation, 
exist at the fundamental level […], causal relations can, 
and do, exist (or “emerge”) at higher levels’. 
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But the problem is not evaded: (i) if we accept 
microlevel regularities as having a real—yet non-
productive—causal role, why should we still hold that the 
possibility of mental causation rests necessarily on that of 
reduction? In fact, reducing and reduced phenomena do 
not differ with respect to the “genuinity” of their causal 
features; (ii) if we claim that real causation exists or 
emerges only at higher levels, why is reduction of mental 
phenomena to microphysical phenomena necessary, given 
that the microworld lacks the essential feature which 
secures and explains mental causation? To say that 
causal relations emerge at higher levels does not help, 
once entities and features of the microworld are taken as 
paradigmatic and ontologically prior. 
Far from regarding only Kim, the problem regards 
Antony too. As mentioned, she fails to specify what she 
means by physical causation. Nonetheless, she claims that 
a physical model of causation is to be applied to mental 
events. If by physical causation she means production, the 
same objections against Kim hold. If she means something 
different, mental causation is not different from, and no 
more genuine than, microphysical causation. 
5. Conclusion 
The reason underlying Kim’s Reductive Physicalism and 
Antony’s Non-Reductive Physicalism is that only the 
mechanisms at work at the microlevel can secure and 
explain the truth of psychological generalisations. I have 
shown that, if the supposed feature that these 
mechanisms should have, and that mental ones inherit 
from them, is that they conform to a CQ model of causal 
production, then psychological and microphysical laws are 
on a par with respect to their causal features. In fact, there 
are microphenomena not explainable in terms of 
continuous sequences of causal intermediaries in 
spacetime, as the CQ model requires. 
Antony and Kim have gone to great effort to con-
vince us that—the possibility in principle of—a systematic 
link between mental properties and regularities and physi-
cal entities and mechanisms is necessary, because only 
the latter, so they argue, can secure and explain the truth 
of the explanations given by means of the former. But they 
do not put the same effort in telling us on what features of 
the microlevel, which the mental level lacks, the truth of 
our psychological generalisations depends. I would urge 
them to specify what it is that distinguishes physical 
mechanisms from mental regularities, and renders the 
former the secure basis for the latter, in order to convince 
us about the necessity of their enterprises, whether 
explanatorily or ontologically reductive. 
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On Two Recent Defenses of The Simple Conditional Analysis of 
Disposition-Ascriptions 
Kai-Yuan Cheng, Chia-Yi, Taiwan 
I. Introduction 
A wide variety of reductionist projects in philosophy ap-
peals to dispositions to do the work. Dispositional analyzes 
can be found in the areas of inquiry on mental states 
(Ryle, 1949), meaning (Kripke, 1982; Quine 1960), colors 
(McGinn, 1983), values (Lewis, 1989), goodness (Smith, 
1994), properties (Shoemaker, 1980), and so on. That the 
dispositional explanatory strategy is broadly adopted by 
reductionists is not hard to explain. A traditional view, 
which is rooted in empiricism (see Bricke, 1975) and con-
tinues to be shared by contemporary philosophers, such 
as Carnap (1936), Goodman (1955), Quine (1960), Mackie 
(1973), Prior (1985), and many others, analyzes a disposi-
tion-ascription “x has D” in terms of a simple counterfactual 
conditional “If x were p, x would q”, which mentions only a 
pair of possible events. If this analysis were correct, dispo-
sitional properties would be themselves reduced to mere 
possibilities of events, and thus rendered ideal to figure in 
reductive accounts of other properties regarded as capti-
vating and problematic. 
Things are not so straightforward, however. 
Counterexamples to the simple conditional analysis have 
been offered by Martin (1994), Smith (1977), Johnston 
(1992), and Bird (1998), and are extensively considered as 
decisive in refuting the analysis in question. The nature of 
dispositions is consequently not as simple as the 
conditional analysis seems to suggest. Viewing a 
disposition as a robust property and not merely as possible 
events is an expected result. However, exactly how to 
characterize it has become a major challenge and focus of 
heated debates for contemporary metaphysicians (e.g., 
Armstrong, Martin, & Place, 1996; Mumford, 1998; etc.). 
Against this realist trend, recently two philosophers 
stand out—Choi (2006) and Gundersen (2002)—in 
defending the simple conditional analysis of dispositions 
(see Fara, 2006). They make a glaring claim that various 
counterexamples fail to refute the simple conditional 
analysis. Their attempts to reduce disposition-ascriptions 
to conditionals, if successful, would lead to “the ontological 
consequence that there are no dispositions qua properties” 
(Mumford, 1998). Given the significance of this issue, the 
aim of this paper is to examine whether these two 
philosophers succeed in their attempts. I shall argue that 
they do not, and show that each founders on a similar 
ground. Below I will begin with a brief review of the 
counterexamples raised by Martin and Bird, to which Choi 
and Gundersen have aimed at responding. 
II. Counterexamples to A Simple  
Conditional Analysis by Martin and Bird 
According to a simple conditional analysis, a disposition-
ascription is analyzed into a counterfactual conditional. 
Take fragility for example. A simple conditional analysis 
has it that DA iff CC: 
 
DA. Something x is fragile at time t. 
CC. If x were to be struck at t, then it would break. 
Martin (1994) considers a pair of cases with an ex-
ample to show that this bi-conditional analysis fails in both 
directions. To use a variant of Martin’s (1994) electro-fink 
example, imagine that a sorcerer brings about an effect on 
a glass in the following two ways (this case is due to 
Lewis, 1997): i) as soon as a fragile glass is about to be 
struck, the sorcerer protects the glass from breaking by 
instantaneously casting a spell that renders the glass no 
longer fragile; ii) as soon as a non-fragile glass is about to 
be struck, the sorcerer renders it fragile and causes it to 
break when struck. In case i), DA is true, but CC is false. 
This means that CC is not necessary for DA. In case ii), 
DA is false while CC is true. This means that CC is not 
sufficient for DA. As a result, disposition-ascription is not 
logically equivalent to a conditional. Martin infers from this 
result that dispositions qua real properties cannot be re-
ductively explained by conditionals. 
Lewis (1997) takes Martin’s (1994) refutation of SCA 
as decisive, but maintains that a conditional analysis can 
be remedied by refining it as follows: 
 
RCA. Something x is disposed at time t to give re-
sponse r to stimulus s iff, for some intrinsic property B 
that x has at t, for some time t' after t, if x were to 
undergo stimulus s at time t and retain property B 
until t', s and x’s having of B would jointly be an  
x-complete cause of x’s giving response r. 
where an x-complete cause is “a cause complete in so far 
as havings of properties intrinsic to x are concerned, 
though perhaps omitting some events extrinsic to x” 
(Lewis, 1997, p. 149). Lewis’s proposal consists of two 
main ideas: 1) to have a disposition is to have some intrin-
sic property that serves as the causal basis of giving re-
sponse r upon receiving stimulus s; 2) the clause of retain-
ing the intrinsic property B during the time lag between t 
and t’ can deal with Martin’s counterexample. 
It is worth noting that Lewis does not seem to apply 
RCA directly to deal with Martin’s counterexample. Choi 
(2006, p. 370) brings our attention to Lewis’s taking two 
different steps in coming up with an analysis of a disposi-
tion-ascription (1997, p. 142-146). The first step is to put 
an ordinary disposition-ascription such as DA into an 
“overly dispositional locution” by specifying the stimulus 
and the response of fragility as follows: 
 
ODL. Something x is fragile at time t iff x has the 
disposition at t to give the response of breaking to 
the stimulus of being struck. 
The second step is to apply RCA to ODL to yield the fol-
lowing analysis of fragility: 
 
RCA*. Something x is fragile at time t iff, for some 
intrinsic property B that x has at t, for some time t' 
after t, if x were to be struck at time t and retain 
property B until t', x’s being struck and x’s having of 
B would jointly be an x-complete cause of x’s giving 
response r. (c.f. Choi, 2006, p. 371) 
Noting this two-step procedure inherent in Lewis’s analysis 
is crucial to our subsequent discussion and evaluation of 
Choi’s own position. 
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RCA* handles Martin’s counterexample nicely. It 
correctly dictates that a glass would be attributed with fra-
gility, if it were to retain the intrinsic property when struck. 
The analysis also justly predicts that a glass would not be 
ascribed fragility in the second case. This is because if the 
glass were to retain the intrinsic property between t and t’, 
that property would be causally irrelevant to breaking the 
glass; what causes the glass to break in this case is some 
extrinsic factor, i.e., the sorcerer. 
Bird (1998) argues, however, that Lewis’s analysis 
remains a failure, given the cases of antidotes. An antidote 
is defined by Bird as “something which, when applied be-
fore t’, has the effect of breaking the causal chain leading 
to r, so that r does not in fact occur” (1998: p. 228). An 
example of an antidote is a physical device that absorbs 
the shock waves of a glass when struck. Consequently, 
the glass retains its fragility at t’ but does not break when 
dropped, thanks to the device. In this case, the analysan-
dum on the left-hand-side of RCA* is met, but the analy-
sans on the right-hand-side of RCA* is not fulfilled. This 
means that a conditional is not necessary for a disposition-
ascription. Another counterexample that works in a con-
verse order is offered by Lewis himself (1997, p. 145-146). 
A styrofoam S is not fragile. But as soon as the Hater of 
Styrofoam hears the distinctive sound made by S when 
struck comes and tears S apart by brute force. In this case, 
the analysans is true: it is clear that if S were to be struck 
and retained its intrinsic property B, the striking and B 
would jointly be an S-complete cause of S’s breaking. 
However, the analysandum is false: S is plainly not fragile. 
This is a case of mimickers. It shows that a conditional is 
not sufficient for a disposition-ascription. Lewis’s RCA* 
thus has to be rejected by the two counterexamples (see 
Johnston, 1992, for making similar points). 
III. Choi’s Two-Step Approach 
Choi’s (2006) defense of the simple conditional analysis of 
disposition-ascriptions is taken through an indirect route. 
He first argues that Lewis’s two step procedure can be 
suitably exploited to restore Lewis’s own reformed condi-
tional analysis from the antidotes and mimickers counter-
examples. He then shows that the same approach can be 
adopted to develop a plausible simple conditional analysis 
which can equally defeat all the relevant counterexamples 
including Martin’s fink cases. Consequently, Lewis’s origi-
nal motivation for advocating a reformed conditional analy-
sis is invalidated. Moreover, given that the simple condi-
tional analysis is ontologically more economic, with no 
commitment to construing a disposition as an intrinsic 
property, the simple version should be preferred to the 
reformed version. I shall argue that despite Choi’s illumi-
nating discussion and intriguing suggestion, the two step 
approach does not escape a basic problem which Martin 
raises for the simple conditional analysis. 
To see how the two step approach works, first con-
sider how Lewis himself deals with the Hater of Styrofoam 
case. Lewis maintains that S obviously does not qualify as 
a fragile object, because its breaking does not go through 
a certain direct and standard process (1997, p. 145). Lewis 
suggests that ODL be revised by adding this constraint to 
the specification of the manifestation of S, which is the first 
step of the analysis. The second step is to apply RCA, 
which is kept intact, to this revised form of ODL. The result 
will be a new analysis which dictates that S is not fragile, 
since S goes through an indirect and non-standard proc-
ess of manifestation which renders the conditional on the 
right-hand-side of the bi-conditional analysis false. 
Choi’s innovating idea is to adopt a similar method 
to treat the presence of fragility-antidotes as a non-
standard stimulus condition, which a plausible ODL had 
better exclude in its formulation. Generalizing these two 
counterexamples, the Styrofoam and antidote cases, Choi 
(2006, p. 373) proposes that the following two steps be 
taken. The first step is to revise ODL: 
 
ODL'. Something x is fragile at time t iff x has the 
disposition at t to exhibit a fragility-specific manifes-
tation in response to a fragility-specific stimulus, 
where a fragility-specific stimulus includes x’s being struck 
in the absence of antidotes to fragility, and a fragility-
specific manifestation includes x’s breaking through a cer-
tain direct and standard process. The second step is to 
apply RCA to ODL' to produce a new analysis of fragility: 
 
RCA**. Something x is fragile at time t iff, for some 
intrinsic property B that x has at t, for some time t' 
after t, if x were to undergo a fragility-specific stimu-
lus at time t and retain property B until t', s and x’s 
having of B would jointly be an x-complete cause of 
x’s exhibiting a fragility-specific manifestation. 
RCA** can thus well handle the Styroform and antidote 
counterexamples. 
Choi (2006, p. 374) then makes a crucial claim that 
the same two-step strategy can be adopted to restore the 
simple conditional analysis of the following form: 
 
SCA. Something x has the disposition at time t to 
give response r to stimulus s iff, if x were to undergo 
s at time t, it would give response r. 
The procedure is to take the first step of adopting the re-
vised ODL' instead of ODL, and then take the second step 
of applying SCA to ODL' to imply a new analysis of fragil-
ity: 
 
SCA*. Something x is fragile at time t iff, if x were to 
undergo a fragility-specific stimulus at t, it would ex-
hibit a fragility-specific manifestation.  
SCA* can overcome the Styrofoam and antidote cases. 
For the Styrofoam S would not break when struck in the 
absence of fragility-mimickers, and hence would be cor-
rectly classified as non-fragile. The glass would break 
when struck in the absence of fragility-antidotes, and 
hence would be qualified as fragile. Choi also quite com-
pellingly shows that SCA* can handle Martin’s fink cases, if 
the specification of ODL' in the first step of the analysis 
suitably includes the absence of finks like the sorcerer 
(2006, p. 375-376). Given that SCA* can counteract all the 
counterexamples as well as RCA** does, without having to 
introduce an intrinsic property B as x’s causal basis in its 
formulation, Choi concludes that the simple conditional 
analysis is superior to Lewis’s reformed conditional analy-
sis, under the framework of the two step approach. 
The problem that Choi’s two step approach to re-
storing the simple conditional analysis faces seems to be 
this. The key to dealing with counterexamples in this 
analysis is to focus on the first step, by formulating an 
ordinary disposition-ascription into an overtly disposition 
locution in such a way that it excludes certain factors which 
might causally interfere with the typical manifesting proc-
ess in response to a typical stimulus. For example, when 
specifying a fragility-specific stimulus, the analysis includes 
the absence of fragility-finks, fragility-antidotes, fragility-
mimickers, and relevant others. For this formulation to 
work, however, it has to specify a full list of factors which 
are relevant to bringing about counterexamples to the 
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analysis. How to provide such a list is, as Choi himself 
acknowledges, “a nontrivial and indeed hard problem” 
(2006, p. 377). What seems to be worse is that it is hard to 
see how this task could be done without having to presup-
pose the very dispositional concept fragility, or even invok-
ing the concept itself. Doesn’t the concept of fragility, when 
put into an overtly dispositional locution, simply becomes 
one “which nothing prevents it from being fragile”? This 
would be strikingly circular. 
The difficulty involved here is, in my view, not differ-
ent from the problem for proponents of the original simple 
conditional analysis who try to handle the fink cases by 
adding a ceteris paribus clause to the antecedent of the 
conditional. The trick is to enable us to treat the presence 
of finks as a condition where other things are not being 
equal, and thus allow us to legitimately exclude the fink 
counterexamples to the conditional analysis. As Martin 
(1994, p. 5-6) convincingly points out, however, the idea of 
introducing the ceteris paribus clause is to include the set 
of all the events which would bring about the same effects 
as finks, and this simply amounts to stating that nothing 
happens to make it false that the disposition in question is 
in place. This modified simple conditional analysis is bla-
tantly circular. It seems to me that the simple conditional 
analysis in Choi’s two-step approach merely transfers the 
circularity problem from the level of a conditional (in the 
second step) to the level of formulating an overtly disposi-
tional locution (in the first step), without making a genuine 
progress over the original version discussed by Martin. 
IV. Gundersen’s Appeal to Standard  
Conditions in Subjunctive Conditionals 
The basic objection to the simple conditional analysis SCA 
relies on an intuitive and gripping picture of the world, 
which is nicely expressed by Bird (2000, p. 229) as follows: 
 
Some object might possess a disposition, and con-
tinue to have it, and also receive the appropriate 
stimulus, yet fail to yield the manifestation. 
Bird’s explanation of this widespread phenomenon is also 
a natural one: antidotes (might) exist and interfere with the 
causal process leading to the manifestation of a disposi-
tion. Gundersen (2002) examines several ways of constru-
ing and defending Bird’s antidote counterexamples to 
SCA, and argues that none of them works. Below I shall 
focus on one of these lines of argument, and show why I 
think Gundersen does not make a compelling case for the 
defense of SCA. 
Gundersen first points out that Bird’s antidote coun-
terexamples can be given a modalized reading, as sug-
gested by Bird’s own expressions: 
 
The state of the world we are interested in is one 
described, albeit incompletely, in my illustrative 
story. It is one that includes among other things the 
context of the boron rods being lowered and the 
presence of the relevant stimulus for [the pile’s dis-
position to chain react]. I shall call this state w. It is 
sufficient for a counter-example to the conditional 
analysis to show that w is possible, where it is the 
case that in w, [Fx] is true and m is false. It is 
agreed that in w, [Fx] and [- m if the boron rods are 
lowered]. Since, as just remarked, w includes the 
context [of the boron rods being lowered], it follows 
that in w, [- m]. (Bird, 2000, p. 232; c.f. Gundersen, 
2002, p. 400) 
In Gundersen’s understanding, Bird regards a disposition 
as an intrinsic property, which renders the analysandum (a 
disposition-ascription) of SCA true in whatever context the 
disposition is (or might be) in, and is also simultaneously 
committed to an ultra-contextualism, according to which 
the mere possibility of a world state w renders the analy-
sans (a subjunctive conditional) of SCA false.  
Gundersen then maintains that an ultra-
contextualism regarding subjunctive conditionals is unten-
able. The reason is that it amounts to the thesis that a 
super-causal link exists between stimulation and manifes-
tation; put differently, it gives us an understanding of sub-
junctive conditional in terms of strict entailment where the 
consequent is true in every possible world in which the 
antecedent is true. Gundersen contends that this is a the-
sis too strong and unreasonable to be accepted, stating 
that “no one believes an object has a certain dispositional 
property if and only if the characteristic manifestation must 
be displayed whenever stimuli conditions obtain” (2002, p. 
401). Gundersen claims that SCA is as good as it stands, 
and what needs to be discarded is the following modalized 
version of SCA: 
 
SCAm. Necessarily, something x has the disposition 
at time t to give response r to stimulus s Iff, if x were 
to undergo s at time t, it would give response r.  
(c.f. Gundersen, 2002, p. 401) 
Gundersen thus seems to suggest that SCA holds, even 
given counterexamples such as those raised by Bird. This 
means that Gundersen must think that there are certain 
cases, cases that do not include counterexamples, in 
which a subjunctive conditional in SCA is rendered true. 
What then are those cases? 
Gundersen has an answer to the above query. It 
goes as follows (2002, p. 402): 
 
… subjunctive claims only require for their truth a 
causal link which typically associates them in stan-
dard, or better, sufficiently nearby environments. 
We may continue to ask: What are those environments, 
which are deemed standard, or sufficiently nearby, in 
which subjunctive claims are rendered true? To this ques-
tion, Gundersen admits that “that surely is a hard ques-
tion”, but insists that subjunctive semantics depends on an 
implicit acknowledgement of such standard conditions” 
(2002, p. 402). Gundersen claims that the standard in 
question is objective, which serves as the ground for our 
making subjunctive claims. Nonetheless, Gundersen ap-
pears to leave such a standard unspecified. 
This is highly unsatisfactory. In a simple conditional 
analysis, we rely on a subjunctive conditional to inform us 
whether a disposition-ascription is true. In the version 
recommended by Gundersen, it is a subjunctive 
conditional under standard conditions that fulfills this task. 
However, we are not provided with any explicit 
specification of what those standard conditions are or any 
method of how to identify them. We are then on no sound 
ground to determine whether a disposition-ascription is 
true or not. In other words, the simple conditional analysis 
faces a dilemma. On one horn, it lacks a clear specification 
of the standard conditions in question, and hence renders 
a subjunctive conditional of SCA vague and undetermined 
in its truth-value. On another horn, to specify it would risk 
presupposing the disposition under inquiry, and hence 
renders the analysis circular. Either horn of the dilemma 
seems to render Gundersen’s defense of the simple 
conditional analysis futile. 
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V. Conclusion 
The simple conditional analysis of disposition-ascriptions is 
well motivated, given its implication for shedding light on 
the ontology of dispositions and for the prospects of reduc-
tionist projects in a wide variety of philosophical inquiries. 
However, some basic difficulties seem to persistently 
plague any attempts to advocate such an analysis. The 
difficulties in question have to do with how the analysis 
handles counterexamples to it. Either some phrase like the 
ceteris paribus clause has to be added to the antecedent 
of a conditional in the analysis, which is notoriously vague, 
or the phrase has to be specified clearly, which ends up 
unavoidably circular. 
Choi and Gundersen seem to run into similar diffi-
culties in each of their sophisticated defenses of the simple 
conditional analysis. Choi’s two-step approach separates 
the task of formulating a disposition-ascription into an 
overtly dispositional locution from that of giving the disposi-
tional locution a conditional analysis. The hope is to keep 
the conditional analysis intact, while let the formulation in 
the first step do the trick of dealing with counterexamples. 
It turns out that the formulation is either incomplete, or 
circular when further specified. This leaves the analysis as 
a whole deeply problematic. Gundersen, on the other 
hand, holds that counterexamples do not refute a subjunc-
tive conditional, because there is an objective standard 
which determines when the causal link between manifesta-
tion and stimulus specified by the conditional obtains. 
Such a standard, however, is merely left unspecified. It 
remains a daunting challenge to give a substantial specifi-
cation of the standard in question without rendering the 
analysis circular. In conclusion, it appears that the pros-
pects of restoring the simple conditional analysis are dim. 
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Queen Victoria’s Dying Thoughts 
Timothy William Child, Oxford, England, UK 
In a number of passages, Wittgenstein suggests that we 
can make perfectly good sense of ascriptions of thoughts 
that we have no means of verifying: thoughts that not only 
are not but could not be manifested in behaviour. For 
example: 
 
Lytton Strachey writes that as Queen Victoria lay 
dying she ‘may have thought of’, say, her mother’s 
youth, her own youth, Prince Albert in a Grenadier’s 
uniform (LPP 274. See also LPP 32-3, 99, 152, 229; 
RPP i 366). 
We clearly understand Strachey’s speculation. But it 
seems perfectly possible not only that Queen Victoria did 
not report her dying thoughts but that she could not have 
done so. And in that case, we cannot make sense of 
claims about her dying thoughts in terms of what she was 
disposed to report thinking; she had no such disposition. 
So how do we understand what Strachey says?  
One idea would be to appeal to counterfactuals: if 
Queen Victoria had been able and willing to report what 
she was thinking, she would have reported thinking such-
and-such. But Wittgenstein takes a different line. We learn 
‘She thought X’, he thinks, in cases where people say what 
they thought, and where the question what they thought 
has some practical importance. But with our understanding 
secure in those basic cases, we can go on to apply the 
same words to cases where there is no possibility of verifi-
cation, and where no practical consequences attach to 
someone’s having thought one thing or another. Thus:  
 
We understand ‘He thought X but would not admit 
it’, but we get the use of ‘He thought X’ from ‘He 
admits X’, i.e. says X, writes in his diary X, acts in 
an X-like way . . . Thinking and not admitting comes 
in only after thinking and admitting. It’s an excep-
tion-concept. You’d have to explain to someone 
who did not know what ‘thinking and not admitting’ 
was in terms of thinking and admitting (LPP 329). 
In Wittgenstein’s view, then, a central role is played, 
in determining the content of the concept of thought, by 
cases in which someone’s thoughts are manifest in their 
words or actions. That is a particular case of a more gen-
eral principle: that a central role is played in determining 
the content of a concept by cases in which the concept is 
manifestly instantiated. That principle does not apply to 
every concept. The content of a highly theoretical concept, 
for instance, is determined by the theory in which it ap-
pears, not by cases where it is manifestly instantiated. 
Similarly for concepts that can be analyzed in terms of 
descriptive conditions. But it is very plausible that there are 
some cases where the principle does apply.  
Colour concepts are an obvious example. Cases 
where something is manifestly red, where it is observed to 
be red, have a crucial role in determining the content of the 
concept red. But the concept red also applies to things that 
are not observed to be red, and to things that in some 
reasonably strong sense could not be observed to be red: 
things that can only exist in conditions where human life is 
impossible, and so on. How should we understand the 
application of the concept in those cases? One idea is to 
appeal to counterfactuals: for an unobserved object to be 
red is for it to be true that, if it were observed by a suitable 
observer in suitable conditions, it would look red. That 
proposal might work in explaining how we understand 
applications of the concept red to objects that merely are 
not observed. But it is hard to see how it could work for the 
case of an object that could not be observed to be red. Yet 
we do seem able to make sense of the thought that such 
an object is red. So we need a different idea. An obvious 
proposal is this: cases in which objects are manifestly red 
play an essential role in determining the content of the 
concept red. What it is for an unobserved object to be red 
is then explained by relation to what it is for an observed 
object to be red: an unobserved object is red just in case it 
is the same colour as an object that is observed to be red.1 
Now Wittgenstein might complain that such a view 
would be question-begging. If we are trying to explain what 
it is for an unobserved object to be red, we cannot simply 
help ourselves to the idea of the object’s being the same 
colour as an observed red object. For (adapting what he 
says about a different case): I know well enough that one 
can call an observed red thing and an unobserved red 
thing ‘the same colour’, but what I do not know is in what 
cases one is to speak of an observed and an unobserved 
thing being the same colour’ (cf. PI §350). But how far 
would Wittgenstein push this objection? He would certainly 
insist that what it takes for one thing to be the same colour 
as another cannot just be taken for granted: it must be 
understood by reference to a humanly-created concept of 
colour; and the existence of the concept depends on a 
whole practice of sorting and classifying things according 
to their colours, of agreeing and disagreeing about which 
things are the same colours, and so on. But once that 
point is accepted, does Wittgenstein think there is a further 
problem about extending the concept red from things that 
are observed to things that are not, and could not be, ob-
served? It seems plausible that, for the case of objects that 
are unobserved but could be observed, he would accept 
the dispositional view mentioned in the previous para-
graph: what it is for an unobserved table to be brown is for 
it to be disposed to appear brown to the normal sighted 
under certain circumstances (see RC §97). But how would 
he understand the application of the concept red to things 
that could not be observed? I know no passage where 
Wittgenstein explicitly considers that question.2 Perhaps 
he would regard such an application as unintelligible. But if 
that is his view, it needs further argument. For, on the face 
of it, there is no obvious reason why the concept of colour 
that we develop in connection with practices involving ob-
served things should not be straightforwardly applicable to 
things whose colours we could not observe. 
What about the concept of thinking? Two points 
about Wittgenstein’s view seem clear. First that, as I have 
said, a central role is played in determining the content of 
the concept by cases in which what someone is thinking is 
                                                     
 
1 My formulation of this proposal draws heavily on Peacocke’s account of 
‘identity-involving explanations of concept possession’ (see Peacocke 2008, 
especially chapter 5). But I have not attempted to represent Peacocke’s own 
view. 
2 PI §§514-15 considers the question whether a rose is red in the dark, in the 
context of a discussion of forms of words that look like intelligible sentences 
but are not. But Wittgenstein’s point seems not to be that the sentence ‘a rose 
is red in the dark’ is unintelligible but, rather, that it is not the possibility (or not) 
of imagining a rose being red in the dark that shows the sentence to be intelli-
gible (or not). 
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manifest because she says or otherwise manifests what 
she is thinking. Second, that our grasp of what it is for 
someone to think so-and-so in a case where her thoughts 
cannot be manifested is dependent on our grasp of what it 
is for someone to think so-and-so in a case where her 
thoughts are manifested. But exactly what is the relation 
between the content of the concept in the two kinds of 
case? We can distinguish three quite different models, 
each of which is consistent with the two points just made. 
On the first model, the relation between the case 
where someone says what she is thinking and the Queen 
Victoria case is like the relation between the cases of ob-
served colour and unobservable colour suggested above. 
The concept of thinking cannot be explained without mak-
ing use of examples of thinking; we acquire the concept of 
thought, in part, in connection with cases where we can tell 
what someone is thinking. But, having explained the con-
cept of thinking as it applies in cases where we can tell 
what someone is thinking, we can apply the same concept 
without further explanation to cases where people’s 
thoughts are not and could not be manifested. At one 
point, Wittgenstein presses the question, ‘what we can do 
with’ a sentence about Queen Victoria’s dying thoughts – 
‘how we use it’ (RPP i 366). On the current model, that 
question has a straightforward answer. We use the sen-
tence ‘Queen Victoria saw so-and-so before her mind’s 
eye’ to speculate about Queen Victoria’s dying thoughts. 
We engage in such speculation because we are interested 
in what she was thinking about immediately before her 
death. And we are interested in that question for its own 
sake – not because we think it has any practical implica-
tions. 
 Maybe Wittgenstein would accept that answer. But 
some of what he says suggests a quite different model. On 
this second model, the content of the concept of thought 
as applied in the Queen Victoria case cannot simply be 
read off the content of the concept in the more basic 
cases; it must be understood by giving a direct account of 
the nature and point of the practice of describing and 
speculating about thoughts whose ascription cannot pos-
sibly be verified. We find it natural to take the word 
‘thought’ from the basic cases, where we can tell what 
someone is thinking, and apply it in Queen Victoria cases. 
The meaning of the word in these new applications is 
parasitic on its meaning in the basic cases, but it is not 
fully determined by that use; it depends also on the actual 
use of the word in the new applications. And that use is a 
matter of our shared interest in developing narratives 
about the inner lives of others: narratives that have no 
practical purpose, and for which there is no standard of 
correctness other than what people agree in regarding as 
plausible or appropriate. On this view, the practice of dis-
cussing Queen Victoria’s dying thoughts comes closer to 
the practice of discussing fiction than to that of ascribing 
thoughts in more basic cases. 
A third model is suggested by the following pas-
sage: 
 
What is the purpose of a sentence saying: perhaps 
N had the experience E but never gave any sign of 
it? Well, it is at any rate possible to think of an appli-
cation for the sentence. Suppose, for example, that 
a trace of the experience were to be found in the 
brain, and then we say it has turned out that before 
his death he had thought or seen such and such 
etc. Such an application might be held to be artificial 
or far-fetched; but it is important that it is possible 
(RPP i 157). 
On this view, the sentence ‘perhaps N had the ex-
perience E but never gave any sign of it’ has an applica-
tion, a meaning, because there is in principle some way of 
verifying whether or not N did have the experience E. If we 
apply this line to the Queen Victoria case, we will say that 
we understand the ascription of thoughts in such a case by 
supposing that there is, after all, a method of verifying 
such ascriptions, albeit a method that looks not to the sub-
ject’s actual or potential words and actions, but to physical 
traces of her thoughts.  
If Wittgenstein accepts the first model of our under-
standing of the ascription of thoughts in the Queen Victoria 
case, his treatment will be decisively non-verificationist. If 
he accepts the second model, his account of the meanings 
of such ascriptions will, again, avoid verificationism; but it 
will nonetheless be a form of anti-realism. For it will explain 
the meanings of such ascriptions in a way that gives up 
the idea that there is any independent fact of the matter 
about what Queen Victoria was thinking in her dying mo-
ments. If he accepts the third model, his account of the 
Queen Victoria case will, after all, be a form of verification-
ism. For on this view, the meaningfulness of ascriptions of 
thought in the Queen Victoria case depends on the suppo-
sition that those ascriptions are not, after all, inaccessible 
to every form of verification. 
Which of the three models would Wittgenstein ac-
cept? I think his position is unclear. The first model is con-
sistent with much that he wants to say. But there is some 
evidence that he would reject that model; that he would 
insist that an account of the meaning of the word ‘think’ as 
applied in Queen Victoria cases must say something more 
substantive about our practice of using the word in such 
cases. The very fact that he presses the question, what we 
do with the sentence ‘Queen Victoria may have thought . . 
.’ suggests that, even when we have explained the mean-
ing of ascriptions of thought in cases where a subject’s 
thoughts are manifested, there is a further question, how 
we understand ascriptions of thoughts that lie beyond our 
normal methods of verification. That, in turn, suggests that 
when we apply the concept of thought in Queen Victoria 
cases, we are in some way developing or extending the 
concept, or using it in a secondary sense. A view of that 
sort seems right for the application of the adjectives ‘fat’ 
and ‘lean’ to days of the week. Perhaps it is right for the 
application of the concept calculating to cases in which 
there is no overt process of calculation. But it is hard to 
believe that it is right for the application of the concept 
thinking to Queen Victoria cases. If Wittgenstein was 
tempted by such a view, it is a temptation he should have 
resisted. 
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Diagonalization. The Liar Paradox, and the Appendix to  
Grundgesetze: Volume II 
Roy T Cook, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA & St Andrews, Scotland, UK 
1. Diagonalization in the Grundgesetze 
The standard story regarding Frege’s Grundgesetze is as 
follows: Frege’s system amounts to nothing more than 
higher-order logic plus the inconsistent Basic Law V: 
 
    BLV: (∀X)(∀Y)[§(X) = §(Y) = (∀z)(Xz = Yz)]1 
 
There are a number of aspects of Frege’s logic that 
differentiate it from standard higher-order systems, 
however. 
The first of these is that Frege treats statements (or, 
more carefully, what we would think of as statements) as 
names of truth values. Thus, the connectives are, quite 
literally, truth-functions, and quantification into sentential 
position is allowed. (These are first-order quantifiers 
distinguishing Frege’s approach from higher-order logics 
which allow for second-order quantification into sentential 
position, interpreting such quantifiers as ranging over 
‘concepts’ of zero arity). For example, the Grundgesetze 
analogue of: 
 
    (∃x)(~x) 
 
is both well-formed and a theorem in Frege’s formalism. 
Once we realize that the quantifiers of the 
Grundgesetze range over not just value ranges and other 
mathematical (and perhaps non-mathematical) objects, but 
also over truth values, the second aspect of Frege’s 
system which will be of interest becomes apparent. 
Frege’s language contains a falsity predicate: 
 
    x = ~(∀y)(y = y) 
 
In other words, an object is the false if and only if it is 
identical with the truth value denoted by: 
 
    ~(∀y)(y = y) 
 
Thus, within the Grundgesetze, we can quantify over 
statements and we can construct a falsity predicate. The 
next question to ask is whether the Liar Paradox can be 
constructed within Frege’s system. The answer is “Yes”. 
We define our diagonalization relation as follows:  
 
    Diag(x, y) =  (∃Z)(y = §Z ∧ x = Z(y)) 
 
“Diag” holds between x and y if and only if y is the value-
range of some concept Z and x is the truth value obtained 
by applying Z to the value-range of Z. We can now prove 
the following version of diagonalization:  
 
Theorem 1: In the Grundgesetze, for any predicate Φ(x), 
there is a sentence G such that: 
 
    Φ(G) = G 
 
 is a theorem. 
                                                     
 
1 Here, and below, I use modern symbolism instead of Frege’s two-
dimensional notation, primarily for typographical convenience. All proofs, etc., 
can be straightforwardly translated into Frege’s original formalism. Particular 
attention should be paid to the use of identity, since in Frege’s system identity 
holding between two statements (i.e. names of truth values) is roughly equiva-
lent to our biconditional. 
Proof:  Given Φ(x), let: 
 
   F(y) = (∃x)(Diag(x, y) ∧ Φ(x)) 
   G = F(§F) 
The following are provably equivalent in the Grundgesetze: 
 
   (1) Φ(G)  
   (2) Φ(F(§F)) 
   (3) (∀x)(F(x) = F(x)) ∧ F(§F) = F(§F) ∧ Φ(F(§F))  
   (4) (∃Z)((∀x)(F(x) = Z(x)) ∧ Z(§F) = Z(§F) ∧ Φ(Z(§F)))  
   (5) (∃Z)(§F = §Z ∧ Z(§F) = Z(§F) ∧ Φ(Z(§F))  
   (6) (∃x)(∃Z)(§F = §Z ∧ x = Z(§F) ∧ Φ(x)) 
   (7) F(§F)  
   (8) G 
[(1) and (2) are equivalent by the definition of G, (2) 
and (3) by logic, (3) and (4) by logic, (4) and (5) by 
BLV, (5) and (6) by logic, (6) and (7) by the definition 
of F, and (7) and (8) by the definition of G.] 
The basic idea of the proof is that we can ‘fake’ the 
standard proof of diagonalization (see e.g., Boolos and 
Jeffrey [1989], Chapter 15) by using the value ranges of 
concepts as ‘names’ of those concepts, and quantification 
over truth values in lieu of names of statements, thereby 
sidestepping the need for Gödel numbers or analogous 
coding devices.  
We can immediately generate the Liar paradox. 
Applying Theorem 1 to our falsity predicate results in a 
sentence Λ such that: 
 
    Λ = (Λ = ~(∀y)(y = y)) 
 
is a theorem. But this entails: 
 
    ~(∀y)(y = y) 
 
Note that we can derive (8) from (1) without the use of 
BLV. In other words, letting Grundgesetze – BLV denote 
the system obtained by removing BLV from thes 
Grundgesetze, we have: 
 
Corollary 2: In the Grundgesetze – BLV, for any predi-
cate Φ(x), there is a sentence G such that: 
 
  Φ(G) → G 
 is a theorem. 
 
This does not lead to contradiction, however. Applying 
Corollary 2 to the falsity predicate we obtain: 
 
    (Γ = ~(∀y)(y = y)) → Γ 
 
which entails merely: 
 
    Γ 
 
This is not surprising, since the consistency of the BLV-
free fragment of the Grundgesetze is relatively easy to 
demonstrate. 
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It is worth noting that we can also prove: 
 
Corollary 3: In the Grundgesetze – BLV, for any predi-
cate Φ(x), there is a sentence G such that: 
 
 G → Φ(G) 
 is a theorem. 
This result is obtained by replacing our definition of “Diag” 
above with: 
 
    Diag(x, y) = (∀Z)(y = §Z → x = Z(y)) 
The trick is that without BLV we cannot prove that there is 
a single sentence G such that both: 
 
    Φ(G) → G 
and: 
 
    G → Φ(G) 
Thus, we can prove an analogue of Gödel’s diagonaliza-
tion lemma within the Grundgesetze, and restricted ver-
sions of diagonalization hold in the consistent sub-system 
not containing BLV. The reader might wonder why we 
have made so much of these results. After all, we already 
knew that the Grundgesetze (including BLV) was inconsis-
tent, so the news that one can construct the Liar paradox 
as well as Russell’s paradox within Frege’s system is not 
exactly earth-shattering (although the ‘naturalness’ of the 
construction of the Liar paradox in the Grundgesetze is 
somewhat surprising, at least to the author). In addition, 
the corollaries that follow for the consistent subsystem 
Grundgesetze–BLV are trivial in any system of sufficient 
expressive strength – just let G be any tautology in Corol-
lary 2, and any contradiction in Corollary 3. 
The interest of these results lies in their connection 
to Frege’s attempted fix of the Grundgestze in the 
appendix to Volume II, to which we now turn. 
2. Diagonalization and the Appendix to 
Grundgesetze 
A quick examination of Theorem 1 reveals that the full 
strength of BLV is not required in order to prove the full, 
biconditional form of diagonalization. Instead, we merely 
need the resources to infer line (2): 
 
    Φ(F(§F)) 
from line (5): 
 
    (∃Z)(§F = §Z ∧ Z(§F) = Z(§F) ∧ Φ(Z(§F)) 
In order to get from (5) to (2), we do not need it to be the 
case that concepts with the same value-range are always 
co-extensive. Instead, we merely need concepts to agree 
on their shared value-range. Thus, we can recapture 
Theorem 1 by replacing BLV with the (prima facie weaker) 
Fixed-Point Principle for value-ranges: 
 
    FPP: (∀X)(∀Y)(§(X) = §(Y) → (X(§X) = Y(§X))) 
 
If FPP holds, then we can move from: 
    §F = §Z 
 
to: 
 
    F(§F) = Z(§F) 
 
and thus from: 
 
    Φ(Z(§F)) 
 
to: 
 
    Φ(F(§F)) 
Thus, any principle meant to replace BLV and provide 
identity conditions for value ranges cannot, on pain of Liar-
induced contradiction, imply FPP. 
Surprisingly, in response to the detection of Rus-
sell’s paradox, and without any (apparent) knowledge that 
the Liar paradox could also be derived within the 
Grundgesetze, Frege isolated FPP as exactly the prob-
lematic consequence of BLV.  
In the appendix of Volume II of the Grundgesetze, 
Frege begins his discussion of Russell’s paradox by distin-
guishing between the two ‘directions’ of BLV: 
 
    BLVa: (∀X)(∀Y)((∀z)(X(z) = Y(z)) → §X = §Y) 
 
    BLVb: (∀X)(∀Y)(§X = §Y → (∀z)(X(z) = Y(z))) 
He notes that, if we are to individuate concepts extension-
ally (an assumption he is unwilling to give up), then BLVa 
cannot be the problem – after all, any function ƒ from con-
cepts to objects will satisfy: 
 
    (∀X)(∀Y)((∀z)(X(z) = Y(z)) → ƒX = ƒY) 
So BLVb must be where the problem lies, and Frege sets 
out to discover exactly what goes wrong with this principle. 
He outlines his strategy as follows: 
 
We shall now try to complete our inquiry by reach-
ing the falsity of (Vb) as the final result of a deduc-
tion, instead of starting from (Vb) and thus running 
into a contradiction. (1893, p. 288 in the Frege 
Reader) 
Thus, in order to understand exactly what it is about BLVb 
that causes the problem, we need to find a direct proof of 
its negation, and not rely merely on a reductio of it via 
Russell’s construction. In other words, Frege requires a 
direct proof of: 
 
    (∃X)(∃Y)(§X = §Y ∧ (∃z)(X(z) ∧ ¬Y(z))) 
In searching for such a proof, Frege discovers that he can 
obtain a stronger result, which I have elsewhere (Cook [in 
progress]) called: 
 
Frege’s Little Theorem: For any function ƒ from concepts 
to objects one can prove: 
 
    (∃X)(∃Y)(ƒ(X) = ƒ(Y) ∧ X(ƒ(X)) ∧ ¬Y(ƒ(X))) 
So, given any function from concepts to objects, there exist 
two concepts such that the function maps both concepts to 
the same object, yet the concepts differ on that very ob-
ject. 
Here is the rub: The instance of Frege’s Little Theo-
rem obtained by substituting the the value range operator 
“§” for “ƒ” is the negation of FPP! In other words, the prin-
ciple that Frege identifies as causing Russell’s paradox is 
exactly the principle that is needed to turn the proofs of our 
corollaries into proofs of the diagonalization. 
The proof runs as follows (see Frege 1893, pp.  
285 – 288 in the Frege Reader, for Frege’s original proof): 
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Proof: 
 
Given a function ƒ from concepts to objects, let: 
 
    R(x) = (∃Y)(x = ƒ(Y) ∧ ¬Y(x)) 
 
Then: 
 
(1) ¬R(ƒ(R))                  Assump for Reductio 
(2) ¬(∃Y)(ƒ(R) = ƒ(Y) ∧ ¬Y(ƒ(R)))            (1), Df. of R 
(3) (∀Y)(ƒ(R) = ƒ(Y) → Y(ƒ(R)))               (2), Logic 
(4) R(ƒ(R))                            (3), Logic 
(5) R(ƒ(R))                    (1) – (4), Reductio 
(6) (∃Y)(ƒ(R) = ƒ(Y) ∧ ¬Y(ƒ(R)))             (5), Df. of R 
(7) (∃Y)(ƒ(R) = ƒ(Y) ∧ R(ƒ(R)) ∧ ¬Y(ƒ(R)))   (5), (6), Logic 
(8) (∃X)(∃Y)(ƒ(X) = ƒ(Y) ∧ X(ƒ(X)) ∧ ¬Y(ƒ(X)))       (7), Logic 
Frege concludes that such ‘fixed points’ are the root of 
Russell’s paradox: 
 
We can see that the exceptional case is consti-
tuted by the extension itself, in that it falls under 
only one of the two concepts whose extension it 
is; and we see that the occurrence of this excep-
tion in no way can be avoided. Accordingly the fol-
lowing suggests itself as the criterion for equality 
in extension: The extension of one concept coin-
cides with that of another when every object that 
falls under the first concept, except the extension 
of the first concept, falls under the extension of the 
second concept likewise, and when every object 
that falls under the second concept, except the ex-
tension of the second concept, falls under the first 
concept likewise. (1893, p. 288 in The Frege 
Reader) 
As a result, Frege suggests a modification of BLV: 
 
BLV* (∀X)(∀Y)(§X = §Y = (∀z)((z ≠ §X ∧ z ≠ §Y) → (X(z) = Y(z)))) 
According to the amended principle two concepts receive 
the same value range if and only if they hold of exactly the 
same objects other than their value ranges. 
The inadequacy of Frege’s BLV* is well-known, al-
though the reasons commonly given for its failure are mis-
taken. The well-known works addressing the formal as-
pects of BLV*, Frege’s so-called ‘way out’, such as Quine 
(1955) and Geach (1956), report that Frege’s amended 
principle is consistent, but inadequate for his purposes, 
since it implies that at most one object exists. What they 
fail to appreciate, however, is that since Frege’s Grundge-
setze allows for quantification into sentential position, one 
can (without any version of BLV, amended or not) prove 
the existence of at least two objects (the true and the 
false). As a result, from the perspective of Frege’s 
Grundgesetze, BLV* is just as inconsistent as was BLV 
(Landini (2006) comes closest to this, as he proves that 
BLV* is inconsistent if the truth values are their own single-
tons, as Frege intended, and also proves that BLV* is in-
consistent if the truth values are not value-ranges at all).  
3. Lessons Learned 
The ultimate failure of Frege’s attempt to salvage his life’s 
work does not imply that it contains nothing of value. I will 
conclude by identifying two lessons that can, and should, 
be drawn from all of this. 
The first is that we should take care in attributing the 
inadequacies of BLV* to some sort of panicked, half-
hearted attempt by Frege to amend his. Quine describes 
this common attitude to the appendix: 
 
It is scarcely to Frege’s discredit that the explicitly 
speculative appendix now under discussion, writ-
ten against time in a crisis, should turn out to pos-
sess less scientific value than biographical inter-
est. Over the past half century the piece has per-
haps had dozens of sympathetic readers who, af-
ter a certain amount of tinkering, have dismissed it 
as the wrong guess of a man in a hurry.  
(1955, p. 152) 
While the ‘fix’ might have been written in a hurry, and BLV* 
is inconsistent, the discussion leading up to it has much to 
teach us about the mathematics of abstraction principles in 
general and the roots of Russell’s paradox and related 
phenomenon in particular. In this respect, Frege’s Little 
Theorem is not the incorrect guess of a man in a hurry, but 
rather a deep insight into the puzzling nature of abstraction 
and the paradoxes that can arise from its unfettered appli-
cation. 
This brings us to the second lesson. Connections 
are often drawn between the Liar paradox and Russell’s 
paradox (and between the semantic and set-theoretic 
paradoxes more generally), but these connections tend to 
be quite loose, relying on the intuition that circularity of 
some vicious sort is at the root of both phenomena (for a 
project that draws the connections much more tightly, 
however, the reader is urged to consult Cook 2007!). The 
construction of the Liar paradox within Frege’s system, and 
his identification of the exact principle that is the root of 
both this paradox and the one communicated to him by 
Russell, suggests that further study of Frege’s system (or 
modern variants that retain object-level quantification into 
sentential position, such as that provided in Landini 2006) 
hold promise for a deeper understanding of these 
paradoxes individually and of the links that bind them 
together as distinct aspects of a single problem.2 
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Exorcizing Gettier 
Claudio F. Costa, Natal, Brazil 
Knowledge is not simply justified true belief,  
but it is justified true belief, justifiably arrived at. 
Robert J. Fogelin 
Gettier’s problem1 seems to be a daunting treat to our 
belief in the rationality of the human knowledge. In what 
follows I intend to show with some formal precision the 
natural way out of the trap. 
Using the symbol a to a person, K to knowledge, B 
to the belief, E to a reasonable justifying evidence (justifi-
cation), and p to the proposition, we might symbolize the 
tripartite definition of knowledge as follows: 
 
                                    (i)      (ii)       (iii) 
(Df.1)  aKp   =   p  & aBp & aEBp 
According to this definition, a knows that p (aKp) means 
the same as the conjunction of these three conditions, 
namely (i) that p is true, (ii) that a believes that p is true, 
and (iii) that a has a reasonable justification for her belief 
in the truth of p. As it is well-known, Gettier’s problem 
arises from the discovery of counterexamples to this defini-
tion, namely, from cases where the person a fails to attain 
knowledge though satisfying these three conditions. 
To remember Gettier’s counterexamples, consider 
the following2. Suppose that professor Stone said to Mary 
yesterday that he would come to the university this night to 
give a lecture. Since Mary knows that Stone is a highly 
responsible person, she can claim that she knows that he 
came to the university this night. However, unknown to 
her, one of Stone’s sons suffered an accident and he 
needed to drop the lecture. However, it is true that he 
came to the university, since he was momentarily in his 
room to take some documents. Mary’s claim to know that 
Stone came to the University this night seems to satisfy 
the conditions to the traditional definition: it is a true belief 
and the justification presented by her is reasonable 
enough. Nevertheless, its truth is only accidentally 
achieved and nobody would say that Mary really knows 
that Stone was at the university tonight. 
As it was sometimes noted, there is a 
straightforward and effective way to answer the problem, 
which seems to be nearly buried under the considerable 
amount of alternative answers explored in the literature3. It 
consists simply in the request that a sound epistemic 
justification must belong to what we are able to accept as 
making the proposition p true4. So, Mary’s justification for 
                                                     
 
1 E. L. Gettier: “Is Justified Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23, 6, 1963, 121-23. 
2 I take this example (with slight changes) from D. J. O’Connor and Brian Carr, 
Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (The Harverster Press: Brighton 
1982).  
3 Similar considerations can be found in D. J. O’Connor and B. Carr, Introduc-
tion to the Theory of Knowledge, p. 82. The origin of this view seems to be due 
to Robert F. Almeder, particularly in the paper “Truth and Evidence”, The 
Philosophical Quarterly 24, 1974, 365-68. The most original and compelling 
defense of a similar view can be found in Robert Fogelin’s book, Pyrrhonian 
Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (Oxford University Press: Oxford 
1994), chapter 1. 
4  This requirement was stated by D. J. O’Connor and by Brian Carr, who also 
say that “the reason why the proposition is true must not be independent on 
the facts asserted in the proposition constituting the grounds for the belief”, 
claiming for elaboration (Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, p. 81). 
Robert Fogelin stated the same point more concisely his definition of knowl-
edge: “S knows that P iff S justifiably came to believe that P  on grounds that 
establish the truth of P” (Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justifica-
tion, p. 28) 
her belief that professor Stone came to the University this 
night, based on the evidence given by his statement that 
he would give a lecture, might be reasonable, but is 
epistemically unsound, since this information is no part of 
what we – as the epistemic evaluators of Mary’s 
knowledge claim – are prepared to accept as making true 
the belief that Stone came to the university this night. 
Reasonability is not enough. A justification must also be 
epistemically sound, by making itself acceptable to the 
epistemic evaluators of a knowledge claimer a as making a 
proposition p true5. In the case of the gettierian 
counterexamples, these epistemic evaluators have always 
some information that overrides the epistemic soundness 
of the reasonable justification given by the knowledge 
claimer.6 
My aim here is to improve the tripartite definition of 
knowledge by stating more formaly this intuitive solution. 
This can be done by making explicit the internal link 
between the condition of justification and the condition of 
truth. In order to do it, we shall review the formulation of 
the conditions (i) and (iii) of (Df.1). 
We begin with the condition of truth. As it appears in 
the traditional definition, it is surely a simplification. For it 
seems like the truth-value of the proposition when it is 
contemplated by God. Since God doesn’t need to verify 
anything in order to know the truth, he does not need to 
consider whether any truth-condition is satisfied. So, for 
him “p” or “p is true” is enough. However, if we intend to 
make justice to the condition of the truth of p as it is known 
by us (that is, by the knowledge-evaluators of knowledge-
claimers), we need to consider whether the truth-
conditions were satisfied. Now, how to do it? We need first 
to see that, when an evidence E for the ascent of p is 
found, it must be seen by us as sufficient to make the 
proposition p true. The meaning of ‘sufficient’ here can be 
made precise as follows: 
 
An evidence E is sufficient for the assent of p as 
true iff E makes p either (i) necessarily true (when p 
is a non-empirical, deductively grounded truth) or (ii) 
probable in a very high level (for the cases of em-
pirical, inductively grounded truths)7. 
We can introduce the symbol ‘~>’ (to be read as “is suffi-
cient to”) in order to express this conditional. Thus, given 
the evidence E for the ascent of p, this means that E ~> p, 
in other words, that for us either E makes p necessarily 
true or very probably true.  
With this in mind we can introduce the symbol E* to 
designate the set of all justifying evidences that we 
consider individually sufficient for the truth or falsity of p in 
the already specified sense. To give an example: suppose 
                                                     
 
5 My distinction between a reasonable justification and an epistemically sound 
justification is equivalent to the distinction between a personal justification 
(epistemically responsible) and a justification given on the basis of adequate 
grounds. See Michael Williams, Problems of Knowledge: a Critical Introduction 
to Philosophy (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2001) pp. 22-23. 
6 The words ‘we’ and ‘us’ point usually to the knowledge-evaluators, with their 
usually wider informational set. However, this does not precludes the possibil-
ity that the knowledge-evaluator is the knowledge-claimer herself, by making a 
self-evaluation of her own past knowledge claims. 
7 I am not considering Kripkian cases like that of necessary a posteriori beliefs 
derived from E (they are also controversial). 
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that I am sure that it is true that Stone came to the 
university tonight because of E1: “I saw him parking 
outside”, and/or because of E2: “he called me on phone, 
saying that he was coming here”. Since I take these 
evidences as true, and I see each of them as sufficient to 
make me accept the truth of the proposition p, I can say 
that E1 ~> p, that E2 ~> p, and that E* = {E1, E2}. An 
important characteristic of E* is that, under the assumption 
that we are rational evaluators, either all its members are 
sufficient to make p true or they are all sufficient to make p 
false, otherwise they would cancel one another8. With 
these concepts we can redefine the condition of truth by 
making explicit the role of the evidential truth-conditions to 
our acceptance of p as true. Here is the formulation for the 
condition of truth: 
 
(i’)   (E* & (E* ~> p)) 
This is the same as saying that p is true, since given 
our acceptance of E* as true (that is, the truth of at least 
one evidence E such that E ~> p), our acceptance of the 
truth of p follows (by modus ponens or inductively). The 
difference is that now the satisfied evidential truth-
conditions can be made explicit as the members of the set 
E*. I claim that this is what we, fallible truth-searchers, 
ultimately mean with the condition (i). 
The second improvemente concerns the 
reformulation of the condition of justification in the 
definition of knowledge, linking this justification with the set 
of evidences that make the proposition p true. What we 
need to do is only to require, additionally, that the 
evidential justification E given by a might be seen by us as 
belonging to our accepted *E, namely, to the set of 
evidences that we (as the evaluators of knowledge-claims) 
are prepared to accept as the satisfied truth-conditions 
which are individually sufficient to make p true (cases in 
which E* ~> p). Here is our reformulation of the third 
condition: 
 
(iii’)   aEBp & (E ∈ E*) 
The condition (iii’) says that, additionally to the condition 
that a has a reasonable evidence justifying the truth of p, it 
is required that this evidence, for being sound, must be 
able to be accepted by us as belonging to the set of evi-
dences that we are prepared to accept as individually mak-
ing p true.  
                                                     
 
8 For example: evidences for the roundness of the earth are E1 (photos from 
the all) and E2 (the circumnavigation of the globe). Each one is a member of 
E*, sufficient for the truth the proposition p saying that the earth is round. But if 
~E2 were an element of E*, E1 would loose its force and would not be a 
sufficient condition, do not belonging to E* anymore.  
 
With this in mind we are prepared to reformulate the 
tripartite definition of knowledge in a way that makes 
explicit the internal relation between the condition of 
justification (iii) and the condition of truth (i). Here it goes: 
 
                              (i’)                    (ii)                (iii’) 
(Df.2)  aKp =  (E* & (E* ~> p))  &  aBp  &  (aEBp &(E ∈ E*)) 
Dropping the condition (ii) as redundant, since it is re-
peated in the first conjunct of (iii), we get the following 
version: 
 
                                         (i’)                            (iii’) 
(Df.3)  aKp =  (E* & (E* ~> p))  & (aEBp &(E ∈ E*)) 
What these definitions tells us is that the justifying evi-
dence E given by a must belong to the set of evidences (of 
fulfilled truth-conditions) that might be hold by us (the 
knowledge-evaluators) as individually sufficient to make p 
true. If the evidence E given by a belongs to E*, and E* is 
so that its individual members lead to the necessary or at 
least highly probable truth of the proposition p, so that E* 
~> p, than E is epistemically sound, for it assures us the 
truth of p either as necessary or as practically certain. 
Now, consider again our gettierian counterexample. 
Mary’s evidence E (“Stone said to me he would give a 
lecture today”) would not be accepted by us (since we are 
better informed, and also know about the accident with his 
son etc.) as belonging to our E*, even if we know that 
Stone was (by different reasons) at the university this 
night. So we conclude that, according with our definition of 
knowledge, she really does not know. And this result can 
be generalized in order to exorcize any conceivable 
gettierian counterexample. Since in no counterexample of 
Gettier kind the justifying evidence E belongs to the set E*, 
none of these counterexamples satisfies the proposed 
reformulation of the tripartite definition of knowledge. 
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A Wittgensteinian Approach to Ethical Supervenience 
Soroush Dabbagh, Tehran, Iran  
Introduction 
What can we say with regard to the extent of the pattern-
ability of the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant 
feature in different ethical contexts? The main issue be-
tween generality and particularity in moral reasoning con-
cerns the existence of patterns in use of moral vocabulary 
that would permit the formulation of general statements 
governing the applicability of that vocabulary. Particularism 
challenges an intuitive notion of generalism. There are 
general patterns to which the reason-giving behaviour of a 
morally relevant non-moral property in different contexts is 
responsive and this is the main issue in evaluating argu-
ments of particularism and generalism. It concerns the way 
in which a morally relevant feature contributes to the moral 
evaluation of different cases. The subject can be formu-
lated using the idea of supervenience, according to which 
if two concrete ethical situations are relevantly similar with 
respect to their non-moral (descriptive) properties, their 
moral (evaluative) properties would be the same. Suppose 
we are confronted with a concrete ethical situation, in 
which a moral property F supervenes on non-moral proper-
ties G and H. According to the generalist, should we come 
across a similar ethical situation in which G and H are 
combined together, the ultimate moral evaluation of the 
case would be the same —F would apply. So, subscribing 
to the existence of supervenience leads to approving the 
existence of general patterns to which the reason-giving 
behaviour of a morally relevant non-moral property can fit. 
In other words, with the aid of such patterns, we can see 
how a morally relevant non-moral property contributes to 
the moral evaluation of different cases.  
According to generalists who subscribe to the notion 
of supervenience, the reason-giving behaviour of a morally 
relevant feature in different cases is generalisable in the 
sense that its reason-giving behaviour is answerable to 
patterns of word use. But a particularist like Dancy prefers 
to talk about the idea of resultance with regard to the way 
in which non-moral properties are related to moral 
properties in ethical contexts. According to him: 
 
Resultance is a relation between a property of an 
object and the features that ‘give’ it that property. 
Not all properties are resultant; that is, not all prop-
erties depend on others in the appropriate way. But 
everyone agrees that moral properties are resultant. 
A resultant property is one which ‘depends’ on other 
properties in a certain way. As we might say, noth-
ing is just wrong; a wrong action is wrong because 
of other features that it has…Supervenience, as a 
relation, is incapable of picking out the features that 
make the action wrong; it is too indiscriminate to be 
able to achieve such an interesting and important 
task (2004, 85-88). 
According to this view, there is no such thing as a general 
pattern which summarises the reason-giving behaviour of 
a morally relevant feature and we cannot see how a mor-
ally relevant feature contributes to the moral evaluation of 
different cases by appealing to supervenience. Superven-
ience deals with the behaviour of a morally relevant fea-
ture in different ethical contexts, the way in which moral 
properties supervene upon the class of non-moral proper-
ties. In contrast, resultance concerns the way in which a 
moral property results from non-moral properties in a spe-
cific ethical situation. So, a particularist who claims there is 
no metaphysical account available of generality in moral 
reasoning, emphasises that the reason-giving behaviour of 
a morally relevant feature and its contribution to moral 
evaluation can vary from case to case as a result of com-
bining with other features in many different ways. So, the 
reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature is not 
generalisable to say, its relevance for reasoning in differ-
ent cases is not answerable to general patterns of word 
use. Rather, the reason-giving behaviour results from the 
way in which different morally relevant features are com-
bined together in a specific moral situation. Therefore, 
according to Dancy, the idea of resultance, unlike super-
venience, can better systematise our common sensical 
intuitions with regard to the way in which several morally 
relevant features are combined together in different ethical 
contexts.1  
Now I outline the particularist’s answer with regard 
to the extent of the patternability of the reason-giving 
behaviour of morally relevant features in different contexts 
which is associated with resultance while undermining 
superveneince.  
1. The Particularists’ Answer 
According to the particularists’ standpoint, moral principles 
are strongly context-dependent in the sense that the rea-
son-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature is not 
answerable to general patterns.  
The main argument in support of particularism 
draws on the idea of holism about reasons for action. Ac-
cording to holism, morally relevant nonmoral properties are 
highly contextual, and may change their reason-giving 
behaviours from case to case where they are compounded 
with other morally relevant non-moral properties, so that 
what makes an action wrong in one case may make it right 
in another case. In other words, the deontic valence of a 
moral consideration (such as one's duty to fulfil his prom-
ise to someone else) is not constant, and may vary from 
case to case.  
Dancy’s argument in favour of holism about reasons 
for action is an application of holism about normative 
reasons in general. Dancy claims that normative reasons 
for belief are obviously and non-controversially holistic 
(highly contextual), and that it is very odd to account for 
reasons for action as non-holistic. But how could normative 
reasons for belief be holistic? Dancy’s argument for this 
claim is as follows: suppose that something is in front of 
me, and I experience it as a red pencil. Experiencing 
something as a red pencil is a justified reason for me to 
believe that a red pencil is in front of me. Again suppose 
that, as a thought experiment, I have taken a pill which 
makes blue things seem red to me. In this case, 
                                                     
 
1 For more on the distinction between resultance and supervenience, see 
Dancy, J (1981) ‘On Moral Properties’, Mind, 90, pp, 367-385, 380-382 & 
(1993) Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 73-79. See also R∅nnow-
Rasmussen, T. (1999) ‘Particularism and Principles’, Theoria, 65, pp.114-126, 
115-119. See also Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1999) ‘Some Varieties of Particula-
rism’, Metaphilosophy, 30, pp. 1-12, 2-5.  
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experiencing something as a red pencil is a reason that 
justifies me in believing that a blue pencil is in front of me. 
Therefore, it is not the case that experiencing something 
as red always justifies me in believing that there is 
something red is in front of me. Conversely, it can justify 
me in believing that there is something blue is in front of 
me. Dancy says:  
 
It is not as if it is some reason for me to believe that 
there is something red before me, though that rea-
son is overwhelmed by contrary reasons. It is no 
longer any reason at all to believe that there is 
something red before me; indeed, it is a reason for 
believing the opposite (2004, p.74). 
This means that reasons for belief behave holistically, and 
the way in which they are combined together and contrib-
ute to ultimate justification can vary from context to con-
text. In other words, they have no intrinsic and invariant 
valence outside context, for their valence can change as a 
result of reacting to other reasons. 
2.Criticising the Particularistic Position: 
Wittgensteinian account of normativity 
In order to criticise Dancy’s constitutive and metaphysical 
claim concerning the way a morally relevant feature con-
tributes to the moral evaluation of different contexts, I draw 
on the account from Wittgenstein with regard to the nature 
of concepts2.  
Suppose we want to articulate and define the con-
cept ‘game’. On the face of it, it seems that in order to do 
this we need to state common properties of games with 
which we have been confronted, such as: basketball, 
handball, snooker, chess, boxing, wrestling etc. On the 
basis of the common properties obtained, we would say 
that: 
If x meets the condition g1, g2, g3, … gn, x is a ‘game’. 
This view supposes that there is something in common 
which needs to be articulated and categorised to arrive at 
the definition of the concept ‘game’. It suggests that there 
is something in common among different kinds of games. 
By utilising the obtained general rule, we can say whether 
or not a new phenomenon can be regarded as a game. In 
this model, the general pattern acts as the normative stan-
dard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words. 
However, Wittgenstein rejects the existence of such 
a common property in different kinds of games; something 
which can be articulated as an essence of the concept 
‘game’. The whole idea of ‘family resemblance’ in Philoso-
phical Investigations is concerned with the denial of such 
an approach to defining a concept like game. There is 
nothing in common among different games which can be 
articulated. For instance, if someone says that losing and 
winning can be regarded as a common feature of different 
games, we can show him other games in which there is no 
such thing as losing and winning like the child who builds a 
house using Lego. Moreover, if we want to consider 
equipment such as a ball, goal, net, racket etc. as a com-
mon feature or features of different games, one can show 
other games such as: boxing, wrestling etc. in which these 
items not used. So, it seems that there is an open-ended 
                                                     
 
2 Note that, at this stage, I shall apply the Wittgensteinian account with regard 
to the nature of concepts to repudiate Dancy’s constitutive claim regarding the 
reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different contexts. The 
justification of the Wittgensteinian account of the nature of concepts is another 
issue and can be evaluated separately and on its own. 
list of game-making features which forms the different 
games with which we are familiar. So, it seems that we 
cannot arrive at what the concept ‘game’ is through articu-
lating a feature common to different games. Nevertheless, 
we, as language-users use the word ‘game’ in our com-
munication meaningfully. In other words, although there is 
an open-ended list of game-making features, we cannot 
regard anything we like as an example of the concept 
‘game’. It seems that there is a normative constraint that 
requires us to see whether or not the phenomenon with 
which we are dealing can be regarded as a game. Witt-
genstein attempts to show that the normative constraint 
that we are talking about cannot be put into words. Rather, 
it can only be grasped through ongoing practice of seeing 
the similarities and dissimilarities. There is nothing beyond 
seeing the similarities which can do this job. He states: 
 
What does it mean to know what a game is? What 
does it mean, to know it and not be able to say it?… 
Isn’t my knowledge, my concept of a game, com-
pletely expressed in the explanations that I could 
give? That is, in my describing examples of various 
kinds of games; showing how all sorts of other 
games can be constructed on the analogy of these 
(1953, §75).   
According to Wittgenstein, it is not the case that I know 
what the concept ‘game’ is before being engaged in the 
practice of seeing the similarities. Rather, what we see 
within practice is all we have about the concept ‘game’. 
This results in the denial of the pre-existing concept of 
game. However, the more we are engaged in the practice 
of using the word, the more clearly we see what a game is. 
This is an open-ended process. To grasp the meaning of a 
concept such as game, all we have is seeing the similari-
ties: this is a game, that is a game, this is not a game etc. 
and this is not ignorance. Being engaged in practice is not 
a halfway and second hand explanation of what a game is. 
This is all we have at hand and it does not mean that any 
phenomenon can be regarded as an example of the con-
cept ‘game’. Rather, there is a normative constraint which 
lies in the way in which we are engaged in seeing things 
as similar. In other words, it is not the case that regarding 
a new phenomenon as a game is a matter of taste and can 
be done arbitrarily or at random. Rather, there is a norma-
tive constraint which can be seen within practice. There is 
an account which can be given with regard to whether or 
not the new phenomenon is a game. The account be-
comes clearer to the extent that we are engaged in the 
practice of seeing things as similar. There is no such thing 
as a pre-existing and abstract pattern which can be utilised 
in order to see whether or not the new phenomenon is a 
game. Rather, there is an account with regard to the nor-
mative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use 
of words which is associated with the way in which we are 
engaged in seeing the similarities. The crucial thing at this 
stage is that there is an account with regard to a normative 
constraint which can be given. In fact, in place of the no-
tion of the pre-existing source of normativity, there is a 
normative constraint which can be seen merely within 
practice. 
To the extent that we are engaged in the activity of 
seeing things as similar, we can see what the concept 
‘game’ is. We have a role in shaping the concept. In other 
words, the concept ‘game’ emerges following our ongoing 
practice of seeing the similarities. Moreover, the concept 
‘game’ is extendable. The more we are engaged in the 
practice of seeing similar games, the more the concept is 
extended. Practice has an indispensable role in the ex-
tendibility of the concept ‘game’. So, we can say that there 
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is some generality in the concept ‘game’, albeit one that 
emerges.  
What follows from the Wittgensteinian story is that 
the reason-giving behaviour of the word ‘game’ in different 
contexts is answerable to general patterns of word use. 
This is the constitutive and metaphysical claim with regard 
to the existence of patterns of word use.  
Considering Wittgensteinian account of patternabil-
ity and the way in which the reason-giving behaviour of a 
morally relevant feature is answerable and responsive to 
patterns of word use, it seems that Dancy’s claim about 
the very idea of supervenience is implausible. According to 
Dancy - as there is no such thing as an exactly similar 
ethical situation - to say that the reason-giving behaviour 
of a morally relevant feature would be answerable to gen-
eral patterns in other ethical contexts is useless.  
But as we saw in the example of the concept 
‘game’, although several game-making features are com-
bined together in different ways, they are not responsive to 
general patterns of word use: Answerability to general 
patterns is not necessarily associated with the existence of 
exactly similar situations. As far as an emerging pattern is 
concerned, there is no such thing as a finite list of features 
which make the pattern. Nevertheless, there is such a 
thing as a normative constraint which can be seen to the 
extent that we are engaged in practice. So, we can sub-
scribe to the idea of supervenience, according to which 
moral properties supervene upon non-moral properties in 
the sense that the reason-giving behaviour of a morally 
relevant feature in different context is answerable to pat-
terns without resorting to phrases like ‘exactly similar situa-
tion’. In other words, the modest-generalist can agree with  
 
a particularist like Dancy in criticising the idea of a pre-
existing and fixed pattern according to which a new phe-
nomenon has to be subsumed under a determined and 
rigid pattern. Such an account of pattern requires the new 
phenomenon to be exactly similar to the components of 
the pattern. But the modest-generalist can appeal to the 
idea of open-endedness to give a constitutive account of 
patternability without appealing to pre-existing and deter-
mined pattern.  
To summarise, Dancy’s claim with regard to the way 
in which the reason-giving behaviour of a non-moral fea-
ture contributes to the moral evaluation of different cases 
can be reconciled with the generalistic Wittgensteinian 
position which deploys the idea of patternability and an-
swerability. It follows from this that still we can stick to the 
very idea of supervenience, as far as the reason-giving 
behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different contexts 
is concerned.  
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There can be Causal without Ontological Reducibility of Con-
sciousness? Troubles with Searle’s Account of Reduction  
Tárik de Athayde Prata, Fortaleza, Brazil 
I. Introduction 
In his writings about the philosophy of mind John R. Searle 
often deals with the question of reduction, because the 
main question in this field can be defined in these terms: 
do the mental phenomena have a special mode of exis-
tence or are they reducible to physical phenomena? (see 
SEARLE, 1992, p. 2). But it is not clear whether his ac-
count of reduction is really coherent. Searle distinguishes 
different types of reduction (see SEARLE, 1992, p. 113-
114), but when he speaks about consciousness, he makes 
incompatible claims. The two types that are relevant here 
are causal and ontological reduction. The main problem is 
that he thinks of consciousness as a special case, in which 
these two types of reduction are not equivalent: con-
sciousness can be causally but not ontologically reduced, 
and that seems to commit him with the contradictory 
claims that consciousness is and is not identical to brain 
behavior. In the present paper, Searle’s conception of 
causal reduction and its relations with ontological reduction 
will be examined (section II), as well as his argument for 
the ontological irreducibility of consciousness (section III), 
which seems to be in contradiction with this conception of 
causal reduction. After that, Searle’s arguments for the 
thesis that ontological irreducibility does not force us to 
dualism are going to be discussed (section IV). My conclu-
sion is that this last argument fails, so that ontological irre-
ducibility entails a kind of dualism, and Searle states and 
denies (in contradictory way) the identity of consciousness 
and brain processes.  
II. Causal and Ontological Reduction 
Searle defines the causal reducibility of consciousness as 
follows:  
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain proc-
esses, because all features of consciousness are 
accounted for causally by neurobiological processes 
going on in the brain, and consciousness has no 
causal powers of its own in addition to the causal 
powers of the underlying neurobiology.” (SEARLE, 
2002b, p. 60, my emphasis) 
A causal reduction of consciousness consists of the causal 
explanability of its surface features by brain processes at 
the microlevel and the identity of causal powers of both. 
These two aspects are closely related to an identity thesis 
concerning consciousness and brain behavior.  
Firstly, causal explanability entails that the surface 
features of the phenomenon are caused by the behavior of 
the system’s microstructure in which the phenomenon is 
realized in. But this causation does not mean that we have 
to do with two different things. In Intentionality the author 
mentions: 
 
“there can be causal relations between phenomena 
at different levels in the very same underlying stuff 
(…) to generalize at this point, we might say that 
two phenomena can be related by both causation 
and realization provided that they are so at different 
levels of description.” (SEARLE, 1983, p. 266, my 
emphasis) 
Searle’s conception of the causation of surface features by 
the system’s microstructure behavior does not concern an 
event which causes another, but a sufficient condition 
without temporal connotations (see SCHRÖDER, 1992, p. 
100).  
Secondly, the identity of causal powers is presented 
by Searle as a consequence of an identity relation be-
tween both phenomena. In one of his first writings on the 
philosophy of mind Searle defended the causal efficacy of 
mental phenomena and thought the description of its 
causal powers as possible at different levels: “Mental 
states are no more epiphenomenal than the elasticity and 
puncture resistance of an inflated tire are, and interactions 
can be described both at the higher and lower levels, just 
as in the analogous case of the tire.” (SEARLE, 1980, p. 
455, my emphasis) 
Furthermore, it is clear that the identity of causal 
powers follows from the fact that both phenomena are the 
same thing described at different levels. These two points 
(the connection of causal explanability and of the identity 
of causal powers with the identity of both phenomena) 
become more understandable if we consider Searle’s 
scheme for the representation of the causal functioning of 
mental states. In Intentionality he draws the following 
picture: 
 
Searle asserts explicitly that “the phenomena at t1 and t2 
respectively are the same phenomena described at differ-
ent levels of description” (SEARLE, 1983, p. 269, my em-
phasis), what entails that the “cross level” causation be-
tween neuron firings and the intention in action is causa-
tion with identity, and the simultaneous relation of realiza-
tion between them determines this identity.1 This is, the 
causal explanability of the features of a conscious mental 
phenomenon is made possible by causal relations without 
time gap, by causal relations between different levels of 
the same system. And once that the phenomena at t1 and 
t2 are identical, he says that there are also “diagonal” 
causal relations between the phenomena at t1 and t2:  
 
                                                     
 
1 Explaining the realization relation in the case of liquidity Searle writes: “the 
liquidity of a bucket of water is not some extra juice secreted by the H2O 
molecules. When we describe the stuff as liquid we are just describing those 
very molecules at a higher level of description than that of the individual mole-
cule.” (SEARLE, 1983, p. 266, my emphasis) 
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“Notice that on this model (…) we could also draw 
diagonal arrows which in this case would show that 
the intention in action causes physiological changes 
and that the neuron firings cause bodily movements. 
Notice also that on such a model the mental phe-
nomena are no more epiphenomenal than the rise 
in temperature of the firing of a spark 
plug.”(SEARLE, 1983, p. 270)2 
I think that these “diagonal” causal relations correspond to 
the identity of causal powers of conscious mental phe-
nomena and brain processes, the second aspect of 
Searle’s conception of causal reduction. And if it is really 
so, then this identity of causal powers is grounded on the 
identity of the phenomena themselves. The connection of 
(a) causal explanability and (b) identity of causal powers 
with (c) the identity of the phenomena is a strong evidence 
for the connection of causal and ontological reduction, 
because ontological reduction yields the conclusion that 
entities of certain types “consist in nothing but” (SEARLE, 
1992, p. 113) entities of other types, what is for him a pe-
culiar form of identity relation that exists also by properties 
(as liquidity, solidity and consciousness). Moreover, Searle 
himself acknowledges that, in general, successful causal 
reductions lead to ontological reductions: “where we have 
a successful causal reduction, we simply redefine the ex-
pression that denotes the reduced phenomena in such a 
way that the phenomenon in question can now be identi-
fied with their causes.” (SEARLE, 1992, p. 115) It seems to 
me that the causal reduction makes such a possible re-
definition because the causal explicability and the identity 
of causal powers allow an identity statement concerning 
both phenomena (for example liquidity and molecular be-
havior). But in Searle’s opinion there is an exception, there 
is at least a phenomenon whose causal reduction does not 
lead to an ontological reduction: consciousness. 
III. The Argument for Ontological  
Irreducibility 
Ontological irreducibility leads to a situation that is in my 
opinion very strange, namely that “Consciousness is en-
tirely causally explained by neuronal behavior but it is not 
thereby shown to be nothing but neuronal behavior.” 
(SEARLE, 2004, p. 119) We saw above that causal expli-
cability (and identity of causal powers) entails in Searle’s 
view an identity relation between the phenomena in ques-
tion, but if it is not the case that consciousness is nothing 
but neuronal behavior, then consciousness is something 
else as neuronal behavior, so that it is not clear how con-
sciousness could be causally reducible. Appealing to 
Thomas Nagel’s, Frank Jackson’s and Saul Kripke’s con-
ceptions, which (in his opinion) have articulated the same 
argument in different ways (see SEARLE, 1992, p. 116-
117), Searle offers the following formulation:  
 
“Suppose we tried to say the pain is really ‘nothing 
but’ the patterns of neuron firings. Well, if we tried 
such an ontological reduction, the essential features 
of the pain would be left out. No description of the 
third-person, objective, physiological facts would 
convey the subjective, first-person character of the 
                                                     
 
2 In my presentation of Searle’s view of causal reducibility I refer to his re-
marks about intentional states, while the subject of this paper is his account of 
the reduction of consciousness. But it seems not problematic for me, because 
Searle thinks consciousness and intentionality as connected, and makes 
similar remarks about the causal efficacy of conscious sensations (see 
SEARLE, 1995, p. 219). Moreover, he suggests that consciousness is identi-
cal to brain behavior (although consciousness is caused by it – see SEARLE, 
2002a, p. 9)  
pain, simply because the first person features are 
different from the third-person features.” (SEARLE, 
1992, 117) 
He says explicitly that subjective and objective features are 
different, what is in my opinion incompatible with his con-
ception of causal reduction presented above (section II). A 
redefinition of consciousness in terms of objective entities 
(as brain processes) is impossible, and it seems to me to 
undermine the possibility of a causal reduction in Searle’s 
model. Such a causal reduction requires an ontological 
reduction. But now we need to examine his argument for 
the claim that ontological reduction has no deep conse-
quences and to evaluate if it can make causal reduction 
compatible with ontological irreducibility. 
IV. Is Ontological Irreducibility Harmless? 
Searle refuses the general opinion that an ontological irre-
ducibility of consciousness is a challenge to our scientific 
world view, and tries to prove that this irreducibility does 
not force us to a property dualism. He believes that onto-
logical irreducibility is in this sense harmless because it is 
a consequence of our interests about consciousness, and 
not a consequence of the structure (or essence) of the 
phenomenon itself (see SEARLE, 1992, p. 123). According 
to him, an ontological reduction consists to carve off the 
surface features of a phenomenon and to redefine it in 
terms of the microlevel’s causes of these surface features. 
We make this when our interest is to know about the mi-
crocauses. The only difference between subjective states 
of consciousness and objectives system features (as li-
quidity or solidity) is that in the case of consciousness our 
interest are the surface features, so that we cannot carve 
off them. 
But what draw my attention is that Searle compares 
subjective with certain objective phenomena (as mud and 
music, see SEARLE, 2004, p. 120) – because, when we 
use the expressions “mud” and “music”, we are interested 
on the surface features of these phenomena – and, more-
over, says that we could make the redefinition if we want. 
These statements suggests (a) that consciousness is iden-
tical to brain processes and (b) that we are not interested 
in this identity when we use the expressions “conscious-
ness”, “pain”, etc. – as we are not interested in the identity 
of music and air movements when we speak, for example, 
about Beethoven’s ninth symphony. But these two claims 
seem problematic to me. Searle himself says that subjec-
tive and objective features are different – what becomes 
clear when we note that the description of molecular be-
havior can convey the surface features of mud, while the 
description of brain processes cannot convey the surface 
features of consciousness – and the fact that we are not 
interested in microcauses when we speak about surface 
features is trivial and cannot explain ontological irreduci-
bility. If objective descriptions never would convey the 
subjective character of conscious states, because they are 
different, then ontological irreducibility does not follows of 
our pragmatics interests in the surface features.3 
                                                     
 
3 A further strategy to defend Searle’s view would be to say that he takes 
consciousness not for identical but for supervenient to brain processes. But his 
position about supervenience is ambiguous. On one hand he says: “It is cer-
tainly true that consciousness is supervenient on the brain” (SEARLE, 2004, p. 
148). On the other hand he finds this concept not helpful and thinks that his 
own theory of cross-level causation (that implies identity) is more interesting: 
“the concept of supervenience adds nothing to the concepts the we already 
have, such concepts as causation, including bottom-up causation, higher and 
lower levels of description, and higher order features being realized in the 
system composed of the lower level elements.” (SEARLE, 2004, p. 149). The 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
I think that causal and ontological reduction – in Searle’s 
conception – is essentially linked and that causal reducibil-
ity is incompatible with ontological irreducibility. Because of 
this, Searle’s theory implies contradictory claims: in some 
moments he asserts that consciousness and brain proc-
esses are identical, in other moments he says that they are 
different. It seems to me that Jaegwon Kim realizes this 
inconsistence when he comments Searle’s claim that 
causal interactions between mental and physical phenom-
ena can be rediscribed at different levels: “Obviously, the 
redescription strategy is available only to those who accept 
‘M=P’, namely reducionist physicalists (Searle of course 
does not count himself among them).” (KIM, 2005, p. 48). 
Moreover Searle’s strategy to show that ontological irre-
ducibility is harmless seems to repeat the same mistake, 
then he suggests that consciousness and brain processes 
are identical, what is incompatible with his claims about 
ontological irreducibility (difference). This irreducibility is for 
me the most troublesome thesis of biological naturalism, 
and it would be very helpful for the credibility of the theory 
if this thesis was eliminated. Perhaps Searle should con-
ceive the difference between consciousness and brain 
processes in another way which is not ontological.4 
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concepts of levels of description and of realization implies identity (about 
realization see footnote 1 above). 
4 I am very grateful to Guido Imaguire and Noa Latham for many helpful 
comments and to Ananda Badaró for the correction of the English. 
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Algorithms and Ontology 
Walter Dean, New York, USA 
This purpose of this note is to advertise — but not answer 
— a question which is of significant foundational 
importance to both mathematics and computer science but 
which has been largely overlooked within philosophy of 
mathematics. Succinctly stated it is as follows:  
 
(A) Are the mathematical procedures conventionally 
termed algorithms themselves mathematical ob-
jects?1 
I will assume that some general notion of algorithm — i.e. 
of a practical method for solving a mathematical problem 
— is already implicit in mathematical practice. This seems 
reasonable since algorithms for simple arithmetic opera-
tions (e.g. the “grade school” long division algorithm) have 
long been commonplaces of our informal computational 
practice. Specific algorithms (e.g. Euclid's algorithm) are 
well known not only because of their antiquity but also 
because of the ways in which they have contributed to 
modern mathematics (e.g. in the definition of Euclidean 
domain or in the proof of Sturm's theorem). Finally, a great 
many other algorithms have been developed in conjunc-
tion with specific subfields of mathematics — e.g. Brent’s 
method in numerical analysis, Gosper’s algorithm in com-
binatorics, Strassen’s algorithm in matrix algebra — and 
will thus be known to specialists in these fields. 
Mathematicians have traditionally been most 
interested in applying algorithms to solve mathematical 
problems such as determining whether a given number is 
prime or that a function has a root in a given interval. This 
flags two important observations about the role of 
algorithms in contemporary mathematics: 1) that many of 
the individual mathematical statements which we now take 
ourselves to know (e.g. that certain numbers are prime) 
have been derived by the application of specific 
algorithms; and 2) that mathematical interest has generally 
been focused on the results of applying these methods 
rather than on the computational properties of the methods 
themselves.2 
The situation is quite different in contemporary 
computer science. In this context, algorithms are regarded 
as abstract objects in their own right whose properties may 
be directly studied and compared. This is evident from the 
sort of language used to describe individual algorithms, of 
which the following observations are typical: 
 
I) Individual algorithms are referred to by proper 
names — e.g. “Euclid's algorithm”, MERGESORT, 
                                                     
 
1 Although it appears that this question has not been systematically investiga-
ted by philosophers, the technical proposals of (Moschovakis 1998) and 
(Gurevich 1999) both seek to establish positive solutions.  However, both of 
these approaches arguably fall victim to the problem of “computational arti-
facts” which is discussed below. 
2 This is not, of course, to say that properties of algorithms are completely 
ignored by mathematicians. For in particular, it is acknowledged that prior to 
claiming that the fact that the application of an algorithm A to a value a yields b 
as output is a proof that the value of a function f at a is equal to b, A must be 
proven correct with respect to f -- i.e. it must be shown that ∀x[f(x) = A(x)]. 
Such proofs generally proceed by constructing a mathematical model M of A -- 
i.e. a purely mathematical representation of its mode of operation.  The availa-
bility of such representations might be taken to suggest that mathematical 
practice is already committed to some version of (A). However, since mathe-
maticians are not generally interested in the computational properties of indivi-
dual algorithms (e.g. their running time), they will generally accept correctness 
proofs based on models M which only weakly reflect the operation of the 
algorithms which they are introduced to represent. 
HEAPSORT, etc.  
II) Such names are used to predicate computational 
properties directly of individual algorithms — e.g. 
“MERGESORT” has running-time O(nlog2(n)).” 
III) General results are stated using quantifiers rang-
ing over algorithms — e.g. “There is a polynomial 
time algorithm for primality”, “If P ≠ NP, then there is 
no polynomial time algorithm for deciding proposi-
tional satisfiability”, “There is no comparison sorting 
algorithm with running-time less than O(nlog2(n)).” 
If we apply conventional standards of ontological commit-
ment to I)-III), we are led to the conclusion that computer 
science is committed to regarding algorithms realistically 
— i.e. as forming a class of objects to which algorithmic 
names (such as those in I)) refer, and over which quantifi-
ers (such as those in III)) range.  
To get an impression of what is at stake in our 
interpretation of such claims, it will be useful to consider 
the developments which led to the adoption of the idiom 
exemplified by I)-III). Statements of this sort are 
characteristic of a field known as algorithmic analysis 
which was established in the late 1950s by (Knuth 1973). 
Knuth proposed a means of measuring and comparing the 
efficiency of algorithms in terms of their so-called big-O 
running-time complexity — i.e. the asymptotic rate of 
growth of the number of steps O(tA(|x|)) it takes algorithm 
A to return a value on an input x as a function of its size. 
The development of this theory was motivated by the dual 
observations that i) there exist intuitively distinct algorithms 
A1 and A2 which compute the same function but which 
differ in their asymptotic running-time and ii) the relative 
efficiency of A1 and A2 in practice is often invariant with 
respect to how they are implemented relative to a 
particular formal model of computation M (e.g. as RAM 
machines). 
The first of these observations illustrates that within 
computer science, algorithms are treated intensionally. 
This is to say that an algorithm A is generally not identified 
with the function fA it computes, but rather with a 
procedure or method whose operation induces this 
function. That algorithms are indeed individuated in this 
manner may be illustrated by observing that a 
computational predicate like “A has running-time O(t(|x|))” 
creates a context in which the substitution of names for 
algorithms which compute the same function need not 
preserve truth value.3 The second observation records the 
fact that it is conventional to treat algorithms as the 
intrinsic bearers of asymptotic complexity theoretic 
properties. For not only is it often difficult to reason 
mathematically about the complexity of an algorithm if we 
are forced to work with a particular mathematical 
representation (e.g. RAM machine), but the combinatorial 
features of such representations often turn out to be 
irrelevant for comparing the behavior of different 
algorithms in practice.  
These observations shed some light on why it is 
useful to adopt an idiom which treats algorithms as 
                                                     
 
3 For instance, it does not follow from the fact that 1) MERGESORT has run-
ning-time O(|x|log2(|x|)), and 2) that MERGESORT and SELECTIONSORT com-
pute the same function that 3) SELECTIONSORT has running-time 
O(|x|log2(|x|)). 
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objects. But they also leave unanswered a variety of 
foundational questions concerning what it means to regard 
algorithms in this manner. For note that if algorithms are 
indeed treated as intensional entities within computer 
science, then we might fear that will be forced to posit a 
novel class of non-extensional (and perforce non-
mathematical) abstract objects in order to account for the 
truth conditions of statements of types II) and III).4 This 
concern serves to illustrate the importance of establishing 
a positive answer to (A).  
Some hope that such an answer may be given 
comes from reflecting on the origins of computer science 
within computability theory. The origins of the latter subject 
can be traced to the call to provide a mathematical 
definition of the class C of effectively computable functions 
as it arose within the Hilbert programme. It this context, 
there was general agreement that a function f: Nk → N is 
effectively computable just in case there exists an 
algorithm for computing its values. But in order to show 
that a given function is not effectively computable required 
that C be given a precise definition.  
The developments leading to the consensus that C 
should be identified with the class of partial recursive 
functions — i.e. to the claim now known as Church's 
Thesis [CT] — are sufficiently familiar that they need not 
be repeated here. What is less well recognized is that the 
original arguments for CT did not proceed by first giving a 
mathematical definition of a class A which could plausibly 
be taken to consist of objects corresponding to algorithms 
and then defining 
(C)  C =df {f : Nk → N : f(x1, ..., xn) = A(x1, ..., xn) & A ∈ A}  
 
Rather, Church, Turing, Gödel, and Post all proceeded by 
defining a class of formal models M (which I will refer to 
somewhat inaccurately as machines) which formalize 
different notions of what it means to be a finitary 
procedure. For instance, for Gödel, M consisted of the 
class of general recursive definitions. Such definitions can 
be taken to formalize a variety of ways in which functions 
can be introduced so that their values can be explicitly 
computed (e.g. by course of values recursion). But if we 
define FM to be the class of functions computable by 
members of M, for each choice of M, the question remains 
as to whether the corresponding class FM exhausts all 
effectively computable functions. 
In order to demonstrate that we ought to accept C = 
FM thus requires an additional argument that for any 
informally characterized algorithm A, there exists a 
machine M ∈ M such that A and M determine the same 
function. This appears to be an extensional claim about 
the relationship between two classes of functions. But note 
that any argument in its favor must apparently proceed by 
the following intensional route: i) given any algorithm A, 
there is an M ∈ M such that each step in the informally 
characterized operation of A can be correlated with one or 
more steps in the operation of M; ii) hence the function 
induced by the complete operation of M coincides with that 
induced by that of A. Incipient arguments to this effect may 
be found in the original papers of Church, Turing, and Post 
from 1936. Better fleshed out versions appear in the 
                                                     
 
4 The gravity of this concern will ultimately depend upon how tightly the prac-
tice of computer science pins down the identity conditions which must be 
imposed on algorithms. It follows from the example of the previous note that 
extensionally equivalent algorithms cannot be identified when they differ with 
respect to a definite computational property such as asymptotic running-time 
complexity, But at the same time, there do not appear to be cases in which 
statements of algorithmic non-identity -- i.e. of the form A1 ≠ A2 -- are accep-
ted in computer science when no such property serves to distinguish A1 and 
A2. 
writings of more recent commentators such as (Rogers 
1967), (Gandy 1980), and (Sieg & Brynes 2000).  
Inasmuch as any sound argument for CT must 
proceed in the manner just suggested, one might 
reasonably conclude that at least certain choices for M will 
include a formal representation of every algorithm.5 And on 
this basis, one might conclude that it is allowable to take  
A = M in (C). But the members of M will generally be finite 
combinatorial objects, and thus mathematical objects par 
excellence. Thus one also might conclude that not only 
should (A) be answered in the positive, but such an 
answer is already implicit in our acceptance of CT. 
The fact that such a conclusion is not warranted 
follows by reflecting further on some basic results which 
have emerged from algorithmic analysis. As noted above, 
for instance, algorithms are individuated at least as finely 
as their big-O running-times. But for certain choices of M, 
we can find examples of algorithms A computing certain 
functions f to which we assign running-time O(tA(|x|)) but 
for which it may be shown that there is no M ∈ M 
computing f with running-time O(tM(|x|)) ≤ O(tA(|x|)).
6 If we 
take the property of having running-time O(tA(|x|)) to be a 
property of A itself, then results like this suggest that we 
cannot take algorithms to be identical to members of any 
specific class M. For if we were to do so, there would be 
no guarantee that there is a member of M which faithfully 
represents A’s computational properties.  
This situation highlights the kind of conceptual and 
technical problems which arise when we attempt to settle 
(A) directly by identifying algorithms with machines. For on 
the one hand, the argument for CT sketched above 
promises to show that for every informally presented 
algorithm A, there will exist a machine M A ∈ M which 
mimics its step-by-step operation. But on the other hand, 
the question of determining when the existence of a 
particular form of step-by-step correlation is sufficient to 
allow us to conclude that M A is identical to A appears to 
require that we have a prior characterization of the 
properties of A itself. This is to say that before we can be 
in a position to assess whether a given argument for (A) of 
this form might be successful, we must first agree on how 
our computational practices fix the properties of individual 
algorithms.  
At this point, a number of analogies between (A) 
and various reductive proposals in the philosophy of 
mathematics can be drawn. For note that if we agree that 
algorithms are regarded as intensional objects in computer 
science, (A) amounts to the claim that reference to such 
entities can be eliminated in favor of extensional 
mathematical ones. The desire to demonstrate such a 
claim can thus be compared to the traditional nominalist 
desire to show how reference to mathematical entities can 
be eliminated in favor of reference to concrete ones. 
This observation suggests that other strategies are 
available in attempting to demonstrate (A) than simply 
attempting to identify a mathematical object to correlate 
with each individual algorithm — i.e. what (Burgess & 
                                                     
 
5 This point is put by (Rogers 1967) (p. 19) as follows: “[T]here is a sense in 
which each of the standard formal characterizations appears to include all 
possible algorithms ... For given a formal characterization..., there is a uniform 
effective way to ‘translate’ any set of instructions (i.e. algorithm) of that charac-
terization into a set of instructions of one of the standard formal characteriza-
tions.” 
6 A number of examples of lower-bound results of this nature are known for 
the single-tape, single-head Turing machine model T which is most often 
referenced in Rogers-style translation arguments. For instance, while there is 
a trivial O(n) algorithm for determining whether a binary string is a palindrome, 
no machine T ∈ T can solve this problem in time faster than O(n2) (cf. Hopcort 
and Ulman 1979). 
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Rosen 1997) call objectual reduction. Rather, we might 
start out by treating our computational practice as 
constituting a term-introducing “procedural” theory Tp. 
Such a theory would contain not only standard mathe-
matical terms and quantifiers, but also terms (A1, A2, ...) 
naming algorithms and quantifiers (∀X1, ∀X2, ...) ranging 
over such entities.  
The question as to whether Tp commits us to the 
existence of a non-mathematical class of entities 
corresponding to the range of the procedural quantifiers 
can accordingly be formalized by asking whether it is 
possible to interpret Tp over a purely mathematical theory 
Tm ⊆ Tp. In particular, we can ask whether Tp is 
conservative over Tm for purely mathematical statements 
and also whether it is possible to formulate Tm in a manner 
such that it is able to derive appropriate interpretations of 
results of types II) and III).   
Demonstrating the former fact is likely to be 
straightforward as it requires only that Tm is able to prove 
the correctness of various algorithms (in the sense of note 
2) relative to some means of representing them which 
need not reflect their intensional properties such as 
running-time. However, constructing an interpretation 
which is also capable of accounting for results in 
algorithmic analysis will most likely require that we attend 
to the details of how we make reference to individual 
algorithms in practice. Reflection on this topic suggests 
that: 1) the only linguistic means we have of referring to 
individual algorithms is via expressions of the form “the 
algorithm implemented by machine m”7; 2) we generally 
take it to be possible to refer to the same algorithm by 
referring to different machines. As a consequence, Tp is 
likely to contain many statements of the form imp(m1) = 
imp(m2), and imp(m1) ≠ imp(m2) (where imp(⋅)) is intended 
to formalize “the algorithm implemented by m”).  
This latter observation illustrates why it is unlikely 
that the interpretation of an algorithmic name like 
MERGESORT can be taken to be identical to any particular 
machine.8 If Tp is to reflect the grammatical structure of 
statements like those in II) and III), this suggests that we  
 
                                                     
 
7 The other option is to treat algorithms as corresponding to the denotations of 
programs -- i.e. linguistic descriptions of procedures given over a formal pro-
gramming language. However, reference to algorithms via this route arguably 
collapses into reference via machines as each program will be interpretable as 
a machine via an appropriate form of operational semantics. 
8 For if we take A = M for a fixed M there will generally be no way of defining 
imp so that these identity and non-identity statements are satisfied. More 
generally, such a proposal will entail that the computational properties of A are 
identical to those of M. But this will generally be unacceptable since machines 
possess a variety of “artifactual” properties which we generally do not attribute 
to algorithms -- e.g. have a fixed number of states, having exact (as opposed 
to asymptotic) running-time, etc. 
must take the values of imp(⋅) to be equivalences classes 
of machines under a definition of computational 
equivalence ≈ defined over a suitable class of machines 
M.9 Such a definition would ideally serve to analyze the 
meaning of statements of the form  
 
(M) machines m1 and m2 implement the same algorithm 
 
in a manner which additionally satisfied all statements of 
algorithmic identity and non-identity contained in Tp. On 
this proposal, the sustainability of (A) will rest on the 
availability of such a definition of equivalence. If such a 
definition could be given, we would have shown how it was 
possible to contextually reduce procedural discourse to 
mathematical discourse (again in the sense of Burgess & 
Rosen). The ontological status of algorithms could 
accordingly be taken to be that of (neo)-Fregean abstracts 
over M relative to ≈.  
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9 This fact is recognized by Moschovakis (who identifies algorithms as equiva-
lence classes of computational models known as recursors) but it is ultimately 
denied by Gurevich. Even for Moschovakis, however, the question remains 
whether his chosen notion of equivalence either 1) serves to analyze the 
meaning of statements of the form (M) and 2) induces identity questions on 
algorithms which are consistent with those reflected by Tp. 
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The Knower Paradox and the Quantified Logic of Proofs 
Walter Dean / Hidenori Kurokawa, New York, USA 
The Knower paradox was originally introduced by 
(Montague and Kaplan 1960) [M&K]. We will begin by 
recording a simple version of the paradox adapted from 
(Egré 2005). Suppose that T extends Q and let K(x) be a 
(possibly complex) predicate in LT. It follows that T proves 
a fixed point theorem of the following form: 
 
(FP) For every open formula φ(x) in LT, there exists a sen-
tence δ such that 
(*)  T ⊢ φ(δ) ↔ δ. 
Now suppose K(x) additionally satisfies 
(T) T ⊢ K(φ) → φ 
(Nec) if T ⊢ φ, then T ⊢ K(φ) 
Then it may be shown that T is inconsistent by letting δ be 
such that  
1) T ⊢ ¬K(δ) → δ    
2) T ⊢ K(δ) → ¬δ      
via (FP) and then arguing as follows 
 
3)  K(δ) → δ T 
4)  ¬K(δ)   2), 3) 
5) δ   1), 4) 
6) K(δ)   5), Nec 
7)  ⊥ 
The foregoing presentation of the Knower departs from 
that of M&K in two respects. The first of these is that rather 
than using a sentence δ satisfying 1), 2), they use one 
satisfying K(¬δ) ↔ δ. The second is that we have em-
ployed the rule Nec, as opposed to assuming that K(x) 
satisfies the axioms  
 
(U) K(K φ → φ) 
(I)  K(φ) & I(φ,ψ) → K(ψ) 
wherein I(φ,ψ) expresses that ψ is derivable from φ. It may 
reasonably be claimed that the original derivation of M&K 
rests on a set of principles which more precisely isolates 
the source of the paradox than those we have employed. 
We have elected to base our treatment on 1)-7) because 
the resolution we suggest below will also be applicable to 
the choice of fixed point and weaker principles employed 
by M&K.  
It is also notable that the Knower was originally 
formulated in an arithmetic language as opposed to one 
with a propositional operator. This reflects the fact that 
M&K assume that such a setting is required in order to 
ensure the existence of self-referential statements and 
argues that they took the paradox to weaken Quine’s 
argument that modal operators must be conceived as 
predicates of sentences. As Érgé convincingly argues, 
however, the availability of self-reference in a language 
with modal operators is essentially independent of whether 
we think of these operators as taking sentences or 
propositions as arguments. 
This observation suggests that by viewing the 
foregoing derivation in a modal setting, it may be possible 
to isolate the principles which lead to paradox in a manner 
that does not depend on the mechanism by which self-
reference is achieved. It is an easy observation that this 
derivation remains valid when we reinterpret K(x) as a 
propositional operator   and treat the arithmetic sentence δ 
as a denoting a fixed proposition D of which  
8)  ¬D ↔ D  
is provable. When recast in this light, the derivation can be 
taken to show that there is a general conflict between the 
modal reflection axiom T (which is the analogue of T) and 
any modal principles which would imply 8). 
One means by which this can be demonstrated is to 
note that the logic S4 (which includes T) is incompatible 
with self-reference in the sense that not only is it incapable 
of proving any instance of 8) but also  
9) S4 +  (¬D ↔ D) is inconsistent1 
This result might be taken to bear on the Knower not only 
because its proof essentially recapitulates 1)-7), but also 
because there is a well-known interpretation of S4 
whereby  is assigned the reading  
10) F iff F is informally provable  
Such an interpretation was first proposed by (Gödel 1933) 
in an attempt to provide a provability semantics for in-
tuitionistic logic. The details of what follows do not, how-
ever, rely specifically on the relationship between S4 and 
intuitionism. Rather, they depend on the availability of so-
called explicit refinements of S4 which can be employed to 
reason about knowledge qua provability.  
For present purposes, an explicit modal logic can be 
taken to be one that possesses an infinite family of 
modalities of the form t:F. As opposed to 10), wherein  
expresses a notion of provability in which proofs are kept 
implicit, this notation is conventionally assigned the 
interpretation 
 
11) t:φ iff t verifies φ 
 
Here t may be a structured term which, in the paradigmatic 
case, is taken to denote an explicit mathematical proof. A 
system employing this notation was envisioned by (Gödel 
1938). However, a complete formalization of a logic of 
explicit proof was first provided by (Artemov 2001) under 
the name LP (the Logic of Proofs).  
LP itself is not sufficient to express the versions of 
FP and T which are required to formulate the Knower. For 
note that on their intended interpretations, both the 
arithmetic knowledge predicate K(x) and the informal 
provability predicate  contain implicit quantifiers over 
proofs or other evidentiary entities. This is clearest in the 
case of K(x), which is standardly taken to extend an 
arithmetic provability predicate Bew(y) which itself 
abbreviates a statement of the form ∃xProof(x,y). 
Although as Gödel already observed, the  of S4 cannot 
be interpreted as expressing provability within formal 
                                                     
 
1 This tension also surfaces with respect to the provability logic GL in which 
statements like 8) are provable. However, it may easily be shown that GL + T 
is inconsistent. 
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arithmetic, 10) is already suggestive of quantification over 
a domain of informal proofs — cf. (Tait 2001).  
In order to reconstruct the Knower in a system of 
explicit modal logic, we need a version of LP which 
contains quantifiers ranging over proofs. Such a system is 
presented in (Fitting 2004) under the name QLP. The 
language of QLP is given by first specifying a class of 
proof terms  
TermQLP = c | x | !t | t1 ⋅ t2 | t1 + t2 | <t∀x> 
 
The class of formulas of LP is then specified as follows: 
 
FormLP = P | t: φ | ¬φ | φ → ψ | (∀x)φ | (∃x)φ 
 
The axioms of QLP are as follows: 
LP1  all tautologies of classical propositional logic  
LP2  t:( φ → ψ) → (s: φ → t·s:ψ)  
LP3  t: φ → φ 
LP4  t: φ →!t:t: φ  
LP5  t: φ → t+s: φ and s: φ → t+s: φ  
QLP1  (∀x) φ (x) → φ (t)  
QLP2  (∀x)(ψ → φ(x)) → (ψ → (∀x) φ (x))  
QLP3  φ(t) → (∃x)φ(x)  
QLP4  (∀x)(φ(x) → ψ) → ((∃x)φ(x) → ψ)  
UBF  (∀x)t:φ(x) → <t∀x>:(∀x)φ(x),  x ∉ FV(t)  
Axioms LP1-LP5 correspond to versions of the S4 axioms 
wherein instances of  have been “realized” by proof 
terms. Axioms QLP1-QLP4 correspond to a set of axioms 
adequate for classical predicate calculus and to which the 
usual free variable restrictions apply. UBF is an explicit 
form of the Barcan formula and is justified on the basis of 
the observation that if we possess a proof term t which 
serves to uniformly verify φ(x) for all x, then there should 
be a proof (denoted by the complex proof term <t∀x>) 
which serves to justify (∀x) φ(x). The rules of QLP consist 
of modus ponens and universal generalization together 
with a rule known as axiom necessitation. This rule says 
that if φ is an axiom of QLP, then we may introduce c:φ 
where c is a so-called proof constant — i.e. an unstruc-
tured proof term introduced as an atomic justification for φ.  
Before reconstructing the derivation of the Knower 
in QLP, it will be useful to record the following technical 
result: 
Theorem (Lifting) [Artemov/Fitting]  
 
If QLP ⊢ φ, then for some proof term t, QLP ⊢ t:φ. 
The Lifting Theorem reports that if a statement φ is derivable 
in QLP, its derivation may be internalized within the system 
so as to yield a proof term t which exhibits its structure. As 
such, the Lifting Theorem serves as a sort of explicit coun-
terpart to the S4 necessitation rule (i.e. ⊢ F / ⊢ F) which 
itself is an implicit form of the rule Nec used to justify the 
step 5)-6).  
The final step which we must undertaken before 
reconstructing the Knower is to introduce some means of 
introducing an explicit analog of a self referential statement 
which mirrors (*). The most straightforward way to proceed 
is to simply consider the result of adjoining a statement of 
the form  
 
12) d:(¬(∃x)x:D ↔ D) 
which formalizes “d is a proof of ‘there does not exist a 
proof of D iff D’.” Reasoning in QLP from 12) as a premise, 
we may now derive a contradiction as follows: 
13) ¬(∃x)x:D → D left to right direction of 11) 
14) (∃x)x:D → ¬D right to left direction of 11) 
15) (∃x)x:D → D derivable in QLP 
16) ¬(∃x)x:D propositional logic 
17) D   
18)  t : D  for some term t obtainable via Lifting  
19) t : D → (∃x)x:D QLP3 
20) (∃x)x:D  
21) ⊥ 
 
The step 17)-18) is analogous to the step 5)-6) in the origi-
nal derivation. In the case of QLP, however, this step is 
elliptical in the sense that although we know a term t exists 
via the Lifting Theorem, such a term must be explicitly 
constructed by internalizing steps 13)-18). Constructing t 
requires not only constants d1 and d2 such that  
 
21) d1:(¬(∃x)x:D → D)    
22) d2:((∃x)x:D → ¬D) 
(which may be constructed from d in 12)) but also a proof 
term which serves as a verification of 16). Note that while 
this statement is a explicit analog of an instance of the 
reflection axiom T, it is not an axiom of QLP. Not only must 
this statement be derived in QLP, but to construct t, its 
proof must also be lifted. This may be done as follows: 
 
24) x:D →D        LP3 
25) r:(x:D → D)       axiom necessitation  
26) (∀x)r:(x:D → D)       universal generalization 
27) (∀x)r:(x:D → D) → <r∀x>:∀x:(x:D → D)     UBF 
28) <r∀x>:(∀x):(x:D → D) 
29) (∀x)r:(x:D → D) → ((∃x):D → D)   QLP4 
30) q:[(∀x)r : (x:D → D) → ((∃x):D → D)]   axiom necessitation 
31) q ·<r∀x>:((∃x):D → D)       LP2 
With this derivation in hand, it is then easy to see that we 
may take 
31) t ≡ d1 · ((a · (q · <r∀x>)) ·d2)  
where a is a proof constant for the tautology (ϕ → ψ) → 
((ϕ → ¬ ψ) → ¬ ϕ). 
The insight which we think QLP provides into the 
Knower can now be framed by considering the role which 
UBF plays in the foregoing derivation. For note that QLP 
includes neither a general necessitation rule analogous to 
Nec, nor even a local instance of this principle akin to U. 
As we have just seen, however, the explicit forms of both 
principles — i.e. 
 
32) (∃x):D → D and 
33) q · <r∀x>:((∃x):D → D)  
— are derivable in QLP. Both of these principles are re-
quired in order for the derivation 13)-21) to go through. 
However UBF turns out to essential to the derivation of 33) 
as it may be shown , without UBF, no statement of the 
form t:((∃x):D → D) is derivable in QLP.2  
This is significant for diagnosing how the principles 
involved in the original derivation of the Knower conflict. 
Several recent commentators have proposed that the 
paradox should be resolved by rejecting U.3 However, the 
                                                     
 
2 This follows from the fact that UBF is not conservative over the QLP-UBF for 
statements not containing terms of the of <r∀x>. In particular, it may be 
shown that for no φ, do we have QLP−UBF ⊢ (∃y)y:((∃x): φ → φ). 
3 More specifically, among the three principles employed in the original M&K 
derivation (i.e. T, U and I), the consensus among recent commentators has 
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original motivation for adopting this principle over the Nec 
rule seems to be mainly to reduce the strength of the 
assumptions required to develop the paradox. (Note in 
particular that the epistemic rational which is commonly 
given for adopting U seems to be a special case of that 
which is given for Nec.) If we develop the Knower in the 
context of QLP, not only is neither principle accorded 
elementary status, but the foregoing observations 
demonstrate that if we think of knowledge in terms of proof 
existence, that there is an implicit interaction between the 
knowledge modality and proof quantification implicit in the 
original derivation. It is precisely this interaction which is 
exposed by the role of UBF in QLP derivation.  
This observation prompts a reconsideration of UBF 
itself. The original motivation for its inclusion in QLP was to 
preserve the Lifting Theorem (a version of which also 
holds for LP). However, in light of the original setting of the 
Knower, one might also inquire into its arithmetic 
significance. In this regard, a parallel may be drawn 
between UBF and implicit form of the Barcan formula — 
i.e. 
34) (∀x)φ(x) → (∀x)φ(x) 
— in the context of Quantified Provability Logic. As (Boolos 
1993) observes, if we take Φ(x) ≡ ¬ProofPA(x,⊥), then it 
may readily be seen that 34) is not arithmetically valid. For 
note that on this interpretation, the antecedent expresses 
the fact that no natural number is provably a proof of ⊥, 
while the consequent expresses the fact that it is provable 
that there is no proof of ⊥. But of course the former state-
ment is true (in the standard model), whereas, per the 
second incompleteness theorem, the latter is false (assum-
ing that PA is consistent).  
Now define an arithmetic interpretation of QLP to be 
a mapping (⋅)* which i) replaces every propositional letter 
P with an arithmetic sentence (P)* and every proof term t 
with a natural number or variable according to its type, ii) is 
such that (x:φ)* = ProofPA(x,φ*), iii) commutes with 
connectives, and iv) is such that ((∀x)φ)* = (∀x)[Pf(x) → φ*] 
(where Pf(x) expresses that x is a code of a proof). On the 
basis of such an interpretation, it may similarly be shown 
that UBF is not arithmetically valid. In particular, the 
interpretation of UBF for Φ(x) = ¬x:⊥ corresponds to the 
claim that if for all natural numbers x, (b)* is a proof that if x 
codes a proof, then ¬ProofPA(x,⊥), then (<b∀x>)* is a 
proof that there is no proof of ⊥. On the assumption that 
(<b∀x>)* denotes a standard natural number (and that PA 
is consistent), this conclusion also violates the second 
incompleteness theorem. And from this it follows that there 
can be no uniform means of arithmetically interpreting 
proof terms of the form <t∀x>. 
                                                                             
 
been to blame the paradox on either U or I. (Maitzen 1998) argues that the 
paradox may be resolved by rejecting the assumption that knowledge is clo-
sed under deductive consequence as embodied by I.  However, (Cross, 2001) 
shows that a version of the Knower may be developed by using a modified 
knowledge predicate which is not assumed to be deductively closed. This 
observation appears to lay the blame squarely on the principle U -- a point of 
view which is adopted by both Cross and Érgé. We take our explicit recons-
truction of the Knower to deepen the motivation for adopting this position. 
We take the foregoing observations to highlight the 
applicability of explicit modal logic to the Knower, but also 
point to a more precise diagnosis of the root of the 
paradox. For not only does the use of constructive 
necessitation in the derivation allow us to see logical 
structure which is hidden by the use of principles like U or 
Nec in the original derivation, but it also appears that there 
are good reasons to be suspicious of at least one of the 
principles which is suppressed in the original derivation — 
i.e. UBF — at least if we wish to assign it an arithmetic 
interpretation. 
This desire may be reasonable if we look to 
arithmetic for the source of self reference required to 
develop the Knower. However, if our aim is merely to 
reason about justified knowledge more generally, there 
may also be good reasons to retain UBF. For not only 
does it arises naturally out of reflection on the notion of 
informal proof and provability, it also allows us to prove the 
provable consistency of our reasoning about these 
concepts. Both facts appear to have been foreseen by 
(Gödel 1938, p. 101-103). Much more can be said about 
these issues, but doing so is outside the scope of the 
current paper.  
Literature 
Artemov, Sergei 2001 "Explicit Provability and Constructive Se-
mantics", The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7(1), 1-36.  
Boolos, George 1993 The Logic of Provability, New York: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Cross, Charles 2001 "The Paradox of the Knower without Epis-
temic Closure", Mind 113, 109-114.  
Egre, Paul 2005 "The Knower Paradox in the Light of Provability 
Interpretation of Modal Logic", Journal of Logic, Language and 
Information 14, 13-48. 
Fitting, Melvin 2004 "Quantified LP", Technical report, CUNY Ph. 
D. Program in Computer Science Technical Report TR2004019.   
Gödel, Kurt 1933 "An Interpretation of the Intuitionistic Proposi-
tional Calculus", in: Solomon Feferman et al. (eds.), Collected 
Works, Vol. 1 K. Gödel, New York: Oxford University Press.  
Gödel, Kurt 1938 "Lecture at Zilsel's", in: Solomon Feferman et al. 
(eds.), Collected Works, Vol. 3, K. Godel, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.  
Kaplan, David and Montague, Richard 1960 "A Paradox Re-
gained", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1, 79-90.  
Maitzen, Stephen 1998 "The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Clo-
sure", Synthese 114, 337-54. 
Tait, William 2006 “ Gödel’s interpretation of intuitionism”, Philoso-
phia Mathematica 14, 208-228.  
 
 
 
  64 
Quine on the Reduction of Meanings 
Lieven Decock, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Quine’s semantic nihilism is well-known. From his earliest 
work onwards, he expelled meanings from his ontology. 
One of the important innovations in his doctoral thesis, The 
Logic of Sequences, which is a reworked version of 
Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica, was 
extensionalism. Quine replaced the intensional 
propositional functions by extensional classes. During his 
trip to Europe in 1933, he discovered that this had become 
standard practice in Europe, and has defended 
extensionalism ever since, even in his latest writings. The 
only universals one should accept are classes. He 
regarded classes or sets as bona fide objects, because 
there is a clear criterion of identity, viz. classes can be 
identified through their members. For intensions no such 
criterion is available, so they cannot be hypostasised 
(1960:244). For some years, Quine also tried to get rid of 
classes (Quine 1936; Goodman & Quine 1947), but he 
came to recognize the necessity of positing sets, thus 
giving up strict nominalism. 
Quine’s extensionalism has determined his views on 
meaning and semantics. Attributes or meanings, the 
intensional components of universals, are only acceptable 
if they can be given a clear criterion of identity. In practice, 
this meant that meanings are only acceptable insofar they 
can be reduced to clearly identifiable objects, i.e. classes 
of classes, … , of physical objects. In Quine’s work, one 
can find two concrete proposals for such a reduction. In 
the first proposal empirical meanings are characterised as 
stimulus meanings, i.e. classes of physical stimuli, in the 
second they are classes of linguistic expressions. Quine 
judges both proposals unsuccessful.  
Quine defines a stimulus meaning as the ordered 
pair of the affirmative stimulus meaning and the negative 
stimulus meaning (1960:31-35). The affirmative stimulus 
meaning is the class of all stimulations to which a given 
speaker at a date would assent; the negative stimulus 
meaning the class of stimulation to which she would 
dissent. The proposal can be sharpened by using reaction 
time to measure doubt, or by introducing a modulus, i.e. a 
maximum time duration for stimulations. So far, stimulus 
meaning is reduced to an ordered pair of classes of 
stimulations. An ordered pair can be reduced by means of 
Kuratowski’s or Wiener’s reduction method to sets (1960 
§53). Hence, a stimulus meaning is clearly identifiable if 
stimulations can be reduced to simpler entities. The 
stimulations can be ocular irradiation patterns together with 
“the various barrages of other senses, separately and in all 
synchronous combinations” (1960:33). Ocular irradiation 
patterns are types of evolving chromatic irradiation 
patterns of all durations up to some modulus. An 
alternative is defining an external momentary stimulation 
as “the set of [a person’s] triggered receptors.” (1981:50) 
Quine’s notion of stimulus meaning is unproblematic from 
a reductionist point of view. Empirical meanings are 
reduced by means of reduction strategies that are 
acceptable for Quine to entities that Quine finds 
unproblematic, namely physical objects and classes.  
The reduction strategy is clearly inspired by 
Carnap’s reduction programme in Der logische Aufbau der 
Welt. Quine’s worries concerning stimulus meaning accord 
with his objections to Carnap’s early reduction programme 
and his later verification theory of meaning (Carnap 1936). 
Quine believes that stimulus meaning is restricted to 
observation sentences, whereas most sentences are not 
immediately linked to sensory stimulations. Only sentences 
at the boundary of the web of belief have stimulus 
meaning, but this is only a small fraction of all sentences. 
Hence, stimulus meaning is not a viable basis for 
semantics, because the meaning of most sentences 
cannot be explained as stimulus meaning. In brief, Quine 
has given an impeccable reduction strategy, and at the 
same time pointed out its severe limitations. 
In Quine’s second reduction strategy, “we could 
define the meaning of an expression as the class of all 
expressions like it in meaning.” (1992:52; see also 
1960:201; 1979:140; 1981:46). The reduction of 
expressions is unproblematic, either to classes (via Gödel 
numbering and the reduction of numbers to sets) or to 
classes of physical objects (inscriptions). More noteworthy, 
the class of meaningful expressions can be precisely 
delineated in grammar (see Decock 2002:86). For the 
reduction strategy to work, the only further requirement is 
that a precise characterisation of the dyadic predicate “x is 
alike in meaning with y” or “x is synonymous with y” is 
elaborated. In his early work, Quine is extremely sceptical 
about this notion of synonymy, especially for standing 
sentences (1960:201). Of course, one can use stimulus 
meaning to define synonymy, and even with the help of 
first order logic extend this notion to ‘cognitive synonymy’ 
(1979), but this will not help for standing sentences. The 
only alternative is to characterise synonymy by means of 
the notion of analyticity: “Once we have analyticity, 
cognitive equivalence is forthcoming; for two sentences 
are cognitive equivalent if and only if their truth-functional 
biconditional is analytic.” (1992:54f) In view of Quine’s 
well-known demise of the analytic-synthetic distinction, this 
looks like a dead end.  
However, in an interview on the occasion of the Rolf 
Schock prize in November 1993, Quine said: 
 
Yes so, on this score I think of the truths of logic as 
analytic in the traditional sense of the word, that is 
to say true by virtue of the meanings of the words. 
Or as I would prefer to put it: they are learned or can 
be learned in the process of learning to use the 
words themselves, and involve nothing more. They 
are analytic in the same sense in which the stan-
dard example such as “No bachelor is married”, is 
analytic: something that’s learned in the process of 
learning to use the word “bachelor” itself. 
(Bergström & Føllesdal 1994, 199f) 
This passage and other more covert passages (1974:79; 
1992:55) look like a recantation of one of Quine’s most 
famous claims. Quine admits that theorems of first order 
logic can be analytic, and that sentences such as “No 
bachelor is married” can be analytic. It is arguable that 
Quine has regarded first order logic as analytic since the 
end of the 1940s, or even propositional logic as analytic 
since ‘Truth by convention’ (1936). Nevertheless, the claim 
that “No bachelor is married” can be analytic, is a radical 
departure from earlier claims. Quine here offers a clear 
behaviouristic characterisation of analyticity. This further 
implies that synonymy and meaning become unproblem-
atic, at least for expressions that are analytically equiva-
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lent. It also implies that an inventory of analytic statements 
can be made up, and that with the help of first order logic 
semantical rules or meaning postulates can be distilled. 
In other words, the section about ‘meaning 
postulates’ in Quine’s ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ 
becomes unconvincing. Section 4 of ‘Two dogmas of 
empiricism’ is a long critical discussion of semantical rules. 
Quine writes:  
 
Now the notion of semantical rule is as sensible and 
meaningful as that of postulate, if conceived in a 
similarly relative spirit – relative in time, to one or 
another particular enterprise of schooling unconver-
sant persons in sufficient conditions for truth of 
statements of some natural or artificial language L. 
But from this point of view no one signalization of a 
subclass of truths of L is intrinsically more a seman-
tical rule than another; and, if ‘analytic’ means ‘true 
by semantical rules’, no one truth of L is analytic to 
the exclusion of another. (1953:34) 
We see that Quine argues that the characterisation of ana-
lyticity is in the end circular. However, in view of Quine’s 
extreme antifoundationalism this is hardly an objection. 
Second, he argues that the distinction of analytic and syn-
thetic statements on the basis of semantical rules is arbi-
trary. But this is hardly a serious objection to Carnap. Al-
ready in 1934, in The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap 
had formulated his principle of tolerance, claiming that 
there are no morals for setting up linguistic frameworks. 
The arbirtrariness of the choice of semantic rules, and thus 
of L-determinate statements is an essential ingredient of 
Carnap’s later philosophy. In the early thirties, Carnap still 
believed that a formal characterisation of analyticity could 
be found, but he was soon convinced by Gödel, Tarski, 
and McLane that the construction was flawed. Quine must 
have known that Carnap was only interested in language-
relative notions of analyticity. Moreover, there is no reason 
to believe that the verification theory of meaning is still an 
essential part of Carnap’s notion of meaning. Hence, it is 
hard to see how Quine’s critique relates to the position 
Carnap endorsed in Meaning and Necessity. It seemingly 
took several decades before Quine realised that analytic-
ity, synonymy, meaning, and semantical rules can rather 
innocuously be grounded in behavioural practice. Quine 
did have serious arguments against Carnap’s various pro-
posals of an analytic-synthetic distinction, and certainly 
with regard to the distinction between factual and mathe-
matical truths, but it is ironical that Quine’s most famous 
argument is least firmly grounded, and even later to a 
large degree withdrawn. 
In The Roots of Reference, some of the critical re-
marks of ‘Two dogmas’ still find an echo though. Quine 
gives the following behaviourist definition of analyticity: 
 
If the samples first acquired qualify as analytic, still 
they gain thereby no distinctive status with respect 
to the language or the community; for each of us will 
have derived his universal categorical powers from 
different first samples. Language is social, and ana-
lyticity, being truth that is grounded in language, 
should be social as well. Here then we may at last 
have a line on a concept of analyticity: a sentence is 
analytic if everybody learns that it is true by learning 
its words. Analyticity, like observationality, hinges on 
social uniformity. (1974:79) 
The complaint about the complete arbitrariness of choos-
ing meaning postulates is here replaced by the observa-
tion that different people learn the domestic language in a 
different way, so that everyone could have an idiosyncratic 
notion of analyticity. The list of analytic truths is thus dras-
tically reduced through the requirement that everyone 
must have learned the truth of an analytic sentence 
through learning the language. This important qualification 
notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that already in 1974 
Quine gave a precise definition of analyticity by means of 
which in principle a reduction of meanings was possible.  
A further step in Carnap’s direction can be taken. If 
analyticity hinges on social uniformity, it becomes possible 
to impose the uniformity through social linguistic 
engineering. For Carnap, this is entirely unproblematic. He 
was actively engaged in the promotion of artificial 
languages such as Esperanto. In the Vienna Circle, an 
artificial pictorial language, ISOTYPE, had been 
constructed by Otto Neurath and his wife. Carnap’s 
construction of artificial linguistic frameworks in his major 
semantical works ties in with his engineering approach 
towards natural language. On this view, it is possible to 
regard semantical rules not as arbitrary formal postulates, 
but as social imperatives concerning the use of certain 
expressions. Social uniformity need not be the result of 
every individual’s learning the language, but may be 
effectuated through teaching the language in standardised 
ways. The normative force of schoolbooks, dictionaries, 
etc. can thus significantly broaden the class of analytic 
expressions. As a result, language can be transformed 
and streamlined.  
For Quine, however, this line of reasoning is 
problematic. Quine regularly stresses that the formal 
frameworks must be interpreted, and often gives the 
impression that he believes that this is only possible by 
borrowing their meaning from the natural language in 
which they are embedded. Both in ‘Two dogmas of 
empiricism’ and ‘Carnap on logical truth’, he demands that 
the notion of analyticity be clear in the natural language 
before application of the notion to artificial languages be 
feasible (1953:36; 1976:127). On the other hand, in the 
introduction to the chapter on ‘regimentation’, i.e. the 
transformation of a scientific theory expressed in natural 
language into a theory expressed in first order logic, in 
Word and Object, Quine writes: 
 
Opportunistic departure from ordinary language in a 
narrow sense is part of ordinary linguistic behavior. 
Some departures, if the need that prompts them 
persists, may be adhered to, thus becoming ordi-
nary language in the narrow sense; and herein lies 
one factor in the evolution of language. Others are 
reserved for use as needed. (1960:157).  
The passage illustrates Quine’s ambivalence towards arti-
ficial languages and linguistic engineering. Sentences can 
be meaningful in natural language, but meaning postulates 
in artificial languages are usually parasitic on the meaning-
fulness of natural languages, or at best, as the quoted 
passage illustrates, can become meaningful in the long 
run. Moreover, dictionaries do not stipulate meanings, but 
are merely an inventory of a variety of uses: 
 
Though the word ‘meaning’ is ubiquitous in lexicog-
raphy, no capital is made of a relation of sameness 
of meaning. An entry gets broken down into several 
“meanings” or “senses,” so called, but only ad hoc 
to explain how to use a word in various dissimilar 
situations. When a word is partly explained by para-
phrasing a sample context, as is so often the way, 
the paraphrase is meant only for typical circum-
stances, or for specified ones; there is no thought of 
sameness of meaning in any theoretical sense. 
(1995:83) 
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In conclusion, Quine has two reduction methods for mean-
ings. The first, interpreting empirical meaning as stimulus 
meaning has limited applicability. In the second method, 
meanings are regarded as sets of synonymous expres-
sions, whereby synonymy is characterised through analy-
ticity, which is in a behaviourist way explained as true as a 
result of learning the language. This could be explained as 
resulting from socially imposed semantical rules, but Quine 
refrains from taking this last step. It is as if only his aver-
sion of transforming the natural language prevents him 
from taking it.  
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The Scapegoat Theory of Causality 
Marcello di Paola, Rome, Italy 
1. 
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s position was radically anti-
factualist. Hume’s influence was evident: the cause-effect 
relation cannot be observed: belief in the causal nexus is 
superstition.  
But Wittgenstein also embraced the Kantian insight: 
though there are no causal facts, the logical structure of 
the world/language is causal, i.e. causality is the only form 
in which our descriptive systems can be conceived. Natu-
ral laws, whether they exist or not, are the grammar of our 
thoughts and language. Causality is the grammar of sci-
ence.  
At the end of the Philosophical Investigations, how-
ever, Wittgenstein throws in a totally original viewpoint, 
questioning the primacy of grammar in general:  
 
“If the formation of concepts can be explained in 
reference to natural facts, then, rather than on 
grammar, should we not perhaps involve ourselves 
with what, in nature, grounds it?” PI, XII 
 
“Compare a concept with a style of painting. Can we 
just choose it or not? Are we here simply talking of 
what’s pretty and what’s ugly?” PI, XII  
Indeed, in On Certainty knowledge would finally be charac-
terized as a decision: 
 
“We do not learn the praxis of empirical judgement 
by learning rules; we are taught judgements, and 
their connections to other judgements. We are pre-
sented with the plausibility of a totality of judge-
ments”. OC, 140 
 
“My ‘state of mind’, the “knowing”, is for me not a 
guarantee of what happened. It consists of this: that 
I would not be able to see where a doubt could 
arise, where supervision would be possible”.  
OC, 356 
 
“But here, is it then not shown that knowledge re-
sembles a decision?” OC, 362 
The roots of this view are to be sought in Cause and Ef-
fect. There Wittgenstein does the background work for his 
final conception of what “knowing” is. Before ramifying into 
the world, logical structures germinate from the seeds of 
action. The way we think matches the morphology of the 
way we act. Action is decision. To know is to judge. To 
know with certainty is: 
 
“When a guy says that he will not recognize any ex-
perience as evidence for the contrary; this is no 
doubt a decision”. OC, 368  
To know is to pass a verdict. This fits with popular charac-
terizations of reason as a tribunal. What reason does is 
investigating; but, pace Kant and Tractatus, this is not a 
logical enterprise. The grammar of the world/language 
evolves from the practical facts of society. We may, for our 
convenience, invent many alternative natural histories in 
order to study concepts: but to know with certainty we 
must decide and elect only one among them, and not 
doubt our decision thereafter. A concept is like a style of 
painting, but we do not choose it on aesthetic grounds: it 
embodies the evolution of social judgements. This interpre-
tation of PI, XII sees reason as a tribunal, and human 
practice as the jury. 
2. 
In CE, Wittgenstein rejects Russell’s thesis on causality. 
To explain why we describe the world as causally struc-
tured there is no need to postulate any direct intuitions of 
causal relations: it is enough to point out that certain 
statements, describing a first event as the cause of a sec-
ond, are simply never subjected to criticism. The linguistic 
game of causality does not start with a doubt. However, to 
consider causal statements as “beyond doubt” does not 
amount to their being transcendentally grounded (contra 
Kant); nor (contra Russell) to their being intuitions, as 
when I am hit with a stick, experience pain, and intuitively 
know that the blow caused the pain.  
The experience of pain is one we may genuinely call 
“experience of a cause”, says Wittgenstein. But not be-
cause we are directly and unmistakably made aware of a 
specific cause. There could be endless possible alternative 
causes for the pain: while the blow may only have the 
function of giving me the impression of touch, pain could 
actually be exploding inside me (a micro-bomb, previously 
inoculated).  
Causal propositions are beyond doubt not because 
they are solidly grounded on a priori categories or intui-
tions, but because their being grounded at all is not even 
in question. I cannot be certain about any specific cause: 
but I must (I want to) be certain about there being a cause 
in general. Not to question certain things is a practical 
methodology.  
In CE, Wittgenstein constructs an elegant Ge-
dankexperiment to show how we come to speak of causes: 
 
two plants, a rose and a poppy. I am led to think that 
the macro-differences I see between them corre-
spond to micro-differences in their seeds’ biological 
compositions. Different seeds cause different plants: 
I doubt not that fine-grained genetic inspections 
would find the seeds to differ in some respect. This 
is the medieval doctrine that all the “perfections” of 
the effect already be present in the cause: the “pipe-
line” conception of causality (Martin, 2008). 
Wittgenstein proposes to block the pipeline: suppose the 
seeds are found to be identical. How to explain the rose 
and the poppy being two different plants? We would not 
know what to think, quite literally. Now suppose we finally 
do find a difference, perhaps at the quark level. Wittgen-
stein still asks us to prove that such micro-difference is the 
pertinent one, so that the macro-difference between the 
two plants does not merely correspond to, but is causally 
determined by, the micro-one. We cannot be certain of 
that, and neither Kant nor Russell can help, at this point. 
We may keep on searching desperately (CE, App.1); or we 
may simply proclaim a cause. 
 
“… We also speak of ‘tracking the cause’: in a sim-
ple case we follow, so to speak, the rope, to see 
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who’s pulling it. When we find such individual – how 
do we know that it is him, his pulling, the cause of 
the fact that the rope is moving? Do we establish 
that through a series of experiments?” CE, p. 15.10  
We don’t. The main point of the causality issue is that, 
when something happens we look for (what we call) the 
cause of it. At the root of the grammar of causality are not 
scientific facts, logical categories, or direct intuitions. There 
is action: there are acts of investigation. Investigation is 
not modelled on science, but vice-versa. The search for 
causes is a non-scientific, eminently practical activity. We 
react to the cause, our eyes running from one thing to 
another:  
 
“… to call something a ‘cause’ is like pointing to 
someone and say “He did it!” CE, 24.9  
 
“He who follows the rope and finds who’s pulling 
can take a further step, and conclude: so this was 
the cause, - or rather, is it not the case that all he 
wanted to find was whether someone was pulling, 
and who?”CE, 16.10 
3.  
The practice of scapegoating is anthropologically ubiqui-
tous. The individuation of scapegoats is not an experimen-
tal, much less a logical enterprise. The chain between the 
scapegoat and the misfortune it is said to have caused 
does not need to be spelled out scientifically. All that mat-
ters is that someone did it: if that is the case, then some-
thing can be done back.  
 
“In one case ‘he is the cause’ simply means: he 
pulled the rope. In other cases it means something 
like: these are the facts that I must change in order 
to eliminate this phenomenon … But how do I get to 
the idea of changing a circumstance in order to 
eliminate a phenomenon? ... Yes, it may be said 
that this presupposes that I am looking for a cause, 
that from a phenomenon I go look for another”.  
CE, p.20  
The search for a cause is a human reaction to the social 
facts of existence. We do not observe causal relations, we 
do not project causality onto the world, nor do we experi-
ence it intuitively. These are chit-chats (CE, 22.10). We 
proclaim it. 
 
“… In alternative to what? Certainly to never pull the 
strings, always remaining uncertain about what 
really is the cause of the phenomenon; as if it made 
sense to say: strictly speaking it is impossible to 
know with certainty, so that what would come closer 
to the truth would be to leave the question open. 
This idea is based on a total misunderstanding of 
the roles that pertain to exactness and doubt”  
CE, 21.10 
 
“The simple form (and this is the primitive form) of 
the game of cause and effect is the determination of 
the cause, not the doubt” CE, 21.10 
The primitive form of the causality game is the hunt for a 
scapegoat, guilty of all bad, even and especially when the 
trajectory of emergence of such bad is un-reconstruct-able. 
The proclamation needs not be substantiated scientifically 
– all is needed is that the general mechanism not be ques-
tioned. 
In CE, the genealogical argument starts with an in-
spection of the grammar of doubt: linguistic games in 
which we doubt (that something is the cause of something 
else) originate as complications of simpler games, in which 
there is no doubt.  
I now submit that Wittgenstein’s position is best 
made sense of by an evolutionary interpretation.  
4. 
The evolutionary position has it that some functions of our 
mind, which philosophers, struck by their pervasiveness, 
have hypostasized as transcendental categories, or direct 
intuitions, are indeed specializations that have evolved in 
response to social situations humans have found them-
selves in during their history as a species. 
Such hypothesis was explored by Cosmides and 
Tooby (1992), who maintained that problems we find con-
fusing when expressed in naked logical terms become 
very clear when coated in social ones — we score high at 
logical inference if the latter refers to contexts of interac-
tion: and those are the contexts faced by our ancestors 
when establishing patterns of socio-economic connection. 
Our mind has evolved a specialized capacity to tackle 
socially significant problems, such as individuating those 
who defect from covenants.  
When confronted with social problems, a specialized 
mental mechanism moves our eyes from one thing to an-
other. Thousands of years of social negotiation have 
equipped us with a somewhat automatic drive to look for, 
and ability to find, who’s pulling the rope.  
Now, keeping all that in mind, as well as our brief 
discussion on scapegoating and Wittgenstein’s Ge-
dankexperiment, consider the following statement:  
 
“… If I say: history cannot be the cause of develop-
ment, that does not mean that I cannot foresee de-
velopment starting from history, for this is precisely 
what I do; but it means that I do not call this a 
‘causal connection’, that this is not about predicting 
the effect from the cause.       
 
To say: ‘There must be a difference in the seeds, 
even if we cannot find it, plainly displays how power-
ful it is within us the impulse to see everything 
through the scheme of cause and effect … ‘there 
must be’, that is: we want to use this image in any 
case”. CE, 26.9 
Causality in the scientific sense means predicting the ef-
fect from its cause. In evolutionary, genealogical, Wittgen-
steinian sense, it means tracking the cause from its ef-
fects. This is the scapegoat theory of causality. 
When the group is hit by misfortune, the linguistic 
game of explanation is enacted in causal terms, with refer-
ence to a violation of social trust, which in turn implies a 
violation of the group’s covenant with its natural context, 
which explains the misfortune. The mysterious cause of 
nature’s operations is thus searched for and individuated 
within the group. The elimination of the guilty scapegoat is 
a necessary and sufficient condition for the continuation of 
social life. But what is important is that the causal chain 
linking the scapegoat to misfortune actually runs the other 
way: from misfortune to scapegoat. The cause can only be 
genealogically reconstructed: before they break the social 
covenant, community members are, as members, indistin-
guishable, just like the two seeds in the Gedankexperi-
ment. In both cases, the inability to predict effects is ubiq-
uitous: the grammar of a genuinely causal explanation in 
the scientific sense has no application.  
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We may have evolved a specialized capacity to de-
tect defectors from covenants, which has later been 
adapted by our minds to other kinds of operations, such as 
scientific investigation. The seed of the causality game is 
not in the world, in our speculative intellect, or in our intui-
tions: it is in the realm of social action. Investigation is not 
modelled on science, but vice-versa.  
5. 
The scapegoat theory of causality implies, contra Hume, 
that effects (misfortunes; different plants) are in the past: 
from past facts we extrapolate causes, and it is thus 
causes that, properly speaking, follow effects. In his cri-
tique, Hume chronologically ordains effects and causes 
the other way, himself operating a first, and crucial, ration-
alization, which misleads him into considering causality a 
theoretical, not a practical, problem.  
Kant does not question Hume’s formulation. Tran-
scendentalism imputes the pervasiveness of causal ex-
trapolations to a priori, immutable categories of the intel-
lect. Wittgenstein does not abandon the Kantian idea of 
world-descriptions being only conceivable in causal terms, 
but he rejects the claim that this is so because there are 
immutable logical categories underlying the 
world/language. While Kant sees causality as a universal 
category of our descriptions, Wittgenstein sees it as a fact 
about our descriptions, genealogically traceable to the 
practice of linguistic games more akin to scapegoating 
than to science. To verbalize such games in cognitive 
terms conceals their origins as social activities. Pace Kant, 
causality is not a cognitive lamp with which rational beings 
illuminate the world. It is an unspoken presupposition that 
circumscribes the linguistic activity of men within circum-
stances that are primarily social. Such presupposition is 
not transcendental: indeed it is not conceptual at all, it is 
eminently practical (reactive + adaptive). 
 
“Knowledge is interesting only within a game”.  
CE, 18.10 
Finally, the directness of Russell’s intuition finds no ex-
pression in a linguistic game:  
 
“To ‘intuitively recognize the cause’ means: to know 
it in some way (to experience it in a non-usual way) 
... Is he not then in a situation no different from that 
of one who correctly guesses the cause?”  
CE, 18.10  
“We can of course imagine someone saying, in the 
bliss of inspiration, that he now knows the cause: 
but that does not preclude us from checking 
whether he knows the right thing.” CE, 18.10 
Checking from within the linguistic game of causality we 
play.  
Intuitionism misleads us out of this game. The latter 
is the not-primarily-scientific one of social adaptation: a 
way to know causes that has no role within such game is 
“not interesting”. Much more interesting are the words of a 
medicine man pointing at the scapegoat to explain the 
mysteries of nature. 
We have no intuition of causality as if it existed apart 
from the use we make of it in linguistic games. The scape-
goat theory describes the game of causality as that of find-
ing a cause in any case. This implies an active search for 
it, accompanied by a non-scientific trust in its existence. 
6. 
In line with Wittgenstein, an evolutionary interpretation 
suggests that the use of the causality relation within lin-
guistic games responds to adaptive requirements, primarily 
social, so strong as to account for both the dimensions of 
“universality” and “instinctive-ness” that transcendentalism 
and intuitionism, respectively, wished to capture.  
We trust it that there is a cause for every effect, 
much like primitive groups trust it that there is a scapegoat 
for every misfortune. The game played is similar, and does 
not involve “knowing”.   
 
“They tell me that in these circumstances this thing 
happens. They discovered it by checking a few 
times ... In the end, I trust those experiences, or 
their reports, and in conformity with those I orient, 
unscrupulously, my actions. But this trust, has it not 
performed well? For all I can see – yes”. OC, 603 
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Logic Must Take Care of Itself 
Tamara Dobler, Norwich, East Anglia, England, UK 
1. A fundamental tension1 in Wittgenstein’s early 
conception of logic, which he became aware of at the time 
he started with Notebooks 1914-19162, surfaces in the 
question stated in the second entry: “How is it reconcilable 
with the task of philosophy, that logic should take care of 
itself?” (NB, 2). ‘The task of philosophy’, I take it, refers to 
the idea of complete analysis that is central to both Frege’s 
and Russell’s projects.  
The following brief reconstruction will outline several 
basic assumptions that underlie the concept of logically 
perfect language and logical analysis within Frege’s and 
Russell’s frameworks. Firstly, this conception entails a 
sharp divide between thoughts and expressions of 
thoughts in language – thoughts are what logic is 
interested in, not its expressions in everyday language, 
which is a matter for psychology. Consequently, we have a 
separation between logical form – which logic is 
exclusively interested in – and grammatical form3 – which 
has no importance for the ‘science of logic’ except as the 
source of impurity and confusion (“Instead of following 
grammar blindly, the logician ought rather to see his task 
as that of freeing us from the fetters of language” Frege 
1997 [1897] 244). Logic deals with propositions – that is, 
with proper expressions of thoughts – not with sentences 
of ordinary language. Symbolism or logically perfect 
language (modelled on the example of maths) should be 
able, in contrast with the sentences of ordinary language, 
to present clearly the logical form of our thought (“A 
language of that sort would be completely analytic, and will 
show at glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or 
denied” Russell 1956 [1918], 197-98). Every (assertoric) 
sentence of our language should be translatable into 
symbolism – that means that a sentence is subjected to 
analysis. The idea behind symbolism is “one word and no 
more for every simple object” as Russell put it, or in 
Frege’s words: “every expression constructed as a proper 
name… in fact designate an object”. A combination of 
these simple words or names (in a proposition) is assumed 
to refer to a fact, or a complex made of simple objects (“In 
a logically perfect language the words in a proposition 
would correspond one by one with the components of the 
corresponding fact” Russell 1956 [1918], 197). Analysis is 
completed when we dissect the proposition so that simple 
objects that constitute a fact are shown to be clearly 
represented by simple names that stand for them. This 
also means that the logical form of a proposition is 
rendered perspicuous, and that the task of philosophy, as 
far as the proposition in question is concerned, is fulfilled.   
Note that this is a rather oversimplified version of 
the story. We have to bear in mind that many fine 
differences become visible if we focus more closely on the 
relation between Russell’s and Frege’s conceptions of 
logical analysis. One conception is given in the Tractatus 
as well. Here I merely sketch how the goal of ‘complete 
analysis’ relates to the task of philosophy and the shared 
basic assumptions of such a goal.    
 
                                                     
 
1 See the abstract  
2 Hereafter NB 
3 This general view is also highlighted in 4.0031 of the Tractatus  
2. Now we need to flesh out a rationale behind the 
“extremely profound and important insight” that “logic must 
take care of itself” (NB, 2). The significant portion of 
Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is condensed in the first 
few entries of the Notebooks. The account presented in 
this section is largely based on these opening passages 
and on several earlier remarks from Dictations to Moore 
(1914)4. 
Firstly, we are invited to consider the idea of 
something like the self-sufficiency of (logical) syntax – we 
must be able to set the rules of syntax by looking at the 
symbols alone. That is, every mention of the meaning of a 
sign is an empty move, as it were; it is absolutely 
unneeded as nothing is being said which was not already 
seen (“If syntactical rules for functions can be set up at all, 
then the whole theory of things, properties, etc., is 
superfluous” (NB, 2). This pertains especially to the theory 
of types: any such theory is superfluous, tautological and 
senseless – for it tries to do something that is always 
already done in a more trivial way in our language (“Even if 
there were propositions of [the] form "M is a thing" they 
would be superfluous (tautologous) because what this tries 
to say is something which is already seen when you see 
"M"” (DM, 110). What is given by ordinary sentences is 
enough for us to have a pretty good idea of what makes 
sense, i.e., that which we understand (“It is obvious that, 
e.g., with a subject-predicate proposition, if it has any 
sense at all, you see the form, so soon as you understand 
the proposition, in spite of not knowing whether it is true or 
false” (DM, 110). The same moral is expressed in the 
thought that whatever is possible is also legitimate (“A 
possible sign must also be capable of signifying” (NB, 2), 
viz. logic that governs the formation of any possible sign in 
our language makes it legitimate, puts it in traffic. I.e. 
“Every possible sentence is well-formed” (NB, 2).  
Secondly, we are faced with a question of 
nonsense: it is not as if the signs were responsible for the 
breakdown of sense – the responsibility is completely on 
our part (“Let us remember the explanation why "Socrates 
is Plato" is nonsense. That is, because we have not made 
an arbitrary specification, NOT because a sign is, shall we 
say, illegitimate in itself!” (NB, 2). We are free to utter 
whatever gibberish we like, only that does not entail that 
whatever it is that brings sense to our utterances will 
automatically lose its significance. Even though 
Wittgenstein does not spell out at this point what those 
conditions of sense might be, it is certain, given the 
quotations above, that every possible linguistic 
construction is designed legitimately i.e. to make the sense 
possible.   
A month after Wittgenstein wrote the above 
remarks, he envisaged conditions of sense in terms of the 
(extended) picture metaphor as the agreement between 
our thoughts, our language, and how our world is. But that 
discussion falls out of the scope of this paper. The crux of 
our examination herein is to point out an important 
contrast: in Frege/Russell’s case, it is ordinary language 
that is on trial, “for very many of the mistakes that occur in 
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reasoning have their source in the logical imperfection of 
language” (Frege 1997 [1897] 244), whereas, for 
Wittgenstein, it is we who have not “given any meaning to 
certain of its [sentence’s] parts. Even when we believe we 
have done so” (NB, 2).   
The first move towards making the picture metaphor 
applicable across the board has thereby been made: all 
sentences are to be treated equally in their capacity to 
display logical features; they are all able to express sense. 
Unanalysed sentences are not to be treated as logical 
failures. If there is something for analysis to determine, it is 
not sentences’ logical integrity, for they possess such 
integrity inherently (“Remember that even an unanalysed 
subject-predicate proposition is a clear statement of 
something quite definite” (NB 4). If a difference between 
the analysed and unanalysed form of a sentence is to be 
made, it should not depend on its capacity to express 
sense but perhaps on something additional. 
3. We can now go back to Wittgenstein’s question: 
“How is it reconcilable with the task of philosophy, that 
logic should take care of itself?”  
Here the idea that logic is already at work in any 
possible sentence clashes with the task of philosophy 
conceived in terms of complete analysis. Wittgenstein 
becomes acutely aware of this tension when he asks 
himself “Does such a complete analysis exist? And if not: 
then what is the task of philosophy?!!?” (NB, 2) That is, if 
everything that we need of logic is always already there in 
our language, is “shown by the existence of subject-
predicate SENTENCES”, then why should we need 
analysis at all? The question is all the more pressing, for 
analysis is conceived as the task of philosophy, as our real 
need (“Then: if everything that needs to be shewn is 
shewn by the existence of subject-predicate SENTENCES 
etc., the task of philosophy is different from what I 
originally supposed” (NB, 3). 
With this astonishingly important question, 
Wittgenstein for the first time touched the heart of the 
matter – Frege’s and Russell’s expectations about what 
philosophy should accomplish, i.e., the ultimate clarity of 
logical form via the complete analysis of propositions, 
wherein analysis is taken as a necessary route towards 
such clarity, just did not fit the idea that “logic must take 
care of itself” whose main features I outlined above.  
It is hard to overstate the significance of this 
acknowledgement. Being stated in the form of a question it 
also suggests that the deepest difficulties related with what 
he took as a given from his teachers, in contrast with 
where his own investigations had brought him by this 
point, are yet to be met. If everything is already in ‘perfect 
order’ in our language, as his new picture of logic implies, 
then in what sense do we really need analysis? Is analysis 
a necessary precondition of clarity about the logic of our 
language such that in the absence of analysis we would 
not be able to know what we think, or what does and does 
not make sense?   
Wittgenstein was obviously not ready to reach any 
final verdict at this point, so likewise I could offer merely 
preliminary suggestions regarding his removal from Frege 
and Russell. Again, the thing to keep in mind is that the 
Tractatus does contain an account of ‘complete analysis’ 
and accordingly we should be wary of being overly or 
prematurely dismissive with regard to a possible role for 
analysis in achieving a certain level of perspicuity of the 
linguistic expressions. Equally, given that Wittgenstein’s 
‘fundamental insight’ also appears in the Tractatus, it 
seems plausible to at least wonder if the reasons for 
having such a need for logical analysis are somewhat 
different than in Frege/Russell’s case as the following 
passage, for instance, suggests: 
 
Can't we say: It all depends, not on our dealing with 
unanalysable subject-predicate sentences, but on 
the fact that our subject-predicate sentences be-
have in the same way as such sentences in every 
respect, i.e. that the logic of our subject-predicate 
sentences is the same as the logic of those. The 
point for us is simply to complete logic, and our ob-
jection-in-chief against unanalysed subject-
predicate sentences was that we cannot construct 
their syntax so long as we do not know their analy-
sis. But must not the logic of an apparent subject-
predicate sentence be the same as the logic of an 
actual one? If a definition giving the proposition the 
subject-predicate form is possible at all...? (NB, 4) 
4. As a result, I suggest that one way to gain a 
better perspective on the role of the ‘picture metaphor’ in 
Wittgenstein’s early work is to focus on his urge to 
reconcile what struck him as two conflicting lines of 
thought. On the one hand, he was partially committed to 
the idea that the task of philosophy, as Frege and Russell 
held, ought to address imperfections of ordinary language 
by a means of analysis (“a considerable part of what one 
would have to do to justify the sort of philosophy I wish to 
advocate would consist in justifying the process of 
analysis” Russell 1956 [1918], 178), and, on the contrary, 
he was seriously engaged with the idea that logic always 
takes care of itself and that ordinary language sentences 
are perfectly fine as they are.  
Hence, the ‘need’ that the picture metaphor at-
tempted to fulfil could hardly have arisen from the concep-
tion that “logic must take care of itself”, as this view entails 
that, in principle, logic does not have needs that a logician 
is invited to discover and satisfy. It was actually one of 
‘Russell’s needs’ i.e. the need to answer the question 
when the analysis should be considered complete that 
sought the fulfilment (or as Wittgenstein put it “when those 
signs [signs that behave like signs of the subject-predicate 
form] are completely analysed?” (NB, 2) In order to ac-
count for the problem of ‘completeness’ in the above men-
tioned sense, the analysis’ advocate needs the ‘world’ as 
an ontological excuse. I.e. he needs to assume ‘simple 
objects’ in the world which would, when reached, give him 
a ‘wink’ that the analysis is completed and, therefore, the 
logical form of a sentence rendered clear (logical atoms as 
“the last residue in the analysis” Russell, 1956 [1918], 
178). Secondly, he needs to bridge the world and proposi-
tions so that the simple names arrived at in the process of 
analysis correspond to simple objects.  
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Note, however, that the need is not to seek answers 
from the world, but to tune the metaphysics of the 
world/reality in such a way to serve the ‘analyst’ with the 
desired targets (“The demand for simple things is the de-
mand for definiteness of sense” NB, 62). 
The metaphor of picturing was introduced as an ac-
count of the agreement between our sentences/thoughts 
and pieces of the world that allegedly dictate their analysis.  
The trouble is, I fear, that at least initially Wittgen-
stein adhered to ‘Russell’s need’ somewhat dogmatically, 
and thus the metaphor of picturing, which was to offer the 
fulfilment, turned out to be dangerously oversimplified. By 
the time of the Tractatus, however, Wittgenstein’s thoughts 
might have already gone in another direction, as the fa-
mous proposition 6.54 suggests – only this must stay a 
topic for some different occasion.  
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Wittgenstein on Frazer and Explanation 
Keith Dromm, Natchitoches, Lousiana, USA 
In his “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” Wittgenstein 
identifies at least two problems with Frazer’s explanations 
for religious and magical practices. First, Frazer’s 
explanations are implausible. Frazer regards them as 
nascent forms of contemporary science that reflect “faulty 
views” about physics, medicine, or technology 
(Wittgenstein 1993, p. 129). According to Wittgenstein, this 
is to treat these practices as “pieces of stupidity”: “But it 
will never be plausible to say that mankind does all that out 
of sheer stupidity” (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 119). 
Wittgenstein’s second criticism would seem to have 
priority. He writes: “the very idea of wanting to explain a 
practice . . . seems wrong to me” (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 
119). However, some commentators have focused on the 
first criticism, and they find in Wittgenstein’s remarks a 
more plausible account of religious and magical practices. 
Rather than the antecedents of contemporary science or 
technology, the practices examined by Frazer are 
elaborations on either expressive or instinctive behaviors. 
As expressive behaviors, magical practices, for example, 
do not attempt to effect some change in the natural world; 
they are expressions of wishes, desires, or other attitudes 
toward the world. Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting this 
view of magic when he writes that “magic brings a wish to 
representation; it expresses a wish” (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 
125; see, e.g., Hacker 1992, p. 286).1 Other commentators 
have focused more on Wittgenstein’s references to 
instinctive behavior within these remarks (e.g., Clack 1999; 
De Lara 2003). For example, Wittgenstein refers to 
“Instinct-actions” within an observation about the non-
instrumental character of ritualistic actions (Wittgenstein 
1993, p. 137). Elsewhere, he associates a ritual with an 
instinctive behavior (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 141). 
Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting in these places 
biological origins for religious and magical practices. Some 
supporters of the instinct reading have vigorously opposed 
the expressivist reading (e.g., Clack 1999 and 2003). 
However, both readings agree that, according to 
Wittgenstein, ritualistic actions are performed without 
regard to their utility. As such, they are misleadingly 
compared to modern technology or medicine. These 
readings also take Wittgenstein to be opposed to the view 
that these practices are manifestations of a primitive 
science, since—as Wittgenstein insists in several places—
they should be not characterized in terms of the beliefs of 
their participants. He writes: “the characteristic feature of 
ritualistic action is not at all a view, an opinion” 
(Wittgenstein 1993, p. 129; see also p. 123 and 129). As 
such, they do not represent beliefs, whether true or false, 
about nature.  
According to these interpretations, Wittgenstein’s 
second criticism of Frazer amounts to the claim that the 
kind of explanation that Frazer offers is not appropriate for 
these practices. Since magical and religious practices are 
not based on beliefs about the world or anything else, they 
should not be explained in terms of their participants’ 
beliefs. However, this is still to attribute to Wittgenstein an 
explanation for these practices. The explanation is 
                                                     
 
1 While Hacker (1992) seems to endorse, at least in part, the expressivist 
interpretation, his understanding of Wittgenstein’s use of “perspicuous repre-
sentations” and developmental hypotheses in his remarks on Frazer is very 
close to mine. Paul Redding (1987) also provides a similar interpretation.  
importantly different than the one Frazer offers; we can 
characterize it as a causal explanation as opposed to 
Frazer’s intellectualist explanation. The causes that 
Wittgenstein is supposed to have identified for these 
practices preclude the interpolation of participants’ beliefs 
in an explanation for their performance. The practices arise 
naturally out of certain instinctive or expressive behaviors 
of humans without the mediation of beliefs. But 
Wittgenstein’s second criticism does not challenge the type 
of explanation that Frazer offers for these practices. Again, 
Wittgenstein says that there is something wrong with the 
“very idea of wanting to explain a practice.” If we are to 
reconcile these two criticisms, some other purpose for 
Wittgenstein’s discussions of expressive and instinctive 
behaviors needs to be found. This purpose must be 
something other than explaining religious and magical 
practices. Identifying this purpose will be my task in what 
follows.  
P. M. S. Hacker offers some correct advice in dealing 
with Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer: “If one wants to 
learn from them, they should not be squeezed too hard” 
(Hacker 1992, p. 278). They were only slightly revised after 
their initial composition. Only the first part of them (MS 
110) was preserved in a transcript (TS 221), and those 
remarks were subsequently dropped from a later version of 
that transcript (TS 213). The second part of the remarks 
comes from scraps of paper that were probably inserted by 
Wittgenstein into his copy of the abridged version of The 
Golden Bough (MS 143).2 But while the remarks were not 
worked over like those collected in the Philosophical 
Investigations, they deserve some attention. They are 
about a book in which Wittgenstein had a serious interest 
(Drury 1981, pp. 134-5) and, if read properly, they can 
illuminate not only their subject but other areas of 
Wittgenstein’s thought. The best strategy for approaching 
them is to read them in light of the more reliable records of 
Wittgenstein’s thought. This strategy will warn us away 
from taking Wittgenstein to be offering in them his own 
explanation for religious and magical practices.  
Wittgenstein famously asserts in the Philosophical 
Investigations that in philosophy “We must do away with all 
explanation, and description alone must take its place” 
(Wittgenstein 2001, §109). Explanations cannot remedy 
the confusions that generate philosophical problems. 
Instead of the novel information that an explanation 
provides, we require a better understanding of language or 
other practices in order to be relieved of our confusions. 
Wittgenstein’s second criticism of Frazer seems to extend 
this admonition to our efforts to understand ancient and 
otherwise unfamiliar practices. But how can mere 
descriptions improve our understanding of alien practices? 
This depends on the type of deficiency in our 
understanding that we are trying to rectify. Wittgenstein 
understands Frazer’s central problem to be the 
strangeness and unfamiliarity of certain religious and 
magical practices. Frazer is attempting to make sense of 
these practices. So, his question is less about where they 
came from, and more about why they are performed. The 
former can be answered without answering the latter. And 
                                                     
 
2 See the editors’ introduction to the “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough” for 
more information on their sources (pp. 115-117).  
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whereas the former question can be answered by 
uncovering new facts about the practices, the latter 
question requires a different kind of solution. 
In attempting to explain these practices, by either 
revealing the beliefs of their practitioners or fitting them 
within a developmental hypothesis (a method of Frazer’s 
that we will consider later), Frazer is succumbing to what 
Wittgenstein calls in these remarks the “the foolish 
superstition of our time” (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 129), which 
is to believe that every puzzle can be remedied by a 
scientific explanation. In one of his transcripts, 
Wittgenstein identifies this as the “scientific way of 
thinking” and says:  
 
What is disastrous about the scientific way of think-
ing (which today possesses the whole world) is that 
it wants to respond to any disquiet with an explana-
tion. (TS 219, p. 8; author’s translation) 
The disquiet that Frazer suffers from, that which motivates 
him to seek an explanation for these practices, is caused 
by their strangeness and unfamiliarity. However, this can-
not be remedied through an explanation. Instead, Wittgen-
stein says in these remarks, in a variation on his advice to 
philosophers, that “one can only describe and say: this is 
what human life is like” (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 121). 
Wittgenstein uses a concept that plays an important 
role in his discussions of the treatment of philosophical 
problems to characterize the sort of description that can 
provide the desired understanding: “perspicuous 
representation” (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 133). Such a 
representation will help us see that “there is also 
something in us which speaks in favor of those savages’ 
behaviour” (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 131). He provides an 
example of this in a passage that has been used to 
support both the expressivist and instinctive interpretations 
of his “Remarks on Frazer”: 
 
When I am furious about something, I sometimes 
beat the ground or a tree with my walking stick. But I 
certainly do not believe that the ground is to blame 
or that my beating can help anything. “I am venting 
my anger”. And all rites are of this kind. Such ac-
tions may be called Instinct-actions.—And an his-
torical explanation, say, that I or any ancestors pre-
viously believe that beating the ground does help is 
shadow-boxing, for it is a superfluous assumption 
that explains nothing. The similarity of the action to 
an act of punishment is important, but nothing more 
than this similarity can be asserted. 
 
Once such a phenomenon is brought into connec-
tion with an instinct which I myself possess, this is 
precisely the explanation wished for; that is, the ex-
planation which resolves the particular difficulty. And 
a further investigation about the history of my in-
stinct moves on another track.  
(Wittgenstein 1993, p. 137) 
A description alone can reveal such a connection 
between an opaque practice and something I do. In doing 
this, it would satisfy Wittgenstein’s criterion for a 
perspicuous representation:  
 
This perspicuous representation brings about the 
understanding which consists precisely in the fact 
that we “see the connections.” Hence the impor-
tance of finding connecting links.  
(Wittgenstein 1993, p. 133) 
That Wittgenstein puts the connection in terms of a shared 
“instinct” should not be taken as a commitment by him to 
some biological account of the origins of ritualistic prac-
tices. Such an account, as well as any version of the ex-
pressivist theory, would be as incapable as Frazer’s expla-
nations of making an alien practice seem less strange. 
Wittgenstein also says that an investigation of the instinct’s 
history “moves on another track,” suggesting that an exact 
characterization of it is irrelevant to the purposes served by 
its identification.  
Instead of revealing the emotional or biological roots 
of ritualistic actions, Wittgenstein is drawing our attention 
to what he elsewhere calls the “common spirit” that 
underlies the practices being compared: 
All these different practices show that it is not a 
question of the derivation of one from the other, but of a 
common spirit. And one could invent (devise) all these 
ceremonies oneself. And precisely that spirit from which 
one invented them would be their common spirit. 
(Wittgenstein 1993, p. 151) 
It is only by recognizing the “common spirit” in which 
a practice is performed that it can be relieved of its 
strangeness. The recognition is not a matter of knowing 
certain facts about the practice, facts that an explanation 
can provide. Rather, it involves being able to occupy 
imaginatively the place of a participant in the other 
practice. Our ability to do this can be facilitated by a 
description of the practice that highlights a “common spirit” 
or “connecting link” between the alien practice and one in 
which we are already a participant. A description that is 
able to do this will provide the “satisfaction,” as 
Wittgenstein puts it, that Frazer sought through his 
explanations:  
 
I believe that the attempt to explain is already there-
fore wrong, because one must only correctly piece 
together what one knows, without adding anything, 
and the satisfaction being sought through the ex-
planation follows of itself.  
(Wittgenstein 1993, p. 121) 
If we fail to recognize the “common spirit” in which the 
practices are performed, then no amount of new informa-
tion provided by an explanation will make the alien practice 
any less opaque.  
Wittgenstein does admit a role for explanations in 
facilitating our understanding of alien practices. However, 
in serving this role they are importantly different than the 
explanations that Frazer offers (as well as those 
sometimes attributed to Wittgenstein). For example, in 
order to account for the sinister quality a contemporary 
spectator would discern in the Beltane Fire Festival, Frazer 
offers a developmental hypothesis for the ritual that 
locates its origins in human sacrifice. But this explanation’s 
ability to increase our understanding of the practice does 
not depend upon the explanation’s truth. As Wittgenstein 
explains:  
 
The deep, the sinister, do not depend on the history 
of the practice having been like this, for perhaps it 
was not like this at all; nor on the fact that it was 
perhaps or probably like this, but rather on that 
which gives me grounds for assuming this.  
(Wittgenstein 1993, p. 147) 
The explanation can function as a “perspicuous represen-
tation” of the practice that is able to highlight those fea-
tures of it by which we can, as Wittgenstein puts it, discern 
its “connection with our own feelings and thoughts” (Witt-
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genstein 1993, p. 143). In order to do this, the hypothesis 
about the practice’s origins need not be true (it need not 
even be supposed to be true); it only needs to draw our 
attention to those aspects of the practice that are shared 
by ones in which we participate.  
This is also the case with the developmental 
hypotheses identified in these remarks by the expressivist 
and instinctive interpretations. The purpose of these 
hypotheses is not to inform us about the origins of religious 
and magical practices, but to facilitate our understanding 
of these practices. This is the same function served by 
other hypotheses we find in Wittgenstein’s writings, such 
as those that associate the development and acquisition of 
language with instinctive or “primitive” reactions (e.g., 
Wittgenstein 2001, §244). For Wittgenstein’s purposes in 
these writings, the truth of these hypotheses is irrelevant. 
Instead, as he puts it, “the correct and interesting thing to 
say is not: this has arisen from that, but: it could have 
arisen this way” (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 153). While their 
truth certainly makes a difference in other contexts, it does 
not make a difference to Wittgenstein’s efforts to relieve us 
of certain confusions.  
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Dummett on the Origins of Analytical Philosophy 
George Duke, Melbourne, Australia 
Introduction 
Michael Dummett’s claim that ‘the fundamental axiom of 
analytical philosophy [is] that the only route to the analysis 
of thought goes through the analysis of language’ (1993, 
128) has been criticized on the grounds that it excludes 
seminal figures in the analytical tradition such as GE 
Moore and Bertrand Russell (for example in Monk and 
Palmer, 1996). In this paper I begin by suggesting that 
Dummett’s characterization has some validity if restricted 
to what Alberto Coffa (1991) has called ‘the semantic tradi-
tion’ (that part of the analytical tradition represented by 
figures such as Frege, the Russell of ‘On Denoting’, the 
early Wittgenstein, Carnap, Tarski and Quine), in which the 
role played by logical analysis based on mathematical 
techniques is central. The restricted applicability of Dum-
mett’s characterization, even when suitably qualified in this 
way, is instructive because it allows for a clearer view of 
the extent to which it is possible and/or meaningful to 
characterize the analytical tradition as a whole and its rela-
tion to what Dummett calls ‘other schools’ (1993, 4). 
1. The Linguistic Turn 
Stated without further qualification, Dummett’s characteri-
zation of analytical philosophy raises obvious objections. It 
is simply not the case that the seminal thinkers of the ana-
lytical tradition form a united front around the notion that a 
philosophical account of thought can only be achieved 
through a philosophical account of language. Apart from 
the examples of Moore and Russell already mentioned, 
Frege is equally problematic, on account not only of his 
lifelong ambivalent attitude towards imprecise natural lan-
guage but also his ‘realist’ view that thoughts unthought by 
a thinker are still true or false (53, 1900). 
Dummett’s characterization has the virtue, from his 
own perspective, of bringing together those components of 
the thought of Frege and late Wittgenstein to which he is 
particularly sympathetic. It is hard not to think, however, 
that he has been led astray by his almost exclusive con-
cern upon the historical relations between Frege and 
Husserl in Origins of Analytical Philosophy, which, given 
Husserl’s commitment to a phenomenology of pure con-
sciousness, could lead to the conclusion that the linguistic 
turn is distinctive of the analytical school as against other 
philosophical approaches.1  
While no one would deny the centrality of linguistic 
considerations to the analytical tradition, Dummett’s formu-
lation is too rough-grained to offer any meaningful charac-
terization of a particular tradition. A better approach would 
be to focus on the origins of what Alberto Coffa has called 
‘the semantic tradition’, a tradition which includes many of 
the major thinkers of analytical philosophy. What unifies 
these figures, however, is not so much an emphasis upon 
linguistic meaning and rejection of intuition (Russell and 
                                                     
 
1 Moreover, for leading representatives of the European tradition after Hus-
serl, such as Gadamer and Derrida, linguistic considerations are central. While 
these thinkers were not concerned with giving an account of thought in the 
apposite sense, and their approach to language is based on hermeneutic and 
semiotic considerations respectively rather than semantics and logic, this 
raises more questions as to the adequacy of Dummett’s attempt to distinguish 
the two dominant philosophical schools of the twentieth century. 
Quine are counter-examples to this thesis), as a belief in 
the capacity of logical analysis to illuminate traditional phi-
losophical problems.  
2. Frege’s new logic 
When we read Dummett’s characterization of analytical 
philosophy in the context of his views on Frege’s place in 
the history of ideas it in fact accords with the privileged 
place of logical analysis. According to Dummett, ‘only with 
Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally estab-
lished’ (1975, 458). This involves the thesis, ‘first, that the 
goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of 
thought; secondly, that the study of thought is to be 
sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological 
process of thinking, and, finally, that the only proper 
method for analysing thought consists in the analysis of 
language’ (1975a, 458).  
For Dummett, therefore, Frege began a revolution in 
philosophy as overwhelming as that of Descartes (1973, 
665-666 and 1975, 437-458). Whereas the Cartesian revo-
lution consisted in giving the theory of knowledge priority 
over all other areas of philosophy, Frege’s primary signifi-
cance consists in the fact that he made logic the starting 
point for the whole subject (1973, 666). Dummett here 
means logic in the broad sense of a theory of meaning or 
the search for a model for what the understanding of an 
expression consists in (1973, 669). The thought is that 
Frege inaugurated an epoch in which ‘the theory of mean-
ing is the only part of philosophy whose results do not 
depend upon those of any part, but which underlies all the 
rest’ (1973, 669). 
In appealing to the linguistic turn as decisive for 
analytical philosophy, Dummett therefore points towards 
the introduction of semantic considerations that he takes to 
be embodied in Frege’s employment of the context princi-
ple in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884). Faced with 
the Kantian question concerning how it is possible to be 
given numbers, when we do not have representations or 
intuitions of them (1993, 5), Frege, Dummett alleges, con-
verted ‘an epistemological problem, with ontological over-
tones’ into one about ‘the meaning of sentences’ (1991, 
111).  
It is Frege’s new predicate logic introduced in Be-
griffsschrift, based on the extension of function-argument 
analysis from mathematics to logic, which provides the 
technical means to carry out this strategy. In The Logical 
Basis of Metaphysics, Dummett argues that while the phi-
losophy of thought has always in a sense been regarded 
as the starting point of the subject ‘where modern analyti-
cal philosophy differs is that it is founded on a far more 
penetrating analysis of the general structure of our 
thoughts than was ever available in past ages, that which 
lies at the base of modern mathematical logic and was 
initiated by Frege in 1879’ (1991, 2).  
Dummett’s defence of analytical philosophy against 
‘the objections of laymen’, who lament the abandonment of 
‘fundamental’ questions for technical investigations, sets 
out from the fact that the analysis of inference carried out 
in modern logic presupposes an analysis of the structure 
of propositions. From this point of view, one could see why 
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an adequate syntactic analysis of our language has priority 
in philosophical explanation. If we grant the further thesis 
that Frege’s new language of quantifiers and variables 
represents the most perspicuous means of representing 
natural language, we can apparently in good conscience 
justify the privileged role of logical analysis in analytic phi-
losophy.  
 To privilege the role of Frege’s predicate logic is 
not to understate the importance for the semantic tradition 
of either the attack on psychologism, which Dummett calls 
‘the extrusion of thoughts from the mind’, or the context 
principle. This is because these two tenets of analytical 
philosophy in its classical phase are coeval with the intro-
duction of Frege’s new logical symbolism. Frege’s notions 
of concept and object are correlative to the symbolic no-
tions of function and argument; by taking concept as a 
function of an argument, we can understand the process of 
concept formation without appeal to extraneous psycho-
logical considerations. And the context principle is, as 
Frege states explicitly, inspired by the rigorisation of the 
calculus, whereby infinitesimals are banished through an 
explanation of the meaning of ‘contexts’ containing ex-
pressions such as df(x) or dx rather than seeking to ex-
plain them in isolation. 
It is generally acknowledged that the introduction of 
quantifier notation and bound variables was the single 
most important advance in logic since Aristotle. Frege’s 
way of parsing sentences involving quantifiers offers a 
tremendous increase in expressive power insofar as it can 
adequately represent the statements of multiple generality 
that had troubled traditional syllogistic. Although the sig-
nificance of Frege’s revolution in logic is well-known, how-
ever, the original intention informing his development of his 
new conceptual notation is easily understated in the con-
temporary context. Dummett’s statement that ‘the original 
task which Frege set himself to accomplish, at the outset 
of his career, was to bring to mathematics the means to 
achieve absolute rigor in the process of proof’ (1973) is 
obviously accurate, but, informed by an awareness of the 
incompleteness of second-order proof procedures, also 
understates the extent of Frege’s ambition.  
An historically unprejudiced reading of the preface 
to Begriffsschrift cannot avoid the conclusion that Frege 
conceived of his new formula language as a vital contribu-
tion to the realization of the Enlightenment project of a 
mathesis universalis, a universal methodical procedure 
capable of providing answers to all possible problems. 
While conceding the slow advance in the development of 
formalized languages, he notes recent successes in the 
particular sciences of arithmetic, geometry and chemistry 
(1879, XI), and also suggests that his own symbolism 
represents a particularly significant step forward insofar as 
logic has a central place with respect to all other symbolic 
languages and can be used to fill in the gaps in their exist-
ing proof procedures (1879, XII). On account of its seem-
ingly limitless generality, the new predicate calculus, with 
its expressive power to represent functions and relations of 
higher level, is conceived by Frege as the most significant 
advance yet made on the way towards Leibniz’s grandiose 
goal of a universal characteristic. 
 
3. Transformative Analysis and Semantic 
Logicism 
Recent work by Michael Beaney (2007) and Robert Bran-
dom (2006) further clarifies the distinctive philosophical 
perspective of the semantic tradition. Brandom’s charac-
terization of the notion of ‘semantic logicism’ is particularly 
revealing, in that it provides a way of bringing together 
philosophers for whom logical analysis of language and 
meaning is the core concern and naturalistic and empiricist 
approaches which are less easily accommodated by 
Dummett’s fundamental axiom. 
Beaney explicates three conceptions of analysis in 
the Western philosophical tradition, claiming that the third 
of these - transformative analysis - is characteristic of ana-
lytical philosophy in its classical phase as embodied by 
Frege, Russell, the early Wittgenstein and Carnap. The 
first form of analysis is the decompositional - the breaking 
of a concept down into its more simple parts. The decom-
positional approach is prevalent in early modern philoso-
phy and encapsulated in Descartes’ 13th rule for the direc-
tion of the mind that if we are to understand a problem we 
must abstract from it every superfluous conception and by 
means of enumeration, divide it up into its smallest possi-
ble parts. The second kind of analysis is regressive analy-
sis, according to which one works back towards first prin-
ciples by means of which something can be demonstrated. 
This conception is predominant in classical Greek thought, 
for example in Euclidean geometry. Transformative analy-
sis works on the assumption that statements need to be 
translated into their ‘correct’ logical form before decompo-
sition and regression can take place. Classic examples are 
Frege’s attempt to reduce mathematics to logic and Rus-
sell’s theory of definite descriptions. The epistemological 
and ontological explanatory power of Frege’s predicate 
logic would thus appear to be the major assumption of 
analytical philosophy in its classical phase. 
Robert Brandom introduces the notion of ‘semantic 
logicism’ to characterize ‘classical’ analytical philosophy. 
According to Brandom, analytical philosophy in its classical 
phase is concerned with the relations between vocabular-
ies – ‘its characteristic form of question is whether and in 
what way one can make sense of the meanings expressed 
by one kind of locution in terms of the meanings expressed 
by another kind of locution’ (2006, 1). So, what is distinc-
tive of analytical philosophy is that ‘logical vocabulary is 
accorded a privileged role’ (2006, 2) in specifying semantic 
relations that are thought to make the true epistemological 
and ontological commitments of the former explicit.  
In explicating the classical project of analysis as 
‘semantic logicism’, Brandom notes that it involves, to em-
ploy Dummettian phraseology, the translation of epistemo-
logical and ontological questions into a semantic key. 
Brandom describes how two core programs of classical 
analytical philosophy, empiricism and naturalism, were 
transformed in the twentieth century ‘by the application of 
the newly available logical vocabulary to the self-
consciously semantic programs they then became’ (2006, 
2). The generic challenge posed by such projects is to 
demonstrate how target vocabularies, for example, state-
ments about the external world, can be reconstructed from 
‘what is expressed by the base vocabulary when it is 
elaborated by the use of logical vocabulary’ (2006, 3).  
Brandom’s characterization of semantic logicism is 
more inclusive than Dummett’s fundamental axiom, but 
nonetheless does not completely cover the range of phi-
losophers who would commonly be considered analytic. 
Apart from thinkers like Moore and Ryle, to whom it does 
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not seem strictly applicable, more recent analytical thinkers 
have in fact placed the basic thesis of semantic logicism in 
question.  
Brandom suggests that the main challenge to ana-
lytical philosophy in its classical phase came from Wittgen-
stein’s rejection of the assumption that, following a codifi-
cation of the meanings expressed by one vocabulary, 
through the use of logical vocabulary, into that of another 
vocabulary, we can derive properties of use. Emphasising 
the dynamic character of linguistic practice, Wittgenstein 
rejects the assumption of classical semantic analysis that 
vocabularies are stable entities with fixed meanings, re-
placing this model with a piecemeal account of the uses to 
which language is put in various language games. 
From this perspective, if we accept that semantic 
logicism is in some way characteristic of analytical phi-
losophy in it classical phase, the pragmatist challenge of 
Wittgenstein and subsequent thinkers such as Rorty, is 
best viewed as a response to the original assumptions of 
the semantic tradition based on a realization of the limits of 
the application of mathematical techniques to natural lan-
guage and everyday experience. As has often been noted, 
these responses in fact share much in common with the 
thought of major twentieth century continental thinkers, 
such as Heidegger and Gadamer. The fact that many 
dominant programs in contemporary analytical philosophy, 
such as contextualism, no longer have unmitigated faith in 
the program of logical analysis is also a recognition of the 
limits of the original aspirations of logical analysis.  
As Michael Friedmann has suggested, the Carnap-
Heidegger debate is highly instructive here, in that it high-
lights two radically different philosophical attitudes not only 
to logic and mathematics but also to the modern natural 
science built upon their edifice. This explains why the work 
of thinkers like Davidson, McDowell and Brandom, who 
have sought to explicate the logical space of reasons and 
reintroduced hermeneutic considerations, is accurately 
thought to represent a rapprochement between divergent 
traditions. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that Dummett’s fundamental 
axiom of analytical philosophy is inadequate not only be-
cause of what it excludes, but also insofar as it risks un-
derstating the role of logical analysis for that part of the 
tradition which he himself privileges. While representative 
of his own commitment to a position which reconciles se-
mantic logicism with the dictum that meaning is use, 
Dummett’s axiom is at risk of covering over both the true 
origins of analytical philosophy in its classical phase and 
the extent to which its original project has been placed in 
question.  
To provide a more complete characterization of 
analytical philosophy and its relation to ‘other schools’ one 
would need to spell out the relation between ‘instrumental’ 
and ‘reflective’ rationality. Arguably, the failure of ‘other 
schools’ in the twentieth century, with some notable 
exceptions, was precisely their inability to present an 
adequate account of an alternative account of rationality to 
the instrumental i.e. their critique of instrumental rationality 
was indiscriminate in the sense that it was often 
prosecuted against rationality per se. This is why the 
recent ‘hermeneutic’ turn in analytical philosophy 
represents a more significant development than the earlier 
‘pragmatist challenge’. 
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Wittgenstein meets ÖGS: Wovon man nicht gebärden kann … 
Harald Edelbauer/Raphaela Edelbauer, Hinterbrühl, Österreich 
0. Das Projekt 
Die rezente Studie Sprache Macht Wissen, kommt zu dem 
Ergebnis, „daß das Bildungswesen in Österreich für gehör-
lose/hörbehinderte SchülerInnen und Studierende reform-
bedürftig ist, und chancengleiche Bildungsmöglichkeiten 
für diese Personengruppe nicht immer gegeben sind.“ 
(Krausnecker/Schalber 2007) 
Hier hakt unser Projekt Evaluierung von Wittgen-
steins Sprachphilosophie(n) anhand der Gebärdensprache 
ein. Formal zielt es auf die Übertragung des Tractatus 
logico-philosophicus sowie der Philosophischen Untersu-
chungen in die Österreichische Gebärdensprache (ÖGS) 
ab; im zweiten Schritt soll die Übersetzung dieser Werke in 
die ‚alphabetische’ Gebärdenschrift, wie sie C. Papaspy-
rou entworfen hat, erprobt werden. 
Ziel des Projekts ist einerseits eine Hilfestellung für 
Gebärdendolmetscher, die hinter dem Katheder philoso-
phische Inhalte an gehörlose Studierende vermitteln sol-
len; zum andern die Einübung semantischer Kompetenz 
auf höherem Niveau für Mitglieder der Gebärden-
Sprachgemeinschaft. Es soll überprüft werden, inwiefern 
auch in Wittgensteins Konzepten noch implizite sono-
zentrische Annahmen stecken. 
„Deshalb ist der Vorgang der Übersetzung fast noch 
wichtiger als ihr Ergebnis“, erläutert der organisatorische 
Leiter des Projekts, Thomas Nagy.   
Jede Übersetzungseinheit, an der gehörlose Stu-
dent(inn)en und hörende Dolmetscher(innen) mitwirken, 
wird filmisch dokumentiert. Geplant ist darüber hinaus die 
anschließende Fixierung der – im Konsens vorläufig ak-
zeptierten - Gebärden mittels einer neuen Notation.  
(Papaspyrou 1990)  
1. Expedition in semantisches Neuland 
 
Definitionen sind Regeln der Übersetzung von einer 
Sprache in eine andere. Jede richtige Zeichensprache 
muß sich in jede andere nach solchen Regeln über-
setzen lassen. Dies ist, was sie alle gemeinsam ha-
ben. (Wittgenstein 1984) 
Dieser Satz des Tractatus - 3.343 – enthält quasi 
Wittgensteins frühe Sprachkonzeption ‚in a nutshell’; er 
birgt sogar in nuce den Grundgedanken, daß die logischen 
Konstanten nicht vertreten. 
Auch wenn wir – wie ihr Autor selbst – die Feststel-
lung 3.343 nicht mehr unterschreiben würden, bleibt das 
Problem der Übersetzung für die philosophische Semantik 
grundlegend. 
Gerade die Übertragung der beiden ‚Zentralwerke’ 
Wittgensteins – des Tractatus (im folgenden ‚T’) sowie der 
Philosophischen Untersuchungen (im folgenden ‚PU’) – 
offenbart eine faszinierende Selbstreferenz: eben jene 
philosophisch-semantischen Probleme, von denen der zu 
übersetzende Text handelt, tauchen in unerwarteter Bri-
sanz als Probleme der Übersetzung wieder auf.  
Und dieses ‚thematische Feedback’ nimmt enorm 
zu, wenn die Zielsprache aus Gebärden anstatt aus Lau-
ten besteht; denn, wie schon Wilhelm Wundt am Anfang 
des 20. Jahrhunderts erkannte, tun sich hier kategoriale 
Abgründe auf: 
 
Wie sehr man dabei meist noch geneigt blieb, ein-
fach die der Lautsprache entnommenen Kategorien 
auf die Gebärden zu übertragen, dafür bildet freilich 
die noch heute vollständigste Sammlung von Zei-
chen dieser Art einen Beleg. Sie unterscheidet die 
Gebärden lediglich in Symbole für Hauptwörter, Ei-
genschaftswörter und Zeitwörter, ohne darauf 
Rücksicht zu nehmen, daß diese grammatischen 
Kategorien in der Form, in der sie die Lautsprache 
besitzt, für die Gebärde überhaupt nicht existieren. 
(Wundt 1911) 
Diese kategoriale Inkompatibilität – der Wittgensteins 
Hypothese (‚Definitionen als Regeln der Übersetzung’) 
nicht standhält – verdankt sich vor allem den völlig distink-
ten Kommunikationskanälen. Chrissostomos Papaspyrou, 
ein selbst gehörloser Linguist, unterscheidet hier zwei 
Sprachfamilien verschiedener Substanz: 
 
Jede natürliche Sprache weist bekanntlich sowohl 
eine Form, als auch eine Substanz auf, die als ma-
terieller Träger der Form dient. … Die Substanz hat 
unmittelbare Beziehung zu der Aktualisierungsmo-
dalität, bei der sich eine natürliche Sprache auf phy-
siologische Art und Weise manifestiert. … Jedoch, 
wie ein Blick in die relevante Literatur zeigt, ist die 
Substanz als Vergleichsfaktor nicht berücksichtigt 
worden. Die Annahme, daß alle menschlichen na-
türlichen Sprachen Lautsprachen sind, und somit 
eine gemeinsame Substanz besitzen, klammerte 
diese Möglichkeit von vornherein aus. … Doch es 
gibt die Gebärdensprachen, die die Gültigkeit der 
oben erwähnten Annahme offensichtlich aufheben. 
Als visuell-manuelle Zeichensysteme bieten die Ge-
bärdensprachen, anders als die unterschiedlichen 
Lautsprachen, eine noch tiefer ausgeprägte Kon-
trastierung: die Kontrastierung der Aktualitätsmoda-
litäten zueinander. (Papaspyrou 1990) 
Um zu prüfen, ob und wieweit Wittgensteins Sprachkon-
zepte den Übergang von einer ‚Substanz’ zur anderen heil 
überstehen, haben wir den empirischen Weg gewählt, den 
Versuch einer Übersetzung von T und PU in die – in Öster-
reich unter Gehörlosen gebräuchliche – Gebärdensprache: 
Wittgenstein meets ÖGS. 
2. Wittgenstein – der Maßstab auf dem 
Prüfstand 
Warum Wittgenstein? Weil er für uns noch immer die 
maßgebliche Instanz der Philosophie der idealen und der 
normalen Sprache bleibt. Seit er, im T, Bedeutung als Bild 
und später, in den PU, Bedeutung als Gebrauch charakte-
risiert hat, ist bis jetzt nichts Neues an vergleichbarer Kraft 
und Tiefe hinzugekommen.  
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Daß manche bedeutende Werke der 
philosophischen Literatur ihrer Ursprungs-Sprache 
unablösbar eingeschrieben bleiben, ist ein bekanntes und 
oft diskutiertes Faktum; für manche auch ein Ärgernis. 
Heideggers Ontologie läßt sich ebensowenig gänzlich vom 
Deutschen lösen, wie Sartres Ontologie vom 
Französischen. Man mag zu Quines Unterbestimmtheit der 
Übersetzung stehen, wie man will; sie gilt zumindest für 
den Großteil der philosophischen Klassiker. Wer sie 
sozusagen persönlich kennenlernen will – ohne 
kompromißbelastete Übertragung - muß die Sprache lesen 
können, in welcher sie verfaßt sind. 
Innerhalb der Sprachphilosophie wird die feste 
Bindung eines Systems an ein bestimmtes Idiom weit 
weniger tolerabel. Dort, wo es um das Verhältnis von 
Sprache schlechthin zur Wirklichkeit geht, muß ein 
Gedankengebäude auch auf fremdem Grund fest stehen 
können. Eine Theorie der Bedeutung beispielsweise, die 
sich etwa nur in Whorfs SAE (‚Standard Average 
European) - Sprachen vollständig und korrekt formulieren 
läßt, würde ‚Bedeutung’ zu einer Eigentümlichkeit dieser 
Idiome degradieren. (Whorf 1970) 
Wir wollen diese Minimalforderung das 
Kopernikanische Prinzip der philosophischen Semantik 
nennen: Jede Hypothese (mit allgemeinverbindlichem 
Anspruch) über die Natur sprachlicher Bedeutung 
schlechthin sollte sich in sämtliche Sprachen, die über 
reflexive Potenz verfügen, übersetzen lassen. Unter 
reflexiver Potenz verstehen wir hier die Möglichkeit, 
innerhalb eines Verständigungssystems Bedeutungs-
analyse zu betreiben, d.h. Phänomene wie Intention, Sinn, 
Begriff zu untersuchen und zu klären.  
Cum grano salis ist die Eignung einer Sprache als 
ihre eigene Metasprache gemeint. 
Bei den Gehörlosensprachen ÖGS und DGS 
handelt es sich zweifellos um zwei (miteinander 
nahverwandte) Gebärdensprachen mit reflektiver Potenz, 
z.B. es kann rekursiv und ohne Begrenzung über 
verwendete Gebärden und ihre Bedeutung gebärdet 
werden. 
Der erste Ertrag unseres Projekts liegt in der quasi 
objektiven ‚Meßbarkeit’ der Berechtigung wittgensteinscher 
Sichtweisen: Was sich davon als prinzipiell nicht in die 
ÖGS übersetzbar erweist, ist – entsprechend unserem 
‚Kopernikanischen Prinzip’ - noch nicht allgemein genug 
für eine Universalsemantik.  
Freilich muß von Fall zu Fall rigoros untersucht 
werden, ob wirklich prinzipielle Unübersetzbarkeit vorliegt 
– nicht etwa ein Nachholbedarf auf dem Gebiet der 
Gebärdensprache, Inkompetenz der Gebärdensprecher 
oder tiefliegende Mißverständnisse. 
Den zweiten Ertrag bilden sozusagen die 
Prolegomena zu einer philosophischen Gebärden-
fachsprache. Es ist nicht einzusehen, warum sich 
gehörlose Menschen den Zugang zu tiefen und komplexen 
Fragestellungen stets nur über ihre Zweitsprache 
verschaffen können, ohne Möglichkeit, die Inhalte 
innerhalb ihrer Sprachgemeinschaft an weniger Laut-
Schriftkundige weiterzuvermitteln.  
3. Erste Erfahrungen: (un)gebärdige  
Metaphern 
Schon im Zuge der ersten Übersetzungsversuche waren 
formale Schwierigkeiten deutlich von den inhaltlichen zu 
unterscheiden. Zu den Barrieren formaler Art zählen Ei-
gentümlichkeiten der Gebärdensprache, wie daß z.B. Kon-
junktionen am Anfang eines Nebensatzes (‚daß’/‚ob’) kein 
Gebärdenzeichen entspricht, oder daß der Konjunktiv 
durch die Körperhaltung ausgedrückt wird. Das macht es 
einigermaßen anstrengend, eine Feststellung wie T 2.0211 
 
Hätte die Welt keine Substanz, so würde, ob ein 
Satz Sinn hat, davon abhängen, ob ein anderer 
Satz wahr ist. (Wittgenstein 1984) 
 
zu gebärden.  
Diese Art von Hürden sind aber bei einiger Sorgfalt 
durch Zerlegung und Umformulierung zu umgehen.  
Ernstere Hindernisse ergaben sich angesichts der 
von Metaphorik und Analogienbildung dicht durchzogenen 
Sprache Wittgensteins. Unsere erste ‚Gewährsfrau’, eine 
gehörlose Übersetzerin mit ÖGS als Erstsprache, konnte 
mit der Zentralmetapher des Tractatus – Gedanken bzw. 
Sätze als Bilder von Tatsachen - nichts anfangen.  
Das widersprach diametral unseren Erwartungen, 
da rund 40 Prozent der Gebärden der ÖGS ikonischer 
Natur sind, weiters unsere Gesprächspartnerin Kunstge-
schichte studiert und auch als Malerin mit Theorie und 
Praxis der Abbildung innig vertraut ist. 
Vor der gemeinsamen Besprechung einiger Grund-
ideen der PU legten wir ihr ein Dutzend gebräuchlicher 
Metaphern der deutschen Alltagssprache vor. Obwohl sie 
die meisten kannte, empfand sie sie fast durchwegs als 
verschroben und unnatürlich. Das Problem liegt darin, daß 
man nicht einfach ‚analoge’ metaphorische Gebärden-
komplexe heranziehen kann; es geht ja gerade darum, 
was in jedem konkreten Einzelfall als ‚entsprechend’ zu 
werten ist.  
C. Papaspyrou, der unser Projekt mit Interesse be-
gleitet, erklärte in Hinsicht auf unsere Schwierigkeiten: „Die 
– auf Deutsch formulierten – metaphorischen Beziehungen 
in Wittgensteins Sprachphilosophie müssen deshalb zu-
erst auf entsprechende Ausdrücke der Gebärdensprache 
‚umgedichtet’ werden, bevor man den sprachphilosophi-
schen Inhalt sachlich interpretiert.“  
4. Innensemantik & Bildersprache  
Um die metaphorische Barriere zwischen Laut- und Ge-
bärdensprechenden zu umgehen: wäre es nicht besser, 
zunächst den philosophischen Text zu ‚entmetaphorisie-
ren’? Alles allzu Bildhafte durch ‚Klartext’, brute facts zu 
ersetzen? Wir halten dies bei Sätzen, die vom Wesen 
sprachlicher Bedeutung handeln, für ausgeschlossen: 
Solche Sätze sind entweder verkappte syntaktische – oder 
sie enthalten unreduzierbare Metaphern. 
Für eine ausführliche Begründung dieser apodikti-
schen Absage fehlt hier der Platz. Die Unmöglichkeit, auf 
bildhafte Umschreibung zu verzichten, wurzelt darin, daß 
‚Sprache’ in zwei komplementäre Bereiche zerfällt, einen 
transparenten und eine opaken, entsprechend nicht-
thetischem und thetischem Sprechbewußtsein.  
Zur Präzisierung dieser Hypothese fehlt noch der 
Fachjargon. Wir stehen gleichsam mit einem Fuß auf phä-
nomenologischem und mit dem anderen auf sprachanaly-
tischem Territorium. Doch wird daraus kein Spagat. Denn 
wir befinden uns in einem Gebiet, wo sich die Wege von 
Sartre und Wittgenstein überkreuzen: Im Problemfeld von 
Bewußtsein-Handlung-Leiblichkeit. 
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Vergleichen wir folgende Ausführung Sartres: 
 
In Bezug auf meine Hand bin ich nicht in derselben 
benutzenden Haltung wie im Bezug zum Federhal-
ter. Ich bin meine Hand. Das heißt, sie ist der Still-
stand der Verweisungen und ihr Abschluß.  
(Sartre 1943) 
mit Wittgensteins Einsicht: 
 
Das Schreiben ist gewiß eine willkürliche Bewe-
gung, und doch eine automatische. Und von einem 
Fühlen jeder Schreibbewegung ist natürlich nicht die 
Rede. Man fühlt etwas, aber könnte das Gefühl un-
möglich zergliedern. Die Hand schreibt; sie schreibt 
nicht, weil man will, sondern man will, was sie 
schreibt. (Wittgenstein 1984a) 
Die Hand kommt im flüssigen Schreiben sowenig vor wie 
das schweifende Auge im Erfassen der Landschaft. Sie 
wird im Erleben für-mich gleichsam ‚durchsichtig’. Und 
pointiert ließe sich sagen: im Schreiben habe ich keine 
Hand; – so, wie Douglas Harding anstelle seines Kopfes 
die visuelle Welt setzt. Der Kopf – in der 1.Person-
Perspektive – verschwindet und macht so Platz für die 
ganze Welt. (Harding 2002) 
Analog dazu verschwindet die artikulierte Sprache 
im Brennpunkt meiner Rede und macht hier den Platz für 
Bedeutung frei. Semantik, von innen betrachtet, ist sozu-
sagen Syntaktik-für-mich – nicht etwas, das zu wohlge-
formten Sätzen hinzukommt, sondern das nicht-thetische 
Formulieren von Sätzen im Modus être-pour-soi.  
Daß das Durchsichtigwerden der Sprache gegen-
über dem Gemeinten auch das Lesen kennzeichnet, weiß 
jede(r) mit der Lektüre verschiedensprachiger Texte in 
raschem Wechsel Befaßte: man kann einfach nicht mehr 
sagen, ob der zuletzt gelesene Absatz englisch oder 
deutsch war, obwohl der Inhalt noch als sozusagen gesto-
chen scharfes Nachbild vor dem seelischen Auge steht. 
Bedeutung-an-sich, festgestellte Bedeutung, gibt es 
gemäß der innensemantischen Sicht immer nur ex post, in 
der Reflexion. Das sprechende Menschenwesen befindet 
sich in der Schieflage von Morgensterns Blondem Korken:  
 
Ein blonder Korke spiegelt sich 
in einem Lacktablett – 
allein er säh’ sich dennoch nich’ 
selbst wenn er Augen hätt’! 
 
Das macht, dieweil er senkrecht steigt 
zu seinem Spiegelbild! 
Wenn man ihn freilich seitwärts neigt, 
zerfällt, was oben gilt. 
 
O Mensch, gesetzt du spiegelst dich 
im, sagen wir, - im All! 
Und senkrecht! – wärest du dann nich# 
ganz in demselben Fall? 
(Morgenstern 1995) 
Wir können unsere Vermutung der ‚zwangsläufig metapho-
rischen Innensemantik’ auch so formulieren, daß die 
Grammatik von ‚bedeuten’ eher der Grammatik psycholo-
gischer Verben – als der Beschreibung materieller Zustän-
de oder Relationen ähnelt; deshalb bedarf es bildlicher 
Vermittlung. Auch diese These muß sich im Zug der Über-
setzungsarbeit erst bewähren. 
5. ‚Denkspiele’ als Erlebensformen 
Welchen Stellenwert den Gebärden im ‚Denken’ zukommt, 
darüber herrscht offenbar keine Einigkeit; selbst unter den 
Gehörlosen mit einer Gebärdensprache als Primärspra-
che. Viele betonen, daß sie zuweilen in Gebärden däch-
ten, weisen jedoch das Bild von ‚inneren Gebärden’ – ana-
log dem zu sich selbst Sprechen – oft belustigt zurück.  
Während unsere gehörlose Projektpartnerin nach ih-
rem Selbstverständnis ihre Gedanken mittels Gebärden 
ausdrückt, verneinte sie kategorisch jede Beteiligung ihrer 
Gebärdensprache am ‚privaten’ – für Lautsprachler: stillem 
– Denken. Für sie fällt ‚reines Denken’ mit einer gesteuer-
ten Abfolge innerer Bilder zusammen.  
Das führt zur Frage nach der Ordnung dieser Bilder. 
C. Papaspyrou meinte im Gedankenaustausch zu diesem 
Thema, daß jedes Denken – als operativ-rekursive Tätig-
keit – auf figurative Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten als Stütze 
angewiesen sei. Neben Gebärden erwähnte er als Mittel 
zur Denksteuerung: Schriftsprache, Mathematik, geometri-
sche Formen und Farbsysteme als gebräuchliche ‚Vehikel 
des Denkens’ Gehörloser.  
Wir stecken noch in derselben tiefen Verwirrung, die 
Wittgenstein in den PU angesichts der Memoiren des ge-
hörlosen Mr. Ballard rätseln ließ: „Bist du sicher, daß dies 
die richtige Übersetzung deiner wortlosen Gedanken in 
Worte ist?“ (Wittgenstein 1984) 
Gerade an dieser logischen Bruchstelle - im Nie-
mandsland zwischen unterschiedlichen ‚Sprachsubstan-
zen’ (Papaspyrou 1990) – wollen wir so wenig wie möglich 
mit apriorischen Mutmaßungen arbeiten. Nur die Erfahrung 
des Übersetzungsdialogs kann hier Erhellung bringen; 
damit wird Licht auf die Familie der ‚inneren’ Sprachspiele 
überhaupt fallen.  
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Abbildung und lebendes Bild in Tractatus und Nachlass 
Christian Erbacher, Bergen, Norwegen 
1. „Der Satz ist ein Bild der Wirklichkeit.“ (4.01) 
Zu seiner Verwendung des Begriffs des Bildes im Tracta-
tus sagt Wittgenstein im Gespräch mit Waismann vom 9. 
Dezember 1931, dass sie in zwei verschiedenen Auffas-
sungen wurzelte: zum einen im ‚gewöhnlichen Sinne’ (vgl. 
4.011) des Wortes, etwa wenn man von einem gezeichne-
ten Bild spreche; zum anderen im mathematischen Begriff 
der ‚Abbildung’:  
 
„Als ich schrieb: ‚Der Satz ist ein logisches Bild der 
Tatsache’1, so meinte ich: ich kann in einen Satz ein 
Bild einfügen, und zwar ein gezeichnetes Bild, und 
dann im Satz fortfahren. Ich kann also ein Bild wie 
einen Satz gebrauchen. Wie ist das möglich? Die 
Antwort lautet: Weil eben beide in einer gewissen 
Hinsicht übreinstimmen, und dieses Gemeinsame 
nenne ich Bild. Der Ausdruck ‚Bild’ ist dabei schon 
in einem erweiterten Sinn genommen. Diesen Beg-
riff des Bildes habe ich von zwei Seiten geerbt: ers-
tens von dem gezeichneten Bild, zweitens von dem 
Bild des Mathematikers, das schon ein allgemeiner 
Begriff ist. Denn der Mathematiker spricht ja auch 
dort von Abbildung, wo der Maler diesen Ausdruck 
nicht mehr verwenden würde.“ (WWK 1989, S.185) 
Die vorliegende Untersuchung zeigt, welche Stellen 
des Tractatus mit dem Begriff im mathematischen Sinn in 
Verbindung stehen und wo die Verwendung wechselt.  
2. Mathematische Bestimmungen der  
Begriffe Abbildung und Repräsentation  
Für die Analyse ist die Erinnerung an einige Begriffsbe-
stimmungen hilfreich. Die Angaben orientieren sich an 
Orth (1975; vgl. aber auch z.B. Suppes 1988) 
 
Abbildung 
Unter einer Abbildung von einer Menge A in eine 
andere Menge B versteht man eine Vorschrift (auch: 
Zuordnung, Zuordnungregel), die jedem aЄA genau ein 
bЄB zuordnet. Da jedem aЄA genau ein bЄB zugeordnet 
wird, bezeichnet man eine Abbildung auch als eindeutig. 
Wird A in B abgebildet, so heißt B Bild von A und A Urbild 
von B.  
Wenn es umgekehrt ebenfalls zu jedem bЄB genau 
ein aЄA gibt, so heißt die Abbildung umkehrbar eindeutig 
(auch: bijektiv). Es besteht hierbei also nicht nur eine 
Abbildung von A in B, sondern auch umgekehrt von B in A; 
man schreibt: φ(a) = b. 
 
Homomorphe Abbildung (Repräsentation) und Iso-
morphismus 
Von einer homomorphen Abbildung spricht man, wenn 
nicht nur eine Menge in eine andere abgebildet wird, son-
dern auch Relationen zwischen den Elementen dieser 
Menge. Mindestens eine Menge und mindestens eine 
darauf definierte Relation fasst man als Relativ (auch: 
                                                     
 
1 Waismann merkt an, dass dieser Satz nirgendwo genau steht und verweist 
auf die Stellen 3, 4.01, 4.03. 
Relationenstruktur) zusammen. Man schreibt hierfür A= 
<A, R1, ..., Rn>. Eine Relation ist eine Teilmenge aller ge-
ordneten Paare, die zueinander in einer bestimmten Be-
ziehung stehen.  
Bei einer homomorphen Abbildung wird also ein 
Relativ in ein anderes Relativ abgebildet. Man kann dies 
auch so ausdrücken, dass das Bild einer Relation 
zwischen zwei Elementen aus der Menge A gleich der 
Relation der Bilder in der Menge B ist. Eine entsprechende 
Definition lautet:  
 
D1: „Es seien A=<A, R1, ..., Rn> und B=<B, S1, ..., Sn> 
zwei Relative desselben Typs. Eine Abbildung φ von 
A in B heißt homomorphe Abbildung (oder: Homo-
morphismus) von A in B, wenn für alle Elemente  
a1, a2 Є A und für alle i = 1, 2, ..., n gilt: φ[Ri(a1, a2)] = 
Si[φ(a1), φ(a2)].“ (Orth, S.16) 
Besteht eine homomorphe Abbildung von A in B, so sagt 
man auch, dass A durch B repräsentiert wird, und B eine 
Repräsentation von A ist. Isomorphe Abbildung (auch: 
Isomorphismus) wird eine bijektive Repräsentation ge-
nannt, also eine umkehrbar eindeutige homomorphe Ab-
bildung. 
3. Repräsentation im Tractatus 
Mit dem so definierten Begriffsinstrumentarium kann man 
sagen, dass der Tractatus die isomorphe Repräsentation 
der Welt durch Sprache darstellen soll. Dies wird nun an 
den Stellen des Tractatus aufgezeigt, die dem mathemati-
schen Verständnis des Bildbegriffs entsprechen. Die Re-
formulierung in den oben bestimmten Begriffen ist den 
Zitaten kursiv vorangestellt: 
 
1. Die Welt wird als Relativ dargestellt, das aus der Menge 
der Gegenstände und ihren Relationen zueinander be-
steht:  
 
„Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist.“ (1) 
“Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen 
von Sachverhalten.“ (2) 
„Der Sachverhalt ist eine Verbindung von Gegens-
tänden (Sachen, Dingen).“ (2.01)  
„Im Sachverhalt verhalten sich die Gegenstände in 
bestimmter Art und Weise zueinander.“ (2.031) 
„Die Art und Weise, wie die Gegenstände im Sach-
verhalt zusammenhängen, ist die Struktur des 
Sachverhalts.“ (2.032) 
 
2. Der Satz wird als Relativ dargestellt, das aus Wörtern 
und ihren Relationen zueinander besteht:  
 
„Das logische Bild der Tatsachen ist der Gedanke.“ (3)  
„Im Satz drückt sich der Gedanke sinnlich wahr-
nehmbar aus.“ (3.1) 
„Das Satzzeichen besteht darin, daß sich seine E-
lemente, die Wörter, in ihm auf bestimmte Art und 
Weise zueinander verhalten“ (3.14) 
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3. Der Elementarsatz wird als Relativ dargestellt, das die 
Welt isomorph repräsentiert: 
 
Diese Reformulierung kann in drei Sätze aufgespal-
ten werden:  
 
a) Im Elementarsatz bilden Namen Gegenstände ab, d.h. 
es besteht eine eindeutige Zuordnung von einfachen Zei-
chen zu Gegenständen: 
 
„Im Satze kann der Gedanke so ausgedrückt sein, 
daß den Gegenständen des Gedankens Elemente 
des Satzzeichens erntsprechen.“ (3.2) 
„Diese Elemente nenne ich ‚einfache Zeichen’ und 
den Satz ‚vollständig analysiert’.“ (3.201) 
„Die im Satze angewandten einfachen Zeichen hei-
ßen Namen“ (3.202) 
„Der Elementarsatz besteht aus Namen. Er ist ein 
Zusammenhang, eine Verkettung, von Namen.“ 
(4.22) 
„Der Name kommt nur im Zusammenhange des E-
lementarsatzes vor.“ (4.23) 
 
b) Im Elementarsatz werden nicht nur Gegenstände abge-
bildet, sondern der Elemtarsatz repräsentiert die Sachlage 
(bildet sie homomorph ab), da auch die Beziehungen zwi-
schen den Gegenständen abgebildet werden:  
 
„Die Konfiguration der einfachen Zeichen im Satz-
zeichen entspricht die Konfiguration der Gegens-
tände in der Sachlage.“ (3.21) 
 
c) Die Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Welt ist nicht nur 
eine Repräsentation, sondern eine isomorphe Repräsenta-
tion, da eindeutige Rückübersetzbarkeit gefordert wird: 
 
„Daß es eine allgemeine Regel gibt, durch die der 
Musiker aus der Partitur die Symphonie entnehmen 
kann, durch welche man aus der Linie auf der 
Grammaphonplatte die Symphonie nach der ersten 
Regel wieder die Partitur ableiten kann, darin be-
steht eben die Ähnlichkeit dieser scheinbar so ganz 
verschiedenen Gebilde. Und jene Regel ist das ge-
setz der Projektion, welches die Symphonie in die 
Notensprache projiziiert. Sie ist die Regel der Über-
setzung der Notensprache in die Sprache der 
Grammophonplatte.“ (4.0141) 
„Die Grammophonplatte, der musikalische Gedan-
ke, die Notenschrift, die Schallwellen, stehen alle in 
jener abbildenden Beziehung zueinander, die zwi-
schen Sprache und Welt besteht.“ (4.014) 
Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass der Tractatus 
eine isomorphe Repräsentation von Sachverhalten durch 
Elementarsätze, von Welt durch Sprache, verlangt. Da der 
Sachverhalt der Sinn des ihn abbildenden Elementarsat-
zes ist („Was das Bild darstellt, das ist sein Sinn.“ (2.221)), 
kann man auch von einer Konzeption von Sinn als isomor-
phe Repräsentation sprechen (z.B. Hacker 1981, Glock 
2006).  
4. Der Wechsel zur gewöhnlichen Begriffs-
verwendung  
Für die Frage, inwiefern im Tratctatus durchgängig eine 
Theorie der isomorphen Repräsentation von Sinn formu-
liert wird, ist die Betrachtung einer Stelle aufschlussreich, 
in der von Bild nicht mehr im mathematischen Sinn ge-
sprochen wird. Das ‚gewöhnliche Verständnis’ des Begriffs 
erscheint mit der Beschreibung der Verkettung von einfa-
chen Zeichen zu Elementarsätzen: 
 
„Der Elementarsatz besteht aus Namen. Er ist ein 
Zusammenhang, eine Verkettung, von Namen.“ 
(4.22) 
„Ein Name steht für ein Ding, ein anderer für ein an-
deres Ding und untereinander sind sie verbunden, 
so stellt das Ganze – wie ein lebendes Bild – den 
Sachverhalt vor.“ (4.0311) 
 
Es wird hier, wie zuvor, gefordert, dass Namen zu Elemen-
tarsätzen verbunden sind; allerdings bleibt die Frage offen, 
welche Relationen zwischen Namen bestehen, wie die 
Verkettung von Namen ein „lebendes Bild“ bilden kann. 
Hierfür scheint der Tractatus keine weitere Zuordnungsre-
gel (im mathematischen Sinn) anzugeben. (Die Verknüp-
fung von Namen durch logische Konstanten kommt hierfür 
nicht in Frage. Sie sind Operationen, die auf der Menge 
der Elementarsätze definiert sind und von Elementarsät-
zen zu allen anderen Sätzen führen.) 
5. Bild und Abbildung in Manuskripten aus 
dem Nachlass 
Der Blick in Wittgensteins Nachlass bestätigt den Eindruck 
in Bezug auf den Wechsel der Begriffsverwendung wie er 
oben für den Tractatus dargestellt wurde. Betrachtet man 
die drei Manuskriptbände Ms101 (09. August 1914 – 30. 
Oktober 1914), Ms102 (30. Oktober 1914 – 22. Juni 1915) 
und Ms103 (29. März 1916 – 10. Januar 1917), sind Ein-
träge in Verbindung mit den Begriffen Bild und Abbildung 
vor allem in Ms101 und Ms102 zu finden, und hier haupt-
sächlich in den Monaten September, Oktober und Novem-
ber 1914 (siehe Tabelle 1). Diese frühe Beschäftigung mit 
dem Thema weist auf seine grundlegende Bedeutung für 
den Tractatus hin.  
 
Tab. 1: Vorkommnisse der Begriffe Bild/bil* und Abbil-
dung/abbil* in Ms101, Ms102 und Ms103 (abs. Häufigkei-
ten, nach BEE, diplomatische Version). 
 
 Bild/bil* 
 
Abbildung/abbil*  
 
Ms101  17/22 6/11 
Ms102  53/67 4/10 
Ms103  2/2 0/0 
In Ms101 scheint eine klare Trennung der zwei Verwen-
dungsweisen mit vornehmlicher Verwendung des Begriffs 
im mathematischen Sinne vorzuliegen. So spricht Wittgen-
stein wiederholt von ‚logischem Abbild’ (Ms-101,22r, Ms-
101,29r, Ms-101,52r)2 und ‚meiner Theorie der logischen 
Abbildung’ (Ms-101,52r). Wenn von Bild im gewöhnlichen 
Sinn die Rede ist, dann in Abgrenzung zu dem logischen 
oder mathematischen Sinn der Abbildung. So heisst es in 
dem Eintrag vom 29. September 1914 zum Beispiel:  
 
„Denken wir daran daß auch wirkliche Bilder von 
Sachverhalten stimmen und nicht stimmen können.“ 
(Ms-101,28r, Wittgensteins Unterstreichungen).  
 
Dieser Eintrag entspricht im Tractatus einem Satz in 4.011, 
wo von Bildern „auch im gewöhnlichen Sinne“ gesprochen 
wird. Dass hier von „wirklichen Bildern“ und „auch im ge-
wöhnlichen Sinne“ (meine Hervorhebung) gesprochen 
wird, legt nahe, dass ansonsten von Bild als Abbildung im 
präzisierten mathematischen Sinne die Rede ist. Es deutet 
                                                     
 
2 Zitierweise der Nachlass-Dokumente orientiert sich an den Sigla, die am 
Wittgenstein-Archiv im Hyperwittgenstein- und DISCOVERY-Projekt 
(http://wab.aksis.uib.no /wab_discovery.page; http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wab_hw.page/) 
entwickelt wurden. 
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sich hier allerdings schon die Verschmelzung der beiden 
Verwendungsweisen an.  
Für die vorliegende Untersuchung liegt der 
Kulminationspunkt der Manuskripteinträge zwischen Ende 
Oktober und Anfang November 1914. Der Eintrag vom 30. 
Oktober macht die entscheidende Rolle der Elementar-
sätze für die Idee der Repräsentation von Sachverhalten 
deutlich. Dort heisst es:  
 
„Vor allem muß die Elementarsatzform abbilden,  
alle Abbildung geschieht durch diese.“ (Ms-102,3r).  
 
Die erste Hälfte des Eintrages vom 4. November lautet:  
 
„Wie bestimmt der Satz den logischen Ort?  
Wie repräsentiert das Bild einen Sachverhalt? 
Selbst ist es doch nicht der Sachverhalt, ja dieser 
braucht gar nicht der Fall zu sein.  
Ein Name repräsentiert ein Ding ein anderer ein an-
deres Ding und selbst sind sie verbunden; so stellt 
das Ganze — wie ein lebendes Bild — den Sach-
verhalt vor.“ (MS-102,17r-18r) 
 
An dieser Stelle geschieht wie in Tractatus 4.0311 der 
Wechsel der Begriffsverwendung. Wittgenstein gibt hier 
keine Zuordnungsregel für einfache Zeichen zu Elemen-
tarsätzen an, sondern spricht von einem „lebenden Bild“.  
In dem Notizbuch verwendet Wittgenstein fortan noch 
häufig den Begriff Bild, und zwar in Zusammenhängen des 
mathematischen Sinnes; den Begriff Abbildung verwendet 
er sehr viel weniger. Die beiden zunächst klar unterschie-
denen Begriffe scheinen hier verschmolzen. Die deskripti-
ve Statistik der Begriffe in den Manuskripten spiegelt die 
hier skizzierte Entwicklung sehr gut wider (siehe Tabelle 1).  
6. Mathematische Mannigfaltigkeit 
Der Rest des Notizbucheintrages vom 4. November be-
schäftigt sich weiter mit der Verbindung von Dingen und 
somit auch mit Relationen von Zeichen. Er drückt die Ein-
sicht aus, dass die Verbindungen der Dinge den Relatio-
nen der abbildenden Elemente entsprechen müssen: 
 
„Die logische Verbindung muß natürlich unter den 
repräsentierten Dingen möglich sein und dies wird 
immer der Fall sein wenn die Dinge wirklich reprä-
sentiert sind. Wohlgemerkt jene Verbindung ist kei-
ne Relation sondern nur das Bestehen einer Relati-
on.“ (MS-102,18r-19r) 
 
Im Tractatus wird analog im Anschluss an 4.0311 mit Be-
zug auf die „mathematische Mannigfaltigkeit“ festgestellt, 
dass die Relationen der Namen im Elementarsatz den 
Verbingungen der Gegenstände entprechen können müs-
sen:  
 
„Am Satz muss gerade soviel zu unterscheiden 
sein, als an der Sachlage, die er darstellt. Die bei-
den müssen die gleiche logische (mathematische) 
Mannigfaltigkeit besitzen. ... „ (4.04) 
 
Liest man Defintion D1 genau, so sieht man dass auch 
dort diese Forderung genannt ist, denn das abbildende 
Relativ soll „desselben Typs“ sein wie das abgebildete. Für 
die Relationen des Relativs der Elementarsätze gibt Witt-
genstein im Tractatus aber keine Bestimmung. In dem 
Folgenden Paragraphen heisst es stattdessen:  
 
„Diese mathematische Mannigfaltigkeit kann man 
natürlich nicht selbst wieder abbilden. Aus ihr 
kommt man beim Abbilden nicht heraus.“ (4.0411) 
7. Fazit 
 
Der Tractatus gibt Bedingungen einer isomorphen Reprä-
sentation von Sachverhalten an 
 
Einerseits stellt der Tractatus die Forderung nach einer iso-
morphen Repräsentation von Welt dar (vgl. Hacker 1981, 
Glock 2006). Insofern gibt er Bedingungen für eine Theorie 
von Sinn als Repräsentation an. Andererseits wechselt Witt-
genstein die Verwendung des Begriffs des Bildes von einem 
mathematischen zu einem gewöhnlichem Sinn, wenn er 
über die Verkettung von Namen zu Elementarsätzen spricht, 
also gerade dort, wo die Forderung nach einer Abbildung 
der Relationen zwischen Dingen erfüllt werden müsste. 
Abgesehen von der bloßen Forderung der Gleichartigkeit 
der Verbindungen zwischen Gegenständen und zwischen 
Namen wird im Tractatus keine Zuordnungsregel von Na-
men zu Elementarsätzen genannt.  
 
Die Frage nach der Konzeption von Wahrheit im Tractatus 
ist nicht betroffen 
 
Die Frage nach der Konzeption von Wahrheit ist von die-
ser Analyse nicht betroffen. Die Konzeption von Sinn muss 
von der Konzeption der Wahrheit im Tractatus unterschie-
den werden (Glock 2006). Insofern ist auch Hintikka (1994, 
S.223) zuzustimmen, dass es keinen Sinn hat von der 
Abbildtheorie zu sprechen, da verschiedene, voneinander 
weitgehend unabhängige Ideen unter diesem Titel verhan-
delt werden. Die hier besprochenen Aspekte betreffen 
Hintikkas erste von insgesamt sechs Abbild-Ideen („Ele-
mentarsätze als Bilder“, S. 224, 227-229). Ihre Formulie-
rung hat zunächst keine Auswirkungen auf Operationen 
mit Elementarsätzen. Dies drückt auch Wittgenstein aus, 
wenn er schreibt:  
 
„Die Schemata No. 4.31 haben auch dann eine Be-
deutung, wenn ‚p‘, ‚q‘, ‚r‘, etc. nicht Elementarsätze 
sind“ (5.31).  
 
‚Das Leben von Zeichen‘ 
 
Man kann auch die Frage, wie Zeichen ein „lebendes Bild“ 
bilden können, wie Leben in die Zeichen kommt, ohne 
Annahme von Elementarsätzen behandeln. Wie wir wis-
sen, beschäftigt sich Wittgenstein mit dieser Frage in spä-
teren Jahren.  
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Explaining the Brain:  
Ruthless Reductionism or Multilevel Mechanisms? 
Markus Eronen, Osnabrück, Germany 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, I will compare and criticize two approaches 
to reduction and explanation in neuroscience: metascien-
tific reductionism and mechanistic explanation. I will first 
show that the traditional models of intertheoretic reduction 
are unsuitable for neuroscience. Then I will compare John 
Bickle’s model of metascientific reductionism and Carl 
Craver’s model of mechanistic explanation, arguing that 
the latter has a stronger case, especially when supple-
mented with James Woodward’s interventionist account of 
causal explanation. 
2. Intertheoretic reduction 
The development of intertheoretic models of reduction 
started in the middle of the 20th century, in the spirit of 
logical positivism. The ultimate goal was to show how unity 
of science could be attained through reductions. In the 
classic model (most importantly Nagel 1961, 336-397), 
reduction consists in the deduction of a theory to be re-
duced (T2) from a more fundamental theory (T1). Condi-
tions for a successful reduction are that (1) we can connect 
the terms of T2 with the terms T1, and that (2) with the help 
of these connecting assumptions we can derive all the 
laws of T2 from T1. 
Unfortunately this model fails to account for many 
cases that are regarded as reductions. The model is too 
demanding: it is very hard to find a pair of theories that 
would meet these requirements. Even Nagel’s prime ex-
ample, the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical me-
chanics, is much more complicated than Nagel thought 
(see, e.g., Richardson 2007). The classic model also has 
problems accommodating the fact that the reducing theory 
often corrects the theory to be reduced, which means that 
the theory to be reduced is strictly speaking false. How-
ever, logical deduction is truth-preserving, so it should not 
be possible to deduce a false theory from a true one. 
Problems of this kind lead to the development of 
more and more sophisticated models of intertheoretic re-
duction, and finally to the “New Wave reductionism” of P. 
S. Churchland (1986), P. M. Churchland (1989) and J. 
Bickle (1998, 2003, 2006). Due to constraints of space, I 
will not go through these models here. It is sufficient to 
point out one fundamental assumption that underlies all 
intertheoretic models of reduction, and which leads to seri-
ous problems in the case of psychology and neuroscience.  
This assumption is that the relata of reductions are 
exclusively theories, and that intertheoretic relations are 
the only epistemically and ontologically significant 
interscientific relations (see, e.g., McCauley 2007). 
However, well-structured theories that could be handled 
with logical tools are rare in and peripheral to psychology 
and neuroscience. Instead, scientists typically look for 
mechanisms as explanations for patterns, effects, 
capacities, phenomena, and so on (see, e.g., Machamer et 
al. 2000 and Cummins 2000). Although there are theories 
in a loose sense in psychology and neuroscience, like the 
LTP theory for spatial memory or the global workspace 
theory, these are not theories that could be formalized, 
and can hardly be the starting points or results of logical 
deductions. Therefore looking at the relations between 
theories is the wrong starting point, at least in the case of 
psychology and neuroscience. 
3. Metascientific reductionism 
At least partly for these reasons, John Bickle, the most 
ardent advocate of New Wave reductionism, has taken 
some distance from the intertheoretic models of reduction 
and now emphasizes looking at the “reduction-in-practice” 
in current neuroscience (Bickle 2003, 2006). He calls this 
approach “metascientific reductionism” to distinguish it 
from philosophically motivated models of reduction that are 
typically used in philosophy of mind.  
The idea is that instead of imposing philosophical 
intuitions on what reduction has to be, we should examine 
scientific case studies to understand reduction. We should 
look at experimental practices of an admittedly 
reductionistic field, characterized as such by its 
practitioners and other scientists.  
According to Bickle, molecular and cellular cognition 
– the study of the molecular and cellular basis of cognitive 
function – provides just the right example. The reductionist 
methodology of molecular and cellular cognition has two 
parts: (1) intervene causally into cellular or molecular 
pathways, (2) track statistically significant differences in 
the behavior of the animals (2006, 425). When this 
strategy is successful and a mind-to-molecules linkage has 
been forged, a reduction has been established. The 
cellular and molecular mechanisms directly explain the 
behavioural data and set aside intervening explanatory 
levels (2006, 426). Higher-level psychology is needed for 
describing behavior, formulating hypotheses, designing 
experimental setups, and so on, but according to Bickle, 
these are just heuristic tasks, and when cellular/molecular 
explanations are completed, there is nothing left for higher-
level investigations to explain (2006, 428).  
Metascientific reductionism does not require that the 
relata of reductions are formal theories, and does not lead 
to the problem mentioned in the end of last section. 
However, it is not without its share of problems, as I will 
show below.  
4. Mechanistic explanation 
The discrepancies between traditional models of reduction 
and actual scientific practice in psychology, neuroscience 
and biology have resulted in the development of alterna-
tive models. One alternative that I have just discussed is 
Bickle’s metascientific reductionism. Another approach that 
has been receiving more and more attention recently is 
mechanistic explanation (e.g., Bechtel & Richardson 1993, 
Machamer et al. 2000). In this paper I will focus on Carl 
Craver’s (2007) recent and detailed account of mechanistic 
explanation.  
The central claim of advocates of mechanistic ex-
planation is that good explanations describe mechanisms 
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(at least in neuroscience). Mechanisms are ”entities and 
activites organized such that they are productive of regular 
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination condi-
tions” (Machamer et al. 2000, 3). A mechanistic explana-
tion describes how the mechanism accounts for the ex-
planandum phenomenon, the overall systemic activity (or 
process or function) to be explained. 
For example, the propagation of action potentials is 
explained by describing the cellular and molecular mecha-
nisms involving voltage-gated sodium channels, myelin 
sheaths, and so on. The pain withdrawal effect is ex-
plained by describing how nerves transmit the signal to the 
spinal chord, which in turn initiates a signal that causes 
muscle contraction. The metabolism of lactose in the bac-
terium E. coli is explained by describing the genetic regula-
tory mechanism of the lac operon, and so on.  
5. The case of LTP 
A paradigmatic example for both Bickle (2003, 43-106) 
and Craver (2007, 233-243) is the case of LTP (Long Term 
Potentiation) and memory consolidation. Both authors 
agree that the explanandum phenomenon is memory con-
solidation (the transformation of short-term memories into 
long-term ones), and that this is explained by describing 
how the relevant parts and their activities result in the 
overall activity - that is, by describing the cellular and mo-
lecular mechanisms of LTP. However, the conclusions the 
authors draw are completely different.  
According to Bickle, the case of LTP and memory 
consolidation is a paradigm example of an accomplished 
psychoneural reduction. He describes the current cellular 
and molecular models of LTP in detail, and argues that 
they are the mechanisms of memory consolidation. Fur-
thermore, he argues that these mechanisms explain mem-
ory consolidation directly, setting aside psychological, 
cognitive-neuroscientific, etc., levels. This is an example of 
the ”intervene cellular/molecularly, track behaviorally” 
methodology, and in Bickle’s view a successful reduction.  
What makes Bickle’s analysis ”ruthlessly” reductive 
is the claim that ”psychological explanations lose their 
initial status as causally-mechanistically explanatory vis-á-
vis an accomplished (and not just anticipated) cellu-
lar/molecular explanation” (2003, 110). He argues that 
scientists stop evoking and developing psychological 
causal explanations once ”real neurobiological explana-
tions are on offer”, and ”accomplished lower-level mecha-
nistic explanations absolve us of the need in science to 
talk causally or investigate further at higher levels, at least 
in any robust ’autononomous’ sense” (2003, 111).  
Craver’s analysis is quite different. He points out 
that the discoverers of LTP did not have reductive aspira-
tions – they saw LTP as a component in a multilevel 
mechanism of memory, and after the discovery of LTP in 
1973, there has been research both up and down in the 
hierarchy. Craver claims that the memory research pro-
gram has implicitly abandoned reduction as an explanatory 
goal in favor of the search for multilevel mechanisms. His 
conclusion is that ”the LTP research program is a clear 
historical counterexample to those ... who present reduc-
tion as a general empirical hypothesis about trends in sci-
ence” (2007, 243). 
What sets Craver’s position in direct opposition to 
ruthless reductionism is the thesis of causal and explana-
tory relevance of nonfundamental things. That is, he ar-
gues that there is no fundamental level of explanation, and 
that entities of higher levels can have causal and explana-
tory relevance. This is in sharp contrast to Bickle’s view. 
Craver’s defense of the causal and explanatory relevance 
of nonfundamental things relies heavily on Woodward’s 
(2003) account of causal explanation, which I will briefly 
present here – the details are available in Woodward’s 
articles and books.  
6. Causal explanation 
A key notion for Woodward is intervention. An intervention 
can thought of as an (ideal or hypothetical) experimental 
manipulation carried out on some variable X (the inde-
pendent variable) for the purpose of ascertaining whether 
changes in X are causally related to changes in some 
other variable Y (the dependent variable). Interventions 
are not only human activities, there are also ”natural” inter-
ventions, and the notion of intervention can be defined with 
no essential reference to human agency.  
Another key concept is invariance. Broadly speak-
ing, a generalization or relationship is invariant if it remains 
intact or unchanged under at least some interventions. 
Suppose that there is a relationship between two variables 
that is represented by a functional relationship Y = f(X). If 
the same functional relationship f holds under a range of 
interventions on X, then the relationship is invariant within 
that range. For example, the ideal gas law “pV = nRT” 
continues to hold under various interventions that change 
the values of the variables, and is thus invariant within this 
range of interventions. Invariance is a matter of degree: for 
example, the van der Waals force law ([P + a/V2][V - b] = 
RT) is more invariant than the ideal gas law since it contin-
ues to hold under a wider range of interventions.  
The main point is that according to Woodward, 
causal explanation requires appeal to invariant generaliza-
tions. Invariant generalizations are explanatory because 
they can be used to answer “what-if-things-had-been-
different questions” (w-questions). For example, the ideal 
gas law can be used to show what the pressure of a gas 
would have been if the temperature would have been dif-
ferent. True but non-invariant generalizations like ”all the 
coins in the pocket of Konstantin Todorov on January 25, 
2008, are euros” cannot be used to answer w-questions. 
Only if a generalization is invariant under some range of 
interventions can we appeal to it to answer w-questions. In 
other words, causal explanatory relevance is just a matter 
of holding of the right sort of pattern of counterfactual de-
pendence between explanans and explanandum, and 
invariant generalizations capture these patterns.  
If we accept Woodward’s model of causal explana-
tion, we see that Bickle’s claims about higher-level expla-
nations losing their status as causally/mechanically ex-
planatory are unwarranted. In Woodward’s account, things 
that figure in invariant generalizations have causal ex-
planatory relevance. It is clear that in this sense nonfun-
damental things can have causal and explanatory rele-
vance even when the ”fundamental” cellular and molecular 
explanations are complete. For example, the generaliza-
tions at the higher levels of the memory consolidation 
mechanisms will remain invariant even after the cellular 
and molecular explanations are complete.  
In order to counter this argument, Bickle would have 
to show either that the relevant higher-level generaliza-
tions are not actually invariant, or that there is something 
wrong with Woodward’s account. The latter alternative is 
the more promising one. Bickle could argue that Wood-
ward’s model is simply wrong, or that there is a stronger 
notion of causation that applies to the cellular/molecular 
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level. However, a notion of causation like this does not 
emerge from scientific evidence only (Craver’s and Wood-
ward’s models are just as much based on scientific evi-
dence as Bickle’s), and Bickle seems to be reluctant to 
provide philosophical arguments for his views.  
Furthermore, such a stronger notion of causation 
would inevitably lead to problems. We can always ask the 
question: why stop at the cellular/molecular level and not 
go further down to the chemical/atomic/quantum level? 
Bickle is conscious of this, and in fact seems to admit that 
it is possible that in the future causal explanations will be 
found at the microphysical level (2003, 156-157). This of 
course means that the cellular/molecular explanations are 
only temporarily causal explanations. It also suggests that 
at some point the causal explanations for all human be-
havior will be microphysical explanations. This kind of a 
notion of causal explanation strikes me as implausible and 
unnecessarily restrictive. 
On the other hand we have Woodward’s notion of 
causal and explanatory relevance that conforms to scien-
tific practice and is being more and more widely accepted 
among philosophers of science. The prospects of ruthless 
reductionism do not look very good.  
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued first that intertheoretic models 
of reduction are inappropriate for neuroscience, mainly 
because they focus on relations between formal theories. 
Then I have argued that mechanistic explanation and 
Woodward’s theory of causal explanation taken together 
present a great challenge to a strongly reductionistic ac-
count of explanation in neuroscience. 
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Occam’s Razor in the Theory of Theory Assessment 
August Fenk, Klagenfurt, Austria 
1. Overview 
In this paper I will at first discuss the role of economy, par-
simony or simplicity in theory assessment and model se-
lection. This discussion (in Section 2) will amount to a 
three-dimensional model of theory assessment, including 
Coombs’ (1984) dimensions generality (breadth) and 
power (depth), and simplicity as the third dimension.  
Theory assessment is, most commonly, a matter of 
the methodology of empirical science. But its principles 
might also apply to “metaphysical theories”, at least in part, 
as already suggested in Laszlo (1972:389). Thus they 
might also be applicable, in selfreferential ways, to those 
meta-theory – the “theory of theory assessment” in terms 
of Huber (2008:90) – that has invented the above men-
tioned criteria of model selection and theory assessment. 
This is exactly what I shall study in Section 3 of this paper, 
focusing on the key-concepts of law and lawlikeness. Laws 
are usually assumed to be a precondition for the recon-
struction and explanation of phenomena on the one hand 
and their anticipation and prediction on the other, but rela-
tive frequency will be shown as the proper basis of all our 
projections to the past and to the future. Evolutionary per-
spectives are indicated in the last Section 4.  
Thus, this paper does not deal with the reduction of 
theories in the sense of Nagel (1961), or with the problems 
in the attempts to reduce “emergent” systems to their ele-
ments, but rather with the reduction of (semantic) complex-
ity and the elimination of dispensible components of (meta-
)theories. And, in a certain sense, with the “reduction” of 
law to statistical generalizations. 
2. Three dimensions of theory assessment 
Most theories of theory assessment are two-dimensional, 
balancing e.g. “empirical adequacy” against “integrative 
generality” (Laszlo 1972:388) or power against generality 
(Coombs 1984), and most of the standard methods of 
model selection provide, according to Forster (2000:205), 
“an implementation of Occam’s razor, in which parsimony 
or simplicity is balanced against goodness-of-fit”. 
But there are also some attempts to three-
dimensional models: In his above mentioned paper Forster 
(2000:205) suggests that model selection should, besides 
simplicity and fit, “include the ability of a model to general-
ize to predictions in a different domain”. In Lewis 
(1994:480) there is talk about a trade off between the “vir-
tues of simplicity, strength, and fit”. And Laszlo’s 
(1972:388) factor “integrative generality” figures as “a 
measure of the internal consistency, elegance, and ‘neat-
ness’ of the explanatory framework”. Two scientific theo-
ries, he says, can be compared with regard to the number 
of facts taken into account (I), the precision of the account-
ing (II), and the economy (III) whereby the balance be-
tween “integrative generality” and “empirical adequacy” is 
produced. Economy (III) is, first of all, associated with a 
small number of “basic existential assumptions and hy-
potheses” (Laszlo 1972:388). (I) and (II) correspond to 
Coombs’ generality and power, and Coombs’ model may 
be viewed as an appropriate decomposition of Laszlo’s 
factor “empirical adequacy”. But it fails to account for Oc-
cam’s razor. 
Considering such arguments I emphasize a three-
dimensional model (Fenk 2000) including the dimensions 
precision, generality (size of domain), and parsimony, as 
well as a strict distinction between the theory’s assertions 
– the lawlike propositions in the core of any scientific the-
ory – and the theory’s “predictive success” (in the sense of 
Feyerabend 1962:94). Other than in the above mentioned 
approaches by Forster and by Lewis, goodness-of-fit is not 
a separate dimension, but the touchstone of the whole 
theory. According to this model we state an advantage of a 
theory t2, as compared with a former version or conflicting 
theory t1, if it achieves at least the same predictive suc-
cess (number of hits) despite a higher precision of the 
predictions and/or an extended domain and/or a lower 
number of assumptions. With regard to Coombs’ trade-off 
between the dimensions „power“ and „generality“, this idea 
is illustrated in Fenk & Vanoucek (1992:22f.), though only 
on the level of single lawlike assumptions.  
Popper (1976:98,105) suggests disregarding, at 
least in epistemological contexts, properties of pure repre-
sentation as well as the respective conventionalistic, “aes-
thetic-pragmatical” conceptualizations of “simplicity” or 
“elegance”. But maybe the aesthetic attributes come by 
the theory’s economic functionality, just as in the aesthetic 
BAUHAUS-principle “form follows function”? And our 
three-dimensional model actually applies, first of all, to 
theory as a hypothetical representation or construction. It 
is particularly interesting to see that it none the less fits all 
of Popper’s further arguments regarding the relations be-
tween “empirical content”, “testability”, and “simplicity”: The 
more possibilities ruled out by a sentence (“je mehr er 
verbietet”; p. 83), the higher its empirical content. “Auf die 
Forderung nach möglichst großem empirischen Gehalt 
können noch andere methodologische Forderungen zu-
rückgeführt werden; vor allem die nach möglichst großer 
Allgemeinheit der empirisch-wissenschaftlichen Theorien 
und die nach größter Präzision oder Bestimmtheit.“ (p. 85) 
„Einfachere Sätze sind /…/ deshalb höher zu werten als 
weniger einfache, weil sie mehr sagen, weil ihr empirischer 
Gehalt größer ist, weil sie besser überprüfbar sind.“ (p. 
103) Thus, generality (Allgemeinheit), precision (Bes-
timmtheit) and simplicity (Einfachheit) turn out to be three 
different facets of Popper’s essential idea of testability and 
the chance to be falsified. 
Are virtues such as “integrative generality” and 
“economy”, as suggested in Laszlo (1972:389), also appli-
cable to “metaphysical” disciplines, i.e. to meta-theories 
that have to do without the corrective of direct empirical 
tests? In theoretical semiotics, for instance, a reduced 
complexity of the terminological framework may allow to 
solve classificational problems such as the definition of 
iconicity (Fenk 1997), or to solve and communicate them in 
better understandable ways.1 Can we apply criteria of sci-
entific progress invented by the philosophy of science 
even to essential concepts of that philosophy of science? 
                                                     
 
1 The latter aspect reminds, in some ways, of the concepts of “userfriendly-
ness” in Cognitive Ergonomics and of (low) “item-difficulty” in test theory. 
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3. A reductionistic look on laws and 
lawlikeness 
A general principle „that is applicable to all kinds of rea-
soning under uncertainty, including inductive inference“ 
(Grünwald 2000:133) – is such a thing conceivable in view 
of the problems discussed in the philosophy of science? 
I will try that focusing on the key-concepts of law 
and lawlikeness. In Goodman (1973:90,108) a hypothesis 
is lawlike only if it is projectible and projectible when and 
only when it is supported (some positive cases), unviolated 
(no negative cases), and unexhausted (some undeter-
mined cases)2. But especially the criterion “unviolated” 
seems to be rather meant for universal laws (Fenk & 
Vanoucek 1992). What should be considered the negative 
and the positive cases in view of a weak regularity such as 
a very severe side-effect of a medicament showing in one 
of hundred patients in nine of ten studies? 
The following outline starts with the universal laws in 
the Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model by Hempel & Op-
penheim (1948). The authors note that their formal analy-
sis of scientific explanation applies to scientific prediction 
as well. This symmetry between explanation and prediction 
will outlast. The application of the D-N model, however, is 
restricted to a world of universal laws – a rather restricted 
or even non-existent world, if law is not understood as a 
mere proposition but as an empirically valid argument. 
Thus we see a shift of the focus in the philosophy of sci-
ence from the universal laws in the D-N model to statistical 
arguments rendering their extremely high probabilities 
(“close to 1”) to the explanation in Hempel’s (1962) Induc-
tive-Statistical (I-S) model. And from here to the reduction 
of “plausibility” to the relative frequencies observed so far 
(Mises 1972:114) and to “stable” frequency distributions as 
a sufficient basis for “objective chances” (Hoefer 2007). Let 
me carry that to the extremes: If a dice had produced an 
uneven number in ten of fifteen cases I would, if I had to 
bet, bet on “uneven” for the sixteenth trial. For if there is a 
system it seems to prefer uneven numbers, and if there is 
none, I can’t make a mistake anyway (Fenk 1992). But 
how if the “series” that had produced uneven has the 
minimal length of only one trial? I would again bet on “un-
even”. And if I knew that on a certain day in a certain place 
on the equator the highest temperature was 40° C, I would 
– if I had to guess in the absence of any additional knowl-
edge – again guess a peak of 40°C for the day after or the 
day before. The only way I can see to justify such deci-
sions is an application of Occam’s razor, or a principle at 
least inspired by Occam’s razor: Do without the assump-
tion of a change as long as you can’t make out any indica-
tion or reason for such an assumption! 
Hardly anybody would talk about laws in the exam-
ple with the fifteen dices, or in the case of a series of fif-
teen S1–S2 combinations in a conditioning experiment, 
and most of us wouldn’t even talk about “relative fre-
quency” in our one-trial “series” – despite an ideal “relative 
frequency” of 1 in the one-trial “series” and in the S1-S2 
combinations in the conditioning experiment. But the ex-
amples reflect a principle as simple as general: Use the 
                                                     
 
2 For cases of two conflicting assumptions both satisfying the above criteria, 
Goodman (1973:94) suggests deciding for the assumption with the “better 
entrenched” predicate, e.g. for “all emeralds are green” rather than “... are 
grue”, where “grue” “applies to all things examined before t just in case they 
are green but to other things just in case they are blue”. But this argument is at 
best relevant if we don’t admit any contextual knowledge. Why should we, on 
the expense of the precision of our predictions, allow all the emeralds having a 
specified crystal lattice to be either green or blue or to change their “output”, 
i.e. the spectrum of the light reflected?  
slightest indication and all your contextual knowledge to 
optimize your decision but bet on continuity as long as you 
see no reason to assume that a system might change its 
output-pattern; generalize the data available to unknown 
instances! “Laws”, “probabilities”, and “objective chances” 
are – beyond a purely mathematical world – nice names 
for such generalizations and projections, usually based on 
large numbers of observations. But there is no lower limit 
regarding the strength of a regularity or the number of data 
available that ceases the admissibility of this way of rea-
soning! I can’t resist quoting Hempel (1968:117) when he 
admits that “no specific common lower bound” for the 
probability of an association between X and Y “can rea-
sonably be imposed on all probabilistic explanation.” 
4. Evolutionary perspectives 
In his commentary on Campbell (1987), Popper (1987) 
agrees with Campbell’s view of the evolution of knowledge 
systems as a blind selective elimination process. I am not 
quite sure if this is fully compatible with his remark (p. 120) 
“that in some way or other all hypotheses (H) are psycho-
logically prior to some observation (O)”. And principles of 
theory assessment such as Occam’s razor might guide a 
systematic and conscious selection of theories in ways 
being more efficient and faster than a blind evolutionary 
process. Any sort of anticipation and of explorative or “hy-
pothesis-testing behavior” imputes regularities and pat-
terns and is successfull only if its heuristics and strategies 
in turn follow such patterns. The selective pressure was, 
first of all, on the evolution of mechanisms and strategies 
for learning risks and chances. In our recent life anticipa-
tion plays double a role: still as the cognitive component of 
any practical decision, and in science as the hypothesis 
tested systematically in order to improve our knowledge.  
Irrespective of whether or not the evolution of 
knowledge follows a blind selective process: Real progress 
in nomological science seems to come about relatively 
slowly (Laszlo 1998), most apparently if predictive success 
or prognostic performance is taken as the relevant crite-
rion, and in part due to an again “relatively” slow improve-
ment of the respective methods. “Relatively” slow as com-
pared e.g. with “vague but perhaps persuasive forms of 
explanation in the social and behavioral sciences” and 
“metaphysical theories of human nature” (Laszlo 
1972:389) that cannot claim predictive success. A nice 
parallel in the evolution of technical equipment: “Using 
functional and symbolic design features for Polynesian 
canoes”, Rogers and Ehrlich (2008:1) could show “that 
natural selection apparently slows the evolution of func-
tional structure, whereas symbolic designs differentiate 
more rapidly.” 
Occam’s Razor in the Theory of Theory Assessment — August Fenk 
 
 
 91
Literature 
Campbell, Donald T. 1987 “Evolutionary Epistemology”, in: Gerard 
Radnitzky and W.W. Bartley (eds.), Evolutionary Epistemology, 
Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge, Chicago and La 
Salle: Open Court, 47 – 89. 
Coombs, Clyde H. 1984 “Theory and Experiment in Psychology”, 
in: Kurt Pawlik (ed.), Fortschritte der Experimentalpsychologie, 
Berlin – Heidelberg: Springer, 20 – 30. 
Fenk, August 1997 “Representation and Iconicity”, Semiotica 115, 
3/4, 215 – 234. 
Fenk, August 2000 “Dimensions of the evolution of knowledge 
systems”, Abstracts of the VIth Congress of the Austrian Philoso-
phical Society, June 1 – 4 in Linz. 
Fenk, August 1992 “Ratiomorphe Entscheidungen in der Evolutio-
nären Erkenntnistheorie”, Forum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung 
5(1), 33 – 40. 
Fenk, August and Vanoucek, Josef 1992 “Zur Messung prognosti-
scher Leistung”, Zeitschrift für experimentelle und angewandte 
Psychologie 39(1), 18 – 55. 
Feyerabend, Paul K. 1962 “Explanation, Reduction, and Empiri-
cism”, in: Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science III, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 28 – 97. 
Forster, Malcolm R. 2000 “Key Concepts in Model Selection: Per-
formance and Generalizability”, Journal of Mathematical Psychol-
ogy 44(1), 205 – 231. 
Goodman, Nelson 31973 Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Indianapolis – 
New York: The Bobbs Merrill Company. 
Grünwald, Peter 2000 “Model Selection Based on Minimum De-
scription Length”, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 44(1), 133 
– 152. 
Hempel, Carl G. 1962 “Deductive Nomological vs. Statistical Ex-
planation”, in: Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science III. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 98 - 169. 
Hempel, Carl G. 1968 “Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in 
Probabilistic Explanation”, Philosophy of Science 35, 116 – 133. 
Hempel, Carl G. and Oppenheim, P. 1948 “Studies in the Logic of 
Explanation”, Philosophy of Science 15, 135 – 175. 
Hoefer, Carl 2007 “The Third Way on Objective Probability: A 
Sceptic’s Guide to Objective Chance”, Mind 116 (463), 549 – 596. 
Huber, Franz 2008 “Assessing Theories, Bayes Style”, Synthese 
161, 89 – 118. 
Laszlo, Erwin 1972 “A General Systems Model of the Evolution of 
Science”, Scientia 107, 379 – 395. 
Laszlo, Erwin 1998 “Systems and societies: The logic of sociocul-
tural evolution”, in: Gabriel Altmann and Walter A. Koch (eds.), 
Systems - New Paradigms for the Human Sciences, Berlin – New 
York: Walter de Gruyter. 
Lewis, David 1994 “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind 
103(412), 473 - 490. 
Mises, Richard von 41972 Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahr-
heit, Wien – New York: Springer. 
Nagel, Ernest 1961 The Structure of Science, New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, and Company. 
Popper, Karl R. 61976 Logik der Forschung, Tübingen: Mohr. 
Popper, Karl R. 1987 “Campbell on the Evolutionary Theory of 
Knowledge”, in: Gerard Radnitzky and W.W. Bartley (eds.) Evolu-
tionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowl-
edge. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 115 – 120. 
Rogers, Deborah S. and Ehrlich, Paul R. 2008 “Natural selection 
and cultural rates of change”, PNAS Early Edition, 1 – 5. 
 
 
  92 
Die Nichtreduzierbarkeit der klassischen Physik auf quantentheore-
tische Grundbegriffe 
Helmut Fink, Erlangen, Deutschland 
1 Optimistische Meta-Induktion 
Die Geschichte der Physik ist eine Geschichte fortschrei-
tender Vereinheitlichung ihrer Grundbegriffe. Dies bedarf 
sogleich der Erläuterung: “Grundbegriffe” sind hierbei nicht 
unbedingt solche Begriffe, wie sie in einem Aufbau der 
Physik nach Prinzipien des methodischen Konstruktivis-
mus am Anfang zu stehen haben, nämlich vorwissen-
schaftliche Beobachtungen, lebensweltliche Handlungen 
oder elementare Phänomene. Gemeint sind vielmehr die 
Grundbegriffe “fertiger” Theorien, wie sie sich in einer 
nachträglichen rationalen Rekonstruktion zeigen. Idealisie-
rung und Formalisierung haben zur Folge, dass diese 
Grundbegriffe mathematische Begriffe mit physikalischer 
Interpretation sind.  
Die Vereinheitlichung der Physik ist eine 
theoretische Vereinheitlichung. Die Phänomene bleiben 
qualitativ verschieden, ihre Beschreibung offenbart jedoch 
gemeinsame Strukturen. Je größer der Anwendungs-
bereich einer physikalischen Theorie, desto größer die 
Reichweite ihrer Grundbegriffe. Prominente Beispiele 
solcher Grundbegriffe sind die Potentiale der 
(“phänomenologischen”) Thermodynamik, der Massen-
punkt der klassischen Mechanik, die Felder des 
klassischen Elektromagnetismus. 
Umfassendere Theorien können speziellere 
Theorien etwa als Spezialfall oder Grenzfall enthalten 
(Scheibe 1997, 1999). Letztere sind dann auf erstere 
“reduziert”, d.h. auf noch fundamentalere Grundbegriffe 
zurückgeführt. Dabei kann ein “semantischer Rest” 
bleiben, d.h. ein qualitativer Inhalt der spezielleren 
Begriffe, der aus den umfassenderen alleine nicht 
ersichtlich wäre. Dieser Rest darf jedoch zur Rahmen-
theorie nicht in Widerspruch geraten. Beispiele für solche 
“schwachen” Theoriereduktionen sind die Rückführung der 
Wärme auf die Molekularbewegung oder der Lichtaus-
breitung auf den Elektromagnetismus.  
Künftige Fortschritte können aus der gegenwärtigen 
Physik nicht induktiv erschlossen werden. Die ungeheure 
Erfolgsgeschichte bisheriger begrifflicher Vereinheit-
lichungen nährt jedoch die Hoffnung auf einen nächsten 
Schritt. Die Vereinheitlichung ging bisher immer weiter. Es 
ist daher vernünftig anzunehmen, dass sie es auch in 
Zukunft tun wird. Diese Maxime bezeichnen wir als Prinzip 
(oder Hypothese) der optimistischen Meta-Induktion. Sie 
erscheint zumindest dort gerechtfertigt, wo keine offen-
sichtlichen ontologischen Schwierigkeiten lauern: im 
Bereich der Theorienreduktion innerhalb der Physik. 
Da es nur um Theorien geht, sollte das Verhältnis 
zwischen den Gegenständen der Mathematik und den 
Gegenständen der Empirie kein Hindernis für einzelne 
Reduktionen bieten, denn es betrifft alle Theorien gleicher-
maßen. Und da es nur um Physik geht, sollte die 
Erklärungslücke zwischen materieller Konfiguration und 
subjektivem Erleben kein Hindernis sein, denn die Qualia 
aus der Philosophie des Geistes kommen in der Physik 
gar nicht vor.  
Die erfolgreichsten Rahmentheorien der modernen 
Physik sind die klassische Physik (einschließlich spezieller 
und allgemeiner Relativitätstheorie) und die Quanten-
theorie (einschließlich Quantenfeldtheorien). Die klassische 
Physik ist sicher nicht universell, wie ihr Scheitern bei 
Quantenphänomenen zeigt. Ist die Quantentheorie 
universell? 
2 Hoffen und Bangen des Quanten-
Universalismus 
Die elementaren Bausteine der Materie werden in quan-
tentheoretischen Begriffen beschrieben. Kernphysik, che-
mische Bindung, Festkörperphysik, Optik ruhen auf quan-
tentheoretischen Erklärungen. Quantenphänomene kön-
nen zunehmend auch auf mesoskopischer und makrosko-
pischer Skala herbeigeführt werden. Information erscheint 
in der Sprache der Quanteninformationstheorie in neuem 
Licht. Empirisch wird die Quantentheorie überall bestätigt, 
Grenzen ihres Anwendungsbereichs sind nicht in Sicht.  
Der Formalismus der Quantentheorie ist mathema-
tisch, also abstrakt. Der Bezug des Formalismus auf die 
(bzw. eine mögliche) äußere Realität, d.h. die Interpretati-
on der Quantentheorie, ist nicht so offensichtlich wie die 
Interpretation der klassischen Theorien. Historisch prä-
gend war die Kopenhagener Interpretation. Sie betont die 
klassische Beschreibung der experimentellen Anordnung, 
bestehend aus Präparier- und Registrierapparat. Die 
Quantentheorie ist in dieser Interpretation konzeptionell 
nicht selbstständig. Sie scheint nicht auf eigenen Beinen 
zu stehen, sondern auf klassischen Krücken.  
Es war ein naheliegendes Unternehmen, die Gren-
zen der Quantentheorie auszutesten.  
Was in immer neuen Anwendungsfeldern gelang, 
konnte die eigenen Grundlagen auf Dauer nicht ausspa-
ren: eine rein quantentheoretische Beschreibung. Die Ko-
penhagener Sonderstellung der Apparate erschien zu-
nehmend willkürlich, als historisches Relikt, bestenfalls von 
pragmatischem Nutzen. Die Sonderrolle von “Messprozes-
sen” erregt Misstrauen, erscheint zunehmend angreifbar, 
als interpretatorisches Kuriosum, schlimmstenfalls mit 
anthropozentrischer Botschaft.  
Die Theorie erlaubt die formale Einbeziehung der 
Apparate, ihre Hinzunahme als weiteres Quantensystem, 
ihre Ankopplung mit Verschränkungseffekt (“Prämes-
sung”), die Definition geeigneter Zeigerobservablen und 
deren alleinige Betrachtung nach Ende der Messwechsel-
wirkung. Die Grundidee dieser Quantentheorie der Mes-
sung ist alt: Sie geht auf John von Neumann zurück, der 
sie als Konsistenztest der Theorie ansah. Zahlreiche for-
male und begriffliche Verallgemeinerungen wurden seither 
erarbeitet (Busch et al. ²1996), doch die Gesamtbilanz ist 
ernüchternd: Messungen haben keine Ergebnisse, wenn 
sie rein quantentheoretisch beschrieben werden! 
Quantenzustände liefern Wahrscheinlichkeiten für 
die möglichen Messwerte, und das beste, was man erzie-
len kann, ist dass der Quantenzustand des Messapparats 
für die jeweiligen Zeigerstellungen genau dieselben Wahr-
scheinlichkeiten liefert. Das würde den Schluss von der 
Zeigerstellung auf den gemessenen Wert am ursprüngli-
chen System erlauben — wenn es eine eindeutige Zeiger-
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stellung gäbe. Das Superpositionsprinzip für die Zustands-
vektoren reiner Quantensysteme verhindert dies aber. 
Tatsächlich kann man zeigen, dass die Annahme einer 
Unkenntnisinterpretation für die Wahrscheinlichkeitsvertei-
lung der Zeigerstellungen (d.h. eine Zeigerstellung liegt 
objektiv vor und ist nur nicht bekannt) mit der Gesamtbe-
schreibung unverträglich ist (Mittelstaedt 1998). 
Die traditionelle Kopenhagener Reaktion bestand in 
der Konstruktion der Neumannschen Kette, d.h. iteriertes 
Ankoppeln weiterer Teile der Umgebung ggf. bis zum Ge-
hirn des Beobachters, und im Postulat des Heisenberg-
schen Schnitts, d.h. klassische Beschreibung ab einem 
(nicht genau festgelegten!) Glied dieser Kette. Das Phä-
nomen der Dekohärenz (Joos et al. ²2003) verspricht ein 
Verständnis des “Klassischwerdens” durch Berücksichti-
gung der physikalischen Umgebung. Doch der Wider-
spruch zwischen der linearen Vektorraumstruktur des 
quantenmechanischen Zustandsraums und der Eindeutig-
keit der klassischen Messergebnisse bleibt bestehen. Das 
Messproblem der Quantentheorie ist ungelöst. Es wurde 
zum Ausgangspunkt hypothetischer Alternativen für die 
Zeitentwicklung von Quantenzuständen und bizarrer Inter-
pretationsvorschläge. Wir diskutieren sie hier nicht. 
3 Quantentheorie im Phasenraum 
Die allermeisten makroskopischen Systeme können im 
Rahmen der klassischen Physik sehr gut beschrieben 
werden, auch wenn sie aus Quantensystemen bestehen. 
Historisch waren Begriffe der klassischen Physik im Bohr-
schen Korrespondenzprinzip wegweisend beim Aufbau der 
Quantentheorie. Die grundlegenden theoretischen Struktu-
ren von klassischer und Quantenphysik sind zwar nicht 
gleich, aber auch nicht völlig verschieden.  
Der Zustandsraum der klassischen Physik ist der 
2n-dimensionale Phasenraum P, wobei n die Anzahl der 
Freiheitsgrade des betrachteten Systems bezeichnet. Ne-
ben die (verallgemeinerten) Orte treten die (verallgemei-
nerten) Impulse als kanonisch konjugierte Variablen. Zu-
stände sind Wahrscheinlichkeitsdichten w auf P, reine 
Zustände entsprechen Phasenraumpunkten. Observablen 
a sind reelle Phasenraumfunktionen. Erwartungswerte 
sind Phasenraumintegrale der Observablen, gewichtet mit 
einem Zustand. Die Zeitableitung eines Zustands ist durch 
seine Poissonklammer {. , .} mit der Hamiltonfunktion ge-
geben. Darin stecken die Hamilton-Gleichungen der klas-
sischen Mechanik.  
Der Zustandsraum der Quantentheorie ist der (für 
die meisten Systeme unendlich-dimensionale) Hilbertraum 
H. Reine Zustände sind Vektoren der Länge 1 in H, allge-
meine Zustände W sind positive Operatoren mit Spur 1. 
Observablen sind selbstadjungierte Operatoren A, deren 
reelles Spektrum die Menge der möglichen Messergebnis-
se beschreibt. Erwartungswerte sind von der Form 
Spur(WA). Die Zeitableitung eines Zustands ist durch sei-
nen Kommutator [. , .] mit dem Hamiltonoperator gegeben. 
Darin steckt die Schrödinger-Gleichung.   
Die Betrachtung von Spezial- oder Grenzfallbezie-
hungen zwischen zwei physikalischen Theorien setzt die 
Formulierung beider in gemeinsamen Grundbegriffen vor-
aus. Vergleichbarkeit verhindert Inkommensurabilität. Zur 
Untersuchung der Beziehung zwischen klassischer und 
Quantentheorie erscheint es sinnvoll, die mathematischen 
Grundbegriffe der Quantentheorie auf die historisch ver-
trauteren Phasenraumobjekte abzubilden. Dabei muss die 
innere Struktur der Quantentheorie erhalten bleiben. Der 
Phasenraum wird dann zur gemeinsamen formalen Arena 
von klassischer und Quantentheorie.  
Die bekannteste “Übersetzung” dieser Art (Phasen-
raum-Darstellung) ist die Weyl-Wigner-Abbildung. Generell 
sind alle Vorschriften interessant, die Hilbertraum-
Operatoren W bzw. A linear auf Phasenraumfunktionen w 
bzw. a abbilden, so dass die Erwartungswerte Spur(WA) 
zu Phasenraumintegralen über wa werden. Dabei können 
nicht gleichzeitig folgende drei Bedingungen erfüllt sein 
(Wigner-Theorem): 
 
(i) Linearität der Darstellung 
(ii) Positivität der Darstellung, d.h. aus W positiv 
folgt w positiv  
(iii) Randdichtentreue: Integration von w über Im-
puls bzw. Ort liefert dieselbe Wahrscheinlich-
keitsdichte für Ort bzw. Impuls wie W. 
In der Tat verfehlt die Weyl-Wigner-Abbildung Eigenschaft 
(ii): Wigner-Dichten können negativ werden. Es gibt un-
endlich viele lineare Phasenraum-Darstellungen der Quan-
tentheorie, von denen manche (ii) und manche (iii) verfeh-
len. Das aus W gewonnene w kann aber nie als gemein-
same Wahrscheinlichkeitsdichte von Ort und Impuls des 
Quantensystems interpretiert werden: Erzwingt man die 
Positivität, so zeigt w dafür Verschmierungen (“Unschär-
fen”) im Phasenraum. Kein Wunder: Die Quantentheorie 
erlaubt keine gleichzeitige Zuschreibung von Orts- und 
Impulswerten und keine klassischen Bahnen.  
Linearität der Darstellung und Strukturerhaltung der 
Erwartungswertbildung haben zur Folge, dass Operator-
produkte AB nicht einfach auf Funktionenprodukte ab ab-
gebildet werden können. Auch ist die Phasenraum-
Darstellung des Kommutators [A,B] im allgemeinen nicht 
durch die Poissonklammer {a,b} gegeben, sondern im Fall 
der Weyl-Wigner-Darstellung durch die Moyalklammer, 
und in anderen Fällen durch entsprechende Verallgemei-
nerungen der Moyalklammer. Die Zeitentwicklung quan-
tenmechanischer Systeme im Phasenraum weicht daher 
von der klassischen Zeitentwicklung ab.  
4 Der klassische Limes: Brücke oder  
Grenze? 
Quanteneffekte machen sich (mindestens) überall dort 
bemerkbar, wo die relevanten Wirkungen in die Größen-
ordnung des Planckschen Wirkungsquantums h-quer 
kommen. Diese Naturkonstante kennzeichnet den Anwen-
dungsbereich der Quantentheorie. Im Vergleich zu hinrei-
chend großen Wirkungen erscheint sie vernachlässigbar 
klein. Man erwartet in solchen Fällen die Konvergenz 
quantentheoretischer Voraussagen, etwa Werteverteilun-
gen geeigneter Messgrößen, gegen die Voraussagen der 
klassischen (statistischen) Mechanik. Formal wird dabei 
der Limes h-quer gegen Null gebildet (klassischer Limes). 
Das gelingt für viele physikalisch interessante Situationen 
(Scheibe 1999). 
Theorienreduktion heißt aber mehr: Struktur und In-
terpretation der gesamten reduzierten Theorie sollen in der 
reduzierenden aufgehen. Im klassischen Limes sollte die 
Quantentheorie insgesamt in die klassische Theorie über-
gehen. Und in der Tat verschwinden Kommutatoren [A,B] 
inkompatibler Quantenobservablen für h-quer gegen Null, 
die Struktur der Observablenmenge wird kommutativ, also 
klassisch. Die optimistische Meta-Induktion, gestützt durch 
das Parallelbeispiel des nicht-relativistischen Limes, 
scheint Recht zu behalten. 
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In den linearen Phasenraum-Darstellungen werden 
die verallgemeinerten Moyalklammern in diesem formalen 
klassischen Limes alle zur Poissonklammer und die Zu-
standsmengen werden alle zur Menge der Wahrschein-
lichkeitsdichten auf P, also der klassischen Zustandsmen-
ge. Es scheint, dass sich die zugehörige Interpretation 
dabei kontinuierlich mitverändern müsste: von einer Welt 
objektiver Quantenunbestimmtheit über einen Bereich 
immer kleinerer Unschärfen bis hin zur Welt der klassi-
schen Objekte mit ihren durchgehenden Wertebelegungen 
aller Observablen (wie z.B. klassischen Bahnen). Der 
klassische Limes verspricht einen sanften Übergang in die 
klassische Welt. 
Sieht man vom Rahmen der Präparier- und Regist-
rierapparate ab und beginnt die Betrachtung mit der reinen 
Struktur der Quantentheorie, dann wird der Gegenstands-
bereich ihrer Voraussagen im Limes klassisch. Doch für 
den Messprozess selbst existiert diese Brücke nicht: Hier 
besitzt die Gesamtbeschreibung der physikalischen Situa-
tion eine semantische Unstetigkeit, die schon in den 
Denkvoraussetzungen der Beschreibung steckt und durch 
Umskalierungen ihres Inhalts nicht beseitigt werden kann. 
Quanteneigenschaften sind objektiv unbestimmt, Messer-
gebnisse liegen aber als Fakten vor und sind dann objektiv 
festgelegt. Quantentheoretische Möglichkeiten (etwa 
Strahlengänge von Photonen) kann man rekombinieren, 
klassische Daten stehen hingegen fest (und bestehen als 
Dokumente über die Zeit fort). Das sind qualitative Unter-
schiede, die nicht eingeebnet werden können.  
Die Quantentheorie begegnet der klassischen Theo-
rie also zweimal: einmal als Grenzfall, aber ein andermal 
als begriffliche Voraussetzung der eigenen Interpretation. 
Im einen Fall bildet der klassische Limes eine Brücke, im 
zweiten ist er gar nicht sinnvoll. Die makroskopische Un-
terscheidbarkeit der Zeigerstellungen macht ja gerade das 
Spektrum der verschiedenen quantentheoretischen Mög-
lichkeiten sichtbar. Das Faktum des Messergebnisses 
entsteht dabei unstetig, nicht in einem Limes. Das Faktum 
ist das abrupte Ende der quantentheoretischen Beschrei-
bung. Das Faktum bleibt dem Quantum äußerlich. Der 
Übergang zur klassischen Beschreibung ist hier eine 
Grenze der Quantentheorie, nicht ihr Grenzfall. 
5 In der Sprache der Quantenlogik 
Die Quantenlogik (Mittelstaedt et al. 2005, Kapitel 13) un-
tersucht die Ordnungsstrukturen möglicher Aussagen über 
Quantensysteme. Alle strukturellen Kennzeichen der 
Quantentheorie spiegeln sich in ihren Begriffen wider. Der 
zentrale Strukturbegriff ist dabei der quantentheoretische 
Aussagenverband L(H). Er ist nicht-Boolesch (nicht-
distributiv) und entspricht dem Verband der Teilräume des 
Hilbertraums H. Jeder solche Teilraum steht für eine mög-
liche elementare Aussage (Zuschreibung einer möglichen 
Eigenschaft). Das Superpositionsprinzip der Zustandsvek-
toren und die Inkompatibilität von Quantenobservablen 
werden durch den nicht-Booleschen Charakter von L(H) 
ermöglicht. 
Welches Bild ergibt sich, wenn die klassische Theo-
riestruktur in diesem begrifflichen Rahmen betrachtet wird? 
Klassische Theorien sind durch Boolesche Aussagenver-
bände gekennzeichnet. Die darin zusammengefassten 
Aussagen können immer als objektiv wahr oder falsch, 
Werte von Observablen daher als objektiv vorliegend oder 
nicht vorliegend aufgefasst werden. Die klassische Logik 
ist die Struktur des Faktischen. 
Der Aussagenverband L(H) eines reinen Quanten-
systems enthält unendlich viele Boolesche Unterverbände 
B(H). Die Auswahl eines solchen B(H) kann als abstrakter 
Ausdruck einer Observablenwahl betrachtet werden. In H 
entspricht dieser Wahl die Einführung einer Superauswahl-
regel, d.h. die Auszeichnung eines Systems paarweise 
orthogonaler Teilräume, zwischen deren Elementen keine 
Superpositionen erlaubt sind. 
Die Struktur der Quantenlogik erscheint somit all-
gemeiner als die Struktur der klassischen Logik: Letztere 
kann in erstere eingebettet werden und entsteht aus ihr 
durch Spezialisierung bzw. zusätzliche Forderungen. Sol-
che Untersuchungen sind auch auf die Struktur der Spra-
che von klassischer und Quantenphysik, jeweils auch auf 
relativistischer Raumzeit, ausgedehnt worden (Mittelstaedt 
1986). Die Hoffnung des Quanten-Universalismus zeigt 
sich dabei in der Erwartung einer eigenständigen und fun-
damentalen Quanten-Ontologie, während die klassische 
Ontologie als für die physikalische Realität eher untypi-
scher Sonderfall gesehen wird. 
Doch die Enttäuschung folgt auf dem Fuß: Auch 
durch diese strukturelle Einbettung kann die klassische 
Physik nicht auf die Quantentheorie reduziert werden. 
Denn das Problem der Faktenentstehung bleibt ungelöst. 
Der quantenlogische Zugang illustriert im Gegenteil die 
Notwendigkeit einer klassischen Begriffsbasis auf beson-
ders luzide Weise. 
6 Von der Not zur Tugend 
Ohne klassischen Beschreibungsrahmen (im Sinne der 
klassischen Logik für Eigenschaftszuschreibungen für 
Apparate) hängt die Semantik der Quantentheorie in der 
Luft. Aussagen über quantentheoretische Möglichkeiten 
beziehen ihre Bedeutung aus den klassischen Fakten, die 
zu Beginn schon vorlagen (Präparation) oder am Ende 
eintreten (Messung). Quantenzustände liefern Wahr-
scheinlichkeiten, deren Bedeutung ohne Bezug auf die 
relativen Häufigkeiten der dann tatsächlich gefundenen 
Messwerte gänzlich unklar bliebe. Quantenobservablen 
beziehen ihre Bedeutungen und Bezeichnungen aus 
Transformationseigenschaften, die durch ihre klassischen 
Entsprechungen definiert sind und sich in Symmetrieei-
genschaften der Menge ihrer möglichen Messwerte zei-
gen.  
Der unstetige Übergang zwischen Quanten und 
Fakten (etwa beim Auftreffen eines Photons auf den 
Schirm) entspricht dem strukturellen Sprung zwischen L(H) 
und B(H). Nicht historische Relikte klassischer physikali-
scher Beschreibungen gilt es daher zu bewahren, sondern 
nur die methodische Grundlage für die Rede von Fakten. 
Die Quantentheorie liefert sie nicht, sondern setzt sie vor-
aus. Aus diesem Grund müssen klassische Begriffe in 
Vortheorien (Ludwig ²1990, 2006) zur Quantentheorie 
verankert bleiben.      
Der Quanten-Universalismus ist selbstzerstörerisch: 
Er will die Reduktion aller Theorien auf die Quantentheorie 
und entzieht eben dadurch der Quantentheorie die Grund-
lage ihrer Interpretation. Denn Interpretation heißt gedank-
licher Bezug auf eine mögliche Außenwelt. Und dieser 
Bezug ist ohne Faktenbegriff nicht zu haben.  
Die Reduktion der klassischen Physik auf rein quan-
tentheoretische Grundbegriffe scheitert also. Doch das ist 
kein Ärgernis, sondern eine methodologische Notwendig-
keit. Bohr hat das bereits klar gesehen. Wir müssen es 
wieder sehen lernen. 
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Interpretability Relations of Weak Theories of Truth 
Martin Fischer, Leuven, Belgium 
1. Introduction 
Axiomatic theories of truth are understood as extensions of 
a syntactic base theory which is often taken to be Peano 
Arithmetic, PA . One way to measure the strength of a 
theory of truth is to take into account which formulas of 
arithmetic it proofs. Weak theories in this respect are theo-
ries that do not prove more than PA itself, theories that are 
conservative extensions of PA . The concept of conserva-
tivity has gained some interest in formalizing philosophical 
criteria. This is also the case in the debate on truth, in 
which conservativity is expected to explain the `no sub-
stance' claim of deflationism. For theories of truth conser-
vativity over PA  alone seems to be a very crude measure 
since it does not differentiate between different conserva-
tive theories of truth which have quite different properties 
and prove different formulas containing the truth predicate.  
A comparison of the truth-theoretic strength of 
theories of truth is desirable. A direct comparison of the 
truth-theoretic strength is the subset relation but it is only 
a partial order so that not all theories can be compared. 
Another measure of the strength of a theory of truth would 
be their interpretability relations to other theories 
especially their interpretability or noninterpretability in PA . 
The most famous of these interpretability relations is 
relative interpretability, introduced in (Tarski et al. 1953), 
and it is a good measure for PA  as base theory. On the 
one hand the less restricted version of local interpretability 
collapses in this case into relative interpretability. On the 
other hand Tarskis theorem of undefinability of truth shows 
that there is no definitional extension of PA  by a one place 
predicate τ , PA (τ ), so that PA (τ ) proves ϕϕτ ↔)(  for 
all sentencesϕ  of the language of arithmetic.  
2. Axiomatic theories  
AL is the language of arithmetic and =:τL AL }{τ∪ . The 
arithmetical theories are as usual. For the interpretability 
considerations take the arithmetic theories to be formu-
lated with predicate- instead of functionsymbols.  
 
)( PInd   ))(())1()(()0( xPxxPxPxP ∀→+→∀∧   
Q  is Robinson Arithmetic and PA  is Peano Arithmetic, 
that is AP LIndQ ⋅∪ )( , where AP LInd ⋅)(  is the set of sen-
tences that result from replacing P in )( PInd  by a formula 
of AL  with at least one free variable. Accordingly, 
kPk IndQI Σ⋅∪=Σ )( . 
Assume that AL  contains the relevant syntactical 
vocabulary: ‘ Ct ’ for closed term of AL , ‘ Sent ’ for 
sentence of AL , ‘ 1Form ’ for formula of AL with one free 
variable, and so on, such that PA  proves the relevant 
syntactical theorems. Especially if m  is the gödelnumber 
of a formula )(xϕ  with one free variable x  and n  of a 
term t , then )(nm  is the gödelnumber of the substitution 
of the free variable x in )(xϕ  by the numeral of t . τPA  is 
PA  formulated in the language τL . A theory of truth T is 
a τL -theory with TPA ⊆τ .  
 
)))(())((()(:)( 1 yxyxyxFormxtot ¬∨∀∧⇔ &ττ  
 
Disquotational theories of truth are formulated with a 
scheme of T-biconditionals: 
 
)( PTB          PP ↔)(τ  
)( PUTB     )).())((( xPxPx ↔∀ &τ  
 
Compositional axioms are the universally quantified ver-
sions of the following formulas: 
 
)1(C  )).()()(()()( yvalxvalyxyCtxCt =↔=→∧ &τ  
)2(C   )).()()(()()( yvalxvalyxyCtxCt ≠↔≠→∧ &τ  
)3(C   )).()()(()()( yxyxySentxSent τττ ∧↔∧→∧ &  
)4(C   )).()()(()()( yxyxySentxSent ¬∨¬↔∧¬→∧ &&&& τττ  
)5(C   )))).((()(()( zxzyxyxSent ττ ∀↔∀→∀ &&  
)6(C    )))).((()(()( zxzyxyxSent ¬∃↔∀¬→∀¬ &&&&& ττ  
)7(C    )).()(()( xxxSent ττ ↔¬¬→ &&  
)8(C    )).()(()( xxxSent ττ ¬↔¬→ &  
 
The axiom of internal induction for total formulas is: 
 
)( IIt  )))).((()))1(())((())0(()(( yxyyxyxyxxtotx ττττ ∀→+→∀∧∧∀  
 
The relevant theories are: 
 
τLIndLTBQTB PAP ⋅∪⋅∪= )()(:  
τLIndLUTBQUTB PAP ⋅∪⋅∪= )()(:  
)7()1(: CCPAPT r −∪=   
)()7()1(: IICCPAPT t∪−∪=−  
τLIndCCPAPT P ⋅∪−∪= )()7()1(:  
)8()1(: CCPATCr −∪=  
)()8()1(: IICCPATC t∪−∪=−  
 
rTC is also known as )(SPA  and TC  as )(PAT .  
3. Interpretability 
 
Some basic results: 
 
(i) TCPTUTBTB =⊂⊂  
(ii) −=∪∪Σ TCIICCCCI t )()8(),5(),3(),1(1  
(iii) −=∪−∪Σ PTIICCI t )()7()1(1   
(iv) −− TCPT ,  are finitely axiomatizable. 
(v) TCPTTCPTUTBTB rr ,,,,,  are not finitely axiomatizable. 
(vi) −PTTCPTUTBTB rr ,,,,  are conservative extensions of PA . 
(vii) TCPTTC ,,− are nonconservative extensions of .PA  
 
Definition  
Let TS, be theories formulated in TS LL , . Then 
T  is a pure extension of S  iff T is an extension of S and ST LL = . 
T is reflexive iff T proves ΔCon  for all finite .T⊆Δ  
T is essentially reflexive iff all pure extensions of T are reflexive. 
T has full induction iff for all formulas ϕ  of TL : T  proves 
)())1()(()0( xxxxx ϕϕϕϕ ∀→+→∀∧ . 
 
Full induction and reflexivity are connected in the following 
way, as shown for example in (Hájek/Pudlák 1993, p.189): 
 
Lemma 1 
If TPA ⊆  and T  has full induction, then T  is re-
flexive. 
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Let IT  be the minimal theory of truth with full induction: 
.)(: τLIndQT PI ⋅∪=  
 
Theorem 1 
IT and every pure extension of IT  is essentially re-
flexive. 
 
Corollary 1 
TCPTUTBTB ,,, are essentially reflexive. 
For other conservative theories with restricted induction it is 
far more complicated to show that they are reflexive. One 
example is Tarski's compositional theory with restricted 
induction. In (Halbach 1999) the conservativity of rTC  over 
PA  is proved by a cut elimination proof. This proof has at 
least two advantages in comparison to a model theoretic 
proof along the lines of (Kotlarski et al. 1981). First it can 
also be used for other base theories especially for all kIΣ  
with ω∈k . ).8()1(:)( CCIITC kkr −∪Σ=Σ   
Second it can be formalised in a way that makes it 
provable in PA . So we get: 
 
Theorem 2 
For every ω∈k : PA  proves 
))(Pr)(Pr)(( )( xxxSentx kkr IITC ΣΣ →∧∀  
With this it can be shown that rTC  proves the consistency 
of all of its finite subtheories.  
 
Theorem 3 
rr TCPT ,  are reflexive. 
 
Proof:  
Theorem 2 shows that for any ω∈k : PA  proves 
)( k
rk ITCI ConCon ΣΣ → . Since PA  is reflexive, all kIΣ  are 
finitely axiomatizable and rTCPA ⊆ , for every ω∈k : 
rTC  proves )( kr ITC
Con Σ , which is enough to show that 
rTC  is reflexive. A similar argument shows that rPT  is 
reflexive.                               □ 
 
Theorem 4 −− TKPT ,  are not reflexive. 
 
Corollary 2  
rr TCPT ,  are not essentially reflexive. 
 
For extensions of PA  reflexivity and relative interpretabil-
ity, p , are connected by 1Π -conservativity in the follow-
ing way as shown for example in (Lindström 1997): 
 
Theorem 5 
Let TPA ⊆ . PAT p  iff T  is reflexive and 1Π -
conservative over PA . 
 
This shows that: 
 
Theorem 6 
rr TCPTUTBTB ,,, are relatively interpretable in PA . 
 
On the other hand it is easy to see that theories that are 
not reflexive or 1Π -conservative over PA  are also not 
interpretable in it. 
 
Theorem 7 
TCPTTCPT ,,, −−  are not relatively interpretable in PA . 
Relative interpretability in PA  implies reflexivity and 1Π -
conservativity over PA  but it does not not imply conserva-
tivity over PA . 
 
Theorem 8  
tbConTB ¬+  is relatively interpretable in PA  but 
not conservative over PA . 
4. Weak Theories of Truth 
 
Considering the set TT  of all theories of truth, that is theo-
ries formulated in τL  and containing PA , there are the 
two subsets with one criterion of weakness: 
 {=:CTT TTTT ∈ is a conservative extension of }PA . {=:ITT }PATTTT p∈ . 
 
The combination of these two criteria allow a more fine 
grained picture of theories of truth, especially for weak 
theories. In the preceding sections it was shown that 
ITTCTT, , their complements and their combinations are 
nonempty. There are four possibilities of combination. 
Strong theories of truth not fulfilling either of both criteria 
will not be investigated here. 
The set ITT  consists of theories that are 
deductively weak not only in respect to their arithmetical 
part but also in respect to their truth theoretic strength. 
Relative interpretability is sometimes understood as a 
relation of reduction. The interpretable theories of truth are 
deductively too weak to be interesting as an explication of 
a philosophical conception of truth besides a redundancy 
conception. ITTCTT ∩  contains only theories that are 
also weak in respect to their arithmetical part. Theories of 
CTTITT ∩ , interpretable but nonconservative theories, 
are not as weak but they are quite artificial. Another 
reason is that 1Π -conservativity is also a measure of the 
arithmetical strength and therefore not directly connected 
to truth-theoretic strength. Interestingly all the theories of 
ITT  are reflexive and not finitely axiomatizable and 
therefore similar to PA . 
Of more philosophical interest are the theories of 
ITTCTT ∩ , conservative extensions of PA  that are not 
interpretable in PA . For deflationists conservativity over 
the base theory is a positive aspect of a theory of truth. It 
allows truth to be neutral and insubstantial. On the other 
hand some deflationists claim that the truth predicate 
fulfills an irreducible expressive function. So it would be an 
advantage if a theory of truth is deductively strong in 
respect to its truth-theoretic part. The noninterpretability of 
a theory in PA  would be an indicator that the truth-
theoretic part of the theory cannot be ignored. The theories 
of ITTCTT ∩  are also of help in extracting the essentials 
of truth without influence of their arithmetical part.  
The set ITTCTT ∩  is important for deflationism, 
but not every theory that is an element of this set is as 
good as any other. A further investigation which gives 
more criteria would be of interest. None of the theories in 
ITTCTT ∩  are reflexive and some of them like −PT  are 
finitely axiomatizable. In this respect −PT  bears a 
resemblance to 0ACA . There is more than just a 
resemblance, the two theories are equivalent in the 
following sense: −PT  is a subtheory of a definitional 
extension of 0ACA  and the other way around. This can be 
seen as an argument for the ‘naturalness’ of −PT . −PT is 
also in other respects promising. Since it contains 
compositional axioms and a form of induction for formulas 
with the truth predicate the usual examples to show the 
deductive weakness of deflationist theories do not obtain. 
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It is an interesting open question if there are well motivated 
truth-theoretic sentences not provable in −PT . 
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Does Bradley’s Regress Support Nominalism? 
Wolfgang Freitag, Konstanz, Germany 
One of the standard arguments against realism about 
universals is based on Bradley’s regress. According to this 
argument, realism about universals is committed to a 
vicious regress of instantiation relations. If realism is false 
and nominalism the only alternative, then, so the argument 
concludes, nominalism is correct. The strength of this 
argumentation depends on three things: (1) that 
commitment to Bradley’s regress makes a position 
untenable; (2) that nominalism as the only alternative to 
realism is not committed to the regress; and, most 
importantly, (3) that realism is committed to the regress.  
I have three aims in this paper. My proximate aim is 
to show that if (3) is correct then (2) is incorrect: if the real-
ist is committed to Bradley’s regress then so is at least one 
version of nominalism, namely, trope theory. The demon-
stration that neither theory is committed to the regress 
(and hence that (3) is false) is my second aim, attained by 
the proof that these positions have no commitment to a 
condition which is generally (and rightly!) held to be nec-
essary for Bradley’s regress. As I move along, I shall also 
claim that there is a widely ignored second condition nec-
essary for the regress, to which – again – neither nominal-
ism nor realism has any commitment. The upshot is this: 
Bradley’s regress problem is independent of the problem 
of universals. I conclude with an attempt to explain why 
many philosophers have been misled into thinking other-
wise.  
1. The regress argument, realism and 
nominalism  
Here, I shall discuss solely nominalism and realism con-
cerning universals, which are understood to be nonrela-
tional or relational properties.1 For the sake of simplicity, I 
will focus on nonrelational properties.  
Following the tradition, I take realism about univer-
sals to be the view that different objects may have the very 
same, repeatable property. If both the bike and the car are 
black, then the realist says there is one and the same 
property, blackness, instantiated by both the bike and the 
car. Thus, according to realism about universals, a single 
property may be multiply instantiated in a given world. 
Nominalism denies this. If the bike and the car are black, 
then they do not literally speaking have the same property 
in common. The class nominalist, for example, considers 
being black as no more than being an element of a certain 
class of particulars. Instantiation of a property then re-
duces to membership in a certain class. The trope theorist 
assumes properties to be much as the realist thinks them 
to be, except that they are not repeatable: in a given world, 
no two particulars have literally the same property.  
I have encountered the Bradley argument, em-
ployed against realism about universals, frequently in per-
sonal discussions, and sometimes in print. A very recent 
formulation of the argument by Gonzalo Rodriguez-
                                                     
 
1 Sometimes the dispute is taken to concern not the question of universals in 
the above sense, but that of the existence of abstract entities. Quine even 
uses the term ‘universal’ as synonymous with ‘abstract entity’. I shall not enter 
this different dispute. 
Pereyra, a proponent of nominalism, gives me an opportu-
nity to voice my own view on the matter:2 
 
[One argument against universals is this:] Suppose 
there are universals, both monadic and relational, and 
that when an entity instantiates a universal, or a 
group of entities instantiate a relational universal, they 
are linked by an instantiation relation. Suppose now 
that a instantiates the universal F. Since there are 
many things that instantiate many universals, it is 
plausible to suppose that instantiation is a relational 
universal. But if instantiation is a relational universal, 
when a instantiates F, a, F and the instantiation rela-
tion are linked by an instantiation relation. Call this in-
stantiation relation i2 (and suppose it, as is plausible, 
to be distinct from the instantiation relation (i1) that 
links a and F). Then since i2 is also a universal, it 
looks as if a, F, i1 and i2 will have to be linked by an-
other instantiation relation i3, and so on ad infinitum. 
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2008) 
The argument asserts that instantiation of universals inevi-
tably leads to a regress of ever more instantiation rela-
tions, i.e., to what is usually referred to as Bradley’s re-
gress.3 The claim that a regress ensues seems to be 
based on the following two conditions:  
 
(Pu1) Wherever a universal is instantiated, there is an 
instantiation relation (not identical to one of the re-
lata). 
(Pu2) The instantiation relation is a universal.  
Therefore it seems plausible to attribute to Rodriguez-
Pereyra the following line of thought: According to (Pu1), 
instantiation of a universal demands an instantiation rela-
tion. Classifying this instantiation relation as a universal, as 
done in (Pu2), we are taken back to (Pu1), which then gen-
erates another instantiation relation, which together 
with (Pu2) again takes us back to (Pu1), which generates a 
further instantiation relation, and so on ad infinitum. Rodri-
guez-Pereyra concludes that realism about universals is in 
serious trouble. My first aim is to show that if the realist is 
in trouble, then so is at least one form of nominalism. 
One form of nominalism is trope theory. Trope the-
ory distinguishes itself from realism not with respect to the 
reality of properties, but with respect to the view that prop-
erties can be multiply instantiated. Tropes can be instanti-
ated – but only by the sole object having that particular 
trope. Tropes are “particularised” properties. Now, con-
sider the following pair of conditions:  
 
(Pt1) Wherever a trope is instantiated, there is an in-
stantiation relation (not identical to one of the re-
lata). 
(Pt2) The instantiation relation is a trope. 
                                                     
 
2 For other versions of the argument in print, see Devitt 1980, p. 437, Loux 
1998, pp. 38–40, and Moreland 2001, pp. 114–116.  
3 The attribution of such arguments to F. H. Bradley is historically problematic 
in at least two respects. Firstly, Bradley was concerned with relational proper-
ties specifically and not with properties in general. Secondly, he was not the 
originator of this line of thought. The general type of argument has been 
known at least since Plato’s dialogues. See in particular Parmenides, 127e–
130a. 
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These two conditions differ from (Pu1) and (Pu2) in a single 
respect only: they contain the term ‘trope’ where 
(Pu1) and (Pu2) contain the term ‘universal’. If (Pu1) and 
(Pu2) lead to a regress, then (Pt1) and (Pt2) equally lead to 
a regress. Instead of speaking of universals or tropes, we 
can also formulate the matter in general terms, yielding the 
following pair of conditions:  
 
(P1) Wherever an entity is instantiated, there is an 
instantiation relation (not identical to one of the re-
lata). 
(P2) The instantiation relation is an entity. 
The regress argument poses a threat only to those who 
are committed to these two conditions. The trope theorist 
may deny (P2) as little as the realist. He will understand 
‘entity’ as referring to tropes because he is committed to 
the view that all relations are particularised relations, 
hence tropes. A difference between trope theory and real-
ism concerning these conditions can thus at most be given 
by a difference in commitment to (P1). It will now be shown 
that there is no such difference.  
To see this, we must locate the motivation for (P1), 
the condition that instantiation demands an instantiation 
relation. In my view, the motivation lies in the lack of a 
strict supervenience relation between the existence of the 
relata of instantiation and instantiation itself: given a and F, 
it is not determined that a instantiates F. To illustrate this 
point, consider the situation in which there are exactly four 
entities, particulars a and b and properties F and G. If we 
assume that both a and b individually and contingently 
instantiate exactly one of the properties F and G, and 
nothing else, and if we assume that both F and G 
individually are (contingently) instantiated by exactly one of 
the objects a and b, and by nothing else, then two 
situations are possible: 
 
W1: a instantiates F; b instantiates G. 
W2: a instantiates G; b instantiates F.  
Both situations comprise exactly the same particulars and 
the same properties. Still, the situations differ; they com-
prise different facts, different instantiations. This means 
that the mere existence of particulars and properties does 
not necessitate a specific instantiation. The mere existence 
of the car and blackness does not necessitate that the car 
is black. It may still be that the car is green, and what is 
black is the bike. The existence of particulars and proper-
ties may determine that facts and instantiations obtain, as 
some authors (in particular Wittgenstein 19224 and Arm-
strong 1997) maintain. But it does not determine which 
facts, which instantiations obtain. As a recent author sums 
up this point:  
 
Even if a and F-ness cannot exist except in some 
state of affairs or other, there is nothing in the nature 
of a and nothing in the nature of F-ness to require 
that they combine with each other to form a’s being F. 
(Valicella 2000, p. 238) 
Instantiation between two entities does not strictly super-
vene on the existence of the entities alone, if these entities 
are considered to be contingently related. We need more 
than the relata of instantiation. This need is expressed by 
condition (P1). (P1) is the reaction to contingent instantia-
                                                     
 
4 Wittgenstein makes this claim with the help of the notion of incompleteness, 
which he borrows from Frege (1994/1892) but which he applies to all ‘objects’, 
properties and particulars alike. Together with the idea that incomplete objects 
cannot exist on their own, Wittgenstein arrives at his famous view that “[t]he 
world is the totality of facts, not of objects” (Wittgenstein 1922, 1.1). 
tion. The properties F and G in my example can be under-
stood both as tropes and as universals.5 It follows that, 
given contingent instantiation, the trope theorist is as much 
committed to (P1) as the realist is. David Armstrong has 
seen this very clearly:  
 
Suppose that the link between a particular and its 
tropes is not necessary. Then it is contingent. But if 
it’s contingent, then it seems that we have a clear 
case of a relation between a particular and its trope, 
and an external relation at that. But then a Bradleian 
regress ensues […]. (Armstrong 2006, p. 242) 
 
This concludes the argument for my first claim: realism is 
no more committed to Bradley’s regress than at least one 
form of nominalism, namely trope theory. I now proceed to 
the argument for my second claim: neither position is 
committed to the regress.  
2. How to avoid Bradley’s regress 
2.1 Avoiding commitment to (P1) 
Contingent instantiation leads to (P1) and starts the re-
gress. In order to avoid (P1), avoid contingent instantia-
tion. Make instantiation necessary. There is a variety of 
different positions, both nominalist and realist, which con-
ceive of instantiation as being necessary and hence avoid 
– intentionally or not – commitment to (P1): 
(1) One position that makes instantiation necessary 
is class nominalism. This position, proposed inter alia by 
Anthony Quinton (1957), understands having a property as 
being a member of a certain class of particulars. The 
object a instantiates F iff a is a member of the F-class. 
Because classes are identified by their members and 
class-membership is a necessary relation, instantiation 
between a and F strictly supervenes on the existence of 
the F-class alone. In this way, class nominalism can 
avoid (P1) and thereby the regress. Class nominalism 
naturally escapes (P1). 
(2) Trope theory also has its means of 
avoiding (P1). In fact, a trope theorist has two options: 
(2a) Trope theory in combination with a bundle theory of 
particulars, as defended by, e.g., John Locke and, in more 
modern times, by D. C. Williams (1953), holds that 
particulars are sets or bundles of tropes. Consequently, 
a instantiates F iff the F-trope is in the a-bundle. Since the 
identity of the a-bundle is, I take it, defined by the 
constituting tropes, a’s instantiating F strictly supervenes 
on the existence of the a-bundle. (2b) The second type of 
trope theory combines a subject–attribute view with the 
doctrine of nontransferable tropes. A recent proponent of 
this view is John Heil (2003, chs. 12 and 13), although he 
prefers the term ‘mode’ to the term ‘trope’. According to 
this position, a trope is instantiated by the very same 
object in all possible worlds. Given the nontransferable 
trope F and the particular a, the instantiation between 
a and F follows by necessity.6 Again (P1) can be avoided. 
                                                     
 
5 That F and G, understood as universals, are, in the case discussed, instan-
tiated only by a single entity, is not of relevance here. To see this, simply 
change the example accordingly.  
6 This is simplified. There are at least three conceptions of the non-
transferability of tropes: (i) F is instantiated in all possible worlds, and it is 
instantiated in all possible worlds by a. This presumably implies that a must 
exist in all possible worlds. (ii) F is not instantiated in all possible worlds, but 
where it is, it is instantiated by a. Option (ii) comes in two varieties: (a) in those 
worlds in which F is not instantiated, a does not exist; (b) in some worlds in 
which F is not instantiated, a does exist. The supervenience claim in the main 
text holds only for (i) and (ii.a).  
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(3) Mutatis mutandis, realism has the same two 
options as trope theory: (3a) According to a bundle theory 
based on universals, of which Bertrand Russell (1948, 
part 4, ch. 8) is a proponent, particulars are understood as 
bundles of universals. In this view, a instantiates F iff F is a 
member of the a-bundle. Since F is a member of the a-
bundle necessarily,7 the instantiation relation between 
a and F strictly supervenes on the existence of the a-
bundle. (3b) The second type combines a substance–
attribute view with a theory of nontransferable universals. 
According to this position – maintained by, e.g., David 
Armstrong (2004a, 2004b and 2006)8 – that 
a instantiates F supervenes on the existence of a and F 
alone.9  
Thus, neither nominalism nor realism is committed 
to the regress. Three of these positions, namely, (1), (2a) 
and (3a), agree in understanding instantiation to be 
constituted by class (or bundle) membership. For them 
necessity of instantiation – and hence the possible denial 
of (P1) – is built into the ontological conception of 
instantiation. For the substance–attribute views 
(2b) and (3b), necessity of instantiation is a feature 
additional to the basic conception of instantiation and 
devised, I presume, specifically to avoid (P1).  
All of these five options come with heavy ontological 
burdens. Ignoring their specific difficulties, I shall mention 
only the problem which they share: necessity of 
instantiation makes contingency impossible. Whether the 
substitutes on offer10 are satisfactory is at least doubtful. 
So it is worthwhile to investigate whether there might not 
be another way out of the regress. 
2.2 What is necessary for the regress? – A further 
condition 
So far I have acted as if (P1) and (P2) were sufficient for 
the regress, with the purpose of showing that realism is no 
more committed to (P1) than trope theory is, and that in 
fact neither of the two views is committed to (P1). Thus, I 
hitherto relied on the analysis of Bradley’s regress which 
seems commonly accepted. Now it is time to show that this 
analysis is flawed. (P1) and (P2) by themselves do not yet 
yield Bradley’s regress. It is quite obvious but frequently 
ignored: in order for the regress to obtain, it must be given 
that the instantiation relation is itself instantiated (by the 
entities it relates). Otherwise, given an instantiation rela-
tion, (P1) does not generate a further instantiation relation. 
To arrive at a regress, we therefore need the further prem-
ise 
 
(P3) The instantiation relation is itself instantiated (by 
the entities it relates).11  
Conditions (P1), (P2) and (P3) are jointly sufficient for the 
regress. Are they also individually necessary? I consider 
(P2) to be superfluous, since any instantiation relation is 
                                                     
 
7 Again, I assume that the identity of a bundle depends on the elements 
constituting it.  
8 For Armstrong, not only properties but also particulars are nontransferable; 
particulars have their properties of necessity. Therefore, Armstrong has two 
independent means to secure the intended supervenience relation.  
9 As in the case of tropes, there are at least three possible conceptions of the 
nontransferability of universals. The supervenience claim would have to be 
restricted to the analogues of (i) and (ii.a).  
10 The best, and perhaps only, known way to achieve this is by replacing 
transworld identity with a counterpart relation for particulars (as David Lewis 
(1968 and 1986) and Armstrong (2004b) suggest) or for properties, depending 
on the demands of the theory. Given a suitable semantics, sentences may turn 
out to be contingent, although instantiations are necessary. 
11 One of the few to recognize the need for this condition is Loux (1998, 
p. 38).  
ipso facto also an entity. (P1) and (P3) are hence jointly 
sufficient for Bradley’s regress. I consider them also indi-
vidually necessary: (P1) states the demand for an instan-
tiation relation given any instantiation, while (P3) makes 
certain that this instantiation relation demands further in-
stantiation. Thus (P1) and (P3) constitute, I think, the 
proper analysis of the basis of Bradley’s regress.  
Given this analysis, there is a second way of avoid-
ing Bradley’s regress: accept (P1) and deny (P3); accept 
instantiation relations and therefore take the first step of 
the regress, but block the regress by denying that the in-
stantiation relation is itself instantiated. This option should 
be the natural path to take for substance–attribute views 
operating with contingent instantiation, theories of types 
(2b) or (3b) albeit without the unnatural condition that in-
stantiation is necessary. There is no space to develop this 
option here,12 yet the fact that (P3) is necessary for the 
regress should eliminate any remaining doubts: Bradley’s 
regress has nothing to do with the problem of universals.  
Conclusion 
To show that Bradley’s regress is neither specific to nor 
insurmountable for a realist about universals is one thing. 
To explain why the opposite view has been so compelling 
to many, is another. So let me end with a suggestion on 
this point.  
The source is the confusion of two different and 
logically independent senses of the problem of One over 
Many. There is the intraworld version of the problem, 
which concerns the question whether different particulars 
in a single world can have the very same property F. And 
there is the transworld version of the problem, which 
concerns the question whether different particulars in 
different worlds can have the very same property F.  
The traditional problem of universals is the 
intraworld version of the problem of One over Many. 
Universals can and tropes can’t be multiply instantiated 
within a single world. Bradley’s regress, on the other hand, 
concerns the transworld problem of One over Many. 
Transferable entities can and nontransferable entities can’t 
be multiply instantiated across different worlds. Keeping 
these two versions of the problem of One over Many apart, 
we get a clearer grip on the demands that a satisfying 
metaphysical theory must fulfil. 
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12 In (Freitag 2008) I have further explored this possibility.  
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Zeitliche Ontologie und zeitliche Reduktion 
Georg Friedrich, Graz, Österreich 
Ich werde in diesem Beitrag zwei zusammenhängende 
Fragen behandeln, nämlich (i.) die Frage nach einer 
zeitlichen Ontologie. Darunter möchte ich eine Ontologie 
verstehen, genauer, ein zeit-räumliches Kategoriensystem, 
das die zeitlichen Bestimmungen von Dingen ernst nimmt 
und sie als primär auffasst. Die zweite Frage ist (ii.) die 
Frage nach den Möglichkeiten einer zeitlichen Reduktion. 
Beide Fragen hängen insofern zusammen, als auch die 
zeitliche Ontologie als ein Versuch einer zeitlichen 
Reduktion gesehen werden kann. Sie unterscheiden sich 
dadurch, dass sie auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen 
stattfinden. 
Die erste Frage ist die Frage nach der 
ontologischen Sparsamkeit einer zeitlichen Ontologie. 
Kategoriensysteme dienen der Einteilung der Wirklichkeit. 
Man kann die Wirklichkeit in vielfacher Weise einteilen, es 
kann also mehrere Kategoriensysteme geben. Die zeit-
liche Ontologie reduziert Kategoriensysteme und verein-
facht auch die Kriterien für die Einteilung der Gegenstände 
in die Kategorien. 
Die zweite Frage geht der zeitlichen Reduktion in 
einem anderen, größeren Umfeld nach. Die Frage im 
Hintergrund ist, welche Vorteile es haben kann, die Zeit 
und den Raum bei der Beschäftigung mit ontologischen 
Fragen zu berücksichtigen, ihnen somit eine größere 
Bedeutung einzuräumen und gegebenenfalls proble-
matische Begriffe auf zeitliche Begriffe zu reduzieren. 
Ein zeit-räumliches Kategoriensystem 
Metakategorien, so will ich hier annehmen, kategorisieren 
ontologische Kategorien, sie dienen der Einteilung von 
ontologischen Kategorien. Die Metakategorien, des nun 
folgenden Kategoriensystems, sind Raum und Zeit. Wie 
man gleich sehen wird, ist die Zeit die bedeutendere der 
beiden Metakategorien, weshalb man von einer zeitlichen 
Ontologie sprechen könnte. 
Ich gehe davon aus, dass alle Gegenstände im 
Raum oder in der Zeit sind bzw. nicht sind, d.h. sie stehen 
immer in irgendeiner Beziehung zu Raum und Zeit. Ein 
Gegenstand kann im Raum sein oder auch nicht. Ein Ge-
genstand kann in der Zeit sein oder auch nicht. Führt man, 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der zeit-räumlichen 
Bestimmungen von Gegenständen, eine kategorische Ein-
teilung durch, so ergeben sich vier mögliche Kombinatio-
nen. Es gibt Gegenstände, die … 
 
(1) weder im Raum, noch in der Zeit sind. 
(2) im Raum, aber nicht in der Zeit sind. 
(3) nicht im Raum, aber in der Zeit sind. 
(4) im Raum und in der Zeit sind. 
Der erste, bereits erfolgte Schritt, ist die Bestimmung der 
obersten Kategorien des zeit-räumlichen Kategoriensys-
tems. Interessant, und gesondert zu erwähnen, sind noch 
die unter Punkt (3a) und (4a) genannten Sonderfälle (an-
dere Sonderfälle können unerwähnt bleiben). Diese Ge-
genstände sind ewige Gegenstände, wobei “ewig” in zwei 
verschiedenen Bedeutungen vorkommt. Es sind Gegens-
tände, die … 
 
(3a) nicht im Raum, aber in der gesamten Zeit sind. 
(4a) im Raum und in der gesamten Zeit sind. 
Berechtigterweise kann man nun die Frage stellen, warum 
man genau diese Einteilung vornehmen sollte. Ist sie will-
kürlich? In diesem Fall könnte ich die Welt genauso gut 
durch ein Kategoriensystem einteilen, dessen einzige bei-
den Kategorien rote und nicht-rote Gegenstände sind. 
Welche Vorzüge hätte die Einteilung der Welt mit Hilfe 
eines zeit-räumlichen Kategoriensystems? Die Antwort 
findet sich in (i.) einer Vereinfachung und Reduzierung der 
ontologischen Kategorien und in (ii.) einer eindeutigen und 
vereinfachten Zuordnung der Gegenstände. Das muss 
kurz erklärt werden. 
Zur Vereinfachung der Kategorien. In einem Katego-
riensystem der einfachsten Art, das in der Philosophie 
auch verwendet werden könnte, wird man beispielsweise 
auf folgende Kategorien treffen: physische Gegenstände, 
psychische Gegenstände und abstrakte Gegenstände. 
Diese oder eine ähnliche Einteilung hat zumindest zwei 
Nachteile. 
Einerseits ergeben sich Probleme mit der Abgren-
zung der Kategorien. Es ist beispielsweise nicht trivial, 
dass alle Gegenstände entweder physisch, psychisch oder 
abstrakt sind. Also führt man die Kategorie der physischen 
Dinge als undefiniert ein. Ich beginne hier mit den psychi-
schen Gegenständen, man könnte aber genauso gut mit 
den psychischen oder den abstrakten Gegenständen be-
ginnen. Um zu einem vollständigen Kategoriensystem zu 
kommen, muss man zwischen physischen und nichtphysi-
schen Gegenständen (komplementäre Eigenschaft), un-
terscheiden wobei man in einem nächsten Schritt die 
nichtphysischen Gegenstände mit den abstrakten und den 
psychischen Gegenständen gleichsetzt. Der zweite Nach-
teil ergibt sich aus dem ersten, denn hat man einmal die 
Kategorie der physischen Dinge in der eben genannten 
Weise eingeführt, so ist dadurch festgelegt, dass physi-
sche Dinge nicht psychisch und auch nicht abstrakt sind. 
Ich möchte nicht behaupten, dass es Dinge gibt, die z.B. 
physisch und psychisch zugleich sind, aber immerhin 
könnte es sie geben und ihre Existenz wird auch von eini-
gen Philosophen angenommen (Siehe z.B. Searle 1993, 
29f.). Auch zeigt schon der Hinweis auf die Möglichkeit 
solcher Gegenstände, dass die Einteilung in physische, 
psychische und abstrakte Gegenstände nicht unproblema-
tisch ist. Abgesehen davon macht eine Einteilung, welche 
physische Gegenstände als nicht psychisch oder abstrakt 
einführt, eine Voraussetzung. Man könnte indessen mei-
nen, dass im Rahmen der Kategorisierung, in Anlehnung 
an die Logik, noch keine Voraussetzungen über die Arten 
der Gegenstände gemacht werden sollten, um auf diese 
Weise eine Vorauswahl zu vermeiden. 
Die Schwierigkeiten gehen weiter, wenn man ver-
sucht anzugeben, was z.B. physische Gegenstände sind. 
Im Alltag kann eine zumindest vage Vorstellung davon 
haben, was physische Gegenstände sind. Ein Vorschlag 
zu Bestimmung von physischen Gegenständen könnte 
sein, diese als in Raum und Zeit lokalisierbar, als sinnlich 
wahrnehmbar und als ausgedehnt anzunehmen. Zur Er-
klärung dessen, was physische Gegenstände sind, greift 
man also von neuem auf Raum und Zeit zurück. Die Be-
stimmung der räumlichen und zeitlichen Lokalisierbarkeit 
ist das, was die unter Punkt (4) genannten Gegenstände 
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ausmacht. Diese ist auch die einzig wesentliche Bestim-
mung, die übrigen könnten weggelassen werden, denn 
physische Gegenstände als ausgedehnt zu bestimmen ist 
redundant. Wenn ein Gegenstand im Raum ist, dann ist er 
notwendigerweise auch ausgedehnt, was in einem Grenz-
fall bedeuten kann, dass er einen einzigen Raumpunkt 
einnimmt. Die sinnliche Wahrnehmbarkeit hingegen ist 
problematisch. Bäume sind sinnlich wahrnehmbar, Ele-
mentarteilchen nicht ohne weiteres. Beides scheinen ma-
terielle Gegenstände zu sein. Man könnte statt von sinnli-
cher Wahrnehmbarkeit auch von sinnlicher Wahrnehmbar-
keit mit Hilfsmitteln sprechen. Vielleicht ist aber auch nur 
eine prinzipielle Wahrnehmbarkeit gemeint. Für gewisse 
Elementarteilchen gilt zudem, dass nur in indirekter Weise 
auf sie geschlossen wird. Die Frage ist, ob das für eine 
prinzipielle Wahrnehmbarkeit ausreicht. Es wird jedenfalls 
zunehmend komplizierter und die Schwierigkeiten be-
schränken sich nicht auf die physischen Gegenstände; 
wenn man nämlich beginnt zu fragen, was psychische und 
abstrakte Gegenstände sind, kommt man über analoge 
Überlegungen zu ähnlichen Schlussfolgerungen. 
Auf welche Gegenstände trifft man in welchen zeit-
räumlichen Kategorien? Die Gegenstände, die ich in der 
folgenden Aufzählung nennen werde, sollten vor allem als 
Illustration verstanden werden. Die Bestimmungen der 
Kategorien hingegen gelten uneingeschränkt. Es kann 
sein, dass sich nicht in allen Kategorien Gegenstände 
finden werden. Die Unterkategorien müssen an dieser 
Stelle noch offen bleiben. 
(zu 1) Die Kategorie der Gegenstände, die weder im 
Raum noch in der Zeit sind, deckt sich in etwa mit der 
Kategorie der abstrakten Gegenstände, man beschreibt 
diese vielleicht besser als atemporale oder zeitlose Ge-
genstände, da diese Gegenstände, einmal vorausgesetzt 
sie existieren, unabhängig von bzw. außerhalb der Zeit 
existieren. Gott, die Idee des Guten, die Zahl 10 und Do-
dekaeder, sind vermutlich atemporale Gegenstände. A-
temporale Gegenstände sind ewige Gegenstände einer 
ersten Art, sie sind dem zeitlichen Werden und Vergehen 
nicht ausgesetzt, sie sind auch unveränderlich. 
(zu 2) Unter diese Kategorie fallen Gegenstände, 
die im Raum, aber nicht in der Zeit sind; hier wird man 
grundsätzlich keine Gegenstände finden können, da alles, 
was im Raum ist, auch immer schon in der Zeit ist. Dies 
scheint mir die passende Gelegenheit zu sein, die Frage 
zu stellen, ob die Zeit gegenüber dem Raum primär ist. Sie 
wird gleich beantwortet werden. 
(zu 3) Gegenstände, die nicht im Raum, aber in der 
Zeit sind, sind daran zu erkennen, dass die Frage nach 
ihrem Ort sinnlos ist. Hingegen kann man angeben, wann 
sie sind. Diese Kategorie umfasst Gegenstände wie Seele, 
Bewusstsein, Vorstellungen, fiktive Gegenstände. Sie ha-
ben irgendwann einen Anfang und ein Ende. Ich meine, es 
ist ein Vorteil dieser Einteilung und zugleich ein Ergebnis 
der zeitlichen Reduktion, dieselbe Kategorie für Bewusst-
sein und fiktive Gegenstände zu haben, denn schließlich 
werden letztere durch die Tätigkeit des Bewusstseins ge-
schaffen. Sie sind, wie ich meine, auch nicht sonderlich 
voneinander verschieden. Ihr Unterschied ist vielmehr der 
Unterschied von öffentlichen bloßzeitlichen Gegenständen 
und privaten bloßzeitlichen Gegenständen. 
(zu 3a) Einige der Gegenstände, die nicht im Raum, 
aber in der Zeit existieren, könnten die ganze Zeit über 
existieren. Diese Gegenstände wären ewige Gegenstände 
im Sinne von zeitlich-ewigen Gegenständen, beispiels-
weise eine unsterbliche Seele. 
(zu 4) Gegenstände, die in Raum und Zeit existie-
ren, sind einerseits das, was man üblicherweise als mate-
rielle Gegenstände bezeichnen würde, also Hunde, Men-
schen, Planeten, Elementarteilchen, aber andererseits 
auch Gegenstände, die sich nicht so einfach der Kategorie 
der materiellen Gegenstände zurechen lassen, wie z.B. 
Ereignisse und Magnetfelder. 
(zu 4a) Man könnte sich vorstellen auf Gegenstände 
zu treffen, die im Raum lokalisierbar sind, und zwar zu 
allen Zeitpunkten. Man könnte von ewigdauernden bzw. 
die-ganze-Zeit-über-seienden Gegenständen sprechen. 
Die Atome Demokrits sind sicherlich Gegenstände dieser 
Art, denn sie sind unentstanden und unvergänglich. 
Die Zuordnung der Gegenstände ist, wie bereits er-
wähnt, nicht endgültig, sondern Diskussionsgegenstand. 
Denn die Zuordnung der Gegenstände hängt vor allem 
von den Bestimmungen der Gegenstände selbst und nicht 
ausschließlich von der kategorischen Einteilung ab. Als 
Beispiel: Der christliche Gott ist wahrscheinlich ein Ge-
genstand der Kategorie (1), Zeus könnte ein Beispiel von 
(4) sein. Bewusstsein habe ich (3) zugeordnet, Materialis-
ten würden Bewusstsein vermutlich in (4) einordnen. 
Noch einige Anmerkungen zu den Besonderheiten 
dieses Kategoriensystems. Es gibt Gegenstände, die in 
der Zeit sind und nicht im Raum, aber es gibt keine Ge-
genstände, die im Raum sind und nicht in der Zeit. Die 
Frage ist, warum das so ist. Die Antwort könnte diese sein. 
 
Wenn ich a priori sagen kann: alle äußere Erschei-
nungen sind im Raume, und nach den Verhältnis-
sen des Raumes bestimmt, so kann ich aus dem 
Prinzip des inneren Sinnes allgemein sagen: alle 
Erscheinungen überhaupt, d. i. alle Gegenstände 
der Sinne, sind in der Zeit, und stehen notwendiger 
Weise in Verhältnissen der Zeit. (Kant 1974, 
A34/B51) 
Ich meine, das berechtigt zu der Annahme, dass die Zeit 
die wichtigere Metakategorie ist, weshalb ich von einer 
zeitlichen Ontologie sprechen möchte, weil die Zeit das 
jedenfalls enthaltene Element ist. 
Teilt man die Gegenstände nach ihrem Verhältnis 
zu Raum und Zeit ein, so vereinfachen sich sowohl die 
Kategorien, als auch die Einteilungskriterien, es ist eine 
ontologisch sparsame Einteilung. Eine solche Einteilung ist 
sowohl vollständig, als auch eindeutig, d.h. es lassen sich 
alle möglichen Gegenstände erfassen und sie können 
zweifelsfrei einer Kategorie zugeordnet werden. 
Die zeitliche Ontologie ist auch einfacher in dem 
Sinn, in dem sie besser verständlich ist. Die Bedeutung 
von Ausdehnung in Raum und Zeit scheint mir völlig un-
problematisch. Hingegen kann man, und das haben die 
Beispiele gezeigt, darüber uneins sein, was physische, 
abstrakte oder mentale Gegenstände sind. Zu erwähnen 
ist noch, dass die zeitliche Ontologie weniger Voraus-
setzungen macht. 
Zeitliche Reduktion 
Entgegen der allgemeinen Tendenz, die Zeit selbst auf 
vielfältige Weise zu reduzieren – zu erwähnen wäre hier 
zumindest die logische Reduktion, die soziale Reduktion, 
die physikalische Reduktion und die psychologische Re-
duktion der Zeit – kann die Zeit ihrerseits dazu verwendet 
werden ontologische Kategorien zu reduzieren und zu 
vereinfachen, wie im ersten Teil dargestellt wurde. Des 
Weiteren eröffnet die Berücksichtigung der Zeit bei der 
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Betrachtung ontologischer Fragen, Möglichkeiten, proble-
matische Begriffe im Sinne einer ontologischen Sparsam-
keit zu reduzieren. Der ontologische Status der Zeit selbst 
kann zu diesem Zweck noch ungeklärt bleiben. 
Ein erstes, hier nur am Rande erwähntes Beispiel 
für eine zeitliche Reduktion, ist die zeitliche Reduktion der 
Modalitäten. Sie besteht in der Zurückführung der Begriffe 
“notwendig”, “kontingent” und “möglich” auf zeitliche Beg-
riffe. (Siehe z.B. Rescher und Urquhart 1977, 125ff.). Die-
ser Ansatz ist für viele Verwendungsweisen der genannten 
Begriffe nicht unplausibel; so wird “kontingent” interpretiert 
als “(Es ist der Fall, dass p aber es war nicht immer der 
Fall, dass p) oder (es ist der Fall, dass p aber es wird nicht 
immer der Fall sein, dass p).” Zugegebenermaßen sind die 
Deutungen der Begriffe “möglich” und “notwendig” nicht 
ganz so unproblematisch. Sie haben aber in jedem Fall 
den Vorteil der Einfachheit und Klarheit. 
Eingehender möchte ich die Methode der zeitlichen 
Fragmentierung betrachten. Alle Gegenstände stehen in 
irgendeiner Relation zur Zeit. Gegenstände, die in der Zeit 
sind, können zeitlich fragmentiert gesehen werden. Zeitli-
che Fragmentierung kann eine Methode der Reduktion 
sein, wenn es sich um komplexe Gegenstände handelt, 
die sich in der Zeit mehr oder wenig schell verändern und 
zudem Gegenstände sind, die man in seiner Ontologie 
vermeiden möchte. Der Punkt ist, dass man, anstatt von 
komplexen Gegenständen zu sprechen, nur mehr von 
Individuen und ihren Eigenschaften zu gewissen Zeitpunk-
ten spricht. 
Für die zeitliche Fragmentierung in Frage kommen 
z.B. komplexe Systeme; auch diese sind Gegenstände, 
die man irgendwie in einem ontologischen Kategoriensys-
tem unterbringen sollte. Ein Beispiel für ein komplexes 
System könnte ein soziales System, ein Staat, sein. Die 
Frage ist, welche Art Gegenstand ein Staat ist. Staaten 
können als erweiterte Personen gesehen werden, es gibt 
Versuche sie in Begriffen von Individuen zu definieren 
oder man könnte sie als logische Konstruktionen verste-
hen. (Vgl. Prior 1937) Als logische Konstruktionen, und 
das ist Priors Position, sind Staaten fiktive, unwirkliche 
Gegenstände. Als solche sind Aussagen über Staaten 
unter Umständen ersetzbar durch eine Reihe von ähnli-
chen Aussagen über Individuen, wobei allerdings zu be-
achten ist, dass dieselben Begriffe in Aussagen über Indi-
viduen eine andere Bedeutung haben, als in Aussagen 
über Staaten. 
Über komplexe Gegenstände, wie Staaten, kann 
man Dinge sagen, die zu ontologischen Verpflichtungen zu 
führen scheinen. Staaten schließen beispielsweise Verträ-
ge ab oder – Priors Beispiel – sie führen Kriege. 
 
The statement that “England made war on France” 
[…] is not equivalent to “Tom made war on France, 
Dick made war on France, Harry made war on 
France, etc.”, but to a set of statements like “Tom 
made a belligerent speech in the House of Com-
mons”, “Dick dropped a number of bombs on a 
queue of Parisian women and children”, and “Harry 
was put in prison for being a conscientious objec-
tor”. (Prior 1937, 296) 
Ich meine, dass man von Priors Vorschlag ausgehen 
kann, jedoch sollte man nicht von logischen Konstruktio-
nen sprechen, denn sogleich kann man fragen, was fiktive, 
unwirkliche Gegenstände sind. Anstatt von England und 
Frankreich zu sprechen, sollte man, wie Prior meint, von 
einzelnen Vorfällen sprechen. Hinzuzufügen ist, dass man 
diese durch eine zeitlich fragmentierte Beschreibung er-
fassen sollte, und zwar in demjenigen Raum und Zeitinter-
vall, das jeweils interessant ist. Eine zeitliche fragmentierte 
Beschreibung ist eine erschöpfende Aufzählung aller in-
volvierten Gegenstände und ihrer Eigenschaften zu allen 
Zeitpunkten. Eine solche Beschreibung würde sehr kom-
plex werden, aber man muss sie nicht durchführen, son-
dern es reicht aus zu wissen, wie man sie durchführen 
könnte. (Vgl. Quine, 2002, 282) Und man kann weiterhin 
über Staaten sprechen. 
Es wäre zu überlegen, ob man die zeitliche 
Fragmentierung auch auf andere Gegenstände anwenden 
könnte, beispielsweise Ereignisse. Ereignisse sind 
Gegenstände, die sicherlich in der Zeit lokalisierbar sind, 
ebenso im Raum, wenn auch nicht genau. Ereignisse sind 
ontologisch abhängig von in Raum und Zeit lokalisierbaren 
Gegenständen. Daher könnte es möglich sein über eine 
zeitlich detaillierte Beschreibung der implizierten Gegen-
stände zu einer vollständigen und eliminierenden Be-
schreibung von Ereignissen zu kommen. Analoges kann 
man sich für andere Gegenstände überlegen. 
Schlusswort 
Die Ausgangsfrage ist, ob die Berücksichtigung der Zeit 
bei ontologischen Überlegungen ein Beitrag zur ontologi-
schen Sparsamkeit sein kann. Ich glaube, das ist der Fall. 
Einerseits hat sich gezeigt, dass ein zeit-räumliches Kate-
goriensystem ontologisch sparsam ist. Andererseits kön-
nen durch die Berücksichtigung der zeitlichen Dimension 
mehrere problematische oder umstrittene Begriffe redu-
ziert werden. 
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Why the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Cannot Save Physicalism  
Martina Fürst, Graz, Austria 
I start elaborating the main line of the phenomenal concept 
strategy concentrating on the knowledge argument. 
Analyzing the Mary-scenario the crucial particularities of 
phenomenal concepts are worked out. Next, I argue that 
only an interpretation of phenomenal concepts which 
encapsulate their referents can capture the decisive 
uniqueness of these concepts. Finally, the defended 
account is compared with Papineau’s quotational account 
of phenomenal concepts. A careful analysis of this account 
shows that it has consequences which stand in extreme 
contrast to the target the physicalist phenomenal 
conceptualist intends to reach. 
1. The phenomenal concept strategy 
One of the most famous objections to Jackson’s knowl-
edge argument (Jackson 1986) is the so-called two modes 
of presentation-reply. The basic idea of this reply – which 
is the possibility that one single, ontological fact can be 
known under different modes of presentations – can be 
easily formulated on the level of concepts. This move 
leads to the notion of phenomenal concepts on the one 
hand and the notion of physical concepts (understood in 
the widest sense) on the other hand. These two sorts of 
concepts then are treated in analogy to standard cases of 
co-reference. Hence, according to the two modes of pres-
entation-reply the brilliant scientist Mary possessed all 
physical concepts, when being confined to her achromatic 
room, but gained new phenomenal ones, when enjoying 
her first colour-experience. Obviously, only type-B-
materialist (Chalmers 1997), which grant that phenomenal 
concepts can not be a priori deduced from physical con-
cepts, can adopt the physicalistic phenomenal concept 
strategy (Stoljar 2005). In other words: physicalists, who 
intend to save an ontological materialism by granting just a 
conceptual or epistemic gap, developed this interpretation 
of the knowledge argument to reach their target.  
The physicalist phenomenal concept strategy is 
based on the idea that the particularities of phenomenal 
concepts can explain why one can not deduce them a 
priori from physical concepts, although both sorts of con-
cepts pick out one and the same ontological (ex hypothesi 
physical) referent. Hence, with regard to Mary it can be 
said that no metaphysical entities such as qualia have to 
be invoked to explain the scientist’s new knowledge – it 
suffices to point out the uniqueness of phenomenal con-
cepts. For this strategy to work, the decisive features of 
phenomenal concepts have to be elaborated. These par-
ticularities will have to explain why phenomenal concepts 
are conceptually isolated (Carruthers, Veillet 2007) from 
other concepts, but still pick out physical referents. 
In the following I will demonstrate that if we take the 
uniqueness of phenomenal concepts seriously, we have to 
conclude that they refer to phenomenal entities and there-
fore the physicalist phenomenal concept strategy fails. I 
will start working out the crucial particularities of phenome-
nal concepts: one particularity concerns the concept-
acquisition and the other the very nature of such concepts. 
Importantly, both particularities of phenomenal concepts 
are such that they indicate phenomenal referents. In a 
second step, I will analyze one interpretation of phenome-
nal concepts which seems to describe the crucial particu-
larities of these concepts adequately: Papineau’s quota-
tional account of phenomenal concepts (Papineau 2002, 
2007). A detailed examination of this account will reveal 
two possible interpretations: the first interpretation is simi-
lar to the herein presented account and therefore leads to 
a dualistic conclusion. The second interpretation fails to 
explain the decisive features of phenomenal concepts; 
such as their semantic stability and the closely linked fact 
of carrying information about qualitative experiences. 
Hence, Papineau has to choose between accepting that 
phenomenal concepts do refer to phenomenal referents or 
defending a view of phenomenal concepts which leave the 
crucial particularities of phenomenal concepts and there-
fore also the Mary-scenario unexplained. 
2. The encapsulation relation explains the 
particularities of phenomenal concepts  
Let me start my investigation analyzing the particularities 
of phenomenal concepts. Regarding the concept-
acquisition, the knowledge argument famously illustrated 
that we can gain phenomenal concepts only under the 
condition of attentively experiencing their referents. In 
other words: one has to stand in the extraordinary intimate 
relationship of acquaintance with the referent a phenome-
nal concept picks out. Hence, when Mary leaves her 
achromatic environment, sees for the first time the blue sky 
and is attentively aware of this colour-experience, she 
gains a new phenomenal concept. Let me explain this 
process in more detail: the brilliant scientist, who is aware 
of her very first blue-experience, discriminates this experi-
ence from all other current experiences. In my opinion it is 
this act of attentive discrimination which immediately yields 
a concept referring to this particular, isolated experience. 
The close link between an experience and the gained con-
ception of it is a crucial point for my further argumentation. 
Regarding the nature of phenomenal concepts, a 
careful analysis reveals an encapsulation relation between 
these concepts and the referents they pick out. The notion 
of an encapsulation relation can be considered as funda-
mental for the presented account. It is based on the idea 
that the experience itself is the core of the phenomenal 
concept referring to it. This fact can be explained by the 
special way of gaining these concepts: when Mary dis-
criminates a new experience she is acquainted with, this 
process of isolation implies giving the experience itself a 
conceptual structure and hence forming a phenomenal 
concept which encapsulates the very experience itself. 
Obviously according to this account, both the concept and 
the referent are occurrences in the subject’s mind. The 
intimate link of encapsulation of the referent in the concept 
has very particular roots and consequences: 
One crucial root of the encapsulation is the self-
presenting character of the referent, which enables the 
direct reference of the concept. It is precisely the fact that 
an experience is self-presenting, i.e. that it serves as its 
own presentation, which is responsible for our acquaint-
ance and discriminative awareness of it and hence points 
towards the close link between experience and phenome-
nal concept. 
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The decisive consequences of this account are the 
following: phenomenal concepts pick out their referents 
directly and in all possible worlds – facts which are due to 
the internal constitution of encapsulation. Importantly, 
since the reference of phenomenal concepts is fixed by 
their constitution and not by external factors, they carry 
essential information about their referents. Taking the 
Mary-scenario into account it becomes evident that the 
relevant information has to be about the qualitative charac-
ter of experiences because it is precisely this sort of infor-
mation the scientist lacked in her achromatic room and 
gained when looking at the sky. 
3. Examples of alternative accounts of phe-
nomenal concepts 
In my opinion solely the encapsulation relation can explain 
the particularities of phenomenal concepts. Consider, for 
example, the fact that released Mary gains a new concept 
which importantly carries information about the very ex-
perience she is undergoing. No demonstrative account of 
phenomenal concepts, such as, for example, the one de-
veloped by Levin (Levin 2007), can capture this function of 
phenomenal concepts. Demonstrative concepts typically 
refer to the item currently demonstrated at and hence their 
referents differ from one use to another. Contrary to this, 
my account of phenomenal concepts makes them pick out 
their referent necessarily and in all possible worlds. Re-
member, a phenomenal red-concept should necessarily 
carry information about phenomenal redness to explain the 
Mary scenario and demonstrative concepts do not meet 
this constraint.  
If we consider direct recognitional phenomenal con-
cepts of the sort invoked by Loar (Loar 1997), we are con-
fronted with another sort of problem: obviously our capaci-
ties to discriminate experiences outrun our capacities to 
recognize experiences. Suppose, Mary has an experience 
of the shade red21 parallel to shade red23 and can dis-
criminate these two shades introspectively. Nevertheless, 
she may not be able to recognize these shades when she 
encounters them. According to the recognitional account of 
phenomenal concepts Mary has no phenomenal concept 
of red21 or red23, although she is attentively experiencing 
these shades and at this moment knows, what it is like to 
see them. I take this to be a quite implausible conclusion.1  
These considerations illustrate that no account of 
phenomenal concepts which neglects the intimate link 
between these concepts and their referents can success-
fully explain the particularities of the concepts Mary ac-
quires because of her first colour experience. In addition, 
accounts which take phenomenal concepts and experi-
ences as separate entities, related to each other only 
causally, face a further problem: as Balog (Balog, forth-
coming) points out, on such accounts it is conceivable that 
a first-person’s application of a phenomenal concept is 
performed even in the absence of the experience it refers 
to – and this is quite an absurd way of treating phenome-
nal concepts. For this reasons, let me return to my thesis 
of phenomenal concepts encapsulating their referents.  
                                                     
 
1 My way of arguing shows that I take phenomenal concepts to be singular 
concepts applying to the very occurring experience. According to my ap-
proach, only a generalization-process on the basis of singular concepts yields 
a general phenomenal concept. 
4. The dilemma of Papineaus´s quotational 
account of phenomenal concepts 
In the following I want to focus my attention on a physical-
ist account, which seems to share the herein elaborated 
interpretation, but draws physicalistic conclusions from 
this: the so-called quotational account of phenomenal con-
cepts. Papineau developed this account in his book Think-
ing about consciousness (Papineau 2002), but changed 
some details in a recent article (Papineau 2007).  
The quotational account is based on the assumption 
that phenomenal concepts embed experiences just as 
quotation marks embed words. If his analogy is worked out 
in detail, we will see why Papineau faces a dilemma: if his 
account is understood as a sort of real encapsulation, then 
he has to conclude that phenomenal concepts pick out 
phenomenal referents. The reasons for this conclusion are 
the following: if phenomenal concepts are interpreted as 
encapsulating their referents, then this unique reference 
relation has to be explained. According to my analysis, 
solely an explanation referring to the self-presenting 
character of phenomenal properties and our special 
acquaintance relation to them can do this explanatory 
work. If one wants to avoid this dualistic conclusion, she 
has to give a physicalistic account of how a concept can 
encapsulate and directly refer to a physical item and it 
seems mysterious how this can be done without invoking 
self-presenting (phenomenal) properties. 
The remaining option is to interpret the quotational 
account as phenomenal concepts just using experiences 
without granting that they are a logical part of the concept 
itself. In fact, Papineau in his article “Phenomenal and 
perceptual concepts” (2007) doesn’t seem to believe 
anymore that the particularities of phenomenal concepts 
lie in a unique reference relation, but rather holds that they 
can be explained by the special (neuronal) vehicle in virtue 
of which the concept is realized. This suggests that the 
presence of the experience in the concept should be 
explained by a physical (neuronal) presence:  
 
We can helpfully think of perceptual concepts as in-
volving stored sensory templates. These templates 
will be set up on initial encounters with the relevant 
referents. They will then be reactivated on later per-
ceptual encounters. (Papineau 2007, 114) 
Obviously the “stored sensory template” has to be under-
stood as a physical item. At this point some pressing ques-
tions arise: firstly, what is meant by “involving” these tem-
plates? If this phrase only points at simultaneous occur-
rence of concept and experience, then the concept doesn’t 
carry any information about the qualitative character of the 
experience. If the citation has to be understood as a con-
stitutional relation, one may wonder a) how a physical item 
(as a neuronal template) can be encapsulated in the con-
cept and b), how it can carry the relevant information. Ad 
a) it can be pointed out that on a physicalist account no 
primitive acquaintance relation can be invoked to explain 
this constitution and that neural templates are not intro-
spectively accessible. Next, b) has to be explained in more 
detail: the information a phenomenal concept has to carry 
surely is not information about a neural state – otherwise 
Mary would have possessed this concept in her achro-
matic environment. A phenomenal concept has to carry 
information about the qualitative character of the experi-
ence and it is unclear how a physically understood tem-
plate can do this, without recurring to phenomenal proper-
ties. A purely physical description of a (neuronal) template 
would obviously leave out precisely the sort of information 
a phenomenal concept has to carry to explain Mary’s situa-
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tion. Therefore, if Papineau´s account of phenomenal con-
cepts is interpreted as solely co-occurring with experiences 
or as involving physical items, then the decisive particulari-
ties of the concepts will not be explained adequately any-
more. 
5. Conclusion 
I want to summarize my line of thought: in accordance with 
most phenomenal conceptualists I showed that the con-
cepts involved in the Mary-case differ in several respects 
significantly from any other concept the scientist had be-
fore her release. But the central point of my analysis – 
which stands in contrast to target of the physicalist phe-
nomenal conceptualist – was to argue that these differ-
ences are such that the new concepts refer (because of 
their internal structure) necessarily to phenomenal entities.  
In a next step, I compared the elaborated account of 
phenomenal concepts with some physicalistic ones. I 
demonstrated that the basic assumptions of most physical-
ist phenomenal conceptualist (as Levin or Loar) can not 
explain the crucial particularities of phenomenal concepts. 
Then I focused the attention on the quotational account 
advocated by Papineau which at first glance seemed to 
describe these particularities adequately. But a careful 
analysis illustrated that also Papineau’s account has con-
sequences which stand in contrast to the target the physi-
calist intends to reach: if it is understood as just involving 
physical items, then it can not meet the constraint of ex-
plaining the decisive particularities of phenomenal con-
cepts; such as carrying information about the qualitative 
character of experiences. But if it is interpreted in accor-
dance with the herein advocated encapsulation relation, 
then it has exactly the dualistic consequences the physi-
calist phenomenal conceptualist wants to avoid. 
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Benacerraf and Bad Company 
(An Attack on Neo-Fregeanism) 
Michael Gabbay, London, England, UK 
1 Benacerraf on what numbers could not be 
 
In his celebrated paper, “What numbers could not be”, 
Benacerraf presents a challenge to theories identifying 
numbers with set theoretic constructs. He asks why the 
numbers should be identified with sequence (1), the Von 
Neumann ordinals, rather than sequence (2), the Zermelo 
ordinals.  
 
∅,   {∅},     {∅, {∅}},     {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}     (1) 
  
  ∅,   {∅},     {{∅}},     {{{∅}}}     (2) 
 
Benacerraf concludes that there is no reason why the 
number 3 should be identified with an element from one 
construction rather than another. 3 cannot be identified 
with both as the constructs have incompatible properties. 
For example in (1) the fourth element has three members, 
but in (2) the third element has only one member. Since 
the number 3 cannot be both {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}} and {{{∅}}} 
and there is no fact of the matter whether it is one or the 
other, it is neither. Thus the attempted identification of 
numbers with sets has been refuted.  
 
… if the number 3 is really one set rather than 
another, it must be possible to give some cogent 
reason for thinking so. But there seems to be little to 
choose among the accounts for the accounts differ 
at places where there is no connection whatever 
between features of the accounts and our uses of 
the words in question. [Benacerraf 1965] 
 
It is not hard to see that this objection generalises to any 
theory of numbers that has an ontology containing different 
sequences of objects that could serve as references of our 
number language. Realists may escape Benacerraf’s 
argument either by finding a suitably miserly ontology of 
abstract objects (the ontology of sets is too vast), or simply 
refusing to get involved in the metaphysics of abstract 
objects. 
I shall argue that Neo-Fregean ontology suffers from 
Benacerraf’s objection in much the same way as the 
ontology of sets. I conclude, analogously to Benacerraf’s 
original argument, that Neo-Fregean ontology is 
necessarily too rich and therefore does not provide a 
satisfactory foundation for arithmetic. 
First I shall sketch the Neo-Fregean account of 
arithmetic, I shall assume that the reader is largely familiar 
with the formal concepts behind it (in particular, I assume 
the reader has some knowledge of the workings of Frege’s 
Theorem [Wright 2000]). 
 
2 Neo-Fregeanism on what numbers could be 
 
2.1 Hume’s principle 
The aim of the Neo-Fregean programme is to provide a 
metaphysics of abstract objects together with an 
informative account of our epistemic link to them. 
According to Neo-Fregeanism, reference to the abstract 
objects that are the numbers derives from logic and 
definitions alone. Logic then entails arithmetic truths and, 
in this sense, arithmetic is analytic. 
Neo-Fregeanism promises to provide a realist 
theory of number that can respond to Benacerraf’s 
argument. According to Neo-Fregeanism, certain abstract 
objects exist, and we can know and refer to them via 
abstraction principles. The natural numbers are among 
those abstract objects we can know about via a particular 
abstraction principle, Hume’s Principle:  
 
The number of F = the number of G iff  
the F and the G are in one-one correspondence   (3) 
 
For each predicate F, Hume’s principle identifies or allows 
reference to, an object that is the number of F. This 
formalisation should be familiar to the reader:  
 
∀F∀G[nx.Fx = nx.Gx ↔ F1~1G]                 (4) 
 
Hume’s principle is to be taken as a definition, in terms of 
one-one correspondence, of the binding term-former 
nx.(…). Furthermore, the Neo-Fregeans argue that one-
one correspondence is a fundamental application and 
concept of cardinal numbers. So the abstract entities, 
reference to which is generated by Hume’s principle, really 
are the cardinal numbers (they are the only abstract 
entities tied appropriately to the application of counting). 
 
 
2.2 Frege’s theorem 
 
I now sketch how Neo-Fregeans use Hume’s principle to 
provide a realist foundation for arithmetic. 
Following Frege, the strategy is to define suitable 
properties and relations that satisfy the second order 
Peano axioms of arithmetic. To distinguish the defined 
terms of this section with the defined terms of Section 3.2, 
I subscript them with H for ‘Hume’. 
First a successor/predecessor relation is defined:  
 
PreH(t, t') means ∃F∃z[t' = nx.Fx ∧ Fz ∧ t = nx.(Fx ∧ x ≠ z)]   (5) 
 
So t is the predecessor of t' when t' is the number of some 
property F and t is the number of the Fs that are not z, for 
some z. 
Zero is defined to be the number of any inconsistent 
property, e.g. 0H = nx.(x ≠ x), it does not matter which as 
all empty properties are in one-one correspondence. 
A natural number is then defined as being any 
number in the transitive closure of the predecessor relation 
from 0H. More formally, the transitive closure of any binary 
relation R may be defined as:  
 
R*(t, t') means ∀F [ (Ft ∧ ∀x∀y(Fx ∧ R(x, y) → Fy)) → Ft' ]   (6) 
 
And now we may define the natural numbers as all those 
objects in the transitive closure of the predecessor relation 
from 0H:  
 
NatH(t) means PreH*(0H, t')                    (7) 
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So a natural number is any referent of an abstraction nx.Fx 
that can be ‘reached’ from 0H by following the relation 
PreH. As did Frege, Neo-Fregeans go on to define 
individual number terms:  
 
 
 (8) 
 
 
From these definitions we can derive all of Second order 
Peano Arithmetic, which completely characterises a 
natural number structure. 
3 An alternative abstraction principle 
 
3.1 Benacerraf’s principle 
Now I turn to the argument that the Neo-Fregean ontology 
contains too many abstract objects. I do this by presenting 
an abstraction principle that is similar to Hume’s principle. 
This alternative abstraction principle can do the same work 
as Hume’s principle and in a similar way. But, as with the 
(1) and (2) above, the two abstraction principles yield two 
distinct sequences of abstract objects. As was argued in 
the case of sets, I shall argue that there is nothing to 
decide which abstraction principle yields the ‘true’ natural 
numbers. 
The new principle is simpler than Hume’s principle, 
call it Benacerraf’s Principle: 
 
 
 
     (9) 
Say that F is unitary if it has exactly one element in its 
extension. Then Benacerraf’s principle identifies, for each 
predicate F, an object that is the unitariness of F. We can 
write ‘the unitariness of F’ as ux.Fx, and then Benacerraf’s 
principle is:   
 
∀F∀G [ ux.Fx = ux.Gx ↔  
((¬∃!xFx ∧ ¬∃!xGx) ∨ ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx)) ]      (10) 
Call a property, or concept, unitary when only one thing is 
in its extension. Then Benacerraf’s principle is to be taken 
as a definition, in terms of being unitary, of the binding 
operator ux.(…). The intuition for unitarieness is that one 
can abstract out of a unitary property its ‘unitariness’, or 
the way in which it is unitary. Any non-unitary properties 
are unitary in the same way: they are not. The way unitary 
properties are differentiated, in the spirit of Frege’s Basic 
Law V (see (14)) is through their extension. 
Unitariness is at least as fundamental to our concept 
of number as one-one correspondences. After all, a one-
one correspondence is a correspondence between unit 
objects; when we count, we count unit individuals; 
variables of first order quantifiers range over unit entities; 
the symbols of the language necessary to express even 
basic propositions are discrete, discernable units. Without 
the concept of a unit, a discrete thing, a single entity, we 
cannot even begin a logical enquiry let alone ground 
arithmetic in one-one correspondences. Frege himself 
discusses and rejects the possibility of developing a theory 
of arithmetic based on units. But his compelling refutations 
are aimed at theories of numbers as agglomerations or 
sums of (distinct) units [Frege 1953, §29-§44]. Frege 
objects that such accounts either make no sense, or fail to 
generate arithmetic. He did not consider the possibility that 
the unit, thought of as a property of properties, and derived 
by a similar abstraction method to Frege’s own, could do 
the same work as his favoured theory of number. 
 
 
3.2 An analogue of Frege’s theorem 
I now sketch how Benacerraf’s principle can be used to 
define the numbers along Neo-Fregean lines. To 
distinguish the defined terms of this section with those of 
Section 2.2 I subscript them with B for ‘Benacerraf’. We 
begin with zero:  
 
 
 (11) 
 
 
It is not hard to show that the iB are derivably distinct. For 
example suppose that 0B = 1B, then ux.(x ≠ x) = ux.(x = 0B). 
So by Benacerraf’s principle either ¬∃!x(x ≠ x) ∧ 
 ¬∃!x(x ≠ 1B) or ∀x(x = 0B ↔ x ≠ x). Each of these is 
derivably false in even first order logic. 
We can go on to define the predecessor relation as 
follows:  
 
PreB(t, t') means ∃F[t = ux.Fx ∧ t' = ux.(x = t)]  (12) 
 
A version of Frege’s theorem now arises out of adopting 
Benacerraf’s principle rather than Hume’s principle. We 
use (6) to define the natural numbers to be exactly the 
entities in the transitive closure of PreB . This yields the 
second order Peano axioms. 
 
NatB(t) means PreB*(0B, t')      (13) 
I omit the remaining details here as they are almost 
identical to those of the proof of Frege’s theorem in [Wright 
1983]. 
 
 
3.3 The attack on Neo-Fregeanism 
Let 0H, 1H, 0H… denote the entities abstracted and defined 
using Hume’s Principle, call them the Hume-numbers. Let 
0B, 1B, 0B… be the entities abstracted and defined using 
Benacerraf’s principle call them the Benacerraf-numbers. It 
should be clear that an analogue of Benacerraf’s original 
challenge arises. Benacerraf’s original argument now 
applies, both the Hume-numbers and the Benacerraf-
numbers serve as characterisations of the natural 
numbers. Furthermore there is no reason for the natural 
numbers to be identified with the Hume-numbers rather 
than the Benacerraf-numbers. Therefore Neo-Fregeanism 
is to be rejected alongside set theoretic reductionism by a 
variant of Benacerraf’s original argument. 
The penultimate claim, that there is no choosing 
between the Benacerraf and the Hume numbers, is in 
need of justification. I sketch a justification of it in Section 4 
by comparing the systems obtained from the two 
abstraction principles and showing that there is little that 
can be done with Hume’s principle that cannot also be 
done with Benacerraf’s principle.  
4 A comparison of two abstraction 
principles 
 
4.1 How to avoid bad company 
Formally, Hume’s and Benacerraf’s principles are 
acceptable abstraction principles. I argue for this here by 
presenting a condition on good abstraction principles (i.e. I 
the unitariness of F = the unitariness of G iff  
neither F nor G are singletons, or  
F and G have the same extension. 
0H means nx.(x ≠ x) 
1H means nx.(x = 0H) 
2H means nx.(x = 0H ∨ x = 1H) … 
0B means ux.(x ≠ x) 
1B means ux.(x = 0B) 
2B means ux.(x = 1B) … 
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offer a solution to the bad company problem) and show 
that both abstraction principles satisfy it. 
A famous worry for the Neo-Fregean project, called 
the ‘bad company’ problem, relates to the fact that not all 
abstraction principles are consistent. A famously 
inconsistent abstraction principle is Frege’s notorious 
Basic Law V: 
 
∀F∀G [ εx.Fx = εx.Gx ↔ ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx) ] (14) 
We can use (14) to derive Russell’s paradox. An argument 
of Heck [Heck 1992] shows that there are many 
undesirable abstraction principles. For example, there are 
many Φ for which the abstraction principle:  
 
∀F∀G [ εx.Fx = εx.Gx ↔ Φ ∨ ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx) ] (15) 
 
entails that Φ. It is not hard to find plenty of second order 
sentences Φ (some of which contain F and G) that are 
entailed by an abstraction principle like (15) which we 
would certainly think ought not to be true. Furthermore, 
different abstraction principles can be incompatible with 
each other, although individually consistent; this is strange, 
as abstraction principles are supposed to be analytic and 
so ought to be true, and hence compatible, in any context. 
There is then a question whether some principle can be 
given to discern the acceptable abstraction principles from 
the unacceptable ones (see [Weir 2003] for many 
examples of unacceptable abstraction principles). I now 
present such a principle. 
Let λ be any infinite cardinal, then the consistency 
constraint for λ is the condition that any abstraction 
principle should have the form:  
 
     ∀F∀G [ εx.Fx = εx.Gx ↔ Ψλ(F, G) ∨ ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx) ] (16) 
 
Where  
 
i. Ψλ(F, G) is a second order sentence containing 
no free variables other than F and G, and also 
does contain the ‘new’ abstraction operator εx. 
ii. Ψλ is a transitive and symmetric relation on 
unary predicates. That is:  
- Ψλ(F, G) implies Ψλ(G, F) 
- Ψλ(F, G) and Ψλ(G, H) implies Ψλ(F, H) 
iii. For any model M of cardinality λ, there are at 
most λ many valuations σ such that σ(Ψλ(F, G)) 
= ⊥ .1  
Note that the familiar examples of ‘bad’ abstraction 
principles (e.g. in [Weir 2003]) violate this condition. For 
example in Frege’s Basic Law V has the form  
 
∀F∀G [ εx.Fx = εx.Gx ↔ ⊥ ∨ ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx) ]  
which clearly violates this condition for any λ. Note also 
that Benacerraf’s principle and Hume’s principle satisfy the 
consistency constraint for any infinite λ.2 Now we can show 
that any abstraction principle satisfying the consistency 
constraint for λ can be interpreted in any second order 
model of cardinality at least λ. Let Mλ be a model (that can 
interpret the language of Ψ) with domain |Mλ| of cardinality 
λ. Let R be a relation on properties (i.e. a relation on 
subsets of |Mλ|) such that  
 
                                                     
 
1 This says that the (second order) property represented by Ψλ groups the 
properties of the domain into at most λ many different equivalence classes. In 
other words, Ψλ is only allowed to distinguish up to extensionality, all proper-
ties (i.e. subsets of |M| ) of cardinality < λ . Ψλ must be unable to distinguish all 
but λ of the 2λ properties of cardinality λ. 
2 We must view Hume’s principle as: ∀F∀G [ εx.Fx = εx.Gx ↔ F1~1G ∨ 
∀x(Fx ↔ Gx) ] 
R(P, Q) iff σ(Ψλ(F, G)) = T  
 
for any valuation σ such that σ(F) = P and σ(G) = Q.3 In 
other words, R is the interpretation of Ψλ in the model Mλ. 
Since Ψλ(F, G) contains no free first or second order 
variables other than F and G, R does not depend on σ. 
If P ⊆ |Mλ| then let PR = {Q: R(P, Q) or P = Q}. 
Clearly, PR is an equivalence class. Now consider the set 
A = {PR: P ⊆ |Mλ|} and let μ be its cardinality. If μ > λ, then 
there would be more than λ many valuations σ that falsify 
Ψλ(F, G) (at least one for each of the μ-many pairs of 
different equivalence classes in A). This would violate 
condition (iii) of the consistency constraint for λ. So μ ≤ λ, 
i.e. the cardinality of A is less than or equal to the 
cardinality of |Mλ|. It follows then, that there is an injection f 
from{PR: P ⊆ |Mλ|} into |Mλ|. 
We may use f to identify elements eP ∈ |Mλ|:  
 
eP = f(PR)                                                  (17) 
 
It is now a straightforward matter to check that 
 
eP = eQ iff R(P, Q) or P = Q 
  
It follows that we can extend any second order model Mλ of 
cardinality λ, with an abstraction principle satisfying the 
consistency constraint for λ: we define eP as in (17) and 
then extend Mλ to interpret the new language using (18): 
 
σ(εx.Fx) = e{m: m∈|Mλ| and σ[x/m](Fx) = T}     (18) 
 
Let me describe this interpretation in English: Ψλ forms 
equivalence classes of properties; the conditions on Ψλ 
guarantee that there is a one-one function f from these 
equivalence classes into the domain |Mλ| of Mλ; we 
interpret the referent of εx.Fx under valuation σ as the 
element e which the function f assigns to the equivalence 
class of properties that Ψλ forms from the extension of F. 
We now have in (16) a general criterion for the 
legitimacy of abstraction principles. This criterion 
legitimates Benacerraf’s principle as well as Hume’s 
principle. The only difference between them being that 
extending a model to validate Benacerraf’s principle is 
slightly more straightforward than Hume’s principle. Say 
that an abstraction principle is almost analytic if it satisfies 
the consistency constraint for any infinite λ. It is now a 
matter of dispute whether the fact that λ has to be infinite 
detracts from the analyticity of Hume’s principle and 
Benacerraf’s principle. A point in favour of the Neo-
Fregean programme is that we can give an independently 
motivated formal reasons for treating Hume’s principle as 
analytic and rule out principles like Basic Law V. However, 
a point against the Neo-Fregean programme is that 
Benacerraf’s principle also comes out as analytic, and the 
argument of Section 3.3 stands. 
 
 
4.2 The concept of number 
Perhaps some argument relating to our concept of number 
will differentiate between the two principles. 
The possibility of any such argument is extremely 
doubtful, if anything but for the fact that neither Hume’s 
principle nor Benacerraf’s principle make good analyses of 
our number concepts. Wright acknowledges this: 
                                                     
 
3 σ assigns elements of Mλ to first order variables and subsets of Mλ to sec-
ond order variables; σ[x/m] is a valuation that agrees with σ on all variables 
except that it maps the variable x to m. 
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… no one actually gets their arithmetical knowledge 
by second-order reasoning from Hume’s Principle 
Rather, the significant consideration is that simple 
arithmetical knowledge has to have a content in 
which the potential for application is absolutely on 
the surface, since the knowledge is induced 
precisely by reflection upon sample, or schematic, 
applications. [Wright 2000]  
The schematic applications Wright has in mind is that of 
drawing one-one correspondences when counting. The 
thought might then be that Hume’s principle has one-one 
correspondence, the potential for application of number 
language, ‘on the surface’ whereas Benacerraf’s principle 
does not. 
But counting is not the only application of numbers. 
An obvious application that has little to do with counting is 
when we assign numbers to things to help identify them, 
perhaps in some ordering. For example, rooms in a hotel 
may be numbered in such a way as to indicate their 
location in the building. In such an application, room 
numbers may serve as no indication of how many rooms 
there actually are. For example room 1729 on the top floor 
may be so numbered, in part, because it is on the floor 
numbered 17, which itself is numbered to indicate it is one 
up from 16 (and there may not even be 17 floors in the 
hotel, if there is no 13th floor). What is more important to 
the hotel-room application of numbers is that they can 
represent individual units in some successive ordering. It is 
this potential for application that is absolutely ‘on the 
surface’ of Benacerraf’s principle. 
We can quite easily explain the relation between 
Benacerraf-numbers and one-one correspondence. One-
one correspondence is a learned application of 
Benacerraf-numbers. The adjectival numerical quantifier 
can be treated in the obvious way, analysing ‘there are n 
apples’ as:  
 
  
     (19) 
 
(where ‘less than’ is formalised in terms of PreB*, the 
transitive closure of the predecessor relation on 
Benacerraf numbers). 
Now, who is to say whether drawing one-one 
correspondences is part of the ‘schema’ for applying 
numbers, or whether it is a further application of a simpler 
schema relating to units and succession? There are 
reasons to think of numbers being fundamentally tied to 
one-one correspondence and equally good reasons to 
think that they are tied to units and succession. But to 
which, one-one correspondence or units, are numbers 
really tied? I doubt we could answer one way or the other 
without making unjustifiable or question-begging 
assumptions about the psychology of learning a number 
language. The role of one-one correspondence as an 
application of numbers will not help us to decide whether 
Hume numbers or Benacerraf numbers really are the 
numbers. 
I conclude this section with the claim that 
philosophical analysis of the concept of number will not 
help us decide between Benacerraf’s principle and Hume’s 
principle as the true abstraction principle for cardinal 
numbers. At least not without appealing to some 
disputable intuitions about our psychology of number. 
4.3 Distinguishing the abstracts 
Perhaps Neo-Fregeans should not try to rule out the 
Benacerraf-numbers as legitimate references of our 
number language, but embrace them. There is nothing to 
stop a Neo-Fregean accepting that in the abstract realm 
there are at least two number-like sequences of abstract 
objects. A good line for a Neo-Fregean to take might be 
that the Hume-numbers are the referents of our numbers-
as-cardinals language, whereas the Benacerraf-numbers 
are the referents of our numbers-as-ordinals language. A 
Neo-Fregean could then argue that there are two main 
uses of number language, perhaps even two concepts of 
number (cardinal and ordinal) and so see no reason to be 
worried if there are two collections of abstract entities 
associated with them. Indeed, such a result could be 
regarded as a success of the Neo-Fregean programme. 
The problem is that the Benacerraf-numbers are not 
ordinals: Benacerraf’s principle involves no 
characterisation of ordering or any criterion of position 
correspondence. To understand Benacerraf’s principle we 
need nothing that is not needed to understand Hume’s 
principle. There is nothing about Hume-numbers that rules 
them out as being ordinals, and there is nothing about 
Benacerraf-numbers that rules them out as being 
cardinals. The concept of a unit is no less important to that 
of cardinality than the concept of one-one correspondence. 
Benacerraf’s principle and Hume’s principle each could be 
taken as allowing reference to the natural numbers as 
cardinals. But then Neo-Fregeanism must account for why 
our arithmetic language refers to the Hume-numbers rather 
than the Benacerraf-numbers (or vice versa). I have been 
arguing that that we stand in no significant relation to 
Hume’s principle that we do not also stand in to 
Benacerraf’s principle. So if the Neo-Fregean accepts that 
the two abstraction principles allow reference to different 
abstract entities, then he has made no progress 
overcoming the objection of Section 3.3. 
5 Conclusion 
I have argued that there is no particular abstraction 
principle that we can associate with the natural numbers. 
At least two similar, but formally distinct, abstraction 
principles are capable of lying at the heart of the Neo-
Fregean programme. The principles are distinct enough 
that there is no natural way of equating the abstract 
objects they give reference to. The principles are however 
sufficiently similar that there is no principled criterion that 
identifies one over the other as ‘the correct’ abstraction 
principle for elementary arithmetic. I conclude that 
numbers are not the abstract objects referred to by either 
abstraction principle, or of any other abstraction principle. 
The point to emphasise here is that neither the Hume-
numbers nor the Benacerraf-numbers are really the natural 
numbers. The whole Neo-Fregean framework of 
abstraction principles is just another way of generating 
sequences that encode the natural numbers. This 
conclusion is independent of questions regarding the 
metaphysics of abstraction and whether abstraction 
principles really refer to any abstract objects at all. 
there is a one-one correspondence between  
the apples and the Benacerraf numbers  
less than nB. 
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Deflationism and Conservativity: Who did Change the Subject? 
Henri Galinon, Paris, France 
1. The Problem 
Deflationists about truth hold that truth is not a substantial 
property. But what counts as a substantial property? We 
shall be interested in the thesis that the following is a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the non-substantiality of 
truth:  
 
(Conservativity) The theory of truth of any given 
theory A is a conservative extension of A. 
Suppose that (Conservativity) holds, then the deflationist 
would have some right to claim that truth is an explanato-
rily thin property: for it would show that whenever non se-
mantical facts can be explained by a theory being true, 
they can also be explained by the theory. Suppose (Con-
servativity) does not hold; then there is a theory A, and 
sentences in the A-vocabulary that witness non-
conservativity; the provability in our theory of truth of those 
A-unprovable true LA -sentences would constitute some 
evidence against the deflationary thesis that truth is 
explanatorily dispensable. 
As a matter of logical fact, some putative theories of 
truth have the conservativeness property over some given 
base theories, whereas others don't. But, the conservativ-
ity argument against deflationism continues, conservative 
theories of truth are not acceptable,  because they fail to 
meet an essential requirement. To be sure, the concept of 
truth features in all these theories, that is to say a predi-
cate satisfying Tarski's convention-T. But having the con-
cept of truth is not enough for a theory to be the theory of 
the truth of a given theory. For truth ascriptions come with 
epistemic commitments, and theories of truth must account 
for them. Ketland (1999), in particular, has argued that 
holding a theory to be true is not only to hold all its theo-
rems to be true (distributively, so to speak) but also to hold 
that all of its theorems are true (resp. collectively). Conse-
quently the truth theory of A has to prove reflection princi-
ples for A: For all x, if Pr(x) then T(x).  
Shapiro (1998) has an argument for a related con-
clusion. He offers a perfectly natural explanation (I'll say of 
what in a minute) involving the concept of truth, and ar-
gues that in any good theory of truth for A we should be 
able to carry out the reasonning. The example, unsurprins-
ingly, involves gödelian phenomena: the Gödel sentence 
conPA, it is well known, is a true and undecidable state-
ment of PA; but why is it that conPA is true? A natural 
explanation goes like this, according to Shapiro:  
 
[…] all the axioms of PA are true, and inference 
rules preserve truth. Thus every theorems of PA are 
true. It follows that 0=1 is not a theorem and so PA 
is consistent. (Shapiro(1998), p.505. Shapiro uses 
« A » where I write « PA »). 
As we know, there are arithmetical sentences expressing 
(under codings) the consistency of PA, and these sen-
tences are not theorems of PA. Shapiro's argument is then 
that they should be provable in the theory of the truth of 
PA. 
To sum up: theories of truth come with some epis-
temic commitments, and those commitments yield non-
conservativity results of truth theories over their base the-
ory; hence truth is not explanatorily thin: knowledge of the 
truth of an arithmetical theory T yields new arithmetical 
knowledge beyond T.  
We agree that from truth ascriptions consistency as-
criptions should follow. We shall argue, however, that the 
conservativity argument against deflationism is flawed1. 
2. The Fable 
Let us go into the fantasy of imagining a concurring civili-
zation where people call themselves earthlungs. 
Earthlungs resemble us in every respect, except that in 
mathematics they not only study arithmetic, but also have 
come to recognize the interest and significance of arithmu-
tic. In fact they have come to believe that natural numburs 
are the real elementary blocks constituting the universe, 
and they are for this reason much interested in studying 
them. A partial axiomatization of arithmutic is obtained by 
PA + ¬conPA, where ¬conPA denotes the negation of a 
given sentence of the language of PA that is true in N (the 
standard model of PA) if and only if PA is consistent. Fur-
ther axioms have been proposed but they are much de-
bated at the moment and so we leave them aside. As it 
happens, earthlungs mostly use only the PA-part of arith-
mutic. Moreover, they use the same conventions for for-
malism as we do when doing logic and, believe it or not, 
they call PA the partial axiomatisation of arithmutic which 
is identical to our PA (a nice starting point for a philosophi-
cal vaudeville). We will sometimes write PA* to denote their 
axiomatization and distinguish it from our PA. That is PA* 
and PA are formally identical but intentionaly different, the 
first being intended as speaking about numburs, while the 
second is to be understood as speaking about numbers. 
Those people also have two Gudule Theorems that, I have 
to admit, are just as good as our Gödel Theorems. They 
usually state them as follows: 
 
First theorem: If T is a consistent, recursively enu-
merable and sufficiently rich theory, then T is in-
complete. 
Second theorem If PA is consistent then: 
PA does not prove ∀x (¬PrPA (x), ⎡0=1⎤)  
All this is standard on Urth. The second theorem has es-
pecially been welcome since it had long been an open 
question whether ¬conPA* was independent of PA*. Now 
when they hear us say that G-d-l's theorems show that 
there are true statements undecidable in PA, they agree, 
but they do not agree that conPA is one of them2! 
Now Peter, a guy from here who doesn't know much 
about earthlungs, once decided to engage Puter, one of 
theirs, in a conversation about the explanatory power of 
truth (it was raining hard that Sunday). Here's the conver-
sation. (Caveat: I have tried to disambiguate occurences of 
                                                     
 
1 Field (1999) has an answer to the conservativity argument and we basically 
agree with the general lines developped there. We can think of our argument 
as a variation on his own. We think our version is worth developing, though, 
since it crucially avoids to take a stand on contentious claims about which 
axioms are "essential to truth" and which are not (especially in connection with 
the problem raised by induction axioms involving the truth predicate). 
2 This is just because N is not the salient interpretation of PA in earthlung 
conversational contexts. 
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"PA" by using "PA* ", at least at the begining of the con-
versation. I wrote PA(*) when I was not sure which one 
one had in mind.)  
Peter: Do you believe that the axioms of PA are 
true?  
Puter: Yes, I believe that the axioms of PA* are true.  
Peter: And do you believe inference rules to be 
truth-preserving?  
Puter: I do.  
Peter: You believe then that all of PA's theorems 
are true?  
Puter: Indeed.  
Peter (getting excited): Hence, since PA proves 
0≠1, you believe it is true, and thus you believe that 
PA does not prove 0=1, that is you believe PA to be 
consistent.  
Puter: Yes, I do!  
Peter: You agree, then, that your commitment to the 
truth of PA is a commitment to its consistency, and 
that a good theory of truth for PA should account for 
that?  
Puter: Yes, it would be nice.  
Peter (proud) : Look, Tarski's theory of truth for PA, 
T(PA), is doing precisely this3. 
Puter (sincerly): I know, that's great indeed! 4 
Peter: But look: PA does not prove the consistency 
of PA, while T(PA) does. Truth has an explanatory 
power, it explains new facts that PA can't account 
for, facts that are expressible in the language of PA. 
My acceptance of PA does not logically commit me 
to the acceptance of conPA, but once I have 
acknowledged the truth of PA the acceptance of 
conPA is forced upon me. There's a new purely 
arithmetical fact which is explained by my truth-
attribution to PA.  
Puter (embarrassed): But the consistency of PA(*) is 
not an arithmutical fact. 
Peter: I beg you pardon? 
Puter: Well, I agree that your argument is a sound 
arithmetic reasoning, but it is not an arithmutic 
reasoning. First, it is false that the sentence conPA 
expresses the consistency of PA* in arithmutic. And 
second, you cannot carry your inductive reasoning 
out in any sound axiomatization of arithmutic, be it 
PA* or another theory. This is fortunate, since the 
negation of conPA is a true arithmutical fact!  
Peter: I'm not with you here.  
                                                     
 
3 For reference, T(PA) is the theory obtained by extending PA with the Tarkian 
recursive axioms for truth, letting the the truth predicate enter the induction 
scheme. 
   Equivalently one could get a theory of satisfaction. Moreover, such recursive 
definitions can be turned into explicit definitions provided that we ascend to a 
richer theory (when it exists) allowing higher-order variables, or proving exis-
tence of sets of higher rank than than any set the existence of which is prova-
ble in the base theory . See for instance McGee (1991). It is not very important 
here which of those strong « theory of truth » for PA one has in mind 
4 Of course he had understood Peter's claim as: T(PA* ) proves the consis-
tency of PA* . 
Puter: Well, ok. First things first: the sentence conPA, 
it is well-known, expresses the consistency of $PA* 
$ in the sense that it is true in N if and only if PA(*) 
is consistent. But it is of course not the case that 
conPA is true in arithmutic if and only if PA is 
consistent! Now the second point. In your argument 
you apply induction in the following manner: axioms 
are true, rules are truth preserving, hence all 
theorems are true. This is a perfectly correct 
inference of course, but it belongs to arithmetic, not 
arithmutic, since the induction involves vocabulary 
beyond the language of PA. To carry this argument 
out on the theory PA*, we usually use an axiomatic 
metatheory containing PA-arithmetic to talk about 
strings of PA*, plus a recursive truth theory (Tarski 
style), and we let the truth predicate appear in the 
meta-induction scheme. Sometimes we also enrich 
the logical-mathematical part of our metatheory so 
as to be able to explicitely define the truth predicate 
for our base theory. In any case, there is in the 
metalanguage a sentence conPA* which expresses 
the consistency of PA* in the sense of being true in 
the intended model of the metatheory if and only if 
PA* is consistent, which is provable in the 
metatheory.  
Peter: I'm not sure that I have understood your point 
correctly. For arithmetic, arithmutic, or what have 
you, it remains true that the truth-theory of PA non-
conservatively extends PA, doesn't it?   
Puter: As you can see from my example, T(PA* ) is 
not conservative over PA*. But my point is that in 
this case it does not mean anything interesting. 
Although non-conservative over PA*, T(PA* ) does 
not explain anything more than PA* in the sense 
that arithmutic is left the same before and after we 
ascend to its theory of truth. It is easy to see that 
under disambiguation of the vocabulary of PA 
between arithmutic in the base theory and arithmetic 
in the metatheory, the non-conservativity 
phenomenon vanishes.  
Peter: Ok. There may have been a 
misundertanding. I agree with you that the non-
conservativity of T(PA* ) over PA* is meaningless 
and may just result from a fallacy of equivocation 
between PA and PA*. But the point remains that the 
theory of the truth of PA (and by this I now mean 
explicitely arithmetic PA) should prove the 
consistency of PA (idem), which PA does not. And 
in that case, since PA is thought of as a theory of 
arithmetic, and since you admit that consistency of a 
formal system is an arithmetical fact, you have to 
admit that the non-conservativity of T(PA) over PA-
arithmetic shows truth to have an explanatory power 
after all!  
Puter: I don't think so, for the situation is in fact 
exactly the same as before. Suppose I'm told that 
the theory PA is true, but that I'm not sure whether it 
is PA or PA* which is under discussion. I will in any 
case be able to prove that the theory is consistent in 
my truth-theoretic metatheory. For not only is T(PA) 
non-conservative over PA, but so is T(PA* ). It is as 
it should be since the consistency of PA has nothing 
to do with the the way we think of PA, it has to do 
only with its formal features. So whether I interpret 
PA as arithmetic, arithmutic, or whatever in the 
metatheory, consistency will follow from truth. Now 
the further claim that we have so derived a truth 
pertaining to the field of investigation of our base 
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theory, that is arithmetic in the case in point, that 
claim can only be sustained by an argument to the 
effect that our metatheory is sound as an 
arithmetical theory: for in general, it is just not true 
that the restriction of the truth theory of a theory A to 
the vocabulary of A is sound for the intended model 
of A! (remember it was not sound as an arithmutical 
theory). But how do we know that our metatheory is 
arithmetically sound? There's nothing in our base 
theory that can guarantee this. Clearly our 
recognition of T(PA) as arithmetically sound 
amounts to our acknowledgement of some systems 
stronger than PA as being arithmetical systems 
(T(PA) with unduction on unrestricted vocabulary, or 
second-order arithmetic in the case of an explicitely 
defined truth-predicate, etc.). In other words, a claim 
that T(PA) is non-conservative over PA and 
arithmetically sound amounts to a bold statement of 
new axioms for arithmetic above PA. It is not our 
commitment to truth which is doing the relevant non-
conservative job, but our commitment to PA being 
arithmetic and to T(PA) being a stronger, 
arithmetically sound, theory.  
3. The Moral 
The moral of this story is simple. If someone knows that 
PA is true, he can conclude that PA is consistent. But he 
won't be able to convert this into arithmetical knowledge, 
that is to derive any new arithmetical fact, unless his arith-
metical knowledge outreaches PA from the start. And it  
 
seems inevitable then to say that it is this hidden knowl-
edge, which is unfolded in the course of building the truth-
theory, that does the explanatory work. More generally, 
knowledge that an interpreted theory A is true yields 
knowledge that A is consistent. But it will never in itself 
give any new insights into A-facts, unless one knew from 
the beginning that A was somehow expressively defective 
relative to his actual knowledge concerning the intended 
field of T and had some ways to recognize some exten-
sions of T as being sound relative to his knowledge of T-
facts. Were this last condition not met, how could he be 
sure that one did not change the subject?  
It seems fair to conclude that the conservativity argument 
does not show that truth has any explanatory power by 
itself. On the contrary, close inspection of the argument 
tells in favor of the thesis that "true" is a genuine 
expressive device.  
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Hard Naturalism and its Puzzles 
Renia Gasparatou, Patras, Greece 
1. Introduction 
Most analytic philosophers today would call themselves 
naturalists. According to B. Stroud, the minimum commit-
ment necessary is the exclusion of the supernatural from 
their philosophical system. (B. Stroud, 1996) And since 
today most philosophers seem unwilling to include any 
supernatural entities such as God or psyche in their ac-
counts of reality or the mind, all could count as naturalists. 
Yet some forms of naturalism are harder that others. (P.F. 
Strawson, 1985) The hardest probably being eliminative 
naturalism suggesting the elimination of all mental lan-
guage from our everyday vocabulary. This form of natural-
ism claims that scientific evolution will prove that mental 
terms are just pseudo-entities. I will argue that even 
though they strongly depend on science, hard naturalists 
can hardly account for the evolution of science. 
2. Hard naturalism 
The term naturalism refers to the general view that every-
thing is natural. What gives hard naturalism a more spe-
cific touch is how one conceives nature. Hard naturalists 
take natural to mean physical, material, scientifically ex-
plainable. The claim that all is natural then implies that all 
is to be studied by the methods of physical science.  
The question is what happens if something stands 
out against physical explanation. The most worrying 
example comes from consciousness: mental states resist a 
purely physical description. To use a crude example, it 
seems different to say “I am afraid of dogs” than say 
“seeing dogs produce adrenalin secretion in my brain”. 
The two sentences have different meanings: They are 
used in different contexts to draw attention in different 
aspects of my experience. One important difference being 
that the former describes the way Ι feel, providing the 
phenomenology of the experience from the first person 
perspective, while the later is a neutral description form the 
third person perspective.  
Now, according to hard naturalists, such as P. M. 
Churchland, propositions of the former type cannot be 
translated into propositions of the later type just because 
the way we approach mental phenomena is already 
mediated by folk psychology. Folk psychology is, 
according to him, an implicit theory; a theory which people 
use in order to understand, explain and predict their own 
or other people’s psychological events and behaviour. 
Following folk psychology, we attribute desires, fears or 
beliefs in our attempt to explain our behaviour. 
Propositional states, such as these, are theoretical 
constructions and therefore should be evaluated with 
reference to experience. Like all theoretical entities, 
desires and beliefs are open to revision and total 
elimination, if proven false.  
Lots of other folk theories have proved wrong in the 
past: Folk astronomy claiming that the earth is the centre 
of the universe, or folk physics talking about phlogiston. 
Churchland goes on arguing that folk psychology is such a 
false theory, “significantly worse [...] than [...] folk 
mechanics, folk biology and so forth” (Churchland, 1989, 
p.231). He compares it with the theory of witches, demonic 
possession, exorcism and trail by ordeal: Demons and 
witches just like desires and beliefs are theoretical entities. 
And just as we got rid of the theory of witches, we must 
now eliminate folk psychology. Folk psychology is false 
since it resists physicalistic explanations. As Churchland 
writes:  
 
If we approach homo sapiens from the perspective 
of natural history and the physical sciences, we can 
tell a coherent story of his constitution, development 
and behavioral capacities which encompasses par-
ticle physics, atomic and molecular theory, organic 
chemistry, evolutionary theory, biology, physiology, 
and materialistic neurotheory. That story, though still 
radically incomplete, is already extremely powerful... 
And it is deliberately and self consciously coherent 
with the rest of our developing world picture... But 
FP [folk psychology] is no part of this growing syn-
thesis. Its intentional categories stand alone, without 
visible prospect of reduction to that larger corpus. 
(Churchland, 1981, p.75.) 
Churchland clearly aims for a unifying physical theory that 
can account for all there is. Physical science is the best 
candidate for such an account. In order to save its growing 
synthesis, then, we should reduce all mental terms about 
desires, beliefs, fears etc in physical terms about brain 
activities. If this is not possible, we should eliminate the 
mental vocabulary from our ordinary language altogether. 
Neuroscience talk about brain states is supposed to fill in 
everyday vocabulary about mental states. 
It should be clear that when Churchland asks for the 
elimination of folk psychology, he asks for the abolition of a 
basic corpus of ordinary dispositions and practices. Folk 
psychology refers to the way we all think and talk about all 
kinds of issues in our everyday life. It has to do with de-
scriptions and concepts we all use everyday in ordinary 
language. When we say that the world is round, for exam-
ple, we express a belief, when we take an umbrella before 
we leave our house, we again reveal our belief that it may 
rain. So, the implications of Churchland’s views thus go 
further than his philosophy of mind: Scientific explanations 
about the physical world are the only kind of explanation 
he is willing to admit.  
Physical science is the only explanatory principle. 
Consequently, all kinds of problems people are struggling 
with (psychological, moral, aesthetic issues etc) should be 
translated into scientific, materialistic, physical language. If 
this is not possible, their resistance is strong evidence that 
they are pseudo-problems, which we should abandon by 
eliminating all relevant terms from our vocabulary. Phi-
losophy too is taken in as a branch of theoretical proto 
science that articulates hypotheses for other sciences to 
test. (Churchland, 1986) Churchland’ s views then suggest 
a very strong version of scientism: Physical science is the 
norm by which the legitimacy of all quests, descriptions 
and explanations will be measured.  
3. Problems with hard naturalism 
The question is whether hard naturalism can provide an 
explanation of scientific evolution. Churchland insists that 
all questions regarding human consciousness, for exam-
ple, will be resolved by physical science. His argument is 
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supposedly inductive, for, as it is often said, “induction is 
the method of science”. So he infers the future of science 
from its past: Since science has progressed and has man-
aged to illuminate some issues concerning human con-
sciousness, it will evolve more and resolve all relevant 
questions in the future. Yet, his argument goes beyond 
induction; it rather appeals to Churchland’ s intuitions 
about the future of science and of ordinary language. For 
there is no evidence nowadays that beliefs and desires will 
be eliminated from our folk vocabulary. We have no clue 
whether science (perhaps some new branch of science) 
will embrace them into our common natural history or even 
whether this whole natural history will prove inaccurate and 
change. From our current viewpoint all these hypotheses 
are mere speculation. 
Meanwhile, Churchland identifies explanation with 
the reduction of any phenomenon into physical 
phenomenon. Yet, he has no full-fledged, specific 
paradigms of such a reduction to offer. Failing an 
alternative coherent description of mental phenomena, his 
insisting on eliminating the ontology of ordinary language 
seems impracticable. Moreover, the identification of 
scientific explanation and physical reduction restricts the 
concept of science, without even defining it conceivably. 
The hard naturalist, though, can answer this line of 
criticism: being a philosopher (and thus a proto-scientist) 
they don’t need to provide a full-fledged theory to take folk 
psychology’s place. (Churchland, 1986, p.6). They only 
need to give an outline of what this theory should be like; 
and, according to them, this proto-theory is already being 
built. (Churchland, 1991, p.67) 
Yet Churchland views suffer an imminent tension: 
he takes for granted that many concepts, that are basic for 
communication and understanding, are pseudo-concepts 
with no literal meaning. Meanwhile, they are the concepts, 
which we are brought up with. From day one, we learn to 
engage those concepts and use them to understand all 
there is around us, including science. Ordinary language is 
full of mental vocabulary and the way we approach all 
human experience is full of folk psychology presumptions 
and explanations. Official education teaches us to think 
using such concepts descriptions and explanations. The 
phenomena we approach are described by them; all our 
starting hypotheses involve them. These are the concepts 
Churchland himself uses: when he says that folk 
psychology is a pseudo-theory he expresses a belief of 
his, there is no other way to say it.  
Of course, one would answer that this only goes for 
now; when folk psychology gets eliminated there will be 
some other, better way to say it. (Churchland, 1981, p.87) 
But for the time being those are the only concepts we 
have; it is through them that today’s scientists are trained. 
If we accuse them of being void, we can no longer sensibly 
train today’s scientists. Neither can we sensibly articulate 
today’s hypotheses or theories.  
Eliminative naturalists such as Churchland write and 
teach in a language they consider meaningless. But you 
cannot teach using a language and simultaneously 
suggest that most concepts and dispositions embedded in 
this language are senseless. This only makes what you 
say senseless as well. 
4. Conclusion 
Naturalism sees science and scientific method as a valid 
way people have in their attempt to explain the world. But 
how do people get engaged into scientific method(s)? 
Does naturalism manage a theoretical explanation of how 
scientific education and evolution work?  
Hard naturalism identifies scientific explanation with 
an ideal physicalistic reduction. Yet, hard naturalists such 
as Churchland offer no strict criteria about what physical 
means: is meteorology a physical science? Is cognitive 
psychology a purely physical science today? Science 
seems restricted into very few branches and, what’s more, 
one cannot even know the criterion by which a discipline 
qualifies as scientific. Churchland offers only some intuitive 
remarks about how the scientific worldview will be like by 
proposing the elimination of all terms that today’s science 
has trouble accounting for.  
Moreover, by insisting that all non-reducible terms 
should be eliminated form our explanatory story, the hard 
naturalist restricts the phenomena in need of explanation 
into very few. Many questions posed by today’s people 
(psychological or ethical worries and troubles) are 
considered pseudo-questions, raised by the pseudo-theory 
of folk psychology, which our language supports. 
Most importantly, Churchland’ s hard naturalism, 
despite the scientism it implies, does not manage to 
illuminate the very fact of scientific education and 
evolution. It makes it incomprehensible that people who 
teach and think into pseudo-terms produce new good 
theories and educate new scientists that help science 
evolve. If our language is full of pseudo-concepts and false 
ontology, it is a mystery how scientific education was made 
to work and still continues to do. Consequently, it is a 
mystery how science progressed and still continues to do 
so. The conceptual rules used in everyday life are the 
same rules the scientist uses, even within his technical 
vocabulary. And despite this very fact, new scientists learn 
good science, make valid hypotheses and produce 
compelling theories. Even the most revolutionary among 
them rely, at least at first, on common world picture. Or, 
even when they question it, they are articulated in 
language. 
It seems that the primacy ascribed to science comes 
with a high price: it makes science “stand alone, without 
visible prospect of reduction to that larger corpus”, to 
paraphrase Churchland. (1981, p.75) According to him, 
scientific practice is not part of human practices but stands 
way above them. It is the primary explanatory method and 
the one that will eventually eliminate all other branches. It 
will eliminate the problems other disciples confront, even 
the vocabulary that gives rise to those questions. But if 
one puts science so much higher than any other human 
practice, they cut its every connection with the community 
it comes from, the very community that practices it. Hard 
naturalist’s scientism has to face this paradox: the very 
primacy of science’s explanatory methods makes it harder 
to explain how science is communicated and evolved.  
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The Mind-Body-Problem and Score-Keeping in Language Games  
Georg Gasser, Innsbruck, Austria 
I. The problem 
Maybe to no other problem in philosophy so much time 
and attention has been dedicated in recent years than to 
the mind-body-problem. Enjoying a personal, subjective, 
first-person-perspective from which we undergo experi-
ences with a certain phenomenal feel appears like a mys-
tery in a world being fundamentally physical. The objective 
perspective of physical description lacks all the character-
istic features of first-person-perspective.  
Purported solutions to the problem tend to assume 
either a physicalistic-minded or a dualistic-minded form. 
According to Chalmers, each of these views has its 
promise, and each view seems to make some ad-hoc 
assumptions which are hard to spell out in more detail. 
Take, for instance, type-B materialism and type-D dualism.  
Type-B materialism is the view that there is an 
epistemic gap between the physical and the mental but 
there is no ontological gap. Saying that there is no 
ontological gap implies stating identity between the mental 
and the physical. But how shall identity be stated in the 
light of the strong intuition that there are the properties of 
the brain, objects of perception, laid out in space, and, 
conscious states, defying explanation in such terms? 
According to Chalmers a type-B materialist is forced to 
accept the identity between physical states and 
consciousness as fundamental; it is a sort of primitive 
principle in hers theory of the world (Chalmers 2003, 254).  
Type-D dualism is the view that mental states can 
cause physical states and vice versa. A very challenging 
objection to type-D dualism is that the interaction between 
mind and body is unexplainable. How should anything 
non-physical be able of interacting with physical things? 
Dualists have a straightforward answer. They don’t know 
but ignorance should not be taken as decisive argument 
against their theory: “We should just acknowledge that 
human beings are not omniscient, and cannot understand 
everything.” (Swinburne 1997, xii; for a similar 
argumentation, see Foster 1991, 161). In light of the 
observed connection between physical and phenomenal 
states it is an inference to the best explanation to assume 
that there is a psycho-physical nexus, though we are not 
able to render intelligible how it works.  
What does this discussion show? Both, type-B 
materialism and type-D dualism refer to observed 
connections between physical and phenomenal states. 
The conclusions they draw, however, are very different: 
identity on the one side, psycho-physical interactionism on 
the other. The reason we cannot go on to investigate such 
notions in more fundamental terms is that the bottom of the 
theory in question has been reached. If this 
characterization is correct, then the various accounts in 
philosophy of mind seem to result ultimately in an impasse.  
In what follows, I would like to ask how we could 
possibly explain why we permanently seem to end up into 
such an impasse. In giving a possible explanation I will 
refer to the concept of ‘score-keeping in language game’.  
II. Score-keeping in language games 
The term ‘score-keeping in language games’ was intro-
duced by David Lewis. He argues that in a communication 
process terms and concepts often are partially governed 
by certain implicit, context relative, parameters. These 
parameters define the score of a communication, that is, 
its running well or not. We can compare these parameters 
with rules in games: The rules define the score of the 
game. Thanks to the rules it can be told whether a team is 
doing well or not – whether the score of the game is for or 
against it. Something similar, according to Lewis, goes on 
in communication, even though the score is more flexible 
than the one in games. (Lewis 1979/1983, 240) If Lewis’ 
analysis is correct, then during a communication process 
we tend to adapt continuously the applied parameters in 
order to modify the score of the discourse in such a way 
that its current status is still considered to be successful. A 
good example to illustrate such continuous adaptations of 
the conversational score is vague terms such as “bold”, 
“flat” or “big”. What is bold at one occasion, is not bold on 
another, what is flat at one occasion, is not flat on another 
and what is big at one occasion, may not be considered as 
big on another: „The standards of precision in force are 
different from one conversation to another, and may 
change in the course of a single conversation.” (Lewis 
1979/1983, 245) 
Generally it can be said that our use of standards 
defining the score is broad and not very restrictive. We 
could imagine a situation in which subliminally parameters 
from different contexts are introduced into a single 
discourse (Horgan 2001 and 2007 argues that the agent 
exclusion problem is the consequence of such a situation). 
Thereby an atypical discourse context is created for it is 
unclear which score which is in use in such a situation. 
According to which standards should we judge whether a 
satisfactory score has been reached if the various context 
parameters in practice do not overlap? Probably we would 
end up in a kind of discursive cul-de-sac.  
III. Application to Philosophy of Mind 
Is it plausible to assume that the mind-body-problem is the 
consequence of such a scenario? Let us focus at possible 
parameters in the mind-body-problem first. Physical con-
cepts, as we have seen, are developed in a context of 
objectively accessible phenomena, that is, phenomena 
generally accessible to science. Normally these phenom-
ena are quantitatively definable, in terms of material and 
structural composition.  
Mental concepts, on the contrary, are qualitatively 
determined. They are characterized as essentially 
subjective in the sense that every mental property is 
principally accessible only from a certain subjective point 
of view (Nagel 1974, 442).  
The mind-body-problem arises out of the tension 
between concepts apparently as different as the mental 
and the physical. If someone approaches the mind-body-
problem one tends to undergo a series of cognitive steps (I 
model these steps according to Horgan 2001). A 
physicalistic-minded person may undergo something like 
the following:  
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1. The starting point: The world consists ultimately of 
nothing but bits of matter distributed over space-
time behaving according to physical laws. (Kim 
2005, 7) 
2. An automatical and subliminal accommodation to 
the parameter appropriate to this kind of dis-
course, that is, (micro-)physical explanation takes 
place.  
3. It is not acknowledged that such an accommoda-
tion has occurred and that parameters stemming 
from (micro-)physical explanation are applied to 
notions such as world, reality or nature.  
4. The question: How can there be something such 
as a conscious experience in a physical world like 
this?  
5. There is, however, no shift in the accommodation 
of parameters. The discourse continues under the 
parameters installed at the beginning.  
6. It is realized that what is called ‘consciousness’ or 
‘the mind’ is hard to integrate in the kind of ap-
proach under consideration.  
7. As a result, the mind appears to be ‘special’, 
‘mysterious’ or even ‘unreal’.  
8. Thus, it is intuitively plausible to assume that the 
mental has a place in our world only if it is identi-
cal with something physical. Though the assump-
tion of this identity cannot be illuminated any fur-
ther, it seems to be the inference to the best ex-
planation.  
Crucial components in such a process of reasoning are 
steps 1, 4 and 5. The question posed at the very beginning 
introduces parameters which shape decisively the follow-
ing discourse. Talk about the physical world, bits of matter, 
space-time and physical laws introduces parameters con-
forming to scientific discourse where quantitative and 
structural explanations of reality do not provide any room 
for subjective and qualitative aspects.  
In step 4 a concept with another parameter is 
introduced. Paying attention to the mind and its 
characteristic features comes along with parameters 
pointing towards another score than parameters of a 
physical context. The parameter-setting under which an 
entity counts as mental are, for instance, (i) being 
qualitative and (ii) enjoying a subjective perspective.  
In step 5 the way is paved for the puzzlement 
arising in step 7: It remains unnoticed that talk about the 
mind goes hand in hand with parameters different from 
those shaping the overall score of the entire discourse. As 
long as this conversational score is in use mental 
phenomena will always fall short of being fully appreciated 
for there is no way how they can adequately be integrated 
in a context framed by such parameters.  
The same applies to dualistic thinking:  
1. The starting point: Physical objects are not con-
scious; they do not have thoughts and sensa-
tions. Men and animals, on the contrary, do en-
joy thoughts and sensations. Having a thought 
or a sensation is not just having some physico-
chemical event occur inside one of greater com-
plexity than the physico-chemical events which 
occur in physical objects. It is not the same sort 
of thing at all for it is rich in inbuilt colour, smell 
and meaning. (Swinburne 1997, 1.)  
2. An automatical and subliminal accommodation 
to the parameter appropriate to this kind of dis-
course, that is, a clear distinction between sen-
tient and non-sentient, conscious and non-
conscious takes place. 
3. It is not acknowledged that such an accommo-
dation has occurred. The parameters applied to 
notions such as ‘animal’, ‘man’ and ‘nature’ di-
vide everything up into something mental or 
physical.  
4. The question: How can we explain our experi-
ence of mind-body-interaction in the light of the 
assumption that the mental is so different in na-
ture from the physical? 
5. There is, however, no shift in the accommoda-
tion of parameters. The discourse continues un-
der the parameters installed at the beginning.  
6. It is realized that what might be called mind-
body- and body-mind-interaction is hard to inte-
grate in the kind of approach under considera-
tion.  
7. As a result, mind-body-interaction appears to be 
‘special’ and ‘unexplainable’ (dualistic interac-
tionism) or even ‘unreal’ (epiphenomenalism).  
8. Thus, interactionists will argue: It is intuitively 
plausible to assume that mind-body-interaction 
takes place. It is just one of the most obvious 
phenomena of human experience. Not being 
able to explain how it occurs does not back up 
the epiphenomenalist conclusion that it does not 
occur at all or the much stronger claim that the 
theory is false in principle. 
Is it plausible to assume that the mind-body-problem arises 
out of such scenarios? Let me start with some thoughts 
from Strawson’s Individuals. Strawson argues that there 
exists a categorical framework of our factual everyday 
thinking which is the realm of meso-scopic entities contain-
ing person-like and non-person-like individuals. Person-like 
individuals enjoy physical and mental properties. If we 
describe human persons we describe them as a single 
entity with physical and mental features.  
Taken this analysis as a matter of fact we can aim at 
developing precise theories about mental and physical 
properties. We can ask how mental and physical 
properties are to be described more accurately, whether 
they can consist out of smaller parts, what their differences 
are. In other words, we can start to reason theoretically 
about the various features we rather vaguely describe in 
everyday thinking. Theories in philosophy of mind, 
according to this story, are theories developed for and 
framed from a specific theoretical context. In such contexts 
preciseness, clarity and analyticity are the standards 
amounting to the score of the discussion. This score, 
however, is a very different one from the score valid in 
everyday interaction. As Lewis remarked, in everyday 
communication we generally tend to be very permissive for 
we have an interest that communication goes on. In a 
theoretical setting, on the contrary, we probably are less 
permissive for communication is judged according to 
precise definitions and clear argumentation.  
If this is correct, then the categorical framework of 
our factual everyday thinking is open for different 
theoretical interpretations because the conversational 
score in everyday thinking is broad and not sharply 
defined. Saying that human persons have physical and 
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mental properties, for instance, or that human organisms in 
contrast to other organisms can reason and think leaves it 
open how these statements are to be spelled out in a more 
precise way. In such statements the apparently profound 
differences between mental and physical properties are 
not thematised any further. From theories in philosophy of 
mind, however, accurate definition of these aspects is 
demanded.  
I suggest that impasses in philosophy of mind stem 
from the fact that the variety of our factual categorical 
framework of everyday thinking is given up in favour of a 
possible theoretical precision of certain aspects. For 
instance: What does it mean that biological organisms 
such as human beings can reason and think? Does this 
mean that the substance of mental properties is a 
biological organism? Or does a new entity come into 
existence, a ‘someone’ having these experiences? Trying 
to answer such questions comes along with negligence of 
other aspects being part of our common categorical 
framework as well. If a theory is blamed for being counter-
intuitive or for not taking into consideration certain aspects 
of reality adequately enough, then, I guess, the different 
conversational scores of everyday parlance and theoretical 
inquiry come into conflict. The widely shared impression 
that neither physicalistic nor dualistic theories of mind are 
fully satisfying might have its roots in the fact that the 
ample categorical framework of our factual everyday 
thinking cannot be fully integrated into the narrow and 
specialised frameworks of theories in philosophy of mind. 
Due to the precision required in philosophical thinking and 
the lack of precision in everyday communication a theory 
of mind overlapping in its score with the score of our 
commonly assumed categorical framework will hardly be 
available.  
IV. Conclusion  
This leads to the conclusion that theories of mind will al-
ways have an unsatisfying smack. There will always be the 
feeling that something has not been integrated or that 
some feature has been turned into something other than 
what it is. 
Physicalistic and dualistic theories are on a pair then – 
compared with the categorical framework of our factual 
everyday thinking. Why do philosophers nevertheless have 
either physicalistic or dualistic tendencies? Following 
Hardcastle I would argue it is a matter of attitude. (Hard-
castle 2004, 801) These divergent reactions turn on ante-
cedent views about what counts as explanatory and what 
does not. Thus, problems identified in philosophy of mind 
depend heavily on the perspective out of which we ap-
proach the examination of the mind-body-problem. These 
remarks are not a solution to the mind-body-problem but 
they explain how the problem arises and why remedy is 
hard to find.  
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Wright, Wittgenstein und das Fundament des Wissens 
Frederik Gierlinger, Wien, Österreich 
In seinem Artikel Wittgensteinian Certainties vertritt Crispin 
Wright eine Position, nach der es eine Klasse von Sätzen 
gibt, die das Fundament unserer Wissensansprüche 
ausmachen. Diese fundierenden Sätze (Typ III) werden 
von Wright unterschieden von Evidenzbeschreibungen 
(Typ I) einerseits und Behauptungen (Typ II) andererseits. 
In seiner Schilderung sind es Evidenzbeschreibungen, die 
herangezogen werden, um Behauptungen zu stützen. 
Damit aber diese rechtfertigende Verwendung eines 
Satzes vom Typ I auf einen Satz vom Typ II möglich wird, 
sind bereits Überzeugungen nötig, die selbst nicht 
gerechtfertigt werden können. Dies sei anhand des 
folgenden Beispiels demonstriert: 
 
Typ I (Evidenz): "Mein derzeitiger Bewusstseinszu-
stand ist von solcher Gestalt, dass hier eine Hand 
zu sein scheint." 
Typ II (Behauptung): "Hier ist eine Hand." 
Typ III (Hintergrund): "Es gibt eine materielle Welt." 
Weil Sätze vom Typ III stets vorauszusetzen sind, befindet 
Wright, dass die Annahme eines Hintergrunds (i.e. einer 
Menge von solchen Sätzen des Typs III) notwendigerwei-
se ungerechtfertigt geschieht. Diese Konstruktion und ihr 
Ergebnis benennt er I-II-III Skeptizismus. Indem Wright 
des Weiteren behauptet, die Akzeptanz dieser Sätze stehe 
in keinerlei Zusammenhang mit der Wahrscheinlichkeit 
ihrer Wahrheit, bestimmt er unsere wissenschaftliche Ba-
sis als unsicher. "To be entitled to accept a proposition in 
this way, of course, has no connection whatever with the 
likelihood of its truth." (Wright 2004:53) Wir können zur 
Verteidigung der Akzeptanz dieser Sätze nur vorbringen, 
dass wir sie aus einer praktischen Notwendigkeit des Le-
bens heraus akzeptieren. "One's life as a practical rea-
soner depends upon type III presuppositions. To avoid 
them is to avoid having a life." (Wright 2004:52f) Diese 
Berechtigungskonstruktion, die eine wenig spannende 
Wiederholung der Gedanken David Humes zum skepti-
schen Dilemma darstellt, nennt er Entitlement. 
Der Schluss ist somit der, dass wir den skeptischen 
Zweifel nicht widerlegen können, aber bestimmte 
Überzeugungen die Welt betreffend haben müssen, auch 
wenn diese möglicherweise nicht den Tatsachen 
entsprechen. Ich behaupte, dieser Entwurf ist nicht bloß im 
Ansatz verkehrt – eine Unterteilung in drei Satzgruppen 
nimmt keine Rücksicht auf die verschiedenen Umstände, 
unter denen ein Satz geäußert werden kann – sondern ist 
eigentlich ganz unverständlich. 
Wright behauptet, dass alles ganz anders sein 
könnte, als wir glauben. Wenn aber jemand sagt, es gibt 
keine Gewissheit dafür, dass die Dinge sich wirklich so 
verhalten, wie wir annehmen, dann ist im Grunde nicht 
klar, was hier unter Verdacht steht, anders als 
angenommen zu sein. Kann denn alles angezweifelt 
werden? Wright vermeint sich zwar im Einklang mit 
Wittgensteins Bemerkungen in Über Gewissheit, wenn er 
dies ablehnt, aber die Gründe, aus denen er es ablehnt, 
sind völlig andere als bei Wittgenstein, weshalb von einer 
Übereinstimmung der beiden keine Rede sein kann. 
Während Wittgenstein uns darauf hinweisen möchte, dass 
wir dem Zweifel an Allem keinen Sinn geben können (vgl. 
ÜG 114), meint Wright, dass der Skeptiker eine ganz und 
gar berechtigte Frage aufbringt und uns dadurch die 
Grenzen unserer Rechtfertigungen aufzeigt. "[T]he best 
sceptical arguments have something to teach us." 
Nämlich, "that the limits of justification they bring out are 
genuine and essential" (Wright 2004:50) 
Nehmen wir einmal an, jede meiner Überzeugungen 
ist falsch, d.h. die Dinge verhalten sich tatsächlich anders, 
als ich glaube – und wir wollen so tun, als verstünden wir 
für den Moment, was diese Aufforderung von uns verlangt. 
Nehmen wir zudem an, dass der Dämon, der mich täuscht, 
eines Tages des Spiels mit mir müde wird und mich 
erwachen lässt. Warum sollte ich das nun Wirklichkeit 
nennen? Was hindert mich daran, es für einen Traum zu 
halten? Wie kann ich es überhaupt für irgendetwas halten? 
Das Problem mit derartigen Überlegungen ist, dass sie 
dazu verführen, unsere Begriffe "Wirklichkeit", "Wahrheit", 
"Täuschung", "Skepsis", etc. auf eine Situation 
anzuwenden, in der diese Begriffe keinen Sinn haben. 
(vgl. ÜG 36, 37) 
Wer des Weiteren behauptet, dass unser Verfahren, 
Sätze anzunehmen, nichts mit der Wahrscheinlichkeit ihrer 
Wahrheit zu tun hat, der meint, ohne Kriterium dafür 
auszukommen, einen Satz als wahr oder falsch zu 
bestimmen. Für diese Einsicht ist lediglich anzusehen, was 
es heißen kann, dass wir alle in unseren Überzeugungen 
falsch liegen. Wenn ich sage: " Du liegst mit deiner 
Behauptung falsch", so lässt sich mein Einwand prüfen. 
Wenn jemand aber sagt: "Die Menschheit liegt 
(möglicherweise) mit allen ihren Behauptungen falsch", so 
ist zunächst überhaupt nicht klar, wie sich das prüfen 
ließe. Jede Prüfung bedarf eines geeigneten Maßstabs. Zu 
sagen, es könne alles ganz anders sein, ist gleichsam der 
Versuch, eine Länge abzunehmen, ohne ein Längenmaß 
zu besitzen. Wright bezieht sich auf die Wahrheit als 
Maßstab, entzieht sie aber zugleich unserem 
Erkenntnisvermögen. Seiner eigenen Forderung – 
"Empirical enquiry does par excellence have an overall 
point, namely [...] the divination of what is true and the 
avoidance of what is false of the world it concerns." 
(Wright 2004:43) – ist nicht mehr nachzukommen. Umso 
mehr, als Aussagen vom Typ 3, an denen alles Weitere 
ansetzt, weder wahr, noch falsch, weder zu rechtfertigen, 
noch zu widerlegen sind. 
Es lohnt an dieser Stelle, kurz darauf einzugehen, 
wie Wright das Verhältnis zwischen mathematischem Satz 
und Wahrheit bestimmt. Zum einen, um besser zu 
verstehen, weshalb er es überhaupt als nötig empfindet, in 
dieser Eindringlichkeit auf Wahrheit als Leitidee 
empirischer Forschung hinzuweisen. Zum anderen, um 
nachzuvollziehen, wie Wright sich den besonderen Status 
von Typ 3 Sätzen erklärt. Der mathematische Satz, so 
Wright, fungiert als Regel, die ein Verfahren definiert. 
Diese Regel mag zur Erreichung eines bestimmten Ziels 
ungeeignet sein, aber sie ist als Definition nicht mit den 
Kategorien der Wahr- und Falschheit einzufangen. "The 
merit of a rule may be discussible: rules can be inept, in 
various ways. But, since they define a practice, they 
cannot be wrong." (Wright 2004:43) 
Aber wie leitet mich der Satz "2 + 2 = 4" an, ein 
Verfahren anzuwenden? Ich muss schon verstanden 
haben, wie mit dem Satz zu verfahren ist, bevor er mir als 
Regel dienen kann. Indem Wright dies übergeht und den 
mathematischen Satz der Praxis als Basis zugrunde legt, 
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kommt es zu einem gravierenden Missverständnis. Die 
notwendige Konsequenz, die Wright richtigerweise selbst 
daraus zieht, ist, dass Regeln gleichsam sich selbst 
dienen, sofern wir sie nicht bewusst an ein bestimmtes Ziel 
anknüpfen. "Rules governing a practice can be excused 
from any external constraint – so just 'up to us', as it were 
– only if the practice itself has no overall point which a 
badly selected rule might frustrate." (Wright 2004:43) 
Aus diesen Überlegungen ergibt sich für Wright in 
der Folge ein wesentliches Problem einer internalistischen 
Auffassung von Sprache. Wenn es der Fall ist, dass 
ausschließlich die sprachliche Praxis – und damit die 
Befolgung bestimmter Regeln – unseren Worten 
Bedeutung verleiht, dann scheinen wir von dem, wie die 
Welt wirklich ist, abgekoppelt zu werden. "[I]t is our 
linguistic practice itself that is viewed as conferring 
meaning on the statements it involves – there is no 
meaning-conferrer standing apart from the rules of practice 
and no associated external goal." (Wright 2004:45). 
Deshalb meint Wright bei Wittgenstein ein metaphysisches 
Projekt zu erkennen: Wie wir von der Welt sprechen, 
könnte davon abweichen, wie es sich wirklich verhält. "In 
taking it for granted [...] that type III propositions 'might just 
be false' – as a matter of metaphyiscal bad luck, as it were 
– I-II-III scepticism sets out its stall against the internalism 
of the Investigations." (Wright 2004:45) 
Diese Kritik ist aber verfehlt. Regeln und Praxis 
haben für Wittgenstein Bezug zur Wirklichkeit insofern, als 
sich etwa ein mathematischer Satz erübrigen würde, wenn 
Gegenstände sich nicht mehr in gewohnter Weise 
verhalten. (vgl. BGM I, 37) Wittgensteins Ansatz trennt uns 
nicht von der Welt und ihren Tatsachen ab, auch wenn die 
Dinge uns nicht zu einem bestimmten Urteil zwingen 
können (d.h. es ist keine metaphysische Notwendigkeit 
darin, welchen Schluss wir aus Erfahrungen ziehen). Der 
Verweis auf eine externe Wahrheit, nach welcher sich 
unser Forschen auszurichten hat, ist hingegen ein 
Versuch, die Grenzen unserer Sprache zu verlassen. Wie 
soll mit einer externen Wahrheit verglichen werden? Wie 
soll sie erkannt werden? Die Frage, wonach wir die Wahr- 
oder Falschheit eines Satzes festlegen sollen, bleibt in 
einem Modell, wie es Wright vorschlägt, notwendig 
unbeantwortet. Damit wird allerdings unklar, was 
"Wahrheit" bedeutet. Die Forderung Wrights, Wissenschaft 
habe nach Wahrheit zu streben, entpuppt sich in diesem 
Zusammenhang als sinnlos. 
Ich werde nun näher auf Wrights Charakterisierung 
von Typ III Aussagen als Regeln und damit auf seine 
Auslegung von hinge propositions eingehen. Dabei wird 
sich zeigen, dass Wrights Beschreibung dieser Sätze nicht 
stimmig ist. Seine Grundhaltung ist jene, dass hinge 
propositions – zu denen er auch einfache mathematische 
Sätze zählt – als Regeln gedeutet werden können. (Eine 
solche Leseart vertritt auch Marie McGinn in ihrem Buch 
Sense and Certainty, wenngleich sie eine von Wright in 
wesentlichen Punkten abweichende Auffassung des 
Regelcharakters dieser Sätze verteidigt.) 
In welcher Weise aber besitzen hinge propositions 
Regelcharakter? Wright schreibt: "The cases [dies bezieht 
sich auf seine Unterteilung von hinge propositions in drei 
Gruppen] are [...] unified [...] by their constituting or 
reflecting our implicit acceptance of various kinds of rules 
of evidence." (Wright 2004:42) und bestimmt rules of 
evidence anhand folgenden Beispiels: "Imagine that you 
count the pieces of fruit in a bowl containing just satsumas 
and bananas. You get thirteen satsumas and then seven 
bananas but when you count all the fruits together, you get 
twenty-one. Yet you seem to have made no mistake, and 
no piece of fruit is added or removed – so it seems – 
during the three counts. [...] According to the mooted 
account, the necessity of 13 + 7 = 20 is somehow 
grounded in the fact that such appearances are not 
allowed collectively to stand as veridical. Rather, we 
inexorably dismiss them out of hand – 'You must have 
miscounted somewhere', 'Another piece of fruit must 
somehow have been slipped in', etc." (Wright 2004:34) 
Wright behauptet also, dass wir uns weigern, etwas 
anderes als 20 zum Ergebnis zu nehmen, wenn wir 13 und 
7 zusammen zählen. Nur was mit dem mathematischen 
Satz in Einklang steht, ist für uns als Evidenz zulässig; ein 
anderes Ergebnis akzeptieren wir nicht. Der 
mathematische Satz kann nach diesem Verständnis nicht 
falsch sein und er kann nicht falsch sein, weil wir all jene 
Fälle, die ihn als falsch zeigen könnten, von vornherein 
ausschließen. Wright schreibt diese Ansicht Wittgenstein 
zu. 
Untersuchen wir das Beispiel genauer: Wright 
schildert eine Situation, in der ich einen Fruchtkorb vor mir 
habe und zuerst einen Stoß mit 13 Mandarinen zähle und 
dann einen Stoß mit 7 Bananen und dann lege ich beide 
Stöße zusammen und zähle 21. Möglicherweise wollte ich 
sicher gehen, wie viele Früchte es sind. Dann bin ich jetzt 
erst recht unsicher. Ich zähle also nochmals sorgfältig und 
hierbei wird sich (hoffentlich) herausstellen, dass ich mich 
entweder hier oder da verzählt habe. Aber, und dies ist 
entscheidend, ich verwerfe das Urteil, es seien 21, nicht 
auf Basis meiner Überzeugung, dass gilt "13 + 7 = 20", 
sondern ich verwerfe das Urteil, es seien 21, weil ich 
vermute, irgendwo falsch verfahren zu sein. D.h. ich hege 
keinen Zweifel an der Korrektheit der empirischen 
Tatsachen, sondern an der korrekten Durchführung des 
üblichen Verfahrens, solche empirischen Tatsachen zu 
untersuchen. (Es könnte beispielsweise sein, dass ich eine 
Frucht zweimal gezählt habe, etc. Und das kommt ja vor, 
dass man etwa beim Kartenspiel die Karten zählt und weiß 
es müssen 52 sein, aber man zählt bloß 51. Man wirft 
einen Blick in die Schachtel, ob vielleicht noch eine Karte 
darin liege, und falls nicht, zählt man nochmals mit 
größerer Sorgfalt. Aber der Evidenz misstraue ich in 
diesem Fall nicht weil „1 + 1 + 1 + ... = 52“, sondern weil 
ich weiß, dass im Kartenspiel 52 Karten sein sollen.) D.h.: 
Wenn wir den mathematischen Satz über Evidenz 
erheben, so nicht darum, weil wir die Tatsachen an sich in 
Frage stellen, sondern weil wir einen Fehler in der 
Anwendung eines Verfahrens, dass wir addieren nennen, 
vermuten. Es ist zwar denkbar, dass Evidenz in 
bestimmten Situationen übergangen wird, (vgl. BGM I, 37), 
aber dies ist nicht, worauf Wright hier anspielt. 
Aus dieser defizitären Bestimmung mathematischer 
Sätze als Regeln ergeben sich in der Folge auch 
Schwierigkeiten hinsichtlich der Bestimmung von hinge 
propositions als Regeln. Wright behauptet, es verhalte sich 
mit "Ich habe zwei Hände" auf gleiche Weise, wie mit 
einfachen arithmetischen Aufgaben. Mit anderen Worten: 
er versieht hinge propositions mit der gleichen Rolle wie 
mathematische Sätze und schließt, dass wir gewöhnlich 
an unserer Überzeugung, zwei Hände zu haben, 
festhalten, auch wenn wir gegenläufige Erlebnisse haben. 
"My certainty that I have two hands will 'stand fast' above 
the flow of evidence making [...]. Were I to have a – visual, 
or tactual – impression that I did not have two hands, then 
I should treat it just on that account as unrealiable." 
(Wright 2004:36f) 
 
Wright, Wittgenstein und das Fundament des Wissens — Frederik Gierlinger 
 
 
 124 
Wright verwechselt hier allerdings zwei Dinge 
miteinander. Im Fall der Addition steht die korrekte 
Anwendung eines Verfahrens, das wir zählen nennen, 
(also etwa die Vorgabe jeden Gegenstand nur einmal zu 
zählen, etc.) unter Verdacht. Die Überzeugung, dass ich 
zwei Hände habe, beruht hingegen auf keinem solchen 
Verfahren und darum ist die Berufung auf eine Regel fehl 
am Platz. Es kann zwar angemerkt werden, dass die 
Verwendung des Wortes "Hand" von Regeln geleitet ist, so 
wie jeder Sprechakt auf Regeln basiert. Damit geht aber 
nicht einher, was Wright behauptet. In der Mathematik 
greifen Ergebnis und Verfahren ineinander und es kommt 
nichts hinzu, dass für die Wahr- oder Falschheit des 
Ergebnisses Ausschlag gebend ist. Das 
Wahrheitskriterium ist die korrekte Anwendung eines 
Verfahrens. "Ich habe zwei Hände" verweist hingegen auf 
empirische Gegenstände und die Wahr- oder Falschheit 
des Satzes bemisst sich daran, ob die Dinge sich so 
verhalten, wie der Satz behauptet, d.h. es wird ein 
Vergleich mit der Wirklichkeit angestellt. Die korrekte 
Anwendung eines Verfahrens ist hier kein 
Wahrheitskriterium des Satzes, sondern entscheidet über 
dessen Sinnhaftigkeit (i.e. über die Möglichkeit, den 
intentionalen Gehalt der Aussage zu verstehen). 
Damit sollte gezeigt sein, dass die Analogie 
zwischen den Sätzen "2 + 2 = 4" und "Hier ist eine Hand", 
die in Über Gewissheit an manchen Stellen anzuklingen 
scheint, nicht aus einem gemeinsamen Regelcharakter 
dieser Sätze, wie er von Wright charakterisiert wird, 
herrührt. Und es sollte gezeigt sein, dass die Annahme 
dieser Sätze uns nicht auf metaphysische 
Voraussetzungen festlegt, die möglicherweise falsch sein 
könnten. 
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Reduction Revisited: The Ontological Level, the Conceptual Level, 
and the Tenets of Physicalism 
Markus Gole, Graz, Austria 
1. Reduction and Physicalism in Philoso-
phy of Mind 
When the topic of reductionism is addressed, especially 
within philosophy of mind, one cannot help but summon 
the topic of physicalism as well. Physicalism, broadly con-
strued, can be defined as the thesis that there is nothing 
over and above the physical: all there is is physical, in one 
way or another, and there are no such things as non-
physical substances, events, properties and the like which 
escape the physicalist story. For instance, when I bump 
into the table in my kitchen and thus hurt my leg, the only 
story there is to tell is simply the story of the natural sci-
ences. Such a story might go like this: after having 
bumped into the table, certain physiological mechanisms 
are activated, e.g., the information of tissue damage is 
transmitted via nerve fibers from the leg to the brain where 
certain neurons are caused to fire, which in turn cause 
other neurons to fire, and finally the statement "Ouch, my 
leg hurts!" is uttered followed by wincing and groaning. It 
should be noted that the statement "Ouch, my leg hurts!" is 
solely used as an abbreviated form of the neuron firing talk 
and, similarly, wincing and groaning are themselves noth-
ing over and above another neuron firing story. All we 
need to fully and exhaustively characterize a painful ex-
perience is a characterization of the physical events which 
are solely couched in physical concepts and there does 
not seem to be a need to use any mental concepts like 
"pain", "want", "desire", and so on. But why should anyone 
be a physicalist? The answer to this question leads us to 
the tenets of physicalism which I take to be ontological 
parsimony as well as elegance and simplicity in the con-
struction of our theories. The ontological parsimony stems 
from abandoning non-physical entities, for there is no need 
to introduce mental entities in order to explain what is go-
ing on when someone is in pain. Or, put differently, all 
mental entities have fallen prey to Ockham's razor. By 
elegance and simplicity I mean that it gets easier if only 
one kind of entities, i.e., physical entities, are used to con-
struct theories compared to two kinds of entities, i.e., 
physical and mental entities. Thereby, pain theories be-
come simpler and more elegant once mental entities have 
been crossed out.  
I turn now to the reduction part. In contemporary 
philosophy of mind, it is widely accepted, both by the 
physicalist and dualist, that if a mental property can be fully 
characterized in the language of physics, then the mental 
property in question is actually a physical property. The 
translation of mental expressions into physical 
expressions, or put in another way, the identity between 
the mental concept and the physical concept, can be 
thought of as a conceptual reduction and the identity 
between the mental property and the physical property can 
be thought of as an ontological reduction. Therefore, 
reduction represents a relation between two concepts on 
the one hand and between two things, in this case 
properties, on the other hand. This relation is the relation 
of identity, because one concept or property is nothing 
over and above another concept or property respectively. 
Moreover, the conceptual reduction is sufficient for the 
ontological reduction. However, whether the reverse is true 
is a matter of debate. The present paper is an attempt to 
tackle that question and it is argued that a conceptual 
reduction follows from an ontological reduction as well, but 
only under the background assumption that a priori 
physicalism is true. It is also argued that if the tenets of 
physicalism are taken seriously, then a posteriori 
physicalism should be dropped in favor of a priori 
physicalism.  
2. Conceptual Reduction, Ontological Re-
duction, and Physicalism 
I would like to begin this section by defining a priori and a 
posteriori physicalism. Insofar as the physicalism part is 
concerned, a priori as well as a posteriori physicalism 
agree that all there is is physical. Furthermore, proponents 
of both branches of physicalism are committed to the claim 
that, necessarily, all the mental phenomena are entailed 
by the physical phenomena. Thus, if all the physical things 
are fixed, then all the mental things are fixed, too. Insofar 
as the a priori/a posteriori part is concerned, the discrep-
ancy arises. A priori physicalists (e.g., Jackson 1998) hold 
that all the mental phenomena are entailed a priori, i.e., 
solely on grounds of the meanings of the words involved. 
For instance, the mental concept "pain" refers to the men-
tal property "being in pain" and the physical concept "C-
fiber stimulation" refers to the physical property "having a 
C-fiber stimulation". If a priori physicalism is true, the con-
cepts "pain" and "C-fiber stimulation" are two words with 
the same meaning, in fact, they would be synonymous 
expressions and "pain" could be conceptually reduced to 
"C-fiber stimulation". Because of their synonymy, both 
concepts would have the same property as their referent 
and a fortiori, the property of being in pain could be onto-
logically reduced to the property of having a C-fiber stimu-
lation.  
In contrast, the a posteriori physicalist (e.g., Loar 
1997) argues that the mental phenomena are entailed only 
a posteriori and it is a matter of scientific investigation to 
find out that the properties in question are actually one and 
the same property. Because of this a posteriori nature of 
the identity claim, the concepts involved are independent, 
for it is impossible for the mental phenomena to be 
entailed by the physical phenomena solely on grounds of 
the meanings of the words. That is, a posteriori 
physicalists allow and argue for an ontological reduction 
and in the same vein argue against a conceptual 
reduction. I think it is safe to say that all a posteriori 
physicalists are sympathetic to Kripke's (1980) framework 
of necessary a posteriori identity claims and his canonical 
example "water = H2O". It was an empirical discovery that 
water is one and the same as H2O. Nevertheless, 
conceptual analysis did not get us to say that water is 
nothing over and above H2O, and the reason is that the 
concepts "water" and "H2O" do not mean the same; they 
are not synonymous. So, a posteriori physicalists see the 
identity claim "pain = C-fiber stimulation" akin to the 
identity claim "water = H2O". Therefore, if a posteriori 
physicalism is true, pain is ontologically, but not 
conceptually, reducible to a C-fiber stimulation.  
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The idea of a conceptual reduction is not a new one 
and the following two examples underline its relevance for 
a proper understanding of reduction. For instance, logical 
behaviorists (e.g., Ryle 1949) explicitly state that all mental 
expressions can be translated into, and thereby reduced 
to, expressions about behavioral dispositions. Thus, the 
logical behaviorist is some kind of an a priori physicalist in 
the sense described above, because the mental concept 
"pain" is translated into a statement about withdrawal be-
havior resulting from tissue damaging stimuli. Once a con-
ceptual reduction has been accomplished, an ontological 
reduction will follow. Kim (2005) makes a similar point with 
his model of functional reduction. According to Kim, the 
first step in a successful ontological reduction is to define 
the mental property in question functionally, i.e., in terms of 
the causal role it occupies. As Kim clearly says, that is a 
matter of conceptual work and in terms of the present pa-
per it is a conceptual reduction carried out a priori. For 
instance, the mental concept "pain" is translated into a 
statement about pain and its role in avoiding bumping into 
more tables in the future. The second step in Kim's model 
is to find the realizer of the functionalized property, that is, 
to find the property which fulfills to role of avoiding bump-
ing into more tables. The third and last step is an explana-
tion of how the property which fits the functional specifica-
tion does its job.  
3. An Argument for Conceptual Reduction  
Let us assume, in the spirit of physicalism, that pain has 
been successfully reduced to a C-fiber stimulation on the 
ontological level. Moreover, every C-fiber stimulation is 
describable in purely physical concepts. Does it follow that 
pain is describable in purely physical concepts as well? Let 
us take a closer look: 
 
(1)  Pain = C-fiber stimulation. 
(2)  Every C-fiber stimulation is describable in 
purely physical concepts. 
(3)  Ergo, every pain is describable in purely physi-
cal concepts. 
This argument claims that as a result of the type identity 
statement "pain = C-fiber stimulation" and the descriptive-
ness of every C-fiber stimulation in physical concepts, one 
is entitled to conclude that also pain is describable in 
physical concepts. The expression "C-fiber stimulation" in 
premise (2) can be replaced by "pain" in virtue of their 
identity established in premise (1). On what grounds could 
this argument be refuted? One objection comes from the 
proponents of a posteriori physicalism. A posteriori physi-
calists acknowledge that a priori physicalists have to ac-
cept that argument, and therefore, a conceptual reduction 
follows from an ontological reduction, but only if a priori 
physicalism is true. However, if a posteriori physicalism is 
true, the argument is a non sequitur. (3) does not follow 
from (1) and (2), because in order to describe pain, one 
has to use the mental concept "pain". The reason for this is 
the independence between mental and physical concepts. 
Once the ontological reduction has been accomplished a 
posteriori, the coreference of the mental and physical con-
cept under discussion has been established as well, but  
what has not been established is the synonymy. The point 
is the following: a mental concept can only be conceptually 
reduced to a physical concept if the physical concept is 
synonymous with the mental concept. To be synonymous 
means to have the same meaning, and not just to have the 
same referent (Frege 1892 has famously and convincingly 
argued for the distinction between Sinn, i.e., meaning, and 
Bedeutung, i.e., reference). For instance, although water is 
identical to H2O on the ontological level, the concepts "wa-
ter" and "H2O" do not have the same meaning, but merely 
the same referent, i.e., H2O. Due to the lack of synonymy 
the concept "water" cannot be reduced to the concept 
"H2O". A posteriori physicalists carry over this analysis to 
the case of "pain = C-fiber stimulation". Although pain is 
nothing over and above a C-fiber stimulation on the onto-
logical level, the mental concept "pain" is not reducible to 
the concept "C-fiber stimulation". The pressing question is 
whether a posteriori physicalism should be the kind of 
physicalism of choice. This issue cannot be settled easily, 
yet I want to raise two somewhat related problems for the 
a posteriori physicalist.  
First, to ontologically reduce mental properties to 
physical properties by appealing to the Kripkean 
necessary a posteriori seems to be a red herring, for no 
account has been given of how mental concepts being 
independent and distinct from physical concepts fit into the 
physicalist picture. It seems that the problem has carried 
over from the ontological level to the conceptual level 
without losing any of its original force. Instead of asking 
"How do mental properties fit into the physicalist story?" 
one must ask "How do mental concepts fit into the 
physicalist story?". For instance, Loar claims that mental 
concepts, e.g., "pain", are nothing over and above type 
demonstratives with the form "that kind of experience". 
Therefore, mental concepts are no concepts sui generis, 
but they are some kind of demonstratives which in turn are 
not any threat for physicalism. The situation is this: on the 
one hand, mental concepts are irreducible and therefore 
independent from physical concepts, but on the other 
hand, mental concepts are demonstratives which are not 
in conflict with physicalism and thereby can be viewed as 
some sort of physical concepts. The problem for the a 
posteriori physicalist is that he cannot have both. Either 
mental concepts are physical concepts or they are not. 
The a posteriori physicalist seems to beat around the bush 
when trying to answer that question. It is at least a little 
odd and confusing, if not plainly contradictory, to say that 
mental concepts are independent from, but at the same 
time some kind of, physical concepts. Second, one of the 
aims of every physicalist is parsimony as well as elegance 
and simplicity in the construction of his theories. 
Consequently, if these tenets of physicalism are taken 
seriously, they should also be applied to the conceptual 
level and the best way of doing so is by means of a 
conceptual reduction. The reason for this is that spelling 
out theories gets simpler, more elegant, and more 
parsimonious with just one kind of concepts, i.e., just 
physical concepts. Let us make the point clear: scientific 
psychological theories are not the same as poems. Poems 
need a lot of fancy words, but scientific theories just do 
not.  
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4. Conclusion 
To come to an end, a priori physicalism is committed to 
both, an ontological and a conceptual reduction. Thereby, 
an ideal amount of parsimony, elegance and simplicity has 
been accomplished. In contrast, a posteriori physicalism, 
prima facie, does not require a conceptual reduction. 
However, as I have argued, denying the need for a con-
ceptual reduction is in tension with the tenets of physical-
ism, viz. parsimony, elegance and simplicity. Moreover, an 
inherent problem for a posteriori physicalists is to give an 
adequate account of how mental concepts can be inde-
pendent from physical concepts and at the same time be 
some kind of special physical concepts. In conclusion, my 
analysis suggests that a priori physicalism is the best op-
tion for defending the view that there is nothing over and 
above the physical. Thus, a posteriori physicalism should 
be rejected in favor of a priori physicalism.  
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Reduction and Reductionism in Physics 
Rico Gutschmidt, Bonn, Germany 
The good old standard definition of reduction is penned by 
(Nagel 1961) and demands for a theory to be reduced to 
another that the laws of the first one can be logically 
deduced by the laws of the latter with the help of bridge 
laws connecting the different languages of the theories. A 
theory reduced in this way should then be in principle 
superfluous - if all their laws are, given the bridge laws, 
logically contained in the reducing theory, it is in a strict 
sense not required anymore in our physical description of 
the world. 
But things are not that easy. As (Feyerabend 1962) 
has shown, this concept is somewhat naïve and there are 
no interesting examples of reduction in the Nagelian 
sense. Feyerabend’s point is based mainly on two 
objections. First, the links between physical theories are 
mostly an approximate derivation of laws rather than their 
deduction - and there is a great and in the debate of 
reduction largely overlooked difference between derivation 
and deduction. And second, the conception of the bridge 
laws is rather vague: Feyerabend argues that the terms of 
different theories satisfy not only no identity relation, which 
could be expressed in bridge laws, but are actually 
incommensurable and not comparable whatsoever.  
Let us take a closer look on these two assertions. 
First, there is the mathematical problem of approximate 
derivation: Within physics it seems to be a well established 
practise to derive laws “only” approximately. But what does 
this mean in the context of intertheoretic relations? To take 
an example from the context of gravitation, according to 
Newton’s law of gravitation Galileo’s law of falling bodies is 
strictly speaking false: The acceleration increases instead 
of being constant. Hence these theories contradict each 
other, and therefore a deduction is simply impossible and 
any “derivation” of Galileo’s law from Newton’s law of 
gravitation must thus contain some contra-to-fact 
assumptions. Such assumptions can in this case be and 
are widely in physical derivations hidden in limiting 
processes where some parameter, which is not zero or 
infinite within the law to be derived, is taken to be zero or 
infinite. In our case the distance to earth of the falling body 
compared to the earth’s radius is taken to be zero - but the 
law derived under this assumption is strictly speaking only 
valid for bodies laying down on the earth’s surface, while 
Galileo’s law is about falling bodies. Thus the common 
mode of speaking that this derivation delivers approximate 
validity only for small distances covers the fact that we 
haven’t deduced Galileo’s law but rather established a 
comparison between the two theories under certain 
circumstances: This is all we can say about “approximate 
derivations” here and similarly elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, Galileo’s law is superfluous, not 
because of being deduced, but rather because Newtonian 
physics can also describe falling bodies, in a similar 
manner as Galileo’s law as shown in the comparative 
limiting process. But if “reducing” theories are more 
complex it is far from certain that they are able to 
reproduce any statement of a theory to be reduced. 
Comparisons between theories in the sense of 
approximate derivation seem to be just comparisons of 
mathematical structure and not of concrete explanations of 
phenomena - and the possibility to compare mathematical 
structure does not include that the “reducing” theory is able 
at all to deal with the phenomena explained by the theory 
to be reduced as it is the case in our simple example. If we 
are able to deduce the laws of a theory we are 
automatically able to explain their phenomena but we can’t 
expect to be able to do that by virtue of comparisons 
between mathematical structures as we will see in the 
closing part of this presentation, which discusses the case 
of general relativity in this respect. 
This point doesn’t catch one’s eye if one considers 
simple cases like that of Galileo’s law and has therefore 
widely been overlooked within the debate of reduction. But 
intertheoretic relations in physics actually are in many 
cases nothing but comparisons between mathematical 
structures: A look at the details shows, that e.g. in the case 
of the Newtonian theory of gravitation and general relativity 
the intertheoretic relation is much more complicated than a 
limiting process and far from being well established. A 
mathematical relation in a precise manner between these 
theories is given e.g. in (Scheibe 1999) in terms of a 
topological comparison between sets of models of these 
theories formulated axiomatically (cf. p. 59-108 for the 
case of general relativity). And while there are only single 
cases in which explanations of concrete phenomena can 
be compared (e.g. the planet’s orbits, cf. p. 89-101), 
Scheibe’s “reduction” of the whole Newtonian theory of 
gravitation is not completely worked out and can either 
way be no deduction but nothing but a very subtle 
comparison between mathematical structure. 
The second of Feyerabend’s objections concerns 
language and the incommensurability of the vocabulary of 
different theories. In our context, the equation of motion 
within general relativity is the geodesic equation for neutral 
test particles whereas Newton’s law of gravitation 
describes a force between two masses. We thus are 
concerned with two entirely different concepts and the 
identification of the Newtonian gravitational potential with 
Christoffel Symbols, which can be found in physics 
textbooks (cf. e.g. (Misner et al. 1973), chapter 12), is a 
“component manipulation” (l.c., p. 290) rather than a basis 
for a deduction. Even more concrete, in the example of the 
planet’s orbits their description within the Schwarzschild 
solution deals with test particles without influence to the 
overall curvature and thus without gravitational masses 
whereas their Newtonian description is based on forces 
between just these masses. Therefore, these concepts 
cannot be related by any simple identification and we have 
to concede that we cannot establish reductions via logical 
deduction with the help of bridge laws. 
But nevertheless theories need not to be 
incommensurable – we can of course compare the 
concepts of different theories. But this is in general a 
difficult and not straight forward comparison process far 
from being able to establish bridge laws suiting for a 
logical deduction. We can relate the terms of two theories 
with the help of special case studies and prove that e.g. 
the Newtonian potential is somehow related to the 
Christoffel symbols, but such case studies are no self-
evident processes and again lead to a comparing relation 
rather than a deduction, and such a comparison on its own 
doesn’t make any theory superfluous. 
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All in all, we have seen that reduction via deduction 
has no interesting examples because intertheoretic 
relations typically are no deductions but comparisons 
between both mathematical structure and terms differing 
completely in its usage. So, if we want to define a relation 
of reduction we cannot rely on deduction.  
Having in mind that in our investigation we are 
looking for a concept of reduction that is able to support 
claims of reductionism, one of the most interesting 
answers to that problem is that of (Schaffner 1967). For 
him a theory is not reduced to another if their laws are 
logically deduced, but if it is possible to deduce a new 
corrected theory from the reducing one which is formulated 
in the latter’s vocabulary and strongly analogous to the 
original one to be reduced. In a similar manner, reduction 
is defined in (Hooker 1981), and recently in (Bickle 1998) 
as the so called new wave reduction, which is a result of 
merging Schaffner’s and Hooker’s concept of analogy with 
the structuralistic approach to physical theories, as e.g. 
(Endicott 2001) points out. 
Let us have a closer look at these concepts. At first, 
Schaffner’s definition rests on a very vague and not clearly 
defined “strong analogue”-relation between the original 
theory to be reduced and a “corrected theory” deduced 
from the reducing one. This relation can surely be made 
more precise within the structuralistic approach: As stated 
in (Moulines 1984), a reduction in structuralistic terms 
yields a “mathematical relationship between two sets of 
structures” within a “scheme of reduction” which “does not 
require semantic predicate-by-predicate connections nor 
deducibility of statements” (l. c., p. 54-55). So this 
approach delivers indeed a very sophisticated concept of 
comparing theories that avoids the difficulties of a concept 
based on deduction, but can on the other hand be nothing 
but a comparing relation between both concepts and laws. 
Moreover, this account yields a comparison between two 
independent theories in such a way, that “we could have a 
reductive relationship between two theories that are 
completely alien to each other” (ibid.). 
Such a comparing relation now substantiates only 
reductionistic claims, if it is a comparison between 
concrete explanations as in our simple case above, but 
that seems not to be the case if the theories involved are 
more complex as we will see below considering general 
relativity. A topological comparison in the sense of 
(Scheibe 1999), which is possible also between theories 
“that are completely alien to each other”, doesn’t make any 
theory superfluous and hence cannot on its own support 
reductionistic claims. It is much easier to establish a 
mathematical-conceptual comparing relation between two 
theories than to show that the one can explain the 
phenomena which are typically explained by the other. 
Now, if it is possible to deduce a “corrected theory” from a 
reducing one, this would show that the latter is able to 
cope with the phenomena described by the theory to be 
reduced. However, comparing relations can be established 
between theories without deducing a corrected theory or 
explaining phenomena, and there are indeed theories (as 
general relativity) not permitting such a deduction or 
explanation despite being comparable to another one (for 
instance to Newton’s theory of gravitation) – hence the 
Schaffner-Hooker-Bickle account of reduction seems not to 
be adequate. 
Guided from these observations, I’d like to propose 
the following two definitions. First it seems to be 
appropriate to call most of the intertheoretic relations in 
physics a relation of compatibility: One actually can 
compare two independent theories with each other and 
mostly such comparisons show that the involved theories 
are via approximate derivation and related concepts 
compatible to each other. This term doesn’t evoke any 
reductionistic claim and isn’t meant to do so. If we want to 
find, secondly, a definition of a relation of reduction in such 
a way that a reduced theory is in principle superfluous, it 
seems that we have to refresh an idea of (Kemeny and 
Oppenheim 1956). Their definition of reduction is based on 
the explanation of phenomena (“observable data” in their 
terms, cf. p.13): Any phenomenon explainable by means 
of the theory to be reduced must be explainable by the 
reducing theory. If, furthermore, the explanations of the 
reducing theory are in a sense better and if the theories 
involved are compatible and therefore in a way related to 
each other, it seems legitimate to say that the one is 
reduced to the other. A theory reduced in this sense is 
indeed superfluous: “Their” phenomena are explained 
better by another theory, to which it is compatible (and 
there is no need to go a long way round via “corrected 
theories”). This is now surely the case e.g. for Galileo’s law 
of falling bodies or Kepler’s laws of planetary motion but 
not for Newton’s theory of gravitation: We will now see that 
we have “only” compatibility here. 
The reason is that in spite of having comparable 
laws as shown e.g. in (Misner et al. 1973) or (Scheibe 
1999), there are many phenomena explained by 
Newtonian physics but not by general relativity, because 
no one solved the field equations for them. While the two-
body problem is directly solved by Newton’s law, it has 
(and as a matter of fact can have) only numerical solutions 
within general relativity. And while the orbits of the planets 
can be described as geodesics within the Schwarzschild 
solution, their interaction as described by Newtonian 
physics is not yet explained by general relativity for there 
are no solutions of the field equations for moving 
gravitational sources. Similarly, there are no general 
relativistic explanations for complex formations as star 
clusters or spiral galaxies either, while they can too be 
handled with Newtonian physics. It is surely possible to 
claim that one will find relativistic explanations of these 
phenomena one day, but because of the difficult and 
abstract character of the field equations in contrast to the 
high applicability of Newton’s theory we can also put the 
possibility of such explanations in question. And indeed, as 
a matter of fact numerical simulations of such phenomena 
on the basis of the field equations depend due to their 
complex structure on the heuristic help of Newton’s law of 
gravitation (within the so-called post-Newtonian 
approximation). Therefore, Newton’s law of gravitation can 
be improved by general relativity, but is not superfluous – it 
is in our terms not reduced to general relativity despite 
compatibility. 
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Physicalism Without the A Priori Passage 
Harris Hatziioannou, Athens, Greece 
Defenders of a priori entailment hold that physicalism is 
committed to the following two theses: first, that all 
macroscopic (high-level) facts, including facts about the 
mind, are necessitated by the totality of physical (low-level) 
facts, and, second, that, granting knowledge of the latter 
set of facts, we can deduce the former without needing 
any further empirical information. My target in this paper 
will be the claim regarding the second commitment of 
physicalism. Specifically, I will argue against two different 
formulations of the thesis and then conclude with some 
suggestions regarding the way in which we may 
understand a posteriori physicalism and the determining 
relation between low and high-level facts that it posits.   
A number of attempts have been made to analyze 
the thesis that physicalism is committed to the idea that 
physical facts a priori determine all other facts. One promi-
nent example is David Lewis’s account (Lewis 1972), 
which, relying on the Ramsey - Carnap method of defining 
theoretical terms, appeals to the functional definability of 
high-level terms in order to deduce them from the terms of 
the reducing theory. By this procedure, the theoretical 
terms in question are understood in terms of the relations 
that they hold among each other, as these are expressed 
in a vocabulary of which we had prior understanding: they 
are explicitly defined as the unique entities, whatever 
these may be, that occupy the causal roles specified by 
the theory. In the mind/body case, the theory under reduc-
tion, ‘folk psychology’, is supposed to include all commonly 
known platitudes about the mind, platitudes that are built in 
our a priori understanding of these terms. In Lewis’s view, 
these platitudes do nothing more than specify the position 
of each mental state in the causal nexus in which it par-
takes; thus, each mental state can be in principle explicitly 
defined in terms of its characteristic causes and effects. 
With the expected advancement of science, and when 
these same causes and effects are given a physical char-
acterization, we will be able to identify the states picked by 
the two different sets of terms, thus effecting the reduction 
of our folk psychological theory of mind to the more com-
prehensive physical theory. 
Now, Lewis’s method provides a clear picture of the 
way in which the a priori entailment of facts about the mind 
by physical facts could be understood. Given the functional 
definitions, the identification will clearly be the result of a 
deductive inference. However, Lewis’s contention that 
mental terms can be explicitly defined in terms of their 
causal role is hardly convincing, not only to non-
physicalist, but also to many physicalist philosophers. The 
problem with such explicit analyses is threefold: First, they 
seem to misconstrue the conventional meaning of such 
terms; our concepts picking conscious states have strong 
non-causal connotations, so that a functional definition a la 
Lewis is bound to miss some part of the meaning we con-
ventionally associate with them. Second, they ignore the 
possibility of multiple realization. There is widespread 
agreement, at least since Wittgenstein, that we can find 
explicit analyses in terms of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions only for few of our mental or other everyday con-
cepts: automobile, life, or belief that X, are all concepts 
that seem to be multiply realizable, in the sense that it is 
impossible to specify in a finite non-trivial way the condi-
tions of application that will capture all and only their refer-
ents. The third objection points to the fact that conceptual 
analyses such as Lewis’s seem to hold future empirical 
research into the nature of mind hostage to a priori mean-
ing considerations. Raising the widespread platitudes 
about the mind to the status of a priori definitions of mental 
terms pays no heed to the fact that our concepts evolve 
continuously in the light of novel empirical as well as con-
ceptual developments. The moral to be drawn from the 
foregoing considerations, is that the explicit analysis of 
mental and other terms that we commonly use in order to 
describe the world, and their corresponding concepts, is 
something that we cannot aspire to, since any proposed 
analysis is likely to miss an essential part of their content.  
That same moral has been drawn by Chalmers and 
Jackson (Chalmers & Jackson 2001, Chalmers 1996, 
Jackson 1998), who have proposed an alternative scheme 
for reduction. Their scheme eschews such finite explicit 
analyses, being based instead on a priori intensions, which 
are understood as functions from possible worlds to exten-
sions, and that cannot be put into any explicit linguistic 
description. These functions are supposed to capture our 
implicit knowledge of the application conditions of our con-
cepts, the kind of knowledge that allows us to judge, on a 
case by case basis, whether they apply to a certain situa-
tion or not. So, given a non-trivial neutral description of a 
possible world, considered to be the actual world, we can 
(ideally) determine the extension of our concepts. For ex-
ample, given a description of a world where the salient 
transparent, odourless, drinkable etc. liquid (‘the watery 
stuff’) in the environment is H2O, the a priori intension of 
the concept ‘water’ refers to H2O; given a description of a 
world where the watery stuff is XYZ, it refers to XYZ. In 
other words, the component of meaning that is a priori 
associated with any given term or concept has no explicit 
description; it is encompassed in the term’s a priori inten-
sion, the function that determines the term’s extension in 
every world considered as actual. Accordingly, no appeal 
to explicit analyses needs to be made in accounting for the 
relation of a priori entailment that supposedly holds be-
tween low-level and high-level facts: this relation can sim-
ply be analysed as one between functions from possible 
worlds to extensions.  
Chalmers’s and Jackson’s account thus avoids 
Lewis’s questionable commitment to the explicit definability 
of theoretical terms. However, the problem is that it seems 
to have lost the transparency that characterized Lewis’s 
way of analysing the relation of a priori entailment. With 
the latter method, the question whether a certain instance 
of inter-level reduction succeeds has a clear answer: if the 
proposed functional analyses of the respective sets of 
terms are in place, then the deductive inference and, con-
sequently, the inter-level reduction, can be carried through. 
Chalmers’s and Jackson’s method, by repudiating explicit 
conceptual analyses, has lost this virtue: for any proposed 
instance of inter-level reduction, the answer whether it 
succeeds or fails lies in the viability of our intuitions regard-
ing the referents of our concepts in various counteractual 
scenarios. But this method is always going to be open to 
scrutiny, since a sceptic may appeal to indeterminacy, 
different intuitions, or even knowledge deficit, in order to 
question a proposed reduction of one theory to another, or 
a suggested failure thereof. A priori entailment, understood 
as in Chalmers’s and Jackson’s way, gives us no princi-
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pled way to demonstrate the success or failure of reduc-
tions. 
What is more, it seems to me that Chalmers’s and 
Jackson’s account fails to ground the metaphysical neces-
sity that, according to physicalism, connects physical to 
mental states, on relations between concepts, proposi-
tions, or whatever else can become objects of knowledge, 
whether that be a priori or a posteriori. This is because, by 
construing the relation of a priori entailment as one be-
tween functions from possible worlds to extensions, their 
account seems to reverse the required order of explana-
tion, analysing a supposedly logical - conceptual relation in 
metaphysical terms, whereas what was being advertised 
originally was exactly the opposite. To say that knowledge 
of the complete physical description of the world would 
allow us to have a priori knowledge of all macroscopic 
facts, which is what the original thesis about a priori en-
tailment included, is to say that our understanding of the 
terms that we use in order to describe the world in physical 
terms, allows us to deduce, without looking at the world 
any further, its complete description in macroscopic terms. 
But, an essential component of this thesis seems to be 
that it is our a priori understanding of the concepts in-
volved that grounds the derivation, not the objects that are 
referred to by these concepts. In Chalmers’s and Jack-
son’s account, the burden of the derivation is transferred to 
the level of extensions, not the way that these extensions 
are represented by us. This, in my view, renders the ac-
count unsuitable to be used in explicating the way meta-
physically necessary relations are grounded on logical - 
conceptual relations such as that of entailment.  
In later work, Jackson tries to accommodate similar 
criticisms, by attempting to reconcile the metaphysical 
nature of his proposed relation of entailment with the 
apriority that supposedly characterizes it. Thus, he calls 
the relation of a priori entailment that he endorses de re, 
claiming that it is a type of metaphysical necessitation 
between properties, not necessitation between sentences 
or concepts. Here is the relevant definition that he appeals 
to, quoted directly from his paper: 
 
P1 a priori necessitates P2 iff one’s grasp of what it 
is to be a P1 and what it is to be a P2 allows one to 
see that if P1 is instantiated then so is P2.  
(Jackson 2005, pp. 252-3). 
However, I do not think that this move can serve Jackson’s 
argument. It is obvious that, contrary to his pronounce-
ments, his characterisation of de re a priori necessitation, 
by appealing to our ‘grasp of what it is to be’ a given prop-
erty, proceeds via concepts; given this, Jackson clearly 
has to suggest a way in which these concepts are related. 
Since he repudiates explicit conceptual analyses, he has 
to represent the relation between them as a relation be-
tween functions, i.e. a priori intensions. But, as has been 
argued above, lacking explicit analyses, the relation be-
tween these intensions can never be cognitively obvious, 
since it operates at the limit, i.e. as a relation between the 
concepts’ extensions across possible worlds. This cannot 
be reasonably thought of as a relation between mental or 
linguistic representations; rather, it seems to be closer to 
what he and Chalmers would call a metaphysically ‘brute’ 
one.  
But, if the commitment of physicalism to a priori 
entailment is to be rejected, so that our true high-level 
descriptions of the world cannot be derived from the 
complete physical story, then how can the thesis ever be 
vindicated? If physical properties fail to account 
completely, in a fully reductive account, for the successful 
explanations that we give in macroscopic terms, in what 
sense can they be considered superior in the explanatory 
scheme of things? A full answer to these questions 
certainly needs a systematic investigation into the relation 
between properties that pertain to different levels of 
explanation. However, I think that the key for accepting 
physicalism without an a priori passage is to realize that, 
even within the domain of physics, the descriptions of 
complex systems can very rarely be derived in an a priori 
way from the descriptions of their constituents. The 
derivation must necessarily involve idealizations, 
simplifying assumptions, approximations, and brute 
numerical methods, all techniques that rupture the smooth 
mathematical derivation of properties that pertain to more 
complex systems, thus rendering impossible the a priori 
passage from one level of description to another. The 
failure is already apparent in the classical three-body 
problem, which has exact solutions only in some restricted 
forms. And, of course, it is patently obvious in more 
complex systems: even knowing the momentary positions 
and momenta of all the fundamental particles that 
comprise an iron atom, say, we have no hope at all of a 
priori deducing, on the basis of our best laws of quantum 
theory, their dynamical evolution in time. To arrive at the 
physics of such complex systems from the physics of more 
simple ones, we simply have to resort to methods which 
are, at least in part, justified by appeal to empirical data. 
Physics simply does not have an analytically solvable 
equation that describes the behaviour of every system that 
falls within its scope. In fact it has such equations only for 
unrealistic, highly idealized systems, which are 
encountered in tightly controlled experimental situations 
(see Cartwright 1999). 
I think that the important point to keep here is the 
following: If the passage from simple to complex systems 
is not a priori guaranteed even within physics, then we 
should not expect that the passage from each 
neurophysiological to its corresponding mental state will be 
thus guaranteed either. I am aware that this point raises 
doubts concerning the way in which an antireductionist 
account such as this could support physicalism: if no 
smooth reductions are forthcoming, not even within the 
domain of physical theory, how can we ever be confident 
that it is the physical properties that account for the causal 
and other characteristics of mental states? I believe that, 
just like in the cases of the classical three-body problem 
and the iron atom we have reason to believe that the 
features of the world that are responsible for the dynamical 
evolution of these systems are physical (albeit ones that 
cannot be precisely quantified), so in the case of a 
psychological state we have reason to expect that the 
features that are responsible for its causal outcomes are 
also physical, even if there is no way to move from the 
physical description to the psychological one, except by 
appealing to ‘brute’ a posteriori knowable necessitation. 
Thus, we may view the psychological description as 
capturing, vaguely and imprecisely, the salient features of 
the physical system, while at the same time expecting that 
it will be the description of the underlying complex physical 
state that will ultimately fully account for mental 
phenomena, in the sense of providing the exact sufficient 
causes for them, the effective mechanisms that are 
present in the world. It is true that we need independent 
arguments to warrant this expectation, but, of course, 
plenty of these have already been given in the literature, 
and there is no space to discuss them here. I hope at least 
that these sketchy suggestions point towards a viable 
understanding of a posteriori physicalism. 
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Wittgensteins Projektionsmethode als Argument für die  
transzendentale Deutung des Tractatus 
Włodzimierz Heflik, Krakau, Polen 
Einleitung 
Die Projektionsmethode, die ich in diesem Beitrag unter-
suche, wird von Wittgenstein in den Thesen 3.11 - 3.14 
des Tractatus eingeführt, und daraufhin von einer anderen 
Seite her in der These 4.0141 besprochen. Der Hauptge-
danke dieser Methode ist im folgenden Abschnitt enthal-
ten: 
 
„Wir benutzen das sinnlich wahrnehmbare Zeichen 
(...) des Satzes als Projektion der möglichen Sach-
lage. Die Projektionsmethode ist das Denken des 
Satzsinnes.” (3.11) 
Die ontologische Basis für die Projektionsmethode 
bestimmen die Thesen über die Abbildungsform als das, 
„was das Bild mit der Wirklichkeit gemein haben muss” 
(vgl. 2.151; 2.16 u. 2.17). Die Form der Abbildung wieder-
um hat ihre endgültige Begründung in einfachen Gegens-
tänden als „die Substanz der Welt” (vgl. 2.021). 
Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist, die Projektionsmethode 
nicht nur im Bereich des Systems des Tractatus zu zeigen, 
sondern auch einen Versuch zu unternehmen, diese 
Methode im Bezug auf Kants Philosophie darzustellen. Auf 
diese Weise möchte ich festlegen, ob die transzendentale 
Interpretation der sogenannten ersten Philosophie 
Wittgensteins berechtigt ist.  
Jetzt stelle ich drei Bemerkungen als Hypothesen 
dar, in denen drei Analogien formuliert werden, die sich 
zwischen der Problematik der Deduktion der Kategorien 
bei Kant und der Frage nach Wittgensteins Methode der 
Projektion des Sinnes beobachten lassen: 
(1) Die von Wittgenstein angenommene 
Hauptvoraussetzung über das Vorkommen der 
Abbildungsform, die etwas Gemeinsames für das Bild/Satz 
und Tatsache ist, ist ein Analog der Hauptthese der meta-
physischen Deduktion der Kategorien, und diese lautet: 
„Dieselbe Funktion, welche den verschiedenen Vor-
stellungen in einem Urteile Einheit gibt, die gibt auch der 
bloßen Synthesis verschiedene Vorstellungen in einer An-
schauung Einheit, welche (...) der reine Verstandesbegriff 
heißt.” (A79/B105). 
(2) Aussagen darüber, dass (i) „das Bild die 
Wirklichkeit erreicht”, und (ii) über „Zuordnungen“ der 
Elemente des Bildes den Gegenständen” (vgl. 2.15 - 
2.1515), sind analog zum Hauptgedanken der trans-
zendentalen Deduktion – wie sich die Kategorien auf die 
Gegenstände der Erfahrung beziehen.  
(3) Die Thesen des Tractatus drucken die 
Projektionsmethode aus (vgl. 3.11 -3.13 u. 3.1431), 
entsprechen dem, was Kant unter dem Leitwort des 
„Schematismus” versteht. Er führt die sogenannte Schema-
tisierung der Kategorien durch und hebt die Rolle der 
Einbildungskraft im Prozess des Bezugs der Kategorien 
auf Erscheinungen, bzw. Gegenstande der Erfahrung 
hervor. 
Jede der obigen Bemerkungen verlangt die Ent-
wicklung und Rechtfertigung, die ich nun darbiete.  
1 
Jenen wesentlichen Abschnitt der metaphysischen Deduk-
tion (A79/B105) kann man - in Bezug auf einige im Tracta-
tus auftretende Ideen - folgendermaßen verstehen. Diese 
von Kant genannte Funktion kann mit der logischen Form, 
d.h. auch mit der Form der Abbildung gleichgesetzt wer-
den. Daran wird deutlich, dass hier ein weitgehender Ein-
klang mit der von Wittgenstein gegebenen Bestimmung 
vorliegt: „Die Form ist die Möglichkeit der Struktur” (2.033). 
Diese Form bzw. Funktion, die eine Struktur (1) den Tat-
sachen und (2) Sätzen als deren Bilder gibt, verleiht 
zugleich den Tatsachen und auch Sätzen Einheit. Die 
Struktur besteht in einer Verbindung der Elemente - deren 
Konfiguration. Wir haben also mit solch einer Verbindung 
zu tun: sowohl auf der Seite der Tatsachen, d.h. Erschei-
nungen als auch auf der Seite ihrer Bilder, d.h. es kommt 
zu einer Verbindung der Zeichen in Form des Satzzei-
chens. Das Vorkommen dieser Verbindung der Elemente - 
ob im Urteil oder in der Anschauung/Tatsache - ist Kant 
zufolge gleich, mit dem Angeben der Einheit bzw. der Be-
ziehung auf die Einheit.  
Diese Einheit nennt Kant „Kategorie”. Die Elemente 
des Urteils, die durch die Kategorien verbunden werden, 
sind empirische Begriffe, d.h. unanschauliche 
Vorstellungen, d.h. Zeichen im Sinne Wittgensteins. Diese 
Elemente als Vielheit und Mannigfaltigkeit werden zuerst 
zusammengesetzt. Das heißt: Sie werden synthetisiert, 
aber ohne dass ihren eine Struktur gegeben wird. Erst der 
Bezug auf Kategorien ermöglicht ihnen eine Gestallt des 
Urteils zu erreichen. Analog dazu verläuft der Prozess bei 
den Anschauungen, d.h. Erscheinungen oder Tatsachen. 
Diesen beschreibe ich nun in Wittgensteins Terminologie. 
Tatsachen sind also bestehende Sachverhalte, genauer 
gesagt – Mitvorkommen zugleich der vielen elementaren 
Sachverhalte (vgl. Brief an Russell, Cassino 19.08.1919). 
Der Sachverhalt ist eine Bindung der Gegenstände (2.03) 
oder deren Konfiguration (2.02071) - eine Synthese ersten 
Grades. Die Tatsache wiederum als Mitvorkommen vieler 
Sachverhalte, d.h. ihr Produkt, ist die Synthese zweiten 
Grade. Dabei aber liegt auch das Angeben der Einheit vor. 
Das bedeutet: Diese Vielheit der Sachverhalte wird als 
Einheit erfasst, die Tatsache ist.  
Die Wittgensteinschen Tatsachen entsprechen den 
Gegenständen der Erfahrung bei Kant; beide sind Er-
scheinungen. Jeder Gegenstand der Erfahrung, d.h. 
phenomenon, ist ein Ergebnis einer zweigradigen 
Synthese; und zwar jede einzelne Vorstellung, im Augen-
blick vorkommende, ist eine bestimmte Mannigfaltigkeit. 
Die Erscheinung wiederum ist eine Vereinigung vieler 
Mannigfaltigkeiten im Einen, durch die Beziehung auf das 
Eine, das eine Kategorie ist, die endgültig auch die trans-
zendentale Einheit der Apperzeption ist.  
Zusammenfassend weist die betrachtete Analogie 
auf die Funktion hin, die zwei Ebenen der Vorstellungen 
auf eine transzendentale Grundlage bezieht. Diese 
Ebenen sind: (1) Urteile und (2) Erscheinungen bei Kant, 
(1’) Sätze und (2’) Tatsachen bei Wittgenstein. Diese 
Grundlage wird durch Kategorien und transzendentale 
Apperzeption festgelegt bei Kant, hingegen bei 
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Wittgenstein durch einfache Gegenstände und logische 
Form. 
2 
Die zweite Analogie spricht von der Abbildung: 
‘Bild→Tatsache’, die in der Wittgensteinschen Terminolo-
gie erfasst ist; diese Abbildung wird dann im Licht der 
Kantschen transzendentalen Deduktion dargestellt. Anders 
gesagt: Dies ist ein Versuch eine Antwort auf die Frage im 
Still Kants zu geben: Wie bezieht sich das Bild auf Tatsa-
che/Wirklichkeit? Die Schlussformulierung Wittgensteins 
sagt, dass das Bild bis zur Wirklichkeit reicht. Es sei aller-
dings dabei erinnert, dass Wittgenstein zuvor folgende 
Thesen aufgestellt hat: 
 
„Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.” (2.1) 
„Das Bild ist eine Tatsache.” (2.141) 
Daran kann man deutlich erkennen, dass das Bild der 
Tatsachen auch eine Tatsache ist, demzufolge ist das 
Beziehen des Bildes auf die Tatsache eine Relation, die 
zwischen zwei Tatsachen besteht. Die Grundfrage lautet: 
Auf welche Weise erreicht eine Tatsache (Bild) die andere 
Tatsache, d.h. die Wirklichkeit? Wittgenstein erklärt: 
 
„Die abbildende Beziehung besteht aus den Zuord-
nungen der Elemente des Bildes und der Sachen.” 
(2.1514) 
„Diese Zuordnungen sind gleichsam die Fühler der 
Bildelemente, mit denen das Bild die Wirklichkeit 
berührt.” (2.1515) 
Diese Zuordnungen können als Vektoren verstanden wer-
den. Diese Vektoren sind an Elemente des Bildes befestigt 
und in die Richtung einzelner Dinge in der Wirklichkeit 
gerichtet; so dass das Vektorende den Ort berührt, an dem 
sich das bezeichnete Ding befindet. Demzufolge stellt 
These 2.1514 fest, dass das Verhältnis zwischen dem Bild 
und der Tatsache wesentlich nur eine Summe der Zuord-
nungen ist.  
Allerdings genügt diese Summe der Zuordnungen, 
d.h. die abbildende Beziehung, allein noch nicht, um ein 
Bild auszumachen. Das Verhältnis der Abbildung ist eine 
notwendige Bedingung des Bildes, aber keine 
ausreichende Bedingung. Umgekehrt, erst wenn wir ein 
Bild haben, können wir in diesem diese Zuordnungen 
erkennen. Kurz gesagt: Die abbildende Beziehung bzw. 
die Summe der Zuordnungen gibt noch keinen Sinn. Der 
Sinn also ist weder diese Summe, noch lässt er sich auf 
diese Summe reduzieren; der Sinn ist etwas mehr. 
3 
Erst die Projektionsmethode führt die Antwort auf 
die Frage aus, wie sich das Bild auf die Wirklichkeit 
bezieht. Wir befassen uns hier hauptsächlich mit den 
Sätzen als einer besonderen Art der Bilder. 
Bereits in den Tagebüchern erscheint ein Vermerk, 
der auf Wittgensteins Interesse an der Frage nach dem 
Suchen des im Satz verbogenen Mechanismus hinwies. 
Dieser Mechanismus bewirkt, dass der Satz über eine 
Kraft der Abbildung verfügt: 
 
„Jener Schatten, welchen das Bild gleichsam auf die 
Welt wirft: Wie soll ich ihn exakt fassen? Hier ist ein 
tiefes Geheimnis. (...) 
Der Satz ist eben nur die Beschreibung eines Sach-
verhalts. Aber das ist alles noch an der Oberfläche.” 
(15.11.1914)  
Der Leitfaden der Projektionsmethode ist in den darauffol-
genden Thesen des Tractatus beschrieben: 
 
„Wir benutzen das sinnlich wahrnehmbare Zeichen 
(...) des Satzes als Projektion der möglichen Sach-
lage. 
Die Projektionsmethode ist das Denken des Satz-
Sinnes.” (3.11) 
„Das Zeichen, durch welches wir den Gedanken 
ausdrücken, nenne ich das Satzzeichen. Und der 
Satz ist das Satzzeichen in seiner projektiven Be-
ziehung zur Welt.” (3.12) 
„Zum Satz gehört alles, was zur Projektion gehört; 
aber nicht das Projizierte. 
Also die Möglichkeit des Projizierten, aber nicht die-
ses selbst. 
Im Satz ist also sein Sinn noch nicht enthalten, wohl 
aber die Möglichkeit ihn auszudrücken.  
(Der Inhalt des Satzes heißt der Inhalt des sinnvol-
len Satzes.) 
Im Satz ist die Form seines Sinnes enthalten, aber 
nicht dessen Inhalt.” (3.13)  
Das Wesen der Projektionsmethode lässt sich auf die 
Konstruktion des Sinnes des Satzes zurückführen. Das 
Grundproblem besteht darin, festzustellen, wie Wittgen-
stein den Sinn versteht und wie viele Gemeinsamkeiten 
seine Konzeption des Sinnes mit Freges Theorie hat und 
wie weit von dieser die Stellung Wittgensteins entfernt ist.  
Die Bestimmung des Sinnes führt Wittgenstein eher 
ein, d.h. vor dem Angeben der Beschreibung der 
Projektionsmethode: 
„Was das Bild darstellt, ist sein Sinn.” (2.221) 
Um festzustellen, was sich hinter dem Terminus „Sinn” 
verbirgt, soll zuerst die Bestimmung „was das Bild dar-
stellt” aus einer anderen Perspektive betrachtet werden. 
These 2.201 erscheint dabei hilfreich: 
 
„Das Bild bildet die Wirklichkeit ab, indem es eine 
Möglichkeit des Bestehens und Nichtbestehens von 
Sachverhalten darstellt.” 
Aus beiden obigen Thesen ergibt sich: Sinn ≡ Möglichkeit 
des Bestehens und Nichtbestehens von Sachverhalten. 
Der Sinn gehört zur Sphäre des Möglichen im Gegensatz 
zum Satzzeichen und der Sachlage in der Welt; diese sind 
Tatsachen und gehören zur Wirklichkeit. Der Sinn ist ge-
rade der „Schatten”, der vom Satz auf die Wirklichkeit ge-
worfen wird.  
Lassen wir vorübergehend das Problem des 
weiteren Präzisierens der Bestimmung des Sinnes und 
konzentrieren wir uns auf einem wichtigen Unterschied 
und zwar den zwischen dem Satz und dem Satzzeichen. 
Im Lichte von These 3.12: Der Satz = {Satzzeichen + 
Projektive Beziehung zur Welt}. Vor diesem Hintergrund 
mag überraschen, was Wittgenstein in folgender These 
sagt: 
 
„Zum Satz gehört alles, was zur Projektion gehört; 
aber nicht das Projizierte. Also die Möglichkeit des 
Projizierten, aber nicht dieses selbst.” (3.13)  
Was ist das „Projizierte”? Kann man dieses mit dem Sinn 
gleichsetzen? Auf diese Gleichsetzung scheint das nächs-
te Fragment derselben These hinzuweisen:  
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„Im Satz ist also sein Sinn noch nicht enthalten, 
wohl aber die Möglichkeit ihn auszudrücken.” 
Ob die obige Gleichsetzung berechtigt ist, wird 
weiter erörtert. 
Die Projektionsmethode samt dem Satzzeichen 
konstruiert den Sinn, der, obwohl er konstruiert worden ist, 
über eine eigenartige Autonomie hinsichtlich des Satzes 
verfügt. Außerdem scheint es auch berechtigt, die 
projektive Beziehung vom Sinn zu unterscheiden. Die 
projektive Beziehung kann man auch als Intention inter-
pretieren, die dieses Satzzeichen wieder lebendig macht 
(vgl. Ammereller 2001, 132). Das Wesen des Sinnes 
wiederum wird in folgenden Thesen des Tractatus 
erleuchtet: 
 
„Sehr klar wird das Wesen des Satzzeichens, wenn 
wir es uns, statt aus Schriftzeichen, aus räumlichen 
Gegenständen (etwa Tischen, Stühlen, Büchern) 
zusammengesetzt denken. Die gegenseitige räumli-
che Lage dieser Dinge drückt dann den Sinn des 
Satzes aus.” (3.1431) 
„Der Konfiguration der einfachen Zeichen im Satz-
zeichen entspricht die Konfiguration der Gegens-
tände in der Sachlage.”(3.21) 
Diese Thesen bringen uns zu folgender Verstehensweise 
des Sinnes. Der Sinn ist eine reine und bloße Konfigura-
tion, abgetrennt von seinem Träger, der aus einfachen 
Zeichen besteht. Es lässt sich eine Ähnlichkeit feststellen, 
die zwischen der Konzeption des Sinnes bei Wittgenstein 
und der Auffassung von Husserl vorkommt. Husserl zu-
folge ist der Sinn noemat, die projektive Beziehung hinge-
gen entspricht der Richtung des Intentionsstrahles. Im 
Gegensatz zu Frege schlägt Wittgenstein vor, Sinn viel-
mehr für das, was durch den Denkakt konstruiert wird, zu 
halten, als was nur in diesem Akt als ewiges, fertiges Ob-
jekt erfasst wird. Wittgenstein würde vielmehr sagen, dass 
ewig die Möglichkeit des Sinnes sei, aber nicht der Sinn 
selbst (vgl. 3.13). Dieser Unterschied der Ansichten über 
die Problematik des Sinnes zwischen Wittgenstein und 
Frege hat auch seinen Ursprung in verschiedenen Annäh-
rungen zur Frage nach dem Sinn der Namen. Frege setzt 
voraus, dass Namen ähnlich wie Sätze auch Sinn haben; 
Wittgenstein wiederum ist der Meinung, dass nicht Namen 
Sinn haben, sondern nur Sätze (vgl. Ishiguro 1989). Dieser 
Vergleich mit der Auffassung Freges hebt hervor, dass der 
Sinn - in Wittgensteins Auffassung - sehr stark durch die 
Konfiguration der Gegenstände bedingt wird. Wenn wir 
dagegen mit einem Namen zu tun haben, der einem Ge-
genstand als einfaches Objekt bezeichnet, können wir von 
keiner Konfiguration reden, also – auch von keinem Sinn. 
Es bleibt jedoch eine gewisse Doppeldeutigkeit des 
Terminus „Projektionsmethode” zu klären. Man kann 
nämlich diese Methode und das Satzzeichen in zweierlei 
Erfassung betrachten: (1) als nur gemeinsam 
zusammengesetzt aber nicht verbunden, oder als (2) 
durch den Gedankenakt miteinander verbunden. Im ersten 
Fall bleibt die Projektionsmethode nur eine abstrakte 
Regel, die erst anzuwenden wäre. Im zweiten Fall wird der 
Gedankenakt mit der Projektionsmethode gleichgesetzt. 
Im zweiten Fall schafft also der Gedankenakt eine Konfi-
guration. In These 4.0141 finden wir die Bestätigung, dass 
Wittgenstein diese Doppeldeutigkeit des Terminus 
„Projektionsmethode” zulässt: 
 
„Das es eine allgemeine Regel gibt, durch die der 
Musiker aus der Partitur die Symphonie entnehmen 
kann (...), darin besteht eben die innere Ähnlichkeit 
dieser scheinbar so ganz verschiedenen Gebilde. 
Und jene Regel ist das Gesetz der Projektion, wel-
ches die Symphonie in die Notensprache projiziert 
(...)” 
Diese These zeigt auch, dass sich das „Projizierte” ganz 
außerhalb des Satzes befindet. Daher ist der Sinn wahr-
scheinlich etwas Anderes als das Projizierte. Also ging der 
letzte Vorschlag, den Sinn mit dem Projizierten gleichzu-
setzen, ging eindeutig zu weit. 
Um klarzumachen, was Wittgenstein unter dem 
„Projizierten” versteht, muss man auf den Zusammenhang 
zwischen dem Sinn des Satzes und den einfachen 
Gegenständen achten. In den Tagebüchern können wir 
lesen: 
 
„Die Forderung der einfachen Dinge ist die Forde-
rung der Bestimmtheit des Sinnes. (...) Wenn es ei-
nen endlichen Sinn gibt, und einen Satz, der diesen 
vollständig ausdrückt, dann gibt es auch Namen für 
einfache Gegenstände.” (18.06.1915) 
Das ist offensichtlich, weil der Sinn eine mögliche Konfigu-
ration dieser Gegenstände ist (vgl. 2.0272). Wittgenstein 
vertritt eine ähnliche Ansicht wie Leibniz in der Monadolo-
gie (vgl. §§1,2 dieses Werks). Wenn wir keine einfachen 
Elemente zeigen würden, könnten wir die Konfiguration 
dieser Elemente nicht bilden. Also könnten wir den Sinn 
nicht zeigen! 
Es kann das „Projizierte“, ebenso wie der Sinn, 
einfach nicht mit dem Sachverhalt gleichgesetzt werden. 
Ein Sachverhalt ist nämlich eine wirkliche Verbindung der 
Gegenstände. Daher scheint, dass die Bestimmung „die 
bestehenden Sachverhalte” (vgl. 2.04 u. 2.05) redundant 
ist! Demzufolge wird deutlich, dass das ‘Projizierte’ kein 
Sachverhalt zu sein braucht. Falls das ‘Projizierte’ 
Sachverhalt sein müsste, dann könnten wir mit Hilfe der 
Projektionsmethode nur (bestehende) Sachverhalte re-
konstruieren. Es könnte dagegen unmöglich sein, solche 
Konfigurationen zu konstruieren, die keine wirklichen 
Verbindungen ausdrücken, d.h. eine Gruppe von Gegen-
ständen, die miteinander nicht verbunden sind. Das ist 
ebenfalls das Problem der Falschheit und Negation. Daher 
schreibt Wittgenstein in den Tagebüchern: 
 
„Die Realität, die dem Sinne des Satzes entspricht, 
kann doch nichts Anderes sein, als seine Bestand-
teile, da wir doch alles Andere nicht wissen.” 
(20.11.1914) 
Wir wissen also nicht, ob das ‘Projizierte’ ein 
Sachverhalt oder nur eine Gruppe von einfachen 
Gegenständen ist, von denen wir eine falsche Hypothese 
formulieren, dass diese Gegenstände einen Sachverhalt 
bilden. 
Fassen wir zusammen: Es erscheinen 
Vieldeutigkeiten, indem wir festzustellen versuchen, wie 
der Sinn, das ‘Projizerte’ und die Projektionsmethode 
verstanden sein sollen. Diese Schwierigkeit, die den 
Terminus „Sinn” begleitet, besteht darin, dass der Sinn 
gleichzeitig: (1) universell und (2) konkret sein muss. 
Daher kann man der ersten Bedingung zufolge aner-
kennen, dass Sinn eine reine Struktur/Konfiguration ist. 
Die zweite Bedingung hingegen ordnet den Sinn als 
Konfiguration samt der intentionellen projektiven 
Beziehung an. Das heisst, als einen auf ein bestimmtes 
Fragment der Wirklichkeit geworfenen „Schatten”. In dieser 
zweiten Erfassung kann wohl der Sinn mit dem 
‘Projizierten’ gleichgesetzt werden. 
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Schlussbemerkungen 
Die Projektionsmethode, die in diesem Beitrag analysiert 
wurde, ähnelt in vielen Punkten dem transzendentalen 
Schema bei Kant. Dieses Schema, als ein Erzeugnis der 
transzendentalen Einbildungskraft (vgl. A140/B179) be-
stimmt die Art, wie Kategorien auf Erscheinungen ange-
wendet werden sollen. Die Projektionsmethode bestimmt 
dagegen die Art der Konstruktion des Sinnes dank der 
Regeln, denen zufolge zuerst eine Konfiguration der Zei-
chen, d.h. Satzzeichen, gebildet werden muss. Dieses 
Zeichen wird dann entsprechend interpretiert, damit der 
konstruierte Sinn als „Schatten” auf das beabsichtigte 
Fragment der Wirklichkeit/der Welt geworfen wird.  
Ähnlich wie Wittgenstein den Sinn von der 
Projektionsmethode unterscheidet, grenzt Kant Bilder der 
sinnlichen Gegenstände und Schemata ab (vgl. 
A140/B180). Das Schema bedeutet für Kant „eine Regel 
der Synthesis der Einbildungskraft” und dieses existiert nur 
„in Gedanken” (vgl. ebenda). Die Projektionsmethode, 
ähnlich wie das transzendentale Schema, erfordert die 
Handlung des Gemüts, [um sie anzuwenden.] Wittgenstein 
erwähnt dabei „das Denken des Sinnes des Satzes”, Kant 
die Handlung der Einbildungskraft. In beiden Fällen ist die 
Grundlage dieser Handlung - als psychischer Akt- das, 
was apriorisch und transzendental ist, d.h. ein endgültiger 
Beziehungspunkt. Bei Kant ist dieser Punkt die trans-
zendentale Einheit der Apperzeption. In Wittgensteins 
System scheint hingegen die logische Form eine analoge 
Rolle zu spielen.  
In der Projektionsmethode nimmt Wittgenstein an, 
dass wir zu den einfachen Gegenständen einen direkten 
Zugang haben. Eine Schwierigkeit, die mit dieser 
Voraussetzung verbunden ist, besteht darin, dass der 
Philosoph nicht deutlich genug darauf hingewiesen hat, 
wie diese Gegenstände verstanden werden sollen. 
Aufgrund einiger weiteren Thesen des Tractatus und 
Notizen aus den Tagebüchern, kann man jedoch 
voraussetzen, dass die transzendentale Deutung der 
einfachen Gegenstände, als den Kantschen Kategorien 
analoger Objekte überzeugend genug ist. Eine 
Entwicklung und Begründung der Frage nach dem Status 
der einfachen Gegenstände wurde den Rahmen dieses 
Beitrags überschreiten.  
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Rule-Following and the Irreducibility of Intentional States 
Antti Heikinheimo, Jyväskylä, Finland 
1. Reduction through Functional Definition 
It is not always clear what exactly is meant when it is said 
that something mental is reducible to something physical. 
Thus, when debating about reductionism, it is important to 
keep in mind just which kind of reduction one is talking 
about. One clearly defined and plausible notion of reduc-
tion comes from Jaegwon Kim. Reducibility is often taken 
to be a relation between two “levels”, such as the mental 
and the physical level. Kim argues, plausibly in my opinion, 
that so called bridge-laws that connect the two levels with 
empirical regularities, do not amount to reduction (Kim 
2005, 103-5). This is because both the higher- and the 
lower-level phenomena need to be mentioned in a state-
ment of a regular connection between phenomena at two 
different levels, whereas reduction requires an account of 
the higher-level phenomenon solely in terms of the lower 
level. I take this much to be common ground between most 
reductionists and non-reductionists – that it is not enough 
for the reductionist to establish empirical connections be-
tween the mental and the physical. He/She needs some-
thing stronger. In Kim’s view this stronger requirement is: 
Conceptual connections, e.g., definitions, providing 
conceptual/semantic relations between the phe-
nomena at the two levels. (Kim 2005, 108) 
These conceptual connections serve as the first step of a 
reductive explanation, in terms of the “base” level, of the 
phenomenon to be reduced. The reductive explanation 
consists of three steps: 
Step 1 (functionalization of the target property) 
Property M to be reduced is given a functional defi-
nition of the following form: Having M =def. having 
some property or other P (in the reduction base do-
main) such that P performs causal task C. 
Step 2 (Identification of the realizers of M) Find the 
properties (or mechanisms) in the reduction base 
that perform the causal task C. 
Step 3 (Developing an explanatory theory) Con-
struct a theory that explains how the realizers of M 
perform task C. (Kim 2005, 101-2) 
On this model, then, the reduction of a higher-level prop-
erty, such as being a gene, consists of (1) a functional 
definition, such as “being a gene = def. being a mechanism 
that encodes and transmits genetic information”; (2) finding 
the realizers for the causal-functional role – in this case, 
DNA molecules; and (3) a theory – in our case molecular 
biology – that explains how the realizers – the DNA mole-
cules – fulfil this role (Kim 2005, 101). In the mind-body 
case, the higher-level properties in question are such as 
“being in a mental state S”. 
Although Kim’s notion of reduction through 
functional definition is not, by any means, the only 
intelligible concept of reduction, I will make it the target of 
my following discussion on reductionism. In the end of this 
paper I will include a very brief comment on theory 
reduction and reduction through mind-body identity. There 
are a few things to notice about this reduction schema. 
First, the functional definition should, of course, be 
adequate to the established meaning of the higher-level 
concept. It is sometimes said that, because of some 
indefiniteness of everyday-language concepts, they can 
not, strictly speaking, be defined. Since this is obviously 
not the real issue between reductionists and non-
reductionists, ‘definition’ here should be understood in a 
relaxed sense, meaning something like “rough 
characterization”. Second, it is the attainability of the 
functional definition in step 1 that is essential to the 
philosophical issue of reductionism vs. non-reductionism. If 
step 1 can be completed, i.e. adequate definitions of the 
higher-level properties can be given through causal roles, 
but the reduction nevertheless fails in steps 2 and 3, the 
resulting position will not be non-reductionism (at least not 
in the usual sense of that word), but eliminativism (if there 
are no realizers for the roles specified)1. Third, the 
philosophical debate over reductionism (or at least the one 
I have in mind) concerns the in principle or theoretical 
attainability of the functional definitions, not their 
attainability in practice. 
We are now in a position to see what would 
constitute a conclusive argument for either side in the 
reductionism debate. The mind-body reductionist needs to 
show that 
MBR2 It is in principle possible to define mental 
properties, adequately to the established meaning 
of the concepts in question, with recourse to causal-
functional roles, not using mental property concepts 
in the definiens. 
The non-reductionist, respectively, needs to show that 
MBR is not true, i.e. that it is not possible, even in princi-
ple, to give such definitions. 
According to Kim, functional definitions are not 
attainable for concepts of phenomenal properties, but are 
attainable for concepts of intentional/cognitive properties, 
such as believing that p or desiring that q (Kim 2005). I will 
argue that functional definitions are not attainable in the 
case of intentional properties either, that is, that MBR does 
not hold for intentional properties. 
2. The Normativity Argument 
My argument is based on the discussion on rule-following 
in Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Lan-
guage (Kripke 1982). Kripke’s question was, approxi-
mately, “what makes it the case that, in saying ‘plus’ and 
using the + symbol, I mean addition and not some other 
function?” His answer was, roughly, that there is nothing, 
no fact, short of the whole practices of attributing mean-
ings and doing addition in the community of language-
users that makes the difference between my meaning the 
one thing or the other. Kripke specially considers one sort 
of facts that might be thought to make the difference. 
Namely, facts about my dispositions to use the word ‘plus’ 
and the + symbol. Now these dispositions are exactly the 
kind of causal-functional roles that appear in Kim-style 
reductive explanations. Furthermore, functionally defining 
                                                     
 
1 That is, if we have conclusive grounds for claiming that there are no realizers 
for the causal roles. If we have just not yet managed to find the right realizers, 
then, of course, we do not have to give in to eliminativism. 
2 For mind-body reductionism. 
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intentional states requires functionally defining meaning 
something instead of something else. For surely we need 
to be able to differentiate the contents of intentional states 
in order to differentiate the states themselves. And if a 
definition does not enable us to tell the difference between, 
say, believing that there is a cow in front of me and believ-
ing that there is a horse in front of me, then it is clearly not 
adequate to the meaning of the concept of belief. Those 
who think that mental content does not depend on public 
language might object that considerations of word mean-
ing do not apply to intentional states. I believe that mental 
content does depend on public language. But even if it 
does not, in order to have reductive explanation, we need 
to be able to publicly refer to specific mental contents. So 
the distinction between different mental contents needs to 
be done in public language. Thus similar considerations 
apply. So let us take a look at Kripke’s argument against 
dispositional analyses of meaning. 
Kripke’s main argument against dispositionalism is 
the normativity argument, which I will now lay out. In order 
to make it the case that I mean anything by a word, the 
meaning-determining fact needs to make the difference 
between right and wrong uses of the word. It needs to 
justify my using the word the way I use it (if I actually am 
using it correctly). But dispositions can not do this. If what I 
mean by a word was determined by the way I am disposed 
to use it, then whatever I say would be correct (Kripke 
1982, 24). I could not mistake a cow for a horse, for if I 
called a cow ‘horse’, then that particular cow would, for 
that very reason, be included among the things I mean by 
‘horse’. So there would be no distinction between using a 
word correctly, in accordance with its meaning, and using it 
incorrectly. From this it follows that there would be no such 
thing as meaning anything by a word. 
There are, of course, other candidate solutions for 
the rule-following problem, besides the Kripkean 
community view and the simple dispositional view. The 
most promising such solutions will not, however, help the 
case of reductionism, since they do not offer causal-
functional analyses of meaning. I have in mind here 
primarily the accounts of Crispin Wright and Philip Pettit, 
which are, in essence, versions of the community view 
(see Kusch 2006, ch. 7). The reductionist needs a solution 
close enough to the simple dispositional view to yield 
functional definitions. 
The lesson to be learned from the normativity 
argument is this: Meaning is normative. In order for a word 
to mean something, there must be correct and incorrect 
ways to use the word. Any functional definition of meaning 
must maintain this distinction between correctness and 
incorrectness. Similarly, any functional definition of 
intentional states must maintain the distinction between fit 
and misfit with actual states of affairs (in case of belief this 
amounts to the distinction between true and false beliefs, 
in case of desires, satisfied and not satisfied desires, and 
so on). Next I will take a brief look at some causal-
functional analyses of intentional states, and how the 
normativity argument shows them to be defective. 
3. Functional Analyses of Intentional States 
The first functional analysis I will consider is W.V.O. 
Quine’s behavioural semantics (Quine 1960). Quine, of 
course, intended his analysis to be an analysis of the 
meaning of sentences, for he did not believe in intentional 
states (see Quine 1960, 221). It is, however, quite straight-
forward to extend the behavioural account also to mental 
content. Quine’s basic idea was that the (stimulus) mean-
ing of a sentence is the set of stimuli, presented with which 
a language user would, if queried, affirm the sentence in 
question (Quine 1960, 32). So it is natural to say that the 
same set of stimuli constitutes the content of a belief of the 
language user. In other words, that he/she believes the 
sentence to be true. Functional definitions of other inten-
tional states along these lines may be more complicated, 
but it does not matter to my argument. If the behavioural 
account fails in the case of belief, which is the simplest 
case, then there is not much hope for it in other cases 
either. Now it is easily seen that the normativity argument 
refutes the behavioural account. For the behavioural ac-
count is really nothing more than the simple dispositional 
account already discussed. If whatever stimulus that 
prompts me to affirm a sentence is counted as partly de-
termining the meaning of the sentence, then it is not pos-
sible for me to make a mistake by affirming the sentence. 
So in the case of belief, all my beliefs will be true, for their 
contents are determined by whatever the facts happen to 
be when I express the beliefs. Quine, of course, tried to 
make room for mistakes, but even he had to acknowledge 
that from the behavioural account follow all kinds of inde-
terminacy in meaning, so that it would often have to be 
more or less arbitrarily decided whether someone is mis-
taken or uses a word in an unusual way. 
Another possible source for functional definitions is 
a sentences-in-the-head view. According to such a view, 
intentional states are brain states that somehow resemble 
public language sentences. The most important example 
of such a view is Jerry Fodor’s language of thought -
hypothesis (Fodor 1976). There are at least two possible 
ways to conceive of sentences in the head. They could 
have content in virtue of their non-causal properties, such 
as some kind of isomorphism with public language 
sentences. Or they could have content in virtue of their 
role in controlling behaviour. If content of brain states is 
due to non-causal properties, this will not help the 
reductionist, for the reductionist needs causal-functional 
definitions. If, on the other hand, content is due to causal 
role in controlling behaviour, the reductionist still faces the 
problem of defining intentional states in terms of 
behaviour. And as we just saw, because of the normativity 
condition, that problem seems hard to solve. So it seems 
that sentences in the head will not be of much help to the 
reductionist. This, of course, is not a problem for Fodor, 
since he is not a reductionist. 
Still another reductionist theory of mental content is 
teleosemantics, which purports to account for content in 
terms of evolutionary selection history (see e.g. Millikan 
1984). But teleosemantics is a historical, not a causal-
functional theory. This means that, in the teleosemantic 
view, content does not supervene on the totality of 
causally relevant facts about the present (see Dretske 
2006, 75). And this rules out the possibility of causal-
functional definitions of intentional states. So 
teleosemantics is not an option for a Kim-style reductionist. 
Accordingly, teleosemantics does not aim at reduction 
through functional definition, but reduction through identity. 
4. Conclusion 
I hope my discussion this far to have shown that there are 
some a priori, philosophical grounds to doubt the possibil-
ity of mind-body reduction through functional definition. I 
believe, though limitations of space prevent me from 
elaborating the point, that similar considerations apply 
against theory reduction – the view that a correct theory of 
the mental could in principle be derived from an all-
encompassing theory of the physical – since I see no other 
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route to theory reduction besides functional definitions of 
the higher-level properties. Still it might be thought that the 
sentences-in-the-head view, as well as teleosemantics, 
might facilitate reduction through mind-body identity. But I 
think there are difficulties for this project, too. Reduction 
through identity is supposed to be based on an empirical 
discovery to the effect that some higher-level phenomenon 
is in fact identical with some lower-level phenomenon, as 
in the case of water = H2O. But the water = H2O identity 
rests precisely on the fact that the characteristics of water 
can be explained in terms of water being H2O. And the 
normativity argument shows that similar explanation of the 
characteristics of intentional states in terms of brain states 
is not to be expected. The purpose of these remarks on 
theory reduction and reduction through identity has been 
merely to hint at the direction where I think the problems 
are, and they are not intended to be at all conclusive. 
Literature 
Dretske, Fred 2006 “Representation, Teleosemantics, and the 
Problem of Self-Knowledge” in: Graham MacDonald and David 
Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 69-
84. 
Fodor, Jerry 1976 Language of Thought, Hassocks: Harvester 
Press. 
Kim, Jaegwon 2005 Physicalism, or Something near Enough, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Kripke, Saul A. 1982 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Kusch, Martin 2006 A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules, 
Chesham: Acumen. 
Millikan, Ruth Garrett 1984 Language, Thought, and Other Biologi-
cal Categories, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press 
Quine, Willard Van Orman 1960 Word and Object, Cambridge: 
Technology Press of the M.I.T. 
 
 
 
  141
Relating Theories. Models and Structural Properties in  
Intertheoretic Reduction 
Rafaela Hillerbrand, Oxford, England, UK 
1. Introduction 
The Russian doll model of scientific progress is very ap-
pealing: When a new and more profound theory is able to 
reproduce and refine the results of one or several well-
established theories or even exceeds the scope of the old 
theories, this is seen as a clear instance of scientific pro-
gress. The older theories t iii, i=1,2, …, nest in the new and 
more profound theory T just like a Russian doll nests in-
side the next bigger one; the old theory or theories are 
said to be reduced to T. For simplicity, this paper considers 
the case n=1; t iii    =t. Not only within the philosophical litera-
ture, but also among many scientists and non-scientists 
alike such a reduction from t to T is perceived as a central 
part of progress in science. 
In many instances, the reducing theory T is a more 
fine-grained, `microscopic' description of the system under 
consideration: For instance, in the wake of Lucas critique 
(Lucas 1976), microeconomics aims at founding large 
parts of macroeconomics; molecular biology strives to 
explain classical genetics; … While the `microscopic' 
theories are seen as fundamental, the coarse-grained 
ones – macroeconomics just as classical genetics – are 
often disdainfully referred to as `mere phenomenological'. 
The alleged success of fine-grained theories in reduction 
explains at least partly the great hopes and fears 
associated with advances on micro-sciences like molecular 
biology or nanoscience (cp. Schmidt 2004). 
However, reducing one theory to another is not a 
piece of cake and closer inspection reveals a plethora of 
unsettled questions. Likewise, all examples mentioned 
above have been subjected to heavy doubts as to whether 
they indeed fulfill the criteria of reduction. These criteria 
are commonly equated with the ones given by E. Nagel 
(1974). I follow this notion and identify reduction roughly 
with Nagelian reduction. 
Despite various criticisms, the paradigm of 
successful reduction of an alleged phenomenological to a 
microscopic theory remains the merging of 
thermodynamics in statistical mechanics. My arguments 
will be developed along these two theories. By choosing a 
highly mathematized science like physics, I hope to 
provide arguments that can be carried over to other, less 
formal sciences in a straightforward way. In particular, I 
want to point to two omissions of the classical account on 
intertheoretic reduction: Firstly, it is often not theories that 
are reduced; rather, models deriving from adequate 
theories are related in a way that may be called 
`reductionist'. Secondly, the common view on reduction 
focuses on different descriptive entities appearing in the 
mathematical formulation of the theories t and T. These 
entities – the theories' furniture of the world – are 
correlated via so-called correspondence (or bridge) 
principles. The structural properties of the theories are 
commonly overlooked, whereas I will contend that a 
successful reduction must at least correlate some of the 
structural properties of the theories t and T.  
2. A Tale of Two Models: Models as  
Mediators in Intertheoretic Reduction 
The core idea of Nagel-type reductions is that some theory 
T reduces another t only if the laws of t are (logically) de-
rivable from those of T. In the case of thermodynamics and 
statistical mechanics just like in many other instances of 
intertheoretic reduction, the descriptive vocabulary of T 
and t differ. Terms like entropy or temperature, for exam-
ple, are defined in very dissimilar ways in both theories – 
one speaks of heterogeneous reduction. 
For heterogeneous reductions, the requirement of 
connectability involves the provision of correspondence (or 
bridge) rules connecting the vocabulary of T to the one of 
t. Within the philosophy of physics, the debate on nature 
and status of the bridge rules results in a heated debate on 
what it actually means to reduce thermodynamics to 
statistical mechanics. The original approach of Nagel and 
others has been dismissed as too simplistic and Nagel's 
requirements for a successful reduction turned out too 
stringent a criterion. The only aspiration we can reasonably 
hope for is that statistical mechanics gives us an 
approximation of the laws of thermodynamics (e.g. 
Callender 2001, Frigg 2008, cp. Schaffner 1976): T does 
not actually reduce t, but reduces a modified version t'. For 
instance, from a statistical theory no strict universal laws 
given by thermodynamics can be deduced. Consider a 
system characterized by intensive state variables. 
Statistical physics tells us that the corresponding extensive 
variables can be only specified as mean values. No matter 
how sharp this mean value is for a macroscopic system, in 
the statistical approach the extensive variable never 
becomes a state variable as this is a non-stochastic 
variable.  
How exactly the approximated theory t' that 
connects to T via correspondence laws actually relates to 
the original theory t, raises serious questions. In this paper, 
I want to contend that it is not t that is reduced to T: not 
theories reduce or become reduced – rather a concrete 
model of T can be related to a model of t in such a way 
that the connection between these models qualifies as a 
reduction. Only for concrete models does the notion of 
reduction make sense.  
Take as an example the bridging of the concepts of 
temperature in statistical mechanics and in 
thermodynamics. To determine the correspondence 
principles, concrete models of the considered physical 
system are set up – a model deriving from statistical 
mechanics, another from thermodynamics. Let us begin 
with the former and focus on an ideal gas. The model 
considers gas particles confined to a container. This allows 
deriving an explicit formula for the pressure of the gas via 
the force the particles exert on the idealized and 
rectangular walls of the container. By averaging, we obtain 
a formula relating the (microscopic) pressure of the gas to 
the volume of the container and the mean kinetic energy of 
the gas particles.  
Conversely from thermodynamics, deriving a 
concrete model that allows to specify the temperature of a 
concrete system amounts, amongst other things, to 
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choosing a certain temperature scale. Then the formal 
analogy between the thermodynamic ideal gas law – a 
combination of Boyle's (Mariotte's) law and Charle's (Gay-
Lussac's) law – and the statistical law relating pressure, 
volume, and mean kinetic energy allows correlating 
thermodynamic with statistical pressure as well as 
thermodynamic temperature with the mean kinetic energy 
and the number of degrees of freedom of the individual 
gas particles. Only by settling for a concrete temperature 
scale, are we able to identify Rydberg constant and thus 
Boltzmann constant; only by choosing a concrete 
realization of statistical mechanics were we able to relate 
(statistical) pressure to volume and mean kinetic energy. 
Note that the need to invoke the latter model was also 
noted by S.W. Yi (2003). 
The (not purely) formal analogy between the model 
equations allows identification of the corresponding 
quantities, yielding the well-known bridge concept that 
relates thermodynamic temperature to the mean kinetic 
energy of microscopic particles per degree of freedom. 
Note that we follow here a distinction introduced by L. 
Sklar (1993): Bridge rules may merely correlate the 
involved quantities, or they can identify a concept in T with 
a corresponding one in t. Following Yi (2003), any 
identification of terms between various theories is to be 
rejected as a metaphysically heavily loaded concept with 
many nontrivial and far from obvious assumptions on how 
theoretical terms can make sense outside the theory they 
are embedded in. Nonetheless, Sklar is right when he 
points out that without further specification the term 
correlation is so vague that it begs the question as to how 
the terms are actually related. The preceding analysis 
showed a way out of this dilemma: It is not terms within 
theories that are mapped in one way or another, but in the 
narrow setting of concrete models, various descriptive 
terms can be identified on (not merely) formal analogies 
without the metaphysical ballast bothering us if the 
identification were on the level of the involved theories.  
3. Reducing structural properties 
Even assuming that the commonly suggested correspon-
dence rules successfully reduce models of t to models of 
T, this is not yet the end of the story of reduction to be told 
here. Not only the observational vocabulary stated in theo-
retical terms like temperature or pressure that take on 
specific numerical values needs to be correlated; also 
(parts of) the structural properties of T have to be mapped 
to those of t.  
Structural properties refer to those properties of 
theories that do not turn on arbitrary choice of units, like 
the choice of a certain temperature scale, but concern 
intrinsic features of a system. Consider the thermodynamic 
concept of quasistatic changes, meaning that the system 
goes through a sequence of states that are infinitesimally 
close to (thermodynamic) equilibrium. It is not 
straightforward what the equivalent of a quasistatic 
transformation in statistical mechanics might be (cp. Frigg 
2008). However, implicit correspondence rules map this 
structural property of thermodynamics to that of statistical 
mechanics. The claim for quasistatic transformation within 
the thermodynamic framework translates to the 
requirement that on the microscopic level the relaxation 
time tpa of the particles is much smaller than the typical 
time scale tav at which changes occur in the coarse-
grained, averaged quantities. Hence the microscopic 
condition corresponding to the thermodynamic 
requirement of quasistatic changes is: tpa >> tav, implying 
tpa/tav → 0. 
Following R. Batterman (2002), this limiting 
procedure is a special kind of explanation common within 
physics, a so-called asymptotic explanation. As C. Pincock 
(2007) noted these belong to the broader class of abstract 
explanation appealing primarily to the ``formal relational 
features of a physical system'' and thus account to what I 
have referred to as structural properties. 
It is indispensable that reduction accounts also for 
(some of) the abstract explanations of the different 
theories involved. One obvious objection against this claim 
contends that the content of a theory is identified with its 
empirical content, embedded in the observables that take 
on numerical values. However even then some of the 
structural properties need to be bridged. Any model or 
theory makes predictions only within some range of 
applicability. Beyond theory-external conditions, there are 
always specifications of the range of applicability internal 
to the theory or the model under consideration. In 
specifying this range of applicability, we fall back on the 
structural properties of the theory. Thermodynamics, for 
example, makes predictions about the state of a system if 
the undergone changes are quasistatic. A successful 
reduction requires that at least those structural properties 
of the reduced theory required to specify the range of 
applicability are connected to the reducing theory, and vice 
versa. 
Concluding this section, it is worth noting that there 
is a genuine difference in how the connection of the 
descriptive vocabulary and the structural properties of two 
theories describing the same physical system are treated 
within the sciences. While for the former explicit 
correspondence or bridge rules are stated – as for 
example in relating the microscopic and the 
thermodynamic temperature discussed above – the 
relation between the formal relational features of two 
mathematical descriptions is mostly given implicitly and 
often remains among the `tacit knowledge' of the 
scientists, shared by the practice of doing a specific 
scientific research. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper argued that even when well established theo-
ries exist, the reduction might not be an intertheoretic one. 
Rather a concrete model of a theory T is correlated with a 
model of theory t in a way that qualifies as reductionist. 
Our discussion of the alleged reduction of thermodynamic 
to statistical mechanics thus explicitly showed how some 
of Kitcher's classical criticism of Nagelian reduction within 
biology translate into the more formal sciences. With a 
view to the debate within philosophy of physics, the central 
role of models as regards intertheoretic reduction can be 
taken as a hint to not only ``take thermodynamics less 
seriously'' (Callender 2001), but also take statistical me-
chanics as a theory less serious. 
Turning to more general debates within philosophy 
of science, both points made in this paper – the central 
role of models in the process of reduction and the 
necessity to also connect (some of the) structural 
properties of T and t – reveal a more complex picture of 
scientific progress as commonly recognized within 
philosophy of science. Although the raised points do not 
refute the hopes and fears advanced in the microscopic, 
reducing theories like molecular biology or 
nanotechnology, they do raise serious doubts as regards 
the common view that `microscopic' theories are generally 
more embracing. 
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The Constitution of Institutions 
Frank Hindriks, Groningen, The Netherlands 
Institutions depend on human beings for their existence. 
They are human constructs that would not be there if it 
were not for us. The challenge is to unpack this. Are they 
mere social constructs, or do they have a reality beyond 
our social categorizations? Institutions involve human 
beings and their (inter)actions. Can they simply be reduced 
to these? Or do they have a reality that goes beyond 
them? I shall suggest that institutions present us with a 
number of puzzles that justify a serious investigation into 
these issues. 
A US president has the power to veto laws not due 
to any superior physical or mental abilities, but because he 
is granted this power by the American people. Apparently, 
the powers of presidents do not depend on their intrinsic 
features only. Examples such as this one pose problems 
for a straightforward reduction of institutions to human 
beings and their (inter)actions. Taking constitution to be a 
(non-reductive) relation of unity without identity, I argue 
that such puzzles dissolve once institutions are taken to be 
constituted by human beings, their mental states, their 
interactions, and their surroundings. 
1. Against Identity and Mereology  
Presumably institutional properties supervene on physical 
ones. Supervenience, however, is a fairly innocent rela-
tion. Both reductive and non-reductive materialists about 
the mental accept that mental properties in some sense 
supervene on physical ones. In order to provide an ade-
quate ontology of institutions, then, relations other than 
supervenience have to be considered. The first one that I 
consider is identity, which is a relation between entities 
rather than between properties. I shall argue that institu-
tions are not identical to the entities they consist of or are 
composed of (where these latter notions are used in a 
metaphysically innocent sense). For the purposes of this 
paper I focus on the case of organizations leaving other 
kinds of institutions for another occasion. 
Consider the United Nations (UN). The UN consists 
of countries, which are its members that are united by the 
Charter of the UN. Is the UN identical to the set of its 
members? Presumably not. The UN can enlarge its 
membership, while sets cannot. A set that has more 
members than another set is numerically distinct from that 
other set. The UN remains the same entity when it 
acquires a new member. 
What about organizations that have only one 
member? Are they identical to their members? A limited 
liability company (LLC) can consist of only one individual. 
Even if it does, however, an LLC is not identical to that 
person. An individual can create and later dissolve an LLC 
that has only one member, herself. Someone who does so 
existed before the LLC did, and she outlives it. So the 
persistence conditions of organizations differ from the 
entities they are made of. In other words, there is a 
difference regarding what accounts for their identity over 
time.1 
                                                     
 
1 Cf. Ruben (1985) and Uzquiano (2004). 
Are organizations mereological sums of their 
members? At least on some conceptions of them, 
mereological sums they do not have any (causal) 
properties their parts do not have (Lewis 1986). However, 
the Security Council of the UN has the power to adopt 
resolutions, but none of its members does. The UN can 
have a code of conduct and ensure compliance to it 
without any of its members doing so (recall that its 
members are countries). Similar claims hold for other 
organizations. An LLC can sue another company without 
any of its members doing so. And a choir can sing a 
cantata without any of its members doing so. The upshot is 
that organizations can have causal properties none of their 
members have. 
One can, of course, conceive of mereological 
relations in a more substantial way. The part-whole relation 
might be an ontological relation between parts and wholes 
each of which exist. Suppose it is also granted that wholes 
can have causal properties none of its parts have in 
isolation. Even then it would be inappropriate to conceive 
of the relation between organizations and their members 
as a mereological relation. This is because the part-whole 
relation is transitive while the membership relation as it 
applies to organizations is not. Countries consist of people, 
the UN consists of countries, but the UN does not consist 
of (exactly those) people: as a Dutch citizen, I am a 
member of the Netherlands; I am not, however, a member 
of the UN. 
To sum up, the relation between organizations and 
(collections of) human beings is not identity, nor is it a 
mereological relation. They differ in persistence conditions 
and causal properties. Furthermore, the relation between 
them is non-transitive. In the next section, I shall argue 
that, in order to accommodate these features, the relation 
between organizations and (the collections of) their 
members should be conceived of as constitution. 
2. Constitution 
Constitution is a relation of unity without identity. It obtains, 
for instance, between a statue and the lump of clay of 
which it is made. These are united in that they consist of 
the same material. They are not identical to one another: 
the lump of clay can even when the statue does not; the 
statue can survive gradual replacement of the clay of 
which it consists resulting in a situation in which the statue 
still exists even though it contains none of the material of 
which it consisted originally. These two features can be 
captured in terms of a condition of material coincidence (1) 
and a modal condition (2), a condition that captures possi-
bilities such as the non-existence of a statue in the pres-
ence of a lump of clay. 
In order to account for the fact that a particular lump 
of clay does constitute a statue further conditions have to 
be added. A notion of favourable conditions can serve a 
useful purpose here. Statues owe their status of art object 
to their surroundings. At a general level, they bear some 
relation to an art-world (Baker 1997). They might, for 
instance, have been commissioned as art objects. This is 
one of the conditions that are favourable for an object to 
constitute a statue. Such conditions explain why particular 
objects are statues. They account for this in that they can 
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be invoked in response to the question: why does this 
lump constitute a statue? This can be done in virtue of the 
fact that, necessarily, if a lump of clay is in statue-
favourable conditions it is a statue. These conditions are 
such that they confer the status of statue on lumps of clay. 
Thus, favourable conditions play an explanatory role in 
relation to the instantiation of the constitution relation. 
One condition that has to be added, then, is another 
modal condition – one that states that in the relevant 
favourable conditions a constituter necessarily constitutes 
the constituted object (3). In order for it to do any work, this 
has to be combined with the condition that the relevant 
conditions actually obtain (4). (Whether or not this 
condition is satisfied is a contingent matter. In spite of the 
second modal condition, then, constitution as such is a 
contingent relation.) 
The constitution relation is usually taken to be 
irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. The first modal 
condition accommodates the irreflexivity of the constitution 
relation. This ‘possibility condition’ amounts to the claim 
that, if conditions were not favourable the constituter would 
not constitute the constituted object (the lump of clay can 
exist without there being a statue). No object can have 
such a relation to itself. Asymmetry can be captured by 
adding ‘an impossibility condition’, a condition concerning 
the impossibility of the existence of the constituted object 
without a constituter (5): a (clay) statue cannot exist 
without a lump of clay existing at the same time. Note, 
however, that statues can also be made of other material 
than clay including marble. Such multiple realizability can 
be accommodated by specifying the property (properties) 
that is (are) characteristic of the constituter in a sufficiently 
general way. This could be a characterization in terms of a 
disjunction, or in terms of properties that can be satisfied 
by several kinds of objects. 
Before commenting on transitivity, let me present 
the account of constitution implicit in the preceding 
discussion:2 
a constitutes b at t if and only if a is F and b is G 
and (1) – (5) hold: 
1. a and b coincide materially at t. 
2. It is possible for a to exist in the absence of an x 
that is G and materially coincides with a. 
3. Necessarily, if an x that is F is in G-favourable 
circumstances, there is a y that is G that coincides 
materially with x. 
4. a is in G-favourable circumstances at t. 
5. It is impossible for b to exist in the absence of an 
x that is F and materially coincides with b. 
Conditions 1 and 5 account for the unifying character of 
the constitution relation. Condition 2 reveals that the rela-
tion is distinct from identity. Finally, conditions 3 and 4 
explain why the one object constitutes the other. 
                                                     
 
2 This account owes a lot to Baker (1997, 2007). Let me comment on some of 
the differences. First, I do not require F and G to be what Baker calls ‘primary 
kind’ properties, which are properties that the relevant objects have essen-
tially. Second, I include the impossibility condition in order to account for the 
asymmetry of the constitution relation. Baker (2007, 163-65) believes the 
necessity condition ensures asymmetry. The idea is that there simply are no 
favourable circumstances that account for constitution as a top-down relation. 
Rather than appealing to a (supposed) metaphysical fact that is external to the 
account, I build asymmetry explicitly into the definition of constitution. Third, 
Baker has expanded on the coincidence condition so as to rule out that a 
constituter might constitute two objects of the same kind. I do not include such 
a condition, because one and the same collection of individuals can constitute 
two different organizations. See note 3 for another difference. 
How does this account apply to organizations? The 
first two conditions imply that organizations coincide 
materially with their members and that it is possible for 
these individual members to exist without an organization 
of type G existing that coincides materially with them.3 
What about the other conditions? How should we 
conceive, for instance, of favourable conditions of 
organizations? What does it take, for instance, for one or 
more persons to form a limited liability company (LLC)? 
The answer to this question can be found in the Revised 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 2006. 
The central conditions are the formulation of an 
operating agreement that regulates the relations between 
the members (which they are ‘deemed to assent to’ as 
soon as the company exists), and the drafting of a 
certificate of state (which needs to be submitted to the 
Secretary of State). Together these constitute what I call 
‘the statute’ of a particular LLC. The act in which all this is 
specified in very precise terms provides the means for a 
non-circular specification of the relevant favourable 
conditions (to which I henceforth refer as LLC-favourable 
conditions). It is not possible for an LLC to exist without 
these conditions being satisfied for a particular (collection 
of) individual(s). 
The satisfaction of favourable conditions accounts 
for the persistence conditions of constituted objects, and 
for their causal properties. A collection of individuals can 
exist prior to the existence of the LLC they end up 
constituting because at the time they did not yet constitute 
it they were not in LLC-favourable conditions: they had not 
yet formulated an operating agreement, or they had not yet 
submitted a certificate of state to the Secretary of State. 
Furthermore, it is only because of the LLC-favourable 
conditions that their liability is limited. This has real 
consequences in any lawsuits in which they might be held 
accountable. The upshot is that the LLC-favourable 
conditions account for the differences between an LLC and 
its members. 
Earlier it was noted that the constitution relation is 
usually taken to be transitive. In section 1, I dismissed the 
part-whole relation as inadequate for capturing the 
membership relation because of its transitivity. This seems 
to make it problematic for me to invoke another relation 
that is transitive in order to characterize the relation 
between organizations and their members. This 
appearance is deceiving. 
It is the aggregate of members that constitutes the 
UN, not any of the members themselves, at least not 
directly. As a consequence, it is somewhat misleading to 
say that the relation between organizations and its 
members is one of constitution. Instead, the relation 
between an organization and the aggregate of its 
members is one of constitution. This in turn implies that the 
membership relation should not be cashed out in terms of 
constitution, at least not directly. 
Consider, for purposes of comparison, a case in 
which an organization does consist of single-member 
organizations. Suppose a chess player has to incorporate 
him or herself in order to participate in a chess tournament, 
which only admits single-member foundations. The chess 
tournament is organized by a society created for this very 
purpose that only has foundations as its members. In this 
case, the people who constitute the foundations that 
                                                     
 
3 In fact, I believe that the condition of material coincidence is problematic for 
organizations and their members. In my 2008 I argue it should be replaced by 
an enactment condition. 
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constitute the chess society are members both of those 
foundations (each of his or her own, that is) and of the 
society. 
This discussion reveals that it can be confusing to 
say that the constitution relation is transitive. Even in case 
of the chess society, individual human beings constitute 
the foundations, but the chess society is constituted by an 
aggregate of foundations. So it is not the case that one 
thing constitutes another one that in turn constitutes some 
further object. To be sure, there are such cases. Perhaps a 
human body can constitute a person, which in turn can 
constitute a limited liability company. However, in many, if 
not most, cases of constitution, the constituter is an 
aggregate rather than a constituted object. 
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Do Brains Think? 
Christopher Humphries, London, England, UK 
1 Introduction  
The motivating idea of B&H’s 2003 Philosophical Founda-
tions of Neuroscience (‘PFN’) is that a clear view of the 
relationship between neuroscience and human psychology 
is not possible without a correct analysis of the psychologi-
cal concepts and categories involved in the descriptive 
understanding of mental life. The authors find that these 
concepts are often misconstrued or misapplied by neuro-
scientists and their philosophical allies. Defective under-
standing and misguided questions may, at worst, render 
research futile by misdirection of experimentation and mis-
understanding of its results. It is the authors’ constructive 
intention that their conceptual analysis should ‘assist neu-
roscientists in their reflections antecedent to the design of 
experiments.’ 
A leitmotif of PFN is the identification of a persistent 
mistake of construing the brain, or components of the 
brain, as subject or locus of mental predicates. For B&H, 
the ascriptions properly belong to the person or animal. 
The mistake institutes a sort of Cartesian revanchism, with 
the old error of ascribing psychological attributes to a 
mental substance replaced, in the new materialist version, 
with the error of ascribing them to a physical substance. 
Brain/body dualism is incoherent, like talk of the East Pole. 
Thus (PFN: 71): ‘Only of a human being and what 
resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one 
say: it has sensations; it sees, is blind, is deaf; is 
conscious or unconscious.’ (Wittgenstein 2001: I §281); 
and ‘Perhaps indeed it would be better not to say that the 
soul pities or learns or thinks but that the man does in 
virtue of the soul.’ (Aristotle 1986: 408b). 
The neuroscientist’s reply might be that talk of 
brains and their neural circuits seeing shells flying and 
deciding to take cover is an innocent façon de parler; a 
harmless and amusing shorthand that leads to no practical 
error. Its value is metaphorical: for example, when 
describing neural mechanisms, it can harness the insights 
that have accrued to neuroscience from the field of 
information technology. For B&H, this last is further 
confusion: brains are not computers, and computers do 
not enact rule-governed manipulation of symbols. 
Computers are artefacts that ‘produce results that will 
coincide with rule-governed, correct manipulation of 
symbols.’ (Bennett and Hacker 2007: 151). The projection 
of the designer’s perspective into the operation of the 
computer is a version of the very error of thought currently 
in view. 
B&H assert a sharp line between investigation of the 
logical relations between concepts – the philosopher’s 
trade, having to do with the distinction of sense and 
nonsense – and the scientist’s investigations, which have 
to do with empirical truth and falsehood. But the 
orthogonality of truth and sense is assailable: e.g. are not 
answers to conceptual questions true or false? (Dennett 
2007: 79-82) Again, B&H’s claim that conceptual truths 
delineate the logical space in which the facts are located, 
and are prior to them, (129) could be met by the simple 
objection that the concept of colour is not prior to colour 
facts (cf. PFN: 129-130). At the opposite pole to B&H is the 
Quinean view. Abandonment of the ‘two dogmas of 
empiricism’ results in a ‘blurring of the supposed distinction 
between speculative metaphysics and natural science.’ 
Thus it is nonsense ‘to speak of a linguistic component 
and a factual component in the truth of any individual 
statement.’ Conceptual scheme and the deliverances of 
sense interpenetrate within our ‘total science’. (Quine 
1961) 
2. An Inner Process 
According to B&H, it only makes sense to ascribe mental 
predicates to what is or resembles a living human being. 
Following Wittgenstein, behavior is taken to provide logical 
criteria for the application of mental concepts. Only the 
person (the rational, responsible being), and not the brain, 
satisfies these criteria (PFN: 83). Searle takes this Witt-
gensteinian move to be at the heart of the argument that 
leads to the impossibility, for B&H, of consciousness, 
qualia, feelings etc. existing in and being predicable of 
brains (Searle 2007: 102). Further, Searle takes B&H to 
identify pain (let’s say) with the criterial basis for pain, i.e. 
its external manifestation. Then, because the pain is seen 
to be identified with its criterial manifestation, Searle takes 
B&H to think that it cannot be the subject of neurological 
investigation. On this understanding, the PFN programme 
amounts to criterial behaviourism:  
 
Just as the old-time behaviourists confused the be-
havioral evidence for mental states with the exis-
tence of the mental states themselves, so the Witt-
gensteinians make a more subtle, but still funda-
mentally similar, mistake when they confuse the cri-
terial basis for the application of the mental con-
cepts with the mental states themselves. That is, 
they confuse the behavioral criteria for 
the ascription of psychological predicates with 
the facts ascribed by these psychological predi-
cates, and that is a very deep mistake (103)… The 
fallacy, in short, is one of confusing the rules for us-
ing the words with the ontology (104)…. I think that 
once this basic fallacy is removed, then the central 
argument of the book collapses. (105)  
I don’t think this charge sheet will hold up in court. In the 
first place, B&H nowhere explicitly make the equation be-
tween behavior and the subject ontology of mental predi-
cates. The former is criterial for the latter, not identical with 
it. Pain behavior is a manifestation of pain, and a criterion 
of it, but is not the pain itself. Moreover, the charge of be-
haviourism is refuted if the behavioral criterion is ‘defeasi-
ble’, i.e. only partly constitutive of its object. Thus, if I’m 
reciting the alphabet ‘in my head’, there is no behavior. 
B&H display the defeasibility of behavior when they say: 
‘an animal may be in pain and not show it or exhibit pain 
behavior without being in pain. (We are no behaviourists.)’ 
(Bennett and Hacker 2007: Note 18 p211).1 Secondly, 
                                                     
 
1 Wittgenstein takes behavior as criterial for the mental, but not to be equated 
with it ontologically or causally: the relation is logical and normative. Thus 
behavior, expressed by the body, is the window of the soul. (Wittgenstein 
2001: II §178) Only to a being that has capacities can mental concepts be 
ascribed. But a being that has capacities can exercise them or not: the matter 
is not causally determined. Behaviourism is therefore no apt theory of such a 
being. See Glock: 55-58 and Hacker 1990: 224-254. Thus Wittgenstein is not 
a metaphysical behaviourist. Logical behaviourism (asserting semantic equiva-
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B&H do not deny that it is possible to mount neurological 
investigations of pain etc. ‘Research on the neurobiology 
of vision is research into the neural structures that are 
causally necessary for an animal to be able to see and into 
the specific processes involved in its seeing.’ (Bennett and 
Hacker 2007: 161).  
This last point raises the question of the causal 
relationship between pain etc. and neurophysiology.  
Searle acknowledges that B&H look for causally necessary 
conditions for consciousness, but insists that a causally 
sufficient account is what is required, and uses this 
assumption in the construction of his case for B&H’s 
Wittgensteinian behaviourism. But that requirement seems 
to beg the question about the dichotomy of mental and 
neurophysiological predicates, with a tacit assumption that 
a correct theory of mind must be physically reductive. For 
reduction requires explanatory connection between 
explanandum and explanans, together with bridge laws 
connecting the relevant properties. A causally sufficient 
explanation of consciousness in terms of physical law 
would deliver both of these requirements for reduction 
straight away. Reduction, thus established, would dissolve 
the possibility of a division of categories between the inner 
and the outer. So the hidden reductive assumption covertly 
imports the conclusion into the premises.  
Searle’s reply to this might follow his chapter essay 
‘Reduction and the Irreducibility of Consciousness’ (Searle 
1992: Chapter 5). Consciousness is there described as a 
‘causally emergent property of systems’ on a notion of 
emergence that denies that an emergent has any causal 
powers that cannot be explained by the causal powers of 
the physical base.  Searle says that this type of 
emergence usually delivers causal-explanatory reduction, 
from which ontological reduction follows. However, Searle 
continues, in the case of consciousness, the ontological 
reduction does not work, because the subjectivity of 
experience cannot be explained in third-party causal 
terms. But this failure of ontological reduction he claims to 
be unimportant, because it is a trivial consequence of our 
definitional practices. We cannot, following the usual 
reductive procedure, redefine consciousness in causal 
terms which, being causal, discount the appearances that 
are characteristic of the reduced domain, because in this 
case the appearances are what are of interest. On this 
argument, mental predicates related to consciousness are 
not ontologically reduced, and so the question is not 
begged.  
However, even if this argument is accepted, it still 
does not go far enough. This is because, although it says 
why reduction is harmless in case of consciousness, it 
does not show why reduction would be harmless in case of 
normativity. B&H, as already noticed in the discussion of 
information technology, take normativity to be external to 
the causal realm as exemplified by the computing artefact. 
So Searle’s critique of B&H’s psychological ontology still 
begs the question for mental predicates related to 
normativity. 
In ascribing mental predicates to the animal rather 
than the brain, B&H are proclaiming that the predicates, 
together with their ontological subjects, belong to a 
separate and distinct logical category. Searle criticises 
B&H’s expression ‘mereological fallacy’, pointing out that 
brains are not proper parts of persons: what B&H are 
attacking is a would-be Rylean category mistake. Precisely 
                                                                             
 
lence of mental predicates and behavioral dispositions) is a stronger tendency, 
though less so in Wittgenstein’s later thought. 
so. Most of the category mistakes on the table in PFN are 
simple logical mispredications, not requiring a specifically 
Wittgensteinian unmasking. 
For Searle, it is ‘more or less educated scientific 
common sense’ that conscious states ‘exist in the brain’, 
being produced causally as ‘higher-level or system 
features’ (2007: 99). For B&H, neither does a mental 
predicate attach to a brain as subject or agent, nor is the 
mental fact referred to located in the brain. Thoughts do 
not occur in the brain, they occur in the study (PFN: 179-
180). The claim that to deny the brain-location of thinking 
is like denying the stomach-location of digesting (Searle 
2007: 109) exemplifies the tacit reductivism already 
noticed.  
3. Persons 
For B&H, the proper subject of mental predicates is the 
person, though no extended analysis is offered of what a 
person is. For that desideratum we may borrow a page 
from the patriarchs (Strawson 1957). Thus material objects 
are found to be the basic particulars – identifiable and re-
identifiable without reference to other particulars and partly 
constitutive of the ‘uniquely pervasive and comprehensive’ 
system of individuation provided by time and space. Per-
sons are a separate and distinct class of particulars, as-
cribing to themselves actions, intentions, thoughts, feel-
ings, perceptions etc. These are predicated of a single 
entity, which is grammatically and, by argument, ontologi-
cally the same entity as that to which are ascribed the 
physical characteristics of the person. (‘I am happy; I am 
thin.’) This entity, the person, is logically prior to the indi-
vidual consciousness, for if the priority is taken the other 
way round, no experience can ever be attributed other 
than to oneself. The ontological priority of the person must 
be accepted, not to avoid scepticism, but ‘in order to ex-
plain the existence of the conceptual scheme in terms of 
which the sceptical problem is stated.’ (Strawson 1957: 
106) (Hacker rejects this ‘dichotomous division of 
predicates’ as ‘overly Cartesian’ and prefers a more vague 
definition of the person as a subcategory of the animal, 
having capacities of reason, will and morality; see Bennett 
and Hacker 2007: 312-3.) 
A person, then, is subject of both physical and 
mental predicates. The Strawsonian analysis upholds the 
division of category between physical and mental 
predicates, while uniting them in the person. B&H’s central 
point about mispredication is not a uniquely 
Wittgensteinian insight, but flows from a distinction of 
categories that is fundamental in the descriptive 
metaphysics of mind and body. The point does not 
therefore stand or fall with the various peculiarities of PFN, 
such as the claim that two people can share the same pain 
(in the way that two pillar boxes can share the same 
colour, see PFN: §3.8) and that subjective qualities of 
consciousness (qualia) do not exist (qualia not being 
properties of consciousness but of objects: ‘quale’ 
equivocates between the subjective quality of an 
experience and the experience itself, see PFN: §10.3).  
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4. Conclusion 
So do brains think or don’t they? B&H think not, and I have 
argued that their conclusion does not depend on their spe-
cifically Wittgensteinian account of contemporary neuro-
science. The proposition can be denied, as a category 
mistake, from an alternative descriptive-metaphysical ap-
proach. 
I think B&H’s arguments are stronger than Searle’s 
critique of them. But the Quinean point made above 
disrupts the neat conceptual taxonomy. The way in which 
scientific knowledge influences the a priori conceptual 
scheme is a large question, that cannot be analysed here. 
But this work is needed, because if the conceptual and the 
empirical are orthogonal in the way that B&H claim, then 
there is nothing further to be said about the ontology of 
mind: enquiry is brought to a close by their strictures. 
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How Metaphors Alter the World-Picture – One Theme in  
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty 
Joose Järvenkylä, Tampere, Finland 
Metaphor is a topic that is not usually connected with 
Wittgenstein’s thought. He used many metaphors 
throughout his works but he never presented any theory 
considering them. Of course it is said that his philosophical 
method does not consist of theorizing at all, and he 
explicitly said that “[in Philosophy] we may not advance 
any kind of theory” (PI, § 109). Yet it seems that later 
Wittgenstein had a positive account of metaphor which is 
connected to the idea that Wittgenstein used metaphors 
exactly to avoid theorizing. This view of metaphors is 
connected to what Wittgenstein writes on the world-
picture1 in On Certainty. 
In this paper I have tried to reconstruct what might 
be called Wittgenstein’s positive view of metaphor on On 
Certainty. In order to do so I have compared Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on the picture of the world with some elements of 
Donald Davidson’s theory of metaphors. I believe that both 
philosophers would have agreed that metaphor has only 
literal meaning. They would have also accepted that the 
impact metaphor has on recipient does not belong in the 
analysis of metaphor, But unlike Davidson, Wittgenstein is 
not interested in analysis. Instead he shows the influence 
metaphors have by using metaphors himself. At first I will 
examine Davidson’s theory of metaphor and later on I will 
conjoin it to views Wittgenstein had. 
1. Metaphor to Davidson and Wittgenstein 
In its most austere sense, “metaphor is a figure of speech, 
in which a word or phrase that literally denotes one thing is 
used to denote another, thereby implicitly comparing the 
two things” (Woltersdorff 1999, 562). From this it follows 
that metaphor has the propositional form because it states 
that something is something, but it lacks meaning because 
it is impossible to apply conceptions of true or false to it. 
Hereby it is not an ordinary bipolar proposition. It says that 
world is organized in particular way, but you cannot com-
pare world and it in any eligible way. 
It is sometimes said that metaphor has its own 
peculiar meaning and that only through this meaning an 
acceptable interpretation can be provided. Probably the 
most prominent candidate to challenge this view is Donald 
Davidson, whose polemic claim is that metaphor has only 
literal meaning. Still metaphors might have an effect on us; 
they can make us notice some aspects of things we have 
not seen before. (cf. Davidson 1979, 43) Thus metaphors 
can affect on our understanding of the world. This is an 
insight Wittgenstein would have approved. 
While saying that metaphor has only literal meaning, 
Davidson’s intention is to show that even if metaphors can 
make us grasp new insights, there is no such insight 
connected to the content of metaphor. He singles out the 
way metaphors are used from what they mean, and claims 
that only latter is of the interest of philosophy. (See 
Davidson 1979, 29-30) 
                                                     
 
1 Anscombe and Paul translate Wittgenstein’s “Weltbild” into “picture of the 
world”, but to avoid confusions with other philosophical usage of the concept I 
rather use world-picture. 
Davidson’s views are near to Wittgenstein’s, but one 
clear difference remains. For Wittgenstein, asking the 
meaning of metaphor is not as interesting as how they are 
actually used. While Davidson seems to take 
Wittgenstein’s famous remark “[For a large class of cases] 
the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI, § 43) 
as a basis of his theory of meaning, I rather believe that 
Wittgenstein just wants us to grasp that instead of asking 
what is the meaning of a word we just have to look how 
they are actually used in the language. (See PI, § 130) For 
Wittgenstein investigating a metaphor is precisely throwing 
light into those language-games where metaphors are 
used. 
For Wittgenstein proposition is a meaningful 
sentence, something which can be legitimately called to be 
true or false. Therefore metaphors, for one thing, cannot 
be called propositions. Similarly there are sentences that 
function only as a norm of description and whose use is 
not regulated by other sentences. These sentences are 
not bipolar so they are not propositions in Wittgensteinian 
sense. Wittgenstein’s famous metaphor states that these 
sentences are like hinges on which questions we raise and 
our doubts depend on (OC 341). 
Now there is a certain analogy between these 
hinges and metaphor. They both look like propositions but 
lack a meaning. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock says, stressing 
the nonsensicality of hinges, that they are ineffable but 
have a propositional doppelgänger which can be 
meaningfully mediated inside language game. (Moyal-
Sharrock 2005, 94-97) 
I would like to say that there are similarities between 
hinges and metaphors and sometimes metaphor can work 
as a hinge or at least as its doppelgänger. The uttered 
metaphor is like doppelgänger of hinge which has a 
propositional form but which does not refer on any fact on 
the world. But to fully understand the content of metaphor 
it must be interpreted and within this process of 
interpretation those ineffable hinges taken to be certain 
may change. 
Avrum Stroll has said Wittgenstein’s late realization 
to be that by creating mental pictures metaphorical 
language can break with the logical model thus opening 
important new dimensions of communication (Stroll 2004, 
23). Metaphors can replace one logical model on another 
in a sense that the certainties are like axioms which 
regulate our use of language. By changing model new 
axioms arises. The metaphor creates mental picture which 
challenges earlier pictures we lean on and this is just the 
sense how metaphors can enlarge our understanding of 
the world. 
2. World-picture 
World and picture are constant theme in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. Early Wittgenstein said that language is the 
picture of the world and later Wittgenstein rejected this 
idea as misguiding. In his latest philosophy he realised that 
world as a picture is also illuminative metaphor which can 
be used to illustrate how insights are mediated in philoso-
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phy. This is exactly why Wittgenstein introduces concept 
“world-picture”. 
If I read him correctly, in his book Moore and 
Wittgenstein on Certainty Stroll seems to identify World-
picture with community. (Stroll 1994, 170) This is strange 
and somewhat inaccurate because world-picture itself is a 
metaphor which cannot be reduced into such concepts. 
Stroll admits that this is merely a hint of positive account of 
what world-picture might be. (Ibid.) In his later writings he 
seems to stay on negative accounts saying: “it is a deep 
Wittgensteinian point that a philosophical model does not 
give rise to new facts, but may change one’s ‘picture’ of 
the world” (Stroll 2004, 20). Wittgenstein would have 
accepted that world-picture can be altered with metaphors. 
In this sense metaphor seems to have its original Greek 
meaning “to carry over” or “to transfer”. Metaphor carries 
us over the limits of our World-picture. 
Wittgenstein’s first remark of world-picture in On 
Certainty goes as follows: 
 
Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the 
conviction that no man has ever been very far from 
the earth. Nothing in my world-picture speaks in fa-
vour of the opposite. (OC 93, Paul and Anscombe 
translates here picture of the world) 
From this quote it seems that the world-picture is a context 
where we decide whether some belief is true or false. Be-
cause nothing in my world-picture speaks in favour of the 
opposite, I believe that no man has ever been very far 
from the earth. However, world-picture is not any system of 
beliefs, as Wittgenstein is quick to point out, but rather “the 
inherited background against which I distinguish between 
true or false” (OC 94). 
It does not follow from any conscious decision-
making that we end up supporting some world-picture, as 
is the case with the scientific picture of the world. 
Sentences that describe my world-picture are not 
propositions in which we can say if they are true or false, 
but they are like a rules of a game which “can be learned 
purely practically, without learning any explicit rules” (OC 
95, emphasize mine). In this sense when we choose 
between two different pictures of the world, we already 
must have some world-picture to lean on and this is what 
Wittgenstein means by calling world-picture “the inherited 
background”. 
Nevertheless, though world-picture seems to be 
adherent, it is not totally solid. Wittgenstein compares it to 
the mythology that “may change back to the state of flux, 
the river-bed of thoughts may shift” (OC 97). Later he 
describes how this change can take place: 
 
It is clear that our empirical propositions do not all 
have the same status, since one can lay down such 
a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposi-
tion into a norm of description. 
Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes 
experiments with substances in his laboratory and 
now he concludes that this and that takes place 
when there is burning. He does not say that it might 
happen otherwise another time. He has got hold of 
a definite world-picture – not of course one that he 
invented: he learned it as a child. I say world-picture 
and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-
course foundation for his research and as such also 
goes unmentioned. (OC 167) 
If it would happen that Lavoisier’s experiment does not 
support his hypothesis, it would also mean that Lavoisier is 
forced to correct his scientific picture of the world. Yet he 
has a hold of the definite world-picture, which goes 
unmentioned and thus is not disposed to such changes. In 
contrast, world-picture can alter through a change in the 
status of some propositions. By turning some empirical 
proposition as a norm of description we are also changing 
that background against which we distinguish between 
true or false, and for Wittgenstein this background is the 
world-picture. Therefore we can identify world-picture also 
with the hinges we take for certain. 
This is where metaphor enters the picture. As Stroll 
points out, metaphors do not just conjoin two seemingly 
diverse objects, but they also create a kind of mental 
image. (Stroll 2004, 20) They trigger our imagination and 
lure us to imagine in what respect two conjoined objects 
are similar. The textbook example of a metaphor is “girl is 
a rose”, and if we ask how this can be, the answer might 
be that she is beautiful or her nature is spiky or she smells 
good etc. In each of these cases we create a sort of 
mental image, not actual picture of girl being a rose (what 
this could mean?), but she being a rose in certain way, in 
certain context. The metaphor grasps something essential 
of girl’s nature and therefore it also enlarges our way of 
understanding the world, understanding the girl as a rose. 
It seems that it is quite arbitrary when some 
sentence is used as a metaphor and when it is used as a 
literal statement. For Wittgenstein it is the matter of context 
whether the sentence “earth came into being 50 years 
ago” is or is not a metaphor. Literal interpretation of this 
sentence would say that it is true or untrue empirical 
statement, whereas metaphorical interpretation would ask 
in what sense world can be seen existing for just 50 years. 
While talking of 50 years old fantasy book it is legitimate to 
say that the fantasy-world it describes came into being 50 
years ago. Also it could be that inside the fantasy universe 
it has existed only 50 years. 
But understanding the meaning of a metaphorical 
sentence in a context also means sentence’s end as a 
metaphor, because the mental stance towards the world 
changes so that in the new context metaphor has only 
literal meaning. So understanding the metaphor presumes 
that we change context in which we interpret it, and within 
this context metaphor has eligible meaning. But the 
change of this context is somewhat peculiar process: 
 
I can imagine a man who had grown in quite special 
circumstances and been taught that the earth came 
into being 50 years ago, and therefore believed this. 
We might instruct him: the earth has long… etc. – 
We should be trying to give him our world-picture. 
This would happen through a kind of persuasion. 
(OC 262) 
Wittgenstein uses expression “a kind of” because the per-
suasion in question is not typical argumentation. If our 
world-picture alters it must also mean that those hinges we 
take for certain must change and if our certainties change 
this cannot be due to rational process because there can-
not be any criterion they lean on. But metaphor creates a 
picture which may replace the earlier picture. The altera-
tion of the world-picture does not interfere with the facts on 
the world, but nevertheless our mental stance towards it 
changes. In this sense philosophy can have some positive 
content. 
To summarize, Wittgenstein and Davidson would 
have agreed that metaphor has only literal meaning, but 
while Davidson is more interested in the content of 
metaphor, Wittgenstein is interested in the context. 
Wittgenstein uses world-picture as a metaphor of the 
How Metaphors Alter the World-Picture – One Theme in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty — Joose Järvenkylä 
 
 
 152 
pictorial form of the widest imaginable context. Also 
metaphors can be seen to create a picture which 
sometimes replaces our world-picture. Therefore 
Wittgenstein himself gives us a picture trying to persuade 
us to realize that philosophy works with pictures and by 
changing them we also change our understanding of the 
world. 
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The Modal Supervenience of the Concept of Time 
Kasia M. Jaszczolt, Cambridge, England, UK 
Partial arguments in support of the supervenience of the 
concept of time on the concept of degrees of probability 
are ample. Moens and Steedman (1988) and Steedman 
(1997) contend that temporality is supervenient on the 
concepts of perspective and contingency and that tense 
and aspect systems are founded on the same conceptual 
primitives as evidentiality which, by our definition, is a 
concept overlapping with that of epistemic modality. 
Slightly more remote from this thesis is that of van 
Lambalgen and Hamm (2005) who argue that the past, the 
present and the future are linked by means of the 
imposition of goals, planning, and causation. Temporality 
supervenes on what is intended, desired as present, as 
well as on the cause-and-effect relation between events 
and states that are arranged on the line with relations such 
as earlier-than, later-than, or overlap. Finally, Nuyts (2006: 
19) proposes that modality occupies a higher place than 
time in the hierarchy of semantic categories, which means 
that it is of a higher level of abstraction. 
It is by no means a new idea that time and modality 
are interconnected. But it is much less often claimed, and 
much more controversial, that the concept of time 
supervenes on the concept modality or that time is 
modality. Nevertheless, we can find plenty of arguments in 
support of this view if we are prepared to look through 
different domains, including the behaviour of languages 
from diversified language families, and collect all extant 
information. In this paper I assess some arguments and 
evidence according to which time and modality are related 
by supervenience relation and end with speculating on the 
possibility that they are one conceptual category. 
Peter Ludlow (1999) argues that the future is 
predictability or potentiality, ‘disposition of the world’, and 
hence is to be regarded as a modal concept. He analyses 
the future-tense morphemes in Spanish as consisting of an 
irrealis marker ar and a ‘future’ ending. For example, 
hablaré, ‘I will speak’, is analysed not as habl + aré, but 
instead habl + ar + é. Moreover, as he points out, in Italian, 
to express futurity, one standardly uses a present tense 
form (e.g. vado, ‘I go’) reserving the future tense form 
(andrò, ‘I will go’) for situations of lesser probability or 
uncertainty. Similarly, in English, futurity can be expressed 
with any of the forms listed as (1)-(4), where the present-
tense forms in (1) and (2) express higher certainty (see 
Jaszczolt 2005, ch. 6). 
(1) Peter goes to London tomorrow morning. 
(2) Peter is going to London tomorrow morning. 
(3) Peter is going to go to London tomorrow morning. 
(4) Peter will go to London tomorrow morning. 
Such scales pertaining to degrees of speaker’s commit-
ment to the proposition and the degrees of certainty with 
which the speaker issues a judgement testify to a very 
intimate connection between time and modality. And since 
these scales are scales of modality, modality is the basis 
for temporal supervenience in the case of expressions of 
the future. 
In spite of the rather unquestionable unreal 
character of the future, not all languages express it as 
equally ‘unreal’. As de Haan (2006: 41-42) points out, a 
Native American language Caddo treats the future as a 
realis category. The future morpheme -ʔaʔ is combined 
with the realis prefix ci- as in (5): 
 
(5) cííbáw-ʔaʔ 
ci     yi   bahw ʔaʔ 
Realis  1Sg  see  Fut 
‘I will look at it.’ 
In a Californian language Central Pomo, on the other 
hand, the future can be accompanied either by realis or by 
irrealis, depending on the speaker’s judgement concerning 
the degree of probability of the described event (see ibid.: 
42). This freedom of combination with realis or irrealis 
constitutes a strong argument in favour of the underlying 
modal character of the future: states of affairs are de-
scribed as more, or less, certain. This explanation is fur-
ther supported by the fact that there are languages in 
which there is a choice between different future mor-
phemes to express different degrees of certainty (see ibid.: 
50 for examples). The pairing with the realis category in 
Caddo, on the other hand, is more difficult to explain with-
out a more detailed analysis of the devices available in 
that language. It may, for example, signal that in different 
languages there is a different degree of reliance on the 
epistemology of time. When the degree is high, the inter-
nal, psychological time and the irrealis prevails; when it is 
low, the ontology of time and the B series surface out as 
realis. The fact that generally in languages of the world the 
future pairs with modality (van der Auwera and Plungian 
1998) appears to testify to the strong cognitive reasons for 
the predominance of the internal time.  
The past is governed by the same principle of 
supervenience on modality. Although it is a little more 
difficult to see because, unlike the uncertain future, the 
past may seem to consist of what ‘actually happened’ and 
is subject to judgements of truth or falsity, the 
supervenience is there nevertheless. Ludlow (1999: 160) 
points out that ‘in most non-Indo-European languages the 
so-called past is generally just some form of aspectual 
marker’. Similarly, in English the past-tense morpheme -ed 
is the leftover from a perfect aspectual marker. Next, past 
tense is used in counterfactuals to express an alternative 
present state of the world (or a certain now of an 
alternative possible world) as in (6). 
(6) If I had more time, I would meet my friends more often. 
Ludlow provides pertinent references to the accounts on 
which the past is taken to mean ‘remoteness’, ‘remoteness 
from reality’, and ‘exclusion’. But here is where Ludlow’s 
analysis differs from mine. For Ludlow, states of affairs can 
be ‘remote in time’ or ‘remote in possibility’. Hence, he 
speculates that there is ‘some deeper third element [that] 
underlies both tense and counterfactual modality’ (p. 161). 
He proposes evidentiality as this underlying parent cate-
gory: all past-tense morphology is morphology of evidential 
markers. This recourse to evidentiality is, however, super-
fluous when we redefine epistemic modality as inferential 
evidentiality. Evidence that we have now about what hap-
pened in the past allows us to use indicators of the past 
tense but by the same token we are detaching ourselves 
from the now in the sense of diminished probability as 
compared with that of a statement in the present tense. 
Hence, the situation with the past is analogous to that with 
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the future described above: the truth of now is given in and 
by the now: the truth about the future and about the past is 
given in the now and by what we now remember about the 
past, or anticipate about the future (see Dummett 2004). 
This is how the modal detachment is created and cannot 
be escaped. De Haan (2006: 51) reports on the recon-
struction of the tense-aspect-modality system in Proto-Uto-
Aztecan where the irrealis morpheme is the same as the 
past tense morpheme and both are founded on an abstract 
conceptual feature called dissociative: past tense marks a 
dissociation from now, just as irrealis marks a dissociation 
from reality. This construal derives from the Aristotelian 
view according to which statements can be true or false 
even though we may not be in a position to know the truth 
value (cf. Kaufmann et al. 2006). Varieties of this view 
include evaluations of anticipations and memories dis-
cussed below or versions of temporal logic where repre-
senting the past as modality has also been successfully 
attempted. Thomason (2002) proposes to view pastness 
as historical necessity founded on the model of forward-
branching time: with the passage of time, historical possi-
bilities diminish monotonically. 
Last but not least, it is necessary to mention 
languages in which formal indicators of time are optional. 
In such languages we should investigate not only 
expressions of time but also the semantic category of 
temporality which is often realised through pragmatic 
inference. In Thai, both tense and aspect can be left out of 
the sentence and the specification of these can be left to 
the addressee’s pragmatic inference. For example, f3on 
t1ok1 (‘rain fall’), can express a wide range of temporal and 
modal commitments from ‘it is raining’, through ‘it was 
raining’ and ‘it will rain’, to ‘it might rain’. When a modal 
marker is present, its meaning can also vary and the 
contextual accommodation normally allows the addressee 
to recover the speaker’s intentions without giving rise to 
ambiguity. A lexical item d1ay1II, with the lexical meaning 
‘to receive’, can perform the function of a modality marker 
expressing ability. Sentence (7) can be translated as a 
statement of Gremlin’s (the cat’s) ability but the temporal 
location is not specified, as (7a) and (7b) indicate.  
(7) k1r3eml3in c1ap ng3u: d1ay1II 
    Gremlin     catch snake d1ay1II 
(7a) Gremlin was able to catch a snake (and he caught it).  
(7b) Gremlin can catch a snake (if he wants to). 
(from Srioutai 2006: 109; see also Jaszczolt and Srioutai 
forthcoming.) Contextual information allows the addressee 
to opt for (7a) or (7b). In addition, as Srioutai (2006) dem-
onstrates, d1ay1II comes with a salient, preferred meaning 
of past tense. In other words, when context does not sug-
gest otherwise, (7) is taken to mean (7a). Pastness is the 
default, but cancellable, interpretation. It is not encoded, it 
is merely recovered as the preferred and more common 
interpretation. Similarly, a Thai word c1a, normally trans-
lated as the English will, is not necessarily a marker of 
futurity. Just as the English will, c1a can assume the  
meaning of epistemic necessity (as in 8) or the habitual 
meaning, also called dispositional necessity (as in 9).  
 
                                                     
 
1 1,2,3 and I, II stand for tone markers. 
(8) m3ae:r3i:I  kh3ong  c1a  d1u:  ‘1op1e:r3a:I  y3u:I  t1o’nn3i:II 
  Mary    may    c1a see  opera     Prog now 
 
  ‘Mary will be in the opera now.’ 
 
(9) b1a:ngkh3r3angII  m3ae:r3i:I c1a p1ay1 d1u: ‘1op1e:r3a:I 
  Sometimes     Mary    c1a go   see opera  
 
  n3ay2  ch3udw3o’m 
  in    tracksuit 
‘Mary will sometimes go to the opera in her tracksuit.’ 
(from Srioutai 2006: 125). Unlike the English will, c1a in-
corporates readily into the Thai grammatical system and 
expresses modality with predominant future reference, just 
as d1ay1II expresses modality with predominant past ref-
erence. This behaviour of modals, combined with the situa-
tion in which the language itself does not have an obliga-
tory marking of tense, provides a strong argument for the 
supervenience of temporality on modality in the sense of 
conceptual and semantic inheritance: modal detachment is 
grammaticalized, and temporal detachment follows as 
defaults or context-driven non-default interpretations. 
The past, present and future, the A-theory terms, 
are terms pertaining to human experience. While in reality 
time exists but does not flow, for human agents it is the 
now that has the privileged status; I am experiencing the 
symptoms of flu now, I perceive the clock on my 
mantelpiece now, I hear its ticking as I am writing these 
words. It is the privileged status of the now that forces us 
to conceptualize the not now not as experience, but as an 
anticipation or a memory of an experience. To turn to 
McTaggart (1908: 127) again: 
 
‘Why do we believe that events are to be distin-
guished as past, present, and future? I conceive 
that the belief arises from distinctions in our own 
experience. 
At any moment I have certain perceptions, I have 
also the memory of certain other perceptions, and 
the anticipation of others again.’   
Unless they are illusory, perceptions are real and certain. 
Memories of perceptions and anticipations of perceptions 
are removed from this certainty to some degree, just as the 
past and the future are removed from the very central ex-
perience of the now. In this paper I considered a selection 
of arguments in support of treating the semantic category 
of time as derived from modality. There is only a small step 
from there to the thesis that internal time itself, i.e. the 
psychological future, present and past, are modalities. For 
this step we will have to utilize the premise that semantic 
categories are a window on conceptual categories – in 
agreement with the rich tradition in various strands of se-
mantic theory, from broadly defined cognitive (e.g. 
Jackendoff 2002) to dynamic truth-conditional (Hamm et 
al. 2006). This semantic analysis of temporal expressions, 
albeit pertinent, is a topic for another occasion (see 
Jaszczolt forthcoming, ch. 4). 
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The Determination of Form by Syntactic Employment:  
a Model and a Difficulty 
Colin Johnston, London, England, UK 
1. 
An entity’s logical character, for Russell and Wittgenstein, 
is a matter of the ways in which it may combine with other 
entities to form atomic facts. Where Russell gives a theory 
of the logical constitution of atomic facts, however, Witt-
genstein asserts that the ways in which entities combine in 
facts can be known only a posteriori through the process 
of analysis.1 Russell was thus mistaken in Wittgenstein’s 
eyes in laying out as he did his logical variety of particulars 
and the various kinds of universal. Pressing the Tractarian 
position, Ramsey claims that we know “nothing whatever 
about the forms of atomic propositions”. We do not know, 
for example, “that there are not atomic facts consisting of 
two terms of the same type” (Ramsey 1990 p29). 
I shall suggest that this Tractarian agnosticism is in 
tension with the Tractarian doctrine that the logico-
syntactic use of a sign determines a logical form. Imagine 
a ‘world’ in which there are only two forms (that is, logical 
types) of object and only one mode of combination, a 
mode in which a single object of each form is combined. 
The symmetry of this world is such that the two object 
forms are internally indistinguishable. The internal 
character of each form is exhausted by its being the form 
of an object whose only possibility for combination is in a 
certain mode with an object of the other form, and the 
internal character of the mode of combination is exhausted 
by its being a mode of combination of one object of each 
form. Wittgenstein’s agnosticism regarding the forms of 
reality means that he cannot say in advance that reality 
does not, like our imagined ‘world’, include distinct but 
internally indistinguishable forms. A logico-syntactic use, 
however, is to determine a logical form by virtue of 
determining the internal nature of that form only. If reality 
turns out to include internally indistinguishable forms it 
follows that the determination as envisaged of logical form 
by logico-syntactic use will not everywhere be possible. 
To bring this concern into focus I want to develop a 
simple, semi-formal account of syntactic use, of form, and 
of the place of syntactic use in the determination of form. 
The account will be appropriately general to accommodate 
Wittgenstein’s ignorance of the nature of the forms of 
reality. I do not claim that the semi-formal work is at every 
point implicit in the Tractatus. Rather, the work is intended 
as an elucidatory model of certain Tractarian ideas. 
2. 
The notion to be developed is of an atomic syntactic sys-
tem. An atomic syntactic system S has: 
a vocabulary V of signs, and 
a set T = {Mj: j∈J} of sign types 
                                                     
 
1 See Wittgenstein 1961 5.55 – 5.5571. See also Wittgenstein 1993 
pp. 29-30 and Wittgenstein 1979 p. 42.) 
where each Mj⊆V and J is an indexing set. Signs here are 
typographically identified marks. Further, the system S 
has: 
a set C of manners of sign combination. 
A manner of sign combination c∈C will be a manner of 
combination of a determinate, finite number of ordered 
signs. The combination in mode c of the signs s1, s2, …, sn 
so ordered is denoted by c(s1, s2, …, sn). Finally for S there 
is, for each manner of combination c∈C, a rule of the form: 
x1∈Mf(c,1), x2∈Mf(c,2), …, xn∈Mf(c,n) ⇔ c(x1, x2, …, xn)∈F 
where f is some (appropriately partial) function from C×ℕ to 
J. Set F is the set of formulae of S; it contains no members 
besides those provided by the system’s rules of combina-
tion. Note that the rules for membership of F have the form 
of equivalences. What is not allowed in a syntactic system 
is, say, c(s,t)∈F and c(u,v)∈F, but c(s,v)∉F. Each position 
in each manner of combination determines a set of signs 
which figure in that position in a formula, and whether or 
not a combination in a mode of C of signs from V is a for-
mula of the system depends on the signs’ positions in the 
combination and their membership of such sets only. 
Next we want to reach an idea of the structure of a 
syntactic system, abstracting away from the signs and 
manners of combination deployed in any particular system 
instantiating that structure. The thought here is that what is 
of structural interest is simply the number of positions 
belonging to each sign type in each manner of 
combination. Thus let’s say: 
X∈T occurs n (≥0) times in combination c if, and 
only if, X=Mj and exactly n of f(c,i) are equal to j 
And with this we make the definition: 
Two atomic syntactic systems S1 and S2 with man-
ners of combination C1 and C2 and sets of syntac-
tic mark-types T1 and T2, are isomorphic if, and 
only if, there exists a bijection α:C1→C2 and a bi-
jection β:T1→T2 such that, for all c∈C1 and X∈T1, 
(X occurs n times in c) ⇔ (β(X) occurs n times in 
α(c)).  
Such a bijection (α,β):C1×T1→C2×T2 is an isomorphism 
from S1 to S2. 
The notion of an atomic syntactic system and its 
structure is now given. Let’s take a look at what its interest 
might be. 
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3. 
An atomic syntactic system is a system of combinations of 
marks. Whether and how certain marks in a system’s vo-
cabulary may combine with each other to make formulae 
of the system depends on what types of marks they are. 
With this in view we could say: a syntactic use of a sign is 
a role that sign has in some syntactic system S as a possi-
ble element of members of F, the set of formulae of S, by 
virtue of its membership of a particular sign type of S. Of 
course, such a use is bound to the modes of combination 
and sign types of S, but this tie is something we can ab-
stract away from. If S1 and S2 are isomorphic systems 
with isomorphism (α,β), then the role a mark has in S1 by 
virtue of its membership of a sign type X of S1 is structur-
ally equivalent to the role in S2 had by a member of β(X) 
by virtue of its membership of that set. And at first glance 
one might think to say here: the two syntactic uses deter-
mine the same form. With its syntactic use in a certain 
system, a sign determines a place in the abstract combina-
torial structure instantiated by that system – it determines a 
form. 
On closer inspection, these last two sentences will 
be seen to be slightly hasty. But let’s not worry about that 
right away. Rather, let’s run with them and look instead at 
a few concrete examples of atomic syntactic systems, 
beginning with the case of a Russellian system. A 
Russellian atomic system has: 
FR = ∪n≥2 {cn(x1, x2, …, xn): x1∈Un-1, x2, …, xn∈P} 
Un here is the set of universal signs of degree n, and P is 
the set of particular signs. In line with traditional scripts, 
one might use P = {‘ai’}, Un = {‘Rni’} and set cn(x1, x2, …, xn) 
to be the combination that the xi are written in order. (Thus 
FR would contain such formulae as ‘R11a1’, ‘R24a1a2’, 
‘R32a5a1a6’.) Of course, many other sign types and combi-
natorial modes could be used; the resulting systems 
would, however, all bear the same structure. 
Systems with structures quite different from the 
Russellian structure can of course be readily concocted. 
Ramsey envisages the possibility of atomic facts 
consisting of two entities of the same type. Forms 
answering to this description would arise within such (non-
isomorphic) systems as S1, S2 and S3 defined by: 
F1 = {c1(x, y): x, y∈A}, 
F2 = {c2(x, y): x, y∈B} ∪ {c3(x, y): x∈C, y∈D }, and 
F3 = {c4(x, y): x, y∈E} ∪ {c5(x, y, z): x∈E, y∈F, z∈F} 
Ramsey’s claim against Russell is that we have no more 
reason to believe that logical forms – the forms of reality – 
are those generated in FR any more than they are those 
generated by such entirely different systems as F1, F2 and 
F3. 
4. 
Pausing on the system S2, an interesting possibility may 
come into view. An atomic syntactic system, one will no-
tice, can be non-trivially self-isomorphic. A mapping 
(α,β):{c2, c3}×{B, C, D}→{c2, c3}×{B, C, D} set to identity 
other than β(C) = D and β(D) = C is an isomorphism from 
S2 to itself. Similarly we might consider a system S4 de-
fined by: 
F4 = {c6(x, y): x, y∈G} ∪ {c7(x, y): x, y∈G} 
This system is again non-trivially self-isomorphic with a 
non-trivial isomorphism taking G to G, c6 to c7, and c7 to 
c6. 
With such possibilities in mind, let’s make a few fur-
ther definitions. Consider a system S with manners of 
combination C and set of sign types T. Then for each t∈T 
and c∈C let 
Λt = {x∈T: there is an isomorphism (α,β):C×T→C×T such that β(t)=x} 
Γc = {x∈C: there is an isomorphism (α,β):C×T→C×T such that α(c)=x} 
From this we may say that a system S with manners of 
combination set C and set of syntactic mark-types T is 
symmetrical with respect to K⊆T if, and only if, there exists 
t∈T such that K=Λt≠{t}. Similarly S is symmetrical with 
respect to L⊆C if, and only if, there exists c∈C such that 
L=Γc≠{c}. If S is not symmetrical with respect to any set 
then S is asymmetrical.2 
How are we to place the possibility of symmetry 
within atomic syntactic systems? Well, Wittgenstein 
envisages the possibility of distinct objects which are 
internally indistinguishable.3 In a similar vein we imagined 
above a ‘world’ (call it W1) in which there are only two 
forms of object and only one mode of combination, a mode 
in which one object of either form is combined. The two 
object forms of this world are distinct but the symmetry of 
the combinatorial situation is such that they are internally 
indistinguishable. Alternatively we could imagine a world 
W2 in which there is a single form of objects and two 
modes of combination, each mode being a mode of 
combination of two objects. Here the two modes are 
distinct but internally indistinguishable. And what is in 
general being imagined with such indistinguishabilities, we 
can see, are precisely worlds whose structures are 
instantiated by symmetric syntactic systems. S4 above, for 
instance, instantiates the structure of W2 and is 
symmetrical with respect to {c6, c7}. The structure of W1 is 
instantiated by a system S5 defined by 
F5 = {c8(x, y): x∈H, y∈I} 
which is symmetrical with respect to {H, I}. 
5. 
It would appear that we should revise the general thought 
above that a sign in use in an atomic syntactic system 
determines a place in the abstract combinatorial structure 
instantiated by that system, that is that it determines a 
form. Take the system S2. This system has a structure 
with three forms; two of these three forms are, however, 
internally indistinguishable. A sign of S2 which is a mem-
ber of B determines as such the distinguishable of these 
three forms; in use as a member of B the sign has that 
form. Members of C and D, however, determine as such 
only the class of the two indistinguishable forms: their syn-
tactic use gives the shared nature of the two forms but 
                                                     
 
2 Note that the Λt and Γc partition T and C respectively. They cover T and C, 
for t∈Λt and c∈Γc (put (α,β) to identity). Next, if sign type q∈Λr∩Λs then there 
exist isomorphisms (α1,β1) and (α2,β2) on S such that β1(r)=β2(s)=q. Then 
(α2-1.α1, β2-1.β1) is an isomorphism on S such that β2-1.β1 (r)=s. (The 
inverse of an isomorphism is an isomorphism (as defined), and the composi-
tion of isomorphisms is an isomorphism.) Now take some u∈Λs. There exists 
an isomorphism (α3,β3) on S such that β3(s)=u. But then (α3.α2-1.α1, β3.β2-
1.β1) is an isomorphism on S such that β3.β2-1.β1(r)=u. Thus u∈Λr and so 
Λs⊆Λr.  Similarly Λr⊆Λs, and so Λr=Λs. In the same way, if there is a mode of 
combination d∈Γe∩Γf then Γe=Γf. 
3 See Wittgenstein 1961 §2.0233. Indeed, he envisages the possibility of two 
entities which are externally as well as internally indistinguishable (Wittgen-
stein 1961 §§2.02331, 5.5302). 
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does not select between them. Noting the possibility of 
such a situation one might move to say that a syntactic use 
determines not a form but a form type. Taking up this de-
scription of the matter one needs, however, to bear in mind 
that the number of ‘tokens’ had by a particular ‘form type’ 
is internal to the type. Where the type has only one token, 
then, the determination is of nothing less than the token. 
In whatever terms one chooses to weaken the 
general claim that syntactic uses determine forms, the 
Tractarian position that a sign in logico-syntactic use 
determines a logical form comes under threat. Wittgenstein 
does not know what the logical forms are; he does not 
know the logical structure of reality. Therefore he does not 
know that the structure of reality is not symmetrical with 
regard to certain object forms. But if reality is so 
symmetrical, a logico-syntactic employment of a sign – that 
is, a syntactic employment of a sign in a system 
instantiating the structure of reality – will not always 
determine a unique logical form. 
The point might be thought to be somewhat 
nitpicking. A logico-syntactic use is guaranteed to 
determine, as said, a ‘form type’, even if it is not certain 
that all logico-syntactic uses will determine a single form. 
Is this not good enough for Wittgenstein? Well I cannot 
here follow through what all the repercussions might be for 
his system if the thesis of the determination of logical form 
by logico-syntactic use is relaxed as mooted. We can 
quickly note, however, that on pain of the possibility of 
nonsense Wittgenstein will have to allow that what one  
 
symbol – that is a sign in logico-syntactic use – can mean 
might depend on what other symbols of the language 
actually mean. To see this note first that two signs in the 
same use may not refer to entities of distinct types: two 
signs in the same use will be intersubstitutable in 
propositions, and so their reference to entities of distinct 
types would entail the possibility of nonsense propositions. 
Now suppose that reality has two internally 
indistinguishable forms. In a language instantiating the 
structure of reality there will, under this supposition, be a 
logico-syntactic use u which determines the type of these 
indistinguishable forms but does not select between them 
(in fact there will be two such uses). A sign in use u will 
not, however, be free to refer to an object of either of these 
two forms: it will, on pain of the possibility of nonsense, be 
constrained to refer only to objects of the same form as 
those referred to by other signs in the same use. 
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Zwischen Humes Gesetz und „Sollen impliziert Können“ –  
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen empirisch-normativer Zusammenarbeit 
in der Bioethik (Teil I)* 
Michael Jungert, Bamberg & Tübingen, Deutschland 
Vorbemerkung 
Die Beiträge „Zwischen Humes Gesetz und „Sollen impli-
ziert Können“ – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen empirisch-
normativer Zusammenarbeit in der Bioethik, Teil I und II“ 
stellen eine Sinneinheit dar, sind jedoch aus technischen 
Gründen in zwei Abschnitte unterteilt. 
1. Empirie und (Bio-) Ethik – Alte Probleme 
und neue Dringlichkeiten 
Bioethik ist in den letzten Jahren zu einem „Exportschla-
ger“ der Philosophie avanciert. Diese Entwicklung hat un-
ter anderem zur Folge, dass sich neben Philosophie und 
Theologie als ethischen Stammdisziplinen auch zahlreiche 
andere Fächer aus dem Bereich der Natur- und Sozialwis-
senschaften zunehmend mit bioethischen Fragestellungen 
auseinandersetzen. 
Die dadurch entstandene Multidisziplinarität hat zum 
einen zwar wesentlich zur gegenwärtig großen Akzeptanz 
und institutionellen Verankerung der Bioethik beigetragen, 
verleiht zum anderen aber auch der Frage nach dem 
Verhältnis zwischen Empirie und normativer Theorie neue 
Brisanz. Besonders intensiv werden dabei Debatten um 
das Verhältnis von sozialwissenschaftlicher Empirie und 
normativer Theorie geführt. Dies hängt in erster Linie damit 
zusammen, dass insbesondere die empirischen 
Sozialwissenschaften, worunter neben empirischer 
Soziologie auch Disziplinen wie Psychologie, Ethnologie, 
empirische Anthropologie etc. fallen, traditionell einen 
schweren Stand in normativ-bioethischen Debatten hatten: 
Viele philosophische Ethiker befürchteten, der Einfluss 
soziologischer Kontextualisierung auf normative 
Theoriebildung führe zwangsläufig zu ethischem 
Relativismus (vgl. Borry et al. 2005: 60). 
Zwar sind solche Vorbehalte mittlerweile faktisch in 
den Hintergrund gerückt, systematische Analysen von 
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen empirisch-normativer 
Zusammenarbeit sind jedoch weiterhin dringend not-
wendig, vor allem, weil in den bisherigen Debatten 
zentrale philosophische Argumente und Theorien nicht 
angemessen berücksichtigt werden, was zahlreiche 
begriffliche und argumentative Unklarheiten zur Folge hat. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund werden wir im ersten Teil 
dieses Beitrags zunächst drei idealtypische Modelle 
empirisch-normativer Zusammenarbeit vorstellen. Daran 
anschließend entwickeln wir wissenschaftstheoretische 
und formallogische Kriterien einer adäquaten 
Zusammenarbeit. Die formallogischen Analysen werden im 
zweiten Teil fortgesetzt, um darauf aufbauend eine Be-
wertung der drei Modelle vornehmen zu können. 
Abschließend skizzieren wir drei konkrete Modi adäquater 
normativ-empirischer Zusammenarbeit. 
2. Formen und Kriterien empirisch-
normativer Zusammenarbeit 
G. Weaver und L. Trevino folgend lassen sich drei Ansätze 
empirisch-normativer Zusammenarbeit unterscheiden, 
welche die Autoren als symbiotisch, parallel und integrativ 
bezeichnen (vgl. Weaver & Trevino 1994). 
Symbiotische Ansätze postulieren bestimmte 
Kontaktstellen zwischen Empirie und (Angewandter) Ethik, 
ohne jedoch an der grundsätzlichen theoretischen 
Eigenständigkeit beider Gebiete zu rühren. Dement-
sprechend zeichnet sich eine zulässige Zusammenarbeit 
dadurch aus, dass theoretische und methodologische 
Kerne beider Disziplinen strikt getrennt bleiben, Empirie 
und Ethik aber dennoch bzw. gerade deshalb auf eine 
Kooperation angewiesen sind. 
Vertreter des parallelen Ansatzes sprechen sich 
explizit gegen eine Zusammenarbeit von Empirie und 
normativer Theorie aus und fordern eine strikte Trennung 
beider Bereiche. Neben pragmatischen Faktoren, wie etwa 
mangelnder Kenntnis der Theorien und Methoden des 
jeweils anderen Faches, werden vor allem fundamentale 
theoretische Aspekte als Begründung angeführt. Dazu 
gehören die notwendige Unterscheidung zwischen Fakten 
und Normen und das Wertfreiheitspostulat empirischer 
Wissenschaft sowie der auf David Hume zurückgehende 
Sein-Sollens-Fehlschluss. 
Integrative Ansätze postulieren schließlich das 
Gegenteil. Durch die Verschmelzung der theoretischen 
Kerne beider Wissenschaftsbereiche sollen die Grenzen 
zwischen Empirie und normativer Ethik aufgelöst werden. 
Ein Beispiel für diese Position ist der sogenannte 
„Integrated Empirical Ethics“-Ansatz von B. Molewijk et al. 
(vgl. Molewijk et al. 2004). Eine grundlegende Annahme 
dieses Ansatzes besteht darin, dass Fakten und Normen 
nicht (klar) voneinander getrennt werden können, weil 
Fakten in der sozialen Praxis immer normativ aufgeladen 
sind (vgl. Molewijk et al. 2004: 58). Dies führt zur 
Forderung einer engen Kooperation zwischen Sozial-
wissenschaft und normativer Ethik mit dem Ziel, Moral-
theorie und empirische Daten miteinander zu verflechten, 
um letztlich normative Konklusionen unter Rückgriff auf die 
jeweils relevante Sozialwissenschaft zu ziehen (vgl. 
Molewijk et al. 2004: 57). Diese Forderungen gehen einher 
mit der Behauptung, Humes Gesetz stelle kein grund-
sätzliches Hindernis für eine derartige Zusammenarbeit 
bzw. Integration dar. 
3. Wissenschaftstheoretische Grundlagen 
empirisch-normativer Zusammenarbeit 
Eine Bewertung der genannten Ansätze muss also letztlich 
auf der Beantwortung der basalen Frage beruhen, ob em-
pirisch-normative Zusammenarbeit in (bio-)ethischen Fra-
gestellungen möglich ist und, wenn ja, wie sie aussehen 
kann.  
* Der zweite Teil dieses Aufsatzes findet sich weiter unten; siehe den Beitrag 
von Sebastian Schleidgen. 
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Eine fundamentale Rolle kommt dabei der 
Unterscheidung zwischen Fakten und Normen zu, die 
aktuell Gegenstand zahlreicher Debatten ist. Offenkundig 
hängt es wesentlich von der Position bezüglich dieser 
Kategorien ab, ob überhaupt sinnvoll über eine 
Zusammenarbeit gesprochen werden kann. Die Rede 
davon macht offenbar nur dann Sinn, wenn von zwei nicht-
identischen Entitäten gesprochen werden kann, d.h wenn 
der Bereich des Normativen in einem gewissen Sinn 
selbstständig und unabhängig vom Bereich der Fakten ist. 
Dies gibt uns Gelegenheit zur Klärung einiger wichtiger 
Punkte: Unseren nachfolgenden Überlegungen liegt die 
Ablehnung jedweder objektivistischer Normativitäts-
konzeptionen zugrunde. Die Frage nach der Geltung von 
Normen kann nicht, wie im Fall von Fakten, durch die 
Untersuchung der Beschaffenheit der Welt geklärt werden. 
Normen werden nicht entdeckt oder aufgespürt, sondern 
im Kontext verschiedenster Maßstäbe definiert. Die 
Anerkennung dieser „menschlich-kulturellen Leistung“ 
(Birnbacher 2004: 6) führt weder zu inakzeptablen 
ontologischen Dualismen, noch steht sie in einem 
Zusammenhang mit Letztbegründungsansprüchen. Wenn 
etwa Gerhard Engel als Vertreter naturalistischer Ethik 
schreibt, es gelte zunächst „die Realität als Normquelle 
anzuerkennen“, um daran anschließend die Frage zu 
stellen „Warum soll der Philosoph moralische Werte erst 
begründen müssen, wo sie doch in überreicher Anzahl 
vorzufinden sind?“ (Engel 2004: 52), so ist die Antwort 
darauf: Natürlich sind moralische Werte in der (sozialen) 
Wirklichkeit vorzufinden. Jedoch ist damit noch nichts über 
die Richtigkeit moralischer Normen gesagt. Hier zeigt sich 
ein kategorialer Unterschied, der bei der Frage nach 
Fakten und Normen häufig übersehen zu werden scheint: 
der Unterschied zwischen Feststellungen und Begrün-
dungen. Während Faktenwissenschaften erstere unter-
suchen können, bedürfen letztere immer eines nicht-
faktischen Kontextes, aus dem Maßstäbe und Kriterien 
zuallererst generiert werden. 
Werfen wir zur weiteren Erhellung dieses 
Unterschiedes zunächst einen Blick auf die wissen-
schaftstheoretischen Grundlagen normativer Theorie-
bildung: Grundsätzliches Ziel von Moraltheorien ist es, im 
Hinblick auf einen normativ konstruierten moralischen 
Idealzustand handlungsleitende Normen bzw. Prinzipien 
zu entwerfen. Die Rede vom moralischen Idealzustand 
meint dabei keine Letztbegründbarkeit moralischer 
Normen, sondern lediglich jenen Zustand, in dem die 
spezifische Zielvorgabe einer Moraltheorie vollständig 
erreicht ist: Der utilitaristische Idealzustand bestünde 
beispielsweise darin, stets die Nutzensumme aller von 
einer Handlung Betroffenen zu maximieren. Das bedeutet 
jedoch nicht, dass ausschließlich konsequentialistische 
Theorien einen moralischen Idealzustand anstreben. So 
definiert z.B. Kant den Idealzustand als einen Zustand, in 
dem ausschließlich im Sinne der reinen praktischen 
Vernunft gehandelt wird. 
Handlungsleitende Normen im Hinblick auf einen 
moralischen Idealzustand zu entwerfen, bedeutet nun 
zunächst, „Idealnormen“ (Birnbacher 1988: 16) zu 
entwickeln, die auf idealtypische Akteure ausgerichtet 
werden. Die Umsetzung der Idealnormen würde folglich in 
den avisierten moralischen Idealzustand münden. Jedoch 
handelt es sich bei den Akteuren der Alltagspraxis nicht 
um ideale Akteure, weil sie „in ihrem Denken und Handeln 
kognitiven und motivationalen Beschränkungen 
unterworfen sind“ (Birnbacher 1988: 16). Deshalb müssen 
Moraltheorien in einem zweiten Schritt die zuvor 
entwickelten Idealnormen in Praxisnormen übersetzen, um 
den Grenzen menschlichen Denkens und Handelns 
gerecht zu werden. In diesem Übersetzungsprozess sind 
sie auf empirische Methoden angewiesen, welche die 
jeweils relevanten Grenzen menschlichen Denkens und 
Handelns erfassen können. Zentral ist hier, dass 
Praxisnormen immer auf Idealnormen basieren müssen. 
Denn ein moralisches Sollen kann ausschließlich durch 
Idealnormen etabliert werden, Praxisnormen hingegen 
dienen dazu, die menschliche Praxis so weit wie möglich 
an dieses Sollen anzupassen und können selbst kein 
moralisches Sollen etablieren. Dies liegt in erster Linie 
daran, dass eine Entwicklung von Praxisnormen ohne 
zugrunde liegende Idealnormen beliebige Beschrän-
kungen menschlichen Denkens und Handelns anführen, 
mithin beliebige Normen für die Alltagspraxis „begründen“ 
könnte. Liegen hingegen Idealnormen zugrunde, lassen 
sich im Zuge der Übersetzung in Praxisnormen nur solche 
Beschränkungen anführen, die eine Umsetzung dieser 
spezifischen Idealnormen faktisch verhindern würden. 
Man könnte hier einwenden, das Moment der 
Beliebigkeit werde dadurch lediglich in den Bereich der 
Idealnormen verlagert. Dies ist insofern richtig, als wir 
Idealnormen keinerlei objektivistische Annahmen zu-
grunde legen, die den Beliebigkeitsverdacht ausräumen 
würden. Dennoch ermöglicht bzw. erleichtert die 
Verschiebung von Begründungen in den Bereich der 
Idealnormen einige zentrale moraltheoretische Leistungen: 
Zum einen eröffnet sie einen Reflexionsraum, der im 
Gegensatz zur Diskussion einzelner Praxisnormen 
fundamentale systematische Analysen unter Berück-
sichtigung von Kriterien wie Kohärenz, Reichweite etc. 
ermöglicht. Der letztlich unvermeidbare Begründungs-
abbruch findet dadurch im Idealfall auf einem vergleichs-
weise hohen Reflexionsniveau statt. Zum anderen 
erleichtert der Rekurs auf den empiriefreien Bereich der 
Idealnormen eine Fokussierung auf die jeweiligen 
Kernprobleme, die durch die empirische Komplexität im 
Bereich der Praxisnormen nahezu unmöglich ist. 
Bei der Betrachtung von Idealnormen ist allerdings 
zu berücksichtigen, dass diese oftmals um sogenannte 
Brückenprinzipien erweitert werden. Brückenprinzipien 
sind Sätze nach dem Schema „Eine Handlung H ist 
moralisch geboten gemäß der Norm N genau dann wenn 
das empirisch zu überprüfende Kriterium K gegeben ist“. 
Sie binden demnach die Geltung einer Norm an ein 
situationsspezifisch empirisch zu überprüfendes Kriterium 
K (vgl. Ruß 2002: 119). Dabei ist es gleichgültig, welche 
moralischen Vorschriften N formuliert. Wesentlich ist, dass 
das mit ihr verknüpfte Brückenprinzip eine nur empirisch 
zu leistende Überprüfung von K verlangt, um festzustellen, 
ob N in der vorliegenden Situation Geltung hat. 
Mit Hinblick auf unsere Fragestellung ergibt sich, 
dass ausschließlich normative Ethik in der Lage ist, 
Idealnormen zu entwickeln, die Grundlage jeder ange-
messenen Moraltheorie sind. Schließlich sind es normative 
Theoretiker, die qua ihres Methodenrepertoires „mit 
moralischen Begriffen, Argumenten, Normen und 
Wertsystemen umzugehen“ verstehen (Birnbacher 2003: 
61). Auf der anderen Seite ist aber eine Umsetzung 
moralischer Normen in der Praxis nur auf Basis 
empirischer Daten möglich: Einerseits im Zuge der 
Anpassung von Idealnormen an die einschlägigen 
Beschränkungen menschlichen Denkens und Handelns. 
Und andererseits im Zuge der Klärung von Anwendungs-
bedingungen einer Norm, sofern ihre Geltung an empirisch 
zu überprüfende Kriterien gebunden ist. Empirische 
Analysen sind jedoch nicht im Methodenrepertoire 
normativer Forschung enthalten, weshalb sie genau an 
diesen Stellen notwendig auf eine Zusammenarbeit mit 
empirischen Wissenschaften angewiesen ist. 
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Es stellt sich dann die Frage, welche Rolle 
empirische Sozialwissenschaften in diesem Zusammen-
hang spielen können. Erstens lassen sich mit ihren Mitteln 
interne kognitive und motivationale Potentiale und 
Grenzen menschlicher Akteure bestimmen. Darüber 
hinaus ist eine Erfassung extern bedingter Handlungsmög-
lichkeiten und -beschränkungen möglich, d.h. Rahmen-
bedingungen einer spezifischen Handlungssituation, die 
den Handlungsspielraum zwar mit strukturieren, auf die 
der Akteur aber keinen Einfluss nehmen kann. 
Zweitens sind empirische Sozialwissenschaften in 
der Lage, kollektive Prozesse und Veränderungen zu 
erfassen, beschreiben und erklären, d.h. soziale Prozesse 
gesamt-, teilgesellschaftlicher oder handlungsraum-
spezifischer Natur. Das bedeutet beispielsweise, die Aus-
wirkungen bestimmter Normen und Regeln auf das 
tatsächliche Verhalten der Akteure zu messen oder 
Fragen nachzugehen, wie in bestimmten Situationen 
faktisch gehandelt wird, welche moralischen Vorstellungen 
der Akteure dabei zum Tragen kommen oder welche 
„neuen“ moralischen Problemstellungen sich – z.B. 
aufgrund neuer technologischer Entwicklungen – innerhalb 
einer Gesellschaft ergeben. 
Aus den Zielsetzungen und methodologischen 
Möglichkeiten ergeben sich jedoch auch die immanenten 
Erkenntnisgrenzen empirischer Sozialwissenschaften in 
der ethischen Auseinandersetzung: An der normativen 
Genese moralischer Normen können empirische Sozial-
wissenschaften per definitionem nicht beteiligt sein. 
Aufgrund ihres Erkenntnisinteresses und Methoden-
spektrums sind empirische Sozialwissenschaften in der 
Auseinandersetzung mit ethischen Problemen auf die 
Erfassung, Beschreibung und Erklärung der sozialen 
Wirklichkeit festgelegt. Aus diesem Grund ist der normativ 
interessierte Sozialwissenschaftler (so er denn nicht in 
Personalunion beides vereint) immer auf eine Zusammen-
arbeit mit normativen Theoretikern und ihren metho-
dologischen Möglichkeiten angewiesen. 
4. Formallogische Grundlagen  
empirisch-normativer Zusammenarbeit I: 
Humes Gesetz 
Die bislang auf wissenschaftstheoretischem Wege darge-
legten Grenzen und Möglichkeiten empirisch-normativer 
Zusammenarbeit können durch logische Überlegungen 
weiter untermauert werden. Eine zentrale Grenze empi-
risch-normativer Zusammenarbeit ergibt sich aus Humes 
Gesetz. Hume schreibt in A Treatise of Human Nature: „In 
every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I 
have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some 
time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human 
affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that in-
stead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is 
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with 
an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; 
but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, 
or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 
'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and 
at the same time that a reason should be given; for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can 
be a deduction from others, which are entirely different 
from it.” (Hume 1992: 469) 
Ohne Humes Argument an dieser Stelle einer 
detaillierten metaethischen Analyse unterziehen zu 
können, bleibt festzuhalten, dass er eine logische 
Unmöglichkeit konstatiert, direkt von Fakten auf normative 
Aussagen zu schließen. Seit G.E. Moores Erläuterungen 
zum naturalistischen Fehlschluss (Moore 1993) versteht 
man diese These im Wesentlichen auf Basis der 
Unterschiede im logischen Status von Seins- und Sollens-
Aussagen: Während sich deskriptiven Prädikaten Wahr-
heitswerte zuordnen lassen, ist dies für normative 
Prädikate nicht möglich (Engels 2008: 134). Daher sind 
direkte logische Umformungen von Seins- auf Sollens-
Sätze unmöglich. Wer also aus empirischen Daten – ohne 
weitere Prämissen –normative Konklusionen zieht, begeht 
einen logischen Fehlschluss. Allerdings sind explizit 
genannte und begründete Sein-Sollens-Schlüsse 
prinzipiell zulässig: Hume ist der Meinung, dass ein Sein-
Sollens-Schluss plausibilisiert werden kann, wenn er 
hinreichend begründet und erklärt wird (vgl. Hume 1992: 
469). Demzufolge müssten zwischen einer deskriptiven 
Prämisse und einer normativen Konklusion weitere 
begründete und logisch gültige Schlüsse stehen. In der 
von Moore geprägten Lesart des Humeschen Gesetzes 
bleibt aber festzuhalten, dass Schlüsse von rein-
deskriptiven auf rein-normative Aussagen prinzipiell 
unzulässig sind (vgl. Engels 2008: 134). Darauf ist auch 
und insbesondere im Rahmen normativ-bioethischer 
Explikationen zu achten, die aufgrund ihres immanenten 
Anwendungsbezugs in besonderem Maße der Gefahr 
ausgesetzt sind, gegen Humes Gesetz zu verstoßen (vgl. 
Engels 2008: 125). 
Daraus folgt allerdings nicht, dass eine 
Zusammenarbeit zwischen (sozial-)wissenschaftlicher 
Empirie und normativer Theorie prinzipiell unmöglich ist. 
Es folgt lediglich, dass von (sozial-)wissenschaftlich 
gewonnenen Fakten nicht direkt auf normative Aussagen 
geschlossen werden kann. Zu diesem Ergebnis waren wir 
bereits während unserer Auseinandersetzung mit Er-
kenntnismöglichkeiten und -grenzen normativer Theorien 
und sozialwissenschaftlicher Empirie gekommen. Nun 
können wir dieses Ergebnis um eine logische Komponente 
erweitern: Normative Theorien und sozialwissenschaftliche 
Empirie kommen aufgrund der ihnen jeweils immanenten 
Methoden zu wissenschaftlichen Aussagen, deren 
logischer Status sich wesentlich unterscheidet. 
An dieser Stelle könnte man einwenden, dass 
solche logischen Fehlschlüsse zwar in abstracto zu 
befürchten sind, in der Praxis jedoch nur selten 
vorkommen und daher häufig gegen imaginäre Gegner 
gekämpft wird. Darauf lässt sich Folgendes entgegnen: 
Tatsächlich werden naturalistische Fehlschlüsse deutlich 
seltener begangen als behauptet. Diese Feststellung sollte 
eine genauere Analyse der jeweils verwendeten 
Prämissen und Konklusionen zur Folge haben, um zu 
verhindern, dass der Vorwurf eines naturalistischen 
Fehlschlusses inhaltliche Diskussionen prinzipiell 
unmöglich macht. Das ist deshalb wichtig, weil 
„verdächtige“ Argumente häufig Brückenprinzipien bein-
halten, die – einmal expliziert – den Vorwurf des natura-
listischen Fehlschlusses entkräften und das jeweilige 
Argument einer inhaltlichen Diskussion zugänglich 
machen können. Allerdings spielt diese Feststellung nicht, 
wie man zunächst meinen könnte, denjenigen in die 
Karten, die für den Einfluss empirischer Fakten auf 
normative Theoriebildung plädieren. Vielmehr zeigen 
solche Fälle einmal mehr, dass Deskription und Normation 
in entscheidender Hinsicht getrennt sind: Hat man 
beispielsweise den Verdacht eines naturalistischen 
Fehlschluss der Form „x ist moralisch gut, weil x eine 
natürliche Eigenschaft darstellt“ dadurch ausgeräumt, dass 
man die normative Prämisse „natürliche Eigenschaften 
sind im moralischen Sinne gut“ in den Syllogismus einfügt, 
hat man genau diese Trennung vorbildlich aufgezeigt. 
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Sobald nämlich eine solche normative Prämisse eingeführt 
wird, muss sich die Diskussion zwangsläufig mit deren 
Richtigkeit bzw. Falschheit befassen. Zu dieser dezidiert 
normativen Frage kann Empirie, wie wir bereits gezeigt 
haben, nichts beitragen, da sie sich auf einer kategorial 
davon verschiedenen Ebene bewegt, auf die empirische 
Wissenschaft aufgrund ihres Gegenstandsbereichs und 
Methodenrepertoires keinen Zugriff hat. 
Im nachfolgenden zweiten Teil wird zunächst eine 
Analyse der „Sollen impliziert Können“-Annahme durch-
geführt, eine Bewertung der o.g. drei Modelle empirisch-
normativer Zusammenarbeit vorgenommen sowie schließ-
lich drei konkrete Modi dieser Zusammenarbeit vorgestellt. 
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Assessing Humean Supervenience 
Amir Karbasizadeh, Tehran, Iran 
1. Humean Supervenience:  
Humean Supervenience is a central article of faith for 
David Lewis, who defines it thus: 
 
 “Humean supervenience is named in honor of the 
greater [sic] denier of necessary connections. It is 
the thesis that all there is to the world is a vast mo-
saic of local matters of fact, just one little thing and 
then another…We have geometry: a system of ex-
ternal relations of spatio-temporal distance between 
points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe 
point-sized bits of matter or aether fields, maybe 
both. And at those points we have local qualities: 
perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need 
nothing bigger than a point at which to be instanti-
ated. For short: we have an arrangement of quali-
ties. And that is all. All else supervenes on that.” 
(Lewis 1986 p. x) 
The "all else" includes nomic facts (laws, physical neces-
sity, causation, etc.). The gist of Lewis' suggestion is that 
every contingent property instantiation supervenes on the 
arrangement of perfectly natural properties.  One may ask 
what Lewis means by a “perfectly natural property.” Recall 
that Lewis has a rather hybrid conception of properties, 
being an amalgam of two very different property concep-
tions. (1) On the one hand, Lewis has a conception of 
properties according to which a property is just the set of 
all of its instances, this-worldly and other-worldy.  So the 
property of being a donkey is the set of all donkeys, both 
donkeys from our world and other-worldly donkeys. To 
have this property is to be a member of the class of don-
keys. This conception of properties is abundant because 
on this view, "any class of things, be it every so gerryman-
dered and miscellaneous and indescribable in thought and 
language, and be it ever so superfluous in characterizing 
the world, is nevertheless a property (Ibid, p.192) Con-
cerns from many fronts (e.g., Lewis' desire to formulate 
viable theories of laws, causation and events) require that 
there be some way to distinguish the properties that 
ground objective resemblances and which are causally 
efficacious from those which are not. (2) In light of this, 
Lewis has supplemented his abundant conception of prop-
erties with a sparse conception of properties. Although his 
hope is that a viable nominalistic sparse theory of proper-
ties is formulable, Lewis would settle for, (roughly) Arm-
strongian universals as well. With this contrast in mind, we 
can finally grasp the conception of "perfectly natural prop-
erties" operative in Lewis’ conception of Humean Super-
venience. Lewis gives the following sufficient condition for 
a property being perfectly natural: 
 
A property, F, is perfectly natural if its members are 
all and only those things that share some one uni-
versal. 
Properties like mass, charge and spin, at least at the pre-
sent point of scientific development, seem to be apt candi-
dates for being perfectly natural properties.   
2. Humean supervenience: Two Independ-
ent Theses 
Although he does not mention it, Lewis's Humean super-
venience has two logically independent theses. The first, 
which we may call Separability, claims that spatio-temporal 
relations are the only fundamental external physical rela-
tions. To be precise: 
 
Thesis 1 (Separability): The complete physical state 
of a non-alien world is determined by (supervenes 
on) the intrinsic physical state of each spacetime 
point (or each pointlike object) and the spatio-
temporal relations between those points. 
Separability posits, in essence, that we can chop up 
space-time into arbitrarily small bits, each of which has its 
own physical state, much as we can chop up a newspaper 
photograph into individual pixels, each of which has a par-
ticular hue and intensity. As the whole picture is deter-
mined by nothing more than the values of the individual 
pixels plus their spatial disposition relative to one another, 
so the world as a whole is supposed to be decomposible 
into small bits laid out in space and time. 
The thesis of Separability concerns only how the 
total physical state of the universe depends on the 
physical state of localized bits of the universe. The second 
component of Lewis's Physical determination takes care of 
everything else: 
 
Thesis 2 (Physical Determination): All facts about a 
non-alien world, including modal and nomological 
facts, are determined by its total physical state. 
I have employed the new terminology “Physical determina-
tion” to distinguish Thesis 2 from Physicalism. Physicalism 
holds that two worlds which agree in all physical respects 
(i.e. with respect to all items which would be mentioned in 
a perfected physics) agree in all respects. Thesis 2 essen-
tially adds to Physicalism the further requirement that all 
physical facts about the world are determined by its total 
physical state, by the disposition of physical properties. If 
one holds1, for example, that the laws of nature do not 
supervene on the total physical state of the world (at least 
so far as that state can be specified independently of the 
laws), then one can be a Physicalist while denying Physi-
cal determination. One can hold that worlds which agree 
on both their physical state and their physical laws agree 
on all else, while denying that the laws are determined by 
the state. Lewis's Humean Supervenience importantly 
maintains the stronger claim. 
3. Physicalism and Physical determination 
In order to clearly distinguish Thesis 2 from Physicalism, 
we must remark that the following condition on acceptable 
analyses is accepted by the Physical determinationist, but 
not by the Physicalist: 
 
Non-circularity condition: The intrinsic physical state 
of a non-alien world can be specified without men-
                                                     
 
1 Cf. Carroll 1994 
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tioning the laws (or chances, or possibilities) which 
obtain at the world.  
When conjoined with the thesis of Separability, the non-
circularity condition implies that the physical state of every 
spacetime point is metaphysically independent of the laws 
that govern the world. This in turn implies that the funda-
mental physical quantities, such as electric charge, mass 
etc., are metaphysically independent of the laws of electro-
magnetism, gravitation, and so on. This is a controversial 
thesis, but one that Lewis accepts. It will not come in for 
further notice here. 
The interest in dissecting Humean supervenience 
into Separability and Physical determination arises, in the 
first place, from the remarkable fact that contemporary 
physics strongly suggests that the world is not separable. 
This discovery casts the question of motivating a desire to 
defend Thesis 1 into a peculiar light, for one knows 
beforehand that the motivations, whatever they may be, 
turn out to lead away from the truth. So before asking why 
one might want to be Humean, we shall review the 
evidence that the world is not Humean. Only then will we 
seek the motivations for defending Separability, and then 
lastly turn to the possible motivations for Physical 
determination. 
4. Non-Separability in Quantum Theory 
The central challenge which quantum theory poses for 
Separability is the following. Suppose there are a pair of 
electrons, well separated in space (perhaps at opposite 
ends of a laboratory) which are in the Singlet State. If the 
principle of Separability held, then each electron, occupy-
ing a region disjoint from the other, would have its own 
intrinsic spin state, and the spin state of the composite 
system would be determined by the states of the particles 
taken individually together with the spatio-temporal rela-
tions between them. But, it can be shown, no pure state for 
a single particle yields the same predictions as the Singlet 
State, and if one were to ascribe a pure state to each of 
the electrons, their joint state would be a product state 
rather than an entangled state. The joint state of the pair 
simply cannot be analyzed into pure states for each of the 
components. 
5. Lewis’s Reaction and the Motivation for 
Separability 
Lewis is aware that the quantum theory poses a threat to 
Separability, and says he is prepared to take the conse-
quences: 
 
But I am not ready to take lessons in ontology from 
quantum physics as it now is. First I must see how it 
looks when it is purified of instrumentalist frivolity, 
and dares to say something not just about pointer 
readings but about the constitution of the world; and 
when it is purified of doublethinking deviant logic; 
and—most of all— when it is purified of supernatural 
tales about the power of observant minds to make 
things jump. If, after all that, it still teaches nonlocal-
ity, I shall submit willingly to the best of authority.” 
(Lewis 1986 p. xi) 
If we take Lewis at his word, then he should abandon 
Separability (and hence his version of Humean superven-
ience) forthwith. For one can see how quantum physics 
looks when purified of instrumentalism, and quantum logic, 
and consciousness-induced wave collapse. This has been 
done in several quite different ways: in David Bohm's so-
called ontological interpretation (see, e.g. Bohm and Hiley 
1993), in the (mind-independent) spontaneous collapse 
theories of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986), even in the 
Many Minds theory of David Albert and Barry Loewer (see 
Albert 1992). These theories all have fundamentally differ-
ent ontologies and dynamics, but all agree that the physi-
cal state of the world is not Separable, for they all take the 
wavefunction seriously as a representation of the physical 
state. This is not to say that Non-Separability is absolutely 
forced on us by empirical considerations: it would not be 
impossible to construct a Separable physics with the same 
empirical import as the present quantum theory. But no 
one is trying to do it, and there seems to be no reason to 
start: the quantum theory (in a coherent formulation) is 
elegant, simple and empirically impeccable. Lewis would 
not elevate his preference for Separable theories into 
some a priori constraint which could dictate to physics, as 
the quote shows. Given the definition of materialism cited 
above, contemporary materialism (i.e. metaphysics built to 
endorse the approximate truth and descriptive complete-
ness of contemporary physics) must deny Separability. 
This leaves us with two questions. First, what drew 
Lewis to Separability in the first place? Since the thesis 
appears to be false, we ought to consider carefully the 
grounds upon which it was thought to be established, or at 
least rendered plausible. Second, and more importantly, 
what of Physical Determinism? This second component of 
Humean supervenience remains as yet untouched by any 
criticism, and one could continue to insist upon it even 
while abandoning Separability. Perhaps the physical state 
of the universe does not supervene on the local intrinsic 
states of its point-like parts together with spatio-temporal 
relations, but yet the "modal properties, laws, causal 
connections, chances" (ibid., p. 111) all are determined by 
the non-Separable total physical state of the universe. 
Perhaps. The considerations in favour of Humean 
supervenience already led us astray with respect to 
Separability, so why think they are likely to be any more 
reliable with respect to Physical determination? Before we 
can even begin to take up this question, we must answer 
the first: what considerations seemed to support 
Separability in the first place? 
Fortunately, the answer to this question is clear, 
simple and intelligible. It has, indeed, already been stated. 
Lewis wants a metaphysics built to endorse the ontology of 
physics. And, as the quotation from Einstein above 
forcefully illustrates, classical physics is Separable. 
Classical mechanics and field theory do postulate that the 
physical state of the whole universe is determined entirely 
by the dispositions of bodies, their intrinsic physical 
properties (such as charge and mass) and the values of 
fields at all points in space through time. Taking one's 
ontology from classical physics does entail Separability. 
But the advent of the quantum theory, as we have seen, 
has superseded that argument; it is irreparably damaged, 
and Lewis has nothing more to say. 
6. Counter-examples to Physical Determina-
tion  
Our survey of Humean supervenience would not be com-
plete unless we consider the second thesis, namely physi-
cal determination. In the following sections, we consider a 
putative knock-down argument against Physical Determi-
nation due to John Carroll (1994), which he calls mirror 
argument. I will argue that this argument does not succeed 
in bringing out a surprising consequence of the physical 
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determination thesis; it fails as a refutation of that thesis. 
Physical determination is a very strong negative thesis: it 
claims that there do not exist any two possible worlds that 
match with respect to the non-nomic details but have dif-
ferent laws of nature. So one way to argue against it is 
simply to try to describe a pair of possible worlds that con-
stitute a counter example. This strategy is employed by 
Michael Tooley (1977, pp.669-672) and also is used in 
Carroll (1990). I will consider the so called mirror argument 
against Physical Determination here. 
The argument begins with a possible world, U1, that 
consists of five X-particles and five Y-fields. When each 
particle enters its Y-field it acquires spin up. All of the 
particles move in a straight line for all of eternity. But close 
to the route of one particle there is a mirror on a swivel. 
(Call this particle “particle b”). The mirror is in such a 
position (call it “position c”) that it does not get in the way 
of the trajectory of particle b. It seems plausible that the 
following is a law in U1: 
 
(L) All X-particles subject to Y-fields have spin up.  
Now consider U2, a world that is just like U1 except that 
particle b does not acquire spin up upon entering the 
Y-field. Hence, L is not true at U2. Now, U1 and U2 do not 
pose a problem for the MRL view because the worlds differ 
in their particular matters of fact. The problem stems from 
considering what would have occurred in each of the 
worlds had the mirror been in position d, stopping particle 
b from entering the field. Consider the nearest possible 
world to U1, U1*; here, it seems reasonable to say that L is 
a law because the worlds only differ in that the mirror 
blocks the particle from entering the field. Now consider 
the closest world to U2, U2*, where the mirror blocks the 
particle. It seems that although L is true in U2* it is an ac-
cident because had the mirror not been in the way L would 
be false. U1* and U2* are identical in their particular mat-
ters of fact; yet it seems that L is a law at U1* but not at 
U2*. Hence, laws do not supervene on particular matters 
of fact. Therefore, Physical determination is false. 
I guess there is one reasonable response to the 
Mirror Argument given by Humeans. The Humean just 
retorts that any counterintuitiveness is not a strike against 
Physical determination, for such intuitions presuppose an 
anti-determinationist vantage point. Helen Beebee offers 
this sort of response to the Mirror Argument. She writes: 
 
As a friend of supervenience, I have no desire to 
find a way of grounding the ‘fact’ that L is a law in 
U1*, but not in U2*, since I think L is a law in U2* 
and not an accident. This commits me to the appar-
ently unacceptable claim that the position of the mir 
ror in U2 affects what the laws of nature are, since I 
am committed to the truth of the counterfactual ‘if 
the mirror had been in position d, L would have 
been a law.’ But I truly see no harm in that … As I 
said earlier, part of the Humean creed is that laws of 
nature depend on particular matters of fact and not 
the other way around; it is no surprise to the 
Humean, then, that by counterfactually supposing 
the particular matters of fact to be different one 
might easily change what the laws of nature are too. 
The intuition that’s really doing the work in this 
counterexample, then, is the intuition that laws are 
not purely descriptive … But to describe the exam-
ple in those terms is not to describe it in neutral 
terms but to describe it in terms which explicitly pre-
suppose an anti-Humean starting point …  
At first blush at least, it is clear why the Humean would feel 
compelled to assert this. After all, there is a sense in which 
they are being told that their view is false simply because it 
doesn’t say the laws govern. The Humean thinks the anti-
Humean position is in the grip of an intuition which is ulti-
mately incorrect. 
7. Conclusion 
I have considered Humean Supervenience and its two 
components and their plausibility. I conclude that the first 
component of Humean Supervenience namely Separability 
is untenable. However, I see no reason not to believe in 
the second component of it. 
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Zu Carnaps Definition von ‘Zurückführbarkeit’ 
Roland Kastler, München, Deutschland 
In den Principia Mathematica versuchen Whitehead und 
Russell (Whitehead, Russell 19572)  die Begriffe der 
Mathematik in jene der Logik (Typenlogik bzw. Logik plus 
Klassentheorie)einzubetten. Rudolf Carnap erweiterte das 
Anwendungsgebiet der in den Principia Mathematica 
eingeführten Methode der logischen Konstruktionen, 
indem er in seinem Werk Der logische Aufbau der Welt 
(Carnap 19663) die Grundzüge eines Projektes darstellt, 
welches die Begriffe der Welt auf unmittelbar Gegebenes 
zurückzuführen intendiert. Die von Carnap entwickelte 
Konstitutionstheorie nimmt dabei nicht nur im allgemeinen 
Bezug auf Russell und Whitehead, und zwar in dem Sinne, 
in dem Carnap sich beispielsweise dem Phänomenalismus 
Ernst Machs verpflichtet fühlt (Vgl. Carnap 1993, 29.), 
sondern er formuliert bezüglich der „Principia“, daß jene 
‘ein „Konstitutionssystem“ der mathematischen Begriffe’ 
darstellen (Vgl. Carnap 1966, 47f.). 
Gegen Carnaps Konstitutionstheorie wurden nun 
innerhalb der Literatur eine Vielzahl von Argumenten 
vorgebracht, wobei insbesondere auch seine Definition 
von ‚Reduktion’ bzw. ‚Zurückführbarkeit’ im Mittelpunkt der 
Kritik stand. Bevor aber auf das prominenteste dieser 
Argumente gegen sein Reduktionskonzept eingegangen 
werden soll, seien vorerst Beispiele für konstitutionale 
Definitionen aus der „Principia“ und dem „Aufbau“ 
angeführt: 
 
(K1)  0 =Def {∅},  1 =Def {α | ∃x (α={x})},  2 =Def {α | ∃x∃y (x ≠ y ∧ α={x,y})} 
     μ+ν={ζ | ∃α∃β (μ∈nc ∧ ν∈nc ∧ α∈μ ∧ β∈ν ∧ α∩β=∅ ∧ ζ=α∪β)} 
 
(K2)  gesicht =Def {α | ∃λ(λ∈sinn ∧ Dzp( 5, λ, α, Umgr’Aq))} 
(K1) gibt also die Definition von Zahlausdrücken sowie des 
additiven Funktionszeichens an, wobei ‘nc’ die Klasse aller 
Kardinalzahlen bezeichnet. Es ist hier die vereinfachte 
Carnapsche Version der „Principia“ dargestellt (Vgl. Car-
nap 1929, 52.), welche aber die zugrundeliegende Idee 
präzise widerspiegelt (Vgl. zur „Principia-Version“: Russell, 
Whitehead 1957, Vol. II, 72.). In (K2) wird der Gesichtssinn 
als diejenige Sinnesklasse von Qualitäten bestimmt, deren 
Ordnung der Qualitäten in Bezug auf die durch Aq be-
stimmte Umgebungsrelation die Dimensionszahl 5 hat 
(Vgl. Carnap 1966, 155.). 
Russell formuliert zur oben angegebenen Definition 
an anderer Stelle, dass aufgrund dieser Definition die Zahl 
2 die Klasse aller Paare ist (Vgl. Russell 1975, 29.). Eine 
der entscheidenden Fragen, welche sich in Bezug auf 
Carnaps Begriff der Zurückführbarkeit stellen wird, ist jene, 
ob wir die konstitutionalen Definitionen so interpretieren 
müssen, wie sie jene Äußerung von Russell - welche hier 
natürlich völlig aus dem Zusammenhang gerissen 
präsentiert wird - nahezulegen scheint.  
Carnap definiert zunächst folgendermaßen: 
 
Unter einer „konstitutionalen Definition“ des Begrif-
fes a auf Grund der Begriffe b, c verstehen wir eine 
Übersetzungsregel, die allgemein angibt, wie jede 
Aussagefunktion, in der a vorkommt, verwandelt 
werden kann in eine umfangsgleiche Aussagefunk-
tion, in der nicht mehr a, sondern nur noch b, c vor-
kommen. (Carnap 1966, 47.) 
Und in engem Zusammenhang zum Begriff der konstitutio-
nalen Definition steht jener der Zurückführbarkeit: 
 
Gibt es zu jeder Aussagefunktion ausschließlich ü-
ber die Gegenstände a, b, c,... (wobei b, c ... auch 
fehlen dürfen) eine umfangsgleiche Aussagefunkti-
on ausschließlich über b, c ..., so heißt a „zurück-
führbar“ auf b, c, ...  
[...] Unter einer Aussage oder Aussagefunktion 
„ausschließlich über die Gegenstände a, b ...“ ver-
stehen wir eine solche, in deren schriftlichem Aus-
druck als nichtlogische Zeichen nur „a“, „b“, ... vor-
kommen (Carnap 1966, 47.). 
Gegen einen derartigen Reduktionsbegriff könnte man 
einwenden, dass extensionale Identität nicht das Kriterium 
sein kann, da ja beispielsweise Zahlprädikate innerhalb 
einer Zahlentheorie auf Zahlen zutreffen und nicht auf 
Mengen genauso wie Mengenprädikate innerhalb einer 
Mengentheorie auf Mengen zutreffen und nicht auf Zahlen, 
weshalb es zu keinem Zahlprädikat ein umfangsgleiches 
Mengenprädikat geben kann.  
Es gilt hier also zunächst zu prüfen, ob die obige 
Reduktionsdefinition überhaupt derart interpretiert werden 
kann.  
Carnap arbeitet bereits 1928 am zweiten Teil zu den 
Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik (Vgl. Bonk, 
Mosterin 2000, 47.), in welchen es u. a. um eine 
Formulierung von Extremalaxiomen in der Objektsprache 
geht. Ein Beispiel für ein Extremalaxiom wäre innerhalb 
des Hilbertschen Axiomensystems der euklidischen 
Geometrie das sogenannte Vollständigkeitsaxiom. Dieses 
behauptet, dass die Grundgegenstände des Axiomen-
systems bei Aufrechterhaltung sämtlicher anderer Axiome 
nicht erweitert werden können (Vgl. Carnap 1936, 166f.). 
Wir können demnach festhalten, dass für Carnap Theorien 
zunächst Satzmengen darstellen, welche sich auf einen 
Gegenstandsbereich beziehen. Im Abriß der Logistik 
formuliert Carnap u. a., wie er das Konstitutionssystem der 
„Principia“ mittels des Explizitbegriffes eines (mathe-
matischen) Axiomensystems zu erweitern versucht. Er 
stellt dies u. a. am Beispiel des Hausdorffschen Axiomen-
systems dar, welches als Klasse der Hausdorffschen 
Umgebungssysteme einen rein logischen Begriff darstellt 
(Vgl. Carnap 1929, 76ff.). Eine derartige Formulierung 
kann aber nun in der Sprache des „Aufbaus“ als eine 
„Zurückführung von mathematischen auf logische 
Gegenstände“ betrachtet werden. Nehmen wir nun also 
an, die Relata der Zurückführbarkeitsrelation beziehen 
sich auf die Gegenstandsbereiche zweier verschiedener 
Theorien. Da Carnap zu jener Zeit, in welcher der „Aufbau“ 
ausgearbeitet wurde, Theorien immer in der typen-
logischen Sprache formuliert (Vgl. Carnap 1929, 70 – 90.), 
setzen wir dementsprechend zusätzlich voraus, dass 
unsere fraglichen Theorien in einer Typenlogik gegeben 
sind. Und aufgrund der Tatsache, dass insbesondere dem 
Problem der Reduzierbarkeit von Grundgegenständen der 
einen Theorie auf Gegenstände der anderen Theorie 
besondere Relevanz zukommt, da eine derartige Re-
duktion eines der wesentlichen Ziele eines konstruk-
tionalen Systems darstellt, soll die Frage an diesem 
Spezialfall verdeutlicht werden. 
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Aus der obigen Definition folgt, dass, wenn ein Ge-
genstand a auf einen Gegenstand b reduzierbar ist, es zu 
jeder Aussagefunktion über a eine umfangsgleiche Aussa-
gefunktion über b gibt. Also gibt es beispielsweise zur 
Aussagefunktion ‘... ∈{y | y=a}’ eine solche ausschließlich 
über b. Weiters gilt, dass, wenn a zurückführbar auf b ist, 
es eine konstitutionale Definition des Gegenstandsnamens 
von a mittels einer Formel über b gibt (Vgl. Carnap 1966, 
47.). Konstitutionale Definitionen sind aber bei Carnap 
Identitätsaussagen, welche in der Objektsprache des Sys-
tems formuliert sind. Da nun Identität symmetrisch ist, 
müssen sowohl die Extension des Definiendums als auch 
jene des Definiens Elemente des Vorbereichs der Identi-
tätsrelation sein, somit gemäß der Russellschen Typen-
theorie bzw. der Carnapschen Fassung derselben vom 
selben Typ sein. Damit aber ist klar, dass die obige Defini-
tion nicht von der Relation der Zurückführbarkeit zwischen 
Gegenständen verschiedener Theorien handelt, da eine 
derartige Auffassung einem wichtigen Grundprinzip der 
Konstitutionstheorie widerspricht. Ist nämlich a zurückführ-
bar auf b, so soll a einen logischen Komplex von b darstel-
len, welcher beispielsweise mit der Klasse von b gegeben 
wäre (Vgl. Carnap 1966, 48.). Es muss also die Extension 
des Definiendums von höherem Typ als b sein, was aber 
nicht möglich ist, da der Gegenstand a ja einen Grundge-
genstand darstellt, somit vom Typ 0 ist, wie eben auch der 
identische Gegenstand, welcher Extension des Definiens 
ist. 
Ebenso wenig kann ‘Zurückführbarkeit’ bedeuten, 
dass auf verschiedene Gegenstandsbereiche der 
Konstitutionstheorie Bezug genommen wird, wenn man 
darunter zwei getrennte Grundgegenstandsbereiche und 
ihre daraus gebildeten Gegenstände versteht. Denn auch 
hier kann mit Hilfe des obigen Argumentes und mit einem 
ähnlichen Argument für höherstufige Gegenstände gezeigt 
werden, dass unter einer derartigen Interpretation der 
Begriff der Zurückführbarkeit einen leeren Begriff 
darstellen würde. 
Die Relata der Zurückführbarkeitsrelation sind also 
zunächst lediglich Objekte der Konstitutionstheorie, und 
zwar jene, deren sie bezeichnende Ausdrücke im 
Konstitutionssystem definiert werden, sowie die 
Extensionen der im Definiens vorkommenden Ausdrücke, 
welche sich letztlich auf die Grundgegenstände beziehen. 
In Carnaps erläuterndem Beispiel für die These, dass jeder 
wissenschaftliche Begriff eine Klasse oder Relation ist, 
welche sich alleine mit Hilfe der Grundausdrücke 
formulieren lässt, wird dementsprechend auch genau 
dieser Sachverhalt veranschaulicht (Vgl. Carnap 1966, 
118ff.). Eine derartige Auffassung ist des Weiteren 
durchaus verträglich mit seinen allgemeinen 
Charakterisierungen eines Konstitutionssystems. Denn ein 
Konstitutionssystem ist zunächst ein System, in welchem 
die Begriffe bzw. Gegenstände schrittweise aus den 
Grundbegriffen abgeleitet werden (Vgl. Carnap 1966, 2.), 
was wiederum bedeutet, dass jedes Axiomensystem, 
welches diesen Sachverhalt der schrittweisen Ableitung 
erfüllt, ein Konstitutionssystem darstellt (Vgl. Carnap 1929, 
70f.). Axiomensysteme können aber für sich interpretiert 
werden und weisen nicht notwendigerweise einen Bezug 
zu einem anderen Axiomensystem auf, womit in einem 
solchen Fall eine Zurückführbarkeitsrelation sich zur 
Gänze auf die im System definierten Ausdrücke beziehen 
würde. 
Wenn nun aber die Gegenstände mit Ausnahme der 
Typen keine weitere Sortierung erfahren, dann bedeutet 
‘Zurückführbarkeit’ lediglich, dass bestimmte Klassen oder 
Relationen bzw. Klassen von Klassen usw. von Gegen-
ständen durch (klassen-)logische Operationen aus 
Gegenständen, Klassen oder Relationen bzw. Klassen von 
Klassen usw. von Gegenständen gewonnen werden 
können. Carnap aber will, wie er im Aufbau an vielen 
Stellen erklärt, eigentlich Zahlen auf Klassen, Physisches 
auf Psychisches und umgekehrt sowie rationale Zahlen 
auf natürliche Zahlen usw. zurückführen. Der fehlende 
Zwischenschritt wird nun klar, wenn man zusätzlich 
beachtet, dass die konstitutionalen Definitionen im Aufbau 
jeweils eine definitorische Erweiterung der Konstitutions-
theorie bedeuten, also eine Erweiterung ihres Vokabulars. 
Demnach kann man nun ‘Zurückführbarkeit’ folgender-
maßen charakterisieren: 
 
(Z) Der Gegenstandsbereich der Theorie T ist genau 
dann auf jenen der Konstitutionstheorie K zurück-
führbar, wenn K durch konstitutionale Definitionen 
derart definitorisch erweitert werden kann, sodass 
gilt: T ist Teilmenge der durch die Definitionen erwei-
terten Konstitutionstheorie. 
Mit dieser Bestimmung (Z), wobei natürlich noch eine An-
passung der Typenindices erfolgen muss, welche dann je 
nach gewünschter Reichweite des Kriteriums verschieden 
formuliert werden kann, ist es zunächst im Prinzip durch-
aus verträglich, dass die Gegenstände von T und jene von 
K verschieden sind. Kriterium ist zunächst nur die Struktur-
erhaltung. Dem aber scheinen die vielen „identifizierenden“ 
Aussagen Carnaps zu widersprechen, wenn er etwa meint, 
dass in Bezug auf den Leib-Seele-Dualismus im Konstituti-
onssystem des „Aufbaus“ ein Monismus von Physischem 
und Psychischem gilt (Vgl. Carnap 1966, 223f.), oder er an 
anderer Stelle formuliert, dass bei der Zurückführung von 
Physischem auf Psychisches dem physischen Gegenstand 
seine wahrnehmbaren Kennzeichen zuzuordnen sind (Vgl. 
Carnap 1966, 78.), oder er intentionale Gegenstände als 
komplexe Ordnungen von Erlebnissen darstellt (Vgl. Car-
nap 1966, 227.). Man scheint also durchaus gerechtfertigt 
zu sein, ihn dahingehend zu interpretieren, dass er eine 
Identifizierung der Gegenstände der in (Z) formulierten 
Zurückführbarkeitsrelation vornimmt. Demgemäß ist ‘a ist 
zurückführbar auf b’ so zu verstehen, dass a im Grunde 
nichts anderes ist als b. 
Dagegen aber richtet sich nun der Haupteinwand 
Goodmans, ein Einwand, den übrigens auch Quine 
formuliert (Vgl. Quine 19977, 212f.), bezüglich des 
Konstruktionssystems des „Aufbaus“ und ähnlicher 
Theorien. Ist nämlich ein Gegenstand derart beschaffen, 
dass er mittels verschiedener Konstruktionswege gebildet 
werden kann, so bedeutet dies zunächst, dass seine 
entsprechenden konstitutionalen Definitionen aufgrund der 
Identität in verschiedenen Konstruktionssystemen formu-
liert werden müssen. Aber da er weiters im Grunde nichts 
anderes ist als der eine und auch im Grunde nichts 
anderes ist als der andere Gegenstand, müssen auch 
diese beiden Gegenstände identisch sein, was aber 
aufgrund der eindeutigen Identitätskriterien von Klassen 
nicht sein kann. Ein anschauliches Beispiel innerhalb 
elementarer Sprachen stellt diesbezüglich die Reduzier-
barkeit der Peano-Arithmetik auf ZF mittels der von 
Neumannschen Version und der Zermeloschen Version 
dar (Vgl. Goodman 19662, 9 oder auch 22.). 
Nun ist es zwar richtig, dass im Konstitutionssystem 
(im engeren Sinn) aufgrund des Sachverhaltes, dass 
konstitutionale Definitionen Identitätsaussagen sind, keine 
voneinander verschiedenen Konstitutionswege desselben 
Gegenstandes formulierbar sind. Und es ist auch richtig, 
dass Carnap, nach unserer Interpretation aufgrund von 
(Z), „ontologische“ bzw. „identifizierende“ Aussagen trifft. 
Dies stellt jedoch nur dann ein Problem dar, wenn 
innerhalb der ontologischen Interpretation die Identität von 
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Klassen und abstrahierten Entitäten vorausgesetzt wird. 
Betrachten wir dazu die folgende Bemerkung Carnaps: 
‘Die Klassen sind als Extensionen 
Quasigegenstände. Die Klassenzeichen haben keine 
selbständige Bedeutung, sie sind nur ein zweckmäßiges 
Hilfsmittel, um allgemein über die Gegenstände, die eine 
bestimmte Aussagefunktion befriedigen, sprechen zu 
können, ohne sie einzeln aufzählen zu müssen. Das 
Zeichen einer Klasse repräsentiert also gewissermaßen 
das diesen Gegenständen, ihren Elementen, Gemein-
same.’ (Carnap 1966, 44.) 
Die Frage, welche sich nun also stellt, lautet, ob 
‘Repräsentation’ Identität bedeutet, ob also der 
Klassenterm die abstrakte Entität bezeichnet. Es ist aber 
gerade das Programm des „Aufbaus“, welches an dieser 
Stelle klarmachen sollte, dass eine derartige 
Gleichsetzung nicht adäquat ist, da ja Carnap nicht müde 
wird zu betonen, dass dieselben Objekte auf verschiedene 
Art und Weise konstituiert werden können, nämlich 
beispielsweise auf physischen oder psychischen Basen 
von Konstitutionssystemen. Die Bestimmung, dass die 
Identitätskriterien von abstrakten Entitäten gleich jenen 
von Klassen sind, ist daher, zumindest was den „Aufbau“ 
betrifft, unangemessen. Wenn wir aber eine derartige 
Identifizierung nicht vornehmen, dann könnten die in Frage 
stehenden ontologischen Interpretationen folgendermaßen 
paraphrasiert werden: 
Auf Basis eines Konstitutionssystems K und des 
Prinzips (Z) gilt, dass der Gegenstand der zu 
reduzierenden Theorie S, nennen wir ihn ‘a’, identisch ist 
mit jener abstrakten Entität c, welche durch einen 
bestimmten Quasigegenstand (Klasse) der Konstitutions-
theorie K repräsentiert wird. 
Mit dieser Bestimmung aber, wobei wir hier im 
Unterschied zum oben angeführten Zitat Repräsentation 
als eine Relation zwischen Objekten verstehen, steht 
durchaus nicht im Widerspruch, dass a identisch ist mit 
einer abstrakten Entität, welche durch einen Quasige-
genstand einer anderen Konstitutionstheorie repräsentiert 
wird. Daraus würde dann eben nur folgen, dass diese 
beiden Entitäten identisch sind. 
Das Problem also, welches innerhalb der Literatur 
oft mit Carnaps Definition von Zurückführbarkeit verbun-
den wird bzw. als Haupteinwand formuliert wird, scheint 
 
also bei einer Unterscheidung von drei Ebenen, nämlich 
des Konstitutionssystems im engeren Sinn, des Prinzips 
(Z) und der ontologischen Interpretation, wobei Carnaps 
Definition sinnvoll auf der ersten und dritten Ebene 
angewendet werden kann, nicht einen logischen 
Widerspruch aufzuweisen, sondern vielmehr darauf 
hinzuweisen, dass der „Aufbau“ fragmentarisch ist. Und 
zwar nicht nur in dem Sinne, dass Teile, wie etwa die 
Konstitution des physischen Raumes, nicht ausgeführt 
sind, sondern auch dahingehend, was natürlich die 
Leistung des „Aufbaus“ in keinerlei Weise schmälern soll, 
dass für die konstituierten abstrakten Entitäten noch 
Identitäts- und Einzigkeitsbedingungen zu formulieren 
sind. Dies weist meiner Meinung nach wieder einmal 
darauf hin, dass der „Aufbau“ in erster Linie erkenntnis-
theoretisch, das heißt als eine Theorie des Erkennens 
bzw. der Erkenntnisprozesse, zu interpretieren ist.  
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Ding-Ontology of Aristotle vs. Sachverhalt-Ontology of  
Wittgenstein 
Serguei L. Katrechko, Moscow, Russia  
In the history of philosophy, we can distinguish three 
possible types of ontology1. The first claims that the world 
‘is made up’ of things that are considered its initial 
elements. In the Antiquity, the ontology of things tendering 
to nominalism was presented by Aristotle and Democritus, 
and their concepts, despite the differences, belong to the 
same type of ontology. They differ only on a scale of 
‘thing-ism’, the former postulating that the world consists of 
things, the latter considering that the world is built up of 
atomic ‘bricks’, or particles, regarded as micro–things, that, 
in their term, make up ordinary things that we are used to. 
And it is the ontology of things that has been an 
overwhelming ontology of contemporary natural science.  
The second and the third types of ontology are 
based on predicate interpretation of being, and postulate a 
non-object character of the world. If we take the classical 
approach to structure a sentence (resp. the world) as 'S is 
P’ the ontology of things is accented on ’S is— ’, with ‘S is’ 
representing an inseparably linked complex, and S — the 
essence of the thing which acts as a substance for 
predicates of the thing (resp. grammatically S acts as the 
subject of the sentence). Predicate ontology is the one of 
the ‘— is Pх’ type where ‘things’ (resp. subjects of the 
sentence) become secondary formations, and are 
determined not by the essence but by their predicates. 
Accordingly, esse is being related here not with the subject 
but with the prior–predicate ‘is’ (resp. link–verb of the 
sentence), and produces as transcendental condition for 
the rest ‘real’ predicates of the thing (P1, P2, P3…). 
We can also mark out two subtypes in the predicate 
ontology. The first one presents being as property (resp. 
unary P1n predicate), with property interpreted as ‘— is P1n’ 
inseparably linked predicative complex. It is the property of 
things that is considered prior in ontology while things, 
being secondary, act as ‘intersections’ of properties 
(bundle theory of substance). For instance, the table is 
something that is made of wood, right–angled, yellow, and 
used for writing. Here, something is predetermined by its 
properties (as unary predicates). Plato’s ontology has 
been the first and forming theory of the type so, this type of 
ontology can be named Platonic ontology. It’s possible to 
demonstrate that such interpretation of Plato’s idealism 
does not sound like idealism at all. Priority of Plato’s ‘world 
of ideas’ might be understood as a mere acceptance of 
priority of properties (predicative complex ’is P1n’) in 
respect of thing (S–subject). Furthermore, similar concepts 
are more realistic as compared to both, Aristotelian 
ontology and natural ontology of contemporary natural 
science presuming virtual existence of matter (as 
universal), for we experience not ‘disguised’ (latent) 
Aristotelian essence and not hypothetic matter postulated 
by up-to-date physics (e.g. dark matter in astronomy) but 
                                                     
 
1 The term ‘ontology’ will be used here in two related but a bit different mean-
ings. The initial meaning of the word is concerned with the doctrine (teaching) 
of "being qua being" (Aristotle, metaphysica generalis). The second one 
studies how the universe is made up, i.e. what ontological commitments we 
accept (metaphysica specialis). Further on, we’ll speak of concrete ontology 
(the second meaning) which depends on the general understanding of exis-
tence. 
real properties of objects that we can discover objectively, 
through perception or by means of instruments. 
It’s worth noting, that Aristotelian and Platonic 
ontology do not reject but, rather, enrich each other. These 
are two different approaches to the world defining its 
diverse sections, and each of two has the right to be 
(similar to corpuscular wave dualism in physics). They 
produce two necessary (transcendental) conditions of 
being of objects. The first one postulates the presence of 
single self-identical essence as an indispensable ‘sublayer’ 
(sub–stance) for property of thing, while the second one 
dictates the necessity ‘to partake’ things into the world of 
ideas which terminates the possibility to take into 
possession this or that set of properties. 
Explication of the second predicate ontology was 
made much later on. It interprets being as relation (n–ary 
predicate Pkn.), with Tractatus being one of its variations 
pronouncing that the world is the totality of facts, not of 
things (prop. 1.1). Here, facts act as something different 
from things, as a sort of relation between things or 
‘combinations of things’ (prop. 2.01). Hence, under 
Tractatus, it is relation that is believed to be prior while 
object is defined through a set of relations it could become 
a constituent part of, and, according to Wittgenstein, the 
possibility of that must be already written into the object 
itself (prop. 2.011–2.0121). 
This proposition differs from Aristotelian ontology 
considering essence prior to relation that may be added to 
it as random (accidental) characteristic: ‘that which is per 
se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the relative for the 
latter is like an off-shoot and accident of being’ (Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1096а20; Boethius, On the Trinity, 
§ 5). Challenging such an underestimation of ‘relation’ 
category Plato, in anticipation to Tractatus speculations, 
could have argued that ‘anything which possesses any 
sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by 
another… had real existence’ (Plato, Sophist, 247e), i.e. 
really exists only that which is able to interact. Then, one 
more transcendental condition is being revealed, that is 
relations (interactions) deprived of which not a thing could 
exist (resp. esse acts here as grounds for any ‘real’ 
relations)2. We can register things into ontology status of 
being provided that all three transcendental condition are 
observed. 
Thus, we can separate three types of ontology: the 
ontology of things, attributes and relations. Each of them is 
correlated with a particular type of language. In the 
ontology of things the key structure belongs to the noun. 
Esse interpreted as property, the key position goes to the 
adjective. With esse conceived as relations, separate 
words (nours, verbs or adjective) give way to the whole 
sentence structure, expressing the facts of relationship 
between objects. For instance, the sentence ‘The stone is 
falling’ which purportedly postulates existence in the world 
of Aristotelian ‘initial entities’ (here: stones) able to act, will 
                                                     
 
2 To put it more precisely, had an object ever existed, since it never becomes 
a constituent part of any relation, we couldn’t have learnt about it since learn-
ing is also a relation between an object and a subject. 
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be substituted, in predicate interpretation of being as 
relations, by a verbal modified sentence like ‘It’s stoning’ 3.  
Let’s pass now to a more detailed analysis of the 
ontology of the Tractatus which could be conceived in 
different ways. So, interpretation of the ontology of the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophical (TLP) proposed by the 
author of this article will be presented above. Basically, it 
will be proceeded from the point that the TLP ontology 
gives a logical description of the world, i.e. is a logic 
ontology; it does not postulate that there are some 
unchangeable ‘entities’ like Aristotelian ‘things’, i.e. it is of 
non-substantial character4. 
Peculiarity of the TLP ontology is that it strives to 
describe the world as a system of combinations 
(interacting bodies), choosing isomorphism of the world 
and the language as an important heuristic principle. To 
solve this problem a definite balance of statics 
(synchronism) and dynamics (diachronism) is needed. 
Logic analysis allows to fix a snapshot of the present ‘state 
of affairs’ (Sachlage) or facts (Tatsache). Further, this 
‘picture of the world’ may be specified and enriched by 
discovering new facts and observing results 
(consequences) of the old ones. The proposed 
interpretation of the Tractatus emerged from reflections on 
the translation of the term ‘Sarhverhalt’ which was 
translated into Russian not with a standard equivalent 
‘sobytie’ but with an original term ‘so-bytie’ (where 
‘bytie’=esse (Lat.), or =‘Being’; Wittgenstein, 1994; 
Кozlova, 1995) thus, marking co–existence (common 
existence/being) of objects, i.e. inevitability of existence of 
an object ‘excluded from the possibility of combining with 
others’ (prop. 2.0121). While classical ontology thinks of an 
object as something self-sufficient (closed), the TLP 
ontology regards it open, inviting other ‘things’, 
demonstrating ‘so–bytie–nost'’ (in the Russian language 
that is similar to ‘co–existence–ness’); each thing is 
predetermined by its own system of correlations for it ‘is, 
as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs’ 
(prop. 2.013). 
‘Simple facts’ (Sachverhalte), ultimately accumulated 
into totality, determining the logical world of the TLP 
ontology (since complex facts consist of simple ones), are 
isomorphic to simple sentences describing a state of affair 
(A book is on the table), i.e. has a «А–х–В» structure, with 
«–х–» denoting a particular combination (relation) between 
А and В (prop. 2.01). Propositions 2.01 — 2.02 grasping 
main differences between the TLP ontology and the 
ontology of things seem to be essential in conceiving the 
specificity of the TLP ontology. While Aristotle believes that 
initial elements of the world are unchangeable entities «А» 
and «В» predetermining «–х–», Wittgenstein states the 
priority of the «–х–» functional relation. However, we 
cannot imagine objects in isolation, and their extracting 
(‘exclusion’) from the combined system leads to a gross 
idealization inadmissible in a common case, which 
Wittgenstein tries to fight. 
What makes the basis for the ontology turn carried 
out in the Tractatus? If we take the book (‘lying’) on the 
table as the object of our analysis, we can use 
conventional body and visual language, since all objects of 
our world belong to the ‘continuous substance’ 
                                                     
 
3 Here, we don’t distinguish the ontology connected with the language of 
verbs and the ontology of facts (resp. sentences) that can be identifies. Each 
sentence states this or that fact of the action done. Though, this do not ex-
clude distinguishing the ontology of actions as a separate type of ontology. 
4 For the first time, this kind of interpretation was proposed on the forum ‘The 
World of Tractatus’, as well as in the works [Katrechko, 1999; 2002]. 
(Descartes). Substantiality, in this case, means that the 
changes taking place with the book might be neglected; 
the book will stay a book, with its identity predetermined by 
its essence. But if we need to describe a process, say, an 
electric current impulse and its magnetic field, the current 
(or the magnetic field) stops to be a constant thing with its 
own unchangeable essence existing like a book. The 
example with the current encourages us to be more critical 
to postulating Aristotelian entities, although the essence of 
the Wittgenstein’s turn is connected not with the dynamic 
nature of the current but, rather, with the fact that it 
demonstrates the example of an imperceptible ‘thing’ 
(contrary to the example with the book) which indicates 
lack of means for body and visual description typical for 
classical ontology; the world consists not only of spacial 
objects but of non-visual ‘state of affairs’ as well, and while 
describing the world, should the description has a claim on 
adequacy and universality, those points must be observed. 
According to Wittgenstein, there is a universal language of 
description, and that is logics, in the broad sense, 
conceived as the teaching of functions (G. Frege). E.g., 
the ‘state of affairs’ of the current can be described by a 
formula (compare with Sachverhalt) showing the 
dependence of the strength of the current on the tension 
and resistance, acting here as basic constituencies. In a 
general case, any state of affairs is given by a logic and 
functional space, with strength lines ‘combining’ the 
‘things’ within and, by that, predetermining their 
characteristics while their ‘intersections’ correspondingly 
constitute a particular ‘thing’. 
In a sense, correlation of the ontology of things and 
the ontology of facts is similar to correlation of atomic 
particles and field structure in physics. The ontology of 
facts postulating the priority of field structures in respect of 
particles is holistic contrary to the elementary ontology of 
things. According to up-to-date mathematics, difference 
between the ontology of things and the ontology of facts 
can be explained in the following way. The present 
mathematics based on the theory of sets grounds is well 
concorded with classical ontology: the set is seen as a 
specific objectification of properties, i.e. is being 
interpreted as a meta-object, and the sign giving the set 
acts as its intrinsicality. For the ontology of ‘state of affairs’, 
the language of the mathematic theory of categories 
seems to be more appropriate since today it is considered 
as a serious alternative to the theory of sets approach. 
Within this theory, the objects are defined not by an 
internal but by an external mode, through the system of 
arrows, corresponding to combinations (relations) of the 
given object. 
It’s clear that in the ontology of facts (the predicate 
ontology, generally), the status of things become different. 
At the initial stage of cognition, no individual things, in their 
usual sense, occur but there are indefinite objects – quasi-
things – interacting with each other that can be presented 
in the mode of fussy sets. While the facts are accumulated 
in the process of experience the borders of the sets will be 
specified due to class division and ‘intersections’ of the 
one-type facts, and, at a stage, they will be detailed so that 
quasi-things will turn into ordinary, habitual for us – 
individual – things.  
Let’s explain the aforesaid on an example with a 
hammer. Under prop. 1.1 of the Tractatus, initially we have 
no ‘hammer’ thing (resp. notion of a hammer), we have 
only a fact of ‘hammering in something with the help of 
something’ which can be described by the «А–х–В» 
sentence. Here, the hammer is correlated with the active 
component of the fact ‘that–with–which–is–hammered–in’, 
this function will correspond to, for instance, the following 
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set — {a hammer, a stone, a roll of paper, a vase…} 
consisting of objects that potentially can be involved into 
the act (fact) of hammering something in5. But after we’ve 
tried to hammer a ‘nail’ into a wall with our hammer6, i.e. 
check whether the fact is true, it will occur that the roll of 
paper is torn out and the crystal vase is broken. That’s 
why, at the second stage, the roll of paper and the vase 
are excluded, and the hammer corresponds to a narrower 
set — {a hammer, a stone}. And if we try to hammer a nail 
into a concrete wall the stone as one of possible 
candidates to become a hammer will not be able to 
execute the hammer–function — as a result, it must be 
excluded from the initial set. Hence, in the process of 
accumulating facts quasi–hammer will be gradually 
redefined which means its ‘turning’ into an ordinary tool – a 
thing – an individual hammer. 
At a language level the described procedure 
corresponds to accumulation of facts, as is «А1–х–В», 
«А2–y–C», «А3–z–D»…, and developing on the quasi-thing 
А will, at first, correspond to А1, then to the ‘intersection’ 
А1 ∩ А2, then to (А1 ∩ А2) ∩ А3, etc. So, the indefinite 
character of the quasi-thing in the functional ontology of 
the Tractatus indicates the possibility for further 
specification while Aristotelian things predetermined by its 
essences logically stay all the same. 
Specificity of the ontology of the Tractatus can be 
expressed clearly enough by the metaphor which belongs 
to John Wheeler, a prominent physicist and theorist of the  
 
                                                     
 
5 Within the ontology of things we can, in a general case, randomly give the 
name of hammer to any of those objects; in the ontology of facts, a thing is 
given primarily through its function. 
6 It’s clear that the nail is also a quasi-thing (to accent that we use quotation 
marks) since it’s also defined through its function as something–that–is–
being–hammered–in, but we just omit it here to make the story easier. 
XX century. He suggests two variants of a game in ‘20 
questions’. The first variant corresponding to standard 
ontology, gives the thing in advance and we, by answering 
20 questions in the mode of constructing an appropriate 
classification tree, have to guess what the given thing was. 
In the second variant corresponding to the world of the 
Tractatus, no thing is given but, since the answers (resp. 
physical experiments) to consequently asked questions 
must coordinate with each other, the ‘totality’ of answers 
(resp. Sachverhalt) gives the required thing so, the inquirer 
can also ‘guess’ and, to be more exact, constitute the 
initially indefinite thing (though, if the sequence of 
questions changes the required thing might also change). 
In this sense, the ontology of the Tractatus corresponds 
not only to the logic but also to the quantum mechanic 
picture of the world with its postulate on the importance of 
the observer in cognition.  
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How do Moral Principles Figure in Moral Judgement?  
A Wittgensteinian Contribution to the Particularism Debate 
Matthias Kiesselbach, Potsdam, Germany 
1. Introduction: What is moral deliberation? 
One of the key debates in current moral philosophy fo-
cuses on the role of moral principles in moral deliberation. 
Among the many opinions on the table, we find the theses 
of Universal Weak Particularism (UWP) and Universal 
Weak Generalism (UWG), which can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
(UWP) Generally, the application of moral principles 
is not sufficient for correct moral judgement. 
(UWG) Generally, the application of moral principles 
is necessary for correct moral judgement. 
Obviously, these theses are mutually consistent. More-
over, both are conclusions of strong arguments: (UWP) is 
inductively supported by the fact that, so far, for every 
candidate of a suitably general and non-trivial moral prin-
ciple, it has been possible to devise a scenario in which 
the principle's strict application would strike us as simply 
wrong. This is true for both all out and pro tanto principles 
(see Dancy 2004). (UWG) is supported by the fact that our 
aim of consistency in ethical learning, debate and judge-
ment is not just a piece of ideology, but an actually attain-
able goal. Consistency between particular moral judge-
ments, however, is nothing but the existence of principled 
relations among them. If these arguments are successful, 
we have good reason to accept both (UWP) and (UWG). 
However, the combination of (UWP) and (UWG) 
does not seem to appeal to many commentators. Their 
reservation is, I think, due to the thought that we lack a 
theory of moral deliberation which implies both theses at 
once. What are moral principles, they ask, if moral 
judgement cannot be reduced to their application, and yet 
depends on the latter? In this paper, I want to argue that 
the work of the later (and latest) Ludwig Wittgenstein gives 
rise to an interesting and plausible answer to this question. 
It revolves around the ideas that moral principles can be 
interpreted as grammatical propositions, and that moral 
problems can be interpreted as instances of grammatical 
inconsistency and, hence, as occasions for grammatical 
revision. Moral judgement, on this view, is a matter of 
following grammar, but it is also a matter of adequately 
revising it in the face of grammatical tension. 
2. Grammatical statements, grammatical 
tension and grammatical evolution in  
Wittgenstein's work 
We are surely warranted to take seriously Wittgenstein's 
insistence that his project is one of philosophical therapy, 
aiming to free us from our urge to philosophise by unmask-
ing our seemingly deep metaphysical ideas as mere 
grammatical confusions. However, in order to be able to 
read Wittgenstein in this way, we cannot help but ascribe 
to him a certain number of theoretical commitments re-
garding the workings of language. In this section, I want to 
review, as quickly as possible, key elements of Wittgen-
stein's mature conception of language, and to show that 
they comprise ideas of grammatical tension and grammati-
cal evolution. 
Wittgenstein's return to philosophy in 1929 marks a 
radicalisation of the view that natural language is best 
analysed as a practical calculus embedded in and 
continuous with non-linguistic practice. While the Tractatus 
still entertained the idea that some (namely the “atomic”) 
propositions stand in isomorphic relations with aspects of 
the world, the later Wittgenstein thinks of the calculus of 
language as fully autonomous. All utterances are now 
conceived as practical manoeuvres, connected via rules 
with other such manoeuvres as well as with non-linguistic 
phenomena and doings in their vicinity. On this view, all 
talk of “meaning” or “content” is just a way of discussing 
the role which an expression plays within the practical 
calculus of language. 
This idea poses an obvious threat to the distinction 
between analytic and empirical content. Traditionally, the 
meaning of a proposition was thought to be a two-
component object. There was the empirical component on 
the one hand, and the analytical (logical, conceptual) 
component on the other. With the idea that the meaning of 
an expression is exhausted by the logical or, as 
Wittgenstein has it: internal (TLP 4.125ff., 5.131, 5.2ff.) 
role within the calculus, it becomes an open question how 
empirical content is at all possible, or what it would amount 
to. 
Moreover, in attacking the traditional analytic-
empirical distinction, Wittgenstein's move threatens our 
everyday practice of distinguishing between 
misunderstanding and disagreement. If communication, as 
Wittgenstein writes, depends on “agreement not only in 
definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in 
judgements” (PI 242), then it seems that every time 
speakers diverge in their propositional judgements, they 
turn out to play different games and thus talk past each 
other. Can this be true? 
While many thinkers have taken this threat as a 
pure and simple reductio ad absurdum, Wittgenstein holds 
fast to his interpretation of language as a practical calculus 
and looks, in his later writings, for a pragmatic way to re-
erect the traditional distinctions in question. Wittgenstein's 
eventual solution centres around the idea that if 
philosophers took into account ordinary speaker's actual 
employment of the calculus of language, they would soon 
notice that speakers do not just draw on its rules, but 
constantly develop them further. They are always, he 
thinks, in the business of coining new linguistic 
manoeuvres, such as new propositions. Of course, it has 
long been known that our language is compositional. i.e. 
that it comprises sub-propositional components (such as 
concepts) which can be regrouped to form new, yet 
immediately understandable, sentences (and other 
utterances). But since concept rules are, on a calculus 
account of language, bound up with proposition rules, this 
does not show how empirical content or the possibility of 
proper disagreement comes into the picture. Wittgenstein's 
idea, now, is that we can use propositions to alter the rules 
governing concepts – i.e. their meanings – and thus 
convey empirical content. 
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To give a very simple example: although the 
meaning of a concept like “dog” is fully determined by true 
propositions like “Every dog is a mammal”, “Dogs don't lay 
eggs” (and so on), we can, in a novel proposition, bring a 
new predicate to bear on “dog”. If we do this, we propose 
to (slightly) alter the concept rules (meanings) of both 
“dog” and the new predicate. This way, we pass on new 
information about both. Since in a way, only “new” 
propositions are interesting, it makes sense to say that 
every interesting proposition brings with it new rules for the 
use of concepts. However, Wittgenstein makes clear that 
there is also a use for “old” propositions. “Old” propositions 
clarify how already-established concepts are used and 
thus serve as interpretation guidelines for new propositions 
drawing on these concepts. “Every dog is a mammal” is a 
good example of this. To put the distinction in 
Wittgenstein's own words: a generally accepted 
proposition “is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak 
shunted onto an unused siding. / Now it gives our way of 
looking at things, and our researches, their form.” 
(OC 210f., see also 96ff.) 
It is here that the mature Wittgenstein re-introduces 
the distinction between substantive (empirical) content and 
logical (conceptual) rules, the latter now being called 
grammar. Grammar is comprised of rules of concept use 
as established in “old” (or “hardened”, OC 96) sentences, 
while substantive content resides in the proposed rules of 
concept use displayed in “new” (or “fluid”, OC 96) 
sentences. I have attached quotes to the terms “new” and 
“old”, because these terms are relative to particular 
conversations. A proposition can be long accepted (“hard”) 
in some contexts, but strikingly novel (“fluid”) in others. 
Wittgenstein, keenly aware of this fact, confirms that 
 
Sentences are often used on the borderline be-
tween logic and the empirical, so that their meaning 
changes back and forth and they count now as ex-
pressions of norms, now as expressions of experi-
ence. (For it is certainly not an accompanying men-
tal phenomenon ... but the use, which distinguishes 
the logical proposition from the empirical one.) (RC 
I:32, see also III:19, OC 309)  
Here, then, we see Wittgenstein's way of re-erecting the 
analytical-empirical distinction within a practical calculus 
account of language. From here, of course, it is not difficult 
also to re-erect the distinction between misunderstanding 
and disagreement: if two speakers diverge with respect to 
a proposition which we (the interpreters) take to be a piece 
of grammar, we call their divergence a misunderstanding. 
If the proposition in question is interpreted (by us) as a 
proposal of new concept rules, we call their divergence a 
disagreement. 
Importantly, the sketched conception of language is 
dynamic. It holds that once a proposition is accepted 
(within a particular conversation), every re-iteration will be 
a grammatical utterance. The account thus includes a 
commitment to the evolution of language. I now want to 
stress that according to Wittgenstein, language does not 
always evolve smoothly. There are situations in which a 
new empirical proposition involves a violation of a piece of 
grammar – without thereby being rendered senseless. To 
see what I have in mind, consider again the idea that 
communication rests on “agreement in judgements” (PI 
242). Wittgenstein's clearest example of this is colour 
discourse (see RC I:66, III:42, III:86ff., III:94, III:127). 
Clearly, when someone claims to have seen a patch of 
“bluish orange” (RC III:94), we would conclude that either 
the speaker is crazy, or that her way of speaking is in need 
of translation into our vocabulary (perhaps colour 
vocabulary, but perhaps she does not speak about colour 
at all). “There is, after all,” says Wittgenstein, “no 
commonly accepted criterion for what is a colour, unless it 
is one of our colours.” (RC III:42) And yet, Wittgenstein 
insists (in many passages), there are possible cases in 
which we would allow for different colours. 
 
It is quite possible that, under certain circum-
stances, we would say that people know colours 
that we don't know, but we are not forced to say 
this... (RC III:127) 
Wittgenstein goes on to supply two analogies. 
 
This is like the case in which we speak of infra-red 
'light'; there is a good reason for doing it, but we can 
also call it a misuse. And something similar is true 
with my concept 'having a pain in someone else's 
body'. (RC III:127) 
From this last passage, we can glean an implicit theory of 
grammatical evolution through grammatical tension. To 
see this, take the infra-red case. We can easily imagine 
two opposing factions who argue as follows: “Light makes 
objects visible. Infra-red does not make objects visible. 
Therefore it is not light.” versus “Light is the kind of radia-
tion which helps us navigate and is processed by the eyes. 
This is the case with infra-red (if we use night-sight de-
vices). Therefore, this radiation comes under the concept 
of light.” The important point to notice is that we have, 
here, two premises which are clearly taken to reflect the 
grammar of shared language, yet which, along with uncon-
troversial minor premises, come into conflict with one an-
other in the face of the invention of infra-red radiation. If 
this description is correct, then we have an example of a 
situation in which two sets of grammatical norms turn out 
to be such that following them beyond a certain point leads 
to conflict. This conflict demands a grammatical revision in 
the form of a new empirical judgement. Since this amounts 
to a change of the game of language, every proposition 
uttered or written before the revision must be carefully 
tested and, if necessary, translated into the new language. 
3. Moral principles as grammatical norms, 
moral problems as grammatical tension 
I concede that this short reconstruction of Wittgenstein's 
mature conception of grammar deserves both a stronger 
exegetical appraisal and much more discussion of its de-
tails. In this paper, however, rather than paying these 
debts, I want to show that its core idea is capable of pro-
viding just the account of moral deliberation we need to 
counter the reservation discussed above. If we interpret 
moral principles as grammatical rules and moral problems 
as grammatical tensions along the lines of Wittgenstein's 
infra-red example, we see how it can be the case that 
moral judgement relies both on moral principles and on the 
capacity to make sensible revisions in the face of practical 
conflict, making both (UWP) and (UWG) true. The idea is 
that moral judgements follow norms of grammar just as 
closely as in colour discourse, only that in moral discourse, 
they are less settled and less harmonic. 
To see that this interpretation is not just a wild 
stipulation, consider that grammatical norms do not usually 
come as traditionally analytic propositions, like “A bachelor 
is unmarried” or (to take a moral example) “Justice is to 
give to each person her due”. On the contrary, every 
proposition can serve, once established and accepted as 
true, as a reminder of a piece of grammar. If this is true for 
all propositions, it is clearly true for the following remarks: 
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“A promise must be kept”, “A promise must be kept, unless 
this would involve the breach of a right”, “If a proposition 
constitutes a promise, that counts in favour of doing the 
act to which it refers.” These, of course, are paradigm 
examples of moral principles.  
In the face of the particularist insistence that we can 
always devise scenarios in which following a principle like 
these turns out to be morally objectionable, we can now 
lean back. If, for example, the mentioned promise turns out 
to have been given under torture, we can agree that on 
this condition, the fact that some utterance constitutes a 
promise counts against committing the act in question, 
making even the weakest of the three principles (the pro 
tanto principle) false. The important point to notice, 
however, is that we can take this situation as one of 
grammatical tension analogous to the case in which the 
old grammar surrounding the concept “light” was 
confronted with the new realities of infra-red. In other 
words, we can see in the case an occasion for a controlled 
revision of the grammar surrounding the concept 
“promise”, i.e. a partial revision of its very meaning and 
thus of our language game. On this view, both (UWG) and 
(UWP) come out true. Every judgement involves following 
norms; but some judgements necessarily involve re-
developing them pragmatically. I want to submit to your 
consideration the thesis that this is a suitable interpretation 
for all moral problems. 
The main attraction of this view, besides yielding a 
plausible account of tragic choices, is that it tells a story 
about moral discourse which very closely parallels an 
emerging consensus about science, according to which 
the body of scientific knowledge and the meanings of 
scientific terms evolve together. 
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“Downward Causation”: Emergent, Reducible or Non-Existent? 
Peter P. Kirschenmann, Amsterdam, The Netherlands  
1. Introduction 
It is common to view reality as a hierarchy of levels, such 
as the physical, biological, psychological level. Entities 
(plus their properties) at higher levels (of “organization” or 
“complexity”) consist of entities of lower levels, but are 
supposed to be “emergent” – form “wholes that are more 
than the sum of their parts” – and, possibly, have “down-
ward causal” influences on their parts.  
 All these views, often not well-articulated, are 
contested. For hard-headed (eliminative) materialists or 
physicalists, there is no emergence, let alone “downward 
causation”. For reductionists, they are “nothing but” 
material processes. Emergentists often rest content with 
arguing for their possibility. “Non-reductive physicalists” 
recognize emergent phenomena, but insist on their being 
physically based.  
I myself think that the occurrence of a hawk catching 
a mouse is a macroscopic emergent phenomenon, though 
I doubt that it involves “downward causation”. I used to be 
a fan of layered ontologies (e.g. Nicolai Hartmann’s). Yet 
lately, I think that we should avoid as much as possible 
imposing a level structure on reality. Surely, a distinction 
between macrolevel and microlevel often is very sensible, 
but it can misfire. 
I shall discuss two original views as well as the 
muddled conceptualization and terminology, analyze two 
examples, comment on the “causal exclusion argument”, 
and conclude with a computer analogy.  
2. The Muddle of ‘Downward Causation’ 
Donald T. Campbell, in 1974, first used the expression 
‘downward causation’ (cf. Hulswit 2006, 266), for the view 
that “all processes at the lower level of a hierarchy are 
restrained by and act in conformity to the laws of the 
higher levels”. His (biological) hierarchy ran from mole-
cules and cells up to populations and evolution. He noted 
himself that the expression was at odds with our usual 
concept of efficient causation: his higher-level “laws” selec-
tively restrain lower-level processes, unlike events causing 
other events. 
Around that time, Roger W. Sperry, after his split-
brain investigations, started defending his “emergent 
interactionism” (cf. Emmeche et al. 2000, Ripley 1984, 
Hulswit 2006: 269). To clarify the “form of control” that 
conscious phenomena exert over neural events he used 
the examples of a wheel running downhill and an eddy in a 
stream. The movement and fate of the constituent 
molecules are “determined very largely by the holistic 
properties of the whole wheel” or the whole eddy, though 
without any change in the lower-level molecular laws. 
Similarly, the component parts of “an excitatory neural 
process are carried along and thus controlled by dynamic 
properties of the whole system”, namely by unitary mental 
experiences. Sperry was not quite happy with the term 
‘interactionism’, as it smacked too much of a Cartesian 
dualism. 
What ‘downward causation’ or the downward part of 
‘interaction’ is for these authors remains unclear. 
Meanwhile, the terminological diversity has been 
exploding. Thus, the higher level has been said to cause 
inasmuch as it restrains, constrains, controls, organizes, 
structures, determines, governs, delimits, bounds, 
entrains, enslaves, harnesses or selects the lower-level 
phenomena (cf. Hulswit 2006: 279f.), while said to emerge 
from, cannot be explained by, reduced to, or predicted 
from, them and their laws. Since several of those “causal 
influences” hardly are examples of efficient causation, 
some regard them as Aristotelian formal or final 
(functional) causes. The most general and neutral term, 
though in need of appropriate qualifications, is 
‘determines’. Another disconcerting variation concerns the 
relata of the alleged downward causality: entities, 
substances, events, processes, states, types or 
instantiations of properties, patterns, structures, laws or 
regularities. 
No doubt, novel things have diachronically 
“emerged” during the evolution of the universe: stars, 
heavy elements, planets, life, consciousness. We focus 
here on synchronic emergence: “higher levels of reality” of 
some permanence. Crucial in identifying emergent entities 
or systems, I think, are their significant, possibly lawful 
“horizontal” interactions with entities at the “same level”, 
rather than “downward” influences. 
A useful distinction is between three possible 
meanings of ‘downward causation’ according to their 
strength (cf. Hulswit 2006: 280, also Emmeche et al. 
2000), all concerning an active system constituted by a set 
of active elements:  
 
weak – “downward explanation”: the behavior of the 
elements cannot adequately be explained without 
reference to the system;  
medium – “downward determination”: it is partly de-
termined by the system;  
strong – “downward causation”: it is partly brought 
about by the system. 
3. Examples – Analyzed  
The most intriguing questions of emergence concern life 
and mind. Yet, phenomena of the non-living world have 
raised similar and more easily analyzable questions. They 
often are supposed to attest to a continuity of emergence 
and downward causation through all layers of reality (e.g. 
Rockwell 1998). I have my doubts. 
Sperry’s wheel is an example in point. The 
macroscopic properties of the wheel, together with gravity, 
slope etc., determine the movement of the wheel and thus 
a fortiori that of its constituent molecules. Its stable circular 
shape, due to the cohesive arrangement of its 
constituents, is an emergent property – for not being a 
property of the constituents – in an innocent sense, a 
“structural emergence. It can thus be “explained”, without 
getting reduced to properties and arrangement of 
molecules. It is a factor in macroscopic causal relations, as 
when the wheel should bump into a wall. Yet, pace Sperry, 
there is no “interaction” between the wheel as a whole and 
its constituents, let alone its “downwardly causing” their 
movement, except in the weak sense of downward 
explanation. Note, pace Campbell, that the laws of 
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mechanics, holding for the wheel, need not be considered 
as emergent, as they equally hold for the free movement 
of molecules or stable collections thereof. 
There are many more macroscopic, structurally 
emergent properties, like fluidity, viscosity, solidity which 
can be analyzed in a corresponding manner. 
A quite different, well-worn example is the Bénard 
instability. It concerns an open system, a fluid heated from 
below, far from thermodynamical equilibrium. At a critical 
temperature difference between bottom and top, heat 
conduction changes into convection, in the form of 
cylindrical rolls, with the top closed, or in that of Bénard 
cells, with the top open. These patterns of movement are 
emergent in a sense that goes beyond structural 
emergence. Some say (cf. Rockwell 1998) that such a 
pattern is created by the coordination of the motions of 
molecules, which in turn, “downwardly”, influences their 
behavior, and call this a case of ‘circular causality’. 
Yet, there is at best some downward determination: 
groups of molecules, tending to move (first) upwards, are 
coaxing, and are being coaxed by, neighboring molecules 
into the emerging motion pattern and kept in it. As 
possibility and actuality, this pattern is a determining 
circumstance, though not an extra force. One should not 
say that the “system as a whole” does much in determining 
the behavior of its “parts”, since the decisive, but “outside”, 
driving forces are the heat flow and gravity, acting under 
the geometrical conditions of the pan of fluid and the 
possible motions of the molecules. A hard-headed 
reductionist might want to take the system plus total 
environment as the real “whole” to be analyzed in terms of 
processes of their micro-constituents. 
The cylindrical rolls can either turn clockwise or 
counterclockwise. There is a “bifurcation point”: it is up to 
chance which way they turn. This spontaneous, 
unpredictable “choice”, at the point of instability, can be 
taken to enhance the emergent character of the resulting 
pattern. 
What about the pattern being a significant factor at 
its “own level” of macroscopic causality? It is responsible 
for the rapid heat flow; it can be photographed and printed 
as illustration. 
The Bénard instability represents a nonlinear 
dynamic system. The emergence of the patterns 
constitutes a symmetry break. Such systems are 
dissipative structures, since energy is not conserved within 
them. They also count as examples of “self-organization”, 
mostly a misnomer, inasmuch as the driving forces are 
heteronomous. The behavior of nonlinear dynamic 
systems can lie in chaotic regimes, but also in regimes 
representing various kinds of “attractors”, comparable to 
the patterns in Bénard cells. 
Organisms also are open systems, but differ from 
such non-living examples by their enormous degree of 
internal regulation, coordination and integration of all their 
constituent processes. They possess emergent features, 
such as multiplication, growth, self-repair etc., which are 
determining factors in all kinds of causal relationships, as 
when we catch a cold or when moles disfigure our lawns. 
Yet, I will not discuss claims that their lives might manifest 
a special kind of “downward causation” and turn to more 
abstract considerations.  
4. Supervenience and Critique 
A decisive argument for emergent properties is the multiple 
realizability argument. The standard example is the mental 
state of being in pain, which can be realized by different 
physical states in the same or different persons. This pro-
vides an argument against (type) identity theories of mind 
and brain, reductive or eliminative accounts of the mind 
and for the now widespread view of “non-reductive physi-
calism”. Similarly, biological functions can be physically 
realized in different ways in different organisms. 
The discussion of the relation between properties at 
different “levels” has been dominated by the rather formal 
notion of supervenience, which accommodates the general 
idea of multiple realizability, but is chiefly used in the 
philosophy of mind. 
One definition is: “A set of properties A supervenes 
upon another set B just in case no two things can differ 
with respect to A-properties without also differing with 
respect to their B-properties.” (McLaughlin, Bennett 2005). 
It states a dependency, not further specified. Important 
versions of the notion differ in the kind of necessity 
attributed to this dependency.  
Jaegwon Kim, a prime elaborator of the notion, used 
it in his “causal exclusion argument” against “downward 
causation”, or, to show that “non-reductive physicalism” is 
self-contradictory (cf. Rockwell 1998). Consider the 
following schema: 
 
M causes M* 
P causes P* 
Here, a mental event (instantiation of, or change in, a men-
tal property) M is assumed as causing another mental 
event M*. Yet, M supervenes on (is realized by) a physical 
(neurophysiologic) event P, which causes P*, the physical 
realization of M*. Kim argued, put simply, that the mental 
layer would do no causal work: P causes P* all by itself; M 
in no way “downwardly causes” P*; the mental layer is at 
best epiphenomenal, if not non-existent.  
In its strongest form, the argument presupposes the 
“causal closure” of the physical world. Yet, if this was just 
the world of the most fundamental physical entities, then 
everything else, not just the mental realm, would be 
epiphenomenal. The argument also assumes causation to 
be the only kind of determination.   
What the supervenience approach totally ignores, 
as Mark Bickhard with Donald Campbell (2000) rightly 
pointed out, are the external relations of the systems 
concerned, which, as we saw, are especially important in 
the case of open systems. More generally, they criticize it 
for still assuming a basic level of fundamental particles, 
thus a metaphysics of substances, whereas modern 
physics forces us to adopt a metaphysics of fields. Fields 
are continuously in process, which is “inherently and 
necessarily organized” or patterned. “So, delegitimating 
process organization as a potential locus of emergence 
renders all reality epiphenomenal”. This absurdity amounts 
to an argument for the reality of all patterns of processes, 
also for the plausibility of the emergent reality of mind. 
Non-trivial emergence, for the authors, is “emergent 
(novel) causality”, which (in contrast to my view) will, thus 
as a criterion, “necessarily involve downward causality”. 
Unfortunately, they fail to articulate some alternative notion 
of pattern causality. The kinds of “downward causation” 
they survey are all cases of constraints, thus at best cases 
of “downward” determination. 
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I also think that especially living beings, in which 
physical constituents are continuously replaced, are 
patterns of coordination and integration of processes 
rather than substances. Yet, for understanding them, it is 
inessential whether one considers molecules as entities or, 
in their turn again, as patterned field processes.  
There are a number of alternative proposals 
concerning emergence, supervenience and “downward 
causation”, which I cannot take up here.   
5. Yet Another Computer Analogy 
Analogies with (information processes in) computers have 
been very conspicuous in the philosophy of mind. They 
can be instructive for our present issues. Software – pro-
grams, essentially algorithms – can be multiply realized in 
diverse computers. No one would call the algorithms 
‘emergent’; they get artificially, thus contingently, imposed 
on the hardware, whereas in natural systems one sup-
poses some lawful connections. 
A computer runs through a series of physical states 
which is isomorphous to the logical steps in the algorithm 
(cf. Jongeling 1997). Clearly, the algorithmic program 
determines the physical operation of the computer, but we 
need not call it a ‘downward determination’. How a 
computer, say, can do a calculation, must be reductively 
explained in terms of electronics. The logics of the 
program, however, is apriori establishable, not even in 
need of being reduced to electronics. 
Without pretending to solve the riddle of the mind, I 
want to draw some analogies. Our experiencing and 
thinking depends on our “hardware”: when we are tired, we 
“cannot think straight”. Furthermore, thoughts or 
experiences do not causally follow upon each other, but 
rather in dependence of their content. For instance, when 
making plans, our thinking proceeds by association or 
goal-directed deliberation, albeit not algorithmically. Still, I  
 
should say that the “logics” of such thought processes can 
be understood in themselves and need not be reduced to 
brain processes. How precisely they are realized in the 
brain, is the riddle. Yet, given that the relation between 
thoughts is not causal, the inference to a “downward” 
causal influence cannot even get started. 
Thoughts, no doubt, play a role in determining 
(changes of) states of our brain and body, as well as, 
when plans get realized, meaningful macroscopic 
alterations in the physical world. As in the case of the 
vaguely comparable Bénard cells, I conclude that we 
should speak here at most of ‘downward determination’ 
and certainly not of ‘downward causation’.  
Literature 
Anderson, P.B., Emmeche, C., Finnemannn, N.O. and 
Christiansen, P.V. (eds.) 2000 Downward Causation. Minds, Bod-
ies, Matter, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. 
Bickhard, M.H. with Campbell, R.L. 2000 “Emergence”, in: Ander-
sen et al. (eds.) 2000, 322-348. 
Emmeche, C., Køppe, S. and Stjernfelt, F. 2000 “Levels, Emer-
gence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation”, in: Ander-
sen et al. 2000, 13-34. 
Hulswit, M. 2006 “How Causal is Downward Causation?”, Journal 
for the General Philosophy of Science 36, 261-287. 
Jongeling, B. 1997 “Wat is reductionisme?”, in: W.B. Drees (red.), 
De mens: meer dan materie? Religie en reductionisme, Kampen: 
Kok, 38-54. 
McLaughlin, B., Bennett, K. 2005 “Supervenience”, 
   http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/ 
Ripley, C. 1984 “Sperry’s Concept of Consciousness”, Inquiry 27, 
399-423. 
Rockwell, T. 1998 “A Defense of Emergent Downward Causation” 
   http://users.california.com/~mcmf/causeweb.html 
 
 
 
  178 
On Game-theoretic Conceptualizations in Logic 
Maciej Tadeusz Kłeczek, Nottingham, England, UK 
Game-theory is a rich mathematical framework formalizing 
real-life and intuitive concepts. It comes with a set of 
slogans such as: winning, losing, dynamics, interaction, 
process, choice. The basic ontology is that of players 
acting according to certain definitiary rules of the relevant 
game. How one reacts to the merging of game-theory and 
logical concepts depends on one's philosophical 
assumptions. Some philosophers of logic view with 
suspicion the general anthropomorphic flavor and 
procedural elements involved.  
At least two different levels of analysis are present 
in the literature on logic games. Certainly, games are 
processes and can be described by process theories, such 
as modal logic with some form of bisimulation as the 
invariance relation1. However my concern in this paper is 
more classical and focuses, after preliminary exposition of 
paradigmatic logic games, on the interaction of properties 
of semantic games with '∼'.  
On the standard Tarskian account, truth in a 
structure is understood as a certain abstract relation 
holding between some particular structure and a formula 
(relative to some assignment if the relevant formula is an 
open formula). Truth and/or satisfaction conditions (1) M B 
Φ[α] are provided in a compositional manner.  
The game-theoretic account of truth in a structure is 
given as follows:  
 
(1') M B+ Φ[α] if and only if there is a winning strat-
egy for the initial Verifier (called II) in a semantic 
game G(M, Φ, α). Falsity is defined dually: 
(2) M B− Φ[α] iff there is a winning strategy for an ini-
tial Falsifier (called I) in a semantic game G(M, Φ, α). 
The definitional rules of the game of semantic evaluation 
are given as follows: 
 
(1) If Φ is an atomic formula no action is taken. II 
wins iff M B Φ; otherwise I wins.  
(2) G(~Φ, M, α) — the game is played as on  
G(Φ, M) except that the roles of the players are 
transposed. 
(3) G(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, M, α) — I makes the first choice of a 
conjunct from Ω ∈ {1, 2}. The game continues with 
the conjunct chosen. 
(4) G(ϕ1  V ϕ2, M, α) — II makes the first choice of a 
disjunct Ω ∈ {1, 2}. The game continues with the 
disjunct chosen. 
(5) G(∀xΦ, M, α) — I chooses the witness individ-
ual a from |M|. The game continues  
G(Φ, M, α  ∪ {x, a}). 
(6) G(∃xΦ, M, α) — I makes the first choice of indi-
vidual a from |M|. The game continues  
G(Φ, M, α ∪ {x, a}). 
Assuming the axiom of choice2 (1) and (1') are equivalent. 
Proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of a for-
                                                     
 
1 Game trees can be seen as relational models. Lets M = <W, R, V> and M' = 
<W', R', V'> be two relational models. Bisimulation is a non-empty relation E ⊆ 
WxW such that if wEw': (1) if w and w' satisfy the same proposition letters (2) if 
wRw* then there exists w*' such that w'Rw*' and w*Ew'* (3) and vice versa.  
2 The axiom of choice is needed in connection with ∀∃ formulas in the direc-
tion from Tarski to GTS. 
mula. It is evident that game theoretic content is relevant at 
the level of non-atomic formulas.   
It is important to note that each first-order game of 
semantic evaluation: (1) terminates in a finite number of 
moves; (2) is a two person zero-sum (the payoffs assigned 
to players at the terminal nodes of a game tree equal 
zero); (3) exemplifies perfect information, which amounts 
to lack of ignorance about previous moves of the 
opponent; (4) is non-cooperative. Taking (1), (2) and (3), it 
follows from general game-theory that each FO semantic 
game is determined: one of the players is in possession of 
a winning strategy. Determinancy guarantees the validity 
of the Law of Excluded Middle: (1) M = ϕ V ∼ϕ if and only if 
I has a winning strategy in G(M, ϕ V ∼ϕ) (2) if and only if I 
has a winning strategy in G(M, ϕ) or G(M, ~ϕ) (3) if and 
only if I has a winning strategy in G(M, ϕ) or II has a 
winning strategy in G(M, ϕ). The definitional rule for 
negation involves switching the roles of players and 
winning/loosing conventions. Under perfect information 
this rule respects the classical semantics for negation 
according to which: ∼ϕ is true in M if and only if ϕ is false.  
A structure comparison can be captured by means 
of a certain game of perfect information. For a given 
vocabulary L and L-models M, N a partial injective function 
f: M → N is a partial isomorphism if there is an 
isomorphism f*: [dom(f) → rng(f)], which extends f. Of 
course, the isomorphism f* is unique. An alternative 
formulation is in terms of a back and forth set. If L is a 
vocabulary, M and N are L models then M and N are 
partially isomorphic if and and only if there is a back and 
forth set for M and N. A back and forth set for M and N is a 
set P ⊆ Part(M, N) satisfying the two following conditions: 
(1) ∀f∈P∀a∈M∃g∈P(f ⊆ g and a∈dom(g)) (2) ∀f∈ 
P∀b∈N∃g∈P(f ⊆ g and b∈rng(g)).  
Conditions (1) and (2), imposed on the back and 
forth set, can be characterized by means of a Ehrenfucht-
Fraisse game. There are two players who move 
alternately, choosing elements from a domain of assigned 
models. Analogously to semantic games, the task of 
players is conflicting. I tries to show structural difference, 
whereas II seeks structural similarities. As one can expect:  
 
(1) M ≅p N if and only if player II has a winning strat-
egy in EFω(N, M).  
A more fine-grained concept is that of a back and forth 
sequence of some finite length Pn: (i ≤ n) such that:  
(1) ∅ ≠ P0 ⊆ ... Pn ⊆ Part(M, N) (2) ∀f∈Pi∀a∈M∃b∈N 
∃g∈Pi+1(f ∪ {a, b}) ⊆ g for i ≤ n (3) ∀f∈Pi∀b∈N 
∃a∈M∃g∈Pi+1(f ∪ {a, b}) ⊆ g for i ≤ n. A back and forth 
set implies a back and forth sequence but not vice versa. 
All of this summarized in the following chain of equiva-
lences:  
 
(1) M ≅pn N are partially isomorphic if and only if 
there is back and forth sequence of length n if and 
only if there exists a winning strategy for II in  
EFn(M, N). 
So far the notion of a game has been used in an in-
formal way. Restricting attention to finite cases and assum-
ing a set of possible actions A, a game of perfect informa-
tion is a triple G = <N, H, P>, where: (a) N is a set of play-
ers; (b) H is a set of finite sequences (histories) over a set 
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A with distinguished subset Z of terminal histories; (c) P is 
a function assigning a player to the elements of H\Z. A 
strategy is a function from the preimage of P to a set A. A 
winning strategy is a strategy, which leads to a win for a 
player irrespective of the opponent’s strategy.  
As was mentioned above, game-theoretic character-
istics are equivalent to standard ones. This fact certainly 
makes them adequate. However, it induces doubt about 
whether game-theoretic conceptualizations introduce any 
genuine content into logical theory. The choice of tech-
nique seems to be arbitrary.  
This explains the somewhat pessimistic but instruc-
tive remark found in Johan van Benthem's paper: “... all 
these games are useful didactic and heuristic tools in this 
area, but no significant logical results or insights so far 
appear to rest on them exclusively. But again this may 
reflect the poverty of the notion of game involved so far in 
current literature”. [van Benthem, 1990]  
It all depends on what kinds of results are expected. 
The games outlined above vindicate what can be called a 
strategic viewpoint in logical theory. Consider two graphs 
G = <{1, 2, 3}, V> and G' = <{1, 2, 3, 4}, V>, where V is an 
irreflexive and antisymetric relation. Obviously, those 
graph structures are non-isomorphic. There is no bijection 
between them. Thus I has a winning strategy in game 
EFn(G, G'). Actually, I has two winning strategies. He can 
force a winning outcome in two or three rounds of  
EFn(G, G'). We find an analogous case in semantic games. 
It often happens that II or I are in possession (obviously 
not simultaneously) of more than one winning strategy. 
Hence, winning strategies are more fine-grained semantic 
values than truth-values. Although those facts can be 
hardly regarded as striking results. 
The situation changes when the assumption of per-
fect information is abandoned and lack of information 
about the opponent’s previous moves is allowed. A win-
ning strategy is no longer built up on all the possible 
moves of the opponent. 
A game of imperfect information is the following tu-
ple: G = <N, H, P, Ii, i∈N>. The new element is a set Ii, i∈N 
whose elements are called information sets. Information 
sets induce partitions (equivalence relation) on a set of 
histories such that for all h, h'∈I∈Ι1, A(h) = A(h'), where 
A(h) denotes the set of possible actions after history h. 
Histories belonging to particular information sets occupy 
the same depth on a game tree.  
The difference between the semantic game of per-
fect as opposed to imperfect information can be seen by 
two styles of skolemizing branching-quantifier formulas: (1) 
∃f∃gϕ(x, f(x), z, g(x, z)) (2) ∃f∃gϕ(x, f(x), z, g(z)). It is as-
sumed that Skolem functions correspond to winning 
strategies for II. All of this was made explicit by Jaakko 
Hintikka who introduced IF FO logic ( being a proper ex-
tension of standard FO logic) where the failure of perfect 
information is syntactically expressed by the new element 
'/' i.e. (∀x)(∃y/∀x). Allowing imperfect information in a proc-
ess of semantic evaluation provides a formalisation of the 
idea of dependence/independence relations holding be-
tween quantifiers and attached variables. 
Formulas involving slashes introduce equivalence a 
relation E(Φ, M) on a particular structure M. Those equiva-
lence relations correspond to information sets. Whenever 
some elements or sequences3 of elements belong to such 
                                                     
 
3 Finite ordered sequence is a function f from the finite set of natural numbers 
to some finite set A.  
such an equivalence class it is required that a strategy 
function f satisfies a uniformity condition: i.e. E(a, b) →  
f(a) = f(b).  
Determinacy does not survive in this setting. It is 
possible that neither player is in possession of a uniform 
winning strategy when he is deprived of knowledge about 
all previous moves of his opponent. Thus, the inference 
from the lack of a winning strategy for one player to the 
existence of a winning strategy for the other is no longer 
valid. Despite the fact that the game rule for '∼' is the same 
as it is in the classical case.  
The logic of imperfect information is not closed un-
der contradictory negation. Consequently the Law of Ex-
cluded Middle does not hold in IF logic and truth-valueless 
sentences are allowed. This enables a distinction between 
false/ non-true and non-false / true. Game-theoretic nega-
tion under imperfect information satisfies the Strong 
Kleene evaluation schema: (a)∼(t) = f (b)∼(f) = t (c)∼(u) = u. 
More exactly LEM fails in non-FO fragment of IF logic. A 
canonical example of a truth-valueless sentence is: 
∀x(∃y/∀x) x ≠ y, where |M| ≥ 2.  
The expressive strength of IF logic, which is equal to 
the existential fragment of second order logic, opens the 
possibility of truth definitions for IF language in the signa-
ture of Peano's arithmetic in the language itself. Game-
theoretic non-determinancy guarantees that the Liar Para-
dox will not arise.4 Applying the standard procedure of 
Godel numbering and the Fixed Point Theorem to the Liar 
sentence λ we obtain the paradoxical looking sentence 
∼Tr[λ] where neither I nor II is in possession of a winning 
strategy.  
Moreover, IF logic is strictly more expressive than 
FO logic5. However it validates (a) Downward Skolem-
Lowenheim (Let M be an L-model of infinite cardinality k 
and let k' be a cardinal such that k > k' ≥ |L|. Then M has 
an elementary submodel of cardinality k') (b) Compactness 
(Let W be a set of IF formulas. If every finite subset of W 
has a model, then the entire set W has a model). Thus 
according to the Lindstrom Theorem its expressive 
strength should not exceed those of FO logic. But the 
crucial assumption of the Lindstrom theorem is that the 
logics he considers are closed under contradictory 
negation. Here game-theoric conceptualization shows 
once again its force. 
In this paper the employment of game-theoretic 
apparatus in the core areas of logical theoretizing was 
presented. Certainly, the fact that the existence of a 
winning strategy corresponds to an assertion that such 
and such logical property holds is surprising. At first blush 
those concepts might be regarded as categorically 
different. All of this introduces an entirely new 
methodological perspective, which can, should and is 
pursued in a systematic way.  
As emphasized earlier, varying purely game-
theoretic properties of a relevant game (affecting the 
conditions a strategy to be a winning strategy) entails 
change of meaning of the most important logical constant: 
negation. As it is self-evident this result is far from trivial 
and hardly can be seen as some form of heuristics and/or 
didactic enterprise. 
                                                     
 
4 As it is rightly emphasized by Hintikka the problem of Liar Antinomy does 
not concern truth predicate in isolation but the truth predicate in interaction 
with negation. Consider Truth-Teller sentence: “(1) This sentence is true”. It 
does not give rise to any kind of paradoxical conclusion.   
5 Two logics L1 and L2 are equal in the expressive strength if every class of 
models definable in L1 is definable in L2, and vice versa. 
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A Metaphysically Moderate Version of Humean Supervenience 
Szilárd Koczka, Miskolc, Hungary 
Humean Supervenience (HS) is the doctrine that the nomic 
features of our world supervenes on the arrangement of 
basic, non-nomic properties. David Lewis's motivation in 
elaborating HS was to present a view which does not refer 
to properties and relations alien to physics, so it is 
extremely important for the defender of HS to make it 
compatible with current physics. Contrary to Lewis, 
philosophers known as necessitarians or governists claim 
that laws express necessary relations. These claims 
involve an implicit ontological commitment that Lewis 
summarizes as follows „...there are more things in heaven 
and earth than physics has dreamt of.” (Lewis 1994,474).  
Within a non-humean ontological framework there 
can be states of affairs which are metaphysically related. A 
non-humean approach can be plausible only if the 
defenders of this view can put forward a convincing 
argument to the point that the very notion of a natural law 
involves a non-humean ontology. Whether one can acquire 
such an argument is dubious, and as humean analyses do 
not require such extra entities to explain the role of laws in 
science, it seems that the ontologically less comitted 
humean view is the promising one. For the rest of the 
paper I will assume that there is no such argument around.  
It is clear, that philosophical accounts of scientific 
laws appeal to metaphysical intuitions, but there is a 
significant difference between invoking intuitions or 
metaphysical theories. If one tries to analyse the notion of 
scientific laws in terms of his favorite metaphysical theory, 
the proposed analysis assumes that the background 
metaphysical theory is already accepted. As Lange (2000) 
emphasises: without a previously established metaphysical 
framework, this kind of approach is unilluminating. But if 
we keep in mind that a philosophical account of the natural 
laws is to be fitted with scientific practice, then it seems the 
weaker metaphysical commitment the philosophical 
account has the better. Scientists do not employ fully 
developed metaphysical theories, but they surely know 
how to work with these laws.  
Formulations of Humean Supervenience  
Lewis's original formulation of HS can be summarized as 
follows: In the actual world, everything supervenes on local 
qualities instantiating at certain points of space-time. There 
is no difference between two possible worlds without some 
difference in these local qualities. As Loewer (1996) points 
out, Lewis's motivation was to defend physicalism against 
philosophical challenges. Thus HS is motivated by a ten-
dency to avoid appeal to non-physical entities. However, 
Lewis's (1986) own formulation postulates local properties 
which seems to contradict current theories in quantum 
mechanics. It seems that if our current quantum mechan-
ics is correct, then we have to abandon the view that there 
are local properties at all. Lewis in his (1986,xi) admitted 
that his formulation – as a physicalist doctrine – can be 
falsified by empirical research, if it excludes the possibility 
of his local properties; in this sense HS is at best a contin-
gent truth.  
Loewer argues that for an acceptable doctrine we 
need to refine the Humean Supervenience thesis in order 
to make it compatible with recent physics. Loewer(1996) 
claims that the problem of defining the Humean Base (HB) 
on which everything else supervenes can be solved by 
appealing to the mathematical apparatus of quantum 
physics. According to his solution, the HB can be 
characterized as consisting of points of the fundamental 
mathematical space which is used by current quantum 
mechanics. Earman and Roberts (2005) have some 
misgivings about Loewer's version of HS. They argue that 
different physical theories use different mathematical 
spaces, and there is no uncontroversial way to determine 
which mathematical treatment is the fundamental one. If 
we try to specify the HB as the fundamental magnitudes of 
the best future physical theory HS – without an account of 
what makes a theory 'physical' – will be vacuous. It is 
possible that future physics postulates several kinds of 
entities which are alien to our current theories.  
There are two possible answer to the question of 
HS's compatibility with recent physical theories: (i)To make 
HS compatible with recent physics a neo-humean 
philosopher have to define the HB on which everything 
else supervenes. As Earman and Roberts emphasize: at 
this point our original metaphysical problem turns to be an 
epistemological one. (ii)There is a possible alternative to 
the epistemological account that Schaffer (2008) has in his 
mind while he defends reductionism as a thesis about 
mind-and-theory independent reality. He writes: “Causation 
and the laws of nature are nothing over and above the 
pattern of events, just like a movie is nothing over and 
above the sequence of frames.” (Schaffer 2008). 
According to his view, we do not need to define precisely 
what kind of properties belong to the HB since this 
formulation of HS does not concern the subvenient base. It 
is important that Schaffer does not even refer to basic 
(microphysical) facts. His starting point is the manifest 
image, so it does not matter that whether we can define 
basic microphysical facts with the help of our best theories. 
However this approach relies on the presupposition that 
knowledge about mind independent reality can be acquired 
via metaphysical inquiry of the manifest image. Behind 
these presuppositions is the view that we have knowledge 
about the natural laws. This is what I doubt. For a 
minimalist viewpoint if it is possible to come out with a 
metaphysically less committed approach of nomic notions, 
it seems that there are no much reason to hold such a 
view. Thus if there is a formulation of (i) which can handle 
our philosophical problems about scientific laws, we can 
disapprove (ii). My solution relies on a distinction between 
natural laws (of which we does not have knowledge) and 
scientific laws. I think that the debate can be meaningful 
only if we start with the notion of a scientific law and then 
try to answer the question as to what philosophically 
relevant implications it may have.  
Natural laws or scientific laws?  
Metaphysical discussions of natural laws assume that 
science aims to discover the laws of nature. Consequently, 
a metaphysical account of the natural laws can be ac-
cepted only if it can explain the role of the laws in scientific 
practice. Non-humeans argue that the notion of scientific 
law required by science can only be explained within a 
non-humean metaphysical framework. Humeans (e.g. 
Loewer 1996) argue that HS does explain the role of the 
notion of scientific laws and we do not need non-Humean 
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assumptions. Loewer argues that notion of the natural law 
in scientific practice does not require the governist idea 
that laws have to govern events so it is right to abandon 
governism. However, Balashov (2002) as a non-humean 
can also appeal to scientific practice in order to show that 
humean solutions are untenable. He argues that laws can 
be strongly supported by empirical evidence and have 
explanatory power only if they are necessary. It is clear 
that what Balashov has in mind is the concept of mind-
independent natural laws which can be discovered with the 
help of our science.  
I think that without a sharp distinction between no-
tions of natural laws and scientific laws, it is impossible to 
see the problem as clearly as we need. The concept of 
natural laws involves universality, so “laws of nature with-
out universality” is a contradiction while there is no such a 
contradiction in the sentence that “the laws of thermal ex-
pansion is not universal”. This can be demonstrated easily: 
if ΔL = k.L0.ΔT were an universal truth it should be impos-
sible to cite situations where the relation between L0,  ΔT and ΔL falls, but there is an infinite number of provisos 
implicit in a statement like “without hammering the heated 
iron rod inward at one end ...”, so it is impossible to state a 
genuine law-statement. Thus scientific laws cannot be 
universal, while implicit in the concept of natural laws we 
presuppose universality. scientific laws – at least most of 
them – certainly fail to being equal to natural laws.  
A metaphysically moderate version of 
Humean Supervenience  
I am agnostic about the feasibility of metaphysical ap-
proaches so I will focus on the question of scientific laws 
instead. As I said scientific laws – or at least lots of them – 
fail to be universal. What more can we say about scientific 
laws? Earman and Roberts (2005) identify laws with 
mathematical treatments of certain problems. They wrote: 
“In modern physics (by which we mean, at least, physics 
since Newton), the typical form of a problem is that of solv-
ing a differential equation (or a system of such equations) 
subject to certain boundary conditions, which typically 
include initial conditions.” (Earman & Roberts 2005, 13). 
The difference between nomic and non-nomic facts is 
merely a methodological one. We have to distinguish 
boundary and initial conditions and equations while we try 
to solve a problem, but this difference is not ontological. 
This definition restricts the field of scientific laws to laws 
which can be formulated mathematically. Thus if we hold 
this view as an appropriate account of scientific laws, we 
cannot count many of scientific generalizations as laws; 
e.g. laws of biology will be non-laws according to this 
analysis. I do not think that this would be the right move. 
However, implicit in the view presented by Earman and 
Roberts (2005) there is something resembling to Hume's 
original insight, that nomic relations among events is not 
observable. They define the Humean base as follows: “The 
Humean base at a given world is the set of non-nomic 
facts at that world that can be the output of a reliable, spa-
tiotemporally finite observation or measurment procedure.” 
(Earman & Roberts 2005,17).  
Earman and Roberts suggest a modal 
characterization of HB. In the light of their analysis a fact 
belongs to the HB if and only if there is a nomologically 
possible observaiton or measurement procedure to detect 
it. The explanation will be circular only if we interpret 
nomological possibility as a mind-and-theory independent 
feature of our world. I prefer the alternative – ontologically 
less committed – interpretation that something is 
nomologically possible if it is compatible with our scientific 
laws. It is an epistemological characterization of 
nomological possibility and it has its own problems, but I 
think this is the best we can offer. There is a bit obscure 
notion within the definition presented by Earman and 
Roberts, namely reliability. To disperse this obscurity I 
define reliability as follows: An observation or 
measurement procedure can be reliable, if it is consistent 
with our already accepted theories and all observable fact. 
In addition, reliability has a normative feature: what is and 
what is not reliable depends on our current theories. This 
normative feature can be understood with the help of 
Kuhn's (1996) terminology. Even if it is incorrect to talk 
about “Scientific revolution”, the core idea that scientific 
standards can change with paradigms seems plausible 
enough. Thus I refine my definition: A measurement 
process is reliable, if it is consistent with our already 
accepted theories and directly observed facts, and it fits to 
our current scientific standards.  
A moderate version of Humean supervenience as a 
minimalist theory states that we can develop predictable 
useful scientific laws as inference rules that belongs to 
certain models or systems. The models we develop are 
useful instruments of explanation and prediction, but we 
can never be in an epistemological position that enables 
us to declare that in scientific research we can discover the 
mind-and-theory independent natural laws. We have an 
ability to perceive relevant patterns of non-nomic facts, 
there by creating instrumentally useful models or systems, 
rather than the very natural laws. The Humean Base 
consists of facts that we can acquire directly or with the 
help of any reliable observational or measurement 
procedure. One can argue, that the moderate version of 
HS is not the same as that of Lewis elaborated, and it is 
obviously true. Why call this thesis Humean 
Supervenience after all? Lewis dedicated his thesis as “in 
honor of the greater denier of necessary connection”(Lewis 
1986,ix), however it is possible to come up with a 
supervenience thesis about laws which can express 
Hume's original – epistemological – motivations about 
nomic relations.  
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“In der Frage liegt ein Fehler” – Überlegungen zu Philosophische 
Untersuchungen (PU) 189A 
Wilhelm Krüger, Bergen, Norway 
1. “ ‘Aber sind die Übergänge durch die [...] 
Formel nicht bestimmt? ’ ” (PU 189A1). 
In PU 185 bis PU 190 diskutiert Wittgenstein, inwiefern die 
Übergänge algebraischer Formeln bestimmt sind oder 
nicht. Zum Ausgangspunkt nimmt er dabei ein Verständi-
gungsproblem über die Verwendung des Ausdrucks “+2" 
zwischen einem Lehrer A und einem in PU 143 bis PU 150 
bereits mit der Grundzahlenreihe vertraut gemachten 
Schüler B. Diesem B ist jetzt auch mit guten Worten nicht 
verständlich zu machen, dass seine Verwendung von “+2" 
mit unserer Verwendungsweise dieses Ausdrucks nicht 
übereinstimmt. Ihn dazu zu bringen, die Reihe so fortzu-
setzen, "wie wir es tun" (PU 145B), gelingt dieses Mal 
nicht (vgl. PU 185). Diese Ausführungen Wittgensteins 
zum Verhalten des Schülers laufen in PU 186 erstens 
darauf hinaus, zu hinterfragen, was für den einzelnen zur 
richtigen Befolgen eines Befehls nötig ist (vgl. PU 186A1). 
Wittgenstein weist das intuitive Befolgen von Regeln hier 
zuück.1. Zweitens geht es jetzt darum, was entscheidend 
dafür ist, dass man mit Bezug auf einen Befehl (“+2!") von 
einer richtigen Befolgung sprechen kann. Der Übergang 
vom Verstehen des Befehls durch den Schüler zum Mei-
nen des Befehls durch den Lehrer ist damit gemacht. 
In PU 187 und PU 1882 verdeutlicht Wittgenstein, 
dass nicht nur für das Verstehen (des Schülers), sondern 
auch für das Meinen der Übergänge (durch einen Lehrer) 
seelische Vorgänge u.ä. keine Rolle spielen. Wer 
behauptet, er habe, während er den Befehl gab, schon alle 
Übergänge, der von ihm gemeinten Reihe gewusst, kann 
damit auf jeden Fall nicht ernsthaft behaupten zu dieser 
Zeit an alle Übergänge gedacht zu haben. Behauptet wird 
damit vielmehr, so Wittgenstein, dass man auf Befragen in 
bestimmter Weise reagiert hätte.3 Durch einen Vergleich 
bringt Wittgenstein zum Ausdruck, dass man von dem, der 
das und das meint, erwarten kann, dass dieser in einer 
bestimmten Situation in bestimmter Weise reagiert. - Das, 
was in PU 186A9 noch als “beinahe richtiger” bezeichnet 
wird, erweist sich schon vor diesem Hintergrund als 
(überwiegend) falsch. (Vgl. a. PU 219D.) - In PU 188 
finden wir eine Art “mythologische Beschreibung” (PU 
221A1) des Gebrauchs von “+2" ähnlich wie Wittgenstein 
dies später in PU 221A1 thematisiert. Da für denjenigen, 
der mit dem Ausdruck “+2" in der in PU 187 beschriebenen 
Weise vertraut ist, die Übergänge festliegen, unabhängig 
davon, ob er “sie schriftlich mündlich, oder in Gedanken” 
(PU 188B1) macht, erhält er den irrigen Eindruck, sie seien 
“eigentlich schon gemacht” (PU 188B1) und “in einer 
einzigartigen Weise vorausbestimmt” (PU 188B2).  
Wittgenstein weist diese "Idee" (PU 187) sowohl durch den 
Hinweis, dass der algebraische Ausdruck ("+2") alleine die 
Übergänge nicht festlegt (vgl. PU 185)4, als auch seine 
                                                     
 
1 Für Baker & Hacker (1985) beginnt mit PU 185 Wittgensteins Erörterung des 
Regelfolgens in PU I. 
2 Hier verläuft Wittgensteins Argumentation teilweise parallel zu der in PU 147 
/ 148: das Wissen der Anwendung einer Reihe ist kein seelischer Zustand. 
3 Zu dem Konditional als Kriterium des Meinens vgl. auch PU 684. Zu erinnern 
ist hier auch an PU 78: Wissen wie eine Klarinette klingt, heißt u.a. den Klang 
erkennen, wenn auf ihr gespielt wird. 
4 Hier gilt einmal mehr Wittgensteins "Aber da waren wir ja schon einmal. Wir 
können uns ja eben mehr als eine Anwendung eines algebraischen Ausdrucks 
denken" aus PU 146B.  
Reduktio ad absurdum (an alle gemeinten Übergänge 
kann man nicht denken) und den Hinweis auf den richtigen 
Gebrauch des Satzes (PU 187A4) zurück. Nachdem 
deutlich ist, wodurch die Übergänge algebraischer 
Ausdrücke nicht bestimmt sind, setzt Wittgenstein mit der 
Frage aus PU 189A fort.  
Wittgenstein hat die Frage bewusst formuliert. Und 
auch seine Antwort darauf ist, wörtlich zu nehmen: Der 
Fehler, der sich in der Frage befindet, besteht in dem, was 
die Frage ausläst, um sie beantworten zu können. Es geht 
hier nicht einfach darum, die bereits widerlegte Vorstellung 
eines "geistigen Mechanismus" (PU 689C) des Meinens 
noch einmal zurückzuweisen.5 Vielmehr soll jetzt deutlich 
werden: Man kann nicht sinnvoll nach der Bestimmung 
eines Ausdrucks fragen, ohne dabei auf eine Gruppe zu 
referieren, in der der Ausdruck gebraucht wird. "Bestimmt" 
nennen wir einen Ausdruck nur dort, wo es Menschen gibt, 
die ihn in gleicher Weise gebrauchen, d.h. dort, wo alle auf 
"der gleichen Stufe den gleichen Übergang machen" (PU 
189B). Wittgenstein schlägt damit zwei Fliegen mit einer 
Klappe: wenn alle aufgrund ihrer Abrichtung auf "+3" den 
gleichen Übergang machen, dann ist nicht nur bestimmt, 
was für einen Schüler (z.B.) als nächster Schritt zu tun ist, 
sondern auch wie alle nur denkbaren Schritte gemeint 
werden können, ohne an sie gedacht zu haben. 
Gewonnen ist damit ein Kriterium, durch das zu 
entscheiden (rechtfertigen) ist, welcher Schritt auf den 
Befehl "+3" der richtige ist oder nicht. Die Frage nach der 
Bestimmtheit eines Ausdrucks erweist sich so als Frage 
nach einem konstanten gemeinsamen Verhalten 
(Reagieren) innerhalb 'Gruppe'. Fügt man dem Fragetext 
in PU 189A1 diese hinzu, lässt sich nicht nur zwischen 
denen unterscheiden, für die, die Übergänge festliegen 
und denen, für die sie nicht festliegen, sondern innerhalb 
derer, für die der Ausdruck bestimmt ist, eine weitere 
Differenzierung der Verwendung der Formel in "bestimmt" 
und "unbestimmt" vornehmen (vgl. PU 189C). Wittgenstein 
nennt die Frage wohl deshalb in seinem MS 118 auch 
„zweideutig“ (118. 88v). PU 190 stellt dazu den logischen 
Abschluss dar: der einzelne kann mit (s)einem Zeichen nur 
dort etwas meinen, ihm eine Bestimmung geben, wo er zur 
Erklärung auf Zeichen zurückgreifen kann, die bereits 
bestimmt sind. Wittgensteins Wortwahl ("wie wir sie 
ständig gebrauchen", PU 190A) an dieser Stelle weist 
natürlich auf den "ständigen Gebrauch" in PU 198C hin. 
Unterstrichen wird damit die Nähe dieser Bemerkungen 
zum Regelfolgen in PU 198ff. und die Rolle, die denen, die 
die Zeichen gebrauchen, dabei zukommt. Im Folgenden 
soll anhand einiger Bemerkungen aus dem MS 109 
gezeigt werden, dass diese Einsichten zur Grammatik des 
Ausdrucks "bestimmt" auch für Wittgenstein nicht immer 
selbstverständlich gewesen sind. 
                                                     
 
5 Wittgenstein hat die Fragestellung aus PU 189A2 so oder ähnlich in (min-
destens) fünf verschiedenen Zusammenhängen benutzt (vgl. z.B. MS 113. 
143, MS 131. 63, MS 135. 75; MS 136. 6a). Ausgeschlossen werden soll hier 
nicht, dass er diese Anmerkung auch dazu benutzt, auf irreführende Fragen 
hinzuweisen. Hier wird vielmehr dafür argumentiert, dass er dies in PU 189 
nicht tut.  
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2. “Aber ist der Sachverhalt durch die  
genaue Beschreibung nicht bestimmt?”  
(vgl. MS 109. 298).  
Am 3. Februar 1931 bringt Wittgenstein sein MS 1096 mit 
einer, wie er meint, “einfache[n] Antwort auf unsere langen 
Schwierigkeiten” (109. 298) zum Abschluss. Die Schwie-
rigkeit, die er hier zum Abschluss zu bringen hofft, und mit 
der er im gesamten MS 109 kämpft, beruht auf der später 
in PU 198 formulierten Einsicht, dass Deutungen allein die 
Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks nicht bestimmen können (vgl. 
109. 281). Für ihn steht damit in Frage, wie ist es möglich, 
einen Satz auf bestimmte Weise zu verstehen, einen be-
stimmten Gedanken mit ihm auszudrücken, wenn jeder 
Satz auf verschiedene Weise gedeutet werden kann. Die 
Antwort, die er jetzt gibt, besteht auch hier in einer Anmer-
kung zur Verwendung des Ausdrucks “bestimmt”.  
 
/ Denn mehr bestimmt, als durch eine genaue Be-
schreibung, kann etwas nicht sein. Denn bestimmen 
kann nur heißen, es beschreiben. Und das ist sehr 
wichtig. (109. 298)  
“Bestimmen des Satzsinnes” kann demnach nicht heißen, 
sich das Denken und Verstehen wie einen Mechanismus 
vorzustellen, "dessen äußeres wir kennen, dessen inneres 
Arbeiten uns aber verborgen ist" (109. 174). Die nach 
Wittgenstein nur scheinbare Mehrdeutigkeit des Satzes 
(vgl. 109. 170) kann und muss auch nicht durch verborge-
ne physiologische oder psychologische Vorgänge kom-
pensiert werden.7 “Genau” und “ungenau” und “bestimmt” 
und “unbestimmt” sind für ihn Ausdrücke, die sich auf die 
Beschreibungsmöglichkeiten innerhalb eines Sprachsys-
tems beziehen (vgl. 109. 298). Eine unbestimmte Aus-
drucksweise, die innerhalb der Sprache nicht zu beseitigen 
ist, läst Wittgenstein nicht gelten.8 Insoweit durch einen 
Regelausdruck gegeben ist, “was ich tun soll, soweit es 
überhaupt gegeben sein kann” (298), ist was zu tun ist, 
bestimmt. “Und d.h.,” so Wittgenstein, “es kann der Be-
schreibung nur eine Handlung entsprechen (nur so können 
wir diesen Ausdruck ['bestimmt'] gebrauchen)” (299). - 
Wittgenstein folgt auch hier seiner Praxis, seine Untersu-
chungsergebnisse mit einem philosophischen Kommentar 
zu unterlegen:  
 
Alle Schwierigkeit der Philosophie kann nur auf 
Missverständnissen beruhen. Eine Entdeckung ist 
nie nötig, kann nie nötig sein sie aufzulösen. Es ist 
ein Missverständnis & kann nur als solches aufge-
löst werden. (109. 298.)  
In diesem Zitat wird der Ausdruck “Missverständnis” von 
ihm für eine bestimmte Lesart von “bestimmt” gebraucht. 
W. sagt hier also, dass es einem Missverständnis ent-
springt, die gesamte Sprache, für missverständlich zu 
halten. Die Forderung nach der Bestimmung eines Satzes 
ist nämlich unsinnig, wenn man einen Satz, der alle Mög-
lichkeiten der Bestimmung eines Sachverhaltes aus-
schöpft, weiterhin “unbestimmt” nennt. Die Möglichkeit des 
Missverstehens, die Wittgensteins Kritiker hier gegenüber 
jedwedem Ausdruck der Sprache geltend machen will, fällt 
auf ihn selbst in Form einer Kritik seiner Verwendung des 
Ausdrucks “unbestimmt” (“bestimmt”, “Missverständnis”, 
                                                     
 
6 Die Bezeichnung aller unveröffentlichten MSS und TSS erfolgt nach v. 
Wright 1990, zitiert wird nach der BEE (2000). 
7 Wittgenstein wendet sich im MS 109 u.a. explizit gegen Russells (198) und 
Ogdens und Richards (170) Theorie der Bedeutung. Vgl. auch PU 109 mit 
Wittgensteins Anmerkung zur "pneumatische[n] Auffassung vom Verstehen". 
8 Hier wird wohlgemerkt nicht der Gebrauch von Ausdrücken wie “ca.”, “unge-
fähr”, “vielleicht”, etc. von Wittgenstein problematisiert. 
etc.) zurück. Die Skeptik gegenüber jedwedem sprachli-
chen Ausdruck wird durch den Hinweis auf die richtige, 
weil einzig mögliche Verwendung des Ausdrucks “be-
stimmt”, etc. gebrochen. Die Bedenken sind Missverständ-
nisse, denn mehr darf man von der Bestimmung eines 
Sachverhaltes durch einen Satz nicht erwarten.  Sich sol-
cherart über die Bestimmtheit der Sprache klar zu werden, 
nennt Wittgenstein in seinem Zitat nicht “eine Entdeckung 
machen”. Sein Ergebnis nennt er nicht “Lösung” des Prob-
lems, sondern dessen “Auflösung”. Nimmt man Wittgen-
stein beim Wort, dann gibt es am Ende des MS 109 das 
Problem mit der Unbestimmtheit des Satzes, das er in 
diesem MS seitenweise diskutiert, für ihn nicht mehr. Es ist 
für Wittgenstein gegenstandslos geworden. Zur Verteidi-
gung dieser starken These weist Wittgenstein hier ein 
drittes Mal auf den Zusammenhang seines Darstellungs-
problems mit der Frage hin „sieht der Andere wirklich die-
selbe Farbe, wenn er blau sieht, wie ich?”(299 / vgl. PU 
273).9 Können wir überhaupt wissen, welchen Farbein-
druck der Andere hat, oder kann nur er selber dies wis-
sen? Wittgensteins Antwort lautet hier nicht, dass wir mehr 
nicht tun können, als sein Urteil über das, was er sieht, zu 
akzeptieren, sondern, dass die Frage gar nicht danach 
fragt, ob der andere die gleiche Farbe ‘in sich sieht’. Es 
gibt, so Wittgenstein, einen grammatisch verbrieften 
Rechtsanspruch das, was der andere sieht “dasselbe, was 
ich sehe” zu nennen, wenn sich dies “nach der gewöhnli-
chen Methode konstatieren” (299) lässt. Die Frage in ei-
nem anderen Sinne zu verstehen, ist hier nicht möglich. 
Eine scheinbar noch offene, nur schwer zu beantwortende 
und philosophisch überaus relevant erscheinende Frage, 
wird zu einem Missverständnis bzgl. des Gebrauchs des 
Ausdrucks “die gleiche Farbe sehen” umgedeutet; das 
Problem löst sich auf. - In Analogie dazu ist es Unsinn 
weiter nach der Bestimmtheit eines Satzsinnes zu suchen, 
wenn dieser Satz in dem System, zu dem er gehört, schon 
vollkommen bestimmt ist. Wer nach dem Sinn eines Sat-
zes fragt, erwartet nach Wittgenstein nicht mehr als eine 
Erklärung; und die bekommt er ja auch. (Vgl. PU 504.)  
Vor diesem Hintergrund verwundert es nicht, dass 
Wittgenstein nicht nur fordert, dass die ganze Sprache für 
sich selbst sprechen müsse (vgl. Ms 109. 280), sondern 
auch die Frage „Wie kann der Satz einen Sachverhalt 
bestimmen?” nur noch unter Vorbehalt benutzt, insofern 
dieser zu der Annahme verleitet, ein Satz tue etwas. (Vgl. 
dazu PU 93B.10) Bereits zu Beginn des MS 110 präsentiert 
er dazu, die aus PU 435 bekannte pejorative Form: “‘Wie 
macht der Gedanke / Satz das, das er darstellt?’” (110. 33; 
“Satz” im MS ohne Streichung über “Gedanke”). Auf diese 
Worte wendet Wittgenstein an dieser Stelle seinen 
philosophischen Auftrag aus PU 116B an, “die Worte von 
ihrer metaphysischen wieder auf ihre richtige Verwendung 
in der Sprache” (110. 34) zurückzuführen.  
3. Wo Wittgenstein fehlt  
Benutzt man die grammatischen Hinweise, die durch PU 
189 gegeben werden, wird deutlich, in welcher Schwierig-
keit Wittgenstein sich 1931 befand. Einerseits hat er ja 
ganz recht mit dem, was er über die Bestimmung eines 
Satzes innerhalb einer Sprache sagt. Setzt man, wie Witt-
genstein dies im MS 109 tut, den Gebrauch unserer Spra-
che voraus, ist das, was zu tun ist, durch die Ausdrücke 
der Sprache vollständig bestimmt. Nicht umsonst sind 
                                                     
 
9 Vgl. MS 109. 171, 197 und 299.  
10 Wittgenstein schreibt dort: “Durch ein Missverständnis erscheint es uns so, 
als tue der Satz etwas seltsames” (PU 93). Wir werden so, so Wittgenstein 
eine Bemerkung später “auf die Jagd nach Chimären geschickt (PU 94). 
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nicht nur viele der Fragen, die er zu dieser Zeit z.B. zur 
Grammatik von "erwarten", "wünschen" "denken" und "be-
fehlen" stellt, bis in seine PU I gewandert, sondern auch 
die Antworten, die er damals dazu bereits gab.11  „Unbe-
stimmt“, mehrdeutig“ etc. benutzt Wittgenstein für eine 
Relation innerhalb einer Sprache. Dadurch wird so wenig 
aus der Sprache herausgetreten (vgl. 109.170), wie da-
durch, dass wir “verschiedene Arten von Formeln [...] ein-
ander entgegensetzen“, wie in PU 189C beschrieben.12 
Wittgenstein operiert zu dieser Zeit ganz in Ûbereinstim-
mung mit seiner Ausgangsbasis in PU 204: “wie die Sa-
chen stehen“, ist die Befolgung von Befehlen bestimmt, 
getreu dem Motto „Was in der Logik nicht nötig ist, ist auch 
nicht von Nutzen“ (109.294) Andererseits wird deutlich, 
dass Wittgenstein durch diese Innenansicht der Sprache, 
den in PU 189 vollzogenen Wechsel, der einem Wechsel 
der Perspektive auf seinen Untersuchungsgegenstand 
gleichkommt, hier versäumt. An die Stelle eines inner-
sprachlichen Erklärungsregresses tritt in PU 189 ja der 
Verweis auf verschiedene Gruppen, in denen ein Zeichen 
infolge einer Abrichtung immer auf die gleiche Weise Ver-
wendung findet oder eben nicht. Und damit die Einsicht, 
dass von einer Bestimmtheit des Sinnes dort nicht die 
Rede sein kann, wo es nicht, wie Wittgenstein in einer 
frühen Formulierung von PU 189 schreibt – „Usus“ (Frag-
ment 178E)13 ist, das Zeichen zu gebrauchen. Vorbereitet 
wird dies im Kontext von PU 189 durch die Gegenüberstel-
lung von unserem Verhalten und denen von Marsbewoh-
nern (vgl. PU I, S. 54.), und von unserem Verhalten und 
denen von abnormalen Schülern; und eben durch die Be-
merkungen zum Regelfolgen in PU 198ff. konstruktiv er-
gänzt.14 Solange der in PU 189A durchgeführte Wechsel  
 
                                                     
 
11 Hier braucht man nur an seine Aussagen zur internen Beziehung zu den-
ken, die (u.a.) aus dem MS 109 stammen. Weiterhin Befinden sich in diesem 
MS Vorarbeiten z.B. zu PU 429, 430, 431, 435, 438, 440, 442-446. 
12 Der Fehler, den Wittgenstein zu dieser Zeit macht, besteht scheinbar darin, 
dass er alle Fragen zur Bestimmtheit eines Satzes im Sinne von PU 465B 
versteht. Der Ausdruck der Erwartung ist für Wittgenstein dort nur insofern 
unbestimmt, “dass er etwa eine Disjunktion verschiedener Möglichkeiten 
enthält“.  
13 Dieser vermutlich erste Formulierungsversuch von PU 189 befindet sich 
auf einem Kalenderblatt (Fragment) vom 8. August 1937. Wann Wittgenstein 
den Eintrag vornahm, ist ungewiss. Zweifelsfrei ist aber, dass der dort gege-
bene Hinweis auf Gepflogenheiten mit zu den frühesten im gesamten Nach-
lass gehört.  
14 Schulte (2005, S. 39) weist darauf hin, dass Wittgenstein vermutlich von 
Piero Sraffa "die Anregung [erhielt] menschliches (Sprach-)Verhalten aus 
'anthropologischer' - also quasi ethnologischer - Perspektive zu betrachten". 
der Perspektive - aus einem funktionierenden Kalkül her-
aus (vgl. PU 189C) – zur Verwendungspraxis unterschied-
licher Gruppen hin, nicht geleistet wird, bleibt seine Frage 
nach der Bestimmtheit unserer Ausdrücke zu dieser Zeit 
fehlerhaft.15 Es liegt damit auf der Hand, dass das in PU 
189A2ff. ausgedrückte Wissen des späten Wittgenstein 
dem früheren Wittgenstein (vgl. PU 189A1) gefehlt hat. Ob 
dieses Wissen wiederum nur zur Aufklärung von Missver-
ständnissen (vgl. 109. 298) beitrug, oder ob es, wenn es 
schon keine gewöhnliche Entdeckung war, so doch eine 
“grammatische Entdeckung“ (111. 2) zu nennen ist, und in 
welcher Weise diese Entdeckung ihn überrascht haben 
könnte, kann im Rahmen dieser Arbeit nicht mehr themati-
siert werden.16 - In PU 189A spricht Wittgenstein auf jeden 
Fall erst einmal von einem “Fehler”.  
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15 Insofern das stimmt, lassen sich viele der Bemerkungen aus PU I mit 
Bezug auf diese Fragestellung (grob) datieren. Vgl. z.B. PU 337, PU 432 und 
natürlich PU 198ff. 
16 Vgl. dazu z.B. Wittgensteins Bemerkungen in PU 89 bis 133. 
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Problems with Psychophysical Identities  
Peter Kügler, Innsbruck, Austria 
1. Theories of Psychophysical Identity 
The idea of psychophysical identity is sometimes ex-
pressed by saying that the mind is identical to the body, or 
to one of its parts, the brain. This could mean different 
things. If it is meant as a rejection of the Cartesian dualism 
of mental and physical substances, it would be better to 
say that minds, i.e., mental substances do not exist at all. 
Here, elimination seems to be more appropriate than iden-
tification. If Descartes is wrong, souls are not identical to 
the body, they simply do not exist.  
But of course, other kinds of mind-body identification 
are available. Type identity theory says that mental types 
are identical to physical (neurophysiological) types. In 
different versions of this theory the types are conceived as 
types of properties, events, processes, or whatever the 
preferred ontology is. Token identity theory identifies 
mental tokens with physical tokens without assuming 
identity of types. And functionalism, as it is usually 
presented, identifies mental types with functional types 
which are said to be "realized" by the physical properties of 
the brain. It is common to note that functionalism is 
actually ontologically neutral, because the functional 
properties could also be realized by non-physical 
properties. But it is no less common to supplement the 
functionalist framework with physicalist assumptions. 
Functional types are defined by their causal roles, which 
include physical causes and physical effects. Physicalists 
assume that these causal relations are describable by 
physics. Given this additional premise, the property that 
realizes the functional type must be a physical property. In 
this way, functionalism leads to psychophysical identity; 
whether it is type identity or token identity does not matter 
in the present context. 
Type identity theory, token identity theory and 
physicalist functionalism identify the mental with the 
physical. Hence they aim at reducing the mental to the 
physical in one sense of "reduction". In the following I will 
try to argue against these three theories. For ease of 
discussion, I will use the open sentence "F is identical to 
G" for psychophysical identity statements of all sorts. F is a 
psychological and G a physical term suitable for the 
respective theory. So the terms may either refer to types or 
to tokens.  
2. Psychophysical Identity as Necessary 
Suppose that F is identical to G. Whether F and G stand 
for types or tokens, there are two possibilities as to the 
nature of the respective identity statements. They are ei-
ther meant to express a necessary or a contingent truth. 
Let us consider the first option first and suppose that "F is 
identical to G" is necessarily true. It is well known that this 
assumption flies in the face of anti-physicalist arguments 
based on modal considerations. Descartes famously ar-
gued that he is not a material substance, because 
whereas he cannot doubt the existence of his mind, his 
body might not exist. The mind could exist without the 
body, therefore the two are not identical. Contemporary 
philosophers have criticized psychophysical identity theo-
ries by assuming that in other possible worlds mental 
properties are correlated with different physical properties 
than in the real world, or by evoking a Zombie world that is 
physically identical to the real world but contains no con-
sciousness at all. Arguments like these rely on the possible 
dissociation of the mental and the physical. It is important 
to keep in mind that they only work against psychophysical 
identity claims assumed to be necessarily true. 
When type identity theory was put forward in the 
1950s, it was meant as a theory of contingent identity; as 
an empirical discovery that need not necessarily be true. 
But today most philosophers seem to be convinced that 
type identity implies necessary coextension, which means 
that a mental and a physical type can only be identical if 
they are correlated in all possible worlds. If this is correct, 
type identity is seriously threatened by modal 
counterarguments. But these arguments threaten token 
identity too. Suppose a mental token F is necessarily 
identical to a physical token G. There seem to be possible 
worlds in which F is correlated with different physical 
tokens, or with none at all. Conversely, there seem to be 
possible worlds in which G is correlated with different or no 
mental tokens. For example, we can imagine a possible 
world that is exactly like ours except that my current visual 
impression is correlated with a different brain state, or my 
current brain state with a different visual impression. So 
token identity does not look like a necessary relation 
either. 
A possible defence against these and similar 
objections to psychophysical identity is to challenge the 
underlying modal intuitions. The objections presuppose 
that we are able to imagine, to think about, or to 
consistently describe possible worlds that differ from ours 
in containing other psychophysical correlations, or even 
Zombies without minds. But our imagination is limited, and 
so are our thoughts and descriptions, or any other faculty 
that is supposed to provide epistemic access to possible 
worlds. Thus there are reasons to be sceptical about the 
reliability of possible-world arguments. But although it is 
good to be cautious, one must add that there is no better 
access to possible worlds than that provided by 
imagination, thought, and description. When investigating 
such alternatives to reality we depend on these methods of 
metaphysical enquiry. Without them, it would be pointless 
to claim that psychophysical identity exists necessarily. If 
you dismiss imagination, thought and description as 
insufficient methods for exploring possible worlds, you 
must also dismiss the necessity of psychophysical identity.  
3. Explaining Psychophysical Identity 
Since necessity seems to be a dead end, I will now turn to 
the assumption that psychophysical identity is a contingent 
truth. In this perspective, questions of explanation become 
particularly important. Suppose a psychophysical identity 
claim is true. Do we need to explain why it is true? And, if 
so, how can we explain it? Is there an answer to the ques-
tion "Why is F identical to G?" And do we need such an 
answer to understand that identity? To preclude a possible 
misunderstanding: these closely related questions aim at 
explanation, not at epistemic justification. A justification for 
the claim that F is identical to G might consist in empirical 
evidence that F and G are regularly correlated. But even if 
such an observed correlation were a good reason for be-
lieving that F and G are identical, it would not explain why 
this identity exists.  
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With respect to explanation, there is a huge 
difference between contingent and necessary 
psychophysical identity. Philosophers who prefer 
necessary identity sometimes maintain that we do not 
need an explanation, because in their view the existence 
of something necessary does not require to be explained. 
As their argument goes, there is no sense in asking, e.g., 
why squares are rectangles, because the opposite cannot 
be the case. The same would go for psychophysical 
identity: if F were necessarily identical to G, it could not be 
otherwise; therefore we would not need to explain why F is 
identical to G. I think this argument is almost correct. It 
only needs to be added that there is a reasonable answer 
to the question why squares are rectangles, even though it 
is quite trivial: squares are rectangles because the words 
"square" and "rectangle" are used in a certain way; more 
precisely, because the word "square" is defined in such a 
way that it refers to rectangles with equal sides. In a similar 
vein, we could answer the question why a necessary 
psychophysical identity exists: because F and G (or, for 
that matter, the predicates these symbols stand for) are 
used in such a way that both refer to the same entity. In 
short, the existence of a necessary identity can be 
explained by how the language is used. 
An explanation like this, however, is not sufficient in 
the case of contingent identity. A contingent identity cannot 
be explained by language use alone, although the way the 
words are used always contributes to the explanation of 
why a sentence is true. A sentence has its truth value 
partly because of the meanings of its components. But in 
the case of contingent truths this cannot be the whole 
explanation. That an identity statement is contingently true 
means that it could also be false. Why is it not false? Why 
doesn´t the identity not exist? If we could answer these 
questions solely by how the language is used, the 
statement "F is identical to G" would be true in all possible 
worlds in which the words are used as they are used in the 
actual world. And this would contradict the assumption that 
the identity statement is contingently true. Therefore we 
need an explanation that goes beyond language use.  
Obviously, we can exclude causal models of 
explanation which are used in some branches of dualism 
but are not suitable for explaining psychophysical identity. 
In particular, it does not make sense to say that a mental 
state is caused by the corresponding brain state, if the two 
are identical. An effect must be different from its cause. 
So, what we look for is an explanation of psychophysical 
identity that goes beyond language use and does not rely 
on causal interaction. Which alternatives are left? It is 
useful to consider examples of identities and their 
explanations in other areas, where we find at least three 
different explanatory models. 
4. Three Models of Explaining Contingent 
Identity 
The first one consists in analyzing identity in terms of no-
mological connections. Suppose two different things, A 
and B, are united by some physical process, like two drops 
of water that fuse into one when touching each other. Re-
garding identity, this process allows for different descrip-
tions. An interesting way of describing it is to say that A 
and B, not having been identical before the fusion, are now 
identical. Let us accept this description for a moment, just 
to have an identity that we can explain. We can do this by 
reference to the fact that the molecules of drop A are now 
connected to the molecules of drop B by physical forces 
which can be described by laws of nature. What we call an 
identity is in fact a set of nomological connections. 
The second kind of identity, and the second kind of 
explanation, is based on definite descriptions that refer to 
the same thing. Suppose a single person wrote the Iliad 
and the Odyssey. If this is true, the author of the Iliad was 
identical to the author of the Odyssey. It is easy to 
understand how both descriptions can refer to the same 
thing: Homer wrote both books during his lifetime. We 
know what a human being is, and we also know how a 
single human being can write two books. 
The third and last kind of identity explanation 
concerns epistemic perspectives. Take any of the familiar 
examples of the relativity of perception, say, Locke´s 
example of the water that feels warm to one hand and cold 
to the other (because the one hand has been cold and the 
other has been warm before immersion). The water is the 
same for both hands, and so is its temperature, 
understood as the kinetic energy of the water molecules. 
The sensations of warm and cold are two perceptual 
perspectives on the same object. Three things are 
involved: a sensation of warm, a sensation of cold, and the 
temperature itself, which is neither warm nor cold in a 
sensational sense. 
To conclude, in order to understand identity, we may 
refer to nomological connections, to definite descriptions or 
to epistemic perspectives. When applying these three 
models to psychophysical identity, we realize that they 
correspond to well-known positions in the philosophy of 
mind. The first one is represented by parallelism: F and G, 
the mental and the physical, form a unity, being connected 
to each other by psychophysical laws. In the history of 
philosophy the existence of these laws has sometimes 
been traced back to God, e.g. by Leibniz, but this is no 
necessary part of the theory. We can also stop the 
explanatory regress at the laws themselves. 
The second model suggests a double-aspect view, 
which is often confused with parallelism. What I mean, 
however, is the idea that F and G are but two aspects of 
reality which has other aspects too. As I understand the 
two theories, these other aspects make the difference 
between double-aspect theory and parallelism. Compare 
this to the example of Homer: if he was a real person, he 
was not only the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey, but 
also had other properties characteristic of real persons. He 
had a heart and a brain, was born and died, and so on. In 
analogy, the double-aspect theory conceives of F and G 
as two aspects of a larger whole with additional properties. 
It is often assumed that these properties are unknown or 
even unknowable to us, just like we do not know many of 
the properties of Homer. But nevertheless we may 
speculate that we would understand how F and G are 
linked to each other if we knew the other properties of the 
psychophysical whole. 
Neutral monism, which is our third position, regards 
F and G as two epistemic perspectives on reality which in 
itself is neither mental nor physical. As its name indicates, 
neutral monism rejects physicalist monism. Of course, the 
same is true of parallelism and the double-aspect theory, 
but while these are varieties of dualism (or rather pluralism 
in the second case), neutral monism is neither physicalist 
nor dualist. At least this is the intention behind the theory. 
These considerations suggest that the quest for an 
explanation of contingent psychophysical identity leads to 
non-physicalist models, either to a kind of non-monism 
(parallelism, double-aspect view) or to a non-physicalist 
(neutral) monism. Of course, we may still raise the 
question whether parallelism, double-aspect theory and 
neutral monism are really non-physicalist views. After all, 
each of them has also been interpreted as a kind of 
Problems with Psychophysical Identities — Peter Kügler 
 
 
 189
identity theory, or as a predecessor theory coming very 
close to psychophysical identification. However, if we view 
these theories from the perspective of explanation, seeing 
them as attempts to explain psychophysical identity, we 
also see that they explain physicalism away. What they  
 
assume is a distinction between mental and physical parts, 
properties or aspects, or between the mental and the 
physical on the one side and a neutral third on the other. 
None of this is physicalism. 
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Reducing Complexity in the Social Sciences 
Meinard Kuhlmann, Bremen, Germany 
1. Explanation, Reduction, and Mechanisms 
in the Social Sciences  
Reductions are attractive since they enhance the unity of 
our knowledge and allow for a sparser ontology or concep-
tual scheme. Reduction is intimately connected with expla-
nation since reductive relations between different theories, 
i.e. ‘intertheory relations’, figure prominently in at least two 
of the main accounts of explanation. According to the cov-
ering law model, explanations of phenomena or special 
laws are viewed as derivations from (more) general laws, 
or conversely, in their reduction to more general laws. In 
the unificationist account, the core of explanations is con-
sidered to be their unifying power. Concerning the expla-
nation of special laws, for instance, explanation consists in 
the overall reduction of independent laws, says the unifica-
tionist. Eventually, certain causal theories of explanations 
can also be rated as reductive in the sense that a diversity 
of phenomena is subsumed under universal generating 
mechanisms. 
In the social sciences (i.e. including economics) 
methodological individualism, first introduced by Max 
Weber, makes a clear and still today very influential claim 
about how explanations ought to proceed, namely in terms 
of micro reductions to (individual) human actions (see 
Udehn 2001 for a comprehensive account). For this 
reason it is often said that methodological individualism 
expresses a particular version of reductionism, applicable 
in the social sciences. Methodological individualism is a 
bottom-up approach since the starting point is always the 
bottom level of individual constituents. The main thrust of 
methodological individualism that matters for my concerns 
is the emphasis that social phenomena cannot be 
sufficiently understood by analysing statistical correlations 
between macro quantities, e. g. macroeconomic variables, 
but that it is necessary to refer to the micro level of actors. 
However, as I will show below, very often not all micro 
details are relevant, and moreover, the attention must not 
be restricted to individuals in isolation. 
Friedrich August von Hayek, explicitly endorsing 
Weber’s doctrine of methodological individualism, 
underlined that an understanding of economic phenomena 
presupposes explanations in terms of rational actions by 
economic agents. Hayek’s ideas must not be 
misunderstood as a form of rationalism since he even 
emphasizes the limits of rationalism in the sense of social 
planning and control, arguing that economic phenomena 
often emerge as unintended consequences of the 
economic agent’s actions, whose perspectives are always 
very limited (cf. Heath 2005). For this reason, systematic 
economic analyses should always start by considering the 
perspective of the economic agents, i. e. by following the 
doctrine of methodological individualism. In the 1980s, the 
advent of rational choice theory and in particular of game 
theory triggered new debates about methodological 
individualism, arguing again that “there do not exist 
collective desires or collective beliefs” (Elster 1986: 3). 
These ideas shed some light on modern agent-based 
models of financial markets, studied among others by 
physicists. In both cases it is assumed that the 
constituents of the system have no access to information 
on the level of the whole system. Nevertheless, the net 
effect of all the individual contributions can be large-scale 
structures that seem unexpected given the uncoordinated 
behaviour of the constituents. 
Explanations in terms of social mechanisms, 
advocated among others by Elster, can be seen as a way 
to overcome the divide between methodological 
individualism and holism, its classical opponent, since they 
enable explanations in the middle between micro-
sociological and macro-sociological research, which is 
often desirable for explanatory purposes. They “provide 
more fine-grained accounts of social processes than do 
macro structural theories, but they do not require a 
commitment to the strictures of methodological 
individualism” (Pickel 2004: 177). In particular, modeling 
with artificial societies combines methodological 
individualism on the one side and the search for 
mechanistic explanations on the other side. The 
corresponding formal manifestation is a “shift from 
equation-based modeling to agent-based modeling” 
(Sawyer 2004: 263). 
In the following I want to reflect upon one particular 
strand of agent-based modeling. In the last decade 
economists and physicists investigated various so-called 
microscopic models of financial markets, for instance the 
Kim-Markowitz, the Levy-Levy-Solomon, the Cont-
Bouchaud, the Solomon-Weisbuch, the Lux-Marchesi, the 
Donangelo-Sneppen and the Solomon-Levy-Huang model 
(see Samanidou et al. 2007 for a review). In the stochastic 
multi-agent model of Lux and Marchesi (1999), for 
instance, there are two types of traders, ‘fundamentalists’ 
and ‘noise traders’ (or ‘chartists’). Fundamentalists are 
rational traders in the sense that their action is based on 
the comparison of the fundamental value of the traded 
asset (e.g. stocks, bonds or currencies) and the actual 
market price. Fundamentalists buy if the asset is 
undervalued, and they sell if it is overvalued. In the case of 
noise traders the behaviour only depends on the current 
price trend and the opinion of other traders. In the 
following I will use this approach as an exemplary agent-
based model. 
2. False Models as a Path towards Real 
Mechanisms  
In non-law-based accounts of explanation, such as Wood-
ward's (2003) causal approach, models often play a crucial 
role in discovering causal relations (also see Glennan 
2002). I want to claim that in agent-based explanations, 
the identification and understanding of causal mechanisms 
is in fact the main function of modelling. Mechanisms are 
not simply very detailed descriptions of what is happening, 
but their identification is crucial for causal explanations of 
why things behave the way we observe them. The specifi-
cation of mechanisms is explanatory because it abstracts 
from as many details as possible with respect to the ex-
planatory target. Thus simplicity is a crucial characteristic 
of mechanisms and the best way to identify mechanisms in 
complex systems is by constructing simple idealized mod-
els.  
It is not essential that the mechanism is completely 
realistic. Gibbard and Varian 1978 point out that even 
‘caricature models’ can help to understand certain aspects 
Reducing Complexity in the Social Sciences — Meinard Kuhlmann 
 
 
 191
of the world. It only matters that certain structural features 
are modelled, such as interaction between the parts of a 
multi-agent system or the possibility of strategy change. 
Once these features are incorporated, the employed 
microscopic models of financial markets may be 
surprisingly unrealistic in various other features. For 
instance, microscopic models of financial markets abstract 
from material details about traders and transactions that 
are considered as irrelevant for understanding the basic 
features of financial markets (‘Aristotelian idealization’). 
But microscopic models of financial markets also involve 
certain distortions, which simplify the situation considerably 
(‘Galilean idealization’). Moreover, playing around with 
numerous different more or less unrealistic models has the 
advantage that it is possible to single out exactly which 
structural mechanisms are responsible for the statistical 
effects one wants to explain (see Morgan 1999 for a 
related conclusion). In contrast, an approach with a 
detailed realistic model might not reveal what it is that is 
actually crucial for the explanation (cf. Wimsatt 1987 and 
Cartwright 1983). My point is that agent-based models 
help to explain by concentrating on significant structural 
features while there is hardly any pretence to realism in 
many other respects. Batterman (2004) has a similar point, 
when he argues that highly idealized and oversimplified 
models can sometimes be better for the explanation of the 
dominant phenomenon than a detailed model in terms of 
micro-constituents. 
3. Complexity and Robust Mechanisms in 
Agent-Based Models 
Roughly, I understand a complex system not as an object 
with a complicated compositional structure but rather as an 
object with highly non-trivial dynamical features, on the 
basis of a structurally simple arrangement of a large num-
ber of non-linearly interacting constituents. One example is 
dynamical multi-agent systems in socio-economic con-
texts, which deal with ‘microscopic’ agents in a very simple 
arrangement and with a very simple individual behaviour. 
Whereas for a classical mechanism it is usually easy to 
predict its behaviour once the compositional structure and 
the behaviour of its parts is known, this is radically different 
in the case of complex systems. Here the knowledge of the 
compositional structure, e.g. spins on a square lattice, 
together with the knowledge of the behaviour of its parts in 
isolation as well as in simple composites, allows for hardly 
any straightforward predictions of the dynamical behaviour 
of the complex system. 
Although higher-level interactions and thereby 
higher-level mechanisms are ultimately ontologically 
determined by the underlying physics, higher-level 
mechanisms are explanatorily autonomous. For instance, if 
financial market crashes were described in terms of the 
material processes that obtain between investors and their 
telephones, traders and their computers, electronic 
processes within the computer system of the NASDAQ 
etc., then the mechanisms involved in a crash could never 
be appropriately understood. As it turns out it is sensible to 
abstract so much from these material manifestations that it 
is possible to realize that the same mechanisms obtains in 
other contexts, notably in statistical physics (see Kuhlmann 
2006). These consideration show that it can be extremely 
important for explanations, in particular for explanations in 
terms of mechanisms, not to eliminate level-specific 
vocabulary, notions and methods.  
For mechanistic explanations in agent-based 
complex systems, the occurrence of the type of dynamical 
higher-level pattern one wants to explain, e.g. a statistical 
phenomenon, must be robust. The qualification type of 
pattern is essential since in complex systems the single 
tokens of a dynamical pattern are usually not robust due to 
the high sensitivity to variations of the initial conditions. In 
contrast to a classical mechanism like a thermostat, from 
which we expect a predictable output in each single case 
of its working, mechanisms in complex systems mostly do 
not generate token outcomes that we can predict, but 
rather bring about a certain type of outcome. But when it 
comes to the explanation of statistical features, the 
sensitivity to variations of the initial conditions in each 
single case dissolves in the collective statistics, which is 
not sensitive to such perturbations, provided the 
explanation is successful. To put it the other way around: a 
mechanistic explanation of a statistical phenomenon in a 
complex system is only successful if the resulting collective 
statistics of many simulation runs is not sensitive to 
perturbations of the system’s parameters in a reasonable 
range of values. If this condition were not fulfilled one 
would rather classify the phenomenon as an artefact of the 
model, which does not help to identify an explanatory 
mechanism. 
4. Structural Mechanisms 
The above considerations show that a more abstract struc-
tural conception of mechanisms is prerequisite for under-
standing explanations in complex systems theories. The 
notion of mechanisms I want to suggest applies to many 
cases in the social sciences but also in physics, and biol-
ogy, as far as they are complex systems in the sense I 
specified abobe. Currently, mechanisms are often dis-
cussed on the basis of case studies about biological sys-
tems (see e.g. Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). 
Naturally, this brings about limitations in the applicability. I 
propose the following more general notion of a mechanism 
in a complex system: 
 
A property of the time-dependent relation between 
locally interacting lower-level components and a 
higher-level quantity of a complex system is a can-
didate for a mechanism if it fulfils the following re-
quirements: (i) The dynamics of the higher-level 
quantity exhibits a discernible type of pattern, which 
we want to be explained. (ii) The occurrence of this 
type of higher-level pattern is robust, i.e. it remains 
qualitatively the same under small variations of 
lower-level quantities. 
My emphasis on the local nature of interaction is meant in 
the following way. If the occurrence of the higher-level 
pattern was due to an external influence with a global ef-
fect, e.g. a coordinating external force on all constituents, 
then I think one should not say that the higher-level pattern 
was generated by a mechanism. In other words, the 
higher-level pattern must emerge purely out of the interac-
tion of the system’s constituents. 
I want to illustrate my characterisation of mecha-
nisms in complex systems for the above-mentioned multi-
agent model by Lux and Marchesi. The higher-level quan-
tity is the price of some asset, e.g. a stock, currency or 
bond, and the corresponding example for interacting 
lower-level components are traders in the respective finan-
cial market. An example for a discernible pattern in the 
dynamics of this higher-level quantity is the so-called ‘vola-
tility clustering’, i.e. the tendency of quiet and turbulent (or 
‘volatile’) periods to cluster together. The agent-based 
explanation of this phenomenon rests on idealized as-
sumptions about the relation between interacting lower-
Reducing Complexity in the Social Sciences — Meinard Kuhlmann 
 
 
 192 
level components, namely the traders, and a higher-level 
quantity, i.e. the price of the traded asset. The explanation 
is successful if it can reproduce the characteristic higher-
level pattern in a robust way, i.e. if the reproduced phe-
nomenon remains stable under perturbations in a reason-
able range of initial values. If it does succeed I would say 
that one has identified a mechanism that brings about the 
observed higher-level pattern. In order for such a mecha-
nistic explanation to be satisfactory it is often desirable to 
single out—by appropriate modelling—what it is in the 
interaction of the constituents that generates the macro-
scopic patterns. One example is the swapping mechanism, 
where traders change their strategy and swap from one 
camp of traders to another, which brings about the transi-
tion from quiet to volatile periods. 
In conclusion, mechanistic explanations are 
reductive in the sense that higher-level behaviour of a 
complex system is explained in terms of interacting lower-
level components. However, mechanistic explanations are 
not reductive in the sense that higher-level description and 
conceptualisation was dispensable. But it is the case that 
the irreducibility of autonomous higher-level description 
allows for ‘reduction’ in the sense of a decrease of relevant 
details on the micro level due to the fact that the causal 
mechanisms needed for explanatory purposes are of a 
structural nature. Thus the reference to structural 
mechanisms in the social sciences makes the basic ideas 
of methodological individualism compatible with higher-
level explanations of collective social phenomena. 
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Four Anti-reductionist Dogmas in the Light of Biophysical  
Micro-Reduction of Mind & Body  
Theo A. F. Kuipers, Groningen, The Netherlands 
Introduction 
There are at least four anti-reductionist dogmas: 1) reduc-
tion implies elimination, 2) multiple realizability is an obsta-
cle to concept and theory reduction, 3) supervenience 
implies non-reducibility, and 4) mind-body micro-reduction 
amounts to neuroreduction, neglecting the embodied and 
embedded character of mental life.  
In (Kuipers, Structures in Science (henceforth SiS), 
2001, Ch. 1), I have described several goals and types of 
co-operation between research programs. The programs 
can deal with different levels of aggregation and can even 
belong to different disciplines. Moreover, the programs can 
use different styles of description and explanation: causal, 
functional or intentional. In the present paper, these 
themes are discussed in the context of mind-body 
research. I will focus on interlevel biophysical mind-body 
research, and indicate several kinds of (micro-)reduction 
and (micro-)correlation of concepts and laws. At the end it 
will turn out that none of the four dogmas is observed by 
biophysical micro-reduction of mind&body.  
Global characterization 
Let us concentrate on interlevel mind-body research in the 
form of symmetric co-operation between research pro-
grams or even disciplines, hence boundary-bridging inter-
level research. More specifically, I will deal with (macro-
micro) interlevel reduction and correlation of mind-body 
concepts and with interlevel explanation and reduction of 
mind-body laws. The guiding perspective is the material 
(more specifically, biophysical) realization of such con-
cepts and laws in micro-states, -events and -processes. 
The latter not necessarily restricted to the individual, let 
alone, to its neural states and processes. 
In what amounts to an interdisciplinary dream, I will 
apply the mixed strategy of moderate reductionism or 
moderate holism to the non-eliminative reduction that 
might result from the co-operation between psychology 
and (neuro) physiology. Justin Schwartz (1991) noted 
already long ago that the anti-reductionist arguments of 
many philosophers of psychology are motivated by the 
worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than 
conserve the mental realm. However, as he points out in 
his specific terms, but in the same spirit as ours, some 
paradigm natural science examples of (micro-)reduction of 
concepts, such as water, genes and tables, are not at all 
eliminative. Indeed, “Philosophy of psychology needs more 
detailed attention to issues in natural science which serve 
as analogies for reduction of the mental” (Schwartz, 1991, 
p. 203). I am afraid this still holds to this day. 
Another general point is that philosophers seem to 
favor discussions involving the reduction of whole 
disciplines. From my point of view in general, and the 
mixed strategy in particular, such discussions are rather 
pretentious. The really interesting question is whether at 
least some mental concepts and even some mental laws 
(or, more cautiously, regularities or quasi-laws) can be 
reduced, straightforwardly or approximately, to biophysical 
micro-concepts and -laws. 
To state the (micro-)reductionist ambition more 
precisely, let us start from the common sense division of 
properties (events, states, dispositions, etc.) of human 
individuals into bodily and mental properties. That is, some 
individual properties are purely or largely bodily, e.g., 
weight, temperature, strength etc. Some others are 
typically mental, e.g., having memories, beliefs and 
desires. And there are many mixed properties and the like 
in between: pains, actions, including speech acts, etc. In 
common sense terms all these properties are causally 
active (or at least causally reactive) and not only within 
their own sphere (mind/mind and body/body interactions) 
but also between the spheres (mind/body interactions). 
Many of these properties can be described in functional 
and several of them in intentional terms, and these ways of 
description may well go together. 
To describe and explain these common sense 
ideas, classical mind-body dualism postulated two kinds of 
substances, which can also interact. The modern, 
prevailing biophysical point of view is quite different. On 
lower levels of aggregation or organization everything is 
supposed to be of a biophysical (and partly functional) 
nature, such that all individual properties supervene as 
mental and/or bodily macro-properties of the individual 
conceived as an (organized) aggregate of a biophysical 
nature. In other words, the macro-properties are supposed 
to be (materially) realized by biophysical micro-states. 
Hence, and this is the core idea of my approach, mental, 
bodily and mixed terms can be treated in the same way, 
and that way is such that their being causally interactive is 
unproblematic. 
It is important to note that actual biophysical (micro-
)states of human beings have (distributed) traces of earlier 
states and inputs of one kind or another. This fact is not 
only relevant for many bodily properties, e.g., specific 
muscular features of sportsmen, but also for many mental 
properties, e.g., what one believes and, very important, 
how that is realized. More specifically, it is plausible to 
assume that the specific learning history of an individual 
has left its biophysical traces in such a way that the 
biophysical realization of the same belief may be different 
between different people. Moreover, the precise 
biophysical realization of (psychologically) the same belief 
of one and the same individual may change in time, with 
the consequence, for instance, that the strength of the 
belief changes. The reason is that long-term learning is 
nowadays conceived not only as a matter of electrical and 
chemical processes, within and between neurons, but also 
as a matter of morphological changes of the neurons 
(Kandel et al., 2000; Kandel, 2006). 
The (biophysical micro-)reduction ambition can now 
be stated more clearly. I distinguish B(ody)-properties/-
concepts/-terms, such as weight, M(ental)-properties, such 
as having a certain belief, and MB-properties, such as 
sexual arousal, without supposing that the division is 
always clear. The potential ambiguity will turn out to be of 
no importance. I will talk about B-laws (-regularities/quasi-
laws) and M-laws, depending on whether they relate only 
B-properties or only M-properties, respectively. However, it 
remains a matter of dispute whether (pure) M-laws exist at 
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all. MB-laws are laws that relate M- and B-properties 
and/or MB-properties. Note that in my approach, MB-laws 
are as a rule or even always correlations, MB-correlations 
for short. Correlations may be causal or ontological 
correlations, in the latter case they are incomplete, e.g., of 
a part-whole nature, such that they cannot be considered 
as ontological identities. The question of whether there are 
MB-identities, besides MB-correlations, is irrelevant in my 
micro-reductionist approach, for both concern relations on 
the macro-level.  
In this terminology the really interesting question is 
whether at least some M- or MB-concepts or even some 
M- or MB-laws can be reduced, straightforwardly or 
approximately, to biophysical micro-concepts and -
theories. As long as reduction of, say, an M-concept is not 
successful, it may well be that we can find one or more 
MB-correlations and ‘ontological’ correlations, that is, 
correlations between the M-concept and micro-concepts. 
For instance, neuro-imaging techniques may show that 
certain areas and processes on, relatively speaking, the 
macro-level of the brain are specifically related to a certain 
M-concept. Such MB-correlations may well be a crucial 
step for an ultimate reduction of the M-concept. Moreover, 
electrophysiological, neuro-anatomical, and neurochemical 
experiments, for instance, may show that certain types of 
neurons or neurotransmitters are involved in M. Such 
ontological correlations may be part of an ultimate 
reduction. Similarly, as long as the reduction of, say, an M-
law is not successful, it may be that we can find a micro-
theory that enables the explanation, together with suitable 
concept correlations, of the M-law. 
Further Analysis 
In the following analysis, I will essentially apply the analy-
sis presented in Chapters 3 and 5 of SiS to individuals, 
humans and other animals. In order to simplify the presen-
tation I will restrict the attention to MB-concepts and MB-
laws, relating MB-concepts, since the story is essentially 
the same for pure M-concepts and M-laws, if any exist, for 
B-concepts and B-laws, and for MB-laws relating pure M- 
and B-concepts. Let us concentrate for a while on the 
macro-concepts and let us assume a finite number of fami-
lies of MB-types, i.e., sets of mutually exclusive and to-
gether exhaustive, monadic MB-predicates, each family 
giving rise to an MB-representation of an individual at each 
moment. The MB-predicates at the start are supposed to 
be types in the sense that their application is stable and 
strongly intersubjective and/or because they are lawfully 
correlated with other types. 
Let us now conceive individuals, and their 
environment as far as relevant, as (organized) aggregates, 
to be described in terms derived from ‘base-terms’. It is 
important to distinguish between the genuine base-
concepts for the constituents, e.g., molecules or cells, etc., 
and their mutual relations, and the representation of 
aggregates of these constituents, e.g., substances and 
tissues. The latter may be done by construing set-theoretic 
‘micro-structures’ in terms of the (biophysical) base-
concepts. The micro-structures will be indicated as CS-
structures, because the micro- or base-entities are 
supposed to be Cells, in particular neurons, and (micro-
pieces or -amounts of) Substances. The latter are included 
in order to be able to take non-biological micro-entities in 
the brain, the body and the environment into account. 
Each CS-structure represents a conceptual possibility of a 
state of an aggregate. 
A CS-structure is a token of as many (disjunctions 
of) CS-types as can be meaningfully defined as sets of 
structures, using aggregate concepts, i.e., concepts 
characterizing a certain aspect of the structure, e.g., the 
internal and external temperature, the ratio of activated 
neurons in a certain layer or region of neurons involved, 
etc. Moreover, the idea is of course that many different, 
though probably in some way or other related CS-
structures, may realize (approximately) the same MB-
concept, e.g., the same memory or pain. This set of 
structures is called the realization-class of that MB-
concept. If a structure belongs to such a class, it is also 
said to be a token of the realization-type of that concept. 
Let us now formulate some possible reduction 
results concerning some MB-families that would be 
considered as successes. For this purpose we have to 
assume at least the Token-Identity Hypothesis; i.e., every 
state of an individual can be represented by an MB-type of 
each MB-family as well as by a CS-structure. Additionally 
the Realization Hypothesis has to be adopted; i.e., every 
CS-structure uniquely determines, as a matter of 
ontological fact, an MB-type for each MB-family. Note that 
the Realization Hypothesis implies that each structure can 
be represented as a member of the realization-class of 
precisely one MB-property of each family. In other words, 
that structure is a token of the realization-types of those 
MB-properties. 
It is possible to distinguish (SiS, Chaper 5) three 
degrees of concept (micro-)reduction. A result of the first 
degree is the quasi-type-type reduction of some MB-type, 
say an MB-state. This result only presupposes that it is 
possible to characterize a set of CS-structures as the 
realization-class of that MB-state. Assuming that the CS-
structure representation of a state can be experimentally 
established, the reduction enables the prediction of the 
MB-state on the basis of the CS-structure representation 
(quasi-reduction) and, conversely, being in an MB-state 
predicts that the CS-structure representation belongs to 
the realization-class of that MB-state. Of course, given that 
the realization-class is not exclusively defined in CS-terms, 
for it is by definition ‘MB-induced’, both kinds of prediction 
concern CS-structure representations that are (very) 
similar to those that were used to characterize the 
realization-class. 
As soon as a realization-class can also be 
characterized independently in CS-terms, in the form of a 
disjunction of CS-(micro-)types, exemplifying a multiple 
version of the Type-Type Identity Hypothesis, see below, 
we get the possibility of a one-many or multiple type-type 
reduction of an MB-state: the second degree of reduction. 
A second degree reduction enables the deduction of the 
realization-type and hence the MB-state when one knows 
that the CS-structure of the state belongs to the disjunction 
of the corresponding CS-(micro-)types. The special case 
that the realization-type corresponds to just one CS-type, 
exemplifying the singular version of the Type-Type Identity 
Hypothesis, is a third degree result: the one-one or 
singular type-type reduction of an MB-state. According to 
the singular Type-Type Identity Hypothesis, belonging to a 
certain macro-type and to a certain micro-type amounts to 
an ‘ontological equivalence’.  
The foregoing classification immediately leads to 
three degrees of (micro-)reduction of laws. First, if two MB-
types are lawfully connected and both can be quasi-
reduced, it may be possible that the law can be reduced by 
a theory in a weaker sense than occurs in reduction by 
identification according to a general model (SiS, Chapter 
3), viz., that, starting from one or more specific theory 
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applications, the transformation step consists of replacing 
realization-type attributions by macro-type attributions. I 
call this reduction of a law of the first degree, or quasi-
reduction. If two MB-types are one-many type-type 
reducible and lawfully connected, there must be a lawful 
connection of unions of CS-types. Formally, this must even 
be the case in such a way that the first can be reduced to 
the second, in the sense of reduction by identification, 
based on the appropriate multiple Type-Type Identity 
Hypotheses (SiS, Chapter 5). I call this reduction of a law 
of the second degree, or multiple reduction of a law. In the 
special case that MB-types can be reduced to proper CS-
types, the law reduction is a result of the third degree, 
called singular or strong reduction of a law.  
I have mainly restricted myself to the general 
perspective; for the specifications for the causal-structural, 
functional and intentional style I refer to SiS, Chapter 6.3. 
Paradigmatic examples of research that show progress in 
realizing the above described micro-reductionist ambitions 
concern learning and memory (Kandel et al., 2000; 
Kandel, 2006, Huisman, 2005). Moreover, other examples 
seem to fit very well. In SiS, Chapter 6.3, upon which the 
core of this paper heavily draws, indications are given to 
research dealing with mental disorders and 6.4 deals, 
more extensively, with juvenile delinquency, essentially 
illustrating the non-validity of the four anti-reductionist 
dogmas.  
Conclusion 
All discussed degrees of micro-reduction of concepts and 
laws concern straightforward non-eliminative reduction. 
Multiple reduction of concepts and laws exploits the possi-
bilities of multiple realizability instead of being blocked by 
it. Many of the reduced concepts and laws will typically 
represent supervient properties and patterns, in particular 
arising from the interaction of micro-entities. Finally, wher-
ever relevant, the micro-state goes beyond the neural 
state and includes the relevant parts and aspects of the 
(rest of) body and of the environment. Hence, none of the 
four anti-reductionist dogmas is observed by what I like to 
call biophysical micro-reduction of mind&body. 
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Two Problems for NonHumean Views of Laws of Nature 
Noa Latham, Calgary, Canada 
Humeans and nonHumeans offer dramatically different 
world-views stemming from their different accounts of the 
status of the laws of nature of our world. Humeans take the 
laws to be material conditional facts, while nonHumeans 
take them to be nonmaterial. And this can be shown to be 
equivalent to another popular way of distinguishing 
Humean and nonHumean views. Humeans claim, and 
nonHumeans deny, that the laws metaphysically 
supervene on the totality of particular facts—those 
describing the distribution of properties somewhere in 
spacetime—where fact A metaphysically supervenes on 
fact B iff A exists in all possible worlds in which B exists.  
I shall assume that there is a fundamental level of 
reality, and I shall regard fundamental properties as those 
characteristic of such a level. Humeans can be 
characterised accordingly as claiming that the fundamental 
laws of our universe metaphysically supervene on the 
totality of its fundamental particular facts, and 
nonHumeans as denying this. I am also provisionally 
assuming a view of properties that treats them as 
independent of the laws in which they feature. 
 My discussion henceforth is thus narrower than 
familiar discussions of laws of nature. I shall not examine 
nonfundamental laws such as special science laws, ceteris 
paribus laws of physics and thermodynamic laws. I see it 
as an advantage of the account I am offering that it does 
not run together what I take to be very different kinds of 
laws in quest of a unified account. 
A popular idea, which I think captures the intuitive 
understanding of the role of fundamental laws in our 
universe, is to think of them as analogous to rules of a 
computer programme that changes an array of pixels on a 
screen from one moment to the next. The way I like to put 
it is to say that fundamental laws of nature are derivable 
from a single fundamental law, analogous to the computer 
programme, that (i) provides an instruction, given the 
existence of a time-slice, as to what the next time-slice is 
to be and (ii) makes it the case that this next time-slice 
comes into existence. I call this the generative conception 
of fundamental laws. 
Humeans typically point to the absence of the 
category of nomic facts on their view as a huge gain in 
simplicity and as greatly favouring their view. In opposition 
to this, it can be claimed that the advantage of simplicity 
goes instead to the view that the universe is generated by 
a fundamental law from an initial slice, as this provides a 
sense in which only the fundamental particular facts of the 
initial slice and the fundamental law are 
causally/explanatorily basic. The regularities observed in 
subsequent fundamental particular facts are all 
explainable, while the Humean must treat them as a 
cosmic coincidence. Humeans typically respond that their 
view attributes a causally/explanatorily basic status to the 
initial conditions and fundamental laws too. I think the best 
reply to this is to say that what is compelling about this 
nonHumean view is that laws and initial conditions provide 
a mind-independent causal/explanatory basis for the 
universe. By contrast, the laws are essentially mind-
dependent on the best worked out Humean account, David 
Lewis’s, and it does not appear that any alternative 
Humean account could escape this. The Humean cannot 
offer a mind-independent sense in which anything is 
causally basic, or a mind-independent sense in which 
anything less than the totality of fundamental particular 
facts is explanatorily basic.  
I believe almost all nonHumean views of laws are 
committed to such fundamental generative laws. (Nancy 
Cartwright’s view, if coherent, is one that is not.) These 
include views that take fundamental properties to be 
dispositional and to entail laws. Such views of properties 
presuppose victory over the Humean view of laws, and 
compete with other nonHumean views. I shall not dwell 
here on these differences among nonHumeans as my 
concern in this paper is to examine two problems that I 
think almost all nonHumean views face. 
The idea that the observed world is driven to unfold, 
i.e. generated, over time by fundamental laws or 
fundamental dispositional properties is I think the natural 
way people have understood the workings of nature. This 
appears to be a purely metaphysical view in the sense that 
it is independent of scientific facts about our universe that 
were unavailable to our ancestors and may be unavailable 
to us today. In this respect the nonHumean view of laws 
resembles the view with which it is often compared that 
there is a physical reality independent of our sense 
perceptions. What I will be arguing in the remainder of this 
paper, however, is that the thesis that our universe is 
generated may be empirically false and thus cannot be 
defended as a purely metaphysical thesis. I think this 
empirical sensitivity detracts greatly from the plausibility of 
the generative view. But all the alternatives I have 
encountered strike me as nonstarters.  
The first problem is that generative laws appear to 
be possible only for universes generated from a single 
initial slice. This precludes backwardly infinite universes 
such as a Steady State or oscillating universe, and 
backwardly finite but open universes if these are coherent. 
It also excludes universes for which the notion of a linear 
temporal ordering of events doesn’t make sense in the part 
of the universe where one would need an initial slice to be.  
Why is an initial slice required? Well, some 
particular fact is needed in addition to fundamental laws in 
order for there to be a universe. And the only alternative to 
the fundamental facts of a single slice appears to be the 
fundamental facts of an infinite sequence of slices. This 
reintroduces the Humean view with its problems in 
characterising this infinite sequence as explanatorily basic 
when it appears to be partly generated. Furthermore there 
would be an implausible arbitrariness to the cutoff point 
between this infinite sequence and the generated part of 
the universe. So an initial slice is the only plausible option 
from which a universe could be generated. 
But why should there be a problem in generating a 
temporally dense backwardly finite universe? Assuming for 
the moment an absolute conception of time, then there is 
either a last moment at which there is nothing and no first 
moment at which there is something (a backwardly open 
universe), or no last moment at which there is nothing and 
a first moment at which there is something (a backwardly 
closed universe). And perhaps both open and closed 
options for the temporal topology of a backwardly finite 
universe are also coherent if one rejects an absolute 
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notion of time and requires that something exists in order 
for time to exist.  
The generative conception can accommodate 
backwardly finite but closed universes that begin at a 
singularity. But it is hard to conceive of our universe as 
such, since so little information about it could be stored at 
such a single spatial point. The initial conditions would 
have to consist in finite values of various fundamental 
parameters at that point. Theories of the universe based 
on general relativity that ignore quantum effects yield a 
singularity with infinite values of the fundamental 
parameters at that point. But such a singularity is not a 
candidate for an initial slice as the values of the 
parameters are not well defined. 
Recent efforts to construct a theory of quantum 
gravity for our universe that integrates general relativity 
and quantum theory offer hope of avoiding this problem of 
a Big Bang singularity at which parameters cannot be 
defined. They mostly have the consequence that the linear 
temporal ordering among events breaks down, i.e. that 
time doesn’t make sense, close to the Big Bang when the 
universe is smaller than the Plank scale. If universes in 
accordance with such theories are coherent, they too 
would lack an initial condition and so it would seem could 
not be generated. 
A second problem for the view that our universe is 
generated concerns the direction of generation. For any 
generated universe there is an extrinsic direction of time 
given by the direction of generation (and by the temporal 
asymmetry in the notion of a fundamental dispositional 
property). And in our universe there are temporal 
asymmetries found in intrinsic features that mark a 
subjective direction of time. They are generally regarded 
as based on the thermodynamic condition of increasing 
entropy. Such asymmetries include the way actions affect 
the future not the past, organisms age, and scattered 
rubble doesn’t suddenly cohere to constitute a building. A 
problem arises for the generative conception if there is no 
good reason to believe that these intrinsic and extrinsic 
directions coincide. For part of the appeal of the view that 
our universe is generated comes from its incorporating the 
compelling intuition that what is present was generated by 
the laws and what seems subjectively to be the past.  
Why might the direction of generation and our 
subjective direction of time diverge? The direction in which 
time seems to be flowing in the universe might be the 
opposite to that in which the universe is generated. From 
our perspective on the direction of time we say that our 
universe is 13 billion years old, but if the universe has a 
finite duration and its fundamental laws are time-reversal 
invariant, then it could be generated from the other end, 
and we should say instead that we have another 13 billion 
years or so before the Big Crunch, if we take the direction 
of generation to be the direction of time. Given these 
assumptions then, it is logically possible that our universe 
is generated in the counterintuitive direction. However, this 
should worry us no more than the logical possibility that we 
are brains-in-vats, so long as we have good reason to 
believe that our universe is generated in the intuitive 
direction.  
Tim Maudlin (2007, pp. 130-5) addresses this 
problem for the generative conception, adding to our 
assumptions of a temporally finite universe and time-
reversal invariant fundamental laws the empirically well 
supported assumption that there is low entropy at one 
temporal end of the universe and high entropy at the other. 
Maudlin’s idea, as I understand it, is that we could explain 
why entropy increases given the assumption of the 
fundamental generative laws and the condition that 
entropy starts off low. But we could not explain a decrease 
in entropy given the assumption of the laws and the 
condition that entropy starts off high. As we observe an 
entropy gradient over time in our universe, this asymmetry 
in explanation makes it much more reasonable to suppose 
that the universe is being generated from the lower 
entropy end than from the higher entropy end, and hence 
that the intuitive direction of time coincides with the 
direction of generation.  
Where I think Maudlin goes wrong is in setting up a 
biased contrast that misleadingly gives the impression that 
for possible universes with our generative laws there are in 
a natural sense more of them with low to high entropy 
gradients than there are with high to low entropy gradients. 
The semblance of asymmetry comes from taking as one 
option that the universe has a low entropy beginning, 
ignoring knowledge that it has a high entropy state at its 
other end, and pointing out that it would be highly likely to 
evolve into a high entropy state. This is then compared 
with the option that the universe has a high entropy 
beginning, ignoring knowledge that it has a low entropy 
state at its other end, and pointing out that it would be very 
unlikely to evolve into a low entropy state. Each of these 
options embraces something and ignores something we 
know about our universe. But what the first option 
embraces—that the universe has a low entropy state—is 
something that would be considered highly improbable if 
we knew nothing about which universe was actual, while 
what the second option embraces—that the universe has a 
high entropy state—is something that would be considered 
highly probable if we didn’t know which universe was 
actual.  
I suggest that to determine what it is reasonable to 
believe about our universe we should not skew our 
understanding by suppressing knowledge in this 
asymmetrical way, but should begin with what we do know, 
namely that the actual universe contains an entropy 
gradient with extremely low entropy at one end. The 
salient fact is then surely that from the nature of time-
reversal invariant laws, there is a natural 1-1 mapping of 
universes with a low to high entropy gradient onto 
qualitatively identical universes with a high to low entropy 
gradient. This leaves us without a reason for believing our 
universe is generated from the low entropy end rather than 
the high entropy end.  
Nevertheless, there might be empirical reasons to 
reject the two assumptions we were making—of a 
temporally finite universe and of time-reversal invariant 
fundamental laws. Rejecting either of these assumptions 
would support belief in a coincidence of the direction of 
generation and the subjective direction of time. For if the 
universe is closed at one end and infinite at the other, it 
could be generated from the unique slice at one end but 
could not be generated in the other direction. Current 
estimates of the rate of expansion of the universe suggest 
that it is forwardly infinite, though this could be revised if 
evidence of a lot more “dark matter” arises. And although 
both general relativity and the Schroedinger equation are 
time-reversal invariant, a quantum theory involving a 
Collapse Postulate is not. Whether such a postulate is 
among the fundamental laws of our universe is currently a 
debated feature of the interpretation of quantum theory.  
But should it be so, and (as is widely supposed) there 
cannot be a time-reverse of such a postulate, then the 
universe couldn’t be generated in the counterintuitive 
direction. 
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So science may grant both initial conditions and a 
secure belief that the universe is generated in the intuitive 
direction. However, it is disconcerting that the generative 
conception of fundamental laws should rest on such 
unsettled scientific theory. And this empirical sensitivity 
undermines the idea that the generative conception 
captures a commonsense metaphysical view. It is hard to 
rest content that science will bail out the generative 
conception. For if there are coherent epistemically possible 
ways our universe might be which do not meet the 
empirical requirements for the generative conception, we 
need a way to understand them. 
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Some Remarks on Wittgenstein and Type Theory in the Light of 
Ramsey 
Holger Leerhoff, Konstanz & Oldenburg, Germany 
Paradoxes, Logicism and the  
Theory of Types 
Russell developed his Theory of Types as an answer to a 
range of paradoxes he saw his logicist project confronted 
with. One of these paradoxes is Russell’s well-known 
paradox about the set of all sets not containing them-
selves, others are such famous paradoxes as the liar, 
Berry’s paradox and the Grelling/Nelson paradox. Henri 
Poincaré coined the term ›vicious-circle fallacies‹ for all of 
these: what they seem to have in common is, in Russell’s 
words, that 
 
[i]n each contradiction something is said about all 
cases of some kind, and from what is said a new 
case seems to be generated, which both is and is 
not of the same kind as the case of which all were 
concerned in what was said. (Russell 1908, 224) 
Russell presented the first draft of a solution to this class of 
paradoxes as an appendix to his Principles of Mathematics 
in 1903 and a full-blown solution in his ›Mathematical 
Logic as based on the Theory of Types‹ in 1908. The core 
idea behind type theory is that each propositional function 
has a ›range of significance‹, i.e., a set of possible argu-
ments, and the following limitation: 
 
This leads us to the rule: ›Whatever involves all of a 
collection, must not be one of the collection‹; or, 
conversely: ›If, provided a certain collection had a 
total, it would have members only definable in terms 
of that total, then the said collection has no total‹. 
(Russell 1908, 225) 
The 1908 version of the theory played a key role in the 
monumental logicist project Russell and Whitehead were 
working on then, the Principia Mathematica. One serious 
flaw of the theory, however, was the need for the Axiom of 
Reducibility, which is everything but a prima facie plausible 
axiom of logic. 
Ramsey’s classification of the paradoxes 
Around 1925, F. P. Ramsey, a logicist as well, was trying 
to find a way to dispense with the Axiom of Reducibility 
and to that avail examined Russell’s reasons for introduc-
ing the Theory of Types in the first place: the various vi-
cious-circle paradoxes. He introduced a nowadays gener-
ally accepted distinction between them: 
 
We can easily divide the contradictions according to 
which part of the theory is required for their solution, 
and when we have done this we find that these two 
sets of contradictions are distinguished in another 
way also. The ones solved by the first part of the 
theory [i.e., the Simplified Theory of Types] are all 
purely logical; they involve no ideas but those of 
class, relation and number, could be stated in logi-
cal symbolism, and occur in the actual development 
of mathematics … Such are the contradictions of 
the greatest ordinal, and that of the class of classes 
which are not members of themselves. With regard 
to these Mr. Russell’s solution seems inevitable.  
On the other hand, the second set of contradictions 
are none of them purely logical or mathematical, but 
all involve some psychological term, such as mean-
ing, defining, naming or asserting. … [I]t is possible 
that they arise … from ambiguity in the psychologi-
cal or epistemological notions of meaning and as-
serting. Indeed, it seems that this must be the case, 
because examination soon convinces one that the 
psychological term is in every case essential to the 
contradiction, which could not be constructed with-
out introducing the relation of words to their mean-
ing or some equivalent. (Ramsey 1926, 192) 
Ramsey classified the first type as logical, the second type 
as psychological paradoxes, though the term ›semantical 
paradoxes‹ for the latter is more common today. Regard-
ing these two types of paradoxes, different parts of Rus-
sell’s 1908 type theory are responsible for their solution. 
For the simpler logical paradoxes, the part of Russell’s 
theory which is akin to his first proposal from 1903 was 
sufficient. Ramsey distilled that part from Russell’s more 
complex 1908 theory and coined the term Simplified The-
ory of Types (STT) for the result. The semantical para-
doxes, on the other hand, proved to be consistent regard-
ing the STT and remained a problem requiring the full-
blown theory, the Ramified Theory of Types (RTT), for its 
solution. Now, according to Ramsey, the logicist project 
was not at all confronted with the semantical paradoxes—
he claimed that those paradoxes were problems of lan-
guage, not of mathematics, and so it was not mathematics’ 
job to deal with them. If, following Ramsey, the STT was 
indeed sufficient for the goals of mathematics, there was 
no need for using the RTT—and since the STT was lack-
ing the negative side effects of the RTT that lead to the 
necessity of introducing the axiom of reducibility, Ramsey’s 
modification made the logicist project much more accept-
able. 
Wittgenstein’s critique of the  
Theory of Types 
In the Tractatus’ 3.33 ff., Wittgenstein presents his argu-
ments against Russell’s Theory of Types: 
 
In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never 
play a role. It must be possible to establish logical 
syntax without mentioning the meaning of a sign: 
only the description of expressions may be presup-
posed. (Wittgenstein 1921, 3.33) 
From this observation we turn to Russell’s ›theory of 
types‹. It can be seen that Russell must be wrong, 
because he had to mention the meaning of signs 
when establishing the rules for them. (Wittgenstein 
1921, 3.331) 
The core element of Wittgenstein’s criticism can be under-
stood in at least three ways: (1) In formulating the Theory 
of Types, Russell uses terms (›truth‹, ›meaning‹, ›type‹, 
…) that are, according to Wittgenstein, meaningless. If one 
understands Wittgenstein in this way, an alternative type 
theory, formulated on a purely syntactical level, could es-
cape his criticism. Church’s Theory of Types (Church 
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1940) is constructed in such a way and, given that this is 
the crucial point in Wittgenstein’s criticism, could be re-
garded as a valid alternative to Wittgenstein’s approach. 
James Davant discussed this option in his (Davant 1975) 
and came to the conclusion that any version of type theory 
is incompatible with Wittgenstein’s system in the Tractatus; 
I will not here repeat his arguments. (2) Wittgenstein’s 
criticism is directed at Russell’s talking about the meaning 
of the symbols of the ›object language‹. (3) Wittgenstein’s 
criticism must be understood as a combination of (1) and 
(2)—this is the way I understand Wittgenstein. 
Indeed, Russell has to classify symbols according to 
their type: When he says that, e.g., some symbols stand 
for individuals of type 0 or propositional functions of type 2, 
Russell is in some sense talking about the meanings of the 
respective symbols. This sense is a very basic one, no 
more problematic than saying that the relation ›is larger 
than‹ has to be accompanied by exactly two terms to add 
up to a meaningful sentence. Nonetheless, this is talking 
about the meaning of symbols and one may very well buy 
Wittgenstein’s arguments against this if one likes. 
In my opinion, this rather fundamental difference 
between Russell and Wittgenstein is grounded in their 
different approaches to language: Wittgenstein’s ideal 
language in the Tractatus is no purely artificial language 
but the end point of an actual analysis of ordinary 
language, and thus somewhere between an ideal and an 
ordinary language. Though we do not use the Tractatus’ 
language for actual communication, according to 
Wittgenstein we use the language on a very fundamental 
level of our thinking. Its names do refer directly to the 
objects (Gegenstände) of the world: in the Tractatus, there 
is a very close-knit connection between language, thinking, 
and ontology. As a consequence of this, Wittgenstein 
cannot state the meanings of names, of the symbols of his 
language, in his language: The meanings only show 
themselves through their use. Russell, on the other hand, 
is free to do this; he may very well use a metalanguage or 
a hierarchy inside his language to assign meanings to his 
symbols, since his (much more artificial) language does 
not necessarily stand in a fixed relation to our thinking and 
hence is not subject to the restrictions holding for 
Wittgenstein’s language.1 
Wittgenstein’s way to avoid the logical 
paradoxes 
Since Wittgenstein has to dispense with type theory, he 
has to put forth an alternative way to escape the problems 
associated with the paradoxes mentioned above. More-
over, type theory may very well have it’s origin in the solu-
tion of the paradoxes, but its benefits surpass the simple 
fact that it can deal with them: the theory offers some deep 
insights into the nature of language, e.g., into ambiguity, 
which is a crucial element in the logical paradoxes. Witt-
genstein was very well aware of that and saw the need to 
give an explanation of these phenomena, too: 
 
In order to avoid such errors [resulting from ambigu-
ity] we must make use of a sign-language that ex-
cludes them by not using the same sign for different 
symbols and by not using in a superficially similar 
way signs that have different modes of signification: 
that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by 
                                                     
 
1 I have argued for this approach in my (Leerhoff 2008). 
logical grammar—by logical syntax. (Wittgenstein 
1921, 3.325) 
Wittgenstein’s symbol/sign distinction reminds one very 
much of Peirce’s more familiar type/token distinction. In-
stead of saying that the word ›count‹ has two meanings, it 
could be said with Wittgenstein that there are two different 
symbols (types) which have the one sign (token) ›count‹ in 
common. The connection between the symbol and its 
meaning is constant; it is necessary to refer to the context 
of the sign—its position in the sentence—to ascertain what 
its correct symbol is, since a sign in isolation cannot have 
a meaning. Hence, the analysis of the use of signs in sen-
tences reveals their corresponding symbols and thereby 
their logical form (see (Wittgenstein 1921), 3.326 ff.). The 
first step is a kind of optional disambiguation from sign to 
symbol; the second step the recognition of the symbol’s 
logical form. 
Once this is established, syntactical mistakes can 
be recognised. This does apply to more ordinary 
syntactical mistakes (»table chair« is not a meaningful 
combination of names) as well as to the not-so-obvious 
logical paradoxes: In ordinary language, some sentences 
do occur in which there seems to be a combination of 
symbols leading to a kind of vicious circle. In analysis, 
however, these problems disappear: by regarding the 
sign’s context one can get from the sign to the correct 
symbol; disambiguation takes place. Wittgenstein gives an 
example: 
 
The reason why a function cannot be its own argu-
ment is that the sign for a function already contains 
the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain 
itself. 
For let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be 
its own argument: in that case there would be a 
proposition »F(F(fx))«, in which the outer function F 
and the inner function F must have different mean-
ings, since the inner one has the form φ(fx) and the 
outer one has the form ψ(φ(fx)). Only the letter »F« 
is common to the two functions, but the letter by it-
self signifies nothing. 
This immediately becomes clear if instead of 
»F(Fu)« we write »(∃φ):F(φu) . φu=Fu«. 
That disposes of Russell’s paradox. (Wittgenstein 
1921, 3.333) 
One might have strings of growing complexity, Fu, F(Fu), 
F(F(Fu)), … in which similar signs ›F‹ occur in different 
positions. Analysis reveals that, though the different sym-
bols’ signs ›F‹ are identical, every sign belongs to a differ-
ent symbol. This is exactly the approach that can be found 
in the STT. There, similar symbols (not to be understood in 
Wittgenstein’s sense)—e.g., the relation of identity—do 
appear on different types, i.e., are systematically ambigu-
ous. In the example above, each step to a more complex 
string can be regarded as a step from one type to the next 
in Russell’s STT. Without some explicit indicator, e.g., its 
type attached as an index to the symbol (which would be 
nothing but a disambiguation of the symbol, of course), 
Russell would have to resort to the context of the symbol, 
i.e., its arguments, as well, to get to know its specific type. 
The last sentence in the previous citation makes the whole 
matter clear: this kind of disambiguation is the key to the 
solution of the logical paradoxes (of which Russell’s para-
dox is the most well-known and explicitly mentioned by 
Wittgenstein), and both Russell and Wittgenstein offer 
means to solve the logical paradoxes by disambiguation. 
In Russell’s as well as in Wittgenstein’s ideal language 
there is exactly one name for each object. So, on the most 
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fundamental level, when analysis is done, there is no room 
for ambiguities nor, as a consequence, for the logical 
paradoxes, which can no longer be formulated. 
The semantical paradoxes 
Both the STT and Wittgenstein have similar techniques to 
avoid the kind of systematic ambiguity involved in the logi-
cal paradoxes. The semantical paradoxes, on the other 
hand, are much more complicated to avoid. They can still 
be formulated, and they are still paradoxical in an ideal 
language of Russell’s kind with only STT-restrictions. 
Hence Russell developed the RTT to guard his language 
against them. In a nutshell, the states of affairs described 
in the semantical paradoxes can still be expressed in the 
ideal language, but the RTT enforces a non-paradoxical 
›translation‹ for them. As I have stated above, there is a 
high price to pay for this: the RTT is extremely complicated 
and, at least for some areas of application, further axioms 
have to be postulated. 
How does Wittgenstein’s solution of the semantical 
paradoxes fare in this respect? In all these paradoxes 
some semantical (or, in Ramsey’s word, ›psychological‹) 
terms play a crucial role, e.g., ›truth‹, ›naming‹, ›lying‹, etc. 
In Wittgenstein’s ideal language, there are no and can be 
no expressions for these ordinary-language terms, so the 
whole question of semantical paradoxes is a non-issue for 
Wittgenstein. This, of course, is a high price to pay as well, 
since it sets definite limits to the areas of application for the 
language. In Wittgenstein, these limits do not result from 
the threat posed by the semantical paradoxes; their 
›solution‹ has to be regarded as a kind of side effect of 
limits that are grounded in the Tractatus’ concept of 
language. 
Conclusion 
Ramsey’s distinction of the paradoxes in logical ones on 
the one hand and psychological (or semantical) ones on 
the other proves to be valuable for an examination of Witt- 
 
 
genstein’s alternative to Russell’s Theory of Types. The 
logical paradoxes pose a threat for Wittgenstein’s system 
as well as for Russell’s. Since Wittgenstein cannot inte-
grate a type theory in his system, he offers an alternative 
approach to the disambiguation of terms, which is the key 
to the solution of those paradoxes. His way of solving 
these problems has striking similarities to Russell’s STT. 
The semantical paradoxes, however, do pose a threat for 
Russell’s system, but not for Wittgenstein’s. This difference 
is due to the diverging concepts of language in their re-
spective variants of logical atomism. 
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The Tractatus and the Problem of Universals 
Eric Lemaire, Paris & Nancy, France 
A) The problem of objects 
What we called the problem of objects covers different 
questions. We can distinguish the metaphysical problem 
and the epistemological one. The metaphysical one is 
concerned with 1) the existence of universals and particu-
lars and 2) with the nature of those things. The epistemo-
logical one is “Have we some sort of knowledge of ob-
jects?” and, if yes, “What kind of knowledge?”. Here we 
will be interested with the problem of the existence of uni-
versals.  
The problem of objects received numerous answers. 
Without details, we can give an idea of the different points 
of view. The important point is that there is no consensus 
about the community. The difficulty with that problem is 
that there is no textual evidence to support one of the pos-
sible solutions. We can briefly expose some of the existing 
solutions. From our two principal questions about the ob-
jects, we can classify the authors. 1) The Epistemological 
question: How can we know the objects? 2) The Ontologi-
cal question: What is their ontological status?  
Those who think that we can answer to the two questions. 
Jaakko and Meril Hintikka (1989) argued that the 
tractatian’s objects are russellian’s disguised objects1 ex-
cept the logical one. So objects can be known by ac-
quaintance and ontologically they are particulars and uni-
versals.  
Those who answers the ontological question and deny we 
can answer the epistemological one. 
Peter Hacker (1972) affirmed that the objects are 
universals and we cannot say that they are objects of ac-
quaintance. 
Elizabeth Anscombe and Irving Copi, think that the 
objects are particulars Note and we cannot say that they 
are objects of acquaintance.  
Those who think we can answer neither the ontological nor 
the epistemological question. 
David Pears (1988), Anthony Kenny (1973) think 
that we cannot answer these questions because Wittgen-
stein does not know. They consider this as a lack.  
Sebastian Gandon (2003) asserts that Wittgenstein 
does not know but that is not a lack. He believes the ne-
cessity to answer the questions is a delusion2.  
B) First argument 
Our first argument is ground on the distinction between a 
proposition and a name. We will not explain in details what 
exactly Wittgenstein’s conception of these two things is. 
We need not to do that. Nevertheless, we should say that 
                                                     
 
1 Russell’s thought during the two first decades of the twentieth century 
changed a lot. The expression “russellian’s objects” refers to his posthumous 
book written in 1913 Theory of knowledge. 
2 The supporters of the New Wittgenstein did not give any direct interpretation 
of the problem. However, we can consider, even if he probably disagrees with 
this, that Sebastian Gandon’s book is a speech for the defence of the Dia-
mond-Conant’s point of view.  
by name we mean real name, that is a complete symbol 
and not a description or a logical fiction. A proposition is 
distinguished from a name by being in a relation of denota-
tion with the world, whereas a name means. What is the 
difference? When some sign which can denote something 
do not actually refer to a fact it does not loose its sense. 
Consider the following example: Jones says that “Brandy 
is a nice cat”. In that case, even if Brandy is not nice, the 
proposition Jones pronounced is perfectly intelligible or 
has a sense. But Wittgenstein thinks that a name is not 
mere noises if and only if a name has a meaning, or is 
related to an object in reality. It is some kind of rigid desig-
nator. It is difficult to illustrate this conception with some 
example for nobody, even Wittgenstein, has found real 
name. In fact, the only plausible candidate I can see is 
“this”. A real name may refer to an object directly experi-
enced. If this is true, this means that Wittgenstein en-
dorses a russellian epistemology as Jaako and Meril Hin-
tikka affirmed it. But we do not want to discuss the very 
controversial point here. The point here is that Wittgen-
stein needs to make this distinction in order to differentiate 
the symbolic behaviour of a proposition from the one of a 
constituent. A proposition is bipolar, which means that a 
proposition necessarily can be true or false otherwise it is 
just nonsense. In other words, there is an internal relation 
between a proposition and its truth-conditions. And a name 
needs to be related to an object in order to safe the sense 
of a proposition. 
Another crucial distinction between a real name and 
a proposition is that a name is a simple symbol which 
means a simple object, whereas a proposition is a 
complex symbol which denotes a complex of objects (state 
of affairs or facts).  
Now, suppose that Wittgenstein’s ontology is 
nominalist, that is only concrete particulars exist. We said 
that a proposition is necessarily a complex otherwise the 
essential feature of propositions could not be bipolarity. 
So, at least, a proposition has two constituents. That is, 
according to the nominalist interpretation, a proposition is 
necessarily composed of two concrete particulars. But this 
is very doubtful. How could there be two concrete 
particulars in “This is red” or “Jones is nice” or “this 
painting is beautiful”. It seems very counterintuitive. And 
suppose that a proposition is composed of only one 
constituent. In that case, we cannot say that for the 
simplest proposition, there is a difference between a 
proposition and a name. But the distinction between a 
proposition and a name is a crucial one in the tractarian’s 
system. In fact, When Wittgenstein criticized Frege and 
Russell, he precisely insisted on this point.  
C) Second argument 
Our second argument focuses on the notion of concrete 
particulars and the notion of property. Each object, Witt-
genstein says, has internal and external properties. There 
is no doubt that Wittgenstein thought that there are con-
crete particulars or individuals. Why?  
In asking whether there is individuals or concrete 
particulars, we do not mean “Are concrete particulars 
reducible to universals?”. If there are only universals, no 
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concrete particulars can be subject of a proposition. So the 
only propositions which exist are proposition as “Blueness 
is a colour” or “Triangularity is a shape” in which no 
concrete particular is referred to. Moreover, we should 
note that if it is true, Wittgenstein’s conception of 
universals is Platonist because these universal exist 
independently of any concrete instance. In an Aristotelian 
conception, the existence of universal is dependent upon 
the existence of their instances. If there are only platonic 
universals, the only propositions we could make are 
necessary: “Triangularity is necessarily a shape”, 
“Blueness is necessarily a colour”, etc. Platonic universals 
could be constituents in contingent propositions such as “I 
thought to Blueness this morning”. But such propositions 
suppose the existence of concrete particulars (me, this 
morning, etc.) But it is evident that Wittgenstein’s 
conception of propositions is not compatible with this. 
Every proposition with a sense is contingent. Necessary 
propositions are logical and empty of sense, or 
metaphysical and without sense. For that reason, we 
believe that Wittgenstein’s conception of language and the 
world implies the existence of concrete particulars. One 
could reply that in a bundle theory of particulars, the only 
things that exist are universals. A proposition is for 
example “Blueness is co-present with Squareness”. And 
this is a purely contingent proposition for Blueness could 
be co-present with Roundness. But in that analysis, you 
said that concrete particulars are reducible to co-
instantiated universals.  
There are three conceptions of concrete particulars: 
1) the bundle theory, 2) the substratum theory, and 3) the 
substance theory. What do they say? According to the 
Substratum theory, “a concrete particular is a whole made 
up of the various properties we associate with the 
particular together with an underlying subject or 
substratum that has an identity independent of the 
properties with which it found – a bare particular.3” 
According to the Bundle theory “There are no underlying 
substrata; ordinary particulars are constituted exclusively 
by the properties associated with them, there are “bundles” 
or “clusters” of those properties.4” These two theory share 
the common assumption that a concrete familiar particular 
(like a chair) is not a basic entity but is a whole made up of 
more basic constituents. There is a third theory: the 
substance theory. This theory takes the concrete 
particulars to be ontologically basic entities. There are not 
reducible to properties or to a bare substratum. Another 
point suggests a crucial difference between these three 
theories: the question of identity. The bundle theory is an 
essentialist one. This means that each property is 
essential. If a bundle looses one of its properties, it 
becomes another thing. The substratum theory is anti-
essentialist because the very identity of the particular is 
assumed by the bare substratum, so each property is 
contingent. The identity of the particular does not depend 
upon its properties. In a substance theory, a particular has 
essential and inessential properties. Essential properties 
are generally thought as Kinds (Universal). A Kind term 
show what is the particular. For example, if you ask “What 
is Boby?”, the answer is “Boby is a man.”. But there are 
other properties which permit us to answer the question 
“How is it?”. For example: “Boby is beautiful”. The 
substance theory is generally understood as a realist one, 
which commits us to the existence of universal. Kinds are 
typically universals. The other theories are compatible with 
a trope-theory. And typically, an austere nominalist thinks 
                                                     
 
3 Loux, 2006, 84. 
4 Ibid. 
that we cannot investigate the ontological structure of 
concrete particulars5. We do not want to discuss the merits 
or difficulties of each theory here. Now, come back to 
Wittgenstein. We just saw that the substance theory 
distinguish the following questions: 1) What is it?; 2) How 
is it?. Wittgenstein clearly distinguish these one too. For 
example take the remark 3.221. And in his ontology, he 
insists on the fact that objects have internal and external 
properties. The internals properties are such that it is 
unthinkable that the object do not possess them. And 
external properties can be possessed or not by the 
objects. The last thing is a matter of fact. In fact, 
Wittgenstein seems to avoid problems met by the Bradley 
and Russell in their account of relations. According to 
Bradley, each property of a particular is inherent to it or 
internally related to it. Each property is essential to the 
particular. According to Russell, there is no internal 
relation. Then, each property is externally related to a 
particular. That the particular possesses a property is 
always a matter of fact. There is no essential property. 
Bradley and Russell seem to be committed respectively to 
a bundle theory and a Substratum theory. So he seems to 
hold a substance theory of concrete particulars (Except for 
the subject of thoughts for which he seems to maintain a 
substratum theory.)  
So we have presented two arguments in support of 
a realist interpretation of the Tractatus. Obviously, many 
things should be said to reply objections or to clear up our 
discussion. But we lack place. So, the discussion, I hope, 
will serve to answer questions and perplexities.  
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A Critique of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
Daniel Lim, Cambridge, England, UK 
The Strategy 
The locus classicus of the phenomenal concept strategy 
is Brian Loar’s paper ‘Phenomenal States’ (1990). In it 
he claims that the Knowledge Argument relies on a du-
bious assumption which he dubs the Semantic Premise: 
 
“A statement of property identity that links concep-
tually independent concepts is true only if at least 
one concept picks out the property it refers to by 
connoting a contingent property of that property.” 
(Loar 2004, 224) 
He argues that the Semantic Premise, while true in 
standard cases of a posteriori identities like ‘water is 
H20’, is crucially false in cases of a posteriori psycho-
physical identities. This is because the phenomenal con-
cepts deployed in psychophysical identity statements are 
really type-demonstrative concepts of the form: ‘this 
experience’. The two features of type-demonstratives 
relevant for the strategy are: direct reference and con-
ceptual independence from physical / scientific concepts. 
The first feature ensures that no new properties are in-
troduced and the second feature ensures that the iden-
tity remains a posteriori. 
The phenomenal concept strategy has the 
makings of a powerful response to the Knowledge 
Argument and defenders of the strategy claim that it 
satisfies three important desiderata: (i) it respects the 
kind of knowledge Mary gains after leaving her black and 
white room, (ii) it is physically explicable, and (iii) it 
explains why we cannot resist the illusion of ontological 
distinctness concerning our conscious experiences. 
Phenomenal Knowledge and  
Physical Explicability 
While there are independent reasons1 for eschewing a 
type-demonstrative construal of phenomenal concepts I 
wish to dwell on a dilemma David Chalmers (2007) has 
been keen on exposing which brings features (i) and (ii) 
into tension. If phenomenal concepts are physically ex-
plicable they will not explain our epistemic situation. On 
the other hand, if phenomenal concepts can explain our 
epistemic situation then they will be physically inexplica-
ble. Chalmers focuses his critique on issues of conceiv-
ability, but I will focus on the putative physical mecha-
nisms that make phenomenal concepts possible. A nice 
way of bringing out the tension in this dilemma is to use 
Janet Levin’s and David Papineau’s positions as exem-
plars of each horn. 
Levin’s position exemplifies the first horn. She 
deliberately avoids any account of phenomenal concepts 
that require anything that is physically suspect: 
‘quotation’, ‘partial constitution’, or ‘acquaintance’. She 
opts for a physically safe version of phenomenal 
concepts that is limited to “causation, reliable correlation, 
and relations of physical inclusion or adjacency”. As 
                                                     
 
1 For example see Diana Raffman’s (1995) critique of type-demonstratives 
based on the empirical fact that we can discriminate more colors than we 
can re-identify over time. 
such she argues that phenomenal concepts should be 
construed as introspectively deployed demonstratives 
and nothing more. All that is needed to distinguish 
introspectively deployed phenomenal demonstratives 
from nonphenomenal ones are ‘differences in what they 
[causally] denote’. This is worrisome because it drives, 
what seems to be, an unacceptable wedge between 
phenomenal concepts and the properties they denote. 
By relating the two by causation too much distance has 
been allowed to creep into the picture. In David 
Chalmers’ terminology, this makes phenomenal 
concepts, in a sense, ‘Twin Earthable’. The referents of 
Twin Earthable concepts will be unstable across 
counterfactual worlds. When Twin Oscar thinks, while on 
Twin Earth, that the substance in the lake looks 
refreshing, his thoughts about the substance will be twin 
water thoughts. This is because XYZ, and not H20, 
causes Twin Oscar’s concept of ‘water’ to be tokened. 
When Oscar thinks, while on Earth, that the substance in 
the lake looks refreshing, he will entertain water thoughts 
because they are caused by H20. 
To apply this insight to differentially caused type-
demonstratives, we can imagine a scenario where I am 
observing a lake. The lake is partitioned into sections. 
Scientists, who have managed to transport a sizeable 
amount of XYZ from Twin Earth, have filled some 
partitions with XYZ and others with H20. While looking at 
partition A I deploy a type-demonstrative ‘that liquid’ and 
while simultaneously looking at partition B I deploy, what 
I think is, the same type-demonstrative ‘that liquid’ and 
think in my mind: ‘that = that’. I am wrong about this 
since A is filled with XYZ and B is filled with H20. 
However, I am wrong not because I misapplied one of 
the demonstratives, but because I unknowingly deployed 
two different concepts. This is because my concepts are 
causally individuated by the objects they denote. While 
attending to the liquid in A I may have thought that I was 
deploying a water concept, when in fact I was deploying 
a twin water concept. 
Applying this scenario to our own phenomenal 
states2 it is possible for a normal subject to deploy a 
type-demonstrative ‘that experience’ while attending to 
the same phenomenal property twice in quick 
succession and yet have room to rationally doubt 
whether ‘that = that’ is in fact true. Levin writes: 
 
“…it may seem epistemically odd that introspect-
ing subjects can be mistaken about whether 
they’re using the same concepts in their thoughts 
about their own phenomenal states. But when 
concept difference and identity are determined 
‘externally’ – that is, by the features of what’s de-
noted – this shouldn’t be unexpected, even when 
the subject matter is one’s own mental states.” 
(Levin 2007, 108) 
This makes the following scenario possible: I may mis-
takenly think that I’m deploying a phenomenal concept 
when in fact I am not. Let’s say that brain state p1 is my 
                                                     
 
2 This is a thought-experiment John Hawthorne (2007) develops against 
direct reference theories of phenomenal concepts used to defend property 
dualism. 
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phenomenal concept of experiencing red. This is be-
cause brain state p2, which is my experience of red, was 
causally responsible for p1. Ex hypothesi, p1 and p2 are 
distinct physical states. This would make it possible for a 
neuroscientist to stimulate p1 while ensuring that p2 is left 
inert. But what exactly is happening in this scenario? If it 
is anything like the water case, I will think that I’m enter-
taining a phenomenal concept that refers to p2 but I will 
actually be deploying a nonphenomenal concept of the 
neuroscientist’s electrical stimulation. This means that I 
will mistakenly believe that I am thinking ‘phenomenally’ 
about experiencing red when I am actually thinking non-
phenomenally about something else. 
If we accept Kripke’s observation that there is no 
reality / appearance distinction when it comes to our 
phenomenology then this seems highly implausible. But 
more importantly, it is imperative that the phenomenal 
concept strategist develop an account of phenomenal 
concepts that is genuinely phenomenal and Levin, by 
keeping her account physically respectable, loses touch 
with this crucial feature. She preserves (ii) at the 
expense of (i). This shortcoming points us to a different 
account, one that makes the relationship between the 
phenomenal concept and the object it denotes much 
tighter. 
David Papineau’s account of quasi-quotational 
phenomenal concepts discharges this duty. His idea is to 
analyze phenomenal concepts as a species of 
perceptual concepts. Consider my ability to perceptually 
identify a flower and make judgments about it. I might be 
able to think ‘that flower’ is beautiful when looking at a 
tulip. I have, at my disposal, a visual sensory template 
that I can use to recognize tulips. This template, 
however, is not only useful for thinking about external 
objects like tulips, but it is also useful for thinking about 
internal objects like my conscious awareness of the tulip. 
When we attend to our experiences we use the 
experiences themselves to think about them. The crucial 
feature of phenomenal concepts is that they will always 
deploy an instance of the experience they are about. 
That is, they use the denoted experiences in order to 
mention them. Papineau writes: 
 
“This means that any exercise of a phenomenal 
concept to think about a perceptual experience 
will inevitably involve either that experience itself 
or an imaginary recreation of that experience. If 
we count imaginary recreations as ‘versions’ of 
the experience being imagined, then we can say 
that the phenomenal thinking about a given ex-
perience will always use a version of that experi-
ence in order to mention that experience.”  
(Papineau 2007, 124) 
The problem with this view is that it seems to leave no 
room for any kind of physical explanation. The phe-
nomenal property that the phenomenal concept is about 
is literally a part of the concept itself; as such the tradi-
tional distinction between representation and repre-
sented object that made it possible to specify an expla-
nation in terms of causal / historical correlation between 
the two has been obliterated. It seems that the special 
kind of cognitive presence that Papineau’s account pro-
vides must be explained by the physical presence of the 
experience alone. But does this really count as an ex-
planation or is this better characterized as a stipulation? 
Dualist Illusion 
I believe Chalmers’ dilemma is real and must be ad-
dressed. But even if a path can be cut between the 
horns of this dilemma it is far from clear that the phe-
nomenal concept strategy has adequately accounted for 
(iii). For ease of exposition I will use the ‘explanatory 
gap’ (Levine 2001) as an instance of the dualist intuition. 
The existence of this gap is something defenders of the 
phenomenal concept strategy readily admit. Their claim 
is not that the gap can be bridged but that its existence 
can be explained. 
Let’s begin by thinking about a classic optical 
illusion based on human color constancy known as the 
‘checker shadow illusion’. A subject is shown what 
appears to be a black and white checkerboard with a 
cylinder on it that is casting a diagonal shadow across 
the middle of the board. The squares are actually 
different shades of gray and the image is constructed so 
that the ‘white’ squares in the shadow are the same 
shade as the ‘black’ squares outside the shadow. 
Despite being the same shade the squares appear to be 
very different. The standard explanation for this illusion 
has two parts. The first is that our visual system keys in 
on local contrasts – a square that is lighter than its 
immediate neighbors is considered ‘lighter than 
average’. So the mere fact that the square in the shadow 
is surrounded by darker squares and the square outside 
the shadow is surrounded by lighter squares contributes 
to the illusion. The second part is that shadows often 
have soft edges while painted boundaries have hard 
edges. Our visual system tends to ignore gradual 
changes in lighting in order to determine the color of the 
surfaces involved without being misled by shadows. In 
the image, the cylinder’s shadow is deliberately made 
fuzzy to add to this effect. 
What we have here is a satisfying explanation for 
the existence of the checker shadow illusion. A vital 
feature of this explanation is that it does not presuppose 
the illusion in order to explain it. By exposing the 
tendencies of our visual system to key in on local 
contrasts and import generic information concerning 
boundaries, a non-circular explanation of the illusion is 
provided. The question is whether phenomenal concepts 
provide such an explanation for the explanatory gap. 
David Papineau claims that it does. He locates the 
source of the explanatory gap in the absence of a use / 
mention distinction regarding phenomenal concepts. The 
use / mention distinction is present in a majority of our 
nonphenomenal concepts but it is peculiarly absent 
when we think phenomenally. As already gestured at 
above, it is the way we think about phenomenal 
properties that makes it seem as though we are 
apprehending their essences and consequently intuiting 
phenomenal properties as ontologically distinct from 
anything physical. Phenomenal concepts literally contain 
the properties that they conceptualize so it is no wonder 
why we can disassociate the physical descriptions of the 
properties from the first hand experiences of the 
properties themselves. Papineau writes: 
 
“There is a sense in which material concepts do 
‘leave out’ the feelings. Uses of them do not in 
any way activate the experiences in question, by 
contrast with uses of phenomenal concepts …  
After all, most concepts don’t use or involve the 
things they refer to. When I think of being rich, 
say, or having measles, this doesn’t in any sense 
make me rich or give me measles.”  
(Papineau 2007, 136) 
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I agree that I do not have to have measles in order to 
think about measles. In fact, in most cases, I don’t. I can 
think of the disease in terms of its characteristic symp-
toms, its scientific classification rubeola or even its dis-
tinction from smallpox among other things. But, of 
course, it is also possible to think about measles while 
actually having measles. I can think, using a type-
demonstrative, ‘this disease’, where I use the disease I 
currently have in order to mention it. If Papineau is right, 
juxtaposing this type-demonstrative concept with my 
ordinary measles concept should generate an illusion of 
distinctness. It is this ‘special way’ of thinking that cre-
ates the fallacious impression that other ways of thinking 
about measles fail to refer to the measles themselves. 
But is this at all convincing? Despite the absence of the 
use / mention distinction in my measles type-
demonstrative I have no dualist illusions. I don’t find 
myself thinking that I’m dealing with two ontologically 
distinct entities. 
Since the absence of a use / mention distinction is 
a characteristic of certain nonphenomenal type-
demonstratives that do not engender a dualist illusion, 
the absence of the distinction cannot be used to explain 
the illusion in the case of phenomenal concepts. Without 
offering a principled distinction between type-
demonstratives like ‘this disease’ as opposed to ‘this 
experience’ there is no reason to think that a satisfying 
explanation for our dualist intuitions has been given. Of 
course one can appeal to the peculiarity of the 
phenomenal property itself in contrast to the property of 
being rubeola but this would presuppose the explanatory 
gap, not explain it. This move effectively eliminates the 
possibility of satisfying (iii) and it is a failure of the 
phenomenal concept strategy that is often overlooked. 
Most debates concerning the strategy assume that (iii) is 
adequately addressed, but further examination shows 
that this is a mistake. Referring to the absence of the 
use / mention distinction to explain our dualist intuitions 
simply does not work. 
Conclusion 
The phenomenal concept strategy faces some serious 
problems. Chalmers’ dilemma is real, that is, it does not 
seem that (i) and (ii) can consistently be held together in 
a single account. However, even if this dilemma can be 
resolved it cannot account for (iii) because it does not 
provide us with a satisfying non-circular explanation for 
the dualist illusion. 
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Metaphorische Bedeutung als virtus dormitiva 
Jakub Mácha, Brno, Tschechien 
Die Diskussion über das Wesen der Metapher steht in der 
analytischen Philosophie hauptsächlich unter dem Einfluss 
von Arbeiten Max Blacks und Donald Davidsons. Ihre 
Querele betrifft vornehmlich die Problematik der 
metaphorischen Bedeutung. Black behauptet, dass der 
Begriff der metaphorischen Bedeutung notwendig sei, um 
die spezifische kognitive Kraft der Metapher zu 
beleuchten. Davidson leugnet das, indem er eine Reihe 
von Argumenten gegen die Idee der metaphorischen 
Bedeutung präsentiert. Im Weiteren soll ein von denen 
untersucht werden. Das abzuhandelnde Argument betrifft 
die Tauglichkeit einer solchen Idee zur Erklärung dessen, 
wie Metaphern funktionieren und verstanden werden. Es 
gehört allerdings zu einer generelleren Denkfigur, die in 
der Geistesgeschichte längst bekannt ist. Donald 
Davidson hat sie keineswegs erfunden und auch in ihrer 
Anwendung auf die Erklärung der Metapher behält er kein 
Primat. Es sei vorausgeschickt, dass der Gegenstand 
dieses Aufsatzes keine Beurteilung der Figur selbst, 
sondern nur ihre Ausprägung in der Metapherdiskusion 
sein soll. 
Es war niemand geringerer als Friedrich Nietzsche, 
der in seiner berühmten Kritik an Kant schrieb: 
 
Wie sind synthetische Urteile a priori möglich? frag-
te sich Kant, - und was antwortete er eigentlich? 
Vermöge eines Vermögens […] – hatte er gesagt, 
mindestens gemeint. Aber ist denn das – eine Ant-
wort? Eine Erklärung? Oder nicht vielmehr nur eine 
Wiederholung der Frage? Wie macht doch das Opi-
um schlafen? »Vermöge eines Vermögens«, näm-
lich der virtus dormitiva – antwortet jener Arzt bei 
Molière 
quia est in eo virtus dormitiva, 
cujus est natura sensus assoupire. 
Aber dergleichen Antworten gehören in die Komö-
die […]. (Nietzsche 1954, 575f) 
Hier ist nicht der Ort, um die Entscheidung zu treffen, ob 
Nietzsche mit diesem Tadel Recht gehabt hat. Lediglich 
die Struktur des Arguments soll uns interessieren: Wie 
funktioniert die Leistung Y des Systems X? Vermöge der 
Tatsache, dass X die Eigenschaft Z besitzt. Aber das ist 
keine Erklärung, denn Z stellt nur eine Umschreibung von 
Y dar oder die Eigenschaft Z ist genau so unbekannt wie 
die Leistung Y von X. Für die Variable X können bei-
spielsweise die Ausdrücke „synthetische Urteile a priori“, 
„Opium“, oder „Metapher“ eingesetzt werden. Für Y sind 
es „Möglichkeit“, „Schlafen“, „Verstehen“, für Z daraufhin 
„Vermögen“, „virtus dormitiva” oder „metaphorische Be-
deutung“. Also wie sind Metaphern als solche zu verste-
hen? – Vermöge einer spezifischen metaphorischen Be-
deutung. Aber das Verstehen von Metaphern ist genau so 
erklärungsbedürftig wie jene metaphorische Bedeutung.1 
                                                     
 
1 Es lassen sich viele andere Belege für diese Denkfigur erbringen: Wie 
werden ästhetische/moralische Urteile zustande gebracht? Vermöge eines 
ästhetischen/moralischen Sinns. Wie ist unmittelbares Wissen möglich? 
Vermöge der Intuition – d .h. vermöge einer Sehkraft (vgl. das lateinische 
Verbum in-tueri – genau auf etwas hinsehen) Oder warum waren bestimmte 
politische Subjekte erfolgreich? Sie besaßen eine geheimnisvolle Eigenschaft 
oder Kraft – die virtù, und man neigt dazu, auch den Willen zur Macht in diese 
Liste einzutragen. 
Ohne den Ausdruck „Metapher“ zu gebrauchen, hat 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in seinen Philosophischen 
Untersuchungen das Problem der Erklärung der 
uneigentlichen Rede aufgegriffen. 
 
Gegeben die beiden Begriffe ’fett’ und ’mager’, wür-
dest Du eher geneigt sein, zu sagen, Mittwoch sei 
fett und Dienstag mager, oder das Umgekehrte? 
(Ich neige entschieden zum ersteren.) Haben nun 
hier ”fett” und ”mager” eine andere, als ihre gewöhn-
liche Bedeutung? — Sie haben eine andere Ver-
wendung. — Hätte ich also eigentlich andere Wörter 
gebrauchen sollen? Doch gewiß nicht. — Ich will 
diese Wörter (mit den mir geläufigen Bedeutungen) 
hier gebrauchen. — Nun sage ich nichts über die 
Ursachen der Erscheinung. Sie könnten Assoziatio-
nen aus meinen Kindheitstagen sein. Aber das ist 
Hypothese. Was immer die Erklärung, — jene Nei-
gung besteht. 
Gefragt, ”Was meinst Du hier eigentlich mit ’fett’ und 
’mager’?” — könnte ich die Bedeutungen nur auf die 
ganz gewöhnliche Weise erklären. Ich könnte sie 
nicht an den Beispielen von Dienstag und Mittwoch 
zeigen. Man könnte hier von ’primärer’ und ’sekun-
därer’ Bedeutung eines Worts reden. Nur der, für 
den das Wort jene Bedeutung hat, verwendet es in 
dieser. 
[…] 
Die sekundäre Bedeutung ist nicht eine ’übertrage-
ne’ Bedeutung. Wenn ich sage ”Der Vokal e ist für 
mich gelb”, so meine ich nicht: ’gelb’ in übertragener 
Bedeutung — denn ich könnte, was ich sagen will, 
gar nicht anders als mittels des Begriffs ’gelb’ aus-
drücken. (Wittgenstein 2000, Artikel 144, S. 79f, 
Reinschrift des II. Teils der Untersuchungen.) 
Um die Intention des Philosophen transparent werden zu 
lassen, soll noch ein anderer Kommentar aus dem Nach-
lass vorgelegt werden: 
 
Könnte man hier von ’primärer’ und ’sekundärer’ 
Bedeutung eines Worts reden? — Die Worterklä-
rung ist beide Male die der primären Bedeutung. 
Nur für den, der das Wort in jener Bedeutung kennt, 
kann es diese haben. D.h. die sekundäre Verwen-
dung besteht darin, daß ein Wort, mit dieser primä-
ren Verwendung, nun in dieser neuen Umgebung 
gebraucht wird. 
Insofern könnte man die sekundäre eine ’übertra-
gene’ Bedeutung nennen wollen. 
Aber das Verhältnis ist hier nicht, wie das zwischen 
dem ’Abschneiden eines Fadens’ und ’Abschneiden 
der Rede’, denn hier muß man ja nicht den bildli-
chen Ausdruck gebrauchen. […] 
Man sagt nur von solchen Kindern, sie spielen Ei-
senbahn, die von einer wirklich Eisenbahn wissen. 
Und das Wort Eisenbahn im Ausdruck ”Eisenbahn 
spielen” ist nicht bildlich gebraucht, oder im übertra-
genen Sinn. (Wittgenstein 2000, Artikel 138, S. 
12b–13a, Band S, 31. Januar 1949) 
Metaphorische Bedeutung als virtus dormitiva — Jakub Mácha 
 
 
 208 
Wittgenstein erbrachte mehrere Beispiele, um an ihnen die 
Idee der sekundären Bedeutung zu verdeutlichen. Um-
schreiben wir drei von ihnen in prädikativer Form: 
(1) Mittwoch ist (für mich) fett. 
(2) Der Vokal e ist (für mich) gelb. 
(3) Die Rede ist abgeschnitten worden. 
Alle diese Prädikate sollen eigentlich materiellen Gegens-
tänden zukommen, was hier ersichtlich nicht der Fall ist. 
Daher legt sich die Auffassung nahe, dass die Wörter „fett“ 
oder „gelb“ in einer sekundären Bedeutung gebraucht 
worden sind. Wenn dies so möglich wäre, würde Wittgen-
steins fundamentales Argument gegen die private Sprache 
unterminiert werden. Denn die sekundären Bedeutungen 
wären in einem signifikanten Sinne privat, was durch die 
eingeklammerten Einschübe „für mich“ hervorgehoben 
sein solle. 
Um den Anschein einer privaten Sprache 
abzuweisen, muss eine Erklärung geliefert werden, welche 
die stets hypothetischen sekundären Bedeutungen 
kundgeben soll. Da diese Erklärung nicht vermöge einer 
ostensiven Handlung erfolgen kann (die Beispiele sind so 
konstruiert worden), muss sie auf die ganz gewöhnliche 
Weise gemacht werden. – Das heißt nicht anders als 
mithilfe primärer Bedeutungen der involvierten Wörter: 
Mittwoch sei für mich fett, weil ich als Kind mittwochs viel 
Fettes zu essen pflegte; der Vokal e sei für mich gelb, weil 
in meiner ersten Fibel der Buchstabe e gelb aufgemalt 
worden ist. Der Gebrauch der Wörter „fett“ sowie „gelb“ ist 
in den kausalen Nebensätzen durchaus buchstäblich, d. h. 
ausschließlich ihre primären Bedeutungen werden in 
Anspruch genommen. 
Primär oder sekundär sind demzufolge nicht 
Bedeutungen, sondern Verwendungen – nämlich die 
Stellung der Wörter in ihren spezifischen Umgebungen. In 
eine neue Umgebung oder in einen ungewöhnlichen 
Kontext wird also ein Wort samt seiner Bedeutung verlegt. 
Sobald die Erklärung geliefert ist, ist das Uneigentliche 
dieses Gebrauchs nicht mehr vorhanden. 
Zum Kontrast sei die offensichtlich tote Metapher (3) 
gegenübergestellt. Das Verb „abschneiden“ verfügt über 
eine primäre Bedeutung „etwas auf eine feinere Weise 
abtrennen“ und über die Vielheit von bildlichen 
Bedeutungen wie „eine Rede abscheiden“, „einen Weg 
abschneiden“ oder „bei einer Prüfung abschneiden“ usw. 
Das Argument wird bei Wittgenstein möglicherweise 
in einer nicht so expliziten Form dargestellt wie in dem 
obigen Nietzsche-Zitat. Die Struktur ist doch dieselbe, nur 
der Argumentationsgang erfolgt umgekehrt: Man neigt 
dazu, die Beispielsätze X durch sekundäre Bedeutungen 
bestimmter Wörter Z zu erklären. Aber um diese Sätze 
verständlich (Y) zu machen, werden weitere Erklärungen 
Z’ erforderlich, welche sich alleinig auf buchstäbliche 
Bedeutungen berufen dürfen. Daher tritt die Erklärung Z’ 
anstelle der Erklärung Z oder diese wird durch jene fixiert. 
Für unsere nachfolgende Betrachtung ist wichtig: 
Das Konzept der sekundären Bedeutung ist nicht unsinnig, 
disponiert jedoch über keine Erklärungskraft. Seine 
Berechtigung besteht lediglich darin, dass weitere 
Erklärungen zu erwarten sind, welche es letztendlich 
ersetzten sollen. Es ist ein Provisorium.2 
                                                     
 
2 Man könnte zweifeln, ob die Beispiele überhaupt Metaphern sind. Denn was 
erst widersinnig war, und demzufolge als eine Metapher zu sein schien, ist 
später durch eine buchstäbliche Erklärung ersetzt, die jedoch keine systemati-
sche ist. Sie beruht auf einer durchaus inzidentellen Tatsache. Die Sätze (1) 
und (2) dürfen auch als eine Chiffre angesehen werden, die der Sprecher mit 
Aus Davidsons Formulierung lässt sich erkennen, er 
muss das Beispiel von Nietzsche bzw. von Molière im 
Auge gehabt haben. 
 
[Metaphorische Bedeutungen] erklären die Meta-
pher nicht, sondern die Metapher erklärt sie. Sobald 
wir eine Metapher verstehen, können wir […] (bis zu 
einem gewissen Punkt) […] sagen, was die „meta-
phorische Bedeutung“ ist. Diese Bedeutungen aber 
einfach in der Metapher anzusiedeln, ist so ähnlich, 
als wollte man die Wirkung einer Schlaftablette 
durch die vis dormitiva erklären. Buchstäbliche Be-
deutungen und buchstäbliche Wahrheitsbedingun-
gen können Wörtern und Sätzen unabhängig von 
jeweiligen Verwendungskontexten zugeordnet wer-
den. Deshalb vermag die Berufung auf sie wirklich 
etwas zu erklären.3 
Die oben skizzierte Struktur lässt sich problemlos in diese 
Sätze hineinbringen. Erst wenn wir eine Metapher X ver-
standen haben (Y), können wir darüber reflektieren und 
teilweise herausfinden, was ihre metaphorische Bedeu-
tung Z gewesen ist. Eine metaphorische Bedeutung Z 
vermag nicht zum Verständnis Y einer Metapher (token) 
beizutragen, sondern eher umgekehrt ist sie aus dem Ver-
stehen der Metapher zu entnehmen. Die sekundä-
re/metaphorische Bedeutung war bei Wittgenstein ein 
Provisorium, eine Zwischenstation; Davidson hat sie ans 
Ende der Erklärungsfolge verbannt. 
Die provisorische Annahme Davidsons ist die, dass 
die Metapher (token) eine metaphorische Bedeutung 
haben kann. Wäre diese Bedeutung dem Hörer zuvor 
bekannt, würde sich es um eine tote Metapher handeln. 
Ergo muss die metaphorische Bedeutung unbekannt sein 
und somit besitzt sie keine Erklärungskraft. Umgekehrt 
ausgedrückt heißt es, um die Rolle einer Erklärung 
einzunehmen, muss die metaphorische Bedeutung der 
Metapher als type zukommen, was hieße, dass es um eine 
tote Metapher geht. 
Den Kern der Argumentation macht die 
Schlussfolgerung aus, dass die metaphorische Bedeutung 
die Metapher zu einer toten macht. Aber sehen wir uns die 
Struktur einer toten Metapher näher an. Sie ist eine ge-
wesene Metapher, die gegenwärtig zwei oder mehrere 
buchstäbliche Bedeutungen aufweist. Sollte die Zu-
schreibung der metaphorischen Bedeutung die Metapher 
mit einer toten gleichsetzen, müsste die metaphorische 
Bedeutung mit der zweiten (aber schon buchstäblichen) 
Bedeutung ebenso gleichgesetzt werden. Folglich müsste 
die metaphorische Bedeutung, gegen die sich dieses 
Argument richtet, mit der buchstäblichen gleichartig sein. 
Soweit meine Analyse des Argumentes. Max Black 
wehrt sich aber folgendermaßen:  
 
One must agree that it would be pointless and obfus-
cating to invoke some ad hoc “figurative” sense, not 
otherwise specified, to explain “how metaphor works 
its wonders”. Nevertheless, it would help us to under-
stand how a particular metaphorical utterance works 
in its context if we could satisfy ourselves that the 
                                                                             
 
denen teilt, denen die nachfolgenden Erklärungen oder die in den Erklärungen 
ausgedrückten Tatsachen bekannt sind. Dieser unsystematische Charakter ist 
auch für jede Chiffre wesentlich. Ich möchte aber keineswegs bestreiten, dass 
man immerhin solche zufälligen Tatsachen (etwa in der Gestallt von verste-
cken biografischen Anspielungen) in Metaphern in der Dichtung hineinzuzie-
hen pflegt. Die Chiffre und die Metapher können koinzidieren. 
3 Davidson 1998, S. 51f, Hervorhebung original. Der lateinische Ausdruck „vis 
dormitiva“, der die vermutliche Anspielung auf Nietzsche oder Molière eviden-
ter macht, stammt erst vom Übersetzer ins Deutsche. Im Original steht ledig-
lich „dormative power”. 
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speaker is then attaching a special extended sense to 
the metaphorical “focus” (selecting, as I have ex-
plained elsewhere, some of the commonplaces nor-
mally associated with his secondary subject, in order 
to express insight into his primary subject). This view 
is not open to the charge of invoking fictitious entities. 
(Black 1979, 190f) 
Man muss nun diese Sätze unter die Lupe nehmen. Was 
kann dem Hörer helfen, eine metaphorische Aussage (d. 
h. Metapher-token) zu verstehen? Black hat wohl gemeint, 
dass der Hörer über den Sprecher weiß, er habe einige 
Wörter metaphorisch benutzt und ihre neue Bedeutungen 
sind gemäß seiner Methode der Interaktion4 herauszufin-
den. So würde die Metapher zu einer Art der Kommunika-
tion und der Vorwurf seitens Davidson behielte seine Gel-
tung.  
Hätte jedoch Black „the special extended sense“ 
anstatt des unbestimmten Artikels geschrieben, wäre der 
betreffende Satz einer anderen Lesart fähig. Wenn der 
Hörer lediglich die Tatsache weiß oder annimmt, dass die 
Aussage metaphorisch intendiert worden ist, könnte zu der 
speziellen erweiterten Bedeutung selbst die Methode der 
Interaktion werden. Dieser subtile Unterschied mag mithilfe 
von prozessualen Vokabeln folgenderweise nahegebracht 
werden: Die Methode der Interaktion sei eine Prozedur mit 
vielen Eingaben, unter denen die in der Metapher be-
nutzten Wörter eine signifikante Rolle spielen, wobei der 
Kontext der metaphorischen Aussage und das Hinter-
grundwissen die restlichen Eingaben bilden sollen. Der 
Sprecher kann nun mit seiner metaphorischen Aussage 
entweder diese Prozedur oder ein bestimmtes Ergebnis 
dieser Prozedur verknüpfen. Blacks Formulierungen 
sprechen eher für die zweite Möglichkeit und 
infolgedessen sind sie ein leichtes Ziel von Davidsons 
Kritik. Die erste Möglichkeit hat den Vorteil, dass der 
Sprecher nicht alle Eingaben kundgeben und der Hörer 
nach ihnen nicht forschen muss. Ein anderer Vorteil ist die 
Tatsache, dass eine solche metaphorische Bedeutung 
nicht mit der buchstäblichen gleichartig ist, und somit trifft  
 
                                                     
 
4 Wie die Methode genau funktioniert, ist verhältnismäßig kompliziert und wird 
in dem Zitat in den Klammern angedeutet. Für unsere Überlegung ist allein 
wichtig, dass sie fixiert, wie aus ursprünglichen buchstäblichen Bedeutungen 
die metaphorische Bedeutung hervorkommt. 
auf sie die Davidson’sche Kritik nicht zu. Dies würde 
jedoch heißen, die Ideen der Kommunikation und der 
Übereinstimmung der metaphorischen Interpretationen 
beider Gesprächspartner müssen preisgegeben werden, 
und das hat Black offensichtlich nicht tun wollen. Die 
bekannte These, dass die Kunst, worunter auch die 
Metapher gehört, zweimal gezeugt wird, muss ergänzt 
werden, dass daran zwei selbstständige und voneinander 
unabhängige Leben anschließen können. Denn wenn die 
metaphorische Bedeutung nur eine Methode wäre, wie 
Metaphern zu interpretieren sind, so gewährleistet nichts, 
dass zwei Durchführungen zu demselben Ergebnis 
kommen müssen, weil unter Eingaben dieser Methode 
auch der inzidentelle außersprachliche Kontext gehört. 
Diese Auseinandersetzung sollte darauf 
aufmerksam machen, dass das Konzept der meta-
phorischen Bedeutung allein keine Erklärung der 
Funktionsweise von Metaphern sein kann. Sie kann aber 
als die Bezeichnung einer solchen Erklärung verstanden 
werden, die vorhergehen oder folgen muss. Diese 
Erklärung soll etwas Allgemeines aussagen und zwar über 
die Metapher selbst, nicht über diese oder jene konkrete 
Metapher. Somit muss sie der Metapher als type 
zukommen.5 
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5 K.-Fr. Kiesow (Hannover) hat wertvolle kritische Bemerkungen zu einer 
früheren Auffassung dieses Aufsatzes gemacht. 
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„Vom Weißdorn und vom Propheten“ – Poetische Kunstwerke und 
Wittgensteins „Fluß des Lebens“ 
Annelore Mayer, Baden, Österreich 
„Das uhlandsche Gedicht ist wirklich großartig. Und es ist 
so: Wenn man sich nicht bemüht das Unaussprechliche 
auszusprechen, so geht nichts verloren. Sondern das 
Unaussprechliche ist, - unaussprechlich – in dem Ausge-
sprochenen enthalten.“ (Engelmann S 78). Das Gedicht, 
zu welchem Wittgenstein sich hier äußert, ist die aus 7 
Strophen zu je 4 Zeilen bestehende Ballade „Graf 
Eberhards Weißdorn“ von Ludwig Uhlland (1787-1862). 
Die „Handlung“ ist rasch erzählt: Graf Eberhard „vom 
Württemberger Land“ schneidet sich auf „frommer Fahrt“ 
nach Palästina in einem dortigen Wald ein „grünes Reis 
von einem Weißdorn“ ab, welches er nach vollbrachten 
Taten mit nach Hause nimmt. Dort grünt es und wird zum 
stattlichen Gewächs, unter dessen „Wölbung“ der Ritter 
gegen Ende seines Lebens sitzt und gleichsam wie im 
Traum der Zeit gedenkt, als er das Reis gebrochen hatte. 
Der Dichter schildert hier weniger ein „Geschehen“, als 
vielmehr zwei in der Person des Grafen ineinander 
verwobene Zustände: jenen der Jugend und jenen des 
Greises. Die nach außenhin scheinbar volksliedhaft-
schlicht erscheinende Form beruht auf einer sehr subtilen 
Gestaltung. Das Gedicht hat 7 Strophen. Der Mittleren, in 
welcher die Heimkehr Eberhards mit dem Weißdornreis 
geschildert wird, kommt eine besondere Funktion zu, als 
dort nämlich die beiden Zustände ineinander übergeführt 
werden. Im weiteren Verlauf bezieht der Dichter die nun 
folgende 5. Strophe inhaltlich auf die 3., des Weiteren die 
6. auf die 2. und letztendlich die 7. auf die 1.. Konkretisiert 
wird diese Bezugnahme durch die Schlussworte:  
 
„Die Wölbung hoch und breit, 
Mit sanftem Rauschen mahnt 
Ihn an die alte Zeit 
Und an das ferne Land.“    
In dem, was dem Grafen gegen Ende seines Lebens nahe 
ist, nämlich im mittlerweile zur „Wölbung“ ausgewachse-
nen Weißdorn, evidiert sich demnach für ihn das nunmehr 
zeitlich Ferne und dieses ist somit durch das, was ihm jetzt 
nahe ist, auch selbst wieder nahe. 
Es kann dieses Gedicht durchaus verstanden 
werden als ein ganz bestimmter „Fluß des Lebens“, in 
welchem „die Worte ihre Bedeutung haben“ (Wittgenstein 
1984, 913). Es ist diese Bedeutung als eine anzusehen, 
welche über eine solche auf dem den reinen lexikalischen 
Gehalt beruhende weit hinausgeht. Mit allen gebrauchten 
Wörtern – also mit dem kompletten Gedicht – zielt Uhland 
auf mehr denn auf ein Verständnis der einzelnen durch die 
Wörter ausgesprochenen Begriffe. Das Gedicht fasst diese 
Begriffe gewissermaßen als eine „Gesamtheit der Tat-
sachen“ zusammen, so dass sie in dieser Gesamtheit und 
als solche eine eigene Tatsache ergeben, als welche das 
von Uhland beschriebene ineinander Übergehen der von 
Eberhard gerade zum Zeitpunkt der Beschreibung 
erfahrenen und bedachten Lebenszustände des Greisen– 
und Jugendalters bezeichnet werden darf. Und so kann 
vielleicht doch gesagt werden, dass die Wörter nur in der 
durch den Dichter gegebenen Form des ganzen Gedichtes 
mit seinen inneren Bezügen zwischen den einzelnen 
Strophen ihrer Funktion für die Erreichung dieser „Tat-
sache als Gesamtheit der Tatsachen“ – nämlich der im 
Gedicht erwähnten, wie etwa „Eberhard“ oder „Weißdorn“ 
– gerecht werden können. In diesem Sinne ist dieses 
Gedicht nun auch selbst „Welt“, wenn man diese nämlich 
mit Wittgenstein als „die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen“ 
begreift (Wittgenstein 1984, 1.1., S 11). In dieser Welt gibt 
es das „Aussprechliche“, worunter der rein lexikalische 
Gehalt eines Wortes verstanden werden kann. So ist 
beispielsweise der im Gedicht so wesentliche Weißdorn 
eine genau definierte „Tatsache“ der Welt in deren 
Unterordnung „Pflanzenwelt“, für dessen wissenschaftliche 
Erkenntlichmachung und Beschreibung die Botanik das 
lateinische Wort „Crataegus“ verwendet. Es steht außer 
Zweifel, dass mit dieser rein lexikalischen Bedeutung auch 
im Gedicht etwas gesagt wird. Das „Weiße“ und das 
„Dornige“, durch welches sich diese Pflanze auszeichnet 
macht sie selbst als die bestimmte Tatsache „Weißdorn“ 
erkennbar. Gerade in diesen Bestimmtheiten mag auch 
Uhland den Grund gesehen haben, diese Pflanze als ein 
Medium seines Gedichtes erkoren zu haben. Allerdings 
eben nur als „Medium“, als Mittel, welches die Annäherung 
an etwas Anderes, ja, vielleicht sogar die Handhabung 
dieses „Anderen“ ermöglicht. „Es gibt allerdings 
Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische.“ 
(Wittgenstein 1984, 6.522, S 85). Gemäß dieser 
wittgenstein’schen Feststellung kann das Wort „Weißdorn“ 
– und zwar notwendigerweise im Kontext mit seiner lexi-
kalisch-botanischen Bedeutung – in jenem uhland’schen 
Gedicht als definitorischer Teil der „Gesamtheit der 
Tatsachen des an sich Unaussprechlichen“ in jenem 
Gedicht angesehen werden. Das Unaussprechliche ist ja 
nicht das, was durch die Wörter „erzählt“ wird – also die 
Fahrt des Grafen Eberhard nach Palästina, das Ausgraben 
des Weißdornreises und dessen Wiederanpflanzung in der 
württembergischen Heimat, etc. – sondern das, was formal 
durch die Hervorhebung der 4. Strophe und der nach-
folgenden Verklammerung der weiteren mit den ersten drei 
Strophen bewerkstelligt wird und so zur Evidenz geführt 
werden soll. Es ist dies tatsächlich das Unaussprechliche, 
weil es eine „Gesamtheit von Tatsachen“ –und zwar von 
aussprechlichen solchen - ist, die so ineinander verwoben 
wurden, dass sie im Einzelnen nicht mehr ausgesprochen 
werden können. Demnach ist auch die kunstvolle formale 
Gestaltung dieser Ballade ein Medium der Evidenzia-
lisierung dieses Unaussprechlichen. Durch Uhlands 
poetisch-formale Bemühungen ist es aber auch „ausge-
sprochen“ und es ist ihm dabei tatsächlich nichts verloren 
gegangen, wie Wittgenstein doch richtig festgestellt hat. 
Und so gesehen ist das uhlandsche Gedicht wirklich 
großartig, weil es in der Gesamtheit seiner Struktur eben 
nichts weniger ist als ein „Fluß des Lebens“, in welchem 
den verwendeten Wörtern die Bedeutung zukommt, im 
Ausgesprochenwerden etwas Unaussprechliches hand-
habbar zu machen. 
Einen vielleicht noch extremeren Fall als Uhlands 
Ballade stellt das Gedicht „Пророк“ („Der Prophet“) von 
Aleksandr Sergeevič Puškin (1799-1837) dar. Wittgenstein 
hat dieses Gedicht eigenhändig in russischer Sprache und 
in kyrillischer Schrift abgeschrieben (s.: Rothaupt, S 278). 
Der Dichter schildert darin die Berufung des Jesaja zum 
Propheten, genauer eigentlich die Wandlung und somit 
Werdung zum Propheten, ausgehend von jenem Bericht, 
den der Berufene selbst im 6. Kapitel seines zu den 
wesentlichen prophetischen Schriften des aus christlicher 
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Perspektive sogenannten Alten Testamentes gehörenden 
Buches gibt. Auch hier geht es um die Darstellung einer 
wesentlichen Zustandsveränderung, um die Evidenz-
ialisierung jenes Augenblickes – oder als was sollte es 
bezeichnet werden – in welchem Jesaja sich vom Nicht-
Propheten zum Propheten wandelt. Diese Wandlung, die 
im Gedicht der nunmehr Verwandeltwordende und somit 
Verwandeltseiende selbst beschreibt und reflektiert, 
geschah im göttlichen Auftrag durch einen Seraph, 
welcher dabei dem Jesaja u.a. „die sündige und 
geschwätzige Zunge aus dem Mund herauszog“ und in 
den durch dieses Herausziehen „verklingenden Mund“ mit 
der „blutbefleckten Rechten“ „den Stachel der klugen 
Schlange“ hineinlegte. 
 
„И он к устам моим приник,  
и вырвал грешный мой язык, 
и празднословный и лукавый, 
и жало мудрыя змеи 
в уста замершие мои 
вложил десницею кровавой.“ 
Bei 16 der insgesamt 30 Zeilen des ohne strophische Glie-
derung in einem durchlaufenden Gedichtes steht am Anfang 
das Wort „и“ („und“), wobei von Zeile 10 – 18 dieses Worte 
jeweils 9 mal hintereinander den Anfang bildet, von Zeile 21 
- 23 3 mal hintereinander. Auf diese Weise bringt der Dichter 
die Zusammengehörigkeit, ja das gewissermaßen 
„Punkthafte“ all des hier vor sich Gehenden zur Sprache. 
Auch hier ergibt also ein Konglomerat von Einzeltatsachen 
die Gesamtheit einer Tatsache, auf welcher die Bestimmung 
des Jesaja zum Propheten und sein dadurch ein solches 
gewordenes „Prophetsein“ beruht.  
Bestimmung, Wandlung und Werdung zum 
Propheten, deren Realisierung Puškins Jesaja durch den 
von Gott beauftragten Seraph an sich im Wahrnehmen 
derselben reflektiert, sie alle drei sind samt ihrem Ergebnis 
des „Prophet geworden Seins“ in ihrem Kontext mit dem 
Göttlichen etwas „Geheimnisvolles“ und somit letztlich 
„Unaussprechliches“. Der Dichter zeigt mithin nicht nur, dass 
es dieses Geheimnisvoll-Unaussprechliche gibt, sondern 
„dies zeigt sich“ – um nochmals Wittgenstein zu Wort 
kommen zu lassen – und es zeigt sich mithin in seiner 
Notwendigkeit, das „Mystische“ zu sein. 
Ausgehend von Wittgensteins Wertschätzung des 
Gedichtes „Graf Eberhards Weißdorn“ von Ludwig Uhland 
und des Gedichtes „Пророк“ von Aleksandr Sergeevič 
Puškin könnte folgender Gedanke entwickelt werden: Ein 
Wort gewinnt „im Fluß des Lebens“ seine Bedeutung. Die 
Dichter schaffen mit ihrem ganz bestimmten Werk, also 
etwa mit „Graf Eberhards Weißdorn“ oder „Пророк“ einen 
ganz bestimmten solchen „Fluß des Lebens“. Im Gedicht 
kommt dank des strukturellen Vermögens des Dichters und 
seiner Fähigkeit, Wörter mit bestimmter lexikalischer 
Bedeutung zu einer neuen „Gesamtheit der Tatsachen“ 
zusammenzufassen und innerhalb der Struktur ihres 
Werkes als solche zur Geltung zu bringen das 
Unaussprechliche als Gezeigtes zur Evidenz.    
Wenn dies aber „das Mystische“ ist, dann ist dieses 
„Mystische“ nichts weniger als ein vom Dichter in seiner 
bestimmten Art strukturierter „Fluß des Lebens“. In letzter 
Konsequenz könnte dies bedeuten, dass die Wörter 
Uhlands und Puškins aus den beiden hier angesprochenen 
Gedichten gleichsam in ein und denselben „Fluß des 
Lebens“, nämlich den „mystischen“ eingebettet sind – und 
dies unabhängig von der Verschiedenheit der 
angewendeten Sprachen Deutsch und Russisch. Das Bett 
des Lebensflusses ist aber dann auch gestaltgebend für die 
Struktur des poetischen Kunstwerkes – so es denn ein 
solches ist, wie im konkreten Fall von Uhland und Puškin. 
Die von beiden angewandte präzise Form ist demnach im 
den beiden Gedichten  gemeinsamen „Fluß des Lebens“, 
nämlich jenem des „Mystischen“ grundgelegt und die beiden 
Künstler gestalten dieses dort Grundgelegte gemäß ihrer 
individuellen künstlerischen Fähigkeit und den dies-
bezüglichen Möglichkeiten der von ihnen verwendeten 
Sprachen. So gesehen haben beispielsweise die Wörter 
„und“ bei Uhland bzw. „и“ bei Puškin in ihrer Funktion für die 
Akkumulierung von Einzeltatsachen zu einer „Gesamtheit 
der Tatsachen“ als neuer, unaussprechlich gezeigter 
Tatsache trotz ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu einer jeweils anderen 
Sprache die selbe Bedeutung, sind also, um bei 
Wittgensteins Bild zu bleiben, in diesem Falle der zwei 
Gedichte zwei Tropfen im selben Flusse. In diesen Fluss 
hineinzusteigen – ist das nicht „ein Erlebnis“, vermittelt durch 
das Kunstwerk in seiner durch den Künstler angewandten 
Struktur und Wortwahl? „Aber“, so Wittgenstein, „es gibt 
Erlebnisse charakteristisch für den Zustand des „Sich-
auskennens.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 721, S 337). 
In den beiden hier angesprochenen Gedichten darf 
davon ausgegangen werden, dass sich die Dichter – ganz 
im Sinne Wittgensteins – eben nicht bemühten, „das Unaus-
sprechliche auszusprechen“. Und weil dadurch durch sie 
und in ihnen nichts verloren gegangen ist, „sondern das 
Unaussprechliche - unaussprechlich – in dem Ausge-
sprochenen enthalten“ ist, so lässt sich daraus ein letzt-
endlicher Wert von Sprache – und zwar in der Gesamtheit 
der Tatsachen ihrer Erscheinungsformen, wie beispiels-
weise als Deutsch oder Russisch – wahrnehmen: Sinn und 
Funktion der Sprache ist schlechthin nicht das Aussprechen, 
sondern das Zeigen des Unaussprechlichen oder zumindest 
das Hinzeigen auf dieses. Ein sprachlich-poetisches Kunst-
werk bewerkstelligt dies durch das Nichtbemühen um das 
Aussprechen und durch das Bemühen, die „Gesamtheit der 
Tatsachen“ als neue gemeinsame Tatsache zu zeigen, so 
dass ein „Zustand des Sich-auskennens“ herbeigeführt wird.  
„Was passiert, wenn man Wittgensteins Gesamt-
nachlass nicht nur als Philosophie, sondern auch als 
Literatur, als Dichtung ... betrachtet und liest? Man würde 
nichts verlieren und vieles gewinnen“ (Rothaupt, S 287). 
Josef Rothaupts Frage mit folgernder Feststellung hat auch 
den hier unternommenen Inbeziehungsetzungen von 
wittgenstein’schen Überlegungen mit den Möglichkeiten und 
Erscheinungsformen poetischer Kunstwerke. 
Nahrung gegeben. Äußerungen des Philosophen 
etwa zu Uhland, Puškin und machen anderen bedeutenden 
Vertretern der Literatur – so marginal sie auch fürs Erste 
erscheinen mögen – eröffnen vielleicht tatsächlich zusätz-
liche Möglichkeiten nicht nur des Verständnisses, sondern 
auch der Veranschaulichung von Gedankengängen, so wie 
es hier zu zeigen unternommen wurde. Und was spräche 
denn tatsächlich dagegen, Wittgenstein – unbeachtet des 
Gehaltes und der Originalität seines Argumentierens – auch 
in einem Zusammenhang zu sehen mit Denkern wie 
beispielsweise Johannes Tauler, Angelus Silesius oder 
Friedrich Nietzsche, deren Hervorbringungen ja auch 
durchaus anerkannten literarischen Rang besitzen oder 
auch mit Literaten wie Ljev Nikolajevič Tolstoj oder Rainer 
Maria Rilke, deren Einfluss auf die Philosophie im 
Allgemeinen und speziell auch auf Wittgenstein ja auch 
beachtlich ist? Kann eine solche Sicht nicht als durchaus 
angemessen erkannt werden einem Denker gegenüber, der 
sich selbst die Frage stellt: „O, warum ist mir zumute, als 
schrieb ich ein Gedicht, wenn ich Philosophie schreibe?“ 
(zitiert bei Rothaupt, S 288).   
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„Die Einheit hören“ – Einige Überlegungen zu Ludwig Wittgenstein 
und Anton Bruckner 
Johannes Leopold Mayer, Baden, Österreich 
Ludwig van Beethoven läßt im Finale seiner IX. Sym-
phonie nach einem einleitenden dramatischen, fanfaren-
artigen Motiv die Themen der drei vorhergegangenen 
Sätze nochmals anklingen. 
Ähnliches scheint auch in den drei großen Messen 
und in den Symphonien Anton Bruckners zu geschehen, 
wenn dort – meist gegen Ende des jeweiligen Finalsatzes – 
Material aus anderen Teilen des Gesamtwerkes nochmals 
in ein abschließendes Geschehen einbezogen wird. 
Vielfach wurde in der Musikgeschichtsschreibung daher 
festgestellt, Bruckners Verfahren beruhe auf jenem Beet-
hovens und habe dort sein historisches, von Bruckner 
selbst als solches anerkanntes und daher nachgeahmtes 
Vorbild. 
Eine solche Betrachtung lässt zwei Fragen außer 
acht: erstens, ob es per se das Gleiche ist, wenn zwei das 
Selbe tun – und zweitens, ob hier tatsächlich zwei das 
Selbe tun und daher Gleiches oder gar Selbes passiert. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein scheint dies offenbar anders zu 
hören. „Die Brucknersche Neunte ist gleichsam ein Protest 
gegen die Beethovensche.“ (Wittgenstein 8/1989, S 497). 
In der Tat kann die Aussage des Philosophen als höchst 
angemessen bezeichnet werden. Eine auf Beethoven be-
zogene Interpretation des strukturellen Phänomens der 
Wiederkehr von Material aus den vorangehenden Sätzen 
im Finale bei Bruckner lässt nämlich das außer acht, was 
die beiden Komponisten genau hier – nämlich im Ge-
schehen eines nochmaligen finalen Rekurses auf 
thematisches Material aus vorhergehenden Sätzen eines 
mehrteiligen Gesamtwerkes – geradezu fundamental 
unterscheidet: nachdem Beethoven die Themen der ersten 
drei Sätze hat Revue passieren lassen, leitet der Baßsolist 
mit dem Rezitativ „O Freunde nicht diese Töne. Sondern 
lasst uns andere anstimmen“ zur Intonation der nun 
tatsächlich ganz neuen, ganz anderen Melodie auf die 
Worte „Freude schöner Götterfunken“ über. Allein schon 
durch das nunmehrige Einführen menschlicher Stimmen 
vollzieht sich hier eine intensive Abwendung vom bisher 
nur instrumental geprägten Klanggeschehen. Alles was 
vorher war sollen die Zuhörenden, so lässt es uns der 
Komponist vernehmen, in radikalster Weise und ein für alle 
Mal hinter sich lassen.  
Anders ist dies bei Bruckner, der schon in seiner 
ersten großen Messe d-moll von 1864 in das den 
Gesamtzyklus abschließende „dona nobis pacem“ das 
melodische Material des „Credo“-Schlusses, dort mit den 
Worten „et vitam venturi saeculi“ unterlegt, nochmals und 
tatsächlich abschließend-sinnfällig hineinklingen lässt. 
Solcherart wird auf etwas Vorausgehendes nicht nur 
zurückgegriffen, es wird dieses Vorausgehende durch 
dessen Wiederaufnahme vielmehr bestätigt, sodass dieses 
kompositorische Vorgehen also eine „Restitutio in 
integrum“ darstellt. Auch in seinen Symphonien gelangt 
Bruckner auf unterschiedlichen gestalterischen Wegen 
dazu, gegen Ende des Gesamtwerkes auf dessen Anfang 
zu rekursieren. Die Symphonien 2 – 8 bieten dafür jeweils 
ganz individuelle und exemplarische Lösungen. Für die 
von Wittgenstein angesprochene „IX.“ hat Bruckner 
wiederum ganz andersgeartete Möglichkeiten zur 
Zusammenführung des Gesamtmaterials gesucht. Diese 
sind jedoch nur aus Skizzen überliefert, weil der Tod des 
Komponisten diesem eine Verwirklichung nicht mehr 
gestattete.  
Aber der von Wittgenstein gehörte „Protest“ 
Bruckners gegen Beethovens „IX.“ kann ja bereits aus 
anderen Werken als der letzten Symphonie dieses 
Meisters herausgehört werden, etwa auch aus dessen 
„VII.“, zu welcher sich der Philosoph in einem Brief an 
seine Schwester Helene vom 30.3.1946 äußert: „Gestern 
spielten mir zwei bekannte die 7te von Bruckner vor 
(vierhändig). Sie spielten schlecht, aber nicht ohne Ver-
ständnis. Ich hatte die Symphonie seit Jahren nicht gehört 
und hatte wieder einen großen Eindruck.“ (Wittgenstein 
1996, S 187).    
Im Finale dieser Symphonie leitet Bruckner kunstvoll 
die originären Motive dieses Satzes so, dass durch die 
Struktur eine Rekapitulation des Eröffnungsthemas des 
ersten Satzes geradezu evoziert wird und das Geschehen 
des Finales letztlich in diese Rekapitulation einmündet, 
sodass das Werk in seiner Gesamtheit im Erklingen seines 
Anfanges zum Schluss kommt. Das, was vor dem Finale 
war, wird in diesem Falle also nicht verworfen, um „andere 
Töne“ anstimmen zu können, was offenbar durch das 
zuvor Gehörte notwendig geworden ist, wie bei 
Beethoven, sondern es wird dieser Anfang vielmehr in 
seiner Rückkehr ins Gesamtgefüge bestätigt.  
Also: Nichts von „nicht diese Töne“, sondern ganz 
im Gegenteil - im Sinne des Ganzen zurück zu diesen 
Tönen. Damit kann demnach auch die 7. Symphonie 
Bruckners im wittgenstein’schen Sinne als ein Protest 
dieses Komponisten gegen Beethoven aufgefasst werden, 
und mit ihr die vorangegangenen symphonischen Werke 
und die drei großen Messen.  
Wittgenstein verweist durch seine Aussage auf eine 
deutliche Unterschiedlichkeit der Absichten bei einem 
scheinbar gleichen strukturellen Verfahren – der 
Hereinnahme von Material aus vorhergehenden Sätzen in 
den Finalsatz und er macht damit  jeweils gänzlich anders 
geartete Gesamtkonzeptionen offenbar. Diese unter-
schiedlichen Gesamtkonzeptionen verlangen aber auch 
ein anderes Hören und Bedenken der Zusammenhänge 
innerhalb dieser Symphonien. Beethoven fordert nach-
gerade dazu auf, alles, was der Freudenhymne 
vorausgeht, nicht mehr aufkommen zu lassen, auch wenn 
es sich – wie aus dem nochmaligen Zitieren vernehmbar – 
aufdrängen wollte. Die anderen, letztendlich der mensch-
lichen Stimme anvertrauten Töne, schließen alles Vorher-
gegangene mit aller Entschiedenheit aus. Darin liegt auch 
die Radikalität dieses Werkes, dass es hier zuletzt einem 
eigenen großen Teil von sich selbst widerspricht. Und 
Beethoven will ja offenbar auch, dass der letztendlich 
gültige Teil anders gehört wird, als alles, was ihm 
bevorgeht, indem er nämlich das klangliche Geschehen 
durch die Einführung menschlicher Stimmen völlig ver-
ändert. Das Neue, am Schlusse sich selbst Bestätigende, 
will, ja muss auch anders gehört werden als alles, was da 
vorher kommt. 
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Bruckners Symphonien verlangen aber ein anderes 
Hören: nämlich ein solches in Gesamtheiten, die akustisch 
einen ganzen Organismus darstellen.  
„Ich könnte von einem Bild von Picasso sagen, ich 
sehe es nicht als Menschen. Das ist doch ähnlich dem: ich 
war lange nicht Imstande dies als Einheit zu hören, jetzt 
aber höre ich’s so. Früher schien es mir wie lauter kurze 
Stücke, die immer wieder abreißen, — jetzt hör ich’s als 
Organismus. (Bruckner).“ (Wittgenstein 7/1989, § 677,  
S 436).   
In der Tat: jetzt ist etwas als Gesamtheit eines 
großen Organismus zu hören, dann nämlich, wenn 
Bruckner das Material eines Schlußssatzes kunstvoll so 
strukturiert, dass darauf die Wiederhinwendung zum 
Anfang erfolgen kann. Wie wird aber dieser in das Ende 
den Anfang einbeziehende Letztzustand des Werkes 
erreicht? Kann vielleicht davon gesprochen werden, dass 
der Rekurs auf den Anfang als Zusammenfassung 
verstanden werden soll, als Zusammenfassung nämlich 
von strukturellen Einzelerscheinungen, die als jeweils 
unterscheidbarer symphonischer Satz innerhalb des 
Gesamtzyklus, respective als einzelne melodisch-
thematische Gebilde innerhalb eines solchen Satzes 
hörend wahrgenommen werden können? Durchaus 
verständnisfördernd ist hier folgende Bemerkung 
Wittgensteins: „Von einer Brucknerschen Symphonie kann 
man sagen, sie habe zwei Anfänge: den Anfang des 
ersten & den Anfang des zweiten Gedankens. Diese 
beiden Gedanken verhalten sich nicht wie Blutsverwandte 
zu einander, sondern wie Mann & Weib.“ (Wittgenstein 
2000, S 110).  
Es ist tatsächlich so, dass Bruckner die 
Expositionen seiner Themen als einzelne Ereignisse 
gestaltet. In den frühen Symphonien trennt er sie abrupt 
durch Pausen, später scheidet er sie durch deutlich als 
solche hörbare und auf etwas nun folgendes Anderes 
verweisende Übergänge. Das heißt, dass zuerst einmal 
musikalische Einzeltatsachen, nämlich individuelle 
thematisch-melodische Gebilde zur Darstellung kommen. 
Diese kommen als solche Einzelgebilde scheinbar vorerst 
so zu ihrer ersten Darstellung, als würde tatsächlich mit 
ihnen das Werk erst beginnen. Durch Wittgensteins 
Aussage kann man auf eigentümliche Art auf einen 
fundamentalen Unterschied zwischen der Exposition 
thematischen Materials bei Bruckner und in den 
Symphonien eines wiener Klassikers wie etwa Joseph 
Haydn hingewiesen werden. Bei Letzterem entwickelt sich 
die Darstellung eines Themas nämlich gewissermaßen auf 
ein zweites, zu jenem im Kontrast stehendes Thema hin. 
Diesen Prinzipien der Einführung des Materials folgen im 
Wesentlichen auch Mozart und Beethoven.    
Was hat es nun mit der von Wittgenstein 
konstatierten, zum Charakter der Beziehungen des 
angewandten thematischen Materials bei den wiener 
Klassikern im Gegensatz stehenden „Nicht-
Blutsverwandtschaft“ bruckner’scher Themen auf sich? 
Auch hier hilft ein Rekurs auf Haydn: bei ihm ist es oft der 
Fall, dass ein in der Haupttonart des Werkes exponiertes 
Thema sich so entwickelt, dass in der Folge – und zwar 
tonal kontrastreich auf der Dominante – dasselbe Thema 
nochmals erscheint. Tonale Unterscheidung und 
melodische Gleichheit fallen bei solchen Gegebenheiten 
sinnfällig zusammen.  
Dergleichen gibt es bei Bruckner nicht. Im 
Gegenteil: der Komponist wendet die höchste Kunst an, 
um seine thematischen Gebilde in erkennbar 
unterschiedener Weise erscheinen zu lassen, etwa auch 
durch die Wahl der klanglichen und satztechnischen Mittel. 
Es lassen sich aber darüberhinaus grundsätzliche 
melodische Übereinstimmungen zwischen den expo-
nierten Themen feststellen. Dies trübt die Unterscheid-
barkeit dank der angewandten Unterscheidungsmittel 
keineswegs, lässt aber für aufmerksam Zuhörende eine 
besondere Art von Zusammengehörigkeit evident werden. 
Diese Tatsache und die Art und Weise, wie der Komponist 
im Laufe des symphonischen Geschehens die Themen bis 
hin zur Gleichzeitigkeit ihres Auftretens – wie etwa am 
Schluss der f-moll Messe oder der 8. Symphonie – zu-
sammenführt, all dies lässt den plastischen wittgen-
stein’schen Vergleich von „Mann & Weib“ als gerechtfertigt 
erscheinen. Einzelindividuen, die zuerst auch einzeln 
erscheinen, werden im Laufe von Geschehen gleichsam 
wie in einer ehelichen Gemeinschaft so zusammengeführt, 
dass sie als Gesamtheit angesprochen werden können, 
ohne dabei ihre erkennbare – soll also im konkreten Falle 
heißen: hörbare – Individualität am Ende verloren zu 
haben. Denn gerade auf der Bewahrung der 
Individualitäten und deren Erkennbarkeit beruht ja 
Bruckners Kunst der Zusammenführung seiner 
musikalischen Strukturgebilde. Die „Gesamttatsache“ 
Messe oder Symphonie verweist daher speziell in ihrer 
durch den Rekurs auf den Anfang erreichten 
Zusammengefasstheit nachhaltig und endgültig auf die am 
Ende zusammengefassten „Einzeltatsachen“ der zuerst 
unabhängig exponierten thematischen Gebilde. Diese 
„Gesamttatsache“ ist ja nur hörbar durch die Wahr-
nehmung der „Einzeltatsachen“, durch welche sie zu 
dieser endgültigen „Gesamttatsache“ wird. Es ist dann 
doch so, dass nicht nur Wittgenstein im Laufe einer langen 
bruckner’schen Symphonie „lange nicht Imstande ist, dies 
als Einheit zu hören, jetzt aber“. Erst da, wo Bruckner es 
unternimmt, die Einzelelemente durch deren, aufgrund von 
Rekursen auf Zuvorgehendes erreichtes, gleichzeitiges 
Auftreten in einer Gemeinsamkeit erscheinen zu lassen 
„höre ich es so. Früher schien es mir wie lauter kurze 
Stücke, die immer wieder abreißen, - jetzt hör ich’s als 
Organismus.“ 
Es kann ein höchstrangiges Erlebnis sein, hörend 
an einem solcherart zustandekommenden Ereignis der 
Werdung einer symphonischen Gesamttatsache teil-
zunehmen. Dergleichen ist nämlich keineswegs das von 
Haus aus zu Erwartende. Bruckner lässt sich mit seinen 
Lösungen Zeit und stellt im Laufe des Geschehens 
mehrere Möglichkeiten solcher Lösungen zur Diskussion, 
indem er zuerst die Verschiedenartigkeit der einzelnen 
Elemente in den Vordergrund stellt. Aber er kommt damit 
absichtsvoll nicht ans Ende.  
„Ich glaube, das gute Österreichische ist besonders 
schwer zu verstehen. Es ist in gewissem Sinne subtiler, 
und seine Wahrheit ist nie auf Seiten der Wahrschein-
lichkeit.“ (Wittgenstein 8/1989, S 454). Das „gute Öster-
reichische“ wird in dieser Aussage Wittgensteins u.a. 
durch Grillparzer und Bruckner repraesentiert.   
Dass die Wahrheit hier nie auf Seiten der 
Wahrscheinlichkeit ist – dies mag auch noch durch etwas 
deutlich werden, worauf Wittgenstein im Zusammenhang 
mit dem Streichquartett d-moll von Franz Schubert auf-
merksam macht, in dessen zweitem Satz der Komponist 
sein eigenes Lied „Der Tod und das Mädchen“ variiert. 
„Die letzten beiden Takte des ‚Tod und Mädchen’ 
Themas“, so Wittgenstein, „das ~; man kann zuerst 
verstehen, daß diese Figur konventionell, gewöhnlich ist, 
bis man ihren tieferen Ausdruck versteht. D.h., bis man 
versteht, daß hier das Gewöhnliche sinnerfüllt ist.“ 
„Die Einheit hören“ – Einige Überlegungen zu Ludwig Wittgenstein und Anton Bruckner — Johannes Leopold Mayer 
 
 
 215
(Wittgenstein 8/1989, S 523). Scheinbar Konventionelles 
gibt es auch im melodischen Material Bruckners, zumal im 
Hinblick auf die Typologie der Themen in den Messen, 
welche vielfach auf in der katholischen Kirchenmusik 
traditionsreichen Topoi beruhen. Auch hier liegt die 
Wahrheit nicht in der leicht annehmbaren Wahr-
scheinlichkeit, dass es sich aufgrund der scheinbaren 
Konventionalität der thematischen Gebilde um ein im 
Ganzen konventionelles Werk handelt, sondern in der 
Wahrheit der Sinnerfüllung.        
Es sagt diese Überlegung zur „Sinnerfüllung“ auch 
etwas aus über Wittgensteins Verständnis von Musik. 
Dieses ist mit nichten „konservativ“. Die Erkenntnis einer 
solchen Sinnerfüllung des Gewöhnlichen innerhalb eines 
bedeutenden Kunstwerkes und die Bemerkungen des 
Philosophen zu Bruckner lassen darauf schließen, dass es 
ihm nicht um etwas geht, auf das der Begriff „modern“ ad 
hoc anwendbar zu sein scheint, sondern um das aus sich 
selbst bedeutsame und etwas bedeutende Werk, das dann 
eben gerade auf Grund einer solchen Bedeutsamkeit 
„aktuell“, weil bedenkbar ist.   
Auch Bruckners Musik beruht auf einer solchen Art 
der Aktualität, wiewohl in ihr mit recht Bezüge gehört 
werden können zur frühen europäischen  Mehrstimmigkeit 
des Mittelalters gleichermaßen wie zu den Messen des 
Josquin des Prés, dessen Werk, geschaffen am Ende 
eben jener so gerne mit negativen Epitheta ornantia 
belegten Epoche, einen der grandiosen Höhepunkte 
abendländischer Musik darstellt. 
Was Wittgenstein über Bruckner zu sagen hat, das 
kann darauf aufmerksam machen, dass seine philoso-
phischen Überlegungen bei der gedanklichen Erschließ-
ung des bruckner’schen Werkes äußerst hilfreich sein 
können, ja, für das Verständnis vieler musikalischer 
Gegebenheiten überhaupt. Sachverhalte wie das noch-
malige Aufgreifen thematischen Materiales aus den voran-
gegangenen Sätzen im Finale einer Symphonie er-
scheinen im Hinblick auf Beethoven und Bruckner unter 
Einbeziehung der wittgenstein’schen Überlegungen nicht 
mehr als Abhängigkeit des jüngeren vom älteren Kompo-
nisten, weil durch solche Überlegungen eine vermeintliche 
kultrugeschichtliche Kausalität, aufgrund derer es sich um 
den selben Sachverhalt handelt, verneint wird. Ein solcher 
Blick auf die jeweilige Einzeltatsache ist so geartet, dass er 
die Tatsachen gemeinsam vergleichend erfasst und nicht 
aufgrund eines historischen Hintereinander. 
In Hinsicht auf das Denken über die oder mit Hilfe 
von Musik sollte Wittgenstein durchaus der Rang zu-
gestanden werden, welchen diesbezüglich etwa Aurelius 
Augustinus, Johannes Scotus Eriugena, Mechthild von 
Magdeburg oder Nicolaus Cusanus zu Recht einnehmen. 
Durch diese Namen, denen jener Wittgensteins also be-
gründetermaßen hinzugefügt werden darf, soll aber auch 
darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden, dass sowohl der 
Musik als ganzer als auch einem bestimmten musika-
lischen Kunstwerk die Qualität eines philosophischen 
Erkenntnismittels zukommt. Gewissermaßen ganz von 
Seiten der Musik hat darauf der hochbedeutende öster-
reichische Komponist und Theoretiker Johann Joseph Fux 
(1660-1741) in seinem lateinisch geschriebenen Lehrwerk 
„Gradus ad Parnassum“, erschienen in Wien 1725, 
aufmerksam gemacht. Den zweiten Teil seines Buches 
gestaltet der Autor als philosophischen Dialog nach 
platonischem Vorbild, „utque veritas magis elucesceret“. 
Anhand dieses Buches, welches der Autor dem Anspruch 
verpflichtet, dass aus ihm und aufgrund seiner strukturellen 
Gestaltung die Wahrheit besser hervorleuchte, hat sich 
Joseph Haydn die theoretischen Grundlagen des 
Komponierens erworben. Und gemäß den von Fux 
formulierten Grundsätzen lernte auch ein blutjunger 
Schulgehilfe in einem kleinen Bauerndorf an der 
Nordgrenze Österreichs die Grundsätze der allem künst-
lerischen musikalischen Schaffen mit Notwendigkeit zu-
grundeliegenden Theorie - sein Name war Anton Bruckner. 
Und dieser war später auch als Universitätslehrer bestrebt, 
die Musik als philosophische Wissenschaft zu vermitteln.      
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Counterfactuals, Ontological Commitment and Arithmetic 
Paul McCallion, St Andrews, Scotland, UK 
1. 
On the face of it, utterances of arithmetic sentences in 
which number words or numerals occur as singular terms 
carry commitment to the existence of numbers. Yet there is 
no easy path from the syntax of an uttered sentence to a 
claim about ontological commitment. For it might be that 
the sentence is uttered with non-assertoric force, for ex-
ample as in make-believe. Alternatively, it might be that the 
sentence is to be understood non-literally. 
An assignment of ontological commitment to an 
utterance should mesh with the beliefs that may be 
reasonably attributed to the speaker (for a brief discussion 
of the case of applied arithmetic see (Rayo forthcoming)). 
It would, for instance, be implausible to attribute a 
commitment to the existence of the average Scot to 
someone who asserts 
 
(1) The average Scot has 2.3 children, 
because, for one thing, it is implausible to suppose that the 
speaker believes that any Scot has a non-natural number 
of children. 
In (Yablo 2001) it is noted that the willingness of 
speakers to assert 
 
(2) The number of moons of Jupiter is four 
seems to turn on whether they believe that Jupiter has 
exactly four moons, and is apparently independent of their 
belief in the existence of arithmetical objects. There is 
therefore a prima facie case for denying that an utterance 
of (2) carries commitment to the existence of the number 
four, just as an utterance of (1) does not carry commitment 
to the average Scot. 
Yablo suggests that sentences such as (2) are 
uttered with non-assertoric force, as part of the pretence 
that there are numbers. An alternative explanation is that 
utterances of (2) are to be understood non-literally. On that 
view, the surface syntax of (2) is misleading, and it is used 
to express the proposition that 
 
(3) Jupiter has exactly four moons 
An attractive feature of both Yablo’s suggestion and of the 
alternative just mentioned is that they promise to remove 
the difficulties surrounding the epistemology of mathemati-
cal objects. One might therefore ask whether these analy-
ses can be extended to pure arithmetic, for pure arithmetic 
is replete with numerical singular terms. The aim of this 
paper is to investigate whether the latter analysis can be 
so extended (for an extension of the pretence view to pure 
arithmetic and set theory, see (Yablo 2005)). 
The surface syntax of simple arithmetic sums (such 
as ‘5 + 7 = 12’) suggests that their assertion will carry 
commitment to numbers. Nevertheless, the willingness of 
speakers to assert simple arithmetic sums seems to turn 
on their belief in some sort of generalisation (evidence for 
which is obtained by counting), and is apparently 
independent of their belief in the existence of arithmetical 
objects. So it is prima facie plausible that simple arithmetic 
sums may be paraphrased by sentences whose literal 
assertion would not carry commitment to arithmetical 
objects. 
2. 
This may sound familiar. There have been previous at-
tempts to paraphrase (or otherwise provide a reduction of) 
the sentences of pure arithmetic in terms of generalisa-
tions constructed using the adjectival (or quantificational 
determiner) occurrences of number-words or numerals (for 
an overview, see (Rayo forthcoming)). These have typi-
cally been undertaken in the context of a defence of nomi-
nalism or logicism (or both). The following works are 
broadly in defense of an adjectival strategy: (Bostock 
1974); (Gottlieb 1980); (Hodes 1984); (Rayo 2002). 
A standard starting point for such reductions is the 
paraphrasing of arithmetic sums as generalizations 
constructed using the material conditional. For present 
purposes, it is more plausible for candidate paraphrases to 
involve natural language conditionals. An initial suggestion 
might be that (schematically) 
 
(4) m + n = p  
may be paraphrased as the indicative conditional 
 
(5) for any concept F, and any concept G, if there 
are exactly m objects that fall under F, exactly n ob-
jects that fall under G, and no objects fall under both 
F and G, then there are exactly p objects which fall 
either under F or under G 
It is a good question whether natural language sentences 
involving the indicative conditional have the same truth 
conditions as parallel sentences constructed using the 
material conditional. If these particular indicative condi-
tionals do, then that creates a potential problem for the 
candidate paraphrases: the standard distribution of truth 
values will be preserved only if there are infinitely many 
objects. For if there are less than m objects, the para-
phrase of m + n = p will be true even in a case where the 
paraphrased utterance is standardly taken to be false.  
It is standardly complained (for example in the 
context of nominalist treatments of arithmetic) that such a 
reduction would be theoretically flawed because, in the 
absence of further assumptions, it would leave open the 
epistemic possibility that there is a non-standard 
distribution of the truth values of arithmetic sentences. 
Moreover, the truth of any particular arithmetical sentence 
would be contingent on there being enough objects around 
(the only necessarily true sum would be ‘0 + 0 = 0’). 
A related problem for the proposed reduction is that 
the willingness of speakers to assert or deny arithmetic 
sums in line with the standard distribution of truth values 
should not be – but plausibly is - independent of their belief 
in the infinitude of the world. Might then (4) be better para-
phrased as a counterfactual (or subjunctive) conditional? A 
good candidate would be  
 
(6) for any concept F, and any concept G, if there 
were exactly m objects that fell under F, exactly n 
objects that fell under G, and no objects fell under 
both F and G, then there would be exactly p objects 
which fell either under F or under G 
This is an appealing paraphrase. On limited assumptions 
concerning modality (firstly that each world accesses some 
larger world, and secondly that the modal logic is at least 
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S4) the necessity of arithmetic is secured. It is also well 
placed to explain the apriority and applicability of arithme-
tic sums. 
It might be objected that it is still problematic to 
mesh this reduction with the beliefs of ordinary speakers. 
For suppose there could not be more than m objects. Then 
since counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are 
vacuously true, the paraphrase of m + n = p will be true 
even in a case where the paraphrased utterance is 
standardly taken to be false. The willingness of speakers 
to assert or deny arithmetic sums in line with the standard 
distribution of truth values should therefore not be 
independent of their belief in the potential infinitude of the 
world. 
There are at least two possible lines of response to 
this objection. It could be argued that a willingness to 
make standard arithmetical assertions is indeed tied to a 
belief in the potential infinitude of the world. Alternatively, it 
could be argued that counterfactuals with impossible 
antecedents are not uniformly (vacuously) true. A common 
proposal is that the counterfactual conditional if it were the 
case that A, then it would be the case that B may be 
analysed as all nearby A-worlds are B-worlds. One might 
then follow, for example, (Nolan 1997) in accepting 
impossible worlds at which not everything is the case. On 
that view, some impossible worlds are nearer to the actual 
world than others, and so it is not the case that all 
counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents 
are true. Someone disposed to accept that view will 
arguably agree that on the assumption that there could not 
be 100 objects, the counterfactual ‘if there were exactly 
100 objects that fell under F, exactly 0 objects that fell 
under G, and no objects fell under both F and G, then 
there would be exactly 100 objects which fell either under 
F or under G’ is true and that the counterfactual ‘if there 
were exactly 100 objects that fell under F, exactly 0 objects 
that fell under G, and no objects fell under both F and G, 
then there would be exactly 999 objects which fell either 
under F or under G’ is not. The willingness of speakers to 
assert or deny arithmetic sums in line with the standard 
distribution of truth values can therefore be consistently 
held to be independent of their beliefs regarding the 
potential infinitude of the world. 
3. 
Can this approach be extended to capture more of arith-
metic? One might consider directly paraphrasing quantified 
arithmetic sentences by introducing third-order quantifiers 
into the paraphrases. Alternatively, one might claim that 
arithmetic quantification is substitutional.  
The latter option may have more philosophical 
appeal. It is difficult to see how to make a case for ordinary 
speakers’ belief in something like a third-order 
counterfactual paraphrase of even the simplest quantified 
sentence. However, the willingness of ordinary speakers to 
assert quantified sentences is arguably not independent of 
their beliefs concerning the truth values of substitution 
instances of those quantified sentences. One might see in 
this the beginnings of a case for construing arithmetic 
quantifiers substitutionally. 
There is not enough space here to develop such a 
case. However, it may be objected that if arithmetic 
quantifiers are substitutional then arithmetic must after all 
involve epistemologically troublesome ontological 
commitment. For an explanation of the truth of sentences  
 
involving substitutional quantifiers is commonly given in 
terms of the existence of expression types (or the possible 
existence of expression tokens) and the truth of 
substitution instances. For one thing, it is worth noting that 
the problem of the epistemology of expression types (or 
the possibility of expression tokens) is of a different sort 
from the problem of the epistemology of numbers, as on a 
standard construal numbers are not types. But more 
importantly, such commitments would belong to the meta-
theory of arithmetic sentences, not to arithmetic sentences 
themselves. Substitutional quantifiers may be taken to be 
primitive devices of infinite conjunction/disjunction (see 
(Field 1984)), or to have their meaning given by their 
inferential role (see (Rossberg 2006) and (Wright 2007) for 
an inferentialist treatment of higher-order quantifiers). 
4. 
On the understanding of arithmetic sentences just 
sketched it is natural to think of syntactically singular oc-
currences of numerals and number-words as occurrences 
of mere pseudo-singular terms. Such terms do not behave 
semantically like genuine singular terms; they do not pur-
port to refer to objects. It is likewise natural to think of nu-
merical predicates as pseudo-predicates. Such predicates 
do not behave semantically like genuine predicates; they 
do not purport to ascribe properties to objects. 
A consequence of this would be that second-order 
arithmetic quantifiers (such as those that occur in the 
second-order version of the induction axiom) should also 
be construed substitutionally. This would in turn entail that 
arithmetic predicates may not be impredicatively defined, 
on pain of circularity. The moral is that commitment to 
numbers as objects is therefore unexpectedly revealed not 
by the assertion of sentences involving numerical singular 
terms or quantifiers but rather by the acceptance of 
impredicative definitions of numerical predicates. 
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Getting out from Inside: Why the Closure Principle cannot Support 
External World Scepticism 
Guido Melchior, Graz, Austria 
The canonical version of the argument for external world 
scepticism has the following structure: 
 
Premise1:  If P does not know that she is not a 
brain in a vat, then P does not have 
knowledge of the external world. 
Premise2:  P does not know that she is not a brain 
in a vat. 
Conclusion:  Therefore, P does not have knowledge 
of the external world. 
This version of the argument is presented by Brueckner 
(1994 and 2004), Byrne (2004), Pritchard (2005) and oth-
ers. 
If “a” is any proposition about the external world and 
“b” is the proposition that P is not a brain in a vat, then the 
sceptical argument has the following structure: 
 
Premise1:  (¬K(b) → ¬K(a))/(K(a) → K(b)) 
Premise2:  ¬K(b)  
Conclusion: Therefore, ¬K(a)  
This argument is logically valid. Therefore, any objection 
against the argument has to be one against one of its two 
premises. Subsequently, I will investigate how it can be 
argued for and against each of the two premises.  
 
Argumentations for premise1: The closure 
principle and alternative arguments 
Premise1 states that any knowledge of P about the exter-
nal world implies that P knows that she is not a brain in a 
vat. Why should premise1 be true? Usually, in epistemo-
logical discussions, the argumentations for premise1 are 
grounded on one or the other version of the closure princi-
ple. I will, firstly illustrate how the closure principle can be 
used for arguing for premise1. Secondly, I will present an 
alternative argumentation.  
 
The closure principle 
The closure principle is based on our epistemic intuition 
that persons can gain new knowledge about facts through 
inference from facts they already know. The closure princi-
ple can occur in different forms. The simplest version is:  
 
C: (K(a) ∧ (a → b)) → K(b) 
According to this version, a person knows every proposi-
tion which is entailed by a known proposition no matter if 
the person has any knowledge about this entailment rela-
tion itself. This is obviously an implausible account of 
knowledge through inference. Hence, the more common 
version is:  
 
CP: (K(a) ∧ K(a → b)) → K(b) 
This version expresses the idea that a person, who knows 
a proposition a and knows that a implies another proposi-
tion b, knows b through inference from a. This version 
captures our intuition that a person can only gain knowl-
edge through inference if the person also knows the en-
tailment relation between the two propositions.  
On the basis of the closure principle CP, it can be 
argued for premise1 in the following way:  
 
Argument1 for premise1: 
 
CP: (K(a) ∧ K(a → b)) → K(b) 
The proposition “P is a brain in a vat” and any 
proposition which P believes about the external 
world are contradictory.  
P knows this contradiction.  
Therefore, P infers that she is not a brain in vat, if P 
has knowledge about the external world.  
Therefore, P knows that she is not a brain in a vat, if 
P has knowledge about the external world. 
I think this argument captures the common philosophical 
intuitions concerning premise1. The first premise of argu-
ment1 is the closure principle. One consequence of its 
second premise is that the term “brain in a vat” has to refer 
to persons, who not just have unjustified beliefs but who 
have totally false beliefs about the external world. The third 
premise implies that the person knows the contradiction 
between propositions about the external world which she 
believes and the proposition that she is a brain in a vat, i.e. 
the person has to be epistemologically educated. Both 
premises are philosophically acceptable. Argument1 expli-
cates how it can be argued for premise1 by using the clo-
sure principle.  
According to a common view in contemporary 
epistemology premise1 is essentially based on the closure 
principle. Therefore, a popular anti-sceptical strategy is to 
attack premise1 of the sceptical argument by denying the 
validity of the closure principle in the context of external 
world scepticism. This strategy is famously chosen e.g. by 
Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981).  
These philosophers regard the closure principle in 
the sceptical context as too strong.  
 
Alternative argumentations for premise1 
Using the closure principle is the most popular but not the 
only possible argumentation for premise1. Premise1 states 
that P knows that she is not a brain in vat, if P has knowl-
edge of the external world. Premise1 is an implication of 
the form K(a) → K(b). Inferences between a and b can be 
drawn in two directions. According to this, any implication 
of the form K(a) → K(b) can be interpreted in two ways:  
 
If P knows a, then P infers b from a. 
If P knows a, then P has inferred a from b.  
In the first case, the direction of inference is from a to b, in 
the second case it is from b to a. Both interpretations entail 
the implication K(a) → K(b). According to the first version, 
an inference is always drawn, according the second inter-
pretation an inference has necessarily to be made.  
These two interpretations can be applied 
analogously to premise1. Argument1 for premise1, which 
is based on the closure principle, obviously corresponds to 
the first interpretation. The argument for premise1, which 
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corresponds to the second interpretation of K(a) → K(b), is 
the following: 
 
Argument2 for premise1: 
 
P can only have knowledge about the external world 
if she infers it from knowledge that she is not a brain 
in a vat.  
Therefore, P knows that she is not a brain in a vat, if 
P has knowledge about the external world.  
To sum up, there are two possible argumentations for 
premise1. The common one uses a version of the closure 
principle for arguing that inferences from “e” to “¬BiV” can 
always be drawn. According to the alternative argumenta-
tion, the inference from “¬BiV” to “e” is a necessary condi-
tion for K(¬BiV).  
In a next step, I will show that premise2 of external 
world scepticism can only be true if argument2 for 
premise1 holds and if argument1, which is based on the 
closure principle, is rejected. 
Argumentations for premise2 
I will now analyze possible argumentations for premise2, 
which states that a person cannot know that she is not a 
brain in a vat. If knowledge is justified, true belief, there are 
obviously three possible reasons why P cannot know that 
she is not a brain in a vat: the impossibility to believe it, the 
impossibility that the belief is true and the impossibility that 
the belief is justified. P can obviously believe that she is 
not a brain in a vat and it is possible that this belief is true. 
If knowledge is justified, true belief, the problematic aspect 
for P’s knowledge that she is not a brain in a vat is justifi-
cation.  
Taking into account internalistic as well as 
externalistic theories of justification, the obvious 
candidates for methods of justification are evidence, 
inference and externalistic justification. If it is possible that 
P’s belief that she is not a brain in vat can either be 
evident or externalistically justified, there is obviously no 
specific problem of justification. Therefore, premise2 can 
only be true, if P’s belief that she is not a brain in a vat 
cannot be evident or externalistically justified. It is 
philosophically plausible that this belief is neither evident 
nor externalistically justified. Hence, it can be accepted 
that premise2 is true if P’s belief that she is not a brain in 
vat cannot be justified through inference.  
Next, I will investigate why it should be impossible 
that P’s belief that she is not a brain in vat is justified 
through inference by focusing my attention on the following 
challenge for sceptics: Why is it impossible for person to 
justify that she is not a brain in vat by inferring it from 
knowledge about the external world? Why is the following 
argumentation inadequate? 
 
The anti-sceptical argument:  
 
K(e) 
P infers “¬BiV” from “e”. 
Therefore, K(¬BiV). 
This argument is at least close to the anti-sceptical argu-
mentation proposed by Moore (1925 and 1939).  
Example:  
 
I know there is a computer in front of me. 
Therefore, I am not a brain in a vat.  
This anti-sceptical argument is an inference from K(e) to 
K(¬BiV). It is based on the idea that a person can infer 
from any knowledge of the external world that she is not a 
brain in vat. The closure principle states: If K(a) and K(a → 
b), then K(b). Hence, the anti-sceptical argument uses the 
closure principle for arguing that a person can know that 
she is not a brain in a vat. Why should this argumentation 
line be wrong?  
Generally speaking, there are three possible 
reasons why an argument respectively an inference is not 
a justification:  
 
1. The argument is not preserving truth respec-
tively justification. 
2. The premise of the argument is not justified. 
3. Other reasons.  
I will now investigate each of these three possible reasons: 
1. The inference from a person’s belief about the 
external world to the belief that she is not a brain in a vat is 
truth-preserving. This follows from the fact, that premise1 
can only be valid, if “brain in a vat” refers to persons with 
totally false beliefs about the external world. If premise1 is 
true, then the inference from a person’s belief of the 
external world to the belief, that the person is not a brain in 
a vat is truth preserving and, therefore, preserving 
justification. Hence, in the context of defending external 
world scepticism the first objection against the anti-
sceptical argument has to be rejected.  
2. According to the second objection, the premise 
of the anti-sceptical argument is false, i.e. P’s belief about 
the external world is not justified. The conclusion of the 
argument of external world scepticism is that P does have 
knowledge respectively justified beliefs about the external 
world. This is the same theory as the second objection to 
the anti-sceptical argument. If it is assumed that the belief 
about the external world is not justified in order to argue for 
premise2 of the argument of external world scepticism this 
sceptical argument itself becomes circular. Therefore, the 
second objection against the anti-sceptical argument is not 
adequate in the context of external world scepticism.  
3. The first two objections against the anti-sceptical 
argument are inadequate. Therefore, the anti-sceptical 
argument only fails, if the inference is deficient for other 
reasons. The only reason, why a truth-preserving inference 
with justified premises is not a valid justification, is that the 
inference leads into a vicious circle. This is the case for the 
anti-sceptical argument, if a person can only justify beliefs 
about the external world by inferring it from knowledge that 
she is not a brain in a vat. This means that justification of 
beliefs about the external world is only possible through 
inference from “inside out”. Hence, premise2 is only true if 
this internalistic condition for justifying beliefs about the 
external world is fulfilled.  
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Therefore, the correct argument for external world 
scepticism has to have the following internalistic structure:  
 
Premise1: P can only have knowledge about the 
external world if she infers it from 
knowledge about her own sense data 
and from knowledge that she is not a 
brain in a vat.  
Premise2: P does not know that she is not a 
brain in a vat.  
Conclusion:  Therefore, P does not have any 
knowledge of the external world. 
According to this version of external world scepticism, the 
truth of the premises and of the conclusion essentially 
depends on internalistic concepts of justification. If it is 
possible that beliefs about the external are evident or ex-
ternalistically justified, then the sceptical problem vanishes.  
The inadequacy of the closure principle 
It is a common view that premise1 of external world scepti-
cism is essentially based on the closure principle which 
states in this context that it is at least possible for a person 
to justify that she is not a brain in a vat by inferring it from 
any knowledge about the external world. It has been 
shown, that premise2 is only true if a person’s beliefs 
about the external world can only be justified through in-
ference from her knowledge that she is not a brain in a vat. 
Vicious circles do not lead to justification. Therefore, justifi-
cation through inference from knowledge about the exter-
nal world to the proposition that P is not a brain in vat im-
plies that premise2 is false. On the other hand, justification 
through inference in the other direction implies that the 
closure principle does not hold in the context of scepticism. 
If the closure principle holds, then premise2 is false. If 
premise2 is true, then the closure principle does not hold. 
Hence, premise1 of the sceptical argument can only be 
based on argument2, but not on argument1 which involves 
the closure principle.  
One anti-sceptical strategy is to deny the validity of 
the closure principle. It is based on the intuition that the 
closure principle supports external world scepticism and 
that, therefore, arguments against this principle are 
objections against scepticism. Their sceptical opponents, 
on the other hand, defend the closure principle in order to 
defend external world scepticism. As it has been shown 
this anti-sceptical strategy as well as the sceptical replies 
are superfluous. If the closure principle holds, then 
external world scepticism does not exist.  
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Dispensing with Particulars: Understanding Reference Through  
Anaphora 
Peter Meyer, Göttingen, Germany 
1. Brandom’s theory of reference 
The technical notion of particulars or objects as that which 
singular terms purport to refer to has been known at least 
since Frege to be highly theory-laden. Particularly from a 
non-representationalist point of view it is obvious that one 
cannot simply take some domain of particulars as some-
how simply antecedently understood or given. Instead, 
even language-specific syntactic patterns may have a 
crucial bearing on the question of what may, under which 
circumstances, count as an object referred to (Schneider 
1992). To see how deeply this issue is entangled in foun-
dational discussions about reference, it suffices to have a 
look at its repercussions in philosophical and linguistic 
debates, e.g., with regard to the question of Meinongian 
‘nonexistent objects’ (cf. the defense of some of Meinong’s 
ideas in Parsons 1980) or to the many difficulties with ab-
stract or fictional objects in, say, ‘Millian’ theories of singu-
lar terms. 
From an inferentialist perspective on language 
pragmatics and semantics, Robert Brandom has tried to 
explicate the notion of particular object in terms of singular 
term use, giving a supposedly intra-linguistic, deflationary 
account of reference and rejecting the idea that reference 
should be viewed as some sort of word-world relation 
(Brandom 1994; 2000). In his view, objects are given or 
specified by equivalence classes of symmetrically 
intersubstitutable terms; more precisely, reference to 
particulars is seen as a social practice of attributing and 
undertaking what Brandom calls symmetric material 
substitution-inferential commitments, that is, very roughly, 
commitments to which terms are intersubstitutable salva 
veritate. 
Brandom refines this general picture by an account 
of anaphora as the mechanism that lets linguistic 
tokenings inherit the substitution-inferential commitments 
(and entitlements) associated with other tokenings 
(Brandom 1994, 455 seqq.). Explaining anaphoric 
mechanisms is a vital part of Brandom’s enterprise since 
these mechanisms are needed to account for several 
important and interrelated aspects of his overall account of 
language: First, an understanding of how unrepeatable 
singular term expressions, such as indexical expressions, 
provide a link to extralinguistic circumstances is needed in 
order to explain the empirical contentfulness of language 
use. Second, inter-personal anaphoric connections 
account for the social, interpersonal nature of linguistic 
communication. 
As has been noted by some commentators, 
Brandom’s theoretical outlook on singular term reference 
is, on the face of it, rather strained and idealized at least 
from a linguist’s point of view (cf. Fodor and Lepore 2001). 
To give but one simple example, in many cases the 
possibility of substituting one singular term for another is 
subject to grammatical constraints such as concord. In 
fact, apart from the use of pronominals and other strongly 
context-dependent proforms it is rarely the case that 
speakers would use different context-independent 
descriptions for the same object; they would rather, on 
different occasions, make several different assertions 
about an object, assertions that are linked by an anaphoric 
chain. This already suggests that, in some sense, 
anaphora might be the more primitive, object-constitutive 
relation vis-à-vis substitutional ones. Typically, it is only by 
using nominalization constructions that intersubstitutable 
singular terms come into being in the first place. As far as 
language acquisition is concerned, it seems plausible that 
mastery of anaphoric relationships between utterances 
(such as grasping the kind of semantic link between 
different utterance tokens containing the word mama) 
precedes, or is at least largely independent of, the ability to 
use different expressions (such as mama and dad’s wife) 
that can be more or less always be used interchangeably. 
Perhaps more important in a philosophical context is the 
fact that there are serious problems on the semantic side, 
too; thus, it is possible to understand descriptions whose 
extensions are known to be empty, even though, in such 
cases, no substitutional commitments are undertaken – no 
other term can be taken to be coreferential with the one 
given. A remedy for this problem can be found, I think – 
but it requires looking at the anaphoric relationships empty 
singular terms may entertain to one another. 
2. Inverting Brandom’s order of explanation 
In order to solve the above-mentioned and other issues, I 
propose to invert Brandom’s order of explanation, taking 
the notion of coreference (i.e., the anaphoric relation hold-
ing between coreferential singular term tokens) as a theo-
retical basis for a deflationary account of linguistic refer-
ence and ‘objecthood’. Similar to Brandom, the result is a 
non-representationalist view of linguistic reference that 
does not take some relation between (parts of) linguistic 
utterances and aspects or chunks of some possible or 
actual world as its starting point. It is possible (but not con-
ceptually necessary) to explicate the notion of coreference 
as understood here in terms of Brandomian inferentialism, 
starting with an account of what an implicit and normative 
practice of taking two terms in actual discourse to be 
coreferential actually consists in. Of course, if one thinks 
along the lines pursued here, coreference cannot simply 
be defined as the property of different token expressions to 
refer to ‘the same thing’. Suffice it to say here that, in pro-
totypical cases, coreference can create a ‘pragmatic link’ 
between (aspects of) the utterance situation tokens in-
volved – a link that cannot be created by other kinds of 
subsentential expressions. Two subsequently uttered sen-
tences containing the adjective red are normally not 
thereby linked qua utterance tokens; in contrast, two sub-
sequently uttered sentences containing the proper name 
John may give reason for a hearer to establish a pragmati-
cally relevant connection between the two utterance to-
kens (e.g., upon hearing first John is his room and then 
being ordered Summon John here the addressee will 
probably go to John’s room in order to carry out the order). 
The kind of ‘link’ created by coreferential terms is not some 
simple invariant but correlates, roughly speaking, with the 
kind of sortal that one would use in talking about phenom-
ena of the respective kind. Deflationary though this ap-
proach is, it does allow for reconstructing ordinary ‘refer-
ence talk’, even in a much less artificial way than the one 
proposed by Brandom: An utterance like In that utterance, 
the pronoun ‘he’ refers to John Doe is true if and only if the 
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singular term John Doe is coreferential with the pronoun 
he in the utterance token in question. 
3. Consequences and applications 
The account of linguistic reference briefly sketched here 
shares many of its strong points with Brandom’s approach, 
since, in many cases, Brandom’s ‘substitutional’ analyses 
have a ‘coreferentialist’ analogue. For lack of space, only 
some hints can be given here. Thus, the account is highly 
neutral with respect to ontological questions, which helps 
to solve some well-known problems by actually dissolving 
them. Thus, Quinean concerns with the ‘inscrutability of 
reference’ simply do not arise when the basic question is 
not which object is referred to on a given occasion, but 
which other utterances ‘refer to the same thing’. Similarly, 
the well-known quarrels about, say, description vs. ‘Millian’ 
theories, or the Kripke belief puzzles (Kripke 1980), can be 
given rather down-to-earth analyses that, incidentally, bear 
some similarity to the line of reasoning in Katz’s “new in-
tensionalism” (Katz 2004) without sharing most of its gen-
eral outlook on semantic or metaphysical questions. 
Less perspicuously, the account proposed here 
might help to throw into relief subtle preconceptions about 
what may or may not be regarded as a ‘proper’ particular 
for a theory of reference. The volatile intuitions 
surrounding the concept of rigid designation are a case in 
point: In the narrowly scoped reading of the sentence The 
president of France might have been bald, the subject is 
usually interpreted as a quantified expression of some 
sort; in ordinary parlance (not Brandom’s, to be sure), it is 
assumed to denote different individuals in different 
possible worlds. On the other hand, a rigid interpretation 
(which takes the nominal phrase to denote some kind of 
“generic concept”) cannot simply be dismissed on a priori 
grounds. Indeed, a ‘generic’ reading of the nominal phrase 
in question would seem rather natural in the context of a 
legal or political discussion of the duties or obligations of 
‘the president of France’ or even ‘the present president of 
France’, when what is at stake is not a certain person but 
properties or requirements concerning a political function. 
Positing such kinds of individuals is not as far-fetched as it 
might seem; for instance, the term the mice that inhabit my 
kitchen every winter might be taken to denote a particular 
with remarkably complex identity criteria, pertaining to a 
reoccurring temporary presence of a group of animals 
whose members are possibly different every time. 
The present proposal differs, however, markedly 
from Brandom’s in being much less committed to a picture 
of reference as being ‘about particular objects’. On close 
reading, this picture still figures prominently in Brandom: 
First, the particulars in a representationalist conception of 
reference are supposed to correspond to Brandom’s 
equivalence classes of terms; second, singular terms, on 
Brandom’s view, can get the empirical content they have 
only through entry moves of the language game, 
specifically, non-inferential perception reports that use 
unrepeatable linguistic items tied up anaphorically with 
repeatable ones. Empirically contentful terms are 
prototypically linked to classes of ‘external circumstances’ 
that Brandom calls “reference classes”. This way, a 
surprisingly direct relation between linguistic expressions 
and a nonlinguistic reference class sneaks in, as it were, 
through the back door. 
In stark contrast, the approach presented here 
allows for a much broader understanding of the semantic 
and pragmatic nature of anaphoric relations, even in cases 
where ‘syntactically conditioned’ anaphoric relations clearly 
cannot be correlated with the idea of one and the same 
‘thing’ being referred to twice. In a sense, what is proposed 
here is a radically deflationary attitude towards the notion 
of object. To take a simple example, the two sentences 
John was told that his mother had left and Every boy was 
told that his mother had left are completely analogous as 
to grammatical structure; yet, Brandom would, similar to 
many logic-based semantic approaches, be forced to 
assume that the semantic analyses of the two sentences 
differ with respect to quantification, with the consequence 
that the anaphoric pronoun his must be treated differently 
in these two cases. However, a philosophical account of 
reference should be able to say something about why this 
difference is so difficult to explain to a layperson. This 
requirement becomes more urgent in a strictly relational 
view on grammatical structure as proposed in (Meyer 
2003), where I argue that assigning a grammatical 
structure to a sentence token supervenes on pragmatically 
grounded relationships between this and other utterance 
tokens: If such a view is on the right track, then it is difficult 
to explain why the two sentences can be ascribed parallel 
syntactic structures in spite of differing significantly in their 
semantic makeup. 
Indeed, the alleged semantic difference between our 
two example sentences virtually disappears in a 
‘coreferentialist’ perspective, where both sentences 
receive a parallel treatment: The two terms in question can 
simply be said to be coreferential in both cases, the 
difference residing rather in what I have called above the 
‘kind of link’ between the coreferential expressions. In 
other words, traditional linguistic issues concerning 
quantification and scope relations can be handled 
successfully in the account presented here. That the idea 
of denying any fundamental difference between the 
anaphoric relations in the two sentences is not simply out 
of place is suggested by otherwise widely differing 
conceptions that try to use a unified description for 
quantified and non-quantified sentences; a remarkable 
recent example is (Shapiro 2004) who, following ideas of 
Kit Fine and others, assimilates a sentence such as Every 
sheep is white to the type of sentence exemplified by Dolly 
is white by proposing a logic of arbitrary and indefinite 
objects that is suitable for real-world language processing 
tasks via semantic networks. Surprisingly, much recent 
work on knowledge representation in this area is 
compatible with the non-denotational approach I propose 
(see also Helbig 22008) and deserves to be placed under 
more scrutiny by philosophers of language.  
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Reichenbach’s Concept of Logical Analysis of Science and his Lost 
Battle against Kant 
Nikolay Milkov, Paderborn, Germany 
1. Reichenbach on Logical Analysis 
Reichenbach was rather negligent in both the history of 
philosophy and the philosophical terminology he used. In 
particular, he introduced a very idiosyncratic use of the 
concept of “logical analysis” that has little to do with the 
way that concept was treated by analytic philosophers like 
Frege or Russell. In The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, for 
example, Reichenbach simply set it against “psychological 
analysis”. While psychological analysis studies the “errors” 
of the “speculative philosophers”, logical analysis makes a 
“rational reconstruction” of the scientific theories. To be 
more specific, it sets out the principles on which the results 
of sciences are really based, and not simply the way they 
were set out by their originators. “It endeavours to clarify 
the meaning of physical theories, independently of the 
interpretation by their authors, and is concerned with logi-
cal relationship alone.” (Reichenbach 1949: 293) In other 
words, logical analysis investigates the “context of justifica-
tion”, not the “context of discovery”, of this or that particular 
scientific theory. 
Especially helpful for making logical analyses of sci-
ence is Hilbert’s axiomatic. In fact, Hilbert’s axiomatic 
brings with itself the whole logic with the help of which 
Reichenbach made his “logical analysis” of science. 
2. Metamorphoses of Kant’s A priori 
Reichenbach set out his program for logical analysis in 
Theory of Relativity and A priori Knowledge (1920). It ac-
cepted two fundamentally different principles of knowl-
edge: principles of coordination and principles of connec-
tion. Principles of connection are empirical laws in the 
usual sense, involving terms and concepts that are already 
well defined. Principles of coordination, in contrast, are not 
empirical; rather, they must be first established in order to 
insure such adequate empirical definitions in the first 
place. In other words, principles of coordination are consti-
tutive of the object of every particular scientific theory. In 
this sense (A) they are a priori. Of course, these a priori 
principles change with every new significant theory; they 
are not given once and for all. In that sense (B), the princi-
ples of coordination are empirical. They are the result of 
new observations and examinations. 
For taking this position, Reichenbach was severely 
criticized by Moritz Schlick. The latter claimed that instead 
of a priori in a Kantian sense, we can interpret the 
principles of coordination as conventions in the sense of 
Poincaré. Schlick’s criticism convinced the young 
Reichenbach: from 1922 onward, he adopted Poincaré’s 
terminology of “convention”. More especially, instead of 
principles of coordination he now spoke about definitions 
of coordination, underlining this way their conventional 
character. Unfortunately, this position totally neglected the 
first meaning of principles of coordination as being 
constitutive of the object of knowledge. 
Assessing this turn in Reichenbach’s philosophy, 
Michael Friedman has pointed out that Reichenbach 
“overhastily … acquiesces in the Schlick–Poincaré 
terminology”. We fully agree with this judgment. We, 
however, cannot accept Friedman’s claim that with its 
acceptance, “the most important element in 
[Reichenbach’s] earlier conception of the relativized a 
priori is actually lost” (Friedman 1994: 26). In fact, 
Reichenbach never stopped believing that there are 
principles that connect the basic concepts of scientific 
theories with reality. This point is especially pronounced in 
respect of the so called principle of probability. 
Reichenbach already introduced it in his Dissertation 
(1916) and never stopped considering it necessary for any 
kind of knowledge (cf. Kamlah 1985: 162).  
In this paper, however, we are going to track down 
another trace of Kantian apriorism in Reichenbach’s “new 
philosophy”. To be more specific, we argue that 
Reichenbach’s program for a logical analysis of science, 
which was prominent in his works after 1920 until his death 
in 1951, was nothing but a transformation of the idea that 
science contains elements that are constitutive of their 
objects. In other words, despite the fact that in 1920 
Reichenbach officially abandoned the idea that sciences 
contain a priori elements, he nevertheless continued to 
explore this in the form of a logical analysis of sciences. 
How this can be? 
As well-known, Kant’s position was that we can 
formulate all principles that make science possible once 
and for all through a logical deduction from pure reason: in 
fact, this was a task of solitary reflection. In contrast, 
Reichenbach believed that the definiteness of the 
coordination changes with every new scientific theory. 
Furthermore, the very idea that every significant scientific 
discovery brought with itself new principles of coordination 
posed a new task for philosophy. This was to explicate the 
new principles of coordination of all subsequent scientific 
discoveries. Among other things, this latest task led 
Reichenbach to set up the Berlin Group—a society for 
scientific philosophy with a clear interdisciplinary coloring. 
The Group (we shall return to it in § 4), with its most active 
members Kurt Grelling, Walter Dubislav and Alexander 
Herzberg, developed in a close relationship with the 
Vienna Circle. 
3. Ambiguity in Reichenbach’s Program 
Hartmut Hecht was the first to draw our attention to the fact 
that Reichenbach’s critic of Kant’s a priori and the method 
of logical analysis of science are but two perspectives on 
the one problem of human knowledge (cf. Hecht 1994: 
221). Moreover, despite the fact that they were different, it 
is impossible to conceive of them separately. 
Indeed, on the one hand, Reichenbach criticized 
Kant’s thesis that there is an ultimate table of the 
categories and principles of the scientific theoretical 
knowledge that is given once and for all; on the other 
hand, he claimed that sciences are only possible as long 
as they have coordination principles which are statements 
about the logical structure of sciences that change over 
time. It is exactly this way that the logical analysis of 
science and the criticism of the a priori made two sides of 
one point: the task now was not to criticize the pure reason 
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but to logically analyze the sciences in order to find out 
their specific principles of coordination. 
Reichenbach insisted that this is not merely a 
program for popularization of science. Rather, its pursue is 
exactly as complicated as the studies of science itself, in 
particular physics, are. To be sure, the philosophers must 
work hard in order to clarify the results that scientists 
achieve. This is a necessary work because the scientists 
themselves are more concentrated on making discoveries: 
“Scientific research does not leave a man time enough to 
do the work of logical analysis.” (Reichenbach 1951: 123) 
4. Reichenbach’s Berlin Group and Leonard 
Nelson as Its Grandfather 
To sum up, the task set out by Reichenbach before phi-
losophy was a logical analysis of science: not only of phys-
ics but of all science. Moreover, he was deeply convinced 
that his program for “new philosophy” was radically anti-
Kantian. In this section we are going to show the inaccu-
racy of Reichenbach latter claim with the help of a histori-
cal argument. To be more specific, we shall refer to the 
fact that a program close to that of Reichenbach was in-
troduced, much earlier, by the Göttingen philosopher Leo-
nard Nelson (1882–1927) who considered himself a Kant-
ian. 
In his philosophy, Nelson closely followed Jacob 
Friedrich Fries (1773–1843). Fries was Hegel’s 
contemporary and also adversary and rival. He criticized 
Kant for his “rationalistic prejudice” that we can deduce all 
a priori concepts from one single principle and in one 
system. Fries opposed to it the program for analysing the a 
priori forms of knowledge by “self-observation”. To be 
more specific, he claimed that while the subject of 
investigation of this program was still the a priori, the way 
we reach it was a posteriori, or empirical. It was a task of 
deduction of our a priori knowledge from our immediate 
knowledge, which, however, also included the scientific 
knowledge.  
Fries’ next claim was that metaphysical knowledge, 
which consists of a priori principles, grows; in other words, 
it changes. In particular, this is true of our knowledge of 
axioms of mathematics. Leonard Nelson was eager to 
point out that the growth of metaphysics was especially 
well demonstrated in its sub-discipline of philosophy of 
mathematics by the emergence of the non-Euclidean 
geometry. Indeed, it was discovered after Fries’ death and 
introduced new axioms into it. Moreover, similarly to 
Reichenbach later, Fries and Nelson claimed that the task 
of the philosophy of mathematics is to reduce the number 
of the axioms to a minimum, retaining only those in it which 
are necessary for the logical Aufbau of the theory (cf. 
Nelson 1928: 110). 
The most interesting point is that Reichenbach’s two 
closest friends in the Berlin Group, Kurt Grelling and 
Walter Dubislav, were faithful followers of Nelson. Indeed, 
Grelling worked directly under Nelson for more than fifteen 
years, and while Dubislav had no direct contacts with this 
philosopher, he worked on Nelson and Fries for years (cf. 
Dubislav 1926). Apparently, this fact explains the strong 
theoretical integrity of the Berlin Group. 
The main task of the Berlin Group was: an 
interdisciplinary work on sciences with the aim of 
establishing their specific principles of coordination. In the 
light of our analysis of Reichenbach’s philosophy we made 
in §§ 2 and 3, it is clear that this program was nothing but 
a realization of Reichenbach’s program for “logical 
analysis” of science. In this connection it should be pointed 
out that Leonard Nelson set up the Fries-Society that, in 
fact, was the forerunner of the Berlin Group, already 
before the First World War (in 1913). The Fries society 
was an interdisciplinary forum for discussions of 
philosophers, scientists and mathematicians which had its 
own theoretical organ: Abhandlungen der Fries’sche 
Schule (published between 1903 and 1937). 
5. David Hilbert as Reichenbach’s Critic 
Especially intriguing is the fact that the interdisciplinary 
program of the neo-Kantian Leonard Nelson also inspired 
the top mathematician of the time David Hilbert of Göttin-
gen—this to such a degree that the latter believed that he 
is a Kantian (cf. Majer 1994: 254). In particular, Hilbert 
claimed that mathematics is based on certain non-logical 
objects that are subject to our intuition. These are formal 
structures that have no content; Hilbert called them “ideal 
elements”, or “implicit definitions” of thought.  
This fact is puzzling for at least two reasons. (i) As 
already seen in § 1, Hilbert’s axiomatic method played a 
central role in Reichenbach’s program for logical analysis 
of science. (ii) In 1922, Schlick and Reichenbach were 
convinced that Hilbert’s axiomatic method delivered an 
ultimate proof that there is no need for Kantian a priori 
intuition of perceptions in mathematics. How can this puz-
zle be explained?  
Apparently, Schlick and Reichenbach treated Hilbert 
rather one-sidedly. Indeed, Hilbert’s philosophy of mathe-
matics can be interpreted not only as aprioristic, but also 
as conventionalist. What were the reasons for this over-
sight? 
We have already noted that Reichenbach was a 
careless terminologist. In particular, he made a very free 
interpretation of the term “logical analysis”. But Reichen-
bach’s use of an inadequate terminology was even more 
clearly illustrated by his claim that he was an “empiricist”. It 
seems that he had three main reasons for insisting on this 
point:  
(i) It opposed Kant’s claim that we can formulate the 
principles of science once and for all and in our reasoning. 
Instead, Reichenbach’s position was that these principles 
change with every significant shift of science and so are a 
result of experience.  
(ii) Further impulses to stick to this one-sided 
terminology came from Reichenbach’s crusade in defense 
of Einstein’s theory of relativity against idealistic 
philosophers of a quite different provenance, such like 
Hugo Dingler and Oskar Becker. Apparently, Reichenbach 
believed himself to be an “empiricist” because his 
opponents rejected empiricism. 
(iii) A third reason for insisting on empiricism was 
the fact that “the opposition against Neo-Kantianism and 
other kinds of apriorism was a common bond which united 
logical empiricists and gave them a feeling of being part of 
a unique philosophical movement.” (Kamlah 1985: 158) 
Hilbert, who once sat in sessions of Nelson’s Fries-
Society, closely followed the development of the Berlin 
Group. Moreover, his assistant Paul Bernays actively par-
ticipated in the life of the prominent offspring of the Berlin 
Group—“The Society for Empiric Philosophy”. After the 
analysis we made in this section, it is no surprise that Hil-
bert criticized the naming of the society “empirical”. Rei-
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chenbach promptly reacted to this criticism, renaming it 
into “Society for Scientific Philosophy” (cf. Joergensen 
1951: 48). Unfortunately, Reichenbach did not realise that 
he must also rename his philosophy. Indeed, it was “em-
piricist” in a very weak sense. 
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Defining Ontological Naturalism 
Marcin Miłkowski, Warsaw, Poland 
In most discussions, “naturalism” is thought to be 
equivalent to “physicalism”. For example, David 
Papineau’s book (Papineau 1993) doesn’t even mention 
the word “naturalism,” and uses “physicalism” instead. The 
standard text-book definitions follow the same pattern 
(Schmitt 1995; Guttenplan 1994). 
In other words, it could seem that the term 
“ontological naturalism” is simply reducible to “physicalism” 
and, therefore, can be eliminated from the philosophical 
vocabulary. I will argue that naturalism is not to be reduced 
to physicalism, and that both positions should be 
distinguished. Physicalism must be committed to the view 
that all objects are physical, and that implies that objects 
mentioned in special sciences, for example, are reducible 
to physical. Naturalism doesn’t have to embrace this view. 
This is not to say that naturalism is necessarily anti-
reductive; on the contrary, it has to imply that all objects 
are natural objects, and that means that they are reducible 
to natural objects. The main difference is that narrow 
physicalism implies unity of science, and naturalism can 
remain neutral towards it, neither denying nor accepting it. 
To wit, naturalism is a broader notion and covers various 
other positions such as broad and narrow physicalism. 
Physicalism is usually defined in two basic ways: (1) 
via the notion of a physical object; (2) via the notion of a 
physical theory (Stoljar 2001). What is notable is that it’s 
impossible to define the notion of a physical object without 
implying a theory of it (it’s not observational), and on the 
other hand, any physical theory will imply a notion of a 
physical object. So, both ways are inextricably linked to 
one another but the theory-based approach has two 
advantages: first, its ontological commitments can be 
analyzed the same way they are analyzed in the case of 
scientific theories; second, it will clearly present the 
theoretical background. 
Even if the notion of a physical object is defined in a 
fashion that is deliberately non-scientific (see Strawson 
2006), it will imply a theory at least in a sense that the 
notion of the physical cannot be taken to be purely 
observational. If this theory is based on a priori 
assumptions that are outright incompatible with the physics 
as we know it, it should be dismissed as highly 
objectionable example of armchair theorizing. In other 
words, object-based definition of physicalism must be 
vindicated against the objection that it is arbitrary and 
unjustified. Even if the definition is supposed to be based 
on conceptual analysis that starts with an intuitive notion of 
the physical (as in Strawson 2006), it should be asked 
which concepts were analyzed to reach this definition. If 
they are natural language concepts, then there is no 
guarantee they are correct: we still speak of the Sun rising. 
If they are scientific concepts, like in the case when the 
physical object is defined as whatever exists in timespace, 
it is already theory-laden. Either way, the object-based 
approach collapses into an implicit version of the theory-
based physicalism. 
Theory-based physicalism is not trouble-free, 
however. It cannot offer clear-cut conceptual solutions, if 
the theory it appeals to is scientific. For example, it is hard 
to stay nominalist while positing ideally black bodies or 
timespace points. Moreover, physical theories of the 
genesis of timespace can hypothesize that there were 
once non-timespace objects that gave rise to timespace. A 
theory-based physicalist will have to embrace the claim (if 
scientifically valid), even if it would seem counterintuitive to 
her. 
This is a minor problem compared to an objection 
that if theory-based physicalism refers to scientific physics, 
it is false insofar as current physics is not complete, 
abounds in tensions between disparate theories (e.g., 
quantum mechanics and relativity theory) and has obvious 
gaps. In reply, most physicalists claim that they refer to an 
ideal physics. Yet, they don’t care to explicate the notion of 
ideal physics. Carl Hempel formulated a dilemma: 
physicalism is defined either with current physics, which is 
almost surely false, or with ideal physics, which is 
unknown, and therefore cannot be rationally asserted 
(Hempel 1970). Object-based physicalism, as it implies a 
theory, has to face it as well. 
There are two strategies for dealing with this 
dilemma. First is to define ideal physics in terms of 
empirical accessibility (Guttenplan 1994), and the second 
is to specify requirements that ideal physics will have to 
meet. The first strategy implies either that physicalism is 
equivalent to empiricism (including a priori versions) or that 
empirical access will not be defined in terms of ontological 
commitments of empirical theories (possibly a posteriori). I 
suggest that “empiricism” and “physicalism,” are not to be 
equated; the second possibility boils down to adding some 
explicit criteria for theories that will be able to identify 
empirical objects. It seems that either way, physicalism will 
have to say something more specific about ideal theories. 
One of the ways of spelling out Hempel’s objection 
is to say that physicalists cannot ensure that the future 
ideal physics won’t include the term “ectoplasm,” or 
“nonmaterial substance” in its vocabulary. These terms 
would be worrying for a physicalist because they don’t 
seem to be reconcilable with the current physics. 
Currently, referring to ectoplasm boils down to stipulating 
that there be a miracle happening: There is no place for 
any entity like that in physical laws. Should there be 
genuine cognitive progress in physical theories that leads 
to introducing the term and appropriate laws to physics just 
the way other entities are admitted in scientific theories, 
theory-based physicalists would have to accept that. In 
other words, as soon as ectoplasm is no longer a miracle 
in a theory, it is not embarrassing for physicalism. In spite 
of the skepticism about the cumulative nature of scientific 
theories, it remains relatively uncontroversial that physics 
remains faithful to methodological naturalism. If this feature 
of science is relatively constant, then we know enough 
about ideal physics to be able to refer it, as it won’t admit 
any supernatural objects. In other words, ideal theories 
must fulfill the Humean prescription that explananda 
cannot be more improbable than explanantes (famous 
section X of Hume 1902). 
Two things might be observed. First, even ideal 
physics cannot be an absolutely complete theory; it will 
never be free from cognitive constraints, such as inability 
to observe infinite physical bodies at once by any finite 
cognitive agent. Second, the hypothesized complete 
physics will have limited power of expression; it could not 
decide logically undecidable problems, or problems that 
lead to combinatorial explosion.  
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The ideal physics doesn’t have to be conceptualized 
as the most complete theory of the world in the sense that 
it would contain all the possible physical knowledge. In 
other words, it’s not what Mary the color scientist would 
know (by definition she has all the possible knowledge of 
colors; cf. Jackson 1986); no finite cognitive agent can 
have all the knowledge due to cognitive limitations. It 
would be much more limited; by referring to this ideal 
physics, we mean that we are ready to accept all progress 
in physical theories that would enhance explanatory, 
predictive and descriptive powers of the current physical 
knowledge. To wit, theory-based physicalism defines 
physical objects as objects that physics is committed to, 
and physics is understood as the current-day physics 
including any future enhancements to it. So physicalism 
claims: 
 
(P) There exists everything that can be explained by 
ideal physical theories or observed using the best 
standard observational procedures in these theo-
ries, and whatever is excluded as impossible by 
ideal physics, doesn’t exist. 
The above explication of the idea of the ideal physics 
doesn’t imply that physics will turn out to be united or unify-
ing science at all. It just has more explanatory, descriptive 
and predictive power, while remaining faithful to scientific 
standards. It is probable that it will remain the most basic 
and most universal science but we can only hope that it 
will help us unify special sciences (interdisciplinary unifica-
tion) or even physical theories (intradisciplinary unifica-
tion). The claim (P) can be made stronger (or narrow) by 
adding an explicit condition that the ideal physics will unify 
the special sciences as the most basic and universal the-
ory. Yet, such a condition is not based on any evidence 
and as such is simply metaphysically dogmatic and unpal-
atable for naturalists. Weak (or broad) physicalism doesn’t 
have to be overoptimistic per definitionem. 
This is one of the reasons why ontological 
naturalism might seem more attractive than narrow 
physicalism. While we might hope that physics will be the 
most basic science, as physical laws are known to be 
universal, it may turn out that special sciences that deal 
with objects on other level of organization and with 
context-dependent phenomena will remain irreducible to 
physics (or to one of the competing universal physical 
theories). Even if the microreduction should remain 
possible if universal laws of conservation are not 
undermined (the parts of complex systems as described by 
special sciences will remain reducible to physical 
processes and properties), the system-level properties, or 
emergent properties, could be out of the scope of physics. 
There is yet a deeper reason for thinking that simple 
convergence to physics is not a realistic account of 
science. Natural kinds, and physical objects are a natural 
kind, are notoriously hard to define with a normal 
definition. They are rather determined by bundles of laws 
in which they are referred to. The more independent 
various determinations are, the more robust the objects 
(for more on robustness in theories, see Wimsatt 2007). 
Robust objects tend to appear in several clusters of laws. 
Real progress of science doesn’t invalidate this 
robustness; as finite cognitive agents, we need several 
independent ways of confirming that objects are real, and 
we try to find new ways of doing that. But this also means 
that any kind of unification is actually detrimental to 
robustness of the objects we quantify over in theories: we 
lose ways to re-engineer and correct mistakes in theories, 
if we replace several theories with one. This is not to say 
that reduction is necessarily wrong; if successful, it shows 
that what was thought of as independent, is actually inter-
related, and it shows unexpected features of theories.  
Moreover, as there is no universal algorithm for 
discovering physical laws, we must use fallible heuristics 
instead. The biased heuristics generate different clusters 
of laws that operate on various levels of abstraction, and 
unifying them might be not only infeasible but useless as 
well: add as many heuristics as you might, you'll never get 
a universal algorithm out if it. So there is little hope for 
getting rid of heuristics even in the long run. 
This is why it seems more appropriate to remain at 
least neutral towards the unification in science, and 
endorse a weaker naturalistic position: 
 
(N) There exists everything that can be explained by 
ideal natural science or observed using the best 
standard observational procedures in science, and 
whatever is excluded as impossible by ideal sci-
ence, doesn’t exist. 
 
(N) is a paraphrase of the famous Sellars adage (Sellars 
1956) that science is the measure of things. It doesn’t 
exclude the possibility that it will be physics that will unify 
sciences via reduction or similar procedures but it doesn’t 
require it. Yet, it shares a certain feature with (P) that 
needs to be elaborated. It could seem that it’s possible that 
there exist some objects that are inaccessible to science 
because of the cognitive limitations that are specific to 
human beings. Though we might try to alleviate this 
situation by using more instruments and artificial cognitive 
systems, there will always remain objects that, for 
example, do not interact causally with anything we might 
possibly have access to. Doesn’t (P) or (N) say that those 
objects do not exist? The explicit second clause states that 
the criteria for non-existence should be supplied by a 
theory. If the existence of such an isolated object X is not 
excluded by physics in case of (P), or any other science in 
case of (N), we can remain agnostic towards it. On the 
other hand, if anyone wants to assert that X exists, (P) and 
(N) will rather imply we should use standard 
methodological approaches, and that will include using 
Occam’s Razor against objects with no evidence 
whatsoever. So, it’s far from suggesting that (N) is a 
version of idealism where the role of the subject is played 
by science; it’s not the science that determines what 
exists. It’s rather other way round: science uses its 
procedures to see what does exist and what does not. 
Ontological naturalism appreciates that we have 
multiple ways of access to objects on various levels of their 
organization. Far from denying the role of physics in 
contemporary science, it is able to integrate special 
sciences in the realistic account of human knowledge. 
There is no better source of knowledge than science, and 
there is no evidence that all special sciences will converge 
into ideal physics. No ideal physics will be a complete, all-
inclusive theory as there are unsurmountable cognitive 
limitations. We will need different, independent ways of 
explaining, describing, and predicting the world. 
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The Logic of Sensorial Propositions 
Luca Modenese, Padova, Italy 
1. Introduction 
Propositions 6.375 and 6.3751 of the Tractatus state re-
spectively that there’s only a logical necessity and explain 
it with an example based on colours and the logical impos-
sibility of having two different colours in the same place 
because of the logical structure of colour itself. 
Considering an object named ‘a’, it seems difficult to 
accept that if a has two colours at the same time this 
generates a genuine contradiction (despite of 
Wittgenstein’s statement), because of the absurd situation 
described by the first line of the truth table presented in 
Table 1: that needs a syntax consideration about the use 
of the language of colours to be rejected, and Wittgenstein 
himself in Some Remarks on Logical Form spoke of 
“exclusion” in contrast to contradiction analyzing such a 
type of logical product. 
 
 
Truth table of the presumed logical contradiction indicated in proposition 6.3751 
In my opinion it is not possible to conclude anything about 
logical necessity from a table like this, because it’s not 
clear how to manage its first line by a logical point of view, 
being the “exclusion” not a significant logical operation.  
This difficulty is connected to a not satisfactory 
logical inference theory based on tautologies that derive by 
independent atomic propositions. I think anyway that it’s 
possible to overcome this problematic situation using the 
same principles accepted by Wittgenstein in the first phase 
of his philosophical development.  
This paper will try to find a new point of view to 
consider Table 1 in order to make it clearly logically 
significant. 
2. Sensorial Spaces 
It seems reasonable to call propositions like ‘This table is 
white’ or ‘This wall is rough’ or ‘This food is salty’ sensorial 
propositions. These propositions describe objects using 
sense data and can be analyzed using 5 main classes 
(each related to a sense) and their combinations. This 
main classification is clear if a sensorial proposition is de-
fined as a statement of a sense impression or as a logical 
product of statements of sense impressions1. ‘This table is 
rough’ can be expressed in a form that matches the defini-
                                                     
 
1 It will be not considered, at this level of the analysis, the influence if the 
logical nature of the subject of the proposition. 
 
tion of sense propositions if transformed in: ‘This colour 
spot with the shape that I use to call ‘table’ is in my field of 
vision and, when I move the pink shape that I use to call 
‘hand’ near it, I feel a sensation of roughness’.  
The distinction of the contributions of the single 
senses in a sensorial proposition is possible also in more 
subtle contexts. For instance, a proposition like ‘This 
pullover is comfortable’ can be analyzed using fuzzy logic 
to define in a quantitative manner the grades of each 
sense involved. 
The class of the characteristic properties related to a 
percipient sense can be indicated with Wittgenstein’s 
metaphor of space. 
When a proposition states a certain property of a 
material subject, the coordinates of a point in the space of 
that sense will be fixed by it. This specification will exclude 
other properties of that space because ‘a particle […] 
cannot be in two places at the same time; that is to say, 
particles that are in different places at the same time 
cannot be identical.’ (6.3751). This proposition of the 
Tractatus describes the main property of the structure of 
sensorial spaces. Is this structure logical or empirically 
derived? It depends on what we intend for logic: if we kept 
in mind proposition 5.552 (‘The "experience" which we 
need to understand logic is not that such and such is the 
case, but that something is; but that is no experience. 
Logic precedes every experience that something is so. It is 
before the How, not before the What’) it is probably to be 
considered pure logical. 
3. Logic Of Sense Proposition 
The logical form of the sensorial propositions will be found 
using the method described in proposition 3.315 of the 
Tractatus. Taken a certain proposition ‘Ra’, it is possible to 
rewrite it in the following form, where all the properties of 
the sensorial space are involved: 
 
etcaUaTaR SSS ∧∧∧ ~~  
This form is allowed by proposition 6.3751 and proposi-
tions 3.311-3.313 (see also Anscombe 1963, chap. 6, 
about expressions and symbols). The subscript ‘s’ stands 
for a generic sensorial space. In details, the written logical 
product is an attempt to stress with a different propositional 
sign the structure of the sensorial space involved by the 
proposition analyzed.  
The expression above can be expressed also as:  
 
aRaR SS ~∧    SR∀       with    RRSR SS ≠∧∈  
where SR  could indicate every property of the space S 
different from R.  
The determination of the logical form of a sensorial 
proposition follows three steps: 1) the generalization (i.e. 
the substitution with a variable) of the subject, 2) the 
generalization of the sense properties indicated in each 
component of the logical product of the sensorial 
proposition, 3) the generalization of the space in which the 
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properties are located. This process transforms a sense 
proposition until it says nothing but it shows its logical 
form.  
The method could be represented as in Figure 1. 
Please notice that the generalization process it’s 
much more subtle than how it seems. Especially the 3th 
generalization step it’s critical, because assuming a 
general sensorial space, it’s not enough to derive a logical 
form from the propositions obtained from the 2nd 
generalization: also the sensorial properties expressions 
(in Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘expression’, see again 
propositions 3.311-3.313) must be considered akin a priori. 
This is actually not guaranteed by the sensorial space 
structure. 
 
 
The process applied to write the logical form of the sensorial propositions 
At the end of the generalization process, at the level of the 
logical form, the sensorial space structure is still in evi-
dence. The critical point of the whole process is once 
again the assumption of the structure of the sensorial 
spaces (derived from 6.3751) as a logic place where it is 
possible, defining the “position” of an object, to negate the 
remaining space for the same object. 
4. The Contradiction 
Because of the dependency between a sense proposition 
‘Ra’ and all the propositions about ‘a’ related through that 
space properties, the strange “exclusion” in Table 1 is not 
more needed. If ‘a is red’ is ‘Ra’ and ‘a is green’ is ‘Ga’, the 
logical product became:   
 
( ) ( )aGaRaGaR SSSS ∧∧∧ ~  
It is always possible to write2: 
 ( ) ( )aRaGaGaR SSSS ∧∧∧ ~  
 
because SS RG ∈  and SS GR ∈ .  
                                                     
 
2 In a slightly generalized sense, SR and SG indicates here the classes of 
the properties different from R and G in space S. 
With this method we finally obtain a genuine contradiction 
and also the first line in Table 1 is clearly managed and the 
difficulty by it generated resolved: the first line must be 
considered valid in the same way as the other and its ap-
parent absurdity is resolved thanks to the second “hidden” 
term discovered by the analysis of the sensorial proposi-
tions. 
A consequence of sensorial propositions logical 
form is that a logic product between propositions of the 
same sensorial space can be only a contradiction or a 
tautology (considering the same space-temporal 
coordinate of course). The logic product of propositions 
belonging to different spaces instead is never neither a 
contradiction nor a tautology.  
The investigation here presented can be considered 
an example of the clarifying possibilities of logical analysis. 
5. Conclusion 
The method described in proposition 3.315 of the Trac-
tatus was used to clarify the nature of sensorial proposi-
tions, after the assumption for all the sensorial spaces of 
the logic structure of colours presented in proposition 
6.3751. Considering sensorial spaces that are fully in-
volved when a single point of them is used to define an 
object, it is shown how truth tables derived from sensorial 
propositions can be expressed in a complete and clear 
way, useful to investigate their logical properties. 
The assumptions and critical points of the process 
developed have been stressed in a way so that anyone 
could decide by himself if accept or refuse such a way of 
proceeding.  
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A Wittgensteinian Answer to Strawson’s Descriptive Metaphysics 
Karel Mom, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
1. Introduction 
In the introduction of Individuals Strawson expounds his 
idea of descriptive metaphysics (Strawson 1959 9 ff.; cf. 
A834 = B862). The subtitle of Individuals, “An essay in 
descriptive metaphysics”, indicates that Strawson is con-
cerned with an elaboration of this idea. In this respect, 
Strawson's metaphysics is meant to be similar to Kant's 
(B24), which, with Aristotle's, equally is called descriptive. 
Strawson's subsequent The Bounds of Sense is the out-
come of his decision “that (he) must try to get to grips with 
the work [CPR, k.m.] as a whole” (Strawson 2003 8). This 
development could, therefore, arguably be appealed to in 
making a case for Strawson's Kantianism. 
This book, though, has a multifarious purpose. For it 
is a compound of Strawson's polemic intention to “give 
decisive reasons for rejecting some parts [of CPR, k.m.] 
altogether” and his reconstructive intention to “indicate (...) 
how the arguments and conclusions of other parts might 
be so modified or reconstructed as to be made more 
acceptable (...)” (Strawson 1966 11). Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, Strawson's alleged Kantianism became a 
matter–and probably also a source–of much controversy. 
A prompt settlement of this stubborn controversy by just 
qualifying it as a paradigm of analytic Kantianism is 
unlikely. For if it is to be taken as “a distinctly analytic 
interpretation, defence, and elaboration of Kant's ideas” 
(Glock 2003 16 f.), this nomenclature can hardly satisfy the 
sceptic about its distinctive method: connective analysis. 
Assessing Strawson's Kantianism might, however, clarify 
its systematic and historical position. 
This paper attempts to do so, taking Strawson's 
exposition of his project as point of departure. I will argue 
that Strawson's project shares a similarity with the later 
Wittgenstein; its Kantian remnants, however, prohibit it to 
team up with the full potential of Wittgenstein's linguistic 
analysis. 
2. Descriptive metaphysics 
Departing from Strawson's definition of 'metaphysics' in 
The Bounds of Sense, descriptive metaphysics is the “de-
scription of the limiting framework of what we can conceive 
of or make intelligible to ourselves as a possible general 
structure of experience” (Strawson 1966 15). This defini-
tion might seem ambiguity-ridden, as it relies upon what is 
meant by 'description'. It thus comprises both the “impor-
tant and interesting philosophical undertaking” (Strawson 
1966 15) of an inquiry, which “is concerned with describing 
and clarifying the concepts we employ in discourse about 
ourselves and about the world, and in elucidating their 
relationships–their forms of relative priority, dependency 
and interdependency” (Hacker 2003 49), and its outcome. 
Hacker observes that Strawson's project is 
continuous with traditional metaphysics in its quest for the 
“most general forms of connectedness that permeate our 
conceptual scheme (...)”, while it departs from it, insofar as 
it yields “insight only (...) into the forms and structures of 
our thoughts about reality” (Hacker 2003 62; my emph.). 
This suggests a dissociation of the epistemological 
element of the description–the aforementioned 
philosophical inquiry–from the ontological status of the 
description–the result of that inquiry: “the concepts we 
employ etc.” It is questionable, however, how this inquiry 
can be said to be continuous with the tradition even if its 
result differs categorically from the traditional one: “the 
(knowledge of) the primary causes and principles” (cf. 
Aristotle 1989 A 981b 26 – 982a 20). 
If such a dissociation is defensible at all, it is 
improbable in Strawson's case. For, however Strawson's 
strategy to “develop a conception of the a priori in which 
pure intuition play(s) no role” justifies his assignment to the 
semantic tradition (cf. Coffa 1991 22), the shift from 
ontology to semantics that looms in Strawson's project has 
not cleared away all remnants of the Kantian convertibility 
of the epistemic and metaphysical conditions of 
experience (cf. Aschenberg 1978 335). Hence, the 
ambiguity of the definition of descriptive metaphysics 
somehow is inevitable. This is because the way theoretical 
assumptions about the subject-matter of this inquiry–the 
conceptual framework to be described–are intertwined with 
its method, without this intertwining being given due 
account. For however Strawson acknowledges “having 
been subtly and in part consciously influenced by it [CPR, 
k.m.] in (his) own independent thinking about metaphysics 
and epistemology (in Individuals)” (Strawson 2003 8), 
Kant's epistemological considerations regarding the 
possibility of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline (cf. 
Kant 1993 §40 ff.), are not parallelled in Strawson. As one 
critic puts it, Strawson's “novel merger of the virtues of 
cautious and piecemeal analysis with techniques of bold 
generalizations and systematic theorizing concerning the 
character of 'our conceptual scheme' (...) results (...) from 
a failure to attend sufficiently to the character and 
implications of their interconnection” (Glouberman 1976 
364). 
I will illustrate this by the way Strawson demarcates 
descriptive metaphysics, and, corollarilly, distinguishes its 
method from reductive analysis. It is on the interface of 
both components, indeed, that the aforementioned 
intertwining of theoretical and methodical aspects appears. 
This intertwining, and the ambiguity that goes with it, 
constitute a line of justification for Strawson's project, and 
thus provide, in a way, its prolegomenon. An attempt to 
construe a counter to relevant objections against it, with 
recourse to this 'prolegomenon' might show this. 
To start with the demarcation, Strawson speaks of a 
“limiting framework of necessary general features of 
experience” (Strawson 1966 15; my emph.). To grasp the 
meaning of this phrase–and of its variants that occur 
throughout the book–I recall that Strawson demarcates 
descriptive metaphysics which is “content to describe the 
actual structure of our thought about the world”, from 
revisionary metaphysics “which is concerned to produce a 
better structure” (Strawson 1959 9). I will call this 
demarcation: demarcation1. Strawson also draws a 
demarcation line (demarcation2) between “gramatically 
permissible description(s) of a possible kind of 
experience”, which we could imagine, and a subclass of 
those: “truly intelligible descriptions” (Strawson 1966 15). 
A first objection concerns demarcation2. As 
Davidson observes, demarcation2 assumes that many 
imagined worlds are seen from the same point of view. 
Thus, Strawson's Conceptual Invariance Thesis states that 
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‘our conceptual scheme’ “is constant over time and 
between different languages” (Haack 1979 361). Hence, 
demarcation2 requires a linguistic dualism of concept and 
content, insofar it supposes that a fixed system of 
concepts is used to describe alternative universes. It thus 
rests on the idea of a distinction between theory and 
language; mistakenly, though, for meaning is 
contaminated by theory (Davidson 1984 187 f.). 
The effectiveness of this objection could be 
weakened, however, by differently from Davidson, 
emphasising the methodological, rather than the 
semantical aspect of demarcation2. Such a reading could 
be based on the assumption that demarcation2 can be 
mapped on demarcation1. Demarcation1 should thus be 
understood in the aforementioned methodical sense of a 
particular type of inquiry. In this sense, revisionary 
metaphysics pertains to regimentations of our ordinary 
'discourse about ourselves and the world' (cf. Hacker 2003 
49); descriptive metaphysics to the employment of 
connective analysis as the method of analysis of this 
discourse. Strawson's methodological exposition of his 
connective model of analysis, which sets its apart from the 
reductive or atomist model (Strawson 1985 31 f.), viz. 
Quine's ontological reductionism, viewed as a 
consequence of his regimentation of ordinary concepts, 
and Moore's linguistic reductionism, which overlooks the 
(inter)dependency of concepts (Strawson 1985 59, 43) 
supports this reading. 
To take full recourse to what has been labelled 
Strawson's prolegomenon to descriptive metaphysics, this 
reading should be supplemented by a reading that 
emphasises the semantical aspect of demarcation2, and 
which is consonant with a plausible reading of 
demarcation1. Here, some semantical assumptions of 
Strawson's logical theory can serve as point of departure. 
Among these assumptions, which are recurrent in 
Strawson's work, from On Referring onwards, and which 
are explicitly stated in Individuals but form implicitely in 
The Bounds of Sense a heuristic framework for the 
interpretation and reconstruction of CPR, are: (i) “the 
central importance of the subject-predicate distinction; (ii) 
“the role of particulars as objects of reference”; (iii) the 
conceptual “priority of particulars over universals” (Haack 
1979 362). These assumptions warrant a semantic reading 
of demarcation2 which is consonant with demarcation1. It is on their account that Strawson's logical theory renders the 
modality of a priori necessity to the (inter)connections that 
make up the significance, in Strawson's sense of 
intelligibility, of the conceptual scheme which it is intended 
to describe. As such, e.g. assuptions (i) and (ii) jointly 
warrant in Strawson the objectivity of referring expressions 
in a subject-predicate sentence similarly as does the 
category of substance in Kant (cf. B129). By force of these 
assumptions, though Strawson does not state this 
explicitly, demarcation2, of course, echoes Kant's 
distinction between the use of the categories in mere 
thinking and their application to intuitions “by which a thing 
is given” (B146). In this respect Strawson's logic has a 
transcendental aspect at it. For, although Strawson states 
e.g. that the performance of the referential task of certain 
linguistic expressions “requires no transcendental 
explanation”, it is precisely by the use of uniquely referring 
expressions that “existential assertions may be implied” 
(Strawson 1950 335, 343). 
Interestingly, though, Strawson shares his emphasis 
on the use of language with Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 
1958 §43), as does his suspicion of logical regimentation 
of ordinary language (cf. Strawson 1950 344; Wittgenstein 
1958 §38). However, unlike in Wittgenstein, where 'use' 
extends to the grammar of expressions within a language 
game (cf. Hintikka 1973 55), in Strawson it seems to be 
restricted to their pragmatic, performative aspects. 
A second objection is derived from Stroud and 
concerns the argument for the a priority of some basic 
concepts. The criterion to decide whether a concept is 
basic is whether it answers the demands of Strawson's 
austere issue (PSS) of Kant's so-called Principle of 
Significance (PSK). By this epistemic principle Kant 
distinguishes representations which are informed by 
intuition from empty representations (cf. B75, B150). PSS 
“forbids, as empty, the employment of any concept for 
which no empirical conditions of application could possibly 
be specified” (Strawson 1966 192). It can be noticed that 
PSS resembles the neo-positivist verificationist criterion of meaning, because it likewise is semantic in scope, as it 
pertains to concepts belonging to a conceptual framework. 
As such its employment in descriptive metaphysics could 
resuscitate the objection Stroud raised against the 
argument, in Individuals (Strawson 1959 38 ff.) for our 
knowledge of the existence of objective particulars. Stroud 
argues that insofar as its soundness requires the 
introduction of a verification principle, as he thinks it does, 
it is superfluous as a transcendental argument against 
epistemic scepticism about the existence of objective 
particulars (Stroud 1968 247). 
However, although PSS might resemble the 
verificationist criterion of meaning, its method of 
application, unlike the (neo-)positivist method (cf. Coffa 
1991 327) is not merely verificationist in the sense Stroud 
would be inclined to take it, but rather transcendental. For 
it is applied in a test to establish the a priori status of some 
concepts within a conceptual framework, rather than their 
meaning. The scheme of this test is reductive, as opposed 
to deductive, and, as such, is not logically valid. It argues 
from a conditional assertion and its known consequent to 
its unknown antecedent (Bocheński 1954 101, 102 f.). The 
test, as Strawson conceives it, consists in the sequential 
performance of this scheme of reasoning in its progressive 
and its regressive variants, which Bocheński calls 
verification and explanation respectively. First, the 
admissibility of a concept as basic is (progressively) 
verified, by testing if it answers the demands of PSS. Then 
its a priority is explained (regressively) by “fram(ing) a 
counterfactual antecedent from which we could derive (...)” 
the consequent that “we should have no use for this 
concept (Strawson 1966 115). 
The degree of universality and necessity of the a 
priori concepts that pass this test is a function of the 
epistemic use of the powers of our imagination to ‘frame 
counterfactuals’. In contrast, there is no such appeal to 
such powers in Wittgenstein, where the words “I can’t 
imagine the opposite” e.g. of knowing to feel my pain, 
merely is a defence against a grammatical proposition 
being presented in the form of an empirical proposition 
(Wittgenstein 1958 §251). Therefore, if I can agree with 
Hacker's assessment of Strawson's descriptive 
metaphysics as being metaphysics only in an attenuated 
sense, “just more grammar”, that is, “in Wittgenstein's 
extended sense of the term” (Hacker 2003 54, 59), it is 
only with the first part of it. 
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3. Conclusion 
To conclude, I have shown that a defence of Strawson’s 
project of descriptive metaphysics can draw upon an am-
biguity in Strawson’s exposition of it, by mobilizing its tran-
scendental tendencies. This is because this ambiguity is 
due to the unreflective intertwining of theory and method in 
this exposition and the unconscious denial of a contamina-
tion of meaning by theory that goes with it; hence Straw-
son’s Kantianism. 
Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics, as it concerns 
‘our conceptual scheme’ about the world, involves a shift 
of focus from language to the world (cf. Strawson 1950 
328f.), unlike Wittgenstein’s descriptive analysis of 
language, which remains within language games. Due to 
this digression, Strawson's analysis does not share the full 
potential of Wittgenstein's analysis.* 
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Properties and Reduction between Metaphysics and Physics 
Matteo Morganti, London, England, UK 
1. Tropes 
Trope theory is the ontological view that reality is consti-
tuted by so-called abstract particulars (property-instances 
not derived from multiply instantiable universals) grouped 
together in concrete particulars (objects). 
Such a view must first of all explain similarity, which, 
so to speak, ‘comes for free’ if one subscribes to realism 
about universals. Normally, trope ontologists argue that a 
trope a resembles another trope b exclusively in virtue of a 
and b, that is, of their primitively given ‘causal role’ in the 
world. This may appear more contentious than the realist’s 
claim that similarity is determined by the numerical identity 
of all instances of the same universal. In fact, however, it is 
analogous to what the realist must accept insofar as non-
exact resemblances are concerned. For, surely non-
exactly-resembling entities can still be similar to various 
degrees, and this must be explained in terms other than 
numerical identity even in ontologies with universals. 
Hence the trope ontologist’s typical claim of primitiveness 
appears plausible in this case. 
Something must also be said with respect to the 
way in which tropes constitute complex particulars. Initially 
(Williams 1953), compresence was taken to be sufficient. 
However, if compresence is regarded as an external 
relation additional to the compresent tropes, it seems that 
a form of regress cannot be avoided: what connects the 
compresence trope and the compresent tropes? More 
generally, compresence does not appear sufficient for 
grounding the internal unity of things: what about 
overlapping objects? 
This leads the trope theorist to account for the inner 
cohesion of concrete particulars in terms of internal 
relations of existential dependence among their constituent 
tropes. The first suggestion in this sense was made in 
(Simons 1994), who takes his clue from Husserl’s 
foundation relations. As pointed out by (Denkel 1997), if 
one wants to provide room for substantial change (that is, 
for the type of change involving the partial or total loss of 
an object’s essence) these relations must be regarded as 
holding not between specific tropes, but rather between 
tropes as tokens of more general trope-types (so that 
replacement of any trope – including essential ones 
belonging to what Simons calls the ‘nucleus’, or ‘kernel’, of 
the object - with another that acts as determinate for the 
same determinable is possible).  
Lastly, if tropes truly are the basic ‘building blocks’ 
of reality, it seems that they had better be understood from 
the perspective of a sparse conception of properties, 
according to which not all predicates correspond to actual 
properties. For obviously not all meaningful predicates can 
plausibly be taken to refer to fundamental, non-further-
analysable tropes. Following the ‘scientific’ approach to 
sparseness (Armstrong 1978), this implies that it is 
necessary to look at physical theory in order to identify the 
fundamental tropes.  
2. Applying Trope Ontology 
(Campbell 1990) suggests taking physical fields as the 
elementary tropes. However, the canonical definition of a 
field as an extended entity with varying intensities at vari-
ous points of space seems to suggest an internal complex-
ity and the existence of (dis)similarities between field-
values, which immediately leads one to think that some-
thing more basic exists.  
It seems more advisable to follow (Simons 1994) in 
looking for fundamental tropes at the level of particles. In 
fact, Simons’ view, based on particles as ‘kernels’ of 
foundationally related tropes plus ‘peripheral’ tropes, just 
needs some further articulation and specification. 
The hypothesis that is taken nowadays to be the 
best available description of the elementary constituents of 
reality and their interactions is the so-called Standard 
Model. According to it, the fundamental particles are 12 
fermions constituting matter and 12 bosons mediating 
forces. Fermions can be either quarks (six types, or 
‘flavours’) or leptons (six more flavours). Bosons comprise 
photons, W+, W- and Z0 gauge bosons, and eight gluons. 
Fermions have antiparticles, that is, particles identical to 
them but with opposite electric (and, possibly, colour) 
charge. Each boson-type constitutes instead its own 
antiparticle, except for the W+ and W- bosons, which are 
each other’s antiparticle. Each one of these particles has 
at least one of three possible properties: mass, colour and 
electric charge, and in most cases they have both mass 
and electric charge. (Photons may seem to constitute an 
exception to this latter claim. However, each photon 
possesses energy, which entails that it can in fact be 
attributed relativistic mass. True, the latter is distinct from 
the masses of the other types of particles, as those are 
invariant masses. Nevertheless, the difference is one of 
‘form’ rather than ‘substance’: as is well-known, according 
to relativity theory energy and mass are two ‘aspects’ of 
the same thing. Hence, tropes from the same ‘family’ can 
be attributed to photons and to the other particles as their 
‘masses’). 
In addition to these ‘fully state-independent’ 
properties, which remain completely the same throughout 
the whole of a particle’s existence (unless, of course, 
substantial change occurs), all particles have spin. 
However, only the absolute magnitude of spin is fixed for 
each particle (1/2 for fermions, 1 for bosons), while the 
sign can change. In fact, particles can be in a 
‘superposition’ of the two spin values. How is this to be 
accounted for from the trope-theoretic perspective? 
In general, in quantum mechanics a specific 
property can be possessed with probability p such that 
0≤p≤1. Following (Suarez 2007), I suggest a dispositional 
interpretation of this: whenever a quantum system does 
not have a specific property with probability 1, it possesses 
a dispositional property (or ‘propensity’) corresponding to a 
weighted sum of possible actual properties. In more 
technical terms, if Q is a discrete observable for the 
system Ψ with spectral decomposition given by Q = 
n nn
a P∑ , 
where n n nP v v= , and the system is in a state 
n nc vΨ = ∑  (a linear superposition of eigenstates of Q for 
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the system), then it is possible uniquely to identify a mixed 
state W(Q) as the ‘standard representative’ of Q over the 
Hilbert space of Ψ. This can be taken as a representation 
of the dispositional property possessed by Ψ that 
corresponds to the observable Q. (W(Q) is, in particular, 
equal to ( )n n
n
Tr P P WΨ∑ , with ( )nn n
PW
Tr P
=  ). 
An important antireductionist conclusion follows: not 
all properties are actual and provided with well-defined 
values, or reducible to ‘categorical bases’: some aspects of 
reality are in fact irreducibly dispositional. 
The other, state-dependent, properties of quantum 
particles (e.g., position, momentum, kinetic energy etc.), I 
claim, are mere descriptions of the particles’ dynamic 
‘behaviour’ and/or of their relationships with the rest of 
reality. As such, they needn’t be reified, and consequently 
do not require one to enlarge the set of the basic tropes. 
For example, space(-time) location is not a trope: it simply 
expresses the relation between a trope (or trope-bundle) 
and other tropes (or bundles) - or between tropes and 
space-time points. In short, the sparse view of properties is 
intended here as the view that the basic ‘building blocks’ of 
reality are only those properties that literally constitute 
things. 
Given the above, the way in which the truly basic 
tropes give rise to the whole of material reality is readily 
reconstructed. For instance, it is possible that a trope of 
mass 0.511 MeV coexists (in a relation of existential de-
pendence of the sort described earlier) with a +1 charge 
trope and a ±½ spin trope. The individual resulting from 
the reciprocal existential dependence between these 
tropes is a positron. The same applies mutatis mutandis 
for the other elementary particles, and for the progressively 
more complex levels of reality. For instance, 79 electrons, 
79 protons and 118 neutrons give rise to an atom of stable 
gold. And many such atoms determine molecules and 
bigger pieces of gold. The ‘new’ properties of the emerging 
complexes, such as ‘melts at a temperature of 1064.18 C’ 
or ‘is a good conductor of heat’ for gold, are not tropes, but 
rather ‘derivative’ properties determined by the way in 
which the basic tropes get structured together. This means 
that they are certainly real, but also analysable in terms of 
simpler entities. With this, the sparse conception of proper-
ties and the ‘scientific’ approach to their identification find 
confirmation and application. 
The foregoing vindicates the claim that tropes are 
independent and simple basic constituents of reality (inci-
dentally, it also allows one to get rid of the so-called 
‘boundary problem’ consisting of the fact that tropes are 
presented as fundamental ontological units but seem in 
fact arbitrarily divisible: the truly fundamental properties 
are not divisible, and what is is in fact just a composite 
trope-structure).  
3. Other Properties 
As is well-known, quantum mechanics allows for the pos-
sibility of many-particle systems in which the (supposed) 
component entities do not have well-defined values for a 
given property separately, and are instead mutually corre-
lated with respect to the measurement outcomes concern-
ing that property (even though determinate separate val-
ues will appear upon measurement). 
The ‘non-factorisability’ of the ‘entangled’ states de-
scribing such systems into simpler states of the compo-
nents, it is commonly agreed, points to some form of ho-
lism. Namely, to the fact that certain properties of certain 
physical systems cannot be analysed in terms of proper-
ties of the system’s component parts, either because the 
system doesn’t have parts (ontological holism), or because 
it exemplifies properties that are not reducible to the prop-
erties of its components (property holism). This entails that 
the relevant properties of entangled systems should be 
regarded as emergent tropes in the present context - ei-
ther monadic and belonging to the whole system, or irre-
ducibly relational. 
Here is, then, one more antireductionist theme: the 
evidence just pointed at blocks all attempts at reducing all 
properties of physical objects to the ‘truly basic’ tropes. In 
the specific perspective of property holism, moreover, this 
comes together with the impossibility to reduce all relations 
to monadic properties. This in turn opens the way to a 
more general rejection of physicalism: for it is possible that 
non-reducible tropes emerge at levels of higher complexity 
than physics. (All this, however, needn’t worry the trope 
ontologist, who is not required to commit him/herself to any 
of these forms of reductionism).  
4. Metaphysics and Science 
One last point concerns the significance of metaphysics in 
its relationship with science. In particular, the idea of ‘ex-
perimental metaphysics’ is of obvious relevance here. 
The notion of experimental metaphysics was first 
introduced by (Shimony 1981), who defined it in the 
context of a discussion of quantum mechanics, and in 
particular of the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen (EPR) ‘paradox’ 
and of the violations of Bell’s inequalities by quantum 
systems. According to Shimony, a general pattern of 
reasoning can be individuated of the form E&H → P, 
where E is an accepted theory used to describe the 
relevant experimental setup (in the EPR/Bell case, 
quantum mechanics as it is employed to perform actual 
tests of Bell’s inequalities); H a general (allegedly) 
metaphysical hypothesis (in the EPR/Bell case, locality as 
prescribed by relativity), and P a certain empirical 
prediction (in the EPR/Bell case, that the Bell inequalities 
hold). If P is disconfirmed and E is kept fixed, says 
Shimony, by modus tollens we should get to a rejection or 
modification of H, so bringing experiment to bear upon a 
metaphysical thesis. And this is exactly what happens in 
the case under discussion, for quantum mechanics forces 
us to give up locality, or at least to reformulate it in terms 
that allow for a ‘peaceful coexistence’ between quantum 
mechanics and relativity. 
The question to ask is, though, whether 
experimental metaphysics is metaphysics at all. What is at 
stake in discussions of EPR is the status of what ultimately 
appears to be only a very general statement extracted 
from our best-established theories, and that lies entirely 
within the domain of science. Einstein’s presupposition to 
the effect that the world must be local seems indeed to be 
exclusively a consequence of his endorsement of a 
specific theory (relativity); or, at any rate, of a general 
worldview that was the by-product of (common sense and) 
successful theories prior to, and including, relativity. Of 
course, one might call presuppositions such as locality (or, 
to give another relevant example, the Principle of the 
Identity of the Indiscernibles) ‘metaphysical’, on the basis 
that they are (among) the most general statements about 
reality we can make. But this would be a merely 
terminological choice, and would not detract from the fact 
that those ‘principles’ appear to be nothing but empirical 
generalizations.  
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Does this mean that metaphysics should be reduced 
to science? How does this discussion bear on what was 
said in this paper? Here, I want to suggest one last 
antireductionist idea. Another possible way of looking at 
metaphysics, alternative to the view of it as a mere ‘by-
product’ of science, is as an autonomous discipline having 
to do with hypotheses rather than truths; and as an inquiry 
aiming to account for the same reality described by 
science but by moving at the level of the conjectural rather 
than at the level of the ‘verifiable’. More specifically, 
metaphysics is perhaps best understood as an attempt to 
provide general categories and concepts that transcend 
the empirical and yet find their best application when they 
are employed for interpreting what science tells us. On this 
construal, certainly metaphysics should not be entirely a 
priori but – crucially – it does not reduce to science either: 
what emerges is rather a two-way relationship of mutual 
support, according to which metaphysics provides the 
conceptual tools for the interpretation of science, and 
science the data to make sense of our metaphysical 
hypotheses. 
The suggestions made in this paper, based on a 
prior definition and defence of trope ontology and on a 
subsequent implementation of it on the basis of our best 
science, demonstrate that this understanding of the 
relationship between science and metaphysics may be 
fruitful. 
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Functional Reduction and the Subset View of Realization  
Kevin Morris, Providence, Rhode Island, USA 
1. Introduction  
Functional reduction is the view that functional, realized 
properties are reducible to realizer properties. One way to 
challenge this reductionism is to develop an account of 
realization under which realized properties cannot be so 
reduced. Thus Sydney Shoemaker has argued, and others 
have concurred, that it follows from the “subset view” of 
realization that realized properties are typically irreducible. 
In what follows, I argue that the reductionist can ade-
quately address the challenges raised by this account of 
realization.  
2. Reductionism and the Subset View of 
Realization 
A functional property is one that can be exhaustively char-
acterized, or defined, in terms of a causal role. Arguably at 
least some mental properties are functional in this sense 
and it may be that most nonbasic (for instance, biological, 
mental, economic) properties can be understood in this 
way (Lewis 1972, Chalmers 1996, Kim 1998 and 2005). 
Such a property is said to be realized by another in virtue 
of the latter play the role individuative of the former. The 
reductionist contends that a functional property can be 
reduced, in a given system, to its realizer in that system 
(Lewis 1972, Kim 1998 and 2005). There are at least two 
reasons we might draw this conclusion. First, if a property 
M is “second order,” such that having M is defined in terms 
of having some other property that plays a certain causal 
role, it seems that a system’s having M cannot be anything 
beyond its having whatever property P realizes M. Second, 
it seems that the causal powers of M—the effects that the 
instantiation of M is apt to bring about—will be identical 
with those of M’s realizer P in a system. If we adopt even a 
weak causal theory of properties under which different 
properties cannot have the same powers in the actual 
world, we are thereby compelled to identify M in S with P 
(Kim 1998).  
While there are a number of issues that will 
determine whether realized properties can be reduced in 
this manner, perhaps the most crucial concerns the nature 
of realization. Of the accounts of realization that have been 
developed in recent years, Shoemaker’s subset view 
arguably presents the most serious challenge to functional 
reduction. As on the view just sketched, functional 
properties are again defined in terms of causal roles and 
again realization consists in a certain relationship between 
the role that individuates a functional property and the role 
played by some other property in a system. Under the 
subset view, however, P is a realizer of M just in case the 
effects that the instantiation of P is apt to bring about 
include as a subset those that M is apt to bring about 
(Shoemaker 2001 and 2007).1 Shoemaker and Jessica 
Wilson have argued that realized properties will typically 
                                                     
 
1 In Shoemaker 2007, realization is officially defined not only in terms of 
causal powers, but also in terms of “backward looking causal features,” what 
brings about the instantiation of the properties in question. However, Shoe-
maker suggests that the issues here of interest can be addressed by consider-
ing the simpler formulation in terms of powers. Because of this my focus in 
what follows will be on causal powers, what Shoemaker calls the “forward 
looking causal features” of the properties.  
be irreducible under this account (Shoemaker 2001 and 
2007, Wilson 1999 and 2002). This will be the case 
whenever the powers of M are a proper subset of those of 
P. Since M and P have nonidentical powers, they cannot 
be identified; thus M cannot be reduced to P (Shoemaker 
2001 and 2007, Wilson 1999 and 2002). Shoemaker 
suggests that paradigmatic cases of realization (for 
instance, the mental by the neurophysiological) are like 
this. Thus we have the following argument: 
 
S1. Where P realizes M, the powers contributed by 
M are typically a proper subset of those contributed 
by P; thus, in these cases, 
 
S2. M ≠ P; thus, in these cases,  
 
S3. M is irreducible.  
I believe that the reductionist can adequately 
respond to this argument. First, S1 can be rejected by 
maintaining that a realized property inherits whatever 
powers are contributed by its realizer to a system and that 
Shoemaker does not provide reason to think otherwise. 
Second, the inference from S2 to S3 can be challenged by 
appealing to the possibility of nonconservative 
“eliminativist” reduction. Finally, even if S2 follows from S1, 
this does not entail the failure of conservative reductionism 
about functional properties. 
3. The Subset View and Causal Inheritance 
The arguments advanced by Shoemaker and others in 
favor of S1 are inconclusive at best. Moreover, the reduc-
tionist can explain why the powers of a realized property 
might seem to be a proper subset of the powers of its real-
izer even if this is not the case. 
First, the reductionist need not claim that the powers 
we ordinarily or apriori associate with realized properties 
correspond exactly to the powers of any realizer. But it 
does not follow from this that every realized property does 
not inherit the powers of its realizer in a system (Kim 
1998). The picture here is one in which realized properties 
are understood in terms of a limited set of powers but in 
which we further reason that given that P realizes M in S, 
the powers of M in S are identical with those of P, and thus 
that M “inherits” the powers of its realizer. This reasoning 
is legitimate in at least some cases, as it amounts to the 
possibility of discovering powers of realized properties in 
addition to those typically associated with such properties. 
Moreover, that realized properties are understood in terms 
of a limited set of powers can explain why it might seem 
that the powers of a realized property will be a proper 
subset of those contributed by its realizer even if this is not 
the case.  
Shoemaker considers several cases in which it 
seems that a realizer has powers beyond those of a 
realized property. For instance, consider a mental property 
M, say pain, and its neurophysiological realizer P in 
humans. While the instantiation of both M and P are apt to 
cause the subject to wince, it seems that P will have 
powers beyond those of M: P might contribute the power 
of producing a “P” reading on a cerebroscope attached to 
a person’s head (Shoemaker 2001). Now, it is true that we 
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do not pick out pain in a system by considering whether a 
property causes “P” to appear on a cerebroscope. Further, 
instances of pain with a realizer other than P may not 
cause “P” to appear on a cerebroscope. But we cannot 
conclude from this that pain in humans does not have this 
power. For example, presumably pain in humans causes 
aspirin seeking behavior. Yet it is doubtful that this will 
feature in a functional characterization utilized to pick out 
pain in a system; likewise, pain does not contribute this 
power to nonhuman systems. But just as we cannot 
conclude from this that pain in humans does not cause 
aspirin seeking behavior, we should not conclude from like 
considerations that pain in humans does not cause “P” to 
appear on a cerebroscope. Analogous considerations can 
be advanced in response to the other cases put forward in 
favor of S1, 2 and it thus remains open for the reductionist 
to contend that he has not been given adequate reason to 
relinquish his thesis that a realized property inherits the 
powers of its realizer in a system.  
4. An Eliminativist Response  
Suppose that in at least some cases a realized property 
only has a proper subset of the powers of its realizer in a 
system. Contra Shoemaker, this does not entail S3. This is 
because S3 does not follow from S2, since S2 does not 
rule out nonconservative eliminativist reduction. That is, 
the nonreductive import of the subset view comes entirely 
from the claim that where the powers of M are a proper 
subset of those of P, M cannot be identified with P. How-
ever, the reductionist can reject the assumption that reduc-
tion requires identities and maintain that if we cannot iden-
tify realized properties with realizers, we should consider 
the possibility that there are only realizers. While this is not 
ontologically conservative, it can be considered a form of 
reduction, given its contrast with more radical versions of 
eliminativism. 
This eliminativism is motivated by noting that under 
the subset view, realized properties are superfluous in that 
all effects brought about by realized properties are 
redundant, since they are also brought about by realizers. 
Now, Shoemaker and Wilson have argued that this should 
not be regarded as objectionable overdetermination 
(Shoemaker 2001 and 2007, Wilson 1999). But whether 
this overdetermination is objectionable is beside the point, 
since the reductionist can appeal to parsimony to support 
his commitment to exclusively realizer properties.3 This 
amounts to the suggestion that we cease to take those 
proper subsets of the powers of realizer properties 
associated with realized properties to determine any such 
properties.  
Further, this eliminativism does not require denying 
that systems have the powers associated with realized 
properties. For example, we may have to deny that there is 
a property of human pain determined by a subset of the 
powers of pain’s realizer in humans. But this does not 
require denying that the relevant systems have the powers 
associated with pain; rather, the claim is just that these 
powers do not determine a property. That this 
                                                     
 
2 For example, Shoemaker and Wilson, following Yablo 1992, consider the 
case of Alice, a pigeon conditioned to peck at scarlet things but not at shades 
of red other than scarlet, and argue that scarlet thus has at least one power 
not possessed by red: the power to produce a pecking response in Alice 
(Shoemaker 2001 and 2007, Wilson 1999). But even if this power is not ordi-
narily associated with red and shades of red other than scarlet do not have 
this power, this does not rule out taking red to have this power in virtue of 
being realized by scarlet in the system in question.  
3 This is similar to the reductionist argument recently presented in Gillett 2007.  
eliminativism does not require denying that systems have 
the powers associated with realized properties arguably 
provides a basis for taking such systems to satisfy 
functional concepts even if we cease to regard the powers 
in question as determining functional properties. 4 While 
this is not conservative, it is not the more radical sort of 
eliminativism under which systems just do not have the 
powers associated with eliminated properties (Churchland 
1979). Nor does it entail that the concept of an eliminated 
property cannot be useful, since certain powers could be 
of interest for epistemological and pragmatic reasons 
without these powers determining a property.  
5. Conservative Reduction under the  
Subset View 
While nonconservative eliminativist reduction is a viable 
response for the reductionist, the subset view does not 
entail that realized properties cannot be conservatively 
reduced via identities. Even if S1 entails S2, it does not 
entail the following: 
 
S4. There is no physical property Q such that Q = M.  
This is because even if S1 entails that M cannot be re-
duced to its realizer P, it does not entail that M cannot be 
identified with some physical property Q determined by a 
proper subset of the powers of P. To get S4 from S1, we 
need the following:  
 
S5. For any realized property M, if there is a physi-
cal property P such that M = P, it must be the physi-
cal property that realizes M.  
This says that if a realized property is reducible via identi-
ties at all, it is reducible to its realizer. Given that S1 entails 
S2, S1 and S5 together entail S4. But if we assume, in 
contrast to the eliminativism just sketched, that some 
proper subset of the powers contributed to a system by a 
physical property determines some other property, the 
question is why this latter property should not itself be 
regarded as physical. Thus we can consider two theses: 
 
R1. Possibly, M is realized by a physical property P 
but is identified with Q, where Q is a physical prop-
erty determined by a proper subset of the powers of 
P. 
 
R2. If a proper subset of the powers of a physical 
property P determines a property M, there must be 
a physical property Q determined by this set such 
that M = Q.  
If R1 holds, then S5 fails and so we do not have a valid 
argument for S4. The truth of R2 entails the falsity of S4. 
While both R1 and R2 are in need of an argument, nothing 
in the subset view entails even the falsity of R1, which is to 
say that the subset view does not entail S5 and so S4. 
This means that the subset view at most implies that real-
ized properties cannot be reduced via identities to realiz-
ers.  
                                                     
 
4 This is similar to the eliminativism that reductionists have advanced in re-
sponse to multiple realization: given the reduction of M in S to P, M in S* to P*, 
and so on, we should consider the possibility that there is no structure unre-
stricted property corresponding to our concept of M (Kim 1998, Lewis 1980). 
However, given that there is M in S, M in S*, and so on, we can arguably take 
such systems to satisfy the concept of M.  
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An initial worry with this line of thought is that it 
seems to express a sort of “mysterianism” about physical 
reducer properties. What is needed at this point is a 
principled account of just what subset of the powers of a 
physical realizer property we are interested in and whether 
it is plausible to regard these powers as determining a 
physical property insofar as they determine any property at 
all. One nonarbitrary possibility is that the powers in 
question will be those shared by all of the realizers of a 
given realized property. The question is then whether we 
should hold that these powers determine a physical 
property insofar as they determine any property. While I 
will not attempt to answer this question here, it should be 
noted that the worry here under consideration does not 
threaten the minimal claim that given that the subset view 
does not entail the falsity of R1, it does not entail the 
failure of conservative reductionism.  
6. Conclusion 
For these reasons, then, it seems that the subset view does 
not mandate the rejection of reductionism about functional, 
realized properties. First, the reductionist can insist on 
causal inheritance, and so reject the first premise in Shoe-
maker’s argument. Second, the reductionist can appeal to 
nonconservative reductionism about such properties. Finally, 
the reductionist can contend that without an additional prem-
ise, the subset view does not entail the failure of conserva-
tive reductionism about realized properties.  
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The Writing of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
Elena Nájera, Alicante, Spain 
1. Fragmentary philosophical writing 
There is no doubt that we are faced with two writers who 
are interested in making their thoughts take on a certain 
form. Nietzsche is sure that “better writing means better 
thinking” (Nietzsche 1999 2-592). In a similar sense, Witt-
genstein insists that the value of his thoughts will be all the 
greater, the better expressed they are, although he feels 
obliged to grant them a margin of imperfection: “of all of 
the sentences that I write here”, he points out, “only one or 
the other will make any kind of progress” (Wittgenstein 
1980 §384). And in this respect, precisely with regard to 
our other writer, he explains:  
 
“Nietzsche wrote somewhere that even the best po-
ets and thinkers have written things that are medio-
cre or bad, yet they have separated them from what 
is good. But it’s not exactly like that. Of course, in 
his garden a gardener keeps roses alongside ma-
nure, rubbish and straw; but it is not only their 
goodness which makes them stand out, but, above 
all, their function in the garden” (Wittgenstein 1980 
§338)1. 
Thus relinquishing an entirely elaborate way of writing, 
Wittgenstein also compares his philosophical observations 
with “raisins”, which may be the best part of a cake, al-
though adding them does not ensure a perfect, complete 
form of expression (Wittgenstein 1980 §386). This is why, 
although he acknowledges that he is captivated by his way 
of guiding his thoughts towards philosophy, he says that 
he is not captivated by his own style (Wittgenstein 1997 
100). In the prologue of Philosophical Investigations, he 
confesses in that respect his inability to make his thoughts 
progress in a natural seamless sequence: “After several 
unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into 
such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed”. His 
reflections tend, on the contrary, to “jump all around the 
subject”, finding themselves spread around on “loose 
notes” and breaking themselves up into “countless pieces” 
which are impossible to piece back together, like “excerpts 
from an enormous landscape" in which it is difficult to find 
one's way (Wittgenstein 1980, §§ 156, 317 & 452). In 
short, the Wittgensteinian essay submits to the juxtaposi-
tion and incompleteness typical of an “album” (Wittgen-
stein, 1958).  
Nietzsche also shares this tendency towards 
fragmentation and criticises philosophical systems. He 
introduces himself as “master” of the aphorism and the 
sentence that guides thought along an unhindered path 
which only a particularly conscientious reader could follow 
(Nietzsche 1999 6-153). He acknowledges that the 
aphoristic form creates difficulties and insists on the great 
hermeneutic effort which it requires. He in fact claims, “not 
to write more than that which could plunge «hurried» men 
into despair”, therefore transforming good reading into an 
art by which nothing is achieved unless it is done “slowly” 
(Nietzsche 1999 5-256). Wittgenstein appreciates calm in 
intellectual work too and urges the reader to take their 
time: 
                                                     
 
1 Wittgenstein refers to Human, All Too Human I, § 155. 
“I really want my copious punctuation marks to slow 
down the speed of reading. Because I should like to 
be read slowly (As I myself read.)” (Wittgenstein 
1980 §393).  
And this is, indeed, the pace set by his writing in spite of its 
brevity. In this sense, Wittgenstein is aware of the difficulty 
and obscurity of the extremely short observations which 
make up his work and, therefore, of the fact that only few 
readers will be able to understand it, this perhaps being 
the desired effect as it is possible that, for our two writers, 
style may be best justified as a discriminatory measure. To 
this respect, Nietzsche wrote that “all the nobler spirits 
select their audience when they wish to communicate; and 
choosing that, one at the same time erects barriers against 
the others” (Nietzsche 1999 3-633). And, with regard to 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes along the 
same lines that:  
 
“The book must automatically separate those who 
understand it from those who do not. [...] If you have 
a room which you do not want certain people to get 
into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the 
key” (Wittgenstein 1980 §34).  
But, who has the key to style? In a rough draft of the pro-
logue to Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein dedi-
cates the book to those who are closest to him in a cultural 
sense: “my fellow citizens as it were, in contrast to the rest 
who are foreign to me” (Wittgenstein 1980 §495). How-
ever, he regrets that: 
 
“It will fall into hands which are not for the most part 
those in which I would like to imagine it. May it soon 
– this is what I wish for it – be completely forgotten 
by the philosophical journalists, and so be pre-
served perhaps for a better sort of reader.” (Witt-
genstein 1980 §384).  
The text is aimed, without a doubt, at a close circle of peo-
ple and requires an interpreter who knows how to handle 
the language of philosophy in such a way that is neither 
journalistic nor academic, who, perhaps, instead is sensi-
tive to literature and poetry. 
2. The limits of writing 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein’s styles make an effort to ex-
press their thoughts which seems to bring them close to 
the imaginative or suggestive register typical of poetry. 
And it may well be said that the former wrote all of his 
works in the same hand as the creative poetic reasoning, 
as well as composing actual poems. Wittgenstein, on the 
other hand, confesses to an inability in that respect, which 
is, however, very significant when determining what is to 
be expected from his writing: “Just as I cannot write verse”, 
he points out, “so too my ability to write prose extends only 
so far, and no farther.” (Wittgenstein 1980 §336). So his 
style seems to admit a limit which nonetheless manages to 
highlight his firm poetic vocation. He writes:  
 
“I think I summed up my position on philosophy 
when I said: philosophy ought really to be written 
only as a form of poetry […] For with this assertion I 
have also revealed myself as someone who cannot 
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quite do what he would like to do” (Wittgenstein 
1980 §129). 
The fact that it is impossible to give philosophical writing a 
completely poetic form perhaps justifies its inadequacy. 
Wittgenstein in fact acknowledges that he perhaps ex-
presses only a tenth of what he wants to express, which 
make his texts seem like “mumbling” (Wittgenstein 1980 
§§100 & 145). In this sense he ends up admitting that not 
all that one thinks should be written on paper:  
 
“Really all that can be written —that is, without do-
ing something stupid and inappropriate— is that 
which emerges in the form of writing. All the rest is 
comical and comparable to rubbish, so to speak”  
(Wittgenstein 1997 27).  
Nietzsche also seems to number his words and reserves 
them to tell of some experiences, warning that “one should 
only speak where one cannot remain silent, and only 
speak of what one has conquered”. The rest is all “chatter”, 
“literature”, bad breeding” (Nietzsche 1999 2-369).  
In the same way, the proposals of Tractatus rule 
that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be 
silent”, drawing a precise line between the sphere of the 
speakable, the scientific description of the world, and that 
which can only be shown, the mystic (Wittgenstein 1961 
§7). Decades later, Wittgenstein continues to insist that 
“the indescribable (that which seems mysterious to me and 
which I don’t dare to express)” is the background upon 
which the thoughts that he wants to express acquire their 
meaning (Wittgenstein 1980 §83). In any case, the 
question which we are interested in raising is that his 
literary style favours the unspeakable. The laconic 
proposals of Tractatus create the effect of a certain 
dogmatism —not in vain did their author intend to convey 
an untouchable and definitive truth through them—, 
indicating a road to the mystic which suggests, precisely 
through the obscurity of his writing, an indisputable clarity.  
Turning to the very terminology of Philosophical 
Investigations, it can be affirmed that the aphoristic form 
which Wittgenstein’s writing tends to take on facilitates the 
synoptic vision which provokes understanding, an 
understanding that consists of “seeing connections” and 
depends on “finding and inventing intermediate cases” 
(Wittgenstein 1958 §122). The hermeneutic key to 
aphorism is, in fact, the capacity to provide examples 
which forsake an explanation in favour of a merely 
descriptive illustration2. And this, without a doubt, forces 
philosophy to adapt its writing not to a chain of inferences, 
but to a collection of images which intends to appeal to the 
personal point of view.  
In this sense, Wittgenstein warns his reader that he 
merely intends to be the “mirror” where he can see his own 
thoughts with all of their errors, so helping him to correct 
them (Wittgenstein 1980 §93). In the same way, he seems 
to abandon discursive reasoning when he affirms that 
philosophy purely and simply places everything in front of 
us and does not conclude anything. For this reason, he 
emphasises that: 
 
“Writing in the right style is setting the carriage 
straight on the rails. [...] All we want to do is 
straighten you up on the track if your carriage is 
crooked on the rails. But then we'll let you travel 
alone” (Wittgenstein 1980 §§212-213).  
                                                     
 
2 Cfr. Cavell, Stanley 2004 “The Investigations´ everyday aesthetics of itself”, 
in: The Literary Wittgenstein, New York-London: Routledge. 
So, the literary way of thinking is in itself significant from a 
philosophical point of view and reveals something which 
words cannot say. “Style” is the “expression of a general 
human necessity [...] seen sub specie aeterni” (Wittgen-
stein 1997 28). With this it is acknowledged that an au-
thor’s way of writing allows for the understanding of their 
own particular circumstances and their aspirations to be 
placed in perspective, seen from outside the ordinary logic 
of words, reaching a compromise with the undescribable: 
with the sphere of values, with the mystic.  
In accordance with this idea, Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein’s works may well be an attempt to show a 
cultural situation from a critical point of view, their styles 
suggesting something more than that which the language 
of the time —an egalitarian and scientistic era— allows, 
because that which has been said up to now leads us to 
suspect that our two thinkers did not have too much faith in 
their present nor in what their present had to offer, in short, 
good readers. 
3. Where are the good readers? 
In the case of Nietzsche, he would actually be contradict-
ing himself if he was to expect to find “ears and hands“ for 
his truths in life: “that today one doesn’t hear me and 
doesn’t accept my ideas is not only understandable, it 
even seems right to me” (Nietzsche 1999 6-298). In the 
same sense, Wittgenstein, in the correspondence sur-
rounding the publication of Tractatus, proves to be equally 
resigned to the idea that “nobody will understand it”3. And 
with regard to the “spirit” of Philosophical Investigations he 
regrets the same lack of understanding during that era: 
 
“This book is written for those who are in sympathy 
with the spirit in which it is written. This is not, I be-
lieve, the spirit of the main current of European and 
American civilization”  
(Wittgenstein 1980 §§29 & 34). 
As we insinuated a few lines ago, the philosophies of our 
two writers contain, more or less explicitly, a criticism of 
civilisation which brings them together and in which they 
collaborate and converge their styles. In a text from 1930, 
Wittgenstein points out that there are “problems in the 
western intellectual world” which he has not come up 
against and which no philosopher has ever confronted, 
although he specifies in brackets that “perhaps Nietzsche 
passed them by”. To have done so would mean having 
known how to predict and describe the “odyssey” of the 
west before its end, something reserved for certain poets, 
for which reason it should not seem strange that it is writ-
ten “in the obscure knowledge of premonition and it may 
only be understandable to a few” (Wittgenstein 1980 §41). 
That same year, confirming the wisdom of the Nietzschean 
cultural diagnosis, Wittgenstein wrote about the deca-
dence of the contemporary world: 
 
“Our age is really an age of the transvaluation of all 
values. (The procession of humankind turns a cor-
ner & what used to be the way up is now the way 
down, etc.) Did Nietzsche have in mind what now is 
happening & does his achievement consist in antici-
pating it & finding a word for it?”  
(Wittgenstein 1997 53). 
According to these passages, Wittgenstein seems certainly 
to have read Nietzsche and to have made use of some of 
                                                     
 
3 Letter to Russell, 13.03.1919. 
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his teachings. He coincides with him in the moral censor-
ship of a world which is united around science, industry 
and progress and which, because of this, suffers acute 
nihilism. We are speaking about a world which is impervi-
ous to value and to feeling, in which the light has gone out: 
“it is as if the shine were erased from everything, every-
thing is dead” and “one suddenly realizes that one's mere 
existence is still completely empty, deserted” (Wittgenstein 
1997 198-199). For this reason, in these dark and desolate 
coordinates, authenticity, the value of the individual, be-
comes an arduous task: “For in times like these, genuine 
strong characters simply leave the arts aside and turn to 
other things and somehow the worth of the individual man 
finds expression” (Wittgenstein 1980 §29). 
For Wittgenstein, cultural disappointment prevails, 
but he believes that the individual may still have the 
chance to express himself. It is a question of raising 
oneself to the higher and undescribable perspective of the 
mystic, touching upon aesthetic and religious hope. The 
price to be paid, however, is the creation of something 
from this feeling which cannot be communicated, cannot 
be said in the everyday common language, which is the 
language of argumentation and criticism. So a victory, 
which could almost be described a Pyrrhic victory, is 
celebrated of authenticity over the nihilism of the western 
civilisation.  
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Word-Meaning and the Context Principle in the Investigations 
Jaime Nester, Blacksburg, Virginia, USA 
In the Investigations, Wittgenstein suggests we should, “let 
the use of words teach (us) their meaning” (Wittgenstein, 
2002, p.187). By drawing our attention to use, Wittgenstein 
believes we will see how our linguistic practices confer 
meaning on words. Though this line of thought seems 
promising, there may yet be an issue concerning how we 
come to understand word-meaning. To clarify how word-
meaning can derive from use, I will tie Wittgenstein’s 
notion of meaning-as-use to Frege’s context principle; in 
doing this, I will show how Wittgenstein attributes a 
broader scope to the context principle that extends beyond 
mere propositions. I intend to argue that Wittgenstein’s 
meaning-as-use shows how Frege’s context principle is 
open to circularity, while his transformation of it is not. To 
make this argument, it will be necessary to explain what 
Frege’s context principle is and to show how it operates in 
conjunction with his other two guiding principles. This 
explanation will enable me to show how Wittgenstein’s 
transformation of the context principle allows him to claim 
that our linguistic practices confer meaning upon words 
without opening himself to circularity. 
Frege’s first guiding principle is, “Always separate 
sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective 
from the objective” (Frege, p.X). Frege believed arithmetic 
fell under the laws of logic and that the laws of logic 
govern all thought. Frege is not concerned with the 
subjective mechanics of thinking, but only with what is 
essential to thought in order that judgments have truth-
values; judgments have truth-values regardless of whether 
they are ever thought by individuals (Frege, p.36-38). In 
contrast with psychology, logic is essentially a subject 
matter concerned with truth. Frege’s first guiding principle 
is aimed at showing how logic furnishes the laws of 
thought, which makes possible the claims of truth in any 
other discipline, including psychology (Frege, p.21).  
Frege’s second guiding principle (the context 
principle), enjoins us to ‘look for’ the meaning of a word 
only in the context of a proposition (Frege, p.X). While this 
formulation suggests the possibility that words may have 
meaning in isolation, Frege nonetheless holds one cannot 
identify or judge the meaning of a word unless it is in the 
context of a proposition. At this point, the importance 
attributed to Frege’s context principle is that it helps one 
avoid violating his first guiding principle. Frege holds that if 
one takes a word in isolation, one may be tempted to take 
the meaning of that word to be some idea (‘Vorstellung’) 
one associates with it. Later in the Grundlagen, Frege 
gives a much stronger formulation of the context principle 
when he states words do not have a meaning when taken 
in isolation (Frege, p.71). So, it is not that words have a 
meaning outside the context of a proposition, but rather, 
the proposition confers meaning on words. Why is a 
proposition essential to word-meaning? Why is it 
inessential that we have intuitions associated with words? 
When one takes a proper name in isolation (e.g., 
‘Tolstoy’), it states nothing; it has no truth-value. Likewise, 
predicates (e.g., ‘wrote War and Peace) have no truth-
value by themselves. In combination, however, a name 
and predicate express a proposition that necessarily has a 
truth-value (e.g., ‘Tolstoy wrote War and Peace). The 
meaning of the components goes back to the contribution 
they make to the truth-value of the proposition as a whole. 
So, the name ‘Tolstoy’ gains its meaning from the fact that 
it occurs in a proposition with a truth-value (i.e., the 
proposition has a sense); whatever subjective impressions 
I have of Tolstoy are irrelevant to the meaning of ‘Tolstoy;’ 
and, ‘Tolstoy’ cannot be placed together with just any 
words to produce a proposition. For example, ‘Tolstoy 
Gottlob Frege’ does not express anything. Rather, a name 
must be coupled with a predicate in order to produce a 
proposition. Why is this the case? Is Frege only drawing on 
our grammatical knowledge of natural language in 
assessing what is requisite for a proposition with a sense? 
The grammatical categories of names and 
predicates correspond to features of propositions that 
make a systematic contribution to the truth-value of a 
proposition. These features are then logical categories that 
divide the essential logical components of a proposition. 
Names correspond to the logical category of ‘object,’ 
predicates to ‘concept;’ the meaning of a name is the 
object to which it refers, the meaning of a predicate the 
concept it picks out. The crucial point, however, is that 
‘reference’ in both cases is derivative from the sense of the 
proposition (Dummett, p.5). The reference of ‘Tolstoy’ to 
Tolstoy stems from the sign making a contribution to the 
sense of a proposition; this contribution shows the 
meaning of ‘Tolstoy.’ If ‘Tolstoy’ did not do that, it would be 
logically inert, meaningless. The name ‘Tolstoy’ contributes 
to the meaning of a proposition by picking out an object; 
the predicate names a concept and thus contributes to the 
proposition by picking out a property to be asserted of that 
object. The object-concept coupling yields a full 
proposition; this calls us to Frege’s third guiding principle: 
“Always distinguish between concept and object” (Frege, 
p.X). In some sense, this principle is an outgrowth of the 
second because it tells us what, within the context of a 
proposition, is essential to its having a truth-value. On my 
interpretation, Frege’s three guiding principles work in 
concert to protect the logical values of propositions. 
Frege builds word-meaning out of a linguistic 
calculus that focuses on the truth-value of propositions, 
and this shows how truth-values derive from a 
proposition’s component parts. Wittgenstein takes issue 
with this view of meaning because the components of 
propositions are words, and if words are to be used 
correctly, we must have some knowledge of their meaning 
if we are to use them correctly. Frege hints at how this 
could be a plausible conception of meaning when he 
claims, “the definition of an object does not really assert 
anything about the object, but only lays down the meaning 
of a symbol” (Frege, p.78). Since words operate as 
symbols of objects for Frege, it seems we could grasp the 
meaning of words by simply looking at their definitions. 
This calls our attention to Frege’s problem of circularity: 
the meanings of words are just more words that stand in 
for them (Wittgenstein, 2002, p.12). Frege distinguishes 
between sense and meaning, but it not possible for us to 
grasp the sense of a proposition without first knowing the 
meaning of its constituent words. For Frege, grasping the 
sense of a proposition is something we ought not to 
question because it is a psychological matter; this is 
problematic because it suggests that the logic of grammar 
itself provides us with word-meaning. For Frege, grasping 
the sense of a proposition is supposed to lead us to the 
meaning of that proposition; but we cannot grasp the 
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sense of a proposition without first knowing how to use 
words in a meaningful way. Wittgenstein grounds our 
meaning in use because he realizes no proposition can be 
understood without some mastery of language. Baker and 
Hacker claim Wittgenstein turned from Frege’s conception 
of meaning because the various uses a proposition may 
have cannot be depicted as a mere function of the 
meanings of its component parts and structure (Baker and 
Hacker, p.281). To understand the truth-value of a 
proposition requires that we first know how to use words. 
Wittgenstein’s focus on use challenges Frege’s 
formulation of the context principle that insists the meaning 
of a word is tied to the sense of a proposition. For 
Wittgenstein, “the meaning of a word is its use in 
language” (Wittgenstein, 2002, p.18). Wittgenstein calls us 
to “look and see” (Wittgenstein, 2002, p.27) how words are 
used. When we think of actual cases in which we use 
words, the problem of their meaning disappears; we then 
can see how words operate in the context of propositions 
that in turn only operate in a larger linguistic context. 
Frege’s theory of meaning makes it seem as though 
propositions are intelligible in isolation from the rest of 
language, but Wittgenstein argues, “There is no such thing 
as an isolated proposition. For what I call a ‘proposition’ is 
a position in the game of language” (Wittgenstein, 1995, 
p.5) The meaning of a proposition is not to be thought of 
as something independent of the rest of language; rather, 
propositions can only be understood in the context of 
linguistic practices. Our linguistic practices show how we 
use words, and word-use is directed by the rules of 
language. Though rules help us understand how to use 
words, words do not have a fixed meaning or application; 
words maintain ‘family resemblances.’ The notion of family 
resemblances make clear that our application of a word 
‘resembles’ other ways in which we use that word 
(Wittgenstein, 2002, p.27). Since linguistic practices 
operate according to the rules of certain linguistic contexts 
guiding us toward the meaning of words, Wittgenstein 
describes our use of language in terms of language-
games. What are language-games? What do language-
games show us about our linguistic practices? 
Wittgenstein’s use of ‘language-game’ is not his 
attempt to offer a systematic account of language, as 
Frege had done. Rather, Wittgenstein uses language-
games to look more carefully at what we do in our linguistic 
practices while drawing our attention to the limitations of 
systematic analyses (Stern, p.21). Language-games 
illuminate the similarities between language and games by 
calling our attention to the role that rules play in these 
practices. Though language-games function as heuristic 
tools, they should not be considered only in this way; 
‘language-game’ employs the use of language itself. 
Language-games are practices of language, and they 
exemplify our use of language in certain contexts. By 
comparing language with games, Wittgenstein 
underscores the importance of rule-following. How do rules 
function in language-games, and what impact do they 
have on word-meaning? 
Wittgenstein claims, “A rule stands there like a sign-
post” (Wittgenstein, 2002, p.34) This claim draws our 
attention to signs, which help us understand the role that 
rules play in word-meaning. When dealing with a sign, we 
need not interpret the rules of that sign in order to obey it; 
rather, “Obeying a rule is a practice” (Wittgenstein, 2002, 
p.69). Following a rule is not a matter of guessing at the 
intended meaning of a sign; rather, our use of a sign that is 
in accordance with a certain rule involves explicitly 
formulating the rule one is following (Wittgenstein, 2002, 
p.69). For example, when one points a finger, it operates 
as a sign showing others to look at whatever it may be 
pointing and not at the finger itself. This elucidates how 
rule-following operates without inciting widespread 
ambiguity of a sign’s meaning. This is not to say ambiguity 
never arises; if it does, one must raise questions and 
provide explanations, but there is no need to explain 
ambiguity that may arise unless some ambiguity actually 
does arise (Stern, p.125). Wittgenstein claims: “One may 
say: an explanation serves to remove or to avert a 
misunderstanding – one, that is, that would occur but for 
the explanation; not every one that I can imagine. The 
sign-post is in order – if, under normal circumstances, it 
fulfills its purpose” (Wittgenstein, 2002, p.35). The 
importance that I am attributing to signs is that their 
meaning is unambiguous because of the role of rule; this 
point can be made by looking at the role rule play in 
games. 
When rules of a game are taught, one learns a 
practice that assures obedience to those rules. These 
practices do not need further explanation because rules 
guide the moves we make. By following the rules of our 
language, we can unreflectively understand new 
propositions and use words without having to raise 
questions about how we understand their meaning. 
Wittgenstein argues we show that we understand the 
meaning of words if we can use them in meaningfully 
ways; issues concerning word-meaning do not arise in our 
linguistic practices because rules govern how we use 
words in context. The contexts of our linguistic practices in 
which our words have meaning are language-games. 
Whether a word is in accord with or conflicts with the rules 
of a language-game stems from the more fundamental 
concept of obeying a rule. If a word is to have a meaning, 
it must be used in agreement with the rules of a language-
game. I take rule-following to be central to the question of 
word-meaning for Wittgenstein because rules determine 
what count as valid moves in language-games. Thus, the 
context of language-games is that which confers meaning 
upon our various uses of words for Wittgenstein. It is clear 
Wittgenstein extends the scope of Frege’s context principle 
to consider our use of words in language-games rather 
than focusing on the logical role words play in individual 
propositions. This draws our attention to how linguistic 
practices are similar to games, which underscore the 
importance attributed to rule-following and the way in 
which word-meaning is tied to use. Wittgenstein’s 
transformation of the context principle does not open him 
to Frege’s problem of circularity. Frege sought to ground 
the meaning of words in the logic of our grammar, but 
Wittgenstein focuses on our use of language. The move 
from propositions to use enables Wittgenstein to highlight 
the conventionality of how our words gain meaning. Since 
Wittgenstein ties word-meaning to our conventional 
practices, he avoids Frege’s problem about how it is that 
we can grasp the sense of a proposition without first 
knowing the meaning and use of its constituent parts 
(words). 
Frege’s three guiding principles offer an account of 
word-meaning that stands open to the objection of 
circularity. I have argued Wittgenstein’s meaning-as-use 
can best be understood as a transformation of Frege’s 
context principle. By focusing on use, Wittgenstein shows 
that words have meaning because our use of them follows 
from the rules of particular language-games. Frege sought 
to establish the context principle to protect the truth-values 
of propositions and their components parts from the 
psychological. Frege’s focus on the internal logical 
relations between the words of a proposition to fix their 
meaning led him into problems of circularity. Wittgenstein, 
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however, extended the scope of Frege’s context principle 
to underscore the importance that rule-following plays in 
our linguistic practices, and to situate the meaning of 
words and propositions within the larger framework of 
language; “A proposition is a sign in a system of signs. To 
understand a proposition is to understand a language” 
(Wittgenstein, 1995, p.131). We understand propositions 
when we understand the role that words play in a 
language-game. To formulate propositions, we need to 
understand the meaning of our words, and we need to 
know how to use them. Thus, Wittgenstein looks not to 
propositions for the meaning of words as Frege had, but 
he focuses on use. 
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Naturalistic Ethics: A Logical Positivistic Approach 
Sibel Oktar, Istanbul, Turkey 
The view that ethical words, such as good, correspond to a 
natural object is generally categorised as ethical 
naturalism. In a wider perspective, it is a view that 
abandons any link to the supersensible account of ethics. 
Alternatively, if we recall some of the definitions of G.E. 
Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, like ‘reduction of the ethical to 
the non ethical’ and say that this is mostly committed by 
the naturalists; we arrive at a narrower sense of ethical 
naturalism. In this sense of ethical naturalism, ethical 
knowledge, if any, needs to be acquired by experience. 
Thus, statements of ethical value judgements could be 
examined in the same way as empirical propositions. The 
logical positivists’ refutation of metaphysics is based on the 
fundamental idea that any meaningful statement should be 
capable of being empirically verified. This includes value 
judgements.  
Schlick’s position, no doubt, represents such a view. 
He openly states, in Wittgensteinian sense, that any 
ethical question that has meaning can be answered, thus if 
there is a meaningful question then “ethics is a science” 
(Schlick 1959, p.247). So, before deciding whether ethics 
is a science or not, we need to answer the question, ‘are 
there ethical questions that have meaning?’ 
First of all, looking at the fundamental nature of 
ethics Schlick defines it as ‘theory or knowledge’. He puts 
it clearly that ethics ‘seeks knowledge’ and it ‘seeks to 
understand’ its subject matter. For Schlick, the subject 
matter of ethics – if we think that it is a science – must be 
known as clearly as the subject matter of ‘biology’ or 
‘optics.’ 
Schlick thinks that, as we are talking about ethics in 
ordinary life without difficulty, as we know the word ‘light’ 
even before there was such a science of optics, therefore 
we must know the meaning of the names of the objects in 
ethics. So restricting the subject matter of ethics to the 
definition of ‘good’ is not reasonable, it might have started 
with defining ‘good,’ but it should not end when we define 
it. Although Schlick allows the idea of inventing the 
concept of good ‘quite arbitrarily’, he does not accept 
defining the concept ‘completely arbitrarily’; the person 
who is defining the word ‘good’ will be limited by some 
norm as a guiding principle (Schlick 1959, p.250). In this 
line of argument, R.M. Hare’s main criticism of naturalistic 
ethics is that defining the word ‘good’ arbitrarily becomes 
meaningful. Hare points out that this is different from a 
logician’s arbitrary definition of ‘his own technical words’ to 
provide clarity. Considering the nature of the study, this 
way of defining concepts is not acceptable for the word 
‘good’. As the word ‘good’ has a function in language, 
while investigating we should let it function as it is. For 
Hare, if we change the function of the word ‘good’ by an 
‘arbitrary definition’ then we are no longer studying the 
same thing (Hare 2003, p.92). Schlick escapes this 
criticism by saying that the concept of good is already 
determined by norms, but whether these norms let the 
language function as it is depends on what he understands 
by these norms.  
It is difficult, if not impossible, to point at ‘good.’ At 
this point, says Schlick, most philosophers develop a false 
hypothesis that taking the fundamental concept of good 
given, we possess a special ‘moral sense’ that point out 
the ‘presence of good.’ So we are able to say that good 
has an objective character. But this hypothesis falls short 
in explaining the variations in moral judgement. So how 
would ‘ethics’ take its place, if it could, in the realm of 
facts? 
Schlick’s mention of norms does not presuppose a 
normative ethics. His method is somewhat similar to 
Wittgenstein’s, he introduces ‘normative ethics’ as one of 
the approaches that draws a connection between facts 
and values, but it is not what takes ethics to be. Having 
known that Wittgenstein has a great influence on him, it is 
not surprising that he follows Wittgenstein’s steps. 
Introducing ‘norms’ and/or ‘standards’ to define (to 
fix) the meaning of the word ‘good’, reminds us of 
Wittgenstein’s relative sense of value. In “A Lecture on 
Ethics” (LE), Wittgenstein makes a distinction between 
relative and absolute senses of value judgements and he 
says that it is the absolute sense of value judgements that 
cannot be said. We can express value judgements if they 
are relative value judgements, i.e., if they correspond to a 
fact or predetermined standards. However, absolute value 
judgements do not correspond to facts thus they cannot be 
expressed. 
Schlick’s emphasis on norms does not suggest that 
ethics is a ‘normative science,’ rather it is the starting point 
of his quest to define whether it is a ‘normative science’ or 
a ‘factual science’. As the characteristics of good must be 
able to point certain facts you could distinguishing the 
‘formal’ and ‘material’ characteristics of ‘good’ (Schlick 
1959, p.252). Schlick says that in the external or formal 
characteristic of good, “the good always appears as 
something that is demanded, or commanded” (Schlick 
1959, p.252); as seen in Kant’s moral philosophy, in which 
the formal characteristic is displayed in ‘the categorical 
imperative’. This formal characteristic of good is not only 
seen in Kantian ethics, but also in others, as theological 
ethics taken to rest on God’s command. Schlick 
appreciates the formal characteristics of good as a 
preliminary step, the mistake, he thinks, is considering it as 
the only characteristic of good. On the other hand, there 
are material characteristics of good which, for him, need to 
be considered. 
The way Schlick formulates his ideas of what could 
be the material characteristics of good is very similar to 
Wittgenstein where in LE he compares substitutes for good 
to the Galton’s composite photographs method, in which I 
think lies the germ of the idea of family resemblance. 
Schlick’s suggested procedure is looking at the individual 
cases where we used the word good and search for 
common features of each case. For Schlick, within the 
common features of the word ‘good’ “must lie the reason 
why one and the same word, “good,” is used for the 
several cases” (Schlick 1959, p.253). This procedure 
almost echoes Wittgenstein who, in Philosophical 
Investigations (PI), says that when we are searching for 
the meaning of the word ‘good’ we must look at the 
language-games where the word ‘good’ is used (PI, 77). 
The critical question at this point is, ‘are there any 
such common features?’ At first sight it seems that there 
are more incompatibilities than similarities in various actual 
cases. Here the question is the universal validity of these 
common features. Schlick gives the example of polygamy 
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to point out that a discrepancy in ethical judgements is 
only ‘apparent and not final.’ He states that what is morally 
judged is not polygamy or monogamy rather what is 
morally valued is the ‘peace of family’ or ‘order of sexual 
relationships’. One culture believes that these can be 
attained by polygamy whereas the other believes that they 
can be attained by monogamy. Both are trying to attain the 
same end by different means. What is different is the 
“virtue of their insight, capacity of judgement or 
experience” (Schlick 1959, p.254). 
Applying this procedure of common features we end 
up having ‘norms’ as mentioned above. When we apply 
the procedure to norms it leads us to ‘moral principles’. If 
we think that the aim of ethics is to determine the concept 
of good and find out that this can be accomplished by 
providing moral principles through norms, then we could 
conclude that ethics is a ‘normative science’. But, for 
Schlick, positioning ethics as a normative science makes 
ethics seem something completely different from ‘factual 
sciences’ and this position is fundamentally false.  
The main reason is this: Even if we accept ethics as 
a normative science, it does not matter whether it is 
normative or factual; a science can only ‘explain’ and 
cannot “establish a norm”. He thinks that, if we explain 
‘what is good?’ using norms we can only tell what it 
‘actually’ means rather than what it should mean. For him, 
the search for an ‘absolute justification’ of ‘ultimate value’ 
is senseless. Echoing Tractatus (TLP) 6.4, which says, “All 
propositions are of equal value”, Schlick says: “there is 
nothing higher to which this could be referred” (Schlick 
1959, p.257). So, the justification process ends at the 
highest rule, on which the justification of others depends. 
What are we trying to attain? Absolute certainty? Schlick 
states that “[a]ll important attempts at establishing a theory 
of knowledge grow out of the problem concerning the 
certainty of human knowledge. And this problem in turn 
originates in the wish for absolute certainty” (Schlick 
1959a, p.209). 
Similarly for ethics, the problem turns out to be the 
certainty of ethical knowledge. For Schlick, theory of norms 
is not an answer for “the validity of valuation” (Schlick 
1959, p.257).Schlick thinks that even if ethics is a 
normative science, you cannot escape its connection to 
the factual sciences, because “[t]he ultimate valuations are 
facts existing in human consciousness” and for him this is 
“the most important of the propositions which determine its 
task” (Schlick 1959, p.258). 
Although the attempt of the theory of norms does 
not go beyond trying to find the ‘meaning of the concept of 
good’, Schlick appreciates it as a preliminary step into the 
main concern of ethics. But, he immediately adds that 
“only where the theory of norms ends does ethical 
explanation begin” (Schlick 1959, p.260).  
A system of norms provides “a relative justification 
of the lower moral rules by the higher” (Schlick 1959, 
p.261). When it comes to the justification of moral rules 
and the universality of them, Schlick’s conception of the 
theory of norms almost brings us to Kant’s hypothetical 
imperative. Only through the hypothetical imperatives can 
we talk about the relative sense of values (cf. AK 4:4281). 
                                                     
 
1 References to Kant give the pages in German Academy of Sciences (AK) 
edition of Kant’s collective works. 
For Kant, hypothetical imperatives do not provide 
strict universal validity. Here we come across with the idea 
of causality, which is important both for Kant and Schlick, 
although they reach totally different conclusions. Schlick 
says that scientific knowledge “refers to the cause, 
concerns not the justification but the explanation of moral 
judgements” (Schlick 1959, p.261). Kant says that moral 
law is a law of a special causality “just as the metaphysical 
law of events in the sensible world was a law of causality 
of sensible nature” (AK 5:47). But this is quite different 
from what Schlick has in mind when he says that ‘ethics 
seeks causal explanation’. The difference is that Kant 
asserts that moral law is “a law of causality through 
freedom and hence a law of possibility of a supersensible 
nature” (AK 5:47), Schlick in no way could accept this. I 
believe, Schlick could sacrifice the idea of strict universality 
and he could live with the universality that experience 
provides. Hence his attention turns from justification to 
explanation. 
The explanation of moral judgements takes us into 
the realm of observable causes and effects. For Schlick, 
the explanation of moral judgement and conduct is 
inseparable (Schlick 1959, p.261). So the question 
becomes ‘why is it a standard of conduct?’ rather than 
‘what is the standard of conduct?’ We need to look at the 
behaviour of people to understand and explain because a 
person’s “valuations must somehow appear among the 
motives of his acts” (Schlick 1959, p.262). Considering that 
language is also a kind of action Schlick states that: “What 
a man values, approves, and desires is finally inferred from 
his actions” (Schlick 1959, p.262).  
Schlick suggests that instead of just focusing on 
moral conduct, it is better to study ‘motives of conduct in 
general.’ So first we must study the ‘natural law governed 
behaviour’ and then study moral behaviour, and find what 
it is that is special in moral action. And this brings us to the 
conclusion that “moral behaviour is purely a psychological 
affair” (Schlick 1959, p.263). This does not mean that 
‘there is no ethics’ but that ethics belongs to the realm of 
psychology because its method is psychological.  
Separating ‘value judgements’ into two categories, 
as ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ is enforced by the fact-value 
distinction. We could explain certain uses of ‘good’ with the 
help of facts whereas other uses of the word good could 
hardly be explained by facts. That is why Schlick and 
Wittgenstein had the urge to introduce the relative and 
absolute sense of value judgements. But, at this point, the 
main difference between Wittgenstein and Schlick is that 
Wittgenstein was aware that relative value judgments are 
not problematic, the real issue was in the absolute sense. 
Schlick never attempted to approach absolute value 
judgements and tried to explain only relative value 
judgements. So we can ask, is it really only relative value 
judgements that we are concerned with ethics? I suppose, 
this is not what Wittgenstein understands by ethics. Thus, 
saying that ethics is psychology, is only answering the 
questions related to relative value judgements. Since 
ethical discourse related to predetermined standards was 
never a problematic concept in terms of fact-value 
distinction, Schlick’s scientific approach to ethics still 
leaves the absolute sense of ethics as inexpressible. 
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The Evolution of Morals 
Andrew Oldenquist, Columbus, Ohio, USA 
“Any animal with social instincts 
 would inevitably acquire a moral sense  
as soon as its intellectual powers  
became like those of humans.” 
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, Ch. 4 
We have ancestors, 100,000 years ago, I’ll guess, who 
had no morality–no moral concepts, moral beliefs or moral 
codes. We have more recent ancestors who did have 
moral beliefs and moral codes. What happened in be-
tween? By what describable changes did our earlier an-
cestors’ anger at theft become moral disapproval? There 
are two parts to my explanation of this change: an account 
of how most of the content of current morality resulted from 
the evolution of love and human sociality, and second, 
bridge theories, which are lists of word usage descriptions 
that tell us when a positive or negative feeling turns into a 
moral belief. From facts about innate sociality and lan-
guage I shall derive “S believes A is wrong,” but not “A is 
wrong.”  Moreover, unlike most definitions of “good” or 
“morally wrong,” a description of usage can convey the 
function of moral language without designating anything 
that is morally right or wrong.  
The consensus of paleoethnologists is that humans 
evolved biologically to be social animals, which included 
the evolution of certain wants, fears and anxieties required 
for social living and which then were culturally reinforced. 
Even in pre-linguistic societies some behavior had to be 
taboo and deterred by fear of punishment or banishment.  
Philosophers and scientists have long tried to 
explain altruistic motives, given that they appear to 
diminish likelihood of survival and therefore ought to be 
selected against in evolution (Hamilton, 1964). It is widely 
believed either that only perceived self interest can move 
us to act, or that both morality and self-interest are 
effective motives for action. Both alternatives depend on a 
false dichotomy that gets its plausibility from the distinction 
between particulars and kinds. The object of self-interest is 
a particular, not a kind of thing: my self-interest attends to 
me but even in the same circumstances not necessarily to 
my clone or identical twin. But morality, it is said, may 
judge a person only by qualities other people can have too 
such as cruelty, kindness or unfairness. No rule of social 
morality can refer to me and consequently moral terms 
designate qualities, not particulars.  
However, group egoism generates moral judgments 
that combine descriptions and egocentric particulars: 
“Because it’s mine” is as fundamental as “because it’s me.” 
Group egoism explains a large part of social morality 
including obligations based on love and loyalty to my mate, 
my children, my clan or country. It can conflict with egoism 
as well as with impartial principles. 
It will not do simply to say that if I may do something 
everyone may, for the natural response is, “Every what?” 
Every fellow club member, fellow American, fellow 
Christian, fellow human being, rational being, suffering 
being? These nested and overlapping domains of course 
make morals complicated. Social morality’s constraint 
within domains defined by group loyalties and social 
identities shows there is no sharp line between self-interest 
and altruism and that the possibility of altruism is not the 
fundamental question of moral psychology. The neo-
Darwinian explanation of group loyalties as well as kin 
selection is that they are non-universalizable outside of a 
designated group because they fix on the physical 
coordinates of where one’s DNA type is likely to be 
located, or where protectors or caretakers of it such as 
one’s clan or country are located. 
1. Kin selection, as developed by William D. 
Hamilton (Hamilton, 1964), is caring for relatives according 
to their degree of relatedness and it evolved independently 
of motives or understanding, as in the clear case of the 
social insects. Human parents value their child, who has 
one half of each parent’s DNA, more than their grandchild, 
who has one fourth, and their grandchildren more than 
mere friends.  
2. Increasingly prolonged infancy and the 
dependence of young children were made safer by the 
evolution of parental love, loss of estrus and sexual 
romantic love. Each of these increased the likelihood that 
dependent young children would have both parents around 
long enough to survive on their own. Love, like loyalty, 
makes certain behavior feel necessary independently of 
considerations of self interest. It is our strongest passion, 
explains our strongest feelings of obligation because they 
most directly protect our DNA, and shape our world.  Love 
is directed to a particular and not to a kind of thing 
because it evolved to protect one’s children, who have a 
particular location.    
3. A number of mutually reinforcing things evolved 
to make us innately social, including kin selection, love, 
group loyalty, the felt need to belong, and fear of 
banishment. Feelings of security when living amongst 
familiar people with familiar social practices and in familiar 
spaces, fear of being outcast, and the world-wide 
development of ritual and ceremony, are all constitutive of 
human sociality. 
Kin selection cannot explain altruism on the broader 
level of the clan. What was selected for was clan loyalty 
and other varieties of group egoism which do not depend 
at all on how close one is genetically to fellow clan 
members. Group loyalty was selected for because people 
in clans were safer than those who lived alone or just with 
immediate family. 
Evolved emotional predispositions include our need 
to belong to groups and acquire social identities and 
loyalties, all of which makes the group fare better and 
thereby protect us better than if there were no group 
loyalties and social identities. Love, kin selection and 
innate sociality constitute the evolutionary basis of social 
morality and explain actions felt to be necessary 
independently of self interest. Arriving more recently than 
kin selection and love, loyalty made individuals emotionally 
dependent on clans and willing to sacrifice for them. This is 
in our DNA because those who clove to their clan were 
more likely to survive and pass on this disposition, 
whereas those who lacked such an attachment were more 
likely to wander off and starve, be killed by an enemy tribe 
or be dinner for a big cat. Another way to view a clan is as 
an advantageous environment to which individuals 
adapted.  
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What we now require is a bridge theory–something 
which, based on the preceding, says how ordinary likes 
and dislikes differ from moral beliefs. The bridge theory 
lists conditions I call marks of the moral. Satisfying the 
marks of the moral tells us that S believes or at least 
asserts that A is immoral, but it does not tell us that A is 
immoral. Our ancestors had moral beliefs and moral codes 
when their aversions, hates and likings came to satisfy the 
marks of the moral. If their beliefs only partly satisfied 
these conditions they would have had borderline cases of 
moral beliefs. We want to think a judgment is either moral 
or non moral, but in human affairs almost everything 
shades off into what it isn’t. A dislike or negative attitude 
toward something turns into a moral belief or moral 
judgment when enough of the following features 
characterize it: 
 
1. It concerns benefit and harm to humans and the 
higher animals. 
2. It is communicated by special words.  
3. It appeals to reasons that have a general appeal 
in the community. 
4. It is universalizable, that is, a person is willing to 
judge similar cases similarly, even when one of 
these cases concerns oneself. 
5. It can require actions contrary to self-interest. 
6. It is taught to the young. 
7. It is all things considered, that is, it judges an ac-
tion in the light of self-interest, effects on others, and 
anything else thought relevant. 
8. It often is promulgated ritually and ceremonially, 
as a way of indicating that the community and not 
just an individual is speaking. 
9. It expresses a positive or negative attitude toward 
the object of the judgment. 
10. It is urged upon the listener and rejection of 
what is urged is answered with anger or argument. 
11. It is preached in formal religious and political 
settings. 
If a clan spoke, reasoned and acted in ways 1-11 they had 
morals, but if in not enough of these ways they did not. 
The list aims to describe the contexts and conditions under 
which reasonably educated English speakers use “morally 
wrong,” etc., and is what I suggest should replace defini-
tions of moral words. This is in the spirit of Ludwig Witt-
genstein’s admonition, in Philosophical Investigations, to 
consult the use, not the meaning. These eleven conditions, 
singly or together, carry neither moral realist nor emotivist 
theoretical implications.  
Before they had language our ancestors had to be 
social. The emotional predispositions for sociality had to 
evolve before the evolution of language, the latter requiring 
the evolution of the brain’s speech center, the voice box, 
infant babbling and, of course, people to talk to. Could they 
have moral beliefs? My suggestion is they could not if they 
couldn’t talk, and therefore couldn’t give reasons and 
argue. The evolutionary sequence had to be sociality first, 
then language, and finally morals. 
We can conjecture how particular moral ideas 
arose. For example, sense of unfairness, a moral idea, 
very likely can be deconstructed into clan rejection anxiety. 
The mechanics of unfairness is relatively straightforward; it 
is being denied benefits others receive in similar 
circumstances. A clue to understanding this is the outrage 
and anger perceived unfairness elicits, typically more than 
from equally harmful illnesses, accidents or combat. 
Unfairness has little to do with degree of perceived harm 
and everything to do with actual or symbolic exclusion, 
with being treated as an outsider or non-member when 
one is not an outsider.  
When young people are not shamed or blamed for 
behavior for which others are shamed and blamed, they 
are being treated like outsiders or non-members, that is, 
like invading Huns or wild animals. The result is alienation, 
a loss of sense of belonging and hence loss of one’s social 
identity. Given that these young people evolved to be 
innately social animals like the rest of us, they seek 
substitute social identities in gangs or counter-culture 
groups. Alienation kills sense of belonging, and hence 
pride and shame on which traditional social control largely 
depends.  
Another bridge theory provides an explanation of 
retributive justice. It is often said that retribution is revenge 
and therefore has no moral status. Retributivists explain 
retribution in terms of desert, reciprocity, or making things 
even again, so as to distinguish the moral idea of 
retributive justice from the non-moral (or immoral) idea of 
revenge. I accept that retribution is a moral idea and 
revenge is not. However, explaining retributive justice 
without incorporating revenge is hopeless. Revenge turns 
into retributive justice when the desire to harm wrongdoers 
is constrained by the following empirical conditions (or by 
an improved version of them):  
 
1. Those who decide how, if at all, to punish A are 
neither A’s relatives or friends nor stand to gain or 
lose from the decision. 
2. Similar punishments are given for similar of-
fenses. 
3. The punishment is decreed in a setting of formal-
ity and ritual, which conveys the idea that the com-
munity and not just an individual is speaking. 
4. Punishments are not secret but are codified and 
promulgated by an appropriate official body. 
5. Criminals must be believed to have actually done 
the deed for which they are being punished. 
Retributive justice thus is sanitized revenge.  Vengeance, 
the idea of a person being owed something bad, is funda-
mental to humans, showing itself not just in criminal justice 
but also in countless informal interactions such as ignoring 
or snubbing someone, cursing them, ignoring them, refus-
ing to invite or to help someone, assaulting them and so 
on. Personal accountability is a primary way societies dis-
tinguish members from non-members. The anthropologist 
Christoph von Furer-Haimendorf (Furer-Haimendorf, 1971) 
explained criminal justice as the institutionalization and 
ritualization of retaliation as societies became sufficiently 
secure and complex.  
But are moral judgments true or false, do they 
assert moral facts? These moral realist claims are logically 
compatible with the explanation of morality I have laid out. 
But must genuine moral judgments assert moral facts or 
be literally true or false? Many people, philosophers as 
well as non-philosophers, believe this is part of what moral 
words mean and they would feel that morality is an illusion 
or a fraud if moral judgments were never true or factual.  
Suppose there is an antiquated community where 
shepherds tell time, direction and the seasons by watching 
the stars and planets. When asked what stars are they say 
the stars are gods. One of them is persuaded, with the aid 
of telescopes and a little schooling, that the stars are not 
gods. He might respond, “Rats, stars don’t exist” and stop 
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looking at them, on the ground that part of what he means 
by “stars” is “gods.” Or he might be persuaded that what 
he called stars are still useful for telling time, etc., and that 
he might as well keep calling them stars. If he does, we 
need not conclude that “gods” isn’t part of what he meant 
by “stars.” Rather, he was persuaded to give up part of 
what he meant by “star” in the light of plausible empirical 
claims. We chiseled off part of what he meant by “star” but 
the ways he used the stars were not affected. So too, even 
if part of what people meant by “morally right” and “morally 
wrong” were moral facts, and moral facts do not exist, 
might we not chisel that off without their needing to 
conclude that nothing is right or wrong? 
The salient truths are the empirical ones: Our 
society and our security depend on honesty, fairness, and 
keeping unwanted hands off other people’s bodies and 
property. The differences between our morals and 
premoral clans that just yelled and banished people for 
violating taboos are smaller and more enlightening than 
some people might think. 
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Species, Variability, and Integration 
Makmiller Pedroso, Calgary, Canada 
1. Introduction 
Different from the visible spectrum, the variation among 
living organisms does not form a continuum. Because of 
evolution, life comes discretely organized in clusters called 
species. We refer to these clusters via species names 
such as “Homo sapiens” or “Drosophila pseudoobscura”.  
One can pick a particular species name and ask 
what it refers to. A different kind of question is to wonder 
what is common between the referents of every species 
name. That is, one may ask what every single species has 
in common. This paper is about the latter question. In 
particular, the main aim of this paper is to assess the 
answer provided by Boyd (1991; 1999).  
Clearly, a satisfactory account of the referent of 
species names has to capture what is characteristic about 
species. So before presenting Boyd’s view, I discuss two 
important features of biological species. Firstly, I discuss 
the extent to which the individual traits within a single 
species can vary (Section 2). In Section 3 I discuss how 
this variability is balanced with some integration. Based on 
those two sections, I derive two desiderata that a 
satisfactory conception of species should satisfy. Section 4 
motivates Boyd’s position in face of these desiderata. The 
last section offers some objections against Boyd’s view. 
2. Biological species and variability 
According to essentialism concerning species, all and 
only members of a species necessarily share an intrinsic 
property.1 That is, an organism cannot be a member of a 
species without sharing a certain intrinsic property. This 
property is commonly known as an essence. So, for the 
essentialist picture, the living world comes in “packages” 
because (1) every member of a certain species necessarily 
shares an essence; and (2) different species have different 
essences. However, despite its explanatory power, essen-
tialism appears to be incompatible with contemporary biol-
ogy.  
As Okasha (2002) points out, the incompatibility 
between essentialism and biology has empirical and 
conceptual grounds. On the empirical side, we find 
examples of species that exhibit intra-specific variability 
which rules out the possibility of species essences. On the 
conceptual side, even if all and only the members of a 
certain species share some intrinsic property, this property 
does not count as necessary for membership to the 
species. I now turn to these criticisms. 
The essence of a species can be either phenotypic 
or genotypic features of its members. Let us first consider 
the case in which essences are taken to be phenotypic.  
As mentioned earlier, essentialism can be 
understood as comprising two assumptions: (1) every 
member of a species shares the same essence; and (2) 
different species have different essences. Assuming that 
essences are phenotypic, there are two sorts of examples 
                                                     
 
1 From now on, I will use the word “essentialism” as short for “essentialism 
concerning species”. 
of species in biology that go against both (1) and (2). As to 
(1), there are examples of polytypic species that are 
immensely diverse in terms of phenotypic traits. One 
example is the butterfly species Heliconius erato. 
Concerning (2) there are sibling species that are 
phenotypically alike but are considered as different 
species because they cannot interbreed among 
themselves. The fruit flies species Drosophila 
pseudoobscura and Drosophila persimilis form such a 
case.  
Now consider the case in which essences are 
genetic. As before:  
 
Intra-specific genetic variation is extremely wide – 
meiosis, genetic recombination and random muta-
tion together ensure an almost unlimited variety in 
the range of possible genotypes that the members 
of a sexually reproducing species can exemplify 
(Okasha 2002, p. 196).  
Furthermore, we can have distinct species sharing a con-
siderable array of genes. Thereby, the assumption that 
essences are genetic is empirically problematic because it 
fails to single out individual species.  
The argument presented above against essentialism 
is strictly empirical. In face of this, one may argue on 
behalf of essentialism that the empirical arguments 
presented above are not sufficient to show that it is 
impossible to find a common intrinsic property among the 
members of a species. Maybe the failure in finding species 
essences is just an empirical limitation. Okasha’s 
conceptual argument aims to rule out this possibility. The 
argument runs as follows. Suppose that every member of 
a species shares some intrinsic property. In Okasha’s 
view, this shared property still does count as an essence  
 
For if a member of the species produced an off-
spring which lacked one of the characteristics, say 
because of mutation, it would very likely be classed 
as con-specific with its parents. So even if intra-
specific phenotypic and genetic variation were not 
the norm, this would not automatically vindicate the 
essentialist (Okasha 2002: p. 197). 
To sum up, the argument against essentialism has the 
following format. First, if we look at species studied in biol-
ogy, essentialism has no empirical support. It is not the 
case that, for any species, we can find some trait – be it 
phenetic or genotypic – that is shared by all and only the 
members of the species in question. In addition, even if we 
find a trait shared by all and only members of a species, it 
does not follow that this trait is an essence because it is 
not necessary for the species to instantiate it. That is, we 
may have a circumstance in which a member of the spe-
cies does not possess the trait in question.  
3. Biological species and integration 
As argued in the previous section, to appeal to intrinsic 
properties of organisms is not sufficient to demarcate bio-
logical species. Hence the individuation of species has to 
be based on the relational properties of its members and 
the environment. Contemporary biology provides an array 
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of species definitions in terms of relational properties. Such 
definitions are known as species concepts. In what fol-
lows, I consider two examples of species concepts: the 
Biological Species Concept and the Ecological Species 
Concept. 
According to the Biological Species Concept 
(henceforth, BSC), species are groups of natural popula-
tions that are reproductively isolated from other such 
groups.2 An important feature of BSC is its connection with 
population genetics, because a “reproductively isolated” 
population forms a gene pool in which gene frequencies 
vary through gene transfer within the population. Thereby, 
according to BSC, the stability of a species depends on 
isolating barriers “that would favor breeding with con-
specific individuals and that would inhibit mating with non-
conspecific individuals” (Mayr 2004, p. 178). Examples of 
such barriers include habitat isolation or reduced viability 
of hybrid zygotes.  
For the Ecological Species Concept (henceforth, 
ESC), species are understood as a set of organisms 
adapted to a particular set of resources – or, a niche.3 So, 
according to ESC, species are formed because of how 
resources are made available in face of selective pres-
sures. The parasite-host relations illustrate this fact (Ridley 
2004: 353). Suppose a parasite exploits two host species 
that have different characteristics such as morphology. In 
such a situation, the parasites will have different ecological 
resources and, consequently, they will tend to develop 
different adaptations that will in turn cause them to form 
different species.  
ESC and BSC are related because gene flow within 
a reproductively isolated population may develop shared 
adaptations to a certain niche (Ridley 2004: 353-54). How-
ever, there are situations in which these two species con-
cepts conflict. The North American oaks form distinct spe-
cies despite gene flow among these different species (Van 
Valen 1976). Furthermore, there are cases of single spe-
cies that do not exhibit gene flow among its members (Ehr-
lich & Raven 1969). Another point of conflict is that, in 
contrast to BSC, ESC permits species with asexual organ-
isms as members. 
The point of this section is not to solve the conflicts 
between BSC and ESC but rather to illustrate what makes 
species concepts distinct from essentialism. In particular, 
species concepts do not invoke any intrinsic property to 
define what a species is. Rather they show how a species 
is integrated via relational properties of its members like 
interbreed with or occupy the same niche as. Unlike es-
sentialism, species concepts are both compatible with 
widespread variability of both phenotypic as well as geno-
typic characteristics of the members of a species. 
4. Boyd’s proposal 
The goal of this section is to present Boyd’s view about 
species known as Homeostatic Property Cluster theory. 
Based on the two previous sections, I describe two desid-
erata for a satisfactory account of species. After this, I 
describe how Boyd’s view accommodates these two de-
siderata. 
                                                     
 
2 See Mayr (1970). 
3 For a more detailed definition of the ecological species concept see Van 
Valen (1975).  
The incompatibility between essentialism and 
contemporary biology (Section 2) makes room for the 
following desideratum: 
 
Desideratum I: It is not necessary that members of a 
biological species share any intrinsic property. 
The species concepts (Section 3) grounds in turn the addi-
tional desideratum: 
 
Desideratum II: Every biological species is some-
how integrated (e.g., it forms a gene pool, it shares 
the same niche, etc). 
In face of these desiderata, a satisfactory conception of 
what a species is has to ensure a big range of variability 
within a species (Desideratum I) despite the fact that spe-
cies are interconnected via relational properties (Desidera-
tum II). In what follows, I present Boyd’s view in face of 
these two desiderata.  
According to Boyd, biological species are natural 
kinds. Boyd’s conception of natural kinds is called 
Homeostatic Property Cluster (henceforth, HPC) theory. 
HPC theory comprises, inter alia, the following two claims: 
 
(C1) There is a family (F) of properties that are con-
tingently clustered in nature in the sense that they 
co-occur in an important number of cases. 
(C2) Their co-occurrence is, at least typically, the re-
sult of what may be metaphorically (sometimes lit-
erally) described as a sort of homeostasis. Either 
the presence of some of the properties in F tends 
(under appropriate conditions) to favor the presence 
of others, or there are underlying mechanisms or 
processes that tend to maintain the presence of the 
properties in F, or both (Boyd 1999: 143). 
Different from essentialism, HPC theory does not assume 
that there is a property that is both necessary and suffi-
cient for membership in a species. For HPC theory allows 
the existence of species with members that do not share 
the same single property. Because of this, HPC theory 
seems to permit enough variability within a species to sat-
isfy the first desideratum.  
HPC theory also ensures that species have some 
integration (Desideratum II) because species are coupled 
with some homeostasis. A species forms a unit because 
there is a certain set of properties that tend to co-occur 
among the species’ members. 
5. Assessing Boyd’s position 
As stated by (C2), homeostasis may occur in two forms:  
 
Homeostasis-I: some properties of the cluster F in-
duce the instantiation of other properties in F.  
Homeostasis-II: mechanisms are present that in-
duce the instantiation of properties in F.  
In the case of species individuated by BSC, we seem to 
have these two sorts of homeostasis. The fact that organ-
isms within a species interbreed may cause the species to 
share some phenotypic trait. Thus the property of inter-
breeding with conspecific organisms would induce the 
instantiation of the property to share some phenotypic trait 
(Homeostasis-I). As an instance of Homeostasis-II, one  
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could mention the many sorts of isolating barriers (Section 
3) that prevent gene flow between distinct species (Wilson 
et al. forthcoming). Despite its apparent plausibility, the 
goal of this section is to present an objection against HPC 
theory.  
The properties in the cluster F can be either intrinsic 
or relational.  According to the conceptual argument 
against essentialism (Section 2), no intrinsic property may 
count as necessary for membership in a species. But the 
same argument is also effective against Boyd’s finite 
disjunction of intrinsic properties.4 For if Okasha is right, 
there is no boundary on the variation of individual traits 
among the members of a species. Thus, if the cluster F 
contains intrinsic properties, then given the rejection of 
essentialism F could not exclude any phenotypic or 
genotypic trait. If it did exclude such a trait, F would entail 
that not having a certain property is necessary for 
membership in a species. But this consequence cannot be 
right because F would then not single out individual 
species. To make this clear, consider an example. 
Suppose an unbounded disjunction of intrinsic properties 
P1 v P2 v … and objects a and b both containing P1 and P2. 
Are they both members of the same species? As the 
disjunction is unbounded, the disjunction by itself cannot 
decide this question. Therefore, if we accept the 
conceptual argument against essentialism, F cannot 
contain intrinsic properties and so F can only contain 
relational properties.  
Now let us move to the second kind of homeostasis 
(Homeostasis-II). As mentioned earlier, isolating barriers 
between species seem to count as Homeostasis-II. An 
important feature about isolating barriers is that they are 
evolved characters between two species – e.g., courtship. 
Since isolating barriers are evolved characters, they are 
analogous to phenotypic/genotypic traits: they not only can 
vary through time, but also there is no boundary to such 
variation. In contrast, non-interbreeding caused by 
geographic separation is not considered as an isolating 
barrier because it is not an evolved character (Ridley 2004: 
355).  
                                                     
 
4 See Ereshefsky and Matthen (2005), p. 9. 
But if the previous paragraph is correct, we can 
extend the argument used above against Homeostasis-II. 
A finite disjunction of isolating barriers cannot single out a 
species. Otherwise, we would have to accept that there is 
some a priori impediment to how isolating barriers between 
two species can evolve. Hence, species cannot be 
distinguished via Homeostasis-II.  
I have drawn two conclusions so far: (i) F can only 
contain relational properties; and (ii) species cannot be 
distinguished via Homeostasis-II. Because of (i) and (ii) it 
follows that, if species are HPC kinds, then they are a 
cluster of relational properties where some of these 
properties induce the presence of others (thereby, intrinsic 
properties and Homeostasis-II are both excluded). If I am 
right about this, when applied to species, HPC theory 
collapses into a theory that is no more explanatory than 
the species concepts themselves. Boyd’s theory can only 
state that some relational property such as interbreeding 
with con-specifics induces other relational property like 
belonging to the same gene pool as. So, although the 
notions of homeostatic mechanisms or cluster of co-
occurring properties seem to carry some additional 
explanatory power, I tried to show above that these 
notions are irrelevant to comprehending what a species 
is.* 
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Limiting Frequencies in Scientific Reductions 
Wolfgang Pietsch, Munich, Germany 
1. Introduction 
Limiting frequencies have been largely discredited in the 
philosophical discussions on the interpretation of probabil-
ity. A crucial reason is that frequency interpretations are 
usually classified as objective accounts of probability which 
stands in obvious contrast to the non-empirical notion of 
infinite frequencies. In this essay I will argue that notwith-
standing these conceptual difficulties, limiting frequencies 
are an indispensable tool in theory reductions. 
Section two will be concerned with a classification of 
reduction according to its methodological role: This role 
can be ontological, i.e. concerned with unifying 
phenomena that were originally thought to be of different 
nature. Or reduction can have an epistemological function 
in making a theory simpler and thereby better applicable – 
e.g. when the general theory of relativity is simplified to 
Newton's theory of gravitation, which suffices to treat most 
phenomena concerned with the motion of planets. 
In Section three an important case of such an 
epistemological reduction is examined, which will be 
termed statistical reduction.. In statistical reductions the 
concepts of the higher-level theory necessarily involve a 
large amount of entities of the lower-level theory. 
Therefore the probability calculus is essential for this type 
of reduction. Furthermore, it turns out that such reductions 
usually require the limit of an infinite number of lower-level 
entities, i.e. limiting or infinite frequencies. 
Finally, Section four will discuss how probability in 
statistical reductions should be interpreted. The described 
use of limiting frequencies generally calls for further 
research into the conceptual difficulties of this notion: Can 
the limit be empirically justified by means of certain 
averaging procedures, e.g. time or ensemble averages? 
What is the relation between such different types of 
averages? Are there subjective and epistemic elements 
involved and if so, which role do they play? Due to their 
indispensable role in theory reduction, infinite frequencies 
cannot simply be dismissed, as often happens in 
philosophical discussions on probability.  
2. Reduction as an Epistemological  
Enterprise 
There has long been the sense that reduction comes in 
two different kinds, although the dividing line has been 
drawn in several quite different ways. Ernest Nagel (1974) 
distinguished homogeneous from inhomogeneous reduc-
tions: In the former, all concepts of the reduced theory are 
already contained in the reducing theory. In the later, the 
reduced theory employs additional concepts beyond those 
of the reducing theory, which leads to the need to establish 
bridge laws between these new concepts and the reducing 
theory. Another way, in which a distinction has been made, 
is between interlevel and intralevel reductions. Interlevel 
reductions concern theories on different levels of funda-
mentality – for example chemistry and physics – while 
intralevel reductions refer to the same level, for example 
the relation between Newton's theory of gravity and the 
general theory of relativity. When the reduced theory is not 
eliminated in favor of the reducing theory – which is mostly 
the case in interlevel reductions – one speaks of syn-
chronic reductions. When the reduced theory is given up 
after a successful reduction, this is called a diachronic 
reduction. 
In what follows we will adopt a classification that 
somewhat differs from these suggestions. We will 
distinguish two types according to the function of the 
reduction: (i) reduction as an ontological enterprise and (ii) 
reduction as an epistemological enterprise1. As with the 
other distinctions this is not meant to suggest, that one can 
always unambiguously classify a reduction as one of these 
cases. Rather, we always deal with a mixture, where each 
of the types is more or less clearly present. 
(i) In ontological reductions, phenomena that were origi-
nally thought to be quite different in nature are traced back 
to the same mechanism. Examples for this type are the 
derivation of optics from electrodynamics or the unification 
of Galileo's law of falling bodies and Kepler's laws for the 
planetary motion within the general framework of Newton's 
theory of gravity. Usually, these are intralevel and dia-
chronic reductions, where the original theories do not sur-
vive. 
(ii) Reduction as an epistemological enterprise deals with 
those cases where considerable simplification is required 
in order to apply theories in a specific context. Examples 
for this type are the reduction of thermodynamics to many-
particle mechanics or the reduction of macro- to microeco-
nomics. These epistemological reductions need not always 
be fully worked out. In many cases only certain elements 
of the higher-level theory can actually be reduced to con-
cepts of the lower-level theory, i.e. there are emergent 
aspects in the higher-level theory – at least for the time 
being. Most epistemological reductions are 'imperfect' in 
this way: the reduction of psychology to neuroscience, of 
biology to chemistry, or of chemistry to physics. Usually 
these reductions are interlevel reductions, but not always: 
a counterexample is the reduction of geometrical optics to 
wave optics. Since the different theories in an epistemo-
logical reduction each retain their significance in particular 
contexts, mostly both theories are kept, i.e. the reduction is 
synchronic. 
For the rest of the paper, the focus will be on 
reduction as an epistemological enterprise. Whenever a 
theory is simplified in order to make it better applicable, 
this can in principle be interpreted as a reduction of a 
simpler framework to a more complicated and general one. 
Two important types can be further distinguished, that I will 
call (a) parametric and (b) statistical reduction. This 
classification is not necessarily exhaustive, one can well 
imagine other types of simplification.  
(a) In parametric reduction the limit of a parameter of the 
reducing theory is taken in order to make the equations 
mathematically better manageable. This type is often said 
to be typical for reduction in physics (Nickles 1973, Bat-
terman 2002) and indeed many physical reductions seem 
                                                     
 
1 The distinction between the ontological and epistemological role of reduction 
is certainly not novel (compare e.g. Hoyningen-Huene 2007, 181-183). How-
ever, there are subtle differences between our treatment and that in the litera-
ture.  
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to work this way. Classic examples are the reduction of 
Newtonian mechanics to the special theory of relativity in 
the case of small velocities (velocity of light c → ∞) and the 
reduction of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics in 
the case of large quantum numbers (Planck's quantum of 
action ħ → 0). 
(b) We speak of statistical reductions whenever the higher-
level theory deals with a large amount of entities of the 
lower-level theory, which are treated by means of statisti-
cal methods. The reducing theory is normally concerned 
only with the behavior of a single one or at most a small 
amount of these entities while the reduced theory deals 
with the collective behavior of a huge amount of them. In 
much of the literature these types of reduction (a) and (b) 
are often lumped together – statistical reduction is consid-
ered a parametric reduction in terms of the number of par-
ticles N. But for several reasons that is itself not a good 
reduction of type (b) to type (a).  
First, statistical reduction is so abundant, that it 
merits to be considered separately. It can be found across 
all boundaries in the sciences, whenever large numbers of 
similar entities are involved: humans, neurons, atoms, 
goods etc. Second, there are important conceptual 
aspects in which statistical reduction differs from 
parametric reduction. The calculus of probability plays an 
essential role. Also, the reduced theory deals with a 
peculiar kind of entities and laws: They are statistical in 
nature as we will see in the next section. For the rest of 
this essay we will concentrate on statistical reductions. 
3. Statistical Reduction 
Not very surprisingly the decisive property, that distin-
guishes statistical reductions from other kinds, is that on 
the level of the reduced theory we deal in all aspects with 
statistical phenomena: statistical entities, statistical proper-
ties of the entities and statistical laws connecting these 
properties. We will illustrate this in the following by means 
of the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechan-
ics. Only at the end of this section other examples will be 
quickly addressed. 
Thermodynamics deals with statistical entities, e.g. 
gases, fluids, or solids. These macroscopic entities are 
composed of a large amount of the fundamental entities 
that mechanics is concerned with – namely a large amount 
of point-like masses. The properties of the thermodynamic 
entities are also statistical in nature: Quantities like volume 
V, pressure p, temperature T, or entropy S require a large 
amount of mechanical point masses in order to be 
adequately defined. Finally, statistical laws relate these 
properties with each other – examples are the ideal gas 
law pV ~ T or the second law of thermodynamics describing 
the increase of entropy. 
Starting from the lower-level theory, which is 
mechanics in the considered example, it turns out that 
most of the elements of the higher-level theory can only be 
defined in terms of continuous and differentiable 
probability distributions of the lower-level entities. On the 
basis of a frequency view of probability, these continuous 
distributions must necessarily refer to an infinite number of 
lower-level entities. A finite number of instances, e.g. a 
finite number of atoms, can only yield a discrete 
distribution function corresponding to a weighted sum of δ-
functions. Thus, in order to establish the concepts of the 
higher-level theory the transition to the infinite limit is 
essential. 
Microscopically, matter is not continuously 
distributed in space – a gas actually consists of many 
point-like masses and a lot of empty space. To define 
simple properties like volume or pressure on the basis of 
the actual discrete distribution function for the atoms turns 
out quite difficult: How for example should the boundaries 
of the volume along the edges of the gas be determined? 
There is just no unambiguous way to decide which parts of 
the empty space belong to the gas and which not. The 
question is answered on the basis of pragmatic and in 
particular symmetry considerations. The actual probability 
distribution is smoothed out everywhere and is chosen in 
such a way that the edges are as geometrically simple as 
possible. In this manner, we are led from the actual 
discrete distribution of the atoms to a continuous 
distribution which determines the macroscopic concept of 
volume.  
Similarly, the concept of thermodynamic pressure 
involves an infinite limit in order to arrive from the discrete 
concept of microscopic collisions to the continuous 
macroscopic concept of force per area. Again, symmetry 
considerations lead the way from the actual microscopic 
events to a continuous probability distribution which 
presupposes an infinite number of those microscopic 
events. 
The laws that connect macroscopic quantities – as 
the ideal gas law connects pressure, volume, and 
temperature – presuppose the infinite limit as well, simply 
because properties like pressure and volume are 
otherwise ill-defined. Sometimes, the macroscopic laws 
crucially depend on the way the limit is taken. A good 
example is the second law of thermodynamics which 
describes the increase in entropy during the approach to 
equilibrium. Depending on the way the infinite limit is 
taken, one either derives from statistical mechanics a 
deterministic second law which allows no entropy 
decrease at all – as in Ludwig Boltzmann's H-theorem 
(Boltzmann 1872). In other cases one may obtain entropy 
fluctuations. These results are not contradictory – they just 
correspond to different extents of coarse-graining.  
When other examples of statistical reductions are 
examined one encounters the same need for continuous 
distributions and the infinite limit. Statistical reductions can 
be found across all boundaries in natural as well as social 
sciences, whenever one deals with a great amount of 
similar entities: with neurons in neuroscience, goods in 
economy, human beings in population science, or errors in 
error theory. Considering the abundance of error theoretic 
methods in all kinds of scientific enterprises, the last 
example once more underlines the ubiquity of statistical 
reductions. Whenever Gaussian distributions for 
measurement values are assumed, one has implicitly 
taken the limit of an infinite number of equally distributed, 
miniature errors. 
4. Conclusion: The Need for Infinite Fre-
quencies 
The indispensable role of limiting frequencies for the mac-
roscopic concept formation in statistical reductions pro-
vides an interesting test case for the different interpreta-
tions of probability. Lately, limiting frequencies have not 
enjoyed a good reputation both among scientists and phi-
losophers of science, e.g. illustrated in the following quote 
by Alan Hájek (2007): “To be sure, science has much in-
terest in finite frequencies, and indeed working with them 
is much of the business of statistics. Whether it has any 
interest in highly idealized, hypothetical extensions of ac-
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tual sequences, and relative frequencies therein, is an-
other matter.” H. Cramér takes a similar stance: “[Limiting 
frequencies] involve a mixture of empirical and theoretical 
elements, which is usually avoided in modern axiomatic 
theories.” (quoted in Gillies 2000, 100) 
As the quote by Cramér suggests, the main problem 
of limiting frequencies seems the inextricable mixture of 
ontic and epistemic elements. This squares badly with the 
usual distinction between epistemic and ontic accounts of 
probability2. Subjective interpretations of probability – in 
terms of degrees of belief – can readily account for the 
smoothing out of the discrete probability distributions. 
However, it seems odd to interpret probabilities as degrees 
of belief within objective sciences like physics. But thus far, 
nobody has yet managed to justify the infinite limit on the 
basis of a purely objective account. Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, the scientific practice in statistical reductions 
forces us to make sense of the notion of limiting 
frequencies. Maybe the lesson is to abandon the hard 
distinction between ontic and epistemic accounts 
altogether. 
                                                     
 
2 Excellent overviews of the different accounts of probability are Galavotti 
2005 and Gillies 2000. 
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The Key Problems of KC 
Matteo Plebani, Venice, Italy 
1. The key problem of KC 
According to Floyd and Putnam, we can extrapolate from 
Wittgenstein’s ‘notorius’ remarks on Gödel’s theorem some 
philosophically insightful remarks. Let “P” be the Godelian 
sentence for the logical system of Principia Mathematica 
(PM). Wittgenstein’s key claim (KC) runs as follows: 
 
KC: If one assumes that ¬P is provable in PM, then 
one should give up the “translation” of P by the Eng-
lish sentence “P is not provable” 
The key problem of KC is the following simple remark (call 
it KP): KC is compatible with realism. In this context, “real-
ism” is the claim that mathematics is the study of a well–
defined domain of abstract objects that exist independently 
of our thought, language or experience; it implies the view 
that arithmetic is the study of the standard model N of 
natural numbers. 
However, this problem is considered in strict relation 
to the goal of providing arguments to clarify and support 
Wittgenstein’s stance concerning Gödel’s theorem. 
Otherwise KC would be an interesting remark. It is true 
that it provides genuine insight into the philosophical 
meaning of Gödel’s theorem, but it certainly throws little 
light on Wittgenstein’s thought. In order to understand why 
this is the case, it is important to follow Timothy Bays’s 
(Bays 2006, p.6) recollection of the three uncontroversial 
mathematical results upon which KC is based: 
 
1. If PM A ¬P, then PM is ω-inconsistent. 
2. If PM is consistent but ω-inconsistent, then all of 
the models of PM contain non-standard natural 
numbers—i.e., elements which the model treats as 
natural numbers but which do not correspond to any 
of the ordinary natural numbers. 
3. The translation of P as “P is not provable” de-
pends on interpreting P at the “natural numbers 
alone.” If we interpret P at a non-standard model—
i.e., at one of the models described in 2—then there 
is no reason to think that this will lead to a transla-
tion of P as “P is not provable.” 
Bays goes on to criticize the passage between 1-3 and 
KC. He maintains that we shouldn’t give up our translation 
of P as “P is not provable”, in the case PM turns out to be 
ω-inconsistent, because “there’s no reason to constrain 
our translation of P to the class of models which happen to 
satisfy PM” (Bays 2006, p.6). I agree with him on this latter 
point, but still think that the merit of KC is to underline that 
the equivalence between P and “P is not provable” holds 
only in the standard model. And we can think of cases in 
which this does matter1. But the issue is that the existence 
                                                     
 
1 We won’t discuss this point here, but we can give a sketch of our argument. 
Following an hint from Martino 2006, we think this could play an important role 
in the formulation of Godel’s second incompleteness theorem. The problem, 
roughly stated, is this: an idealised mathematician without any spatial or 
temporal limitation, could acknowledge the consistency of a system s as 
logical consequence of its axioms (that means: in every model – if there are – 
of the axioms of S, it is true that S is consistent). But not in every model for S 
the arithmetic sentence that should express the consistency of S (call it Con) 
is true. This explains why the mathematician doesn’t draw it as a conclusion 
from the axioms of S. This could give an idea of a contest in which the transla-
of non-standard model could perhaps pose a problem on 
choosing of how to translate P, but it is perfectly compati-
ble with the fact that P is true in N iff P is not provable in 
PM and that if PM is consistent, than P is true in N (and 
not provable in PM). 
In other words, not one of these results provides any 
ground for scepticism concerning the existence of the 
standard model N, because all the results are obtained 
using model-theoretic machinery, and, as has been argued 
by many, model theory is the realist framework par 
exellence. 
There is only a way in which Floyd and Putnam’s 
suggestion might be saved: it is possible (although 
questionable, see Rodych 2003) that Wittgenstein claimed 
something like KC; if so, he certainly had a great insight 
into Gödel’s results. But he might have made such 
remarks only in order to highlight an important fact that 
could be acknowledged also from a realistic viewpoint. 
This is tantamount to claiming that KC does not help us 
understand what Wittgenstein’s stance about Gödel’s 
theorem was. 
2. The myth of prose 
Why do Foyd and Putnam think that KC is a philosophical 
claim of “great interest” (p. 624)? Because they believe it 
helps to avoid a misinterpretation of Gödel’s result: 
 
That the Gödel theorem shows that (1) there is a 
well defined notion of “mathematical truth” applica-
ble to every formula of PM; and (2) that if PM is 
consistent, then some “mathematical truths” in that 
sense are undecidable in PM, is not a mathematical 
result but a metaphysical claim. But that if P is prov-
able in PM then PM is inconsistent and if ¬P is 
provable in PM then PM is ω-inconsistent is pre-
cisely the mathematical claim that Gödel proved. 
What Wittgenstein is criticizing is the philosophical 
naiveté involved in confusing the two, or thinking 
that the former follows from the latter. But not be-
cause Wittgenstein want to simply deny the meta-
physical claim; rather he wants us to see how little 
sense we have succeeded in giving it. 
That’s an application to the case of Gödel’s theorem of a 
general way of reading Wittgenstein’s remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics: I will call it “the myth of 
prose”. According to the myth of prose, the task of philoso-
phical investigation of Mathematics is to distinguish be-
tween the real mathematical content of a theorem and 
some philosophical thesis often associated to it from 
mathematicians when they expose it informally. This ap-
parently sensible approach leads to an implausible result. 
As has been argued by many, there is a perfectly legiti-
mate mathematical sense in stating that Gödel’s theorem 
shows that if PM is consistent, than there are sentence 
that are both true and undecidable in PM. Certainly, in 
Gödel’s original paper (Gödel 1931) the theorem is formu-
lated in syntactical terms, using the notions of consistency 
                                                                             
 
tion of the predicate “Proof”, involved in the construction of P and Con, as 
“provable” should be given up. 
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and ω – consistency, but in currently available semantic 
proofs of the theorem the notion of truth is explicitly used, 
thus providing a more simple and clearer demonstration 
than the original one (e.g. Smullyan 1992). Gödel himself 
proposed this concept in the introduction to his 1931 paper 
and, after Tarski, a precise mathematical sense can be 
ascribed to the notion of truth, thus leading to the central 
point: there is no mathematical reason to prefer the syntac-
tic formulation of the Gödel’s theorem to the semantic one. 
This does not mean that there are no reasons whatsoever: 
there are philosophical reasons, the main one being that 
using the notion of truth may suggest a Platonist reading of 
the theorem and, of course, Wittgenstein, among others, 
would not allow such a reading. But the problem now is to 
account philosophically for this rejection, and to do so, a 
philosophy of mathematics alternative that of Platonism 
would be called for. In this enterprise it is not helpful to 
assert that the Platonist’s favourite way of stating the theo-
rem is misleading: it is misleading only from an anti-realist 
view-point; this move thus merely begs the question.  
I want to make a simple point: maybe Wittgenstein 
is really a quasi revisionist in Frascolla’s sense (see 
Frascolla 1994), that means that he may only want to show 
that, without the metaphysical interpretation which it is 
usually accompanied by, the notion of a true but not 
provable proposition loses all its charm. But this is not the 
same as claiming that the notion of true but not provable 
sentence is a metaphysical one and, this is the central 
point: Wittgenstein must justify his position by giving 
philosophical reasons for it. Wittgenstein and his friend 
had to face the burden of the proof: the myth of prose 
could not help them.  
The issue also becomes problematic if we 
contemplate that which Floyd and Putnam consider the 
mathematical theorem proved by Gödel: 
 
that if P is provable in PM then PM is inconsistent and 
if ¬P is provable in PM then PM is ω-inconsistent is 
precisely the mathematical claim that Gödel proved 
Is the above, an apparently an uncontroversial mathemati-
cal result, really metaphysically neutral? I argue that it is 
no more neutral than the supposed “metaphysical thesis” 
(see Martino 2006).  
What does it mean to say that a formal system is 
inconsistent? In textbooks on logics the usual explanation 
runs along the following lines: 
 
A System S is called inconsistent iff for some well 
formed formula of the language L of the system α, 
both α and its negation ¬α are theorems of the  
system S. 
On making such a claim, we are considering the well 
formed formulas as a whole; we are considering all of 
them, and the same holds for the theorems of the system. 
This is tantamount to considering the well-formed formulas 
as a recursively enumerable set, a set isomorphic to the 
standard model N of the natural numbers. If there is a well 
defined notion of well-formed formula, as much as of theo-
rem of a formal system or of numeral, there is a well de-
fined notion of a structure that has the same structure as 
the standard model, N. Hilbert’s notion of a formula as a 
finite sequences of signs is unintelligible if we do not grasp 
the notion of finite. But grasping this notion amounts to 
grasping the notion of natural number. 
In short: if there is a well-defined notion of 
consistency for a formal system, there is a well-defined 
notion of a numeral, well-formed formula, theorem, and so 
forth, and there is a well-defined notion of a structure 
isomorphic to N. If this holds, there is a well-defined notion 
of mathematical truth applicable to every formula of PM, 
which is what we obtain when we interpret our formal 
language using this structure. So the supposed 
mathematical theorem collapses into the metaphysical 
thesis. The conclusion is that either the two formulations of 
Gödel’s theorem are both metaphysical theses or they are 
both mathematical results: there is no room for the prose 
versus proof distinction. 
Other factors make it extremely difficult to give an 
account of Gödel’s first theorem, which avoids make 
reference to the model N: for example, natural numbers 
are used in Gödel numbering. Of course, even if we accept 
the semantic version of Gödel’s theorem, many 
philosophical options alternative to Platonism are left open: 
we could be fictionalists, or nominalists, or intuitionists, 
although we could hardly be strict finitists. We might 
wonder whether we might be Wittgensteinians, and this 
issue is dealt with in the next paragraph. 
3. Wittgenstein and revisionism 
An important feature of Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflec-
tion is his constant claim that it should not interfere with the 
work of mathematicians: he maintained that the clarifica-
tion of the content of a mathematical theorem would never 
amount to giving up this very theorem. No mathematical 
acquisition should come under attack from philosophical 
analysis (the polemical target is the attempt made by intu-
itionists to reform classical mathematics by ruling out all 
non–constructive proof). This is another aspect of what I 
previously referred to as the myth of prose. It is acknowl-
edged that Wittgenstein hated Set Theory and made seri-
ous efforts to contrast it, as he also did on referring to 
“curse of the invasion of mathematics by mathematical 
logic” (Wittgenstein 1956, p.19). This stance appears to 
contradict Wittgenstein’s claim to non–revisionism. The 
usual reply to this objection is to state that, in discussing 
set theoretical topics (e.g. Cantor’s diagonal proof), Witt-
genstein’s concern was only to make us look at them in the 
right way: he believed that, without all the metaphysical 
smoke that they are usually surrounded with, they would 
lose all their charm; however, this would not mean aban-
doning set theory as a calculus, as piece of mathematics. 
Herein lies the sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that he didn’t 
want not drive us out of Cantor’s Paradise; he just wanted 
to make us realise that it is not a paradise. 
It is beyond the scope of the present study to 
discuss whether this interpretation works for Wittgenstein’s 
view of set theory; however, I do not believe that it works 
for the remarks made by Wittgenstein concerning Gödel’s 
theorem. Although it is a controversial issue among 
Wittgenstein’s scholars, many authoritative commentators 
(e.g. Rodych 2003 or Shanker 1988b) have pointed out 
that, in discussing Gödel’s result, Wittgenstein’s main 
concern was to show that in Mathematics the notion of 
truth must be identified with that of provability. This was in 
order to avoid a referential picture of mathematics: 
Wittgenstein rejected the idea that mathematics is about 
something (whether it consisted of mental, non- mental or 
even concrete sequences of signs is immaterial). It is not 
easy to see how this concept, if taken seriously, could fail 
to affect mathematical practice. For example, what sense 
could we give to a subject like model theory if we adopted 
Wittgenstein’s picture?  
Any attempt to defend Wittgenstein’s claims is thus 
a hard job. This probably explains why so many authors 
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have embraced the myth of prose: it saves us the trouble 
of doing such a job. The same advantage, as Russell said 
in another context, “of theft against honest toil” (Russell 
1919, p. 71). 
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The Metaphysical Relevance of Metric and Hybrid Logic 
Martin Pleitz, Münster, Germany 
1. Temporal Reasoning 
To most of our temporal statements, a quantitative element 
is essential. The statement that there will be rain says 
more than that, in the infinitely long stretch of future time, 
there exists a rainy moment. Rather, it conveys that rain 
will come a reasonable temporal interval hence. And in 
reasoning, our temporal reference often is much more 
precise. When recording events, we often reason in the 
following way:  
 
P1: Presently, it is windy. 
P2: Presently, it is 4 p.m. 
C1: It is* windy at 4 p.m. 
In planning for the future, we often reason like this:  
 
P3: The talk starts* at 5 p.m. 
P4: Presently, it is 4 p.m. 
C2: The talk will start in one hour. 
(An asterisk (*) indicates that the verb is used tenselessly.) 
There are four kinds of temporal statements involved here. 
Present statements are made by temporally indefinite sen-
tences in the present tense which do not refer to a date 
(P1). Clock statements are made by tenseless sentences 
of the form “Presently, it is t” (P2, P4). Diary statements 
are made by tensed sentences that give a date (C1, P3). 
Metric tense statements are made by temporally indefinite 
sentences which give the duration from the present mo-
ment to a past or future event (C2).  
A temporal logic that captures our temporal 
reasoning must have the resources to express all four 
kinds of temporal statements. Standard logic (propositional 
and predicate logic) cannot formalize any of these 
statements in a way which preserves their temporal 
characteristics. Date logic states relations between events 
and dates and nothing else. Thus it can express diary 
statements (“@tp” for “At t, it is* the case that p”), but 
neither present, clock nor metric tense statements. 
Standard tense logic allows temporally indefinite 
statements and therefore can formalize present 
statements, but none of the others, because its operators 
F and P cannot cope with quantities. 
2. Metric Tense Logic and the Reduction of 
Dates 
Metric tense logic with its operators F(t) for “It will be the 
case t time-units hence that” and P(t) for “It was the case t 
time-units ago that” can express metric tense statements 
and present statements. But it allows neither clock nor 
diary statements because it cannot deal with dates. Dates 
can only be dealt with by a metric tense logic that is 
grounded, i.e. that is supplemented by a unique proposi-
tion, i.e. a proposition c guaranteed to be true at exactly 
one moment. The clock statement “Presently, it is t” then 
can be translated as “P(t)c” and the diary statement “At t, it 
is* the case that p” as “Sometimes: p ∧ P(t)c”.  
For a realistic example of a grounding unique 
proposition c, we only need “some standard event which is 
presumed to be unique” (Prior 1957, 19). For the current 
system of time-keeping, c is the proposition that presently, 
Christ is born. “Presently, it is 2008” can be translated as 
“It was the case 2008 years ago that, presently, Christ is 
born.” Note that in metric tense logic, one unique proposition 
helps to reduce the whole system of dates (cf. section 4). 
If temporal instants are nothing more than dates, 
then grounded metric tense logic and Ockham’s Razor 
lead naturally to a tensed metaphysics of time, albeit one 
where past and future are graded. 
3. Hybrid Tense Logic and the Reduction of 
Instants 
Although Arthur Prior described metric tense logic in detail 
(Prior 1957, 18-28; 1967, 95-112; 2003, 159-171) and 
used it to translate date statements (Prior 1957, 19; 1967, 
103ff.), he took another way to reach the metaphysics free 
of temporal instants that his tense-theoretical intuitions 
made him look for: He invented hybrid modal logic, that 
provides, for each point of the frame, a unique proposition, 
which Prior called “world-proposition” (Prior 1967, 89) and 
nowadays is known as a “nominal”, as in a sense it names 
an instant (Blackburn 2006, 343ff.). Nominals (i, j …) allow 
the translation of date logic (Prior’s “logic of earlier and 
later”) into hybrid tense logic. “@ip” becomes “Sometimes: 
i ∧ p”, “i is earlier than j” becomes “Always: i → Fj”, etc. 
(Prior 1967, 88ff. and 187ff.; 2003, 124ff.).  
Prior took this logical result to be of metaphysical 
importance: “A world-state proposition in the tense-logical 
sense is simply an index of an instant; indeed, I would like 
to say that it is an instant, in the only sense in which 
‘instants’ are not highly fictitious entities.” (Prior 1967, 
188f.) 
4. Metric or Hybrid Tense Logic? 
For those sharing Prior’s metaphysical tense-theoretical 
convictions, there are reasons to prefer metric tense logic 
to its hybrid alternative. (I) Hybrid tense logic does not 
capture the quantitative side of many temporal statements 
(section 1). (II) Nominals, though formally innocent (e.g. 
Blackburn 2006, 343ff.; Øhrstrøm et al. 1995, 221ff.), are 
suspect from a natural language stance. As only some 
times can be characterized by unique events that are pub-
licly known, the only natural candidates we have for nomi-
nals are (a) complete descriptions of instants and (b) clock 
statements. But (a) leads to modal problems, because it 
makes impossible that something else could have hap-
pened at a certain time than what actually did. And (b) 
translates hybrid tense logic into metric tense logic. (III) 
The reduction of dates to grounded metric tense logic is 
better suited than hybrid tense logic to capture the epis-
temic side of time-keeping. Not only can a person forget 
the date (cf. Müller 2002, 193ff.), but we can also imagine 
a whole time-keeping community losing track of their 
grounding event, but still knowing the truth of many metric 
tense statements. 
A fourth reason to prefer metric to hybrid logic 
concerns its generalizability from time to other dimensions 
of logical space (sections 5-8). 
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5. Prior’s Problem 
As Patrick Blackburn has pointed out, Prior ran into deep 
problems because his tool for the reduction of temporal 
instants, hybrid logic, worked rather too well and allowed to 
reduce objects of other categories, as well – especially 
troublesome in the case of persons (Prior 2003, 213ff.; cf. 
Blackburn 2006, 362ff.). If we interpret the points of the 
frame of our modal logic as persons and personally indefi-
nite propositions to express predicates, we can translate 
statements of standard predicate logic to a “personal” ana-
logue of date logic: “Socrates is wise” becomes “@Socrates 
be-wise”. Nominals used to name persons then dissolve 
the points of personal space; we go over to “Some-
personally: be-Socrates ∧ be-wise” and have lost Socrates 
(cf. Prior 2003, 215-219).  
Prior was aware of this problem. Yet he found no 
solution but to simply proclaim that “persons just are 
genuine individuals […] whereas […] instants are not 
genuine individuals” (Prior 2003, 219f.; cf. Blackburn 2006, 
364). Does metric tense logic, as a tool of metaphysical 
reduction, run into similar difficulties? I will argue in 
sections 6-8 that it does not.  
6. Putting Time and Space into Perspective: 
Standpoint Logic 
Thomas Müller has shown how to generalize metric tense 
logic to cover physical space and relativistic frames of 
reference (Müller 2002, 268-279): Atomic propositions are 
indefinite concerning time, space and frame, and there are 
operators changing the temporal or spatial perspective or 
which lead from one frame to another. All operators are 
metrical, corresponding to temporal intervals, spatial vec-
tors and Lorentz transformations. Müller points out that 
each set of operators constitutes a group in the algebraic 
sense. 
Now, the reduction of dates (section 3) generalizes 
to the reduction of all context-free coordinates (Müller 
2002, 276ff.). We only need to add to Müller’s standpoint 
logic one proposition uniquely characterizing a place 
(“Here is Greenwich”) and another proposition uniquely 
characterizing a frame (“At-this-velocity is Earth”). The 
metaphysical upshot is that places and frames are no 
more genuine objects than instants; our spatiotemporal 
world ultimately is perspectival.  
7. General Perspectival Identification 
But why is there no metric logic for other dimensions of 
logical space, like persons and possible worlds? To an-
swer this question, we have to isolate those features of 
metric logic and standpoint logic that allow the reduction of 
instants, places and frames. When is a modal logic suited 
for a similar reduction of the points of its frame? 
It is not the numbers: The metrical operators of a 
distance logic do not allow the reduction of spatial 
coordinates. E.g., “Two meters from here it is the case 
that” takes us to a sphere of two meters radius and thus is 
hopelessly ambiguous. We need each operator to transfer 
us to exactly one point. This condition of identification must 
be general in the sense that it is satisfied at every point of 
the model. But general identification is only a necessary 
condition, because it is met by the satisfaction operator @t 
of date logic, which of course does not allow a reduction of 
dates. For genuine reduction, we need our operators to be 
perspectival, i.e. the point the operator takes us to must 
depend on the point where it is employed. I argue that 
every general perspectival identificatory modal logic can 
reduce the points of its frame.  
To be honest to the metaphysical project of reducing 
the objects these points purport to be, we have to move 
from a model-theoretical to a syntactical (i.e. proof-
theoretical) characterization of general perspectival 
identification. Otherwise, the objects we want to get rid of 
will recur on the meta-level. I will discuss the following 
meta-theorems: (M1) A modal logic is generally 
identificatory just in case for all its operators V(n), 
V(n)¬p ↔ ¬V(n)p is a theorem, i.e. iff all operators are 
self-dual. (M2) A modal logic is perspectival just in case its 
operators form a group. The group axioms rule out 
satisfaction operators, because none of them has an 
inverse element. In sum, I suggest that a modal logic can 
reduce the points of its frame iff its operators are self-dual 
and form a group.  
8. Solving Prior’s Problem 
To solve Prior’s problem, we thus have to find reasons 
why, for persons and possible worlds, we cannot construct 
modal logics that allow general perspectival identification, 
i.e. whose operators are self-dual and form a group. For 
possible worlds, self-duality clearly fails, because it is es-
sential to alethic modality that the necessary and the pos-
sible do not fall together. For persons, the obvious candi-
date for a relation of accessibility allowing perspectival 
identification is the system of family ties (everyone can 
perspectivally identify her mother). Here generality fails: To 
construct a modal logic that would reduce persons, we 
would need a relation that allows everyone to perspecti-
vally identify everyone. But there is no relation that holds 
among all persons that is systematic and static enough for 
this purpose. 
So, where hybrid logic is too powerful a tool of 
metaphysical reduction, generalized metric logic is just 
right. It can translate context-free temporal and spatial 
statements to perspectival statements, but not statements 
about persons and possible worlds. This fits Prior’s 
metaphysical intuition that while times and places are 
logical fictions, persons are genuine objects.  
9. Worlds and Selves: What is the Role for 
Hybrid Logic? 
But what about possible worlds? If we replace hybrid logic 
by metric logic tout court, we are left with possible worlds 
seeming to be genuine objects just as much as persons. 
But while the reasons counting against hybrid tense logic 
(section 4) generalize easily to space and frame, this is not 
so for possible worlds. There is no quantitative element to 
modality (reason I), and (as shown in section 8) we cannot 
identify possible worlds by their relation to a unique world 
(reason III). What we actually do to identify a possible 
world is to describe it. Therefore, in the case of alethic 
modality, we do a have a natural interpretation for nomi-
nals, namely for each world, the maximally compatible 
proposition that uniquely describes it (reason II). In sum, 
what counts against the employment of hybrid logic con-
cerning time and space, does not count against Prior’s 
project of reducing possible worlds to world-propositions. 
So, from a natural language stance, hybrid logic is 
well-suited to deal with possible worlds. But not with 
persons (or other enduring things): Here, the only natural 
candidates for nominals contain proper names. “I am 
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Martin Pleitz”, e.g., is true at the unique point of personal 
space constituted by me. But proper names already 
presuppose the objects they name. So, a hybrid logic of 
persons, when founded on natural language, cannot 
reduce persons. 
10. Logic and Metaphysical Commitment  
Today, modal logics generally are seen as tools not for the 
decision of metaphysical questions, but to give an internal 
characterization of given structures. In this “Amsterdam 
perspective” (Blackburn 2006, 330ff.), it is left entirely un-
specified what these structures are. It may therefore seem 
strange that the preceding arguments about metric and 
hybrid logic have led to the following substantial meta-
physical theses:  
Instants, places and frames can be reduced to a per-
spectival metaphysics of space-time (by metric logic).  
Possible worlds can be reduced to maximally com-
patible propositions (by hybrid logic).  
Persons (and other enduring things) are the only 
genuine objects we are left with. 
But these metaphysical commitments do not rest on formal 
considerations alone, but on reasons concerning the appli-
cability of logical systems to our ordinary use of natural 
language. The reasons for perspectivist spatiotemporal 
metaphysics lie in our practices of time-keeping and refer-
ring to places. The reason for linguistic ersatzism about 
possible worlds is given by our practices of describing 
possible situations. And the existence of persons and 
things is connected to the practice of naming. Only in co-
operation with the philosophy of language can logic an-
swer the question of what there is.  
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Reductionism in Axiology: the Case of Utilitarianism 
Dorota Probucka, Cracow, Poland 
Utilitarianism claims that any axiology and psychology of 
valuation is grounded in individual experience. Values 
arise in primordial cognitive acts which form any axiology’s 
elementary datum. Hence, the range of values peculiar to 
a given axiology depends on the kind and content of 
individual experience. The indissoluble connection 
between axiology and epistemology prompts the 
impossibility to build an independent theory of value. Thus, 
epistemological (as well as ontological) assumptions must 
become integral part of any general axiological theory. 
Under the utilitarian conception of axiology as a the-
ory based on individual experience, axiology, epistemology 
and psychology should be integrated into one theoretical 
framework. The aim of this paper is to analyze this frame-
work, unveil its internal structure and show that reduction-
ism, which pervades contemporary philosophy and axiol-
ogy, is an essential feature of the utilitarian theory of value. 
Subjectivism and relativism are main components of re-
ductionist way of thinking. 
The doctrine of utilitarianism was created as a secu-
lar ethics which, in accordance with the assumptions of 
British empiricism, refused to acknowledge the existence 
of empirically unrecognizable beings. Empirically recogniz-
able world is the only one on which affirmative judgment 
can be made. Therefore, any attempts to go beyond hu-
man experiences are unwarranted as being cognitively 
meaningless. What remains to be done in these circum-
stances - the utilitarians claim - is to search for values as 
somehow existing in the world accessible to our senses. 
Once axiology is to be grounded in individual human 
experience, there is no other choice for a utilitarian but to 
reduce values to some facts conceived of as empirical, 
psychosomatic data. In other words, the recognition of 
values as values amounts to the recognition of facts. Does 
the reducing of values to facts mean that every fact is a 
value? Certainly not, for not all facts have anything in 
common with values. Nevertheless, those facts which are 
recognized as values still remain no more than facts. 
That’s how the idea to derive axiology from individual ex-
perience leads to reductionism ( typical of any naturalistic 
stance in philosophy), reduction being understood as a 
special relation between values and facts. 
What are facts? On The whole, they are states of af-
fairs given to us in external and internal experience. Which 
states of affairs can be referred to as values? According to 
the utilitarians, those which are preferred, valuated, de-
sired by subjects who experience these states. One must 
not attach values with states of affairs without considering 
human valuating, preferring, desiring. Values do not exist 
independently of human beings, they can’t be traced out-
side their external or internal experience. According to H. 
Sidgwick, a leading utilitarian philosopher, material things 
have no intrinsic value. We should estimate their worth and 
consider the importance of their existence solely with ref-
erence to human beings. Values are related solely to hu-
man beings. Such is the consequence of reductionist 
thinking in axiology and ethics. 
In utilitarian view, factual values do not exist outside 
sensual experience. They are important component of this 
kind of experience, but still belong to its empirical dimen-
sion as a part of natural order. Let us repeat that under this 
kind of reductionism facts form an ultimate reality which is 
the only reality. According to R. Brandt’s views expressed 
in his book Ethical Theory, utilitarianism is far from the 
view that values exist independently of the world and 
unlike variable things are changeless. 
Moreover, if values are entirely connected with indi-
vidual experience, subjectivism is the logical consequence 
of that thesis. Indeed, individual and empirical knowledge 
is conceived as the sum of the subject’s psychosomatic 
experiences. The factual values are one of possible con-
tents of these experiences.  
Utilitarianism is a philosophical trend which has 
evolved for 200 years and it has many variants. I take into 
account mainly its traditional interpretation represented by 
J. Bentham and J. S. Mill (earlier by C.A. Helvetius and D. 
Hume). J. Bentham was first to clearly define its principles 
later developed by J. S. Mill, J. Austin, H. Spencer and H. 
Sidgwick. Contemporary utilitarianism is represented by G. 
E. Moore, C.D. Broad, S. Toulmin, H. Rasdall, J. Narve-
son, J.J.C. Smart, R. B. Brandt, W.T. Stace, D. Parfit, D. 
Lyons, J.D. Harsanyi, D. Brink, R.E. Bayles. In my paper I 
omit intuitivism (so called ideal utilitarianism) initiated at 
the second half of XIX c. by H. Sidgwick and developed at 
the first half of XX c. by G.E. Moore. I analyze mainly he-
donistic branch of utilitarianism in its standard version. The 
adherents of ideal utilitarianism assume the existence of 
the moral sense which provides the abilities for the recog-
nition of values existing beyond the subject. 
Coming back to the subject matter I would like to no-
tice that the arising of utilitarian thinking was connected 
with the evolution of empirical psychology (turn of the XIX 
and XX c.) and its primordial current – psychological he-
donism. We should underline that the classical utilitarian-
ism was founded on the psychological hedonism. That 
theory, having a long tradition and many adherents 
(d’Alembert, Helvetius, Hartley, Priestley, Tucker, Locke), 
assumed that the escape from pain and desire for pleas-
ure were the main motives of human action. Positive val-
ues have been reduced to pleasurable states of subject. 
Utilitarian axiology underlines this conclusion and treats it 
as a result of inquiries made by empirical psychology. For 
these psychological hedonists “pleasure” is the primary, 
undefined notion. Thus, experience is the only way of de-
scribing it. According to C.D. Broad, there is possible only 
ostensive definition of that term, made on the basis of in-
trospection. All of us know what  pleasure is, one way or 
another, we pursue it and avoid pain and frustration 
caused by the lack of satisfaction. The experience of pain 
and pleasure must be reduced to subjective feelings. But, 
the terms, corresponding to them, will be connected with 
the individual expression of positive or negative sentiments 
evoked by their empirical referents. 
There are many variants of psychological hedonism. 
L. T. Troland in his book entitled “Fundamentals of Human 
Motivation” describes its three versions: - psychological 
hedonism oriented at the future ( the thought about the 
future pleasure as a consequence of some course of ac-
tion is a necessary condition of that action and the main 
reason of it), 
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psychological hedonism oriented at the present (the 
pleasure or annoyance experienced at the present 
determine our course of action), 
psychological hedonism oriented at the past (our 
current decision are determined by the pleasures 
and annoyances experienced in the past). 
W. Tatarkiewicz, the Polish philosopher, describes the 
discussed theory in that manner: 
 
everything what we do, we do with a view on the future, 
we need solely a pleasure, 
if we need to do something, we do it solely for the 
sake of pleasure, 
the desire of pleasure is one of the main human mo-
tives and it directs us in our decisions, 
pleasure is the aim of all human efforts.  
Independently of all these versions, for all adherents of 
psychological hedonism, the principle “people avoid pain 
and desire pleasure” is a descriptive one, which covers 
some psychological facts and characterizes human mo-
tives, reasons and behavior. Such is its epistemological 
status. I don’t inquire into the truth of this principle. The 
problem involves another question. - What will happen if 
we give normative character to the above rule? Then, a 
judgment about facts will change its meaning. It will turn 
into a judgment about duty. But, the sentence “people 
experience some pleasure and pain” is different from 
“people ought to aim at pleasure and to avoid pain”. If we 
assume the identity of these two sentences, then we will 
pass from epistemological and psychological considera-
tions to the normative level of our reflection. According to 
the descriptive principle people organize their lives. Ac-
cording to the normative principle people should organize 
their lives. For the utilitarians a transition (from the psycho-
logical level to the normative one) will be possible, pro-
vided that the factual values are perceived by people as 
superior aims of human conduct and are actually re-
spected by them. 
The world of factual values will be identified with the 
world of human purposes. But, to do it, we have to 
transcend individual, empirical experience and to extend 
the human knowledge by a contents which exceeds 
empirical data. This content must be derived from another 
source. If so, the empirical approach is insufficient. But 
utilitarian theory assumed that empirical data was the only 
possible one. Thus, we should reject that thesis, because 
it is incompatible. 
We have approached the basic problem of utilitarian 
reduction called the naturalistic fallacy. What does this 
fallacy mean (in the case of utilitarian thinking)? Let’s 
appeal to J.S. Mill and his argumentations included in the 
fourth chapter of “Utilitarianism”. According to him, the only 
proof of that some object is visible is that it is viewed by 
people. Thus the only proof that an object is desirable is 
that it is desired. The above argumentation is based on an 
analogy between epistemology and ethics, an analogy 
assumed by J.S. Mill. The epistemology, based on the 
sense of perception, would be impossible if it predicated 
on things which have never been seen by anybody. Ethics 
would be in practice unacceptable if it pertained to such 
desirable aims, which nobody has never desired. But, the 
judgment “the visual perception of some object confirms its 
capability of being visible” is not equivalent to the judgment 
“the desire of something confirms its desirability”. Because 
from the fact that something is desired doesn’t follow that it 
is worthy of being desired. From the fact, that something is 
desired follows solely that it is capable to being desired. 
J.S. Mill’s intention was to identify the word “desirable” with 
the phrase “worthy of being desired”. In this case, the 
naturalistic fallacy rests on indistinguishing what is from 
what ought to be and it is based on ambiguity of the word 
“desirable”. Duties do not follow from facts. An attribute of 
things worthy of being desired is that there some people 
who desired them. But, this does not imply that all things 
desired by people are worthy of being desired. The fact 
that something is desired is not sufficient to prove that it is 
worthy of being desired. From the judgment “people desire 
pleasure” does not follow the opinion that pleasure ought 
to be the aim of human action and, secondly, that the 
pleasure ought to be desired every time, everywhere and 
by everybody.  
Let’s recall the opinion of J. Dewey. According to 
him, desires are merely desires and that’s all what we can 
say about them. None of psychological theories is 
sufficient to build the general theory of values. In utilitarian 
axiology, the conclusion drawn from the psychological 
inquiries and the description of the human desires are 
identified with the evaluation of these states of affairs. 
Let’s repeat, description is identified with evaluation. That 
is a primary mistake of all utilitarian hedonistic thinking. 
Another important issue involves the possibility of 
experience of sadistic pleasures, such which are the 
source of the human pain. According to J. Bentham, there 
are people who have done something with ill intention. 
Let’s call it malevolence, jealousy, cruelty. Their motive of 
action will be always some kind of pleasure. It will be the 
pleasure which people experience when they think of 
somebody’s pain. That unworthy pleasure is good in itself, 
as well. It may be undignified but it is as good as any 
other. There are no better or worse pleasures. The value 
of pleasures is connected entirely with their intensity. Thus, 
if sadism is a source of our pleasure it ought to be 
recommended. If we are pleased with the sadistic acting 
we ought to prefer it. Such conclusion ensues from the 
assumption that pleasure could be the only basis of 
axiology and ethics. 
The next problem connected with reduction in 
axiology is presented by R. Nozick. Generally, this problem 
concerns what happens if we reduce all values to 
pleasurable states. R. Nozick describes some hypothetical 
situation. Let’s assume, that we are in a special 
constructed machinery which provides abilities for 
experience of many pleasures. Neurologists stimulate, by 
means of electrodes, our brains in such way that we feel 
again and again sensual pleasure. Do we want to live in 
such constructed machinery? R. Nozick gives a negative 
answer to such a question. According to him, all of us wish 
to be persons, somebody more than only the object of 
positive sensations. Therefore, a valuable life is something 
more that the sum of pleasurable experiences. If we agree 
with the philosopher in this matter we will have to admit 
that axiology, based on the primacy of individual 
experience, makes the axiological sphere very poor. That 
way of thinking reduces possibilities of men’s evolution 
because it does not invite to philosophical inquiries. Poor 
axiology makes human life shallow and degrades a human 
being. The rule “people ought to pursue of pleasurable 
states” reduces the human seeking for sense of life solely 
to one sensual sphere.  
To sum up, hedonistic utilitarianism has reduced 
human life to the pursuit of pleasurable states. Such 
thinking has treated one value as the only one and the 
most important one. Thus, pleasure has gained a 
monopolistic position in the realm of values at the costs of 
other values. N. Hartmann has compared it to the 
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developing of cancer tissue in human body, underlying 
pathological nature of such way of thinking about values. 
Reduction in axiology leads to tyranny of one value over 
the others and makes it impossible to reach the emotional, 
psychical and intellectual maturity of man. 
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The Return of Reductive Physicalism 
Panu Raatikainen, Helsinki, Finland 
1. Motivating Physicalism 
As Papineau (2001) argues, the popularity of physicalism 
among contemporary philosophers is not just a result of 
arbitrary fashion: it has rather been characteristically moti-
vated by a certain line of reasoning, which is based on the 
apparently plausible assumption of “the completeness of 
physics” and the worry that the mental would end up being 
causally epiphenomenal. By “the completeness of physics” 
one means here the assumption that all physical effects 
are due to physical causes. The exclusion argument is 
then, roughly, that anything that has a physical effect must 
itself be physical. Thus, if the mental is capable of causing 
physical effects, it must be itself physical.  
Smart (1959) therefore proposed that we should 
identify mental states with brain states, for otherwise those 
mental states would be “nomological danglers” which play 
no role in the explanation of behaviour. Armstrong (1968) 
and Lewis (1966, 1972) argued that, since mental states 
are picked out by their causal roles, and since we know 
that physical states play these roles, mental states must be 
identical with those physical states. Lewis (1966) made the 
completeness assumption explicit. More recently, Kim 
(1989, 1992) and Papineau (1993, 2001) in particular have 
pressed the exclusion argument in defence of physicalism. 
In sum, it is fair to say the exclusion argument, or 
something like it, is essential for contemporary 
physicalism. 
2. The Causal Exclusion Argument 
Let us look a bit closer at the argument. Assume first that 
reductive physicalism is false:  
 
Assumption: (distinctness) 
Mental properties are distinct from physical proper-
ties. 
However, the following three premises are – so the argu-
ment goes – apparently indisputable: 
 
Premise 1 (the completeness of physics):  
Every physical occurrence has a sufficient physical 
cause. 
 
Premise 2 (causal efficacy):  
Mental events sometimes cause physical events, 
and sometimes do so by virtue of their mental prop-
erties. 
 
Premise 3 (no universal overdetermination):  
The physical effects of mental causes are not all 
overdetermined.  
However, these four claims together are arguably inconsis-
tent. Therefore, physicalists conclude, the assumption 
must be rejected. 
 
Conclusion:  
Mental properties must be identical to physical 
properties. 
On can surely dispute this argument (as I, for one, would), 
but the point here is to emphasize just how vital this argu-
mentation strategy is for contemporary physicalism.  
3. Multiple Realizability 
The (type) identity theory is, of course, today disbelieved 
by many because of the so-called multiple realizability 
argument: it is suggested that a particular mental kind can 
be realized by many distinct physical kinds (see e.g. Put-
nam 1967, Fodor 1968, 1974, Block and Fodor 1972). 
Consider, for example, pain. It seems plausible that vari-
ous different animals – humans, primates, other mammals, 
perhaps even birds and reptiles – are all capable of having 
(the same kind of) pain. However, it is also clear that these 
different animals must have radically different physical-
chemical build-up. Therefore, it would be a mistake to 
identify the property of having (a certain kind of) pain with 
any particular underlying physical-chemical property, for 
the latter must vary greatly between different species. Fur-
ther, it has been argued that the underlying physical state 
which realizes a certain mental state may be different even 
in the same individual at different times (see below).   
4. Reductionism Strikes Back: Attacking 
the Nagelian Model  
It would be, however, premature to proclaim the death of 
reductionism. Several philosophers have accepted the 
claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized while 
nevertheless denying such non-reductionist conclusions.  
In particular, it has been often suggested that the 
anti-reductionists’ master argument (based on multiple 
realizability) presupposes the classical Nagelian picture of 
reduction (cf. Nagel 1961), but that this theory is arguably 
outdated and problematic; and that if one leans instead on 
a more accurate picture of reduction, one might be able to 
vindicate reductionism. Such arguments are certainly 
worthy of serious consideration.  
(1) Mere biconditionals are too weak. It has been 
argued that biconditional bridge laws of the Nagelian 
model are too weak, and must be strengthened into 
identities if they are to yield genuine reductions (Sklar 
1967; Causey 1977; Wimsatt 1976, 1979; cf. Kim 1998). 
What is really needed is, for example, the identity 
“temperature = mean molecular kinetic energy”, not just a 
law that merely affirms the covariance of the two 
magnitudes. In Kim’s words, “as long as the reduction falls 
short of identifying them, there would be temperatures as 
properties of physical systems ‘over and above’ their 
microstructural properties.” Furthermore, such correlations 
are badly in need of an explanation: why does temperature 
covary in just this way with mean molecular kinetic 
energy? Identifying the two magnitudes answers this 
nicely: because they are in fact one and the same (see 
Kim 1998). 
Such a view certainly has much to be said for it, but 
the relevant point here is that this stronger requirement 
hardly makes life any easier for reductionists: if multiple 
realizability ever was an obstacle to Nagelian reducibility 
via biconditionals, how much more so would it be if 
genuine identities are required? Therefore, apparently 
pressing this point is in itself little help to reductionism. 
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(2) One-way Nagelian bridge principles. It has also 
been suggested that the common anti-reductionist 
argument involves a misunderstanding of the Nagelian 
model: although Nagel’s examples involve biconditional 
bridge laws, one-way conditional connections expressing 
sufficient conditions at the reducing level are all that his 
“principle of derivability” requires. Multiple realizability, on 
the other hand, only challenges necessity reducing 
conditions, and so is not a challenge to even a projected 
Nagelian reduction of psychology to the physical sciences 
(Richardson 1979; cf. Bickle 2000). However, this 
approach is in considerable tension with the first objection 
to the Nagelian model, which requires that the connections 
between the reduced theory T1 and reducing theory T2 
must be strengthened, not weakened. Also, this strategy is 
in conflict with the exclusion argument: mere one-way 
conditionals simply won’t do; only genuine identities 
suffice. Otherwise the mental (even if it may be “reducible”) 
may end up being causally epiphenomenal.  
(3) Reduced theories are often false. Still another 
problem for the Nagelian model is presented by the 
undeniable historical fact that often the reduced theory T1 
is, strictly speaking, false, and hence its laws can be 
derived from the reducing theory T2 (which is assumed, for 
the time being, to be true) only with some false auxiliary 
assumptions, for example. This holds even for many 
classical examples of reduction in science. Consequently, 
it has been proposed that what one really reduces (e.g., 
derives from T2) is a revised version of T1 (or its “image” in 
T2) rather than T1 itself (Schaffner 1967; Churchland 
1986).  
Yet, this observation poses no serious problems for 
the anti-reductionist; she need not commit herself to any 
specific theory involving mental states (indeed, it is not 
even clear that there exists a definite theory of the mental 
that would be at stake here). She can well allow extensive 
correcting of theories. The real question here is about 
ontological reduction of properties, not about 
epistemological reduction of any particular theory. (For this 
distinction, see Silberstein 2002.) 
(4) Local reductions. Finally, it has been argued that 
the Nagelian condition of connectibility is “unrealistic and 
can seldom be satisfied” (Kim 1998), and that even in 
many paradigmatic examples of reduction in the history of 
science the reduced concept is multiply realizable; e.g., 
that temperature cannot be uniformly identified with a sin-
gle micro-based property; it may be mean kinetic energy of 
molecules for gases, but something else for solids or in 
vacuums; but one may still have “local reductions” which 
are specific to domain, structure or species – for example 
of temperature in gas, or, pain in humans (Hooker 1981, 
Enc 1983, Churchland 1986, Ch. 7, Kim 1998, Bickle 
2000).  
However, this strategy too faces problems in the 
presence of the exclusion argument: together they 
threaten to make the general property of pain but also of 
temperature causally epiphenomenal (see below). And in 
any case, this kind of reply may well be insufficient: one 
may argue for a much more radical type of multiple 
realizability, that the underlying physical realizations of a 
certain psychological property may differ even in the one 
and the same token individual over time (Block 1978, 
Horgan 1993). Arguably there is some empirical evidence 
about such plasticity (Endicott 1993). Yet, in the case of  
 
such a massive kind of multiple realizability, the idea of 
local reduction leads to absurdity. At least one key 
advocate of new wave reductionism, John Bickle, grants 
this much: “The more radical type of multiple realizability 
seems to force increasingly narrower domains for 
reductions to be relativized – at the extreme, to individuals 
at times. This much ‘local reduction’ seems inconsistent 
with the assumed generality of science” (Bickle 2006). 
5. A Reductionist Reply to Radical Multiple 
Realizability 
Bickle – following Hooker (1981) and Enc (1983) – argues 
that the radical type of multiple realizability is a feature of 
some “textbook” cases of reduction, such as the one of 
classical thermodynamics to statistical mechanics: “For 
any token aggregate of gas molecules, there is an indefi-
nite number of realizations of a given temperature – a 
given mean molecular kinetic energy. Microphysically, the 
most fine-grained theoretical specification of a gas is its 
microcanonical ensemble, in which the momentum and 
location (and thus the kinetic energy) of each molecule are 
specified. Indefinitely many distinct microcanonical en-
sembles of a token volume of gas molecules can yield the 
same mean molecular kinetic energy. Thus at the lowest 
level of microphysical description, a given temperature is 
vastly multiply realizable in the same token system over 
times … So this type of multiple realizability is not by itself 
a barrier to reducibility” (Bickle 2006). 
To begin with, a “textbook case” or not, one should 
note that some distinguished philosophers of physics have 
expressed serious doubts about this alleged reduction of 
classical thermodynamics. The locality of it mentioned 
above is actually one of the reasons, but there are many 
more: for example, statistical mechanics is time symmetric 
whereas thermodynamics possesses time asymmetry 
(Primas 1991, 1998, Sklar 1993, 1999; cf. Silberstein 
2002). So perhaps one should not make too much out of 
the contingent fact that Nagel and some others took this as 
a good example of reduction.  
Moreover, this strategy has its price; now the 
exclusion argument enters, and one must conclude again 
that temperature is a causally epiphenomenal property. 
For, temperature clearly is not identical to any particular 
token microlevel arrangement or such.1 But without 
genuine identities, one cannot circumvent the exclusion 
problem. And surely, the conclusion is implausible. For 
example, consider water boiling in a test tube. Now the 
difference-making cause of the boiling is seemingly the 
temperature (> 100°C) of its surroundings, no matter 
whether it was solid or gas, and whatever its specific 
arrangement of microparticles is. Therefore, something 
must have gone wrong. 
6. Conclusions 
Advances in understanding reduction in the philosophy of 
science must certainly be taken into account. However, 
arguably they are not as much help to reductive physical-
ism as is sometimes suggested. In particular, contempo-
rary physicalism which essentially depends on the exclu-
sion problem does not harmonize well with certain new 
views of reductionism.  
                                                     
 
1 As Tim Crane pointed out in a discussion, essentially the same worry is 
already presented (in a slightly different context) in Crane (1992). 
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Rethinking the Modal Argument against Nominal Description  
Theory 
Jiří Raclavský, Brno, Czech Republic 
Taking advantage of Kripke’s famous claim – “If the name 
means the same as that description or cluster of 
descriptions, it will not be a rigid designator.” (Kripke 1972, 
276) –one can complete a Kripkean modal argument (MA) 
against description theory of proper names. It is sufficient 
to use Kripke’s key thesis − proper names are rigid 
designators − as a second premise and formulate an 
appropriate conclusion.1 I will confine myself to the version 
of MA directed against the Nominal description theory 
(NDT). According to NDT, the meaning of a proper name N 
is the same as the meaning of a nominal description ND, 
‘the only individual named N’ (or ‘the only bearer of N’). It 
is an interesting proposal going against the meaning 
reduction advocated by Saul Kripke. NDT as a semantic 
theory has been recently defended mainly by Kent Bach 
(1987).2 Here is my MA: 
 
If a proper name has the same meaning as 
a nominal description, it is not a rigid designator. 
A proper name is a rigid designator. 
Thus, a proper name does not have the same 
meaning as a nominal description.  
MA is an instance of modus tollens, which shows its valid-
ity.3 Nevertheless, Bach’s early critical comments on the 
use of the argument (Bach 1981, 152) made me rethink 
the formulation of MA and re-examine its soundness. Here 
are several objections to MA (only the first one was ex-
pressed by Bach): 
 
i. ND is a rigid designator. For there is no possible 
world W in which an individual is named N and it is 
not picked out by the respective ND.  
ii. If ND is a non-rigid designator due to the fact of 
baptizing of an individual by N, thus not singling out 
N before the baptism by N, then N is a non-rigid 
designator too. For despite N behaves rigidly after 
the baptism, it does not designate N before the bap-
tism (or in those worlds in which N is not baptized 
by N). 
iii. When we identify the meanings of N and ND (or 
certain other suitable rigid description), the Kripkean 
MA does not force us to accept its conclusion. Al-
though MA is valid, its soundness is doubtful. 
The evident contingency of baptism is in fact the main 
issue. The question of rigidity or non-rigidity of nominal 
descriptions is closely connected to it. To resolve the puz-
zles arising from the above objections, I will expose a 
comprehensive picture of language and its explication. 
                                                     
 
1 Scott Soames (1998) formulated another MA. I will not examine here the 
differences between my and Soames’ version. Btw. Soames did not take into 
account rigid descriptions (including nominal ones).  
2 The first proponent of NDT was Bertrand Russell followed by William Kneale. 
Recently, François Récanati and also Stefano Predelli proposed a ‘formal-
pragmatic’ version of NDT (the meaning of a nominal description in not the 
meaning of proper name but it occurs somehow in its ‘content’). 
3 The attack against its formal validity raised by Brian Loar (and followed by 
Bach) is wrong. I have not enough space to prove it here. 
Language and its explication within an  
intensional framework 
A natural language was developed by our predecessors as 
a medium serving for transmission of information about 
facts. An elementary fact consists basically in an individual 
possessing certain property. Suppose that a subject S 
confronted with an external reality recognizes various indi-
viduals and manages a set of pre-theoretically given at-
tributes (properties, relations) denoted by predicates of a 
language L used by S. Modelling attributes as mere 
classes of individuals, as it is common within extensionalis-
tic construal of language, is inadequate because a class is 
given by objects belonging to it. It is thus necessary for an 
individual to be a member of a given class. Empirical facts, 
however, are undoubtedly contingent. It is clear that there 
is a plentitude of conceivable distributions – not just a sin-
gle one – of the same attributes over the same individuals. 
Each of (realizable) distribution is a possible world. Possi-
ble worlds serve then as an index enabling us to model 
contingency, a modal variability. Attributes are explicated 
as certain intensions, namely as mappings from possible 
worlds to classes of individuals (or classes of n-tuples of 
individuals). Propositions are intensions having truth-
values as their values. Etc. It seems reasonable to adopt 
also a temporal parameter because possession of 
a property by an individual changes through the passing of 
time. Then intensions are mappings from possible worlds 
to chronologies of objects; they will be spoken simply as 
mappings from worlds and times (to certain objects). Now I 
wish to stress the most important point implied by the 
above consideration. The language L is underlaid by a 
definite range of possibilities which I will call intensional 
ground. Realize that another language, L', can be under-
laid by a different ground because when it names different 
individuals than L, the thinkable distributions of attributes 
are naturally different from those related to L. 
There is also another important point. The language 
L is construed as ‘synchronically given’. L is explicated as 
a (fixed) mapping associating expressions with meanings, 
or more simply: expressions with denoted objects 
(intensions or non-intensions). Such mappings may be 
conveniently called (linguistic) codes. One might doubt 
whether our natural languages are such codes. But it 
seems quite inadequate to suppose that languages do not 
at least contain something as a code, i.e. a vehicle for 
communication of meanings. According to another 
possible objection, it is more natural to conceive language 
as a grammatical system. However, the idea that there is a 
finite system of grammatical rules generating (or operating 
on) an infinite list of expression-meaning pairs, i.e. a code 
L, does not contradict the idea of a code. Another 
objection against L explicated as a code is based on the 
assumption that expressions belonging to L ‘change’ their 
meanings: an expression can, for example, mean C1 at 
one time and it can mean C2 at another time or in another 
world. Within our intensional framework, this fact has 
a natural explanation. I will borrow the term ‘diachronically 
given language’ from linguistics intending to name 
a language modally and temporally conditioned. One 
should thus distinguish a natural language construed as 
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a code, L, from that understood in the sense of a mapping 
from possible worlds and times to codes, sign it “L”.  
Lt me state a semantical scheme I presuppose. An 
expression E expresses in L a meaning C which 
determines the denotatum D of E in L. The denotatum of E 
in L is an intension / a non-intension / nothing. I believe 
that the adoption of an ‘hyperintensional’ level is 
reasonable, differentiating thus ‘structured meanings’ from 
unstructured denotata.4 But since I will suppress this 
semantical consideration in the present paper, the 
meanings of expressions will be identified with their 
denotata. Non-empirical expressions – e.g. genuine proper 
names of individuals, names (or descriptions) of numbers 
or mathematical/logical functions – are expressions whose 
reference is stable across the possible worlds and times. 
On the other hand, a typical empirical expression has 
a stable denotation but a varying reference. For instance, 
the word ‘horse’ denotes a property but it refers to various 
classes of individuals in distinct worlds and times. The 
reference of an empirical expression E is the value of the 
intension denoted by E in a particular possible world W, 
time-moment T. Examples of empirical expressions: ‘the 
U.S. president’ (which denotes an ‘individual concept’ but it 
refers in some W’s, T’s to G.W. Bush, in other W’s, T’s to 
J. Ratzinger), ‘It rains in Austria’. To know the reference of 
a typical empirical expression in the actual world and the 
present time one has to examine the contingent state of 
reality; it is not deducible by means of pure logic. On the 
other hand, to know the reference of a non-empirical 
expression is in principle an a priori matter. Note also that 
the name relation is best identified with the denotation 
relation, not with the reference relation. For instance, ‘G.W. 
Bush’ names what it denotes, i.e. G.W. Bush; ‘the U.S. 
president’ names certain denoted individual concept (it is 
quite futile to insist on its naming G.W. Bush). 
Refinements for MA 
I have to elucidate some very important distinctions Kripke 
took for granted. One of the simplest is concerned with the 
rigidity or non-rigidity and expressions. An expression is 
rigid iff its reference is stable across possible worlds and 
times; otherwise it is non-rigid. But since rigidity is a se-
mantical property of expressions, it is language-relative. 
For instance, when ‘the U.S. president’ denotes in L' the 
number 7, it is a rigid designator, despite it is a non-rigid 
designator in L. Correcting thus the above definition: an 
expression is rigid in L iff its reference in L is stable across 
the possible worlds and times. (A variant of this definition 
has “L” instead of both occurrences of L.) 
When discussing semantical properties of 
expressions in L, Kripke has in fact used another 
language, call it M. Assume that the code M is a language 
of our considerations too. (M works as a certain meta-
language in which we grasp L.) As I have discussed 
above, L is underlaid by a specific intensional ground, IGL. 
Also M is underlaid by a specific intensional ground, IGM. 
Within IGM, there is a conceivable circumstance that S 
speaks in Wk, Tk by means of L, whereas there is also a 
thinkable circumstance that S enjoys rather L' in the same 
Wk but at Tk+1, or a circumstance that S uses L also in Wk' 
at Tk+1. Remember, therefore, that M is underlaid by a 
                                                     
 
4 Nearly all ideas from the present section are adapted from the work of Pavel 
Tichý (e.g., 1988). As structured meanings, Tichý introduced so-called con-
structions − abstract (structured) procedures that may be seen as objectual 
pendants of λ-terms. 
specific IGM which enables us to discuss various 
contingencies, e.g. those about the uses of L. 
It is quite clear that a genuine proper name such as 
N is a rigid designator (of L). Thus the individual N − 
named in L by N − figures in the intensional ground IGL. 
However, not every proper name syntactically possible 
within L names a particular individual. For the reasons of 
simplicity I will assume that a proper name not naming an 
individual in L is meaningless in L; it may be also spoken 
as a non-designator of L. For instance, an individual N' 
cannot be directly referred to by a proper name N' of L 
when N' was not endowed in L by a meaning (denotation). 
Now when users of L encounter N', they can baptize it by 
the expression N'. After the successful baptism, the users 
of L cease to use L in which N' is meaningless − they 
begin to use L' in which N' is a genuine proper name. 
Needless to say, N' is a rigid designator of L', thus the 
individual N' figures in IGL'. The changes of codes are not 
usually noticeable because we do not name codes by L or 
L'; we use rather “L”, i.e. a description singling out 
particular codes. Briefly, a baptism of an individual 
amounts to the replacement of L by L' in Wk within one 
time-interval, a passage from Tk to Tk+1. The description “L” 
picks out L in Wk, Tk but it picks out L' in Wk, Tk+1. N' is a 
non-designator of L but it is a rigid designator of L'.5 
A baptism is a contingent matter figuring inside IGM; when 
users of (a value of) “L” baptize certain individuals, “L” 
changes its value – L is replaced by L'. 
Now we are ready to distinguish two kinds of 
nominal descriptions. The description NDL (or NDL'), i.e. 
‘the only individual named in L by N', is a rigid nominal 
description denoting an intension which picks out the very 
same individual N in all possible worlds and times. The 
relation “named” mentioned in it links an individual with N 
and the code L. To know which individual is picked out by 
NDL one need not examine worlds and check time – it is 
sufficient to find out which individual is named in L by N.6 
However, the description ND“L”, i.e. ‘the only individual 
named N in “L” ’, is (typically) a non-rigid nominal 
description denoting an intension (an individual concept) 
which is not constant. The relation “named” links an 
individual with N and a code which is a contingent value of 
“L”. When the value of “L” such as L' contains N as 
a meaningful proper name of N, then ND“L” picks out N. 
When the value of “L” such as L does not contain the 
proper name N as meaningful, then ND“L” picks out 
nothing. When the value of “L” is L’’, in which N means 
horsiness, then ND“L” picks out nothing because no 
individual is identical with horsiness. Notice also that the 
above disputed circumstances belong to IGM and that NDL 
and ND“L” are meaningful parts of M (not of L or any other 
value of “L”). 
Soundness of two versions of MA 
The original MA should be properly refined according to 
the above considerations. There arise thereby two ver-
sions of MA: MAL containing rigid nominal descriptions 
and MA“L” containing non-rigid nominal descriptions. It is 
easy to conclude that MA“L” is a sound argument. As 
NDTians prefer rather rigid nominal descriptions, the 
                                                     
 
5 Note that N' can be a non-rigid designator of L'' or that N − originally a rigid 
designator of L − can become a non-designator in L'', when users of L'' have 
forgotten what N meant in the preceding values of “L”. 
6 Rigid nominal descriptions split into two kinds: with or without a reference. 
For instance, N'DL refers to no individual because N' does not name in L 
anything at all. I classify such descriptions as rigid because their reference 
(that is null) is stable, non-varying. 
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soundness of MA“L” does not disquiet them. However, the 
truth of the MAL’s consequence − that a proper name does 
not have the same meaning as a nominal description − is 
a disputable matter: Kripkeans consider it false whereas 
NDTians consider it true. Hence, MAL as such is insuffi-
cient for the change of opinion on the part of NDTians. 
Presumably, both groups of theoreticians share the 
belief that proper names are rigid designators. Realize, 
however, that the respective Kripke’s semantical thesis 
about the meaning of proper names is in fact weak 
because it cannot distinguish proper names from rigid 
descriptions. Therefore, we need to suggest another, more 
provident, semantical thesis. My suggestion of ST is as 
follows: a proper name is an expression whose denotation 
is the same as its reference (language-relativity should be 
added, of course). Rigid descriptions – including the 
nominal ones – are thus not allowed to be proper names. 
(Notice also that Kripke’s key thesis follows from my ST.). 
NDTians may still disagree with this proposal. 
Consequently, NDTians construe MAL as not sound. Now 
we should argue that NDT is a materially less adequate  
 
explication of proper names’ meaning than ST because 
most of competent language users do not think that the 
meaning of N contains the meaning of ‘the’, ‘bearer’, etc. 
Hence, ST is a more preferable proposal and MAL 
becomes sound. 
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Different Ways to Follow Rules? The Case of Ethics 
Olga Ramírez Calle, Granada, Spain 
1. The Proposal  
The suggestion I want to put forward is that reflection on a 
correct account of rule-following in ethics invites to con-
sider what I will call a ‘three fold model’ of conceptual ap-
plication, that varies not just from the very basic cases but 
also from what has been called ‘modus ponens’ cases of 
rule following. Or at least may be considered a specific 
variation of such a model. The working out of this possibil-
ity may help us gain a better understanding of what is at 
stake in competent use of a given group of concepts and, 
maybe, to sort out competing interpretations of rule-
following in a more case-specific and less general account.  
If conceptual acquisition and understanding is to be 
adequately understood according to the rule-following 
model, this model must be capable of accommodating very 
different kinds of concepts (classificatory, relational, 
functional, evaluative, mathematical concepts). It must give 
account of the different ways concepts relate to, and 
characterize, experience. We may put aside the relevance 
of this question either per impossibility – we cannot really 
separate experience from conceptual understanding – or 
simply acknowledge without further interest the obvious 
existence of differing instructions we grasp by grasping 
rules, and otherwise go on giving a uniform account. 
But if it should be possible, and I believe it is, to 
attend to differences at this level it could turn out that we 
require differing interpretations of the very idea of rule 
following for different cases.  
That there should be a difference between very 
simple, basic cases, of rule following and more complex 
ones, is widely acknowledged and supported by 
Wittgenstein’s own writings. Basic cases are those where 
no further non-redundant linguistic specifications or 
reasons can be given, besides direct illustration of how 
concept application goes. In other cases, while acquisition 
may succeed without linguistic aid by the participation in 
further practices, some already linguistically trained 
subjects could on demand give some clearing 
explanations. And at higher levels of complexity in 
language acquisition, some language users at least may 
be able to articulate more or less sophisticated reasons to 
justify conceptual application. This need not amount to an 
exhaustive definitive definition but just sufficiently 
articulated necessary conditions – all these specifications 
resting surely at the end in basic concepts whose 
meanings cannot be put down in any fixed formula –. 
However, when rules are to some extent linguistically 
articulated in such a way, we get what has been 
characterized as the ‘modus ponens model’ of rule 
following.  
These distinctions allude to the grade of 
specification of the rules given. Although this may not be 
unrelated to the topic, what I was questioning before was 
the different ways rules connect our concepts to 
experience. The focus is here on the specific conceptual 
contents involved. Some related proposals are made, for 
example, by Crispin Wright’s (1992), (2002) distinction 
between extension-determining and extension-reflecting 
concepts. Extension-reflecting concepts would register 
“self standing properties” and therefore the possibility of 
getting it wrong makes sense. Even if what it is to fall 
under the concept is epistemically constrained (weather 
something falls under the concept subject to human 
considerations) its existence is not constitutively 
dependent on human responses or considerations. By 
extension determining cases, though, there is no sense in 
which truth could transcend what we would ourselves say, 
as what seems to us, our own impressions or responses to 
some experience, are part of the content we are 
registering. And it is the very conceptual content we have 
to do with that demands it to be so. In Wright words: it is a 
priori that best opinion determines truth. Concepts of 
primary qualities would fall under the extension-reflecting 
and concepts of secondary qualities, under the second. 
This last distinction, however, is supposed to have a wider 
application and extend to avowals, for example, and, 
maybe, to moral concepts. 
If we try, however, to figure out an adequate 
understanding of the rule-following considerations in 
ethics, trying to specify the rules governing conceptual 
application, we become (as a result of considerations of 
content) what appears to be a variation of the modus 
ponens model. Weather this model fits into the extension 
determining schema will depend on how this is exactly 
formulated, but some additional distinctions will be called 
for on its regard.   
2. Rule-Following in Ethics 
According to McDowell (1981) non-cognitivist disentangled 
explanations of thick ethical concepts could not explain 
their consistent rule guided use if it were not on the basis 
of some value neutral feature we should be capable of 
recognizing and to which we would be responding to. And 
the problem is that it should not be possible to sort out 
what feature this is, what all the members of the extension 
have in common, without the aid of corresponding evalua-
tive considerations. 
Carefully considered there are actually two different 
assertions in McDowell’s just cited claim:  
 
(i) It should not even make sense to pick up a 
value neutral class equivalent to the one thick 
ethical concepts sort out without taking into ac-
count evaluative considerations.  
(ii) It should not be possible, once the class is con-
stituted, to see value neutral common features 
among the members of the extension of a thick 
ethical concept.  
McDowell, I believe, wants to assert both (i) and (ii), but 
these two claims do not necessarily have to go together. 
Let’s call the first the ‘generation argument’ (GA) and the 
second the ‘application argument’ (AA). 
McDowell illustrates his general claim arguing that 
given a list of items (individuals, actions, etc. let us 
suppose) that belong to the extension of a thick concept 
we most probably won’t be able to tell what such items 
have in common. The class consider in abstraction of 
evaluative aspects need have “no shape”, form no kind.  
The argument would reach a non-cognitivist claim-
ing that it is at some such recognizable level of appraisal 
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that we are to find the features we respond to. And surely 
if what is at issue is a model of causal reactions to an in-
dependent world, we would situate ourselves at some 
such level. But this does not preclude us from finding some 
common factor at a higher order level. There is nothing in 
the class of ‘communists’ or ‘lawyers’ or items used ‘to 
hold the door’ that could be distinguished at such a level 
either. The argument, thus, does not necessarily refute 
disentangled explanations. We may perfectly well have 
some such (non-recognizable) morally neutral class to 
which a moral value is added and a thick ethical concept 
applied.  
This would allow an answer to AA: there is no 
reason why it should not be plausible to assume that it is 
some specific class of behaviour, say – identifiable 
separately and morally neutral on the first place – that 
guides or application of a thick ethical concept. Once the 
class is identified, the value is added and the concept 
applied.  
But McDowell could still counter that an explanation 
saying why we should at all pick up such a class as 
morally relevant is missing. The apprentice who is suppose 
to understand how to apply the concept may this way learn 
to apply the term on the basis of this independently 
discernable class, but would not understand why such 
behaviours or persons are to be called morally good. He 
would be like a child sticking red labels to all square 
things, without making any more sense of this than 
following orders. Moreover such behaviours in virtue of 
which the moral evaluation is done, may not be paid much 
attention to if it were not for our interest in the moral 
classification: and this, without having to embrace 
McDowell’s position, supports GA. In order to pick up 
some morally neutral class that is to be evaluated, we 
need some reason to fix special attention on it.  
This seems right, without contradicting AA, that the 
relevant common characteristics are there all the way long. 
But it is not any more open to give a disentangled account 
insisting on the possibility of AA, this bringing us back to a 
modus ponens case –always when C(x), apply MV(x); 
application proceeding as in our child example. If this is 
not convincing, what kind of further specification would a 
disentangling supporter need in order to explain why some 
type of behaviour is to be morally evaluated such and so? 
What fails is an explanation telling us why this or 
that behaviour is to be called ‘good’. But behaviours may 
be good for satisfying very different goals: to be healthy, 
becomes acceptance in some sect, favour the Gods, the 
clouds or whatever. What we are looking for is something 
specific, what a thick moral concept is expressing is that 
some behaviour is morally good or bad, so what we look 
for is not just good but morally good. What needs 
explanation is  
 
(i)  What makes some kind of behaviour morally 
good? 
 
(ii)  What do we mean first of all with morally? 
A somehow standard explanation would be to say that 
morality has to do with the relation of men to each other 
(and their surroundings) we want to expect from all. Substi-
tuting we obtain:  
 
(iii)  What kind of behaviour is good with respect to 
what we want to expect from all in their rela-
tion to one another and their surroundings? 
Following Kantian proposals some will conclude, for ex-
ample, that good relative to (iii) is what would equally pro-
tect the needs and interests of the affected. It is not my 
purpose to enforce this particular conclusion right now, the 
point is that whichever conclusion we may arrive at as an 
answer, it will deliver the measure, call it FM, relative to 
whose fulfilment some morally neutral behaviour is to be 
called ‘morally good’.   
 
(iv) A behavioural type is morally good if they fulfil 
FM 
This binding engine is what would mediate between the 
antecedent and the consequent of the modus pones 
model: between the class of neutral behaviours on which 
basis we apply a moral value and the moral evaluation. We 
would actually have to do with a function that working on 
some descriptive level yields the evaluative as a result:  
 
(I.)  Behavioural type input b Æ MF Æ Evaluative 
(+/-) output MV 
 Conceptual application C 
  
Applying this rule we obtain:  
 
(1) b1 fulfils MF 
(2) MV+(b1) 
(3) C1(b1) 
However by our rule guided application of a moral concept 
what we follow is the derived more simple modus ponens 
rule:  
 
(II.)  Behavioural input b1 (assumed MV+)Æ C1(b) 
Because it has already been calculated that characteristics 
b1 fulfil MF, it is now a priori that whichever token falls un-
der type b1 it is MV. In this specific rule it remains implicit 
that FM is fulfilled and therefore MV+. This would account 
for the fact of children and traditional people finding no 
problem in blindly applying some such thick concepts on 
the basis of b1, b2, etc. without being capable of giving 
further explanations of why this behaviour is morally 
blameable, for example. The concept includes the expla-
nation on itself by having established as a priori the rela-
tion between b1 and MV by means of MF.  
3. The Three Fold Model and its  
Implications 
The presented model is what I call the three fold model. It 
is obtained by trying to give a more explicit and satisfactory 
disentangled account of our rule guided use of thick ethical 
concepts. The result being that there is some function 
such that, when it is fulfilled by some type behaviour, it 
qualifies it as morally good. So the content we have to do 
with is established by some operation that assigns by each 
ongoing input a given output. Thick ethical concepts result 
out of synthesizing some such result in a concept. There-
fore, given some type of behaviour for which it has being 
established that it fulfils FM it is a priori that a given moral 
value applies to it. It is a priori determined, that whichever 
extension b1 has, all its members (in virtue of some given 
operation) become a given value and fall as a result under 
some new class.  
Do we have to do with extension-determined 
concepts then? The idea is here not that the decision of 
weather the concept applies depends on our best opinion 
because our own reactions or impressions to some 
behaviour should be directly decisive of the case. This 
would apply to response-dependent models. Here we have 
two different questions actually. a) Weather, in deciding if a 
thick concept applies, best opinion is all there is to truth. 
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And in presuming that given bn some value applies, the 
question is if we do or don’t have to do with bn. b) Weather 
the calculation required to assign a value to some bn 
depends on best opinion. This will depend lately on 
weather human needs and interests, for example, can be 
determinable independently of our own responses –. Both 
questions I shall leave open here.  
On the considerations made, however, some other 
distinction appears to be relevant. Contrary to concepts 
such as ‘red’, ‘tiger’, ‘cup’ or ‘tree’ whose meaning is open 
to development on the way, so to speak.. Some other 
concepts are such that their extension is dependent upon 
prefixed operations and to this extent there is no 
development of meaning on application. Any change 
would require going backwards and proving the 
correctness of the calculations made in its establishment. If 
this is right, we may distinguish between open-ended and 
invariably prefixed rules. That this distinction is not to be 
put together with that between extension-determined and 
extension-reflecting concepts can be seen as ‘red’, for  
 
example, would be a extension-determined but open-
ended (susceptible of refinement or development). The 
distinction does not depend on weather best opinion 
determines of truth, but on the determinateness of 
meaning itself. Three fold concepts would fall under the 
second category but the distinction is not necessarily 
restricted to them.  
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Atypical Rational Agency 
Paul Raymont, Toronto, Canada 
1. The Capacity for Autonomous Decision-
Making 
In respecting one’s autonomy I acknowledge her capacity 
to determine her own values and shape her life in accor-
dance with them. To have this capacity, one must have 
some stable grasp of one’s values and be able to articulate 
projects on the basis of them. Those who lack such skills 
are deemed to be ‘incompetent’, or incapable of truly 
autonomous agency. 
In order to determine whether one possesses the 
requisite abilities, we are to focus not simply on a decision 
but, instead, on how it is reached, for we want to see 
whether the cognitive prerequisites of autonomy are 
evident in this decision-making process. We need to 
determine whether this person has the cognitive skills 
necessary for autonomous decision-making. We are not 
supposed to be addressing the quite different question of 
whether the choice itself is a good one. While such 
evaluation of the choice is relevant to moral and legal 
questions, it is not germane if our task is to determine 
whether the choice expresses genuine autonomy. 
Otherwise, there could be no bad autonomous decisions. 
2. Reason in Action 
Our aim is thus to achieve an understanding of the agent’s 
decision, an account that will show her choice to be ra-
tional in the light of her values and projects. We need not 
agree with the choice, for we may not share these ideals. 
What is required, rather, is that her choice should appear 
to be rational if one starts from her ideals.  
 This sort of understanding is not supplied by a 
purely causal account of her choice; for the beliefs and 
values that make sense of her choice do so by means of 
prescriptive, normative standards rather than simply by 
means of the descriptive, nomological principles that 
sustain a mere causal explanation. To elaborate, when I 
give a mere causal explanation of an event, I subsume it 
under law-like generalizations, the implication being that 
the event occurred because things like it just do typically 
follow from those initial conditions. As John McDowell puts 
it, in this sort of causal account, “one makes things 
intelligible by representing their coming into being as a 
particular instance of how things generally tend to 
happen.” (McDowell 1985, 389) By contrast, when I make 
sense of an action by rationalizing it, my objective is not to 
portray the act as how people just do tend to behave in 
such conditions. Rather, I aim to portray the action as what 
the agent rationally ought to do given her values and other 
attitudes. As McDowell says of such normative accounts, 
they are “explanations in which things are made intelligible 
by being revealed to be, or to approximate to being, as 
they rationally ought to be.” (McDowell 1985, 389) 
The distinctive nature of rationalizing accounts can 
be appreciated by juxtaposing them with mere causal 
explanations. Thus, suppose I want juice and believe that I 
can most readily satisfy this desire by getting the drink 
from the fridge. It is then rational for me to get the juice 
from the fridge, since the statement that I ought so to act is 
the conclusion of a practical syllogism in which the 
premises express the contents of the belief and desire in 
question. (Anscombe 1957) So the account of my action 
by appeal to this belief-desire pair does double duty as 
both an explanation and a rational justification that 
presents the action as being rationally appropriate. 
By contrast, suppose that this same belief-desire 
pair were regularly followed by the motion of one’s left 
hand one millimeter to the right. In that case, one could 
causally explain this hand motion by appealing to my 
desire for juice and my belief about how best to obtain that 
drink, together with the (ceteris paribus) law that links 
these attitudes to such a motion. Here, the contents of my 
belief and desire play no central role in accounting for the 
explained behaviour; after all, one can imagine the same 
sort of nomic link connecting that hand motion to different 
beliefs and desires, and (unlike in the case of rationalizing 
explanations) this variation in the attitudes’ contents would 
subtract nothing from the explanatory work that is 
accomplished by appeal to such states 
In this second, mere causal account, the 
explanation works because of the described nomic pattern, 
a relation that leads us to expect that the hand motion just 
will typically follow the onset of that belief-desire pair, 
without any implication that it is rationally appropriate for it 
to do so. 
3. Further Distinctive Features of  
Rationalizing Explanation 
It has long been recognized in psychiatry that there are 
two such distinct modes of explanation. This is due largely 
to the influence of Karl Jaspers. Jaspers adopted from Max 
Weber and others the distinction between understanding 
an action from the agent’s perspective (Verstehen) and 
giving a causal account of the bodily motions that consti-
tute the action (Erklaren). In his version of this distinction, 
Jaspers stressed that unlike the laws of nature, the rational 
principles that help to make sense of an action do not re-
quire confirmation by supporting cases in order to do their 
explanatory work. Whatever explanatory work is to be 
achieved by such rationalizing explanations does not await 
the discovery of a nomic pattern connecting the reasons to 
the action that they rationalize but is, instead, already 
there to be grasped just by understanding the belief-desire 
contents and their rational connection to the action.1 
In his Blue Book, Wittgenstein likewise contrasts 
mere causal explanations with rationalizations. He notes 
that in the former case, the claim that an action resulted 
from a particular cause is a hypothesis, and adds that this 
hypothesis relies upon confirming instances which show 
“that your action is the regular sequel of certain conditions 
which we then call causes of the action.” (Wittgenstein 
1933/1965, 15) He contrasts this way of explaining an 
action with an account of the act in terms of the agent’s 
reasons, where “no number of agreeing experiences is 
                                                     
 
1 In Jaspers’ words, “Frequency in no way enlarges the evidence for the 
connection. Induction only establishes the frequency, not the reality of the 
connection itself…. A poet, for instance, might present convincing connections 
that we understand immediately though they have never yet occurred.” (Jas-
pers 1923/1963, 304) 
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necessary.” (Wittgenstein 1933/1965, 15) Here, again, 
rationalizing explanations are independent of empirical 
confirmation. 
Suppose that the general principles at work in a 
rationalizing account do not await empirical confirmation. Is 
it the case that they also retain their explanatory force in 
the face of disconfirmation? Yes, for they purport only to 
be normative principles, not true descriptions of actual 
patterns. Thus, for example, consider the case of Joan of 
Arc. We can explain (by rationalizing) her heroic actions 
against the English by appealing to her ideals even if many 
of her compatriots shared her ideals without acting on 
them as she did. This can be so even if Joan of Arc herself 
had not previously shown any greater tendency towards 
heroic deeds than her contemporaries. In this case, the 
statement that one who holds such ideals really ought to 
‘stand up for them’ and oppose the enemy is not generally 
followed in the relevant population, but this is no obstacle 
to explaining or making sense of Joan of Arc’s actions in 
terms of those such ideals. 
4. Starson’s Capacity for Rational  
Autonomy 
Let us now examine issues concerning rational autonomy 
in the context of individuals who suffer from psychiatric 
illness. 
Some of these people continue to exhibit rational 
patterns in their decision-making to greater or lesser 
degrees. It is difficult in such cases to determine to what 
extent such patterns must be present in order for one to be 
capable of exercising genuine autonomy in determining 
the course of her own health care. 
A case of this nature was recently heard by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. (Supreme Court of Canada 
[SCC] 2003) The case involves Scott Starson, who was 
charged with issuing death threats to his neighbours. He 
was found to be not guilty by reason of his mental illness 
but was detained in a psychiatric hospital on the grounds 
that he posed a threat to others. 
Starson refused to take medications that had been 
prescribed by his doctors, who then claimed that Starson 
was not capable of making his own treatment decisions 
and should therefore be required to follow the prescribed 
treatment. Rejecting this determination, Starson appealed 
to the courts. After appeals to various courts, the Supreme 
Court ruled that Starson was competent to make his own 
treatment decisions. 
Starson’s case attracted much attention because of 
his intellectual accomplishments, which include co-
authored publications in physics. Indeed, one prominent 
physicist (Pierre Noyes of Stanford University) says that 
Starson has done “exciting” work that has stimulated some 
of his own thinking about the theory of relativity. While 
Starson has not published a scientific paper since the 
1980’s, he believes that his thinking about physics is a 
central source of meaning in his life. It is this dimension of 
his life that would, he believes, be extinguished by the 
medication. He bases this concern on previous experience 
with another anti-psychotic medication (Haldol), which 
dulled his mind to the point where he could no longer 
pursue his intellectual work. 
In explaining the Court’s ruling, Justice John Major 
did not deny that it may well be in Starson’s best interests 
to take the medication. He adds that respect for capacity 
derives not from the concern for another person’s best 
interests but, rather, from the duty to respect autonomy. 
Says Major, “The right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment is fundamental to a person’s dignity and 
autonomy.” (SCC 2003, para. 75) According to Major, 
one’s autonomy must be respected even at the cost of 
one’s well-being. 
Granted, but was Starson competent to make 
autonomous decisions? In the relevant jurisdiction, 
Ontario, the legal standard for competency, or ‘capacity’, is 
as follows: 
 
A person is ‘capable’ with respect to a treatment … 
if the person is able to understand the information 
that is relevant to making a decision about the 
treatment … and able to appreciate the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of 
decision. (SCC 2003, para. 12) 
According to Major, the first part of this standard, the ‘un-
derstanding’ condition, “requires the cognitive ability to 
process, retain and understand the relevant information.” 
(SCC 2003, para. 78) The second part, the ‘appreciation’ 
condition, requires that “the patient be able to apply the 
relevant information to his or her circumstances and to be 
able to weigh the reasonably foreseeable risks and bene-
fits of a decision or lack thereof.” (SCC 2003, para. 78)  
Starson met these conditions, as is evident from his 
reasons for his choice. To wit, he knew that the 
medications were intended to slow his ‘racing thoughts’, 
and it was for that very reason that he rejected them. He 
rejected the risk of having his mind dulled to the point 
where he would be unable to pursue the central project in 
his life, his physics research. 
As in the above example of Joan of Arc, to make 
sense of Starson’s choice in this way is not to regard it as 
a typical choice, or as one that is statistically normal. More 
specifically, when we see his choice as being rationally 
motivated by his projects we do not thereby assume that 
most people would make the same choice as he did. 
Hence, we can take his choice to have issued from 
reasons that support it, and we can thereby regard his 
choice as an expression of rational autonomy, while at the 
same time seeing it as an atypical choice. Indeed, we can 
take Starson to be quite unlike most rational agents, to be 
quite odd in comparison to them, without this 
compromising our view of him as a rational agent who is 
capable of exercising genuine autonomy. It is not even 
required that we see Starson’s choice as one that most 
people would make if they shared his goals and values, 
just as we need not take Joan of Arc’s choices to be the 
most likely ones for someone who shared her ideals. We 
can, in other words, allow for disagreement among rational 
people.  
This is because a rational agent’s perspective 
typically encompasses a host of competing interests and 
convictions. Thus, Starson, while wanting to pursue his 
work in physics, at the same time recognized that his 
symptoms led him into conflict with others, and also 
desired to be released from the hospital in which he was 
detained. These countervailing concerns could equally 
rationalize a decision to comply with the prescribed 
treatment (just as a concern for self-preservation could 
rationalize a decision by Joan of Arc not to confront the 
English). It is for this reason that opposing choices can 
equally be seen as expressions of a rational, autonomous 
self, the implication being that we should not see just one 
choice, the ‘normal’ choice, as the sole candidate for being 
an expression of rational, autonomous agency. 
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Indexwörter und wahrheitskonditionale Semantik  
Štefan Riegelnik, Wien, Österreich 
Als die bestimmende Eigenschaft von Indexwörtern wird 
gemeinhin die Kontextsensitivität angegeben. Gemeint ist 
damit, dass das, worauf man sich mit einem Indexwort 
bezieht, nur im Kontext einer Äußerung bestimmt werden 
kann und der Bezug eines Indexwortes je nach Kontext 
variiert: 
 
„The ‚context-dependence’ of indexicals is often 
taken as their defining feature: what an indexicals 
designates, shifts from context to context.“ (Perry 
1997) 
 
„[...] it is nowadays a triviality to claim that indexical 
expressions are context sensitive, that is, their ref-
erence depends on the context in which they are 
used.“ (Corazza 2004) 
Indexwörter sind strikt von singulären Termini und Namen 
abzugrenzen, denn während der singuläre Terminus 
„Wien“ einen bestimmten Ort bezeichnet, der Name „Ja-
mes Joyce“ eine bestimmte Person und „23:55“ einen 
bestimmten Zeitpunkt, ist dies bei den Ausdrücken „hier“, 
„er“, oder „jetzt“ nicht der Fall. Deren Bezug ergibt sich 
daraus, wo der Ausdruck von wem und wann gebraucht 
wird. Der Kontext einer Äußerung, also die Bestimmung 
des „hier“, „er“ oder „jetzt“, ist für das Verständnis einer 
Äußerung zentral, wenn und weil es eine Bedingung der 
Wahrheit einer Äußerung ist, worauf sich die Wörter als 
Teil einer Äußerung beziehen. Da der Kontext variiert und 
Äußerungen auch dann verstanden werden, wenn der 
bestimmte Kontext nicht bekannt ist, stellt sich die Frage, 
wie Kontextbedingungen mit einer wahrheitskonditionalen 
Semantik vereinbart werden können. 
Mit Indexwörtern kann eine wahrheitskonditionale 
Semantik scheinbar nicht derart umgehen, dass sowohl 
die Besonderheiten von Indexwörtern berücksichtigt 
werden und zugleich auch die Interdependenz von 
Wahrheit und Bedeutung nicht durchbrochen wird. Um die 
Schwierigkeiten anhand eines Beispieles zu skizzieren: 
„‚Dies ist weiß’ ist wahr genau dann, wenn dies weiß ist“ 
gibt zwar die Wahrheitsbedingungen des Satzes „Dies ist 
weiß“ an und der Grundannahme zufolge, wonach man 
einen Satz versteht, wenn man weiß, unter welchen 
Bedingungen er wahr ist, müsste damit auch das 
Verstehen geklärt sein. Aber worauf man sich mit dem 
Ausdruck „dies“ bezieht, wird durch die Wahrheitsbe-
dingungen des Satzes „Dies ist weiß“ nicht erklärt. Kurz: 
die besondere Rolle des Indexwortes „dies“ kommt dabei 
nicht zum Ausdruck. Eine wahrheitskonditionale Semantik 
ist nun mit folgendem Dilemma konfrontiert: Entweder 
begnügt man sich damit, dass ein Ausdruck wie „dies“ auf 
einen Gegenstand derart Bezug nimmt, dass damit in 
einer bestimmten Situation ein Gegenstand heraus-
gegriffen wird. Das hätte aber zur Folge, dass die 
Wahrheitsbedingungen eines Satzes wie „Dies ist weiß“ 
situationsabhängig sind, was wiederum die Folge hätte, 
dass dasjenige, was man versteht, wenn man diesen Satz 
versteht, gar nicht mehr situationsunabhängig geklärt 
werden könnte. Oder, um auf die andere Seite des 
Dilemmas zu verweisen, man beharrt darauf, dass das 
Verstehen von Äußerungen, die Indexwörter enthalten, 
situationsunabhängig ist, dann müsste man daraus aber 
schließen, dass die Bedeutung einer Äußerung nicht durch 
Wahrheitsbedingungen angegeben werden kann. In 
beiden Fällen ist die Interdependenz von Wahrheit und 
Bedeutung durchbrochen. Donald Davidson geht in „Truth 
and Meaning“ (Davidson 1967) auf dieses Dilemma ein: 
 
„No logical errors result if we simply treat demon-
stratives as constants; neither do any problems 
arise for giving a semantic truth-definition. ‘”I am 
wise” is true if and only if I am wise’, with its bland 
ignoring of the demonstrative element in ‘I’ comes 
off the assembly line along with ‘“Socrates is wise” 
is true if and only if Socrates is wise’ with its bland 
indifference to the demonstrative element in ‘is wise’ 
(the tense).“ (Davidson 1967) 
Davidson relativiert die Wahrheitsbedingungen auf Person, 
Zeit und Ort der Äußerung, um so der Kontextsensitivität 
Rechnung zu tragen: 
 
„We could take truth to be a property, not of sen-
tences, but of utterances, or speech acts, or ordered 
triples of sentences, times, and persons; but it is 
simplest just to view truth as a relation between a 
sentence, a person, and a time.“ (Davidson 1967) 
Aber auch wenn die Wahrheitsbedingungen eines Satzes 
auf Zeit, Ort und Person relativiert werden, stellt sich die 
Frage, welchen Beitrag Indexwörter zur Bedeutung einer 
Äußerung leisten. Da die Wahrheit oder Falschheit einer 
Äußerung nicht nur davon abhängt, wie die Welt ist, son-
dern auch davon, welchen Beitrag die in einer Äußerung 
verwendeten Ausdrücke leisten, ist die Beantwortung die-
ser Frage für die wahrheitskonditionale Semantik von be-
sonderer Relevanz.  
Um auf das Dilemma zurückzukommen: im Sinne 
der ersten Alternative, also der situationsabhängigen 
Ausprägung, sind in letzter Zeit auch Versuche 
unternommen worden, die Bedeutung einer Äußerung 
gänzlich als vom Kontext abhängig zu verstehen, und zwar 
nicht nur derart, dass Person, Zeit und Ort für die 
Interpretation relevant sind, sondern dass der Kontext 
allein den Inhalt einer Äußerung bestimmt: 
 
„As the ordinary language philosophers rightly ar-
gued, literalism can’t be right, because sentences 
are context-sensitive: in vacuo, the do not carry con-
tent, but do so only ‚in context.’“ (Recanati 2006) 
Die Strategie der Vertreter des Kontextualismus – so der 
Name dieses Ansatzes – besteht hauptsächlich darin, mit 
einer Reihe von Beispielen zu zeigen, dass die „richtige“ 
Interpretation nur abhängig vom Kontext entschieden wer-
den kann. Die bloße Angabe von Wahrheitsbedingungen, 
so die Vertreter dieser Richtung, reiche nicht aus, um alle 
für die Interpretation einer Äußerung relevanten Faktoren 
zu erfassen. Gerade in Hinblick auf die Klärung von In-
dexwörtern scheint dies auch eine attraktive Position zu 
sein, denn wie ich einleitend festgehalten habe, kann der 
Bezug eines Indexwortes nur im Kontext einer Äußerung 
bestimmt werden. Wenn aber der Beitrag zur Wahrheit 
oder Falschheit eines Satzes, in dem ein Ausdruck wie 
„dies“ verwendet wird, vom unterschiedlichen Kontext be-
stimmt wird, dann kann ein Ausdruck gar nicht unabhängig 
vom Gebrauch im jeweiligen Kontext verstanden werden. 
Offen bleibt folglich auch, wie Indexwörter von Eigenna-
men unterschieden werden, denn in einer bloßen Kontext-
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situation bieten sich keine Kriterien an, die eine Unter-
scheidung zulassen würden. Erst die Beobachtung, dass 
auch andere Personen in einer anderen Situation ein In-
dexwort derart verwenden, dass sie auf unterschiedliche 
Gegenstände Bezug nehmen, erlaubt es, ein Indexwort 
von einem Eigennamen zu trennen. Um hier die Kritik am 
Kontextualismus allgemeiner zu formulieren: wenn Äuße-
rungen nur situationsabhängig verstanden werden, wie 
kann dann überhaupt auf etwas Bezug genommen wer-
den, was als Gegenstand einer semantischen Betrachtun-
gen fungieren soll? Die Korrektheit dieser Theorie hätte 
schlicht das Abhandenkommen des Untersuchungsge-
genstandes zur Folge. 
Kritik am Ansatz, die Wahrheitsbedingungen auf 
Sprecher, Zeit und Ort zu relativieren, übt auch Stefano 
Predelli. Er führt eine Reihe von Äußerungen mit 
Indexwörtern an, in denen die Angabe von Sprecher, Zeit 
und Ort nicht ausreicht, um das intuitive Verständnis 
theoretisch zu erklären. Um hier ein Beispiel zu skizzieren 
(Predelli 2005): eine Person schreibt im Büro auf einen 
Zettel „Ich bin hier“ und trägt ebendiesen mit der Absicht 
nach Hause, jemanden über ihren Aufenthalt (zu Hause) 
zu informieren. Findet nun jemand im Haus diesen Zettel, 
wird er den Satz, so Predelli, intuitiv derart interpretieren, 
dass die Person, die diesen Zettel geschrieben hat, zu 
Hause sei. Die relativierten Wahrheitsbedingungen 
beziehen sich jedoch auf den Zeitpunkt der Äußerung und 
da befindet sich die Person im Büro. Predelli führt noch 
weitere, ähnliche Beispiele an, etwa historische Er-
zählungen und Beispiele aus der Literatur. Es sind aber 
vor allem geschriebene oder anders aufgezeichnete 
Äußerungen mit Indexwörtern, die als „Problemfälle“ gelten 
und dies hauptsächlich dann, wenn sie zu einem anderen 
Zeitpunkt interpretiert werden als sie geäußert oder 
aufgezeichnet wurden.  
Wie soll man mit der Kritik Predellis umgehen? Ich 
möchte zunächst darauf hinweisen, dass die Beispiele von 
Predelli kein Problem für eine Interpretationstheorie 
darstellen, wenn man die Notwendigkeit holistischer 
Betrachtungen anerkennt, denn für die Interpretation einer 
Äußerung ist das Haben einer Reihe von Überzeugungen 
notwendig. Ein Interpret, der die Äußerung auf dem Zettel 
findet, wird auch der Überzeugung sein, dass es sich um 
eine geschriebene Mitteilung handelt, dass die Mitteilung 
vielleicht an einem anderen Ort geschrieben wurde und 
der Interpret wird auch wissen, wie er eventuelle Zweifel 
bezüglich der Nachricht beseitigt, etc. Die Liste an 
Überzeugungen lässt sich zwar nicht endgültig festlegen, 
aber wenn ein Interpret nicht über ein Netz von 
Überzeugungen verfügen würde, wäre die Interpretation 
prinzipiell unmöglich. Wird dieser Umstand bei der 
Formulierung einer Theorie miteinbezogen, bereiten 
Beispiele wie das von Predelli skizzierte keine Probleme 
mehr.  
Weist man diese Kritiken am „traditionellen“ Ansatz 
der wahrheitskonditionalen Semantik zurück, bleibt 
trotzdem noch die Frage offen, wie die Besonderheiten 
von Indexwörtern mit einer wahrheitskonditionalen 
Semantik in Einklang gebracht werden. Zunächst möchte 
ich festhalten, dass Theorien, die die Erklärung des 
Gebrauchs von Indexwörtern auf den Akt des Zeigens zu 
reduzieren versuchen, keine befriedigende Erklärung 
bieten können, denn eine Theorie des Verstehens kann 
die Frage des Bezugs von Indexwörtern nicht unabhängig 
von der Bedeutung der ganzen Äußerung klären. Dennoch 
wurde eine Reihe von Versuchen dieser Art unternommen. 
Versucht wurde etwa, bestimmte Indexwörter durch 
andere zu ersetzen, etwa „heute“ mit „der Tag, der jetzt 
ist“. Versucht wurde auch, den Bezug von Indexwörtern als 
kausale Verbindung zwischen Sprecher und Gegenstand 
aufzufassen oder auf eine Geste des Zeigens zu 
reduzieren. Diesen Versuchen ist gemein, den Bezug von 
Zeichen auf Gegenstände durch den Akt der Deixis zu 
erklären. Aber weder die Geste des Zeigens noch das 
Aussprechen eines Wortes wie „dies“ oder „jener“ sind 
ausreichend, um etwas im Unterschied zu etwas anderem 
zu meinen. Denn man braucht sich nur vorzustellen, dass 
dem Interpreten der Akt des Zeigens nicht verständlich ist 
oder der Sprecher nur einen Teil des Gegenstandes meint, 
um zu sehen, dass eine Verwendung eines Indexwortes 
allein keine Kriterien für die Referenz zu Verfügung stellt. 
Würde dennoch versucht werden, wäre das, wonach 
gefragt werden würde, unsere grundsätzliche Möglichkeit 
sein, sich mit Zeichen auf Gegenstände der externen Welt 
zu beziehen. Ein solcher Wandel einer semantischen zu 
einer erkenntnistheoretischen Frage hätte aber die 
Konsequenz, die Wende zur Sprache zurückzunehmen, 
die eine Grundvoraussetzung der Akzeptanz der Disziplin 
„Semantik“ überhaupt ist. Anerkennt man hingegen, dass 
Semantik durch Anliegen gekennzeichnet ist, die mittels 
Reflexion auf rein sprachliche Phänomene erfolgt werden 
können, dann verbietet sich die Frage nach der Bedeutung 
von „dies“ als Frage nach der Möglichkeit von Bezug 
überhaupt. Diese Zurückweisung bedeutet auch, Fragen 
wie „Was bedeutet ‚dies’?“ unabhängig vom Gebrauch im 
Gesamtzusammenhang als Frage nach der Teilbedeutung 
eines isolierten Satzes zurückzuweisen. Da die Funktion 
von „dies“ scheinbar die ist, eine Worterklärung 
einzuführen, die sich gerade nicht auf das Mittel, dies zu 
tun, bezieht – mit „Dies ist weiß“ soll eben das angegeben 
werden, was weiß ist, aber nicht dasjenige, was die 
Bedeutung von „dies“ ausmacht – so zeigen diese 
Überlegungen auch, dass all unserem Spreche ein 
deiktisches Element zukommt, welches nicht in Analogie 
zur Bedeutung von Indexwörtern erklärt werden kann. 
Fragen, wie mit Indexwörtern Gegenstände bezeichnet 
werden, wie durch Indexwörter etwas als Gegenstand der 
Rede herausgegriffen wird, was die Bedingungen der 
Verwendung von Indexwörtern sind, sind folglich 
einzuordnen in die allgemeine Frage nach dem 
Satzverständnis und der Referenz von Ausdrücken auf 
Gegenstände. Ein Versuch einer reduktionistische 
Erklärung der Bezugnahme auf Gegenstände ist nicht 
zielführend und hätte, wie oben ausgeführt, 
Konsequenzen für die Disziplin der Semantik: 
 
„If the name of ‚Kilimanjaro’ refers to Kilimanjaro, 
then no doubt there is some relation between Eng-
lish (or Swahili) speakers, the word, and the moun-
tain. But it is inconceivable that one should be able 
to explain this relation without first explaining the 
role of the word in sentences; and if this is so, there 
is no chance of explaining reference directly in non-
linguistic terms.” (Davidson 1977) 
Die Frage nach der Funktion von Indexwörtern ist daher 
zweitrangig zu behandeln. Indexwörter stellen gerade 
deswegen kein Problem für eine wahrheitskonditionale 
Semantik dar, weil eine wahrheitskonditionale Semantik 
vielmehr den Gebrauch von Indexwörtern zur Vorausset-
zung hat.  
Der Umstand, dass eine Äußerung unter 
bestimmten Umständen wahr ist und unter anderen falsch, 
stellt für die wahrheitskonditionale Semantik keine 
Probleme dar, wenn die Wahrheitsbedingungen auf die 
Person, die Zeit und den Ort der Äußerung relativiert 
werden, was aber nicht die Relativierung des Wahr-
heitsprädikats einschließt, und grundlegende Über-
legungen zur Formulierung einer Interpretationstheorie 
nicht ignoriert werden. Fragt man nun dennoch nach der 
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Bedeutung von Indexwörter, so kann nur noch auf 
Verwendungsweisen von Indexwörtern (in Äußerungen) 
verwiesen werden. 
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Two Reductions of ‘rule’ 
Dana Riesenfeld, Tel Aviv, Israel 
1. First reduction: The reduction of rules to 
conventions1 
Kripke (1982) sees Wittgenstein’s discussion on rule fol-
lowing as presenting a paradox which brings about a skep-
tical conclusion: “..there is no fact about me that distin-
guishes my meaning a definite function by ‘+’ …and my 
meaning nothing at all” (1982: 21). But as this “skeptical 
[sic.]2 conclusion is insane and intolerable” (1982: 60), 
Kripke attempts to solve the it by offering a skeptical con-
clusion that involves an appeal to community, and which 
has later been entitled ‘the community view’. The outcome 
of the paradox is that words do not have pre-existing 
meanings, however, he argues, they do gain their meaning 
by the rule’s tendency to match in their usage within the 
linguistic community. Meanings are not derivative of their 
conforming to rules but rather derive from their compliance 
with a social consensus regarding their proper or correct 
use: “the community must be able to judge whether an 
individual is indeed following a given rule in particular ap-
plications, i.e. whether his responses agree with our own” 
(1982: 109). 
The first chapter of Kripke’s book (“The 
Wittgensteinian paradox” pp. 22-37) consists in the 
attempts of the interlocutor to oppose the skeptic’s doubts 
concerning the meaning of ‘+’, the addition sign. The 
skeptic casts doubt on whether anything at all (not 
exclusively a rule) can establish meaning. Having been 
persuaded by the skeptic’s arguments that there is no fact 
about me which ensures my meaning ‘plus’ rather than 
‘quus’, Kripke examines a few plausible answers to the 
skeptic, devoting most of his efforts to reject the 
dispositional account as an inadequate account of rule 
following.  
Dispositionalism in this context is the idea that “To 
mean addition by ‘+’ is to be disposed to, when asked for 
any sum ‘x+y’, to give the sum of x and y as the answer … 
to mean quus is to be disposed, when queried about any 
arguments, to respond with their quum” (1982: 22-23). For 
Kripke it is very important to distinguish between his 
position and the dispositionalist account. Kripke raises a 
few difficulties for the dispositionalist account, the most 
important of which is the claim that it aims to shed light on 
the normative practice of rule following in descriptive 
terms.  
Dispositions tell us how we will answer not how we 
ought to answer. This point is stressed by Kripke 
throughout his attempts to dismiss the dispositional 
account as an adequate candidate to answer the skeptic:  
 
Suppose I do mean addition by ‘+’. What is the rela-
tion of this supposition to the question how I will re-
spond to the problem ’68 + 57’? The dispositionalist 
gives a descriptive account of this relation: if ‘+’ 
meant addition, then I will answer ‘125’. But this is 
                                                     
 
1 Throughout, I refer to Kripke’s views, ignoring the question of whether the 
view Kripke is assigning to Wittgenstein is really his, whether it is Kripke’s 
position or whether it is a hybrid view sometimes assigned in the literature to 
‘Kripkenstein’. Kripke himself is unclear about this issue, (1982: 5).  
2 Throughout Kripke’s text ‘sceptic’ and ‘scepticism’ are spelled with a ‘C’. 
When quoting, I left the spelling as it appears in the original text.  
not the proper account of the relation which is nor-
mative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I 
meant addition by ‘+’, I will answer ‘125’ but that, if I 
intend to accord with my past meaning of ‘+’ I 
should answer ‘125’… The relation of meaning and 
intention to future action is normative, not descrip-
tive (1982: 37).  
Kripke’s discussion of the dispositionalist account and his 
critique of it make it clear that any adequate explanation of 
‘rules’ must retain the normative aspect of rules. But does 
Kripke’s own account give an explanation of rule following 
in normative terms? In what follows, I claim it does not.  
Kripke’s skeptical solution is achieved by a 
‘widening of the gaze’, “…from consideration of the rule 
follower alone and allow ourselves to consider him as 
interacting with a wider community” (1982: 89). So in 
answer to the question ‘what are rules?’ Kripke replies that 
they are in themselves and by themselves nothing at all. 
Only when thought about against a background of the 
community of speakers within which they operate they 
have meaning. The concept of rule means nothing when 
abstracted from the use of rules by a community, and does 
not have any objective meaning outside of how rules 
operate in actual speech. Rules of meaning are thus rules 
of use, and correct, justified and guided use of rules is 
something that is in principle dependent upon the 
pronouncement of the community of speakers. 
This idea is presented by the emphasis Kripke puts 
on the procedure he calls public checkability: 
“Wittgenstein’s sceptical solution to his problem depends 
on agreement, and on checkability – on one person’s 
ability to test whether another uses a term as he does” 
(1982: 99). Public checkability, or agreement, now sets the 
standard of correctness and replaces the appeal to the 
rule as providing such standard.  
‘Agreement’ for Kripke is not an objective fact but it 
is a brute fact. It is not objective in a Platonic sense, for 
agreement can change and shift and what we agree on 
today may not be what we will agree upon tomorrow. It is 
in this sense that agreement lacks the necessitation of 
e.g., a law of nature. However, agreement is a brute fact, a 
descriptive notion, capturing the conventions the linguistic 
community abides by at a certain point in time. In fact, 
Kripke claims, we do agree (e.g., on the meaning of the 
addition sign) generally. But what does it mean to 
generally agree? Does it mean that most of us agree most 
of the time? That most of us agree part of the time? 
Perhaps that part of us agree all of the time? In other 
words, how do the concepts of agreement and public 
checkability differentiate between correct and incorrect rule 
following, and between those and not following any rule at 
all?  
According to Kripke’s solution, when asked to justify 
an action (e.g., giving the answer 125 to the addition 
problem: 68+57) one should answer: “I gave this answer 
because everyone else does”. Following a rule is found to 
be no more (and no less) than acting in conformity to 
others. The maxim “act like everyone else does” replaces 
the appeal to rules when one searches for justification. An 
important merit of this solution is that it maintains one of 
the most basic intuitions about rules: their fallibility. Rules 
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of meaning lack necessitation, logical or physical (in this 
respect they are different from logical rules and physical 
laws) in the sense that we can perfectly well imagine that 
things might have been otherwise. This is what I call the 
conventionality of rules, the fact that rules are arbitrary. 
Another merit of Kripke’s solution is that by preserving the 
conventionality of rules it also preserves the descriptive 
aspect of rules. The way people speak is all the data we 
need to consider in order to know whether they are rule 
followers. However, by putting emphasis on the 
conventionality of rules, Kripke’s solution neglects the 
normativity of rules in that it seems to suggest that the way 
people talk is all we need to know in order to know how 
they ought to talk. Kripke’s community view suggest that 
we read off correctness in our following the rules from the 
actions of the majority. It is in this sense close to a 
naturalistic fallacy: the futile attempt to derive ought from 
is. Kripke’s suggests that agreement on what it is to follow 
a rule constitutes rule following. I claim that this solution, 
like the dispositional account rejected by Kripke, cannot 
account for the normativity of rules.   
Kripke’s solution reduces rule following to the super-
rule: “act/respond as everyone else does”. Generally, he 
claims, there is agreement within a society regarding what 
it is to follow a certain rule. In this case, no one in the 
society will be likely to correct it, and no one outside it has 
a right to correct it. This is the strength of this position but 
also its weakness; it does not allow for a case wherein the 
community agrees upon a certain usage but is at the same 
time wrong in so agreeing. In the realm of ethics this 
situation is quite plausible; the fact that almost everyone 
thinks a war is justified does not make it so. This is an 
ethical problem, and of course claiming that justification 
depends solely on agreement in actions or opinions would 
be wrong. In the realm of language the problem is not 
ethical but conceptual. The problem with Kripke’s solution 
is that it assumes that there is a way of explaining the 
normativity of rules merely by taking into account their 
conventional application.  
2. Second reduction: The reduction of rules 
to norms 
The question concerning the (im)possibility of solitary rule 
following is an important test case for the community view. 
Kripke’s position is that if “…we think of Crusoe as follow-
ing rules, we are taking him into our community and apply-
ing our criteria for rule following to him” (1982: 110). Kripke 
differentiates between an individual being physically iso-
lated and his being considered in isolation (1982: 110). So 
Robinson Crusoe, in spite of his physical isolation can be 
said to be a rule follower as long as he is not considered in 
isolation. In my opinion, the distinction is an elegant vent 
for what could have posed a problem for the community 
view: on the one hand, the community view by definition is 
incompatible with solitary rule following, on the other, some 
of Crusoe’s actions indeed seem fit to be described as rule 
following activities. The distinction between physical and 
epistemological isolation explains that the community view 
bans the later but not the former.   
Baker and Hacker, on the other hand, consider 
Kripke’s distinction ‘a muddle’ (1984: 39) that conceals the 
real question at hand: had, or had not Crusoe been 
following rules? The distinction blurs out the fact that both 
the physically isolated person and the one considered in 
isolation can manifest a rule-following behavior. The fact 
that this is so, they claim, is shown by Crusoe’s regulative 
practice; he uses the rule as “a canon or norm of 
correctness” (1984: 39) and is able to correct his own 
mistakes when and if they occur. Thus rule following for 
Baker and Hacker is performing an activity which is regular 
and which can be corrected by the rule follower. To them, 
then, the question whether anyone else observing or 
considering the isolated individual can or cannot detect the 
rule following behavior is distinct from the question 
whether the individual has in fact been  
Baker and Hacker’s critique of Kripke is 
encapsulated in their different interpretation of the term 
‘private’. While Kripke interprets ‘private’ as the opposite of 
‘social’ (hence the distinction between physical solitude 
and epistemic solitude and the prima facie impossibility of 
solitary rule following), for Baker and Hacker ‘private’ 
means the opposite of ‘public’. Consequently, rule-
following is essentially public in nature but not necessarily 
social (see also 1985: 161-165). That is why the question 
of whether the outside observer may or may not detect the 
rule-following taking place, will find it hard (perhaps even 
impossible!) or easy to learn the rules he is observing 
becomes secondary. What is crucial is that the practice is 
essentially public. Baker and Hacker, then, defend a 
position opting for solitary-public rule following.3 Following 
rules, they emphasize, “…is not a matter of collective 
dispositions, but of a normative practice, which may be 
collective, but need not be” (1984: 74). Kripke, they claim, 
is deriving the answer to the normative question ‘how 
ought we to follow rules?’ from the empirical question ‘how 
do most people follow rules?’ because ‘rule’ is a normative 
concept, it cannot be claimed that the following of rules 
can be the object of observation. It is impossible to derive 
the norms of a given society by looking at the society’s 
conduct. Without stipulation of a rule, actions are but 
‘empty vehicles’ of what would have been considered a 
norm, had we a rule. By considering the rule as distinct 
from its application Kripke’s analysis not only ignores the 
internal relation between the rule and its application, but 
also creates a situation wherein agreement becomes an 
internal property of the rule. This is nonsense, Baker and 
Hacker claim, for then the test of the rule’s correct 
application becomes correspondence with community 
agreement, the action of the majority.  
However, this position, I argue, is highly problematic 
by their own assumptions. The alternative position 
presented by Baker and Hacker, I claim, only succeeds in 
solving those problems by creating others, no less 
resounding, namely that of reducing rules to norms. Such 
reduction, i.e., a normative explanation of rule is at the 
same time devoid of conventionality, of the capacity to 
describe how in fact a linguistic community follows its 
rules. Although following rules is a practice, it is wrong, 
they say, to think of it as essentially a social practice 
(1985:164). Wittgenstein’s conception of practice demands 
it to be shareable, not shared. For a practice to be 
considered rule following “it must be possible to teach a 
technique of applying rules to others, by grasping the 
criteria of correctness, to determine whether a given act is 
a correct application of the rule” (ibid). Baker and Hacker 
characterize the practice of rule following as essentially 
possible but not as essentially occurring, a rule following 
practice which is possibly learnable, teachable correctable 
and regular. None of these conditions are sufficient by 
themselves. But a rule following practice is one which, 
when meeting these conditions, could possibly occur. 
Baker and Hacker characterize a rule following practice as 
                                                     
 
3 Baker and Hacker claim that this is Wittgenstein’s position in unpublished 
manuscripts (see, e.g., 1985: 172).  
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one that could take place, but does not necessarily take 
place. Their criticism of the community view alternative 
compels them not only to defend solitary rule following 
(that allegedly eliminates the role of society in rule 
following practice) but also opens the way to the possibility 
that no one in the society follows its own rules. 
 Rule following is essentially a normative practice, 
one “which may be collective, but need not be” (1984: 74, 
my italics). This means that it is possible that the 
normativity of rule following may not prevail, i.e., that not 
everyone, indeed, that no one, will actually abide by the 
normative rules. Baker and Hacker’s suggestion thus 
neglects the descriptive aspect of rule following, making it 
an inappropriate candidate for a picture of the role of rules 
in language. This creates a tension within their own 
position. For on the one hand Baker and Hacker demand 
that rule following be a learnable, teachable, correctable 
practice, but on the other, it may happen, that it is not 
actually learned, taught, corrected or practiced by anyone. 
Nothing in their suggestion, I claim, prevents such a 
possibility.  
Baker and Hacker’s suggestion allows therefore for 
a hypothetical situation in which no one in the linguistic 
community follows it’s rules. I would like to claim at this 
point, that even if we assign to them the weaker position 
that some of the people, but not necessarily all or most, 
follow the normative rules, my argument against them 
remains valid. If indeed Baker and Hacker’s argument 
amounts ‘merely’ to allowing the possibility of partial rule 
following, the consequence (like those of the stronger 
version) is a disregard of the empirical fact of the 
percentage of the population that do follow the rules, thus 
rendering it irrelevant for the purpose of this discussion. 
This consequence, I wish to claim, is intolerable. I agree 
with Baker and Hacker that a reduction of rule following to 
consensus is wrong in that it cannot account for the 
normative aspect of rules, however, their position ignores 
the descriptive, empirical, conventional aspect of rules. For 
where there are normative rules, actual rule following, the  
 
actual way people use their language becomes, in Baker 
and Hacker’s picture quite immaterial. They accuse Kripke 
for divorcing the rule from its applications, whereas they 
are guilty of separating between the normative notion of 
how we ought to follow rules from the conventional way in 
which we speak in fact. We are in a place where, at least 
possibly, perhaps actually, the picture of rules and rule 
following presented by Baker and Hacker is at best 
contingently related to the way people act linguistically, 
speak their language.  
3. Conclusion  
Both Kripke and Baker and Hacker agree that a full ac-
count of ‘rule’ must accommodate for the rule’s normative 
dimension as well as its descriptive, conventional one. In 
this paper I have attempted to show that both the reduction 
of rules to conventions as well as the reduction of rules to 
norms does not succeed in providing the sought-after ac-
count of the concept. In so doing, I hope to have shed light 
on two concepts; conceptual reduction and rule. 
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Scientific Pragmatic Abstractions 
Christian Sachse, Lausanne, Switzerland 
I. Starting point 
As Kim argues (Kim 1998, Kim 2005), the causally effica-
cious property tokens considered by the special sciences 
are identical with tokens of physical property configura-
tions. Thus, ontologically speaking, biological property 
tokens are identical with configurations of physical proper-
ties. Taking for granted token identity in what follows, one 
may wonder what the relationship between biological and 
physical property types is like. 
 Fodor and Putnam developed a famous argument 
in the late sixties and early seventies that hinged on what 
they called the possibility of ‘multiple realization of property 
types’ in order to exclude a bi-conditional connection or 
identity between property types of the special sciences, 
such as biological property types, and physical property 
types (Fodor 1974 and Putnam 1967/1975). In contrast to 
physical property types, they argued, it is possible that one 
and the same biological functional property type may be 
realized by configuration tokens coming under different 
physical types. In the case of biology, the possibility of 
multiple realization is ultimately based on natural selection, 
in accordance with the Paul Ehrlich’s dictum – 
summarizing the work of biologist W.D. Hamilton - that 
“Selection operates when carriers of some genes out-
reproduce carriers of other genes.” (Ehrlich 2000, p. 38). In 
other words, the evolutionary salience of phenotypic 
effects of genes is defined by it contribution to the fitness 
of the organism in question in a given environment insofar 
as this has a positive effect on their proliferation. This is 
the essential point of biological evolution by natural 
selection – even though it is of course quite more 
complicated than illustrated here. 
The following analysis presents a way of accounting 
for this evolutionary context within the functional definition 
of biological property types, which is a first step in sorting 
through the problems facing a reductionist theory that 
wants to grant biology scientific standing, yet ultimately 
seeks to defend the principle of ontological reduction.  
A biological property is a functional property that is 
characterized in terms of fitness contribution or 
contribution to reproduction (for more details of the debate, 
cf. Weber 2005, especially pp. 38-41; for the argument to 
consider biological properties always in the light of 
evolution, cf. Dobzhansky 1973). Using this working 
definition, we can understand multiple realization as 
follows: let us say, for instance, that there is a functionally 
defined gene type (B) that is realized by different physical 
configurations (of type P1, P2, P3, etc.). This multiple 
realization is possible since it is the phenotypic effect of 
the genes that characterises the gene type in question, 
whereas the different possible ways in which this 
phenotypic effect is physically produced – such that there 
are different physical types – is generally not important: 
 
 
Based on the possibility of multiple realization, theory re-
duction of biology is by and large supposed to fail since 
such a reductive approach to the special sciences is gen-
erally taken to require nomological bi-conditional connec-
tions (Endicott 1998, section 8). Therefore, the special 
sciences such as biology are generally taken to be scien-
tifically indispensable in providing explanations of certain 
parts of the world – namely, those having to do with living 
systems. 
II. The dilemma of a non-reductionist 
framework for biology 
The multiple realization argument poses a fundamental 
challenge to the anti-reductionist position: if one takes the 
MR argument to be an ontological one, it leads to an 
epiphenomenalism as regards the properties of the special 
sciences. Alternately, one may take the multiple realization 
argument to operate purely on the epistemological level as 
an argument against theory reduction. However, this, too, 
is not satisfying.  
Taking multiple realization as an ontological 
argument, it gives us the following asymmetry: on the one 
hand, we have tokens of one and the same functional 
biological property type, B. On the other hand, the possible 
realizer tokens of B may be of different physical types. 
Thus, B is not identical with any of these physical realizer 
types. From this it follows that there is also an ontological 
difference between each token of B and the respective 
physical realizer token because B is taken to be something 
ontological (for a contrary position see MacDonald & 
MacDonald 1986). However, to claim that there is a causal 
power of the property tokens of B over and above the 
causal power of its respective physical realizer tokens 
contradicts ontological reductionism. If, then, we insist on 
an ontological difference between property tokens of B and 
their physical realizer tokens, we must conclude that this 
ontological difference is causally impotent. At this point, 
the whole scientific status of law-like generalizations 
comes into question, insofar as they are couched in terms 
of concepts referring to epiphenomena.  
The other approach to the problem is to take 
multiple realization merely as an epistemological issue 
consisting in multiple reference. On the one hand, there 
are property tokens that are described by the same 
functional concept B (capital letters will be taken as 
concepts in what follows). On the other hand, these 
property tokens are differently described in terms of 
physics (P1, P2, P3, etc.). 
Let us keep in mind that, ontologically speaking, the 
similarities homogenously brought out by the functional 
concept B are nothing that physics can’t explain, since 
every token coming under B is identical with something 
physical and can be, because of the completeness of 
physics, described and explained in physical terms (Cf. 
Chalmers 1996, pp. 44). In considering a single property 
token, physics always provides more detailed causal 
explanations than biology does. However, abstracting from 
physical differences, only the functional concept B seizes 
salient similarities among the entities in question. Biology 
may thus provide explanations in an unificationist manner 
Scientific Pragmatic Abstractions — Christian Sachse 
 
 
 287
physics is not able to make, since physics does not 
dispose of the conceptual means to carry out such 
abstractions (cf. Kitcher 1981). 
Yet this unification by abstraction from physical 
details remains opaque so long as we lack a systematic 
link to physics. If we adhere to ontological reductionism 
and the completeness of physics, everything causally 
efficacious can be considered in terms of physics; 
therefore, the inability to generate a systematic link 
between biological concepts (law-like generalizations) and 
physics is a major epistemological blow to biology. What 
this means is that biological concepts are fundamentally 
unintelligible from the physics standpoint. This, in turn, 
casts doubt upon the scientific credibility of biological 
concepts. In other words, even if we cast our problem in 
epistemological terms, in the end, we can’t coherently 
construct a “soft” autonomy for biology without introducing 
conceptual incoherence into ontological reductionism. 
Given this way of stating the problem, it is obvious 
that, in order to save our ontologically reductionist 
program, we are going to have to find a conceptual 
schema that allows for making systematic links between 
biology and physics. The two main reductionist 
approaches do just this, but, as I will show, they are both 
vulnerable to criticism. The two main approaches are: a, 
that suggested by Lewis and Kim, entailing the 
construction of concepts that are semi-physical-semi-
functional ones, coextensive with physical concepts (see 
Lewis 1980, Kim 1998, 93-95); and, b., that suggested by 
Bickle, the construction of physical theories that are partly 
coextensive with the special science theory in question 
(Bickle 1998). For instance, one may construct a gene 
concept that includes physical criteria in order to be 
coextensive with the physical concept in question or one 
may construct a physical genetic theory that refers to all 
and only the entities described by genetics within a certain 
species. Evidently, the two approaches contain enough 
overlaps to be combined. 
Let us take for granted for the purposes of argument 
that one can ascribe a scientific quality to the semi-
physical-semi-functional concepts (something not trivial). 
Does this get us from the abstract concept B to terms of 
physics (P1, P2, P3, etc.)? Since biology only works with 
functional concepts, but not with concepts specified by 
physical criteria, it is puzzling how Kim’s semi-physical-
semi-functional concepts could serve as bridge principles, 
since it only seems to repeat the problem in other terms. 
This is why it remains unintelligible, from the biological 
point of view, how the salient similarities brought out by B 
can be brought out by the semi-physical-semi-functional 
concepts without this resulting in a conflict with ontological 
reductionism and the completeness of physics. Kim does 
not give us a mechanism whereby it is possible to abstract 
from the physical part of the semi-physical-semi-functional 
concepts, and hence it remains unclear how B can 
causally explain something. 
Against this background, we might want to make the 
radical move of replacing biology tout court with physical 
Ersatz theories. This is in fact Bickle’s solution: the 
construction of physical theories that are, taking together, 
co-extensional with the biological theory in question. In 
other terms, one constructs several physical theories with 
applicable physical concepts (applicable in the sense that 
they cover target objects) that are co-extensional with 
biological concepts (which target the same objects). Since 
bridge-principles are still missing, this approach as well 
does not make intelligible how abstract biological concepts 
and law-like generalizations could be vindicated. This 
approach by Bickle (and Hooker) is more general than the 
approach of Kim (and Lewis), but it also ends up in 
suggesting the elimination of biology. 
III. Reductionist framework without  
elimination 
Because of multiple reference, the starting point is that 
tokens of physical property configurations that come under 
the functionally defined biological concept B may be de-
scribed by different physical concepts (P1, P2, P3, etc.). 
This implies that there is a causal difference among the 
physical configuration tokens coming under a single func-
tional concept B (Kim 1999). In other words, there are 
different ways to bring about the effects on which the func-
tional concept B focuses (Esfeld & Sachse 2007), as, for 
instance, in the difference created by a phylogenetic effect 
that elevates the rate of the reproduction of one gene over 
another. From the physical point of view, there is thus a 
difference in the production of side effects that are sys-
tematically linked with the main effects (characterizing B) 
in question. 
The differences resulting from side effects can be 
detected from the biological point of view in a given 
physical environment, thus giving it standing as a scientific 
fact. This can be illustrated by, for instance, the empirical 
data with which genetics deals, which is often cited as a 
classical case of multiple realization (reference). It can be 
shown that differences between DNA sequences that 
come under a single gene concept (multiple reference) are 
linked to different molecular ways to bring about the effect 
on which the gene concept in question focuses (causal 
implication of compositional differences). These different 
ways to produce characteristic effects in question are 
systematically linked with side effects such as the speed or 
the accuracy of the protein production (see Bulmer 1991) 
that can be salient for selection. To put it in other terms, it 
is possible to construct purely functionally defined 
biological concepts that are nonetheless coextensive with 
the physical concepts. This means, for any concept B, it is 
possible to construct functional sub-concepts B1, B2, B3, 
etc. coextensive with the physical concepts P1, P2, P3, etc. 
Since any physical difference accounting for multiple 
reference leads to side effects that can be in principle 
detected from the biological perspective, there thus is a 
nomological coextensionality (Sachse 2007, 138-152). The 
following figure may help to illustrate the most important 
steps in this argument.  
 
Note that the construction of such functional sub-concepts 
is first and foremost an intermediate step in order to estab-
lish bridge-principles. The important thing here is that we 
can show that the biological concepts have a non-opaque 
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scientific status in that the sub-concepts are coextensive 
with physical concepts, even though all of them may not 
be of any particular biological interest. Let me thus call this 
their possible scientific status. By this means, we can 
bootstrap upwards to establish the scientific status of the 
more abstract concept B. To put it in other terms, since 
any token coming under the abstract biological functional 
concept B also comes under a functional sub-concept 
whose scientific quality would prima facie not be opaque, 
B cannot be opaque either in as much as the only differ-
ence between B and one of its sub-concepts (B1, B2, B3, 
etc.) is the degree of abstraction within a purely functional 
theory. A sub-concept brings out the same salient similarity 
as does its more abstract concept (its relevance here be-
ing defined in the context of selection under normal condi-
tions) while also adding a functional detail (side effect that 
is salient for selection under special conditions) that is 
linked to this outlined salient similarity (B1 = “B + Bminor”). 
Since the matter is so crucial, let me stress here that both 
the abstract concept and its sub-concepts are constructed 
in terms of one single theory, such that the abstraction 
from side effects is a purely theory-immanent matter with a 
conceptual linkage. Thus, under this schema, we clarify 
the assumed scientificity of the abstract unifying concepts 
of biology (for instance, a certain gene concept that ac-
commodates the fact that the gene tokens are physically 
different), as we cannot do in the other reductionist ap-
proaches. There are now bridge-principles sufficient to 
make the abstraction step intelligible. 
This philosophical foundation will help to normalize 
the undoubted pragmatic advantage of biology as a 
special science within a unified conceptual schema that 
retains the completeness of physics and ontological 
reductionism. Biology is scientific because of the 
systematic link to physics, and objective because the 
outlined biological salient similarities are those that exist in 
our world as they depend on biological evolution by means 
of natural selection. Its abstract functional concepts, 
integrated within the proposed reductionist framework of 
constructing functional sub-concepts, counter the twin 
threats of epiphenomenalism and eliminativism. Abstract 
biological concepts can be systematically linked with 
physics. This does not ratify the claim of the indispensable 
character of biology, since that does not seem to be 
compatible with the completeness of physics and 
ontological reductionism, but it does give us pragmatic 
wiggle room – one can now argue that the pragmatic value 
of biology is scientific and objective. Biological concepts 
and the abstract law-like generalizations governing them 
bring out salient similarities among entities that are 
physically different. This is the epistemological power 
belonging to biology alone: its ability to explain biological 
evolution in homogeneous terms that can’t be selected 
from a wholly physics-based point of view. Hence, there is 
no positive argument left for the eliminativist approach to 
biology. Which gives us what we want: biology is the more 
unifying theory about a certain ensemble of entities (the 
living beings) while physics is the more unifying theory in 
general but not as concerns the living beings. 
To sum up and conclude: there is a strong causal 
argument in favour of ontological reduction. Based on this 
argument and the completeness of physics, the standard 
anti-reductionist argument of multiple realization faces the 
dilemma that it apparently leads to either 
epiphenomenalism or eliminativism with regard to biology, 
that is, in respective to its status as a science. In order to 
avoid these consequences, we show that a systematic link 
between biology (and other special sciences) and physics 
is philosophically and empirically possible by means of the 
construction of functional sub-concepts that are 
coextensive with (in the last resort) constructed physical 
concepts. Based on this systematic link to physics, the 
scientific quality of biology and its abstract concepts is no 
longer opaque. This should not be taken as a warrant to 
regard biology as indispensable, given the principles of the 
completeness of physics and ontological reductionism, but 
it does show that, within our proposed reductionist 
framework, biology accrues standing as a objective, 
pragmatic science, which conceptualizes parts of the world 
(living systems) with abstract unificationary concepts that 
have no equivalent in physics. 
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Wittgenstein’s Attitudes 
Fabien Schang, Nancy, France 
1. Between language and mind: a logic of 
propositional attitudes ... 
The statement in §5.542 concerns the logical form of pecu-
liar propositional attitudes, viz. belief-statements: 
 
But it is clear that "A believes that p", "A thinks p", 
"A says p", are of the form " 'p' says p": and here we 
have no co-ordination of a fact and an object, but a 
co-ordination of facts by means of a co- ordination 
of their objects.  
This formulation sounds queer, and we will attempt to see 
why Wittgenstein did state it so before considering Hin-
tikka's replies in favor of epistemic modal logic. 
The core problem concerns truth-functions theory: is 
any meaning-function a truth-function? (Russell 1923) 
made a distinction between two sorts of occurrence for a 
proposition, namely: meaning-functions that contain 
propositions as a member are also truth-functions 
whenever the component proposition occurs as expressing 
a fact (i.e. an ontological entity); they are not so whenever 
the proposition occurs as a fact in its own right, given that 
the whole sentence then talks about the component 
proposition itself. It is precisely the case with propositional 
attitudes, where the fact in consideration is the form of 
words uttered by the speaker. It thus seems that not every 
meaning-function is truth-functional and, in this respect, 
Russell's position is to be compared with what Frege 
argued about the change of denotation in a context of 
indirect discourse.  
Nevertheless, (Wittgenstein 1922) does not accept 
any other meaning-functions than the truth-functional 
ones: not only “Propositions are truth-functions of 
elementary propositions” (§5), but also “There is one and 
only one complete analysis of the proposition” (§3.25). If 
so, the preceding logical analyses as suggested by 
Russell and Frege cannot be accepted because they go 
beyond truth-function theory, the only one for Wittgenstein 
(“In the general propositional form, propositions occur in a 
proposition only as bases of the truth-operations”, §5.54). 
Therefore, the point is not to delimit one context of 
application for truth-functional propositions while ruling out 
some propositions of an intensional sort; rather, the point 
is to streamline every meaningful proposition within the 
unique pattern of truth-functions. There cannot be any 
exception to the theory of extensionality, from a Tractarian 
perspective. 
For one thing, the analysis of "A believes p" 
excludes the subject A from its logical form while replacing 
it by a mention of the proposition within single brackets, 'p'. 
The result seems to be counterintuitive, reducing belief to 
an impersonal relation between a linguistic expression (i.e. 
the propositional sign) and that what it designates (i.e. the 
propositional fact that constitutes a thought). Why such an 
exclusion of the thinking subject, and how to analyze a 
belief while eliminating the psychological side of an 
attitude? (Russell 1923) did not reject it from his own 
analysis, given that he conceived the believer as a 
sequence of psychological facts expressed by means of 
sentences. But those beliefs were then associated with a 
single subject; now Wittgenstein's account definitely 
cancels this particular subject and talks instead about 
some arbitrary sentence in the form 'p'.  
In order to understand such a mysterious statement 
as §5.542, several writers accounted for it in two steps, 
namely: Wittgenstein's theory of object and his subsequent 
distinction between an empirical and a metaphysical 
subject.  
2. … is not a problem of mind  
(no psychologism!) ... 
In (Russell 1923)'s account, each proposition was treated 
as a class of psychological facts that introduce A's mind 
through the analysis of propositional attitudes. The logical 
form of "A believes that p" thus corresponds to the correla-
tion of a fact, i.e. the propositional fact that p, and an ob-
ject, i.e. A's mind. However, any object is simple, Wittgen-
stein claims (“The object is simple”, §2.02), whereas A's 
mind is complex (as a sequence of psychological facts), so 
that the logical form assigned to propositional attitudes is 
not correct. The logical form required for any states of 
affairs (“An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, 
things)”, §2.01) thus leads Wittgenstein to discard proposi-
tional attitudes as states of affairs, in their current reading 
as a co-ordination of a fact and an object. Such a position 
leads him to the equally queer statement: “This shows that 
there is no such thing as the soul – the subject, etc. – as it 
is conceived in superficial psychology. A composite soul 
would not be a soul any longer” (§5.5421).  
Isn't the price to pay for accepting Wittgenstein's 
logical analysis too expensive, if the rejection of 
propositional attitudes apparently leads one to a rejection 
of psychology? (Favrholdt 1964, 559) notes that this result 
directly follows from the Tractarian theory of objects: 
 
For the superficial psychologists that maintain this it 
would be reasonable to say that "A says p" is a co-
ordination of a fact in the Wittgensteinian sense, 
namely a propositional sign, and an object, namely 
the thinking, presenting soul, which being simple is 
to be called an object. This view Wittgenstein is 
bound to reject. According to the picture theory in 
the Tractatus no co-ordination could ever be estab-
lished between a fact and an object. The two enti-
ties in question have to be equally articulated in or-
der to be co-ordinated. Objects can be co-ordinated 
with objects (because they are simple) and facts 
can be co-ordinated with facts in so far as they can 
be analysed into the same amounts of elements. 
(559)  
This prevents Wittgenstein from viewing propositional atti-
tudes in the usual way, to be found in epistemic modal 
logic. Hence his second argument that accounts for 
§5.542: the distinction between an empirical and a meta-
physical subject. 
(Hintikka 1958) puts such a distinction to avoid 
some misunderstanding in Wittgenstein's language theory, 
namely: his thesis of solipsism, ordinarily considered as an 
argument for private language. In order to clarify the 
following passage: “That the world is my world, shows 
itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the 
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language which I understand) mean the limits of my world” 
(§5.62), (Hintikka 1958) argues that Wittgenstein's concern 
 
is not the empirical subject but the "metaphysical" 
subject discussed in philosophy. In other words, he 
is interested only in what can be said to be mine 
necessarily; for otherwise he would only be doing 
empirical psychology. But the only necessity there 
is, according to the other doctrines of the Tractatus, 
is the empty tautological necessity of logic. (89) 
As a matter of fact, solipsism suggests the private charac-
ter of our current thoughts: “The limits of my language 
mean the limits of my world” (§5.6). Now Wittgenstein 
doesn't support the view of a private language altogether. 
As a way to disentangle this wrong connection, Hintikka 
argues that the Tractarian "I" is not a psychological ego or 
single thinker. It is not the agent of Hintikka's later epis-
temic logic, but an abstract subject embodying the whole 
set of propositions: “The subject does not belong to the 
world but it is a limit of the world” (§5.632). Wittgenstein's 
picture theory of language should recall us that the limits of 
the world are determined as the limits of language, where 
the projective relation between both stands for the corre-
spondence between a pictured fact and a picturing propo-
sition. 
Moreover, the metaphysical subject cannot talk 
about itself within the very language it embodies, contrary 
to the case of propositional attitudes: “No proposition can 
say anything about itself, because the propositional sign 
cannot be contained in itself (that is the "whole theory of 
types")” (§3.332). In virtue of such an impossible self-
reference for the Wittgensteinian subject, believing that p 
is the case is thus confined to the impersonal relation 
between a propositional sign and a proposition: 'p' says p, 
meaning that the propositional sign expresses p's being 
the case. Consequently, solipsism means the obvious 
impossibility for the metaphysical subject to go beyond the 
limits of language, given that the latter is a precondition to 
the former; but solipsism does not mean the impossibility 
for a psychological subject to express her own thoughts. 
On the contrary, Wittgenstein's thoughts are as public as 
Frege's ones (the Gedanken) and his solipsism does not 
mean at all that thoughts are private representations 
(Vorstellungen). Nevertheless, such public thoughts are 
separated from the psychological subject that grasps them 
in the Tractatus, hence the resulting logical form in §5.542. 
Now (Favrholdt 1964) recalls in the same time that 
the thinker implicitly occurs in the relation expressed in 
§5.542 between 'p' and p:  
 
"'p' says p" says nothing more than p. It states that 
the propositional sign is being thought, and this is 
the same as asserting the proposition p. Therefore, 
according to Wittgenstein, in sentences as ‘A says 
p’, p is not occurring in a proposition in a special 
way which is in conflict with his general theory of 
truth-functions. (560). 
3. ... but a problem of language  
(no metatheory!) 
It will be attempted to show in the following that epistemic 
logic amounts to some compromise between both topics: it 
introduces belief into logic while presenting it as the public 
occurrence of a statement, or assertion. But the Tractarian 
view of logic excluded to do so. 
Assuming that assertion refers to the occurrence of 
a belief by means of a statement, it does not add anything 
to propositions that serve to make it explicit and is to be 
located in the domain of psychological events. The very 
project of a "doxastic logic" is therefore absurd, in the light 
of the Tractarian language theory: 
 
The thought makes a une proposition out of the 
propositional sign p and this is the same as assert-
ing p. If p is not thought it remains a propositinal 
sign and the expression "├p" in this case is absurd; 
you cannot at the same time assert, that is to say 
think p, and not think p. Hence the assertion sign is 
logically altogether meaningless (see 4.442). (560) 
As to the rules of logic, they specify the limits within which 
subjects do and can express themselves: inferences and 
tautologies don't say anything but embed propositional 
forms that subjects cannot think of, because either these 
forms don't depict any particular image (excluded middle) 
or cancel any of them (non-contradiction). The projective 
nature of language according to Wittgenstein makes his 
logical theory appear as a sort of transcendental frame for 
thinking. Such a view could be interpreted as reminiscent 
of Kant's transcendental logic, to be defined as an inquiry 
into the conditions of a priori possibility for experience 
according to the categories of understanding. Apart from 
the notion of understanding, Kant's criticism is found again 
here in the impossibility for any empirical subject to know 
the limits of language; empirical subjects think within lan-
guage, and they cannot depart from it in order to contem-
plate outwardly what makes a distinction between logical 
and illogical thoughts. 
Logic is thus characterized as a method of 
projecting true or false propositions of a language into 
states of affairs (Tatsachen) or mere situations 
(Sachverhalte), respectively; but these methods are 
inexpressible by themselves. Formal semantics cannot be 
described in the latter: the rules for applying a set of 
formulas into some given model, as depicted in every 
metalanguage from a model-theoretical semantics, 
couldn't be conceived in a Tractarian line. If any subject A 
believes in a contradiction, for example, (Favrholdt 1964) 
recalls that the distinction between a propositional sign 
and a thought makes such a belief meaningless (its 
projection is impossible, as pointing out no plausible 
direction): 
 
Wouldn't it be possible for A to say "p . ~p" thus vio-
lating the laws of logic? The answer is no (...) A can 
think "p" or he can think "∼p". In the first case the 
first link of p . ~p will become a proposition but the 
last part (~p) will remain a propositional sign, be-
cause it is not thought (…) Therefore if one cannot 
think anything unlogical he cannot present anything 
in language which "contradicts logic" either. For lan-
guage is not the physical facts that we call proposi-
tional signs, but these facts in their projective rela-
tion to other facts. (561-2) 
Epistemic modal logic is in total agreement with this, when 
forbidding any two contradictory propositions to be em-
bedded into one and the same "model". The metaproperty 
of consistency says no more than Wittgenstein did here; it 
does the same thing but in saying it with terms, that is, 
within a construed formal semantics.  
4. Conclusion: metatheory as a  
precondition for modal logics 
Universality of language and ineffability of semantics are 
two preconditions that Hintikka will rule out from his very 
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view of logic, in accordance with his distinction between 
logic as a universal language and logic as a calculus; the 
same does for other modal logics than epistemic logic, 
given that any judgment about a proposition was made 
impossible by Wittgenstein. Such a Tractarian impossibility 
came from ineffability as a unknowable relation between 
language and reality. It also follows from this a crucial 
nexus between symbolism and formalism: language sym-
bolizes the world, nothing else, and any formalized lan-
guage should yield a genuine picture of reality. 
The point with epistemic logic is that it becomes 
acceptable only when the preceding preconditions have 
been qualified. Such a qualification is allowed only within a 
model-theoretical framework that Wittgenstein refused for 
philosophical reasons, so that Suszko's initial objection 
pointed to the right direction while assuming uncharitably 
something justifiably refused by the Tractatus.  
In a nutshell: only God can rule in logic, for 
Wittgenstein; but Suszko was an atheist and God is 
(officially) dead with Tarski, so to say. 
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Warum man auf transzendentalphilosophische Argumente nicht 
verzichten kann 
Benedikt Schick, Berlin, Deutschland 
1. Lebenswelt, Reduktion, Elimination 
Der Ausgangspunkt aller philosophischen Bemühungen 
wie auch wissenschaftlicher Forschung ist die Lebenswelt. 
Wir finden uns „immer schon“ – wie manchmal gesagt wird 
– in einer natürlichen und sozialen Welt vor, haben „immer 
schon“ Meinungen, Überzeugungen, Erwartungen, Deu-
tungsmuster und Vorurteile von dieser Welt, von uns selbst 
und von unseren Mitmenschen. Dieses Meinungs-Geflecht 
mit seinen vielen einzelnen Komponenten und größeren 
und kleineren Zusammenhängen scheint uns nur teilweise 
und nur zeitweilig wirklich bewusst zu sein. Dass die Le-
benswelt den notwendigen Ausgangspunkt aller menschli-
chen Tätigkeiten bietet, ist kaum zu bestreiten. Zu offen-
sichtlich ist, dass die „immer schon“ akzeptierten lebens-
weltlichen Annahmen in ihrer je nachdem eher theoreti-
schen oder praktischen Ausrichtung eine notwendige Vor-
aussetzung allen Handelns sind. Das scheint nicht nur für 
das alltägliche Handeln eines bestimmten Individuums zu 
gelten, sondern auch für das Funktionieren aller möglichen 
kulturellen und sozialen Institutionen und Projekte, und 
selbstverständlich eben auch für den Wissenschaftsbe-
trieb. Die Lebenswelt ist in einem bestimmten Sinn primär, 
das meint, sie ist Voraussetzung und Grundlage allen For-
schens und Fragens. 
Dieser Zusammenhang mag einleuchten, es drängt 
sich aber dann eine Frage auf: Folgt aus der 
unbestrittenen Vorrangigkeit der Lebenswelt auch ihre 
Unkritisierbarkeit? Kann das Geflecht von theoretischen 
und praktischen Annahmen, das von jeder wissen-
schaftlichen oder philosophischen Kritik vorausgesetzt 
wird, überhaupt von eben dieser Kritik in Frage gestellt 
werden? Zwingt uns die Tatsache, dass die Lebenswelt 
primär ist, dazu, auch alle ihre Elemente für sakrosankt zu 
halten? 
Wer hier mit ja antworten möchte – so scheint es –, 
treibt die Transzendentalphilosophie entschieden zu weit. 
Lebensweltliche Annahmen sind manchmal begründet, 
manchmal sogar gut begründet, häufig aber bloß mehr 
oder weniger gut bewährt. Die Lebenswelt steckt voller 
Vorurteile, Inkohärenzen, Widersprüche und Irrtümer. Das 
Gesamte lebensweltlicher Annahmen ist auch keineswegs 
stabil, sondern sowohl im Hinblick auf einen bestimmten 
Menschen als auch im Hinblick auf die historische Ent-
wicklung von Gemeinschaften sehr dynamisch, unter 
Umständen geradezu revolutionär. De facto werden lebens-
weltliche Annahmen also häufig kritisiert und korrigiert. 
Außerdem, was ist denn die Lebenswelt? Unterscheidet 
sich nicht die Lebenswelt eines Menschen zumindest 
teilweise von der eines anderen, die der einen Kultur von 
der einer anderen? 
Werfen wir einen Blick in die Wissenschafts-
geschichte, so fehlt es nicht an Fällen, wo vermeintlich un-
aufgebbare lebensweltlich verwurzelte „Wahrheiten“ sich 
als Täuschung erwiesen haben. Als Beispiel mag der 
Verweis auf den Wechsel vom geo- zum heliozentrischen 
Weltbild, der heute gern als „erste Kränkung der Mensch-
heit“ gezählt wird, genügen. 
Es kann kein Zweifel bestehen, dass viele lebens-
weltliche Annahmen kritisierbar und korrekturbedürftig 
sind, und dass hierbei den Wissenschaften eine zentrale 
Rolle zukommt. Das Verhältnis, in dem Ergebnisse 
einzelwissenschaftlicher Forschung zu lebensweltlichen 
Annahmen stehen, muss allerdings in unterschiedlichen 
Fällen auch unterschiedlich beurteilt werden. Nicht in 
jedem Fall ist eine Elimination der lebensweltlichen 
Deutung nötig. Vielleicht können in manchen Fällen eine 
wissenschaftliche Beschreibung und eine lebensweltliche 
Beschreibung desselben Phänomens ohne Widerspruch 
nebeneinander stehen. In anderen Fällen kann es sein, 
dass die Wissenschaft eine Erklärung „von unten“ für eine 
lebensweltliche Gegebenheit liefert und so eine lebenswelt-
liche Beschreibung auf eine wissenschaftliche reduziert. 
Elimination und reduktive Erklärung müssen unterschieden 
werden. Im Gegensatz zur Elimination führt die reduktive 
Erklärung ein Phänomen nur auf eine zugrunde liegende 
Ebene zurück. Das Phänomen wird dabei erklärt, aber 
nicht wegerklärt. 
Aufgrund der Vorrangigkeit der Lebenswelt scheint 
es jedenfalls nicht möglich zu sein, die Lebenswelt als 
Ganze in Frage zu stellen, noch die für unser Welt- und 
Selbstverständnis grundlegenden Voraussetzungen revi-
sionär zu eliminieren. In eine ähnliche Richtung geht Julian 
Nida-Rümelin, wenn er schreibt: „In unserer Lebenswelt 
sind abrupte Veränderungen […] nicht zu erwarten. Sie 
[die Lebenswelt] sperrt sich gegenüber rationalistischen 
Konstruktionen, da sie zu tief mit den je individuellen und 
gesellschaftlichen Lebensformen verbunden ist, um in toto 
zur Disposition gestellt zu werden.“ (Nida-Rümelin 2005, 
40). Wenn die Lebenswelt als Ganze nicht revisionär zu 
überholen ist, dann könnte es auch konstitutive Elemente 
der Lebenswelt geben, die sich einer Elimination oder 
auch einer reduktiven Erklärung entziehen.1 
Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich die Frage nach 
den Kriterien. Wie kann man denn entscheiden, welcher 
Fall jeweils vorliegt. Wann gebietet es sich von Elimination 
zu sprechen, wann eher von reduktiver Erklärung? Anhand 
eines Beispiels soll im Folgenden geprüft werden, ob 
hierbei nicht eine Art transzendentaler Test weiterhelfen 
kann – ja ob ein solcher Test nicht vielleicht sogar 
unverzichtbar ist. 
2. Ursachen und Gründe 
In unserer Lebenswelt ist die Praxis des Begründens fest 
etabliert und bewährt. Gründe spielen nicht nur im Bereich 
des Handelns eine Rolle sondern ebenso im Bereich des 
Wissens, und selbstverständlich in der Wissenschaft. Das 
Gründe-Sprachspiel scheint zu denjenigen lebensweltli-
chen Phänomenen zu gehören, die eine nicht eliminierba-
re Voraussetzung eines jeden möglichen Welt- und 
Selbstverständnisses bilden. Auf der anderen Seite findet 
empirische Forschung bei ihrem Bemühen, kognitive Pro-
zesse und menschliches Verhalten zu erklären, immer nur 
                                                     
 
1 Auch eine reduktive wissenschaftliche Erklärung kann in manchen Fällen 
unmöglich sein. Der des Anti-naturalismus unverdächtige Ansgar Beckermann 
rechnet beispielsweise mit der Möglichkeit, dass phänomenales Erleben echt 
emergent gegenüber körperlichen Prozessen ist, und wir es daher hier mit 
einem unlösbaren „Welträtsel“ zu tun haben. (Beckermann 1999, 34). 
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Ursachen. Neuronale Prozesse etwa sind offenbar durch-
gängig von Ursachen bestimmt. Ist daher die anti-
naturalistische Schlussfolgerung zu ziehen, dass, wenn wir 
an der Möglichkeit festhalten wollen, dass Menschen ihr 
Handeln zumindest prinzipiell an Gründen ausrichten kön-
nen, dass wir dann einen ontologischen Physikalismus 
zurückweisen müssen? 
In seinem Beitrag Ursachen und Gründe: Zu Ihrer 
Unterscheidung in der Debatte um Physikalismus und 
Willensfreiheit bestreitet Michael Pauen genau das 
(Pauen2005, 7). Die Unterscheidung von Ursachen und 
Gründen kann seiner Ansicht nach auch dann aufrecht-
erhalten werden, wenn der Physikalismus wahr wäre. 
Gemeint ist damit, dass selbst wenn menschliches Ver-
halten vollständig durch physische Prozesse bestimmt 
wäre, es dennoch unter dem Einfluss von Gründen stehen 
könnte. Wie argumentiert Pauen nun für diese Ansicht? 
Zunächst einmal verzichtet er darauf „psycho-physische 
Identitätsbehauptungen“ (Ebd. 8) aufzustellen, ihn 
beschäftigt lediglich das Verhältnis der verschiedenen Be-
schreibungsebenen: der lebensweltlichen, in der Gründe 
vorkommen und der neurobiologischen, in der Ursachen 
vorkommen. Was dieses Verhältnis betrifft, so sind 
„Reduktionsbehauptungen“ durchaus denkbar, so Pauen. 
Mit Reduktion ist dabei gemeint die „erklärende Zurück-
führung z.B. einer aus dem Alltag bekannten Phänomen-
beschreibung auf eine wissenschaftliche Theorie, die es 
erlaubt, das Alltagsphänomen zu erklären“ (Ebd. 8). 
Entscheidend ist der Zusatz: „Selbstverständlich wird die 
Existenz des Alltagsphänomens damit nicht angetastet.“ 
(Ebd. 8). Pauen scheint hier einen Mittelweg gehen zu 
wollen. Auf der einen Seite wehrt er sich gegen eine 
„abenteuerliche Identifikation von Gründen und Neuronen“ 
(Ebd. 10), andererseits hält er daran fest, dass Über-
legungsprozesse, die sich auf Gründe stützen, neuronal 
realisiert sind. Als Analogie dient ihm das Verhältnis von 
Computern zu ihren Programmen. Nur weil alles, was sich 
in Computern ereignet vollständig physikalisch beschreib-
bar ist, heißt das nicht, dass nicht Programme die Funktion 
des Computers bestimmen. Die Software existiert und ist 
wirksam, allerdings nicht als etwas Eigenständiges 
sondern als etwas materiell – in der Hardware – Reali-
siertes. 
3. Ein Argumentationsschritt fehlt 
Michael Pauen möchte in dem genannten Beitrag nicht für 
die Wahrheit des Physikalismus argumentieren, er möchte 
vielmehr die grundsätzliche Vereinbarkeit des Physikalis-
mus mit der Möglichkeit, dass Gründe wirksam sind, auf-
zeigen. Er bilanziert daher: „Es mag viele Einwände gegen 
den Physikalismus geben – die Präsumtion, dass unser 
Handeln von Gründen geleitet wird, gehört jedoch offenbar 
nicht dazu“ (Ebd. 11). 
Mit Blick auf diesen Ansatz Pauens ließe sich nun 
manches in Frage stellen. Man könnte etwa den 
vorausgesetzten Kompatibilismus kritisieren (vgl. dazu die 
Replik auf Pauen: Nida-Rümelin 2005), und man könnte 
zweitens bestreiten, dass eine vollständige Reduktion der 
mentalen Ebene auf die neurobiologische Ebene gelingen 
kann (Pauen selbst äußert diesen Zweifel deutlich. Pauen 
2005, 10). Stellen wir diese beiden Einwände aber einmal 
zurück und nehmen um des Arguments willen an, das 
Verhältnis der Redeweise von Gründen zu neuro-
biologischen Beschreibungen sei treffend beschrieben. Es 
ergibt sich dann – so meine ich – ein Problem mit Pauens 
realistischer, nicht-eliminativer Deutung von Gründen. 
Warum geht Pauen so selbstverständlich davon aus, dass 
selbst wenn die lebensweltliche Beschreibungsebene auf 
die neurobiologische reduziert werden kann, die 
lebensweltliche Beschreibung dennoch nicht ihren 
ontologisch verbindlichen Charakter verliert? Dazu noch 
einmal Pauen: „Selbstverständlich wird die Existenz des 
Alltagsphänomens damit [durch die reduktive Erklärung] 
nicht angetastet“ (Ebd. 8). 
Ein Beispiel und eine theoretische Überlegung dazu 
sollen im Folgenden zeigen, dass das alles andere als 
selbstverständlich, vielmehr begründungsbedürftig ist. 
4. Die Dämonen-Theorie als Beispiel 
Das folgende Beispiel hat in ähnlicher Form Richard 
Rorty im Rahmen seiner Argumentation für den 
Eliminativen Materialismus verwendet (Rorty 21993, 96-
99). 
Denken wir uns eine Gesellschaft, in der 
Krankheiten dadurch erklärt werden, dass man sagt, die 
Kranken seien von Dämonen oder bösen Geistern 
besessen. Es gibt in dieser Gesellschaft bestimmte Arten 
der Behandlung, die in der Regel auch wirken, und die 
Wirkweise wird natürlich ebenfalls mithilfe des Dämonen-
sprachspiels erklärt. Diese Gesellschaft kommt irgend-
wann in Kontakt mit der westlichen Welt, lernt die moderne 
Medizin kennen und ersetzt nach und nach die alte 
Beschreibung von Krankheiten durch eine Erklärung 
mithilfe von Viren und Bakterien. Ist das alte Sprachspiel 
damit nicht völlig obsolet geworden, und erzwingt nicht die 
erfolgreiche Reduktion damit auch das Zugeständnis, dass 
es Dämonen nicht gibt? Niemand würde doch die Be-
hauptung stehen lassen wollen: Dämonen sind bakteriell 
realisiert. Die Redeweise von Viren und Bakterien erklärt 
nicht, wie Dämonen Krankheiten bewirken, sie ersetzt viel-
mehr das Dämonensprachspiel. Es gebietet sich hier von 
Elimination, nicht von reduktiver Erklärung zu sprechen. 
Offensichtlich haben wir es beim Dämonenglauben mit 
dem Fall einer in einer bestimmten Gesellschaft etablierten 
lebensweltlichen Annahme zu tun, die aber 
wissenschaftlich kritisiert und eliminiert werden kann. 
Der entscheidende Grund dafür, dass eine 
realistische Deutung des Dämonensprachspiels nicht 
sinnvoll ist, scheint darin zu liegen, dass im Fall einer 
wirklich vollständigen Reduktion eines lebensweltlichen 
Sprachspiels auf eine zugrunde liegende wissenschaftlich 
beschreibbare Ebene dieses Sprachspiel theoretisch über-
flüssig wird, und daher auch jede ontologische Verbind-
lichkeit einbüßt. Die Möglichkeit, dass das überholte 
Sprachspiel aus pragmatischen Gründen beibehalten wird, 
ist damit natürlich nicht ausgeschlossen. Eine solche 
pragmatische Beibehaltung verpflichtet aber nicht 
ontologisch. 
Man könnte das hier Gemeinte auch deutlich 
machen, indem man sich auf das „Prinzip der 
wissenschaftlichen Eleganz“ (Schmidt-Salomon 2007, 
183)2 beruft. Es besagt, dass man zur Erklärung eines 
Phänomens nicht mehr Annahmen investieren soll, als 
unbedingt nötig sind. Oder man greift zu Ockhams 
Rasiermesser und verlangt, dass man die Menge der 
Entitäten nicht ohne Not vermehren soll. Die Redeweise 
von Dämonen ist nach der erfolgreichen Etablierung 
wissenschaftlicher Medizin nicht notwendig für die 
Erklärung irgendeines Phänomens. Daher sollte man 
diese Redeweise aufgeben bzw. zumindest nicht mehr 
                                                     
 
2 Michael Schmidt-Salomon wendet dieses Prinzip in der Frage nach Willens-
freiheit an – allerdings wohl auf problematische Weise. 
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ontologisch ernst nehmen. Zu diesem Schluss kommt 
auch Rorty wenn er schreibt: „Der Fall der Dämonen 
macht jedoch klar, dass die Entdeckung einer neuen 
Möglichkeit, Phänomene zu erklären, die früher durch 
Bezugnahme auf eine bestimmte Sorte von Entitäten 
erklärt worden sind […], einen guten Grund für die 
Behauptung abgeben kann, dass es keine Entitäten dieser 
Sorte gibt.“ 
Was ergibt sich nun aus diesen Überlegungen für 
das Problem der Unterscheidung von Ursachen und 
Gründen? Es soll hier nicht der Eindruck erweckt werden, 
dass dieses Problem genauso zu handhaben ist, wie der 
Fall des Dämonenglaubens.3 Das Problem besteht viel-
mehr darin, dass es einer Begründung für die Ungleich-
behandlung beider Fälle bedarf. Warum ersetzt eine 
vollständige neurobiologische Beschreibung nicht das 
Gründe-Sprachspiel, sondern erklärt nur, wie Gründe 
realisiert sind? Mit anderen Worten, warum haben wir es 
beim Gründe-Sprachspiel anders als bei der Dämonen-
theorie mit einem lebensweltlichen Phänomen zu tun, das 
resistent gegenüber wissenschaftlicher Elimination ist, 
obwohl es ebenfalls – zumindest nach der von Pauen 
versuchsweise eingeführten Voraussetzung – vollständig 
reduzierbar auf eine zugrunde liegende Ebene ist? Wenn 
jedes menschliche Verhalten, das wir gewöhnlich unter 
Berufung auf Gründe zu erklären versuchen, vollständig 
mithilfe neurobiologischer Ursachen erklärt werden kann, 
dann scheint das „Prinzip der wissenschaftlichen Eleganz“ 
doch den Schluss zu erzwingen: Die Erklärung durch 
Gründe erklärt nichts, was wir nicht auch durch neuro-
physiologische Ursachen erklären können, also sind 
lebensweltliche Erklärungen, die sich auf Gründe berufen 
überflüssig (nicht notwendig) und daher ontologisch zu 
eliminieren. 
5. Transzendentale Argumentation 
Mir scheint es notwendig zu sein, auf irgendeine Art trans-
zendentalphilosophischer Argumentation zurückzugreifen, 
um den Unterschied zwischen Phänomenen wie dem Ge-
ben und Nehmen von Gründen einerseits und Phänome-
nen, die durch wissenschaftliche Erklärungen eliminiert 
werden können, andererseits, begründen zu können. Zu-
mindest sehe ich nicht, wie diese Begründungsleistung 
sonst erbracht werden könnte. Auch könnte die Selbstver-
ständlichkeit, mit der Pauen an einer realistischen Deutung 
des Gründe-Sprachspiels festhält, dafür sprechen, dass 
ihm diese Realität intuitiv unkritisierbar erscheint. 
Die Beeinflussbarkeit unseres Handelns und 
Denkens durch Gründe ist eine nicht aufgebbare Voraus-
setzung für unsere lebensweltliche Praxis insgesamt, auch 
für Wissenschaft und Philosophie. Die Praxis des 
Begründens ist so grundlegend mit unserem  
Welt- und Selbstverständnis verflochten, dass es als ein 
 
                                                     
 
3 Genau das ist die These, die Rorty mit Hilfe des Dämonen-Beispiels vertei-
digen will: „Gerade so, wie wir jetzt die Existenz von Dämonen leugnen wollen, 
könnte die zukünftige Wissenschaft die Existenz von Empfindungen leugnen 
wollen.“ (Rorty 21993, 98). 
zelnes Phänomen gar nicht aus diesem Gesamtzu-
sammenhang herausgelöst und zum Gegenstand einer 
kritischen Überprüfung gemacht werden kann. Hierin ist 
der wesentliche Unterschied zu sehen im Vergleich zu 
Annahmen, wie der Dämonentheorie oder auch des schon 
erwähnten Wechsels vom geo- zum heliozentrischen 
Weltbild. 
Eine transzendentalphilosophische Prüfung der 
Rolle, die das Gründe-Sprachspiel in unserer Lebenswelt 
spielt, zeigt, dass es sich bei diesem Sprachspiel um ein 
konstitutives Element handelt, dass so wie die Lebenswelt 
als Ganze nicht als Täuschung entlarvt werden kann. Erst 
mit dieser transzendentalphilosophischen Hintergrund-
annahme wird die Argumentation Michael Pauens 
schlüssig. Sie erklärt, warum selbst unter der Voraus-
setzung des Physikalismus die mentale Beschreibungs-
ebene – und mit ihr die Rede von Gründen – nicht obsolet 
wird. 
Will man hier noch mir Pauen von Physikalismus 
sprechen, so scheint mir diese Bezeichnung allerdings 
irreführend zu sein. Physikalismus heißt in diesem 
Zusammenhang ja nur, dass eine vollständige reduktive 
neurophysiologische Erklärung mentaler Phänomene 
möglich ist. Das Explanandum wird hierbei aber nicht etwa 
wegerklärt, sondern es bleibt Ausgangs- und bleibender 
Bezugspunkt für die wissenschaftliche Erklärung. Die 
Erklärung setzt das zu Erklärende voraus, nicht umge-
kehrt. Die transzendentalphilosophisch abgesicherte Le-
benswelt erweist sich damit als die eigentliche ontolo-
gische Basis. 
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Making the Mind Higher-Level 
Elizabeth Schier, Sydney, Australia 
Central to Kim’s position is a distinction between levels 
and orders. Levels are understood in mereological terms. 
Lower-levels contain parts which are organised into 
structured wholes at higher-levels. Orders are ways of 
conceptualising properties without providing details of their 
various realisers. So water is at a higher-level to the H20 
molecule because water is made up of H20 molecules. 
Liquidity is at a higher-order to water because water is one 
way to realise liquidity. But liquidity is not at a higher 
mereological level to water because water is not a part of 
liquidity in the same way that H20 molecules are a part of 
water. 
Crucially Kim is a realist and a physicalist about 
higher-level phenomena. He is a realist because higher-
level properties have causal powers that their parts lack. 
He is a physicalist because the properties of the higher-
level wholes are determined by their mirco-physics 
constituents. A brief reflection on a simple example shows 
that this is obviously correct. Water can do things that no 
individual H20 molecule can: you would not want to dive 
into a pool containing only one H20 molecule. This 
difference in causal powers is due to the arrangement of 
the molecules: you also would not want to dive into a pool 
containing ice or steam. The fact that the isolated 
constituents or the same constituents in different structures 
can have different types of causal powers means that the 
different structures can not be identical to their 
constituents. There must be more to being water, snow, or 
ice than being composed of H20 molecules. But the extra 
thing is simply the arrangement of the parts. Importantly, 
the ways in which the parts can be arranged depends on 
the nature of the parts. It is the because oxygen is a small 
highly electronegative atom that H20 is a polar molecule 
and it is because H20 is a highly polar molecule that 
hydrogen bonds form between the molecules and it is 
because hydrogen bonds form between the molecules that 
water has unusual properties (e.g. liquid water is denser 
than ice so ice floats on water). The nature of the H20 
molecule determines how it can be arranged and therefore 
determines the causal powers of the structures that are 
composed of it. So it is the nature of the constituents that 
determines the causal powers of the whole. According to 
Kim, although physicalism is true, a strongly eliminative 
micro-physicalism is clearly false. Although everything is 
physical, not everything is identical to the entities of micro-
physics because not all the causal powers are possessed 
by the entities of micro-physics.  
While there are controversies regarding Kim’s 
picture, they do not concern his claim that higher-level 
phenomena are real and physical. No one doubts that 
water can do things that an individual H20 molecule can’t 
and no one doubts that water is physical. This suggests 
that if we can show that the mind and brain are in a 
mereological relationship in the same way as water and 
H20 then we can show, to everyone’s satisfaction, that the 
mind is as real and physical as water. I want to suggest 
that this option has not been explored because the 
standard, classical digital account of the mind does not 
make the mind higher-level. Fortunately, a connectionist, 
analog account of the mind does.  
What might distinguish the mind from its lower-level 
constituents? What might the mind be able to do that its 
parts can’t? One obvious answer is that the mind can 
compute, but its parts can’t. So what would it take for 
computation to be a higher-level property? What is doing 
the causing in computation? Following O’Brien and Opie 
(2006) I suggest that computation is a causal process 
involving representing vehicles where the trajectory of that 
process is shaped by the meaning of the vehicles. That is, 
computation involves representing vehicles causing each 
other in a way that depends on the meaning of those 
vehicles. Meaning is doing the causing in computation. So 
for computation to be a higher-level process we need 
meaning to be higher-level property. That is, we need the 
meaning of a representing vehicle to depend on the 
organisation of its parts. Although we can get this for 
analog computation, we do not get this for digital 
computation.1 
Digital computation is the rule-governed 
manipulation of symbols (Haugeland 1985). A symbol is a 
representing vehicle that bears an arbitrary relation to its 
represented object (Copeland 2005). The content of a 
symbol does not depend on the intrinsic nature of the 
symbol. For example there is nothing about the numeral ‘3’ 
as a physical object that means it must be about the 
number three. Another way to put this is that there is an 
arbitrary relation between the syntactic and semantic 
properties of a symbol. This means that, for symbols, 
meaning is not a higher-level property of the symbol. The 
meaning of a symbol does not depend on the organisation 
of the parts of a symbol. You can change the structure of 
your symbol, and as long as the rules are changed to 
recognise the new structure, the system will still function 
correctly. This is why it is possible to build a digital 
computer out of anything, even beer cans or bricks. 
But there is an alternate analog account of 
computation according to which computation is the 
manipulation of analogs, representing vehicles that 
resemble what they are about. Consider for example an 
architect’s scale model, which is being used to calculate 
the shadows that will be cast by a building.2 Like water, the 
organisation and nature of the parts of a scale model 
matter. If you change the structure then you change what 
they are about. For example, if you move the buildings, 
then they will no longer represent the proposed buildings 
and the shadows they will cast. If you change the nature of 
the constituents you also change the meaning. It is no 
good building your scale model out of glass because it 
won’t block the light in the right way. The organisation and 
nature of the constituents determines what the model 
resembles and therefore determines what it represents. In 
analog computation there are no rules which we can 
change to deal with the change to the representing 
vehicles. The meaning of the representing vehicles in a 
scale model is at a mereologically higher-level to their 
constituents. The same constituents in a different 
arrangement will have a different meaning. Even by Kim’s 
standards, meaning is a new, causally efficacious property 
in the scale model. 
                                                     
 
1 The analog-digital distinction is often understood in terms of the continuity or 
discreteness of the representational medium. I am using the distinction not in 
this way, but rather as a distinction between representing vehicles that do or 
do not have their content grounded in resemblance (see Copeland 2005). 
2 I have taken this example from Gerard O’Brien. 
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Of course we don’t have scale models in the brain. 
But this does not mean that an analog account of the brain 
is impossible as there is a more abstract ‘second-order’ 
form of resemblance (Shepard and Chipman 1970). First 
order resemblance occurs when two things share one or 
more physical properties. For example the paint cards you 
get at the hardware store represent the colour of the paint 
by replicating the colour of the paint. It is implausible that 
the ground of mental content is first-order resemblance 
because we are capable of representing many things with 
which the brain shares no physical properties. But there is 
a more abstract ‘second-order’ notion of resemblance. 'In 
second-order resemblance, the requirement that 
representing vehicles share physical properties with their 
represented objects can be relaxed in favour of one in 
which the relations among a system of representing 
vehicles mirror the relations among their objects' (O'Brien 
and Opie 2004, p.10). Consider for example a mercury 
thermometer. It represents temperature because the 
relation between variations in the volume of the mercury 
resembles the relations between variations in the 
temperature of the substance that the thermometer is in 
contact with. For example, if volume x is greater than 
volume y then the temperature which corresponds to x is 
hotter than the temperature that corresponds to y. 
Because of this relational similarity between the volume of 
the mercury and the temperature of the substance it is in 
contact with, it is possible to use variations in the volume 
of mercury to represent variations in temperature.  
Importantly, the structure and nature of the 
constituents of the representing vehicles determines their 
content for second-order resemblance. As with the scale 
model, the meaning of a mercury thermometer depends on 
the structure of the parts. If you change the structure by 
stomping on it, you would change the meaning. Also like 
the scale model, the nature of the constituents determines 
the meaning in the thermometer. It is because mercury is a 
substance that expands when heated that it can be used 
to represent temperature; you cannot make a thermometer 
out of wood or custard. So meaning in a mercury 
thermometer is at a mereologically higher-level to its 
constituents. 
Connectionism provides a model of how to 
implement analog computation in the brain. We can see 
second-order resemblance in the activation space of many 
artificial neural networks. Activation space is a multi-
dimensional space that enables us to represent the 
relations between patterns of activation across the units of 
a layer of an artificial neural network. Each dimension of 
activation space corresponds to the possible levels of 
activation of one of the units. Each point in activation 
space represents one pattern of activation across a layer. 
Patterns of activation that are near each other in activation 
space will be similar in that they consist of similar patterns 
of activity across the units whereas dissimilar patterns of 
activation across the units will be further apart in activation 
space. The similarity relations between the patterns of 
activation can be represented in activation space via the 
distance between the points. 
Importantly it has been shown that the activation 
space of many artificial neural networks resembles aspects 
of the task domain. Consider for example Cotrell’s face 
recognition network, which is able to recognize familiar  
 
faces, distinguish between faces and non-faces, and 
determine the gender of unfamiliar faces (Churchland 
1995). When the patterns of activation across the hidden 
units were mapped in activation space it was discovered 
that all the patterns of activation that represent images of a 
particular individual are clustered closely together in 
activation space. What this means is that they are 
represented with patterns of activation that are quite 
similar. The patterns of activation that represent images of 
faces of the same gender are clustered together in a larger 
region of activation space. Finally all of the patterns of 
activation that represent faces are located in a large region 
of activation space that is separate from the patterns of 
activation that represent non-face images. In general, 
similar faces are represented with similar patterns of 
activation and dissimilar faces are represented with 
dissimilar patterns of activation. The relations between 
patterns of activation resemble the relations between 
faces. 
So we can see second-order, relational similarity at 
work in artificial neural networks. Importantly the structure 
and nature of the constituents of the representing vehicles 
determines their content in such networks. We can see this 
by realising that the similarity relations between patterns of 
activation that are mapped in activation space are based in 
the intrinsic structure of the patterns of activation. Although 
individual patterns of activation are represented in 
activation space by points, the basis of their location in 
activation space, and the basis of their similarity relations, 
is their internal structure. Two patterns of activation will be 
located near each other in activation space because they 
consist of similar levels of activity across the units. 
Conversely, if two patterns consist of different levels of 
activity of the various units then they will be located in 
different regions of activation space. If you change the 
nature of a pattern of activation you will move it within 
activation space and therefore change what it resembles 
and means. And patterns of activation have the structure 
that they do because of the electrical nature of the 
units/neurons that constitute them; you cannot build a 
network out of beer cans or bricks. For the connectionist, 
meaning does depend on the structure and nature of the 
parts, so meaning is mereologically higher-level to the 
parts. It is only when you organise neurons into the right 
firing patterns that you have representing vehicles with 
meaning. Meaning is neurons arranged in a particular way 
in the same way that water is H20 arranged in a particular 
way. So the meaning of a pattern of activation across 
neurons is at a higher mereological level to the neurons 
that constitute it. This means that the meaning of 
connectionist representing vehicles is not in competition for 
causally efficacy with their neural constituents.  
We can see that on an analog connectionist account 
of the mind the meaning of a representing vehicle is at a 
mereolgocially higher-level to its constituents. So meaning 
can play a causal role over and above that played by its 
neural constituents. Yet, because the causal powers of the 
representing vehicles are determined by the nature of their 
constituents, meaning is a physical property. So, like 
water, meaning is higher-level, real, physical and causally 
efficacious. Connectionism makes the mind higher-level 
and therefore, by everyone’s standards, real, causally 
efficacious and physical. 
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Zwischen Humes Gesetz und „Sollen impliziert Können“ –  
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen empirisch-normativer Zusammenarbeit 
in der Bioethik (Teil II)* 
Sebastian Schleidgen, Tübingen, Deutschland 
1. Formallogische Grundlagen empirisch-
normativer Zusammenarbeit II: Sollen  
impliziert Können 
Während die im ersten Teil der Arbeit explizierte Annahme 
des Humeschen Gesetzes die Grenzen empirisch-
normativer Zusammenarbeit logisch untermauert, verdeut-
licht unsere zweite Grundannahme – die so genannte „Sol-
len impliziert Können“-Annahme – deren spezifische Mög-
lichkeiten. Ihre erste philosophiehistorisch relevante For-
mulierung findet sich in I. Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 
Dort schreibt Kant: „Nun muss die Handlung allerdings 
unter Naturbedingungen möglich sein, wenn auf sie das 
Sollen gerichtet ist“ (Kant 1965: 534). Die Definition und 
detaillierte Analyse der „Sollen impliziert Können“-
Annahme in ihrem noch heute gängigen Verständnis ist 
jedoch H. Albert zuzurechnen. Er schreibt in Konstruktion 
und Kritik: „Wenn wir nun auf unser Problem zurückkom-
men, ob die Sozialwissenschaft etwas zur Beantwortung 
der zweiten Kantischen Frage beitragen kann, so ergibt 
sich eine sehr einfache Antwort, nämlich: tatsächlich kann 
sie, und zwar auch unter Beibehaltung des Weberschen 
Wertfreiheitsprinzips, außerordentlich viel dazu beitragen. 
Sie kann nämlich im Rahmen unseres Wissens die Frage 
beantworten: Was können wir tun? Und diese Frage hat 
eine fundamentale Beziehung zu der Frage: Was sollen 
wir tun? Die meisten Menschen werden nämlich vermutlich 
einer Behauptung zustimmen, die, auf ihre kürzeste Form 
gebracht, lautet: Sollen impliziert Können.“ (Albert 1972: 
58) 
Albert können wir an dieser Stelle keiner 
detaillierten Analyse unterziehen. Es ist jedoch schon 
intuitiv einleuchtend, dass die Befolgung einer moralischen 
Norm davon abhängig ist, inwieweit die Akteure diese 
Norm zu befolgen imstande sind. Diese Intuition lässt sich 
im Hinblick auf die Aufgaben normativer Theorie 
plausibilisieren: Sie soll schließlich Normen generieren, 
nach denen wir – qua unseres Menschseins – überhaupt 
handeln können. Es reicht nicht, dass moralische Normen 
logisch mögliche Handlungen von den Akteuren fordern, 
insbesondere dann nicht, wenn uns eine Erfüllung 
überfordern würde. 
Aus der Akzeptanz der „Sollen impliziert Können“-
Annahme ergibt sich jedoch ein weiteres Problem: So 
kann man fragen, wie Humes Gesetz und „Sollen impliziert 
Können“ – als Grundannahmen einer empirisch-
normativen Zusammenarbeit – in einen konsistenten 
Zusammenhang gebracht werden können. Der Intuition 
zufolge scheint „Sollen impliziert Können“ doch zu 
bedeuten, dass sich ein – empirisch zu messendes – 
Können auf ein Sollen niederschlägt, mithin von einem 
Sein auf ein Sollen geschlossen wird: Aus den deskriptiv 
zu erfassenden Möglichkeiten menschlicher Akteure 
ergeben sich ihre moralischen Verpflichtungen. Das aber 
würde einen Verstoß gegen Humes Gesetz bedeuten. Nun 
ergibt sich dieses Problem aber nur in der intuitiven Lesart  
von „Sollen impliziert Können. Nach dieser Lesart wird 
„Sollen impliziert Können“ – formallogisch gesprochen – 
durch ein Bikonditional repräsentiert, d.h. Können (Ka) und 
Sollen (Sa) stehen im formallogischen Verhältnis Ka≡Sa. 
Etwas wäre demnach gesollt dann und nur dann, wenn es 
gekonnt wird. Das würde tatsächlich bedeuten, dass sich 
die moralische Richtigkeit bzw. Falschheit einer Handlung 
direkt aus den Handlungsmöglichkeiten eines Akteurs 
herleiten ließe. Sieht man sich die oben zitierten 
Textstellen aus der Kritik der reinen Vernunft bzw. 
Konstruktion und Kritik jedoch genauer an, zeigt sich, dass 
weder Kant noch Albert ein solch intuitives Verständnis 
von „Sollen impliziert Können“ im Sinn gehabt haben 
können. So schreibt Kant weiter: „Es mögen noch so viele 
Naturgründe sein, die mich zum Wollen antreiben, noch so 
viele sinnliche Anreize, so können sie nicht das Sollen 
hervorbringen, sondern nur ein noch lange nicht 
notwendiges, sondern jederzeit bedingtes Wollen, dem 
dagegen das Sollen, das die Vernunft ausspricht, Maß und 
Ziel, ja Verbot und Ansehen entgegen setzt.“ (Kant 1965: 
534) Albert hingegen bekräftigt zwar, dass 
sozialwissenschaftliche Empirie zur Frage „Was sollen wir 
tun?“ durch ihre Erkenntnismöglichkeiten hinsichtlich der 
Frage „Was können wir tun?“ etwas beitragen kann, 
postuliert aber gleichzeitig, dass dies „unter Beibehaltung 
des Weberschen Wertfreiheitsprinzips“ zu geschehen 
habe. Damit schließen beide Autoren direkte Schlüsse 
vom deskriptiven Können auf normative Sollens-Aussagen 
und damit ein Verständnis von „Sollen impliziert Können“ 
als Bikonditional aus. 
Das klassische Verständnis von „Sollen impliziert 
Können“ wird hingegen durch eine Implikation zwischen 
Sollen und Können, also Sa → Ka, zum Ausdruck 
gebracht. Auch dieses Verständnis ist unserer Meinung 
nach nicht adäquat: So wird Sa → Ka ja dann und nur 
dann falsch, wenn Sa „wahr“, Ka aber „falsch“ ist. Das 
würde bedeuten, das „Sollen impliziert Können“ im 
vorliegenden Fall verletzt ist. Nun kann man dies entweder 
als deskriptive Aussage verstehen oder aber versuchen, 
„Sollen impliziert Können“ dem vorliegenden Fall 
anzupassen, mithin bei ¬Ka auch ¬Sa einzufügen, um Sa 
→ Ka wieder zu erfüllen. Das entspricht jedoch einem 
Schluss über Modus Tollens von ¬K auf ¬S bzw. von 
einem (Nicht-)Können auf ein (Nicht-)Sollen, was 
wiederum einen Verstoß gegen Humes Gesetz bedeutet. 
Möchte man das klassische Verständnis von „Sollen 
impliziert Können“ retten, müsste man dessen Gültigkeit 
auf Fälle beschränken, in denen Ka den Wahrheitswert 
„wahr“ besitzt. Dies würde das Prinzip jedoch ad absurdum 
führen, da es dann nur noch in Fällen gilt, in denen das 
Gesollte auch gekonnt wird. 
Wie aber ist „Sollen impliziert Können“ dann zu 
verstehen? Unserer Meinung nach erweist sich nur ein 
schwaches Verständnis im Sinne eines Implikations-
verhältnisses von Können und Sollen als plausibel. 
Formallogisch gesprochen bedeutet dies „Können 
impliziert Sollen“ (Ka → Sa), weshalb wir den traditionellen 
Ausdruck „Sollen impliziert Können“ für unglücklich 
gewählt halten. Dabei schränken wir die Gültigkeit von 
„Können impliziert Sollen“ auf solche Instanzen ein, für die 
* Der erste Teil dieses Aufsatzes findet sich weiter oben; siehe den Beitrag von 
Michael Jungert. 
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Sa wahr ist. Das ist wichtig, weil eine generelle Akzeptanz 
von Ka → Sa für alle Instanzen in einen Normkonflikt 
münden würde: wären nämlich sowohl a als auch ¬a 
möglich, würde die Offenheit von Sa hinsichtlich seines 
Wahrheitswertes dazu führen, dass sowohl a als auch ¬a 
gesollt wären. Die Erklärung für diese Einschränkung ist 
einfach: Sofern kein Sollen etabliert ist, also Sa den Wert 
„falsch“ hat, ist eine Beschäftigung mit „Sollen impliziert 
Können“ oder – wie wir es nennen – „Können impliziert 
Sollen“ schlicht irrelevant. Es ist dann schließlich kein 
Sollen etabliert, demgegenüber ein Können steht. 
Nun muss man sich klarmachen, was ein solches 
formallogisches Verständnis bedeutet: Der Satz „Können 
impliziert Sollen“ ist wahr unabhängig vom Wahrheitswert 
der Teilaussage „Können“, d.h. ob etwas tatsächlich 
gekonnt wird, ist irrelevant dafür, ob es gesollt wird. Das 
klingt zunächst contraintuitiv, ist aber deshalb plausibel, 
weil ein moralisches Sollen – wie wir hervorgehoben 
haben – ausschließlich durch Idealnormen etabliert wird, 
die ihre Geltung unabhängig von empirischen 
Erkenntnissen, mithin auch unabhängig von einem 
faktischen Können – beanspruchen: Sollen ist schlichtweg 
unabhängig von Können. „Können impliziert Sollen“ 
entspricht damit einem wissenschaftstheoretisch 
adäquaten Verhältnis von Idealnormen zur Praxis und 
verstößt nicht gegen Humes Gesetz. 
Es bleibt die Frage, welche Rolle das Können spielt, 
wenn es keinerlei Einfluss auf das Sollen hat. Wie wir 
sagten, ist es Aufgabe normativer Theorie, Normen zu 
generieren, nach denen wir – qua unseres Menschseins – 
handeln können. Es genügt nicht, dass moralische 
Normen formallogische Kriterien erfüllen, um 
handlungsleitend zu wirken. Diese Teilaufgabe normativer 
Theorie entspricht aber der von uns bereits 
wissenschaftstheoretisch skizzierten Notwendigkeit einer 
Übersetzung von Ideal- in Praxisnormen. Denn das 
empirisch zu erfassende Können entspricht den 
menschlichen Handlungsmöglichkeiten innerhalb ihrer 
kognitiven, motivationalen sowie extern bedingten 
Beschränkungen. Und das Ziel der Erfassung von 
Beschränkungen bzw. Können besteht ja darin, die 
Handlungen in der Praxis soweit als möglich an den durch 
die Idealnormen avisierten moralischen Idealzustand 
anzupassen. Dabei aber verlieren – wie wir hervorhoben – 
die Idealnormen, als Sollens-Aussagen, keineswegs ihre 
Gültigkeit. Wir haben es also gewissermaßen mit zwei 
Sollensarten zu tun: dem durch die Idealnormen 
generierten „moralischen Sollen“ steht ein „praktisches 
Sollen“ gegenüber, das durch die Praxisnormen 
ausgedrückt wird und welches das moralische Sollen an 
die menschlichen Handlungsmöglichkeiten anpasst. Daher 
ist der Satz „Können impliziert Sollen“ einerseits wahr 
unabhängig von der Wahrheit des Gliedes „Können“ – 
nämlich, wenn er sich auf das moralische Sollen bezieht –, 
gleichzeitig aber ist eine empirische Erfassung des 
Könnens mit Hinblick auf die moralische Praxis zwingend 
notwendig – wenn es um das praktische Sollen geht: 
Können spielt also nur für das Sollen in der Praxis eine 
Rolle, die durch kognitive, motivationale und extern 
bedingte Beschränkungen der Akteure vorstrukturiert ist. 
Eine angemessene Formulierung des traditionellen 
Ausdrucks „Sollen impliziert Können“, die ein hinsichtlich 
des Sollens wirksames Können beinhaltet, ist daher 
„praktisches Sollen setzt Können voraus“. 
An dieser Stelle sei festgehalten, dass “Sollen 
impliziert Können” kein Brückenprinzip im oben skizzierten 
Sinne von Anwendungsbedingungen moralischer Normen 
ist. Schließlich formulieren Brückenprinzipien nach dem 
Schema „Eine Handlung H ist moralisch geboten gemäß 
der Norm N genau dann wenn das empirisch zu 
überprüfende Kriterium K gegeben ist“ ein bikonditionales 
Verhältnis zwischen K und N: N hat in einer vorliegenden 
Situation dann und nur dann Geltung, wenn K gegeben ist. 
Wie wir gezeigt haben, liegt dem adäquaten Verständnis 
von „Sollen impliziert Können“ hingegen ein 
Implikationsverhältnis zugrunde: Die gesollte Idealnorm N 
ist gültig unabhängig von einem empirischen Nachweis 
darüber, ob sie faktisch eingehalten werden kann oder 
nicht. Dieser Unterschied zwischen Brückenprinzipien im 
Sinne von Anwendungsbedingungen und „Sollen impliziert 
Können“ ergibt sich aus ihrem unterschiedlichen Status 
innerhalb normativer Theoriebildung: Brückenprinzipien im 
Sinne von Anwendungsbedingungen sind Erweiterungen 
moralischer Idealnormen und somit Ergebnis normativer 
Theoriebildung. „Sollen impliziert Können“ hingegen hat – 
als Grundlage der Entwicklung von Praxisnormen – 
lediglich eine pragmatische Funktion. 
Bislang haben wir auf wissenschaftstheoretischem 
Wege Erkenntnisinteresse, -möglichkeiten und -grenzen 
normativer Theorie und empirischer Sozialwissenschaften 
sowie die sich daraus ergebenden Notwendigkeiten und 
Grenzen einer Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen normativ-
ethischer Fragestellungen betrachtet. Diese wissen-
schaftstheoretischen Überlegungen haben wir 
anschließend durch formallogische Überlegungen 
untermauert. Auf dieser Basis können wir nun eine 
Einschätzung der von Weaver und Trevino eingeführten 
Ansätze vornehmen: Sowohl parallele als auch integrative 
Ansätze sind abzulehnen, da normative und empirische 
Wissenschaften – insbesondere in der Bioethik – weder 
vollständig voneinander getrennt noch miteinander 
verschmolzen werden können. Schließlich sind sie 
einerseits aufeinander angewiesen, andererseits unterliegt 
ihre Zusammenarbeit aber bestimmten wissenschafts-
theoretischen und logischen Grenzen. 
Demgegenüber zeichnet sich der symbiotische 
Ansatz gerade dadurch aus, dass die theoretischen und 
methodologischen Kerne empirischer und normativer 
Wissenschaften strikt getrennt bleiben und beide 
Disziplinen deshalb auf eine Zusammenarbeit nach oben 
dargestelltem Muster angewiesen sind (vgl. Molewijk et al. 
2004: 58). Nach wissenschaftstheoretischen und logischen 
Kriterien kann also ausschließlich ein symbiotisches 
Vorgehen als adäquat bezeichnet werden. 
Abschließend möchten wir nun drei Varianten einer 
zulässigen und konstruktiven Zusammenarbeit zwischen 
sozialwissenschaftlicher Empirie und normativer Theorie 
vorstellen und durch Beispiele verdeutlichen. 
2. Konsequenzen für eine konkrete  
Zusammenarbeit 
Wie wir gezeigt haben, gibt es einerseits offenkundige 
Notwendigkeiten, andererseits klare Grenzen einer Zu-
sammenarbeit zwischen normativer Theorie und empiri-
scher (Sozial-)Wissenschaft. Daraus ergeben sich drei 
konkrete Modi normativ-empirischer Kooperation, die wir 
abschließend darstellen möchten. 
Die erste Möglichkeit adäquater empirisch-
normativer Zusammenarbeit betrifft die Übersetzung 
normativ entwickelter Idealnormen in faktisch umsetzbare 
Praxisnormen. Wie wir gezeigt haben, muss eine adäquate 
Moraltheorie notwendig auf Idealnormen basieren, die 
aufgrund kognitiver und motivationaler Beschränkungen 
menschlicher Akteure jedoch in Praxisnormen übersetzt 
werden müssen. Damit wird einerseits dem Kriterium 
„Sollen impliziert Können“ entsprochen, andererseits aber 
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garantiert, dem durch die Idealnormen angestrebten 
moralischen Idealzustand möglichst nahe zu kommen. 
Während Idealnormen ausschließlich mit den Mitteln 
normativer Theorie entwickelt werden können, ist eine 
Übersetzung in Praxisnormen auf die Mittel empirischer 
Wissenschaften angewiesen. Mit Hinblick auf die von uns 
dargestellten Erkenntnismöglichkeiten erweisen sich 
empirische Sozialwissenschaften als in besonderem Maße 
für diese Übersetzung geeignet, da sie die Erfassung 
kognitiver und motivationaler Beschränkungen 
ermöglichen. Darüber hinaus sind sie in der Lage, auch 
extern bedingte Beschränkungen zu erfassen. Dabei ist zu 
beachten, dass empirische Erkenntnisse nicht 
ausschließlich Beschränkungen der zu übersetzenden 
Idealnorm zur Folge haben müssen. Denn gerade aus der 
Erkenntnis motivationaler Beschränkungen hinsichtlich 
moralischer Normen lassen sich handlungstheoretische 
Steuerungsmöglichkeiten ableiten: Wenn Klarheit darüber 
besteht, aus welchen Gründen Akteure entgegen den 
Anforderungen einer moralischen Norm handeln, obwohl 
sie dazu kognitiv in der Lage sind, lassen sich 
möglicherweise Wege entwickeln, die Akteure zur 
Einhaltung der Norm zu motivieren. Die Ergebnisse der 
empirischen Sozialwissenschaften schränken die 
Anforderungen idealer Normen also nicht zwingend ein, 
sondern können im Gegenteil sogar Mittel und Wege 
aufzeigen, die Akteure näher an die Einhaltung der 
Idealnormen, mithin die Erreichung des moralischen 
Idealzustandes zu bringen. 
Die zweite Möglichkeit adäquater empirisch-
normativer Zusammenarbeit betrifft die Klärung der durch 
Brückenprinzipien ausgedrückten Anwendungsbe-
dingungen moralischer Normen. Diese Bedingungen sind 
allerdings nicht mit jenen – ebenfalls empirisch zu 
überprüfenden – Beschränkungen menschlichen Handelns 
zu verwechseln, die wir zuvor als Grundlage der 
Entwicklung von Praxisnormen betrachtet haben. Vielmehr 
werden solche Bedingungen durch Sätze wie „Alle 
leidensfähigen Wesen sind gemäß der Norm S zu 
behandeln“ ausgedrückt. Wie wir gezeigt haben, muss es 
Aufgabe normativer Theorie sein, neben der Norm S auch 
ihre Anwendungskriterien K – hier „Leidensfähigkeit“ – zu 
generieren. Die Bestimmung von Fällen, in denen S in der 
Praxis geboten ist, ist jedoch an empirische Erkenntnisse 
gebunden: um festzustellen, ob gegenüber einem Wesen 
X tatsächlich entsprechend S gehandelt werden soll, ist 
empirisch zu überprüfen, ob X faktisch leidensfähig ist. 
Nun handelt es sich im Falle einer Anwendungsbedingung 
„Leidensfähigkeit“ zwar offenkundig um ein natur-
wissenschaftlich zu überprüfendes Kriterium. Es sind 
jedoch auch Brückenprinzipien entwickelt worden, die 
sozialwissenschaftlich zu überprüfende Kriterien einführen: 
Eines der bekanntesten Beispiele hierfür ist das 
regelutilitaristische Brückenprinzip „Wenn dies zur 
Stabilisierung einer Gesellschaft beiträgt, ist gemäß der 
Norm S zu handeln“. Bei der Klärung solcher 
Anwendungsbedingungen ist normative Theorie klarer-
weise auf sozialwissenschaftliche Empirie angewiesen. 
Die dritte Möglichkeit adäquater empirisch-
normativer Zusammenarbeit betrifft die Messung und 
Evaluation der sozialen Praxis hinsichtlich der Umsetzung 
moralischer Normen sowie der Genese neuer moralischer 
Fragestellungen: Wie wir feststellten, sind empirische 
Sozialwissenschaften in der Lage, Handlungs- und 
Diskursmuster der sozialen Praxis zu erfassen. Auf Basis 
dieser Erkenntnisse ist es möglich, die soziale Praxis 
daraufhin zu bewerten, ob und inwiefern sie den 
Anforderungen der zugrunde gelegten Praxisnormen 
entspricht. Stellt sich beispielsweise heraus, dass 
bestimmte Praxisnormen faktisch keine Anwendung 
finden, obwohl sie für moralisch wertvoll befunden wurden, 
können auf Grundlage dieser Erkenntnisse Maßnahmen 
eingeleitet werden, die eine moralkonforme Praxis im 
Sinne dieser Normen befördern. Darüber hinaus können 
empirische Sozialwissenschaften den gesellschaftlichen 
Diskurs auf – beispielsweise durch neuartige Technologien 
herausgeforderte – neue moralische Probleme und 
Debatten hin untersuchen und diese einer normativen 
Analyse zugänglich machen. So lässt sich in den letzten 
Jahren beispielsweise eine verstärkte „moralische 
Hilflosigkeit“ gegenüber neuartigen reproduktions-
technologischen Mitteln beobachten, die dringend einer 
normativen Analyse bedarf. Vor einer solchen Analyse 
muss jedoch zunächst die Feststellung eines solchen 
Bedürfnisses stehen, die offenkundig den empirischen 
Sozialwissenschaften obliegt. Damit kann auch die 
grundlegende Leistung empirischer Sozialwissenschaften, 
soziale Handlungs- und Diskursmuster zu erfassen und 
auszuwerten, für die empirisch-normative Zusammenarbeit 
fruchtbar gemacht werden. 
3. Conclusio 
In den beiden Teilen dieses Aufsatzes haben wir aufge-
zeigt, warum und an welchen Stellen eine Zusammenar-
beit empirischer und normativer Wissenschaften – insbe-
sondere in der Bioethik als angewandter Ethik – zwingend 
notwendig ist: Erkenntnisziele sowie die jeweils immanen-
ten wissenschaftstheoretischen Fundamente bringen bei-
de Disziplinen an ihre Erkenntnisgrenzen, wenn es um 
(bio-)ethische Fragestellungen geht und erfordern daher 
einen Rückgriff auf die Erkenntnismöglichkeiten der jeweils 
anderen Disziplin. Es ergibt sich also – so könnte man 
auch sagen – eine Notwendigkeit der Zusammenarbeit 
gerade daraus, dass Theoriekerne und Methodologie bei-
der Disziplinen – zumindest solange man wissenschafts-
theoretisch adäquat arbeitet – strikt voneinander getrennt 
sind und bleiben müssen. 
Diese wissenschaftstheoretischen Überlegungen 
konnten wir durch formallogische Überlegungen zum 
Verhältnis von Sein und Sollen bzw. Sollen und Können 
weiter fundieren und symbiotische Ansätze als einzig 
adäquate Form empirisch-normativer Zusammenarbeit 
charakterisieren. Davon ausgehend wurden drei zulässige 
Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit in der Bioethik 
charakterisiert: Erstens die empirische Erfassung 
kognitiver, motivationaler und extern bedingter 
Beschränkungen, welche die notwendige Übersetzung von 
Ideal- in Praxisnormen erst ermöglichen. Zweitens die 
empirische Erfassung der Anwendungsbedingungen 
moralischer Normen, die notwendig für die situations-
spezifische Entscheidung über das Vorliegen einer 
moralischen Verpflichtung ist. Und drittens die empirische 
Evaluation der sozialen Praxis, die eine Bewertung des 
faktischen Umgangs mit Praxisnormen erlaubt und darüber 
hinaus neuartige moralische Fragestellungen ausfindig 
machen und der normativen Analyse übergeben kann. 
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Mental Causation: A Lesson from Action Theory 
Markus Schlosser, Bristol, England, UK 
1. What is Mental Causation? 
Approaching an answer to this question, let us first assume 
that the kind of causation we are interested in is event-
causation, where events may be construed as particulars 
or instantiations of properties. Given that, there is mental 
causation only if some mental events are causally effica-
cious in the sense that they stand in event-causal relations 
with other events. Most philosophers would add, firstly, 
that mental events must be causally efficacious in virtue of 
their mental properties (in virtue of instantiating mental 
properties), and secondly, that they must not overdeter-
mine their effects. There is widespread agreement on this, 
and I will take it for granted here. The question I am inter-
ested in is this: What kinds of things must mental events 
cause for there to be genuine mental causation? 
The contemporary mental causation debate, it is 
sometimes claimed, has its roots in Donald Davidson’s 
seminal paper “Mental Events” (1970). One of the basic 
assumptions in this paper says that there is interaction 
between mental and physical events: some physical 
events cause mental events and some mental events 
cause physical events. Damage to muscle tissue, for 
instance, can cause pain, and intentions can cause 
behaviour. Many philosophers would agree with Davidson 
on this. They would agree, in particular, that mental 
causation requires mental-to-physical causation. 
Many philosophers, however, would also 
acknowledge that the mental could be causally efficacious 
by causing other mental events. So why insist on 
interaction with physical events, if we could have mental 
causation within the domain of the mental alone? We can 
identify two closely related reasons for the insistence on 
mental-to-physical causation. Firstly, if there is mental-to-
mental causation, then the mental is causally efficacious, 
strictly speaking. Nevertheless, this falls short of genuine 
mental causation. We tend to think that the mental is truly 
efficacious only if it causes physical events: mental events 
make a real difference only if they make a difference in the 
physical world. Secondly, genuine mental causation 
requires that mental events make a difference to our 
behaviour. They must, that is, make a difference to our 
bodily movements. (Some might reject the suggestion that 
mental-to-mental causation amounts to mental causation 
on the ground that we cannot rule out epiphenomenalism, 
if the mental has no observable effects.) 
2. A Dilemma for Non-Reductive  
Physicalism 
In the following I will sketch a version of non-reductive 
physicalism, and I will defend it against an influential ob-
jection. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that psy-
chology is irreducible and that some version of physicalism 
is true. As just pointed out, many philosophers think that 
there is genuine mental causation only if some mental 
events have physical effects. But mental-to-physical cau-
sation leads to a well-known problem for non-reductive 
physicalism: if mental events cause physical events, they 
merely overdetermine their effects, given the causal clo-
sure of the physical. 
Given all that, non-reductive physicalism faces the 
following dilemma. If mental events cause physical events, 
they merely overdetermine their effects, and if they cause 
only other mental events, they are not truly efficacious. So 
either way, the efficacy of the mental falls short of genuine 
mental causation. This dilemma is based on the dichotomy 
between mental-to-physical and mental-to-mental 
causation. I will now argue that this is a false dichotomy. 
3. Actions and Movements 
The dichotomy between mental-to-physical and mental-to-
mental causation can be avoided if one acknowledges the 
distinction between actions and bodily movements. This 
distinction is common within the philosophy of action. In 
the philosophy of mind, however, it is neglected, some-
times overlooked and often blurred by talk about behav-
iour. Given that behaviour is the most important effect of 
mental events, this distinction should be of interest, and I 
will suggest that it can help in dealing with the problem of 
mental causation. 
There is genuine mental causation if mental events 
cause and causally explain actions (in virtue of their mental 
properties and without overdetermination). But actions, I 
submit, are neither mental nor physical events. If that is 
correct, then there can be genuine mental causation 
without mental-to-physical causation and without limitation 
to mental-to-mental causation. 
Most philosophers of mind accept or presuppose, 
implicitly perhaps, an event-causal theory of action. 
According to this view, actions are events with a certain 
causal history. Certain events, that is, are actions in virtue 
of being caused by the right antecedents (in the right way). 
The right antecedents are mental events that rationalize 
the action: an event is an action only if it is caused by 
rationalizing mental events and in virtue of being caused in 
that way. The causal history, in other words, is part of an 
action’s essence or identity. 
Some actions, I take it, are mental actions. On the 
causal theory, mental actions are realized by and perhaps 
token-identical to mental events. But they are not type-
identical with mental events, because being of a certain 
mental event-type does not determine whether or not the 
event is an action. The formation of an intention, for 
instance, may be an action or not (we form some 
intentions actively, others passively). Whether it is an 
action or not depends on its causal history. The same 
holds for so-called overt actions (roughly, actions that 
involve bodily movement). Take a standard example of a 
basic action such as raising one’s arm. It is physically 
realized by an arm rising, and perhaps every particular arm 
raising is token-identical with a particular arm rising. But 
they are not type-identical for the reasons given. Not every 
arm rising is an arm raising: being a certain type of 
movement does not determine whether or not the event is 
an action. 
What is the rationale behind thinking of actions in 
historical or etiological terms? Consider the following two 
widely accepted doctrines. Firstly, all actions are 
intentional (under some description). Secondly, an action 
is intentional insofar as it is done for reasons in the 
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minimal sense that it can be rationalized in light of some of 
the agent’s mental events, and it is an action in virtue of 
being done for reasons in this sense. Proponents of the 
causal theory have argued that an action is done for 
reasons only if it is caused and causally explained by the 
mental events that rationalize it. Hence, the causal history 
enters into the essence of actions. 
A further reason for thinking that actions are not 
type-identical with the physical events that realize them is 
given by the fact that most of our non-basic actions are 
multiply realizable. Assume that I give someone a signal 
by raising my arm. In this case, I perform the non-basic 
action of giving a signal by raising my arm. Clearly, there 
are many different ways in which I can give someone a 
signal. The act-type of giving a signal is in this sense 
multiply realizable and therefore not identical with a certain 
type of movement. 
So, on the view that I am suggesting, actions are 
caused and causally explained by mental events. Both 
mental events and actions are realized by physical events. 
Given the irreducibility of the mental, mental events are not 
type-identical with physical events. And given the 
etiological nature of action, actions are not type-identical 
with physical events either. In particular, overt actions are 
not type-identical with bodily movements (although they 
are realized by them). Given further that mental events 
cause actions in virtue of their mental properties, we obtain 
a view according to which the mental is causally 
efficacious in a way that avoids the mentioned dichotomy. 
Mental events cause actions in virtue of their mental 
properties and without overdetermination. But this is 
neither mental-to-physical nor merely mental-to-mental 
causation. 
In the next section I will address a pressing 
objection, rather than developing the view further. 
Consider, though, some brief remarks concerning the 
interaction between mind and body. On my view, mental 
causation is not merely mental-to-mental, because mental 
events cause actions. Actions, I argued, are neither mental 
nor physical events. What are they? They are realized by 
physical events, but they belong to the domain or level of 
psychological and intentional explanation: we recognize 
them as actions only insofar as they are rationalized in the 
light of mental events. What about the other direction? Is 
pain, for instance, caused by physical events? This 
appears to be undeniable. But consider the following 
alternative. It is not implausible to suggest that damage to 
muscle tissue, for instance, causes certain physical events 
in the brain that realize the mental event of pain. On this 
view, no physical event causes pain. Rather, physical 
events cause other physical events, which realize pain. If 
something like this holds for all mental events, and if my 
view on mental causation is correct, then there is no 
causal interaction between the mental and the physical. 
Nevertheless, epiphenomalism is false as mental events 
cause actions. 
4. Overdetermination and Downward  
Causation 
One apparent advantage of the suggested non-reductive 
view is that it avoids the causal exclusion problem. Mental 
events do not cause physical events, hence there is no 
problem of causal overdetermination and exclusion. But it 
has been argued, most prominently by Jaegwon Kim, that 
non-reductive physicalism is committed to downward cau-
sation. Kim argues for this claim by considering mental-to- 
 
mental causation. Assume that the mental event M causes 
another mental event M*. According to any version of non-
reductive physicalism, M and M* are realized by physical 
events (their supervenience base). Assume that P is the 
supervenience base of M, and that P* is the superven-
ience base of M*. What explains the occurrence of M*? 
There are two candidates: the occurrence of M and the 
occurrence of P*. Both explain the occurrence of M*, and 
together they overdetermine M*, albeit not causally. M 
determines M* in virtue of being its cause, and P* deter-
mines M* in virtue of being its supervenience base. This 
creates a prima facie tension between the two explana-
tions. The best way to resolve this tension, Kim argues, is 
to assume that M causes M* by causing its supervenience 
base P*. This shows, according to Kim, that mental-to-
mental causation presupposes mental-to-physical causa-
tion (2005, 39-40). 
It would seem obvious that the same reasoning can 
be applied to the view that I have suggested. If actions are 
caused by mental events, and if they are realized by 
physical events, then the resulting tension and 
overdetermination requires us to assume downward 
causation: we must assume that mental events cause the 
physical events (bodily movements, for instance), which 
realize actions. 
But this line of reasoning is mistaken. According to 
Kim, the occurrence of the supervenience base of a 
certain mental event realizes, determines and necessitates 
the occurrence of the mental event. So, in the example, 
the occurrence of P* determines and necessitates the 
occurrence of M*. P* by itself necessitates M*, as Kim 
says, “no matter what happened before” (39), in particular, 
no matter whether M occurred or not (unless M is a cause 
of P*). Putting aside the question of whether non-reductive 
physicalism is in fact committed to this, the same does not 
hold for actions. 
Actions, we assume, are realized by physical 
events. It may well be that there is a sense in which 
physical events determine actions (in the sense in which 
determinates determine determinables, perhaps). But the 
occurrence of a certain bodily movement, for instance, 
does not necessitate the occurrence of a certain type of 
action, for the reasons given above. A certain physical 
event, such as a certain bodily movement, realizes an 
action only if it has the right causal history. Let us replace 
the mental event M* in the example by an action A. Given 
the assumptions, A is caused by M and realized by P*. But 
given the introduced claims concerning the nature of 
action, it is not true that the occurrence of P* necessitates 
the occurrence of an A-ing. Whether or not P* realizes an 
A-ing depends on the causal history. Given that an action 
has been performed, we can assume that M is a 
rationalizing cause of A. Had there been no rationalizing 
cause, there would have been no action performed (P* 
would not have realized an A-ing). So, in this particular 
case, whether an A-ing is performed or not depends on 
whether or not M occurred and on whether or not M 
causes the A-ing. Hence, P* alone does not necessitate 
the occurrence of an A-ing. 
One might reply that it is perhaps not P* alone that 
necessitates P, but P*’s being caused by P. Assuming that 
P realizes the mental event M, P’s causing P* realizes the 
causal history that makes P* an action. In that way, the 
occurrence of A is necessitated by the occurrence of 
physical events and physical causation, and the problem 
of overdetermination reappears: M merely overdetermines 
A, as A is determined by P’s causing P*. 
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Again, this is mistaken. Non-reductive physicalism is 
motivated by the thought that rationality has “no echo” in 
the physical domain. What makes the A-ing an action is 
the fact that it is caused and rationalized by the right 
events. P does not rationalize P*. P cannot possibly 
rationalize P*, as P does not have intentional content. Only 
mental properties can possibly rationalize actions. And 
mental properties are, we assume, not reducible to 
physical properties. The reply fails. The occurrence of P* 
realizes an A-ing because and only because it is caused 
by M. Only the occurrence of a mental event can 
rationalize behaviour. 
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Supervenienz, Zeit und ontologische Abhängigkeit 
Pedro Schmechtig, Dresden, Deutschland 
1. Ausgangsproblem 
Viele Philosophen finden die Idee attraktiv, dass zumin-
dest die Wahrheit kontingenter Propositionen von Dingen 
abhängt, die in der Welt existieren. Typischerweise wird 
gesagt, für jede Proposition <p> und Entität α gilt, wenn α 
ein Wahrmacher für <p> ist, dann kann <p> unmöglich 
wahr sein, ohne dass α existiert. Prinzipen dieser Art cha-
rakterisieren die Verbindung zwischen Wahrheit und Welt 
in Form einer modalen Existenzabhängigkeit, die für jede 
präsentistische Zeitkonzeption eine Herausforderung dar-
stellt. Gemäß der präsentistischen Sichtweise existieren 
Dinge nur in der Gegenwart. Doch natürlich ist es so, dass 
wir mit zahlreichen Propositionen auf vergangene oder 
zukünftige Ereignisse bzw. Individuen Bezug nehmen; 
solche Propositionen können offenkundig wahr sein, ob-
gleich deren Wahrheit nicht von der Existenz gegenwärti-
ger Dinge abhängt. Entsprechend lässt sich folgendes 
Argument formulieren: 
 
Wahrmacher-Argument gegen den Präsentismus: 
 
(P1) Wenn der Präsentismus wahr ist, dann existie-
ren Dinge nur in der Gegenwart [Prämisse des Prä-
sentismus]. 
(P2) Kontingente Propositionen sind wahr, weil sie 
durch Dinge wahrgemacht werden, die in der Welt 
existieren [Prämisse des Wahrmachens]. 
(P3) Propositionen in Bezug auf die Vergangenheit 
bzw. Zukunft sind manchmal wahr [offensichtliche 
Tatsache]. 
 
Aufgrund von (P1) und (P2): 
 
(P4) Propositionen in Bezug auf die Vergangenheit 
bzw. Zukunft werden durch Dinge wahrgemacht, die 
nur in der Gegenwart existieren.  
 
Aufgrund von (P3) und (P2): 
 
(P5) Wenn Propositionen mit Bezug auf die Ver-
gangenheit bzw. Zukunft wahr sind, hängen sie 
(zumindest teilweise) von Dingen ab, die in der Welt 
existieren, aber nicht gegenwärtig sind. 
 
Aufgrund der Unvereinbarkeit von (P4) und (P5): 
 
(K) Der Präsentismus kann nicht erklären, warum 
(P3) gilt. 
Es gibt verschiedene Strategien, das vorliegende Argu-
ment zu entkräften. Man könnte beispielsweise Prämisse 
(P3) bestreiten, indem man sagt, dass Propositionen in 
Bezug auf die Vergangenheit bzw. Zukunft weder wahr 
noch falsch sind. Vielleicht ist es plausibel, zu behaupten, 
dass Propositionen mit Blick auf zukünftige Ereignisse 
weder wahr noch falsch sind (Tooley 1997); doch in Bezug 
auf vergangene Ereignisse wäre eine ähnliche Behaup-
tung sicherlich absurd. Eine andere Möglichkeit bestünde 
jedenfalls darin, Prämisse (P3) zu akzeptieren und statt-
dessen (P2) abzulehnen. Derartige Ansätze behaupten 
entweder, dass Dinge neben ihrer Existenz noch eine an-
dere ‚Seinsweise’ besitzen, so dass sie – gleichwohl sie 
nicht existieren – trotzdem als Wahrmacher für kontingente 
Propositionen fungieren können (Meinong 1904). Oder 
aber man weist (P2) zurück, weil man denkt, dass sich die 
Abhängigkeit, welche im Hinblick auf die gegenwärtige 
Welt besteht, nicht an der ontologischen Fundierung durch 
entsprechende Entitäten festmacht, sondern rein seman-
tisch über die Einführung einer primitiven Maschinerie – 
universelle Quantifikation plus zugehörigem Tense-
Operator – erklären lässt (Prior 1968).1 
Gegenüber solchen – auch als ‚Truthmaker-Denying 
Presentism’ (Keller 2004) bezeichneten – Ansätzen wird 
eingewandt, dass es die wesentlich luzidere Strategie sei, 
an der grundlegenden Fundierungs-Intuition festzuhalten 
und im Austausch dafür zu überlegen, ob sich Prämisse 
(P2) – und damit das betreffende Wahrmacher-Prinzip – 
modifizieren lässt. Demnach lässt sich die bisherige 
Explikation der Wahrmacher-Relation durch ein sog. 
Supervenienz-Prinzip der Wahrheit ersetzen. 
Ich werde kurz die Gründe benennen, die für eine 
solche Modifikation sprechen, und anschließend die Frage 
klären, ob ein Präsentist im Rahmen dieser Strategie 
bessere Karten hat, das angeführte Wahrmacher-
Argument zu entkräften. Das Ergebnis meiner Über-
legungen wird jedoch ernüchternd ausfallen. 
2. Was spricht für ein modifiziertes  
Wahrmacher-Prinzip?  
Ursprünglich wurde die Idee des Wahrmachens in direkter 
Anwendung auf eine konkrete (aktuale) Welt verstanden. 
Man fragt sich, was es heißt – bezogen auf diese einzelne 
Welt –, dass etwas existieren muss, aufgrund dessen eine 
bestimmte Proposition wahr ist. Ein Vergleich zwischen 
verschiedenen Welten, in denen Propositionen sowohl 
wahr als auch falsch sein können, spielt dabei keine Rolle. 
Demgegenüber wurde betont, dass sich die zentrale Intui-
tion der Abhängigkeit von Wahrheit und Realität in anderer 
Weise problemloser verständlich machen lässt. Die Es-
senz der Fundierungs-Intuition beruht darauf, dass es 
keine Differenz zwischen Welten geben kann, in denen 
eine Proposition wahr oder falsch ist, ohne dass es eine 
Differenz bezüglich der Dinge gibt, die in diesen Welten 
vorkommen. Der damit verbundene Slogan ‚Wahrheit su-
perveniert auf Sein’ (Bigelow 1988) lässt sich – mit Bezug 
auf Notwendigkeit und mögliche Welten – durch das fol-
gende Prinzip (Lewis 2001: 216) wiedergeben: 
 
Supervenienz-Prinzip der Wahrheit (SPW): Für jede 
Proposition <p>, Welt ω und ω* gilt: Wenn <p> in ω 
wahr ist, aber nicht in ω*, dann existiert entweder 
etwas in ω, das nicht in ω* existiert, oder es gibt ir-
gendein n-tuple von Dingen, das in irgendeiner fun-
damentalen Relation in ω, aber nicht in ω* steht. 
Es sind vor allem drei Gründe, warum man glaubt, dass 
(SPW) im Vergleich zu bestehenden Wahrmacher-
Prinzipien besser abschneidet. Erstens liefert (SPW) eine 
simple Lösung für das Kardinalproblem jeder Wahrma-
cher-Theorie. Die Idee des Wahrmachens wird als eine 
cross-kategoriale Relation der Notwendigkeit begriffen, die 
                                                     
 
1 Eine etwas anders gelagerte Skepsis gegenüber einem ‚Truthmaker-
Denying Presentism’ wird von Kierland & Monton (2007) in Form eines sog. 
‚brute Presentism’ vertreten. 
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auf alle Arten von kontingenten Propositionen (Wahrma-
cher-Maximalismus) – also auch auf solche, die negative 
Prädikationen bzw. negative Existenzannahmen beinhal-
ten – anwendbar sein sollte. Die Wahrmacher für sog. 
‚negative Wahrheiten’ stellen jedoch ein notorisches Prob-
lem dar. Dieses ließe sich im Rahmen von (SPW) einfach 
dadurch lösen, dass man sagt, es ist die Abwesenheit 
einer Entität in ω, die, bezogen auf eine mögliche Welt ω*, 
die betreffende Proposition falsch macht. Zweitens verhält 
sich (SPW) gegenüber der Frage neutral, ob es zur Fun-
dierung strukturierter Propositionen, welche die Form <a 
ist F> haben, der zusätzlichen Einführung einer fundamen-
talen Kategorie der Sachverhalte bedarf. Oft wird behaup-
tet, die Wahrheit strukturierter Propositionen verlangt, dass 
in einer Welt, in der a und F gemeinsam existieren, zusätz-
lich der Sachverhalt ‚a-ist-F’ bestehen muss (Armstrong 
2004). Dagegen besagt (SPW) lediglich Folgendes: Eine 
strukturierte Proposition, die in einer Welt ω wahr ist, wird 
auch in ω* wahr sein, sofern bezüglich der in ω und ω* 
vorkommenden Entitäten keine Differenz besteht. Entspre-
chend bedarf es für die Erklärung der Fundierung von 
Propositionen des Typs <a ist F> nicht der Existenz von 
Sachverhalten. Drittens scheinen herkömmliche Wahrma-
cher-Prinzipien das Problem zu haben, eine bestimmte Art 
der Veränderung nicht erklären zu können. Die Differenz 
zweier Welten kann – was die Veränderungen der fundie-
renden Entitäten angeht – manchmal existentieller Natur 
sein. Eine Entität α existiert in ω, die in ω* nicht vorkommt, 
einfach deshalb, weil α in ω* aufgehört hat zu existieren. 
Aufgrund des Wahrmacher-Maximalismus muss es etwas 
in ω* geben, das der Wahrmacher für die Proposition ‚α 
existiert nicht in ω*’ ist. Eine derartige Entität wäre so be-
schaffen, dass sie nicht gemeinsam mit α in ω existieren 
kann. Das bedeutet jedoch, ein Vertreter des Wahrma-
cher-Maximalismus kann niemals sagen, dass sich zwei 
Welten ω und ω* allein darin unterscheiden, dass α in ω* 
nicht mehr existiert. Dass etwas bloß aufhört zu existieren, 
wäre unerklärlich, denn der Wegfall von α in ω* ist nur im 
Austausch mit einer positiven Entität – als Wahrmacher für 
die entsprechende negative Existenz-Proposition – ver-
ständlich zu machen. 
3. Supervenienz-Präsentismus und das 
Problem der fundamentalen tensed-
Eigenschaften 
Trotz dieser vermeintlichen Vorteile ist nicht klar, ob eine 
präsentistische Zeitkonzeption im Rahmen von (SPW) 
besser gerechtfertigt ist. Nach der Standardstrategie (Bige-
low 1996) sollte man (SPW) akzeptieren und das Wahr-
macher-Argument dadurch zurückweisen, dass man (P5) 
negiert. Ein solcher Supervenienz-Präsentismus geht da-
von aus, dass die gegenwärtige Welt als Ganze – d.h. die 
Gesamtheit der Dinge, die gegenwärtig existieren – über 
eine Vielzahl von vergangenheitsbezogenen bzw. zu-
kunftsorientierten Eigenschaften verfügt, auf welche die 
Wahrheit entsprechender Propositionen superveniert. 
Demnach wäre es unmöglich, dass eine Welt existiert, 
welche dieselben tensed-Eigenschaft wie die unsere be-
sitzt, aber hinsichtlich der Vergangenheit in irgendeiner 
Form differiert. Während der Vertreter einer nicht-
präsentistischen Zeitkonzeption sagen würde, dass unsere 
Welt beispielsweise die Eigenschaft hat, eine vergangen-
heitsbezogene Proposition wie ‚Cäsar überquerte den 
Rubikon’ wahr zu machen, diese Eigenschaft aber fundiert 
ist in den aktualen Eigenschaften unserer Welt, wie sie zu 
anderen Zeiten war, behauptet der Präsentist, dass die 
Wahrheit derartiger Propositionen auf die gegenwärtigen 
Dinge und wie diese Dinge sind superveniert, d.h. auf die 
Eigenschaften, welche von diesen Dingen gegenwärtig 
instanziiert werden. Er bestreitet, dass es die Eigenschaf-
ten vergangener oder zukünftiger Ereignisse bzw. Indivi-
duen sind, welche die Wahrheit vergangenheitsbezogener 
oder zukunftsorientierter Propositionen begründen. 
Sobald man Prämisse (P5) in Zweifel zieht und die 
Existenz gegenwärtiger Dinge zur grundlegenden 
Supervenienz-Basis erhebt, muss man einräumen, dass 
gegenwärtige Dinge über fundamentale tensed-
Eigenschaften verfügen. Zumindest einige Eigenschaften 
müssen so sein, dass sie ohne Bezugnahme auf andere 
Individuen oder noch basalere Eigenschaften auskommen. 
Fundamentale tensed-Eigenschaften sind jedoch im 
Rahmen einer präsentistischen Ontologie in dreierlei 
Hinsicht äußerst prekär:  
Erstens stellt sich das Problem, wie man erklären 
soll, dass die nicht-gegenwärtigen Instanziierungen 
solcher Eigenschaften – die auch ein Präsentist nicht 
leugnen wird – weder in der Vergangenheit noch in der 
Zukunft stattfinden. Verschiedene Versuche, dieses 
Problem zu lösen, beruhen entweder auf sehr abwegigen 
ontologischen Zusatzannahmen – wie z.B. nicht-
instanziierten individuellen ‚Dasheiten’ (Keller 2004) –, 
oder aber man sieht sich gezwungen, so etwas wie 
‚Ersatz-B-series’ einzuführen (Crisp 2007), wobei 
bezweifelt werden darf, dass es sich dann noch um einen 
strikten Präsentismus handelt (Merricks 2007).  
Zweitens stellt sich die Frage, ob nicht in 
präsentistischer Perspektive wesentliche Vorteile von 
(SPW) wieder verloren gehen. Der Standardstrategie 
zufolge ist es hinreichend, ungebundene (‚abundantly’) 
tensed-Eigenschaften zu postulieren, welche die alleinige 
Supervenienz-Basis bilden. Strukturierte Propositionen der 
Form <a ist F> machen hingegen deutlich, dass es 
zusätzlich zur Postulierung ungebundener Eigenschaften 
der Zuordnung von Individuen – als eine Art subject matter 
– bedarf, denen diese Eigenschaften zukommen. Im 
präsentistischen Rahmen ist es unmöglich, eine solche 
Zuordnung verständlich zu machen, ohne dabei die 
Neutralität einzubüßen, nicht gezwungen zu sein, eine 
fundamentale Kategorie der Sachverhalte einführen zu 
müssen. 
Drittens stellt es generell ein Problem dar, zu 
glauben, die postulierten tensed-Eigenschaften wären in 
irgendeinem Sinne fundamental. Der ungebundene 
Charakter dieser Eigenschaften zeigt vielmehr, dass sich 
es dabei um irreduzible hypothetische Entitäten handelt. 
Derartige Entitäten sind jedoch als Supervervenienz-Basis 
untauglich, da sie nicht in der Welt verankert sind. 
Hypothetische Eigenschaften charakterisieren die Dinge 
nicht, wie sie aufgrund ihrer natürlichen Merkmale in der 
aktualen Welt existieren, sondern allein anhand ihres 
bloßen kontrafaktischen Verhaltens in Bezug auf 
unterschiedliche mögliche Welten. Ontologien, die von 
derart dubiosen hypothetischen Eigenschaften ausgehen, 
sind aus einer Wahrmacher-Perspektive ‚betrügerisch’ 
(Sider 2001, Merricks 2007). 
4. Asymmetrische Fundierung und globale 
Supervenienz 
Angesichts dieser Einwände ist nicht davon auszugehen, 
dass die präsentistische Standardstrategie Erfolg hat. Das 
Scheitern der Standardstrategie bedeutet aber noch nicht, 
dass es allgemein verfehlt sein muss, Wahrmacher-
Prinzipien in Form von (SPW) zu modulieren. Nichtsdesto-
trotz wirft die bestehende Diskussion ein bezeichnendes 
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Licht auf die Beantwortung der Frage, ob es adäquat ist, 
die Wahrmacher-Idee mit Hilfe von (SPW) wiederzugeben. 
Der zentraler Grund, warum man glaubt, dass nur 
ein unbegrenztes Wahrmacher-Prinzip gerechtfertigt ist, 
basiert auf der Annahme einer asymmetrischen 
Fundierungs-Relation. Offenbar wollen wir sagen, dass 
eine Proposition <p> wahr ist, aufgrund von p, aber nicht 
umgekehrt, dass p vorliegt, weil <p> wahr ist. 
Demgegenüber scheint (SPW) eine Umkehrung zu 
erlauben. Angenommen, es gibt zwei mögliche Welten ω 
und ω*, so dass notwendigerweise gilt: Wenn <p> in ω 
wahr ist und nicht in ω*, dann existiert eine Entität α in ω, 
die nicht in ω* existiert. In diesem Fall würde ebenso 
gelten: Sobald man die Wahrheit von <p> in ω fixiert hat, 
legt man gleichzeitig fest, dass α in ω und nicht in ω* 
existiert. 
Vertreter eines strikten Wahrmacher-Prinzips 
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005) haben aufgrund dieser 
Umkehrbarkeit behauptet, dass (SPW) den eigentlichen 
Kern der Fundierungs-Intuition nicht erfasst. Der zentrale 
Punkt ist folgender: Mit (SPW) wird klarerweise auf den 
Begriff der globalen Supervenienz Bezug genommen. 
Dieser Begriff besagt nicht, dass eine Differenz zwischen 
Welten – Menge der wahren Propositionen in diesen 
Welten – notwendigerweise in einer Differenz bezüglich 
des Seins dieser Dinge verankert sein muss; behauptet 
wird lediglich, dass eine Differenz besteht, wie die Dinge in 
der Welt vorkommen. Falls jedoch die Wahrheit einer 
Proposition nicht unmittelbar darauf superveniert, ob etwas 
existiert, sondern lediglich darin fundiert ist, wie bestimmte 
Dinge vorkommen, dann wird ein zentraler Bestandteil der 
Wahrmacher-Idee – nämlich die Behauptung, dass 
zwischen wahren Propositionen und der Beschaffenheit 
der Welt eine ontologische Abhängigkeit besteht – durch 
(SPW) unterminiert. 
Dagegen kann eingewandt werden, dass es äußerst 
umstritten ist, ob zur Erklärung der Fundierungs-Intuition 
eine ontologische Abhängigkeitsbehauptung vonnöten ist. 
Man könnte beispielsweise so argumentieren (Dodd 
2007), dass (SPW) zwar als globales Prinzip korrekt ist – 
Wahrheit superveniert darauf, wie die Dinge sind –, aber 
eben kein striktes Wahrmacher-Prinzip darstellt. Wobei 
Letzteres gar kein Nachteil ist, da eine adäquate Erklärung 
der Asymmetrie auch ohne eine ontologische 
Abhängigkeitsbeziehung auskommt. Demnach ist mit 
Abhängigkeit nicht das Bestehen einer Relation zwischen 
Propositionen und existierenden Dingen gemeint. Die 
besagte Asymmetrie basiert nicht – wie ursprünglich 
angenommen – auf einer modalen Existenzabhängigkeit; 
vielmehr lässt sich die Fundierungs-Intuition rein begrifflich 
erklären, nämlich durch das Behaupten einer speziellen 
Identitäts-Abhängigkeit (Lowe 2004), die innerhalb eines 
Erklärungsschemas der Form ‚<a ist F> ist wahr, weil a ist 
F’ durch die Verwendung des Satzoperators ‚weil’ 
angezeigt wird. 
Diese Argumentation lässt zwei Optionen offen: 
Entweder man lehnt Prämisse (P2) des Wahrmacher-
Arguments prinzipiell ab; dann erübrigt es sich, die 
präsentistische Konzeption mit Hilfe eines modifizierten 
Supervenienz-Prinzips verteidigen zu wollen. Oder aber 
man hält daran fest, dass (SPW) irgendwie doch im Sinne 
der Wahrmacher-Relation zu verstehen ist; dann aber ist 
man verpflichtet, dieses Prinzip vor dem Hintergrund der 
angesprochenen Identitäts-Abhängigkeit neu zu 
bestimmen. 
Gegenüber der zweiten Option lässt sich allerdings 
Folgendes einwenden: Eine derartige Modifizierung wäre 
kontraproduktiv, da sie nicht auf einem globalen 
Verständnis von Supervenienz basiert, sondern einen 
strengeren Begriff erfordert. Ein strenger Supervenienz-
Begriff würde jedoch zentrale Aspekte der Motivation für 
(SPW) zunichte machen; er wäre weder mit der 
bestehenden Erklärung für sog. ‚negative Wahrheiten’ 
vereinbar, noch ließen sich damit existenzielle 
Veränderungen – im Sinne des bloßen Vergehens einer 
Entität – erklären. 
Alles in allem scheint es daher keine wirksame 
Strategie zu sein, das angeführte Wahrmacher-Argument 
durch eine Modifizierung von Prämisse (P2) entkräften zu 
wollen. Selbst wenn sich die Annahme einer Fundierungs-
Relation adäquat begründen lässt, ist damit nicht viel für 
die Rechtfertigung von (SPW) gewonnen. Wie die obige 
Diskussion gezeigt hat, kann ein globales Verständnis von 
(SPW) nur dann seine Vorteile ausspielen, sofern man 
eine nicht-päsentistische Zeitkonzeption unterstellt. Eine 
derartige Einschränkung ist aber nicht akzeptabel; denn 
ein allgemeingültiges Wahrmacher-Prinzip sollte nicht 
davon abhängen, ob eine bestimmte Auffassung über die 
Natur der Zeit korrekt ist oder nicht. 
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Reduction, Sets, and Properties 
Benjamin Schnieder, Berlin, Germany 
1. The Traditional Debate 
Some time ago, philosophers often addressed the ques-
tion about whether it is possible to reduce the category of 
properties to the category of sets.  
The most straightforward idea was that, 
schematically speaking, we may identify the property of 
being F with the set of all Fs. The straightforward problem 
of this proposal was that if conflicts with the combination of 
the generally accepted identity conditions for sets and 
some strong intuitions on the non-identity of certain 
properties: on the one hand, sets are extensional in that a 
set x is identical to a set y iff x has all and only the 
members that y has. On the other hand, two different 
properties can contingently be possessed by the same 
entities. Even if all and only those animals that naturally 
have a heart naturally have a liver, the property of naturally 
having a heart is not identical to the property of naturally 
having a liver. And even though the property of being an 
80 feet long duckbill and the property of being a 5 billion 
dollar worth corkscrew are both exemplified by no entities 
at all, they are not the same property. 
Because of this problem, it is generally agreed that 
the said straightforward identification of properties with 
sets is a failure. But a very similar identification is better 
off: David Lewis famously proposed to identify the property 
of being F with the sets of all actual or merely possible Fs.1 
Since (presumably) no non-actual possible duckbill is a 
non-actual corkscrew, properties in the second example 
come out different on Lewis’s account, and since some 
non-actual animals with a heart lack a liver, the properties 
in the first example come out different as well. 
But there are still problems with Lewis’s proposal: 
first, it may seem to correspond to a too coarse-grained 
individuation of properties: on his account, there are no 
two properties that are necessarily possessed by the same 
entities. But isn’t the property of being an equilateral 
triangle different from the property of being an equiangular 
triangle, despite their being necessarily co-exemplified? 
However, there is a promising response available to this 
third challenge: in the relevant cases, our intuitions on the 
identity or non-identity of properties are not that stable, 
and they are blurred by our tendency to assimilate 
properties to concepts.2 Concepts are individuated partly 
via the role they play in the individuation of beliefs; for this 
reason, we often distinguish between two concepts even if 
they have the same extension with respect to every 
possible world (someone may possess the concept of 
equilateral triangles but lack the concept of equiangular 
triangles because he lacks the concepts of angles). But 
properties play a more worldly role such that different 
properties should at least possibly correspond to 
differences between things; however, in no possible world 
there is any difference between equilateral and 
equiangular triangles, and hence there is only one property 
which is conceived of in different ways (i.e. by the 
employment of different concepts). 
                                                     
 
1  See Lewis (1986: 50–69). 
2  For responses along this line, see, e.g., Lewis (1986: 55), Jackson (1998: 
15f., 126f.), Künne (2003: 26, et passim), and Schnieder (2004: 59–69). 
But there are other problems with Lewis’s proposal. 
One is that it apparently cannot provide for all the 
properties that intuitively exist:3 there is, it seems, the 
property of being a set. But this property cannot be 
identified with the set of all (actual and non-actual) sets, 
because we know from standard set-theory that there is no 
such entity. Lewis might at this place slightly modify his 
proposal and hold that most properties are sets, but some 
properties are proper classes rather than sets. The 
property of being a set, for instance, is the proper class of 
all sets. But firstly that response may seem a little ad hoc, 
and secondly it only pushes the problem up to a higher 
level: intuitively, there is the property of being a proper 
class. But there is no proper class containing all the proper 
classes. So, some properties are still missing on Lewis’s 
account. 
Finally, the proposal only gets off the ground if one 
accepts Lewis’s form of modal realism which can provide 
the required ontological resources: for the proposal to 
work, there must be sets containing actual and non-actual 
duckbills as members and hence there must be non-actual 
duckbills (which are duckbills nonetheless).4 Especially 
due to this metaphysical burden of his approach, Lewis’s 
identification of properties with sets has not a very good 
reputation, to say the least. 
2. A New Order: Sets as Properties 
If properties cannot be reduced to sets, is there no con-
nection between the two kinds of entity? There is! The 
main problem of the traditional debate was that it reversed 
the actual order of things: instead of identifying properties 
with sets, one should identify sets with properties. Sets are 
properties in disguise (but not every property is a set). 
The basic idea is very simple: sets are properties of 
some particular sort. They are what I call identity-
properties, such as the property of being identical to Jean-
Paul Belmondo or the property of being identical to either 
Belmondo or Jean Seberg. 
To understand the details of the proposal, recall the 
two standard ways of specifying a sets: they consist in 
either (i) providing a list of the individual members of the 
set—by using expressions such as ‘{Belmondo}’, 
‘{Belmondo, Seberg}’, ‘{1, 2, 3, …}’—, or (ii) stating a 
condition such that all and only the things satisfying the 
condition are members of the set—by using expressions 
such as ‘{x: x is a bear}’, or ‘the set of all duckbills’. 
Focussing on these two canonical ways of specifying sets, 
a recipe can be given for identifying particular sets with 
particular identity-properties. 
Re (i): If we specify a set by explicitly listing its 
members, the set is just the property of being (identical to) 
one of those entities. Thus, {Belmondo} is the property of 
being (identical to) Belmondo. {Belmondo, Godard} is the 
property of being (identical to) either Belmondo or Godard. 
More generally, {x1, x2, …, xn} is the property of being 
(identical to) either x1, or x2, …, or xn. 
                                                     
 
3  For the following point cp. Egan (2004: 49n.), and Schnieder (2004: 72f.). 
4  For further criticism of Lewis’s account see Egan (2004). 
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Re (ii): If we specify a set via some condition C that 
its members satisfy, the set is the property of being one of 
those entities that actually satisfy condition C. Thus, {x: x is 
a word on this page} is the property of being one of the 
words that are actually on this page. We can specify this 
set, and this property, in some alternative way by listing all 
its members. Thus, {x: x is a word on this page} = {‘a’, 
‘the’, ‘set’, ‘words’, ‘are’, …} = the property of being either 
the word ‘a’, or the word ‘the’, or the word ‘set’, … 
Similarly, {x: x is a bear}, i.e. the set of all bears, is 
identified with the property of being identical to one of the 
actual bears. 
3. Evaluating the Proposal 
To evaluate the given proposal, it should be seen whether 
it can account for the generally acknowledged features of 
sets. On the one hand, some central metaphysical charac-
teristics of sets should be accounted for: 
 
M.1 Sets have their members essentially and they 
could not have had additional members. 
M.2  Sets are extensional. For all sets x, y: x = y iff 
every member of x is a member of y and vice 
versa. 
M.3 Sets are ontologically dependent upon their 
members. 
These three principles are results of the indicated identifi-
cation of sets with identity-properties (given some addi-
tional assumptions about properties).  
Re M.1: Identity-properties are necessarily 
possessed by all and only those entities that possess 
them. So, if a set is an identity-property, and if its members 
are the things that posses it, then a set has its members 
essentially and could not have had additional members.  
Re M.2: Moreover, the intensional individuation of 
properties (i.e. the individuation via their possible 
exemplifications, as described in section 1) accounts for 
the extensionality of sets: if set x and set y contain the 
same members, then x and y are reduced to the same 
identity-property (because x is reduced to an identity-
property I and y to an identity-property I* such that I and I* 
are necessarily possessed by the same entities—hence, 
by the intensional individuation of properties, I=I*). 
Re M.3: an identity property I is individuated via the 
entities e, … that enter into the identities constitutive for I. 
Hence, the essence or nature of e, … is prior to the 
essence of I, which makes the identity property dependent 
upon its constitutive entities and thereby yields the 
ontological dependence of sets on their members.5 
Moreover, the semantics of designators for sets 
comes out right: some of those expressions are rigid 
designators (e.g. ‘{Belmondo}’) while others are flexible 
(e.g. ‘{x: x is a bear}’). On the current proposal, a set 
designator will be rigid if it rigidly specifies the members of 
the set, because then it rigidly specifies a particular 
identity-property. But if a set designator flexibly specifies 
the members of the designated set, then the designator 
will designate different identity-properties with respect to 
different possible worlds and therefore comes out flexible 
itself. 
                                                     
 
5  In this paragraph, I am mainly relying on Fine’s views on essence and 
dependence; see Fine (1994 & 1995). 
A further issue to de addressed is whether the 
proposal may open doors to set-theoretical paradoxes. A 
threat of paradox may stem from the following observation: 
 
M.4 Sets have a limited holding capacity, i.e., there 
can be too many things of a sort be contained 
in a set. 
Properties, on the other hand, do not seem to have a simi-
larly limited holding capacity. For while we know that there 
are, for instance, too many sets to form a set, there is a 
property which all sets have in common, namely the prop-
erty of being a set. Analogously, there is the property of 
being abstract which is possessed by all abstract objects 
and therefore by all sets. But again, there cannot be the 
set of all abstract objects because it would have the set of 
all sets as a subset. 
How exactly might the limited holding capacity of 
sets pose a problem for the suggested reduction of sets to 
properties? Answer: if there are identity-properties 
belonging to more things than can form a set, then the 
proposal should not hold that all identity-properties are 
sets. But then, a criterion should be provided which 
motivates why some identity-properties are sets while 
others are not, and it is hard to see how such a criterion 
might not be ad hoc. 
Fortunately, it can be argued that there are no 
identity-properties which would yield too large sets in the 
first place. For which properties could that be? As we have 
seen, the property of being a set cannot correspond to a 
set because the latter would be too large. But that property 
is not an identity-property and therefore not the kind of 
property that the proposal identifies with sets. What would 
be threatening is the identity-property of being identical to 
one of the actual sets. But while this property may seem 
innocent and thus existing at first glance, there is a reason 
to deny its existence. For it was said before that an 
identity-property is individuated by the entities that enter 
into its constitutive identities, such that the essence of 
those entities is prior to the essence of the property. Now 
assume that the identity-property of being one of the actual 
sets would exist. Then, on the present reductive theory, it 
would be a set, and hence one of the existing sets. But its 
essence should be posterior to the essence of its 
constituting entities, i.e. of all actual sets. Since it would be 
a set itself, its essence would have to be posterior to its 
own essence—which is impossible. Therefore, the 
existence of the said property can be denied. A lesson 
from this consideration is that—contrary to prototypical 
examples of properties—identity-properties do have a 
limited holding capacity, just like sets. 
The last test for the proposal will be to account for 
the theorems of standard set theory. It would be desirable 
if the axioms of ZF-theory could be motivated from it. 
Unfortunately, the current space is too limited to go into 
details here. So I must conclude with the bare promise that 
the validity of ZF-axioms such as intersection can indeed 
be argued for from considerations about identity-
properties. Once this is shown, the proposal can be seen 
to have numerous benefits which allow the conclusion: 
sets are properties. 
Reduction, Sets, and Properties — Benjamin Schnieder 
 
 
 309
Literature 
Egan, Andy (2004): ‘Second-Order Quantification and the Meta-
physics of Properties’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, 48–
66. 
Fine, Kit (1994): ‘Essence and Modality’, in: Philosophical Perspec-
tives 8, 1–16. 
Fine, Kit (1995): ‘Ontological Dependence’, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 95, 269–90. 
Jackson, Frank (1998), From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Clar-
endon Press. 
Künne, Wolfgang (2003): Conceptions of Truth, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.  
Lewis, David (1986): On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Schnieder, Benjamin (2004): Substanzen und (ihre) Eigenschaften, 
Berlin: de Gruyter. 
 
 
 
  310 
Context-Based Approaches to the Strengthened Liar Problem 
Christine Schurz, Salzburg, Austria 
Kripke´s paper (Kripke 1975) was the starting point for 
numerous formal languages that are able to express a 
theory of their own concept of truth without producing a liar 
paradox. However these theories are not regarded as 
modeling the concept of truth of natural language. The 
main reason for this is the strengthened liar paradox, or 
rather a formalized version of this problem. Whether it is 
possible to solve this problem without being committed to 
something (more or less) like Tarski´s hierarchical 
proposal (Tarski 1935), is still a highly disputed matter. 
The majority of those who seek for alternatives to Tarski´s 
proposal attempt to analyze the strengthened liar problem 
by uncovering certain context-dependent elements in a 
strengthened liar sentence. 
This paper consists of two parts. First, I shall outline 
a formal version of the strengthened liar. Thereafter I take 
a look at the context-based approach to this problem. 
From now on, I shall assume a formal language L of 
first order logic that is interpreted by a structure M. M is 
assumed to contain names that are assigned to the 
sentences of L, and functions that represent a certain 
amount of the syntax of L. The symbol Tr is a one-place 
predicate of L that is intended to represent “truth in L”. By 
the fixed-point-lemma a strengthened liar sentence, i.e., a 
sentence φ of the form ¬Tr(l) such that M╞ l = ‘¬Tr(l)’ can 
be formed (the term ‘¬Tr(l)’ is the object-language-name of 
the formula ¬Tr(l)). I shall assume a theory T of “truth in L” 
such that neither T├ φ nor T├ ¬φ. Such a theory results 
e.g. from the axioms of (Friedman and Sheard 1987) which 
define Tr together with some axioms of a theory of M (if, 
for instance, M is a model of arithmetic, then we can take 
the axioms of Robinson´s arithmetic). 
The theory T matches with the intuition that the 
strengthened liar sentence is neither true nor false in as 
much as it gives us no information concerning the truth-
value of φ. But in context of natural language we are also 
capable of expressing this intuition by a meaningful 
sentence and furthermore infer other statements from such 
a sentence (which together lead to the natural language 
strengthened liar argument). Thus, if we seek T to be as 
close as possible to the concept “is true” of natural 
language, we have to investigate whether it is possible for 
T to contain any formula of L which represents a 
semantical diagnosis as “φ is neither true nor false” of φ. Is 
it possible to add such a formula to the axioms of T without 
causing T to be inconsistent? This is indeed an intricate 
problem. 
The first problem: Usually the formula ¬Tr(‘φ’) is 
taken to be a most appropriate candidate to represent a 
diagnostic statement about φ. Since φ fails to be derivable 
from T, it also fails to be true according to T (otherwise it 
would be derivable from T), which can in L be represented 
by the formula ¬Tr(‘φ’). So ¬Tr(‘φ’) should be derivable 
from T. But, on the other hand, we have a “falsity-intuition” 
concerning ¬Tr(‘φ’), taking ¬Tr(‘φ’) to represent the 
sentence “φ is false”. Since T gives us no information 
whether φ is true or false, also no formula representing “φ 
is false” will be derivable from T. Therefore ¬Tr(‘φ’) should 
not be derivable from T. So in the end we have a “failure-
intuition” and a “falsity-intuition” concerning the sentence 
¬Tr(‘φ’). Both intuitions display features of how we 
informally reason about the strengthened liar in natural 
language. So they do not have to be considered as rival 
intuitions of which we have to select only one that 
represents our “actual” reasoning or the way we should 
rationally reason. Maybe, if L is supposed to account for 
natural language, one has to find a way to model both of 
these intuitions and explain how T├ ¬Tr(‘φ’) as well as not 
T├ ¬Tr(‘φ’) can be the case. But obviously this can only be 
consistently realized if we assume some context-sensitive 
element in the sentence ¬Tr(‘φ’). 
Before I turn to the second problem, let me note that 
one could object against the analysis I just gave that it 
shows that ¬Tr(‘φ’) is after all no appropriate choice for a 
formula representing a semantical diagnosis of φ. But then 
the only alternative is to introduce a new “untrueness”-
predicate U to express a formula belonging to T that 
represents a statement about φ. But of course this gives 
rise to a new strengthened liar sentence φ' of the form U(l') 
such that M╞ l' = ‘U(l')’ that leads to just the same 
problems. So in the end we would have just the same 
conflict of failure- against falsity-intuition. 
The second problem: This problem results from our 
attempt to model the ‘failure-intuition’ for ¬Tr(‘φ’). 
According to this attempt, T contains the sentence 
¬Tr(‘φ’), but, on the other hand, it should not contain φ. 
These conditions contradict to the rule of substitutivity of 
identity (I shall from now on write “(SoI)” to refer to this 
rule): 
 
(SoI) Substitutivity of identity:  
Let t1 and t2 be any two terms, let P be any one-
place predicate. Then the following rule is valid: 
 
t1= t2, P(t1) 
P(t2) 
We have to make a decision whether to give up (SoI) or 
again put forward an explanation in terms of a context-
shift. We might even again employ the context-shift we 
have already posited in “¬Tr(‘φ’)” occurring in the argu-
ment based on the failure-intuition and the same formula 
occurring in the argument based on the falsity-intuition. 
Then we not only suppose two different contextual inter-
pretations of “¬Tr(‘φ’)”, but also two different contextual 
interpretations of φ. Indeed some proponents of contextual 
approaches (e.g. (Burge 1979) and (Simmons 1993)) ar-
gue for another tension between two semantical views of 
the strengthened liar sentence φ. But this point is contro-
versial. After all, φ is in the first place assumed to be an 
entirely pathological sentence to which no classical truth 
value can be assigned. ¬Tr(‘φ’) is intended to reflect this 
assumption. So if we finally refute that φ is entirely patho-
logical but consider φ to be also true according to another 
reading, then we refute the basic observation of our whole 
reasoning. 
To conclude, in context of our formal language L, 
the strengthened liar paradox is constituted by (at least) 
two tensions in our metalinguistic reasoning about φ. 
Firstly, the tension between evaluating ¬Tr(‘φ’) as true 
according the failure-intuition, and evaluating it as neither 
true nor false according to the falsity-intuition. Secondly, 
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there is a tension between evaluating ¬Tr(‘φ’) and φ 
equally, and evaluating ¬Tr(‘φ’) and φ differently. The first 
tension indicates that ¬Tr(‘φ’) is context-dependent. 
Concerning the second tension we have two possible lines 
of explanation available. We can either again trust into 
effects of a context-shift, but we can alternatively argue 
against the rule (SoI). 
On a first assessment one might for economical 
reasons decide to make an effort to solve the problem by 
employing an explanation in terms of context-shift only. I 
shall simply call this the context-based approach in order 
to distinguish it from the other strategies. Generally, any 
context-based approach has to clarify what kind of context-
dependence is present in the strengthened liar reasoning. 
It has to determine where a context-dependent element is 
hidden in ¬Tr(‘φ’).  
All context-based approaches agree that a certain 
change of context affects our interpretation of the truth 
predicate Tr occurring in φ. A very direct realization of this 
comes from (Burge 1979). He proposes to add an index i 
to each occurrence of Tr, i.e. “Tri”. This reminds very much 
of Tarski´s proposal, but Burge`s system has several 
advantages. Formulas, such as “Tri(‘Tri(‘P(c)’)’)” where 
“P(c)” represents “Snow is white”, that are meaningless or 
ill-formed according to Tarski´s account, become 
meaningful within Burge´s system. Further developments 
of Burge´s approach are (Koons 1992) and (Simmons 
1993). 
A metaphysically more sophisticated approach is 
posed by (Parsons 1974), (Barwise and Etchemendy 
1987) and (Glanzberg 2004). According to Parsons and 
Glanzberg, a context-shift can lead to a shift from M to 
another L-structure M* which is regarded to be an 
expansion of M. They take propositions as truth-bearers, 
and define an expression relation between sentences and 
propositions. The universe of discourse D of their model M 
is proposed to contain all propositions that can be 
expressed by LM (in Glanzberg´s system, D actually 
contains all truth conditions that can constitute a 
proposition and that can be expressed by LM). The 
universe can expand as context shifts. In the first place, 
therefore, quantifiers represent the context-dependent 
element in (Glanzbergs and Parsons versions of) the 
strengthened liar sentence. But as Glanzberg and Parsons 
note, it is then only a definitional matter to work with a 
context-dependent truth predicate, and in fact both end up 
with working with a context-dependent truth predicate. 
(Barwise and Etchemendy 1987) give a very similar 
account. 
Context-based approaches employ an analysis that 
inevitably gives rise to a certain kind of hierarchy of truth 
predicates. This is obvious for proposals which attach an 
index belonging to a partially ordered set to all 
occurrences of “Tr”. Approaches that appeal to an 
expansion M* of M with a more comprehensive domain D* 
lead to a hierarchical view as well. The language LM* 
interpreted by M* is used to express a true statement 
about φ' (the “ ' ” indicates that φ' is actually a translation of 
the original φ belonging to LM into the language LM*): M* ├ 
Tr*(‘φ'’), and furthermore M* ├ ¬Tr(‘φ'’), where the  
 
predicate Tr represents “truth in LM” and Tr* represents 
“truth in LM*”. A new strengthened liar sentence φ* of the 
form ¬Tr*(l) such that l = ‘¬Tr*(l)’ can be formed that gives 
rise to another context-shift that is associated with another 
model M** to reason about φ*. M** in turn has its own 
truth-predicate Tr** and so on and so forth.  
Of course the hierarchies advanced by context-
based approaches differ from Tarski´s hierarchies of truth-
predicates in several respects. First, as I have already 
mentioned, this approach features some advantages, 
since several cases of formulas that correspond to 
ordinary and meaningful sentences in English, but that 
become pathological in Tarski´s system, are evaluated as 
our intuitions would suggest it. Furthermore, these 
alternative hierarchies are considered to model natural 
language as closely as this can possibly be done, or even 
to represent an intrinsic feature of natural language. The 
strengthened liar problem does not show that the concept 
of truth in natural language is inconsistent, but that the 
predicate “is true” is context-dependent. 
Still it is prima facie undesired that the concept of 
truth is context-dependent. So context-based approaches 
have to give a motivation for this context-dependency. A 
very essential question is, what kind of context-shift 
happens to effect a shift in the extension of Tr and how it 
does this. Earlier proponents of context-based approaches 
do not employ any rigid formal concept of a context. 
Therefore they only give rough and informal explanations 
for this problem, if at all. Sometimes the presence of the 
strengthened liar problem is taken to provide enough 
evidence to prove a context-shift. In contrast, (Glanzberg 
2004) gives a rigid proof of how a context-shift leads to a 
shift from M to M*, which is based on precise notions of a 
context, a proposition and a truth predicate. 
An additional problem which I think deserves 
attention apart from any profound explanation concerning 
the previous question is that in the languages proposed 
there is no way to reflect over all contexts. No formula can 
be used to represent an ultimate or universal perspective. 
Proponents of a contextual analysis have to clarify why this 
is so, and why our naive view that we can reflect over 
absolutely everything is wrong. 
Apart from these two problems a context-based 
approach also has to motivate why it fares better than 
alternative approaches to explain the strengthened liar 
problem. Given all the difficulties related with a hierarchical 
account I have just outlined, it could e.g. be that contrary 
to our first assessment an alternative approach that relies 
in addition on restricting (SoI) in the end provides a better 
trade-off than a purely context-based approach. It has 
sometimes been argued against restricting (SoI) that this 
line of solution was ad-hoc and unmotivated. For the most 
part this point applies to approaches put forward so far 
(e.g. (Skyrms 1970)), since they are not very elaborated 
concerning their applicability to natural language (besides, 
they do not invoke any contextual considerations, and 
therefore do not explain the first problem from which the 
strengthened liar problem arises). Therefore it could be 
interesting to search for other kinds of contextual 
approaches and turn our attention to (SoI). 
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The Elimination of Meaning in Computational Theories of Mind 
Paul Schweizer, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK 
1. The Computational Paradigm 
According to the traditional conception of the mind, seman-
tical content is perhaps the most important feature distin-
guishing mental from non-mental systems. For example, in 
the scholastic tradition revived by Brentano (1874), the 
essential feature of mental states is their ‘aboutness’ or 
intrinsic representational aspect. And this traditional con-
ception has been incorporated into the foundations of con-
temporary scientific approaches to the mind, insofar as the 
notion of ‘mental representation’ is adopted as a primary 
theoretical device. For example, in classical (e.g. Fodorian) 
cognitive science, Brentano’s legacy is preserved in the 
view that the properly cognitive level is distinguished pre-
cisely by appeal to representational content. There are 
many different levels of description and explanation in the 
natural world, from quarks all the way to quasars, and 
according to Fodor (1975), it is only when the states of a 
system are treated as representations that we are dealing 
with the genuinely cognitive level.  
The classical paradigm in cognitive science derives 
from Turing’s basic model of computation as rule governed 
transformations on a set of syntactical elements, and it has 
taken perhaps its most literal form of expression in terms 
of Fodor’s Language of Thought hypothesis (LOT), 
wherein mental processes are explicitly viewed as formal 
operations on a linguistically structured system of internal 
symbols. But a fundamental tension is already built into the 
classical picture: a central purpose of the symbolic 
structures is to carry content, and yet, to the extent that 
they are formal elements of computation, their alleged 
content is completely gratuitous. Computation is 
essentially a series of manipulations performed on 
uninterpreted syntax, and formal structure alone is 
sufficient for all effective procedures. The specification and 
operation of such procedures makes no reference 
whatever to the intended meaning of the symbols involved. 
Indeed, it is precisely this limitation to syntactic form that 
has enabled computation to emerge as a mathematically 
rigorous discipline. If syntax alone is not sufficient, and 
additional understanding or interpretation is required, then 
the procedure in question is, by definition, not an effective 
one. But then the purported content of mental 
‘representations’ is rendered superfluous to the 
computations that comprise the ‘cognitive’ processes of 
cognitive science. The intended interpretation of internal 
syntax makes absolutely no difference to the formal 
mechanics of mind.  
For a number of years now there has been a high 
profile struggle between opposing camps within the 
computational approach to the mind. In contrast to the 
classical paradigm derived from Turing, connectionist 
systems are based on networks of large numbers of simple 
but highly interconnected units that are brain-like in 
inspiration. But according to Fodor, the brain-like 
architecture of connectionist networks tells us nothing 
about their suitability as models of cognitive processing, 
since it still leaves open the question of whether the mind 
is such a network at the representational level. So a 
number of connectionists have taken up the challenge and 
seek out ways of projecting representational content onto 
artificial neural networks. One comparatively recent such 
attempt (Churchland, P.M.1998, Laakso, A. and G. Cottrell 
2000, O’Brien, G. and J. Opie 2001) uses cluster analysis 
to locate ‘vehicles’ of representational content within 
artificial neural networks, where such clusters serve as 
surrogates for the classical notion of internal syntax.  
However, I would contend that such attempts suffer 
from exactly the same built-in tension that afflicts the LOT 
model; namely, the purported content for which the 
clusters serve as vehicles does no work in the processing 
path leading from inputs to outputs.  Just as in the 
classical case, the postulation of content within the 
connectionist framework is gratuitous, because it plays no 
role in the cognitive manipulation of inputs to yield the 
salient outputs. Indeed, if content weren’t gratuitous, then 
computational versions of cognitive processing would be 
lamentably deficient in terms of their specification of the 
inputs. These are characterized solely in formal or 
syntactical terms, and content is entirely absent from the 
external stimuli recognized by the operations that can be 
defined within the model. If representational content were 
at all relevant, then cognitive systems would have to 
process content itself. But according to computational 
methods, content is not specified with the input, nor does it 
play any efficacious role in internal processing. So, from a 
perspective that takes computation as the theoretical 
foundation for cognition, it seems quite retrograde to posit 
content on top of the factors that do the actual work. 
Surely this is an exemplary occasion for invoking 
Ockham’s razor.  
2. Searle’s Objection  
Of course, John Searle’s (1980) celebrated Chinese Room 
Argument (henceforward CRA) runs the dialectic in exactly 
the reverse direction: rather than taking the formal, syntac-
tic nature of computation as a reason for eschewing con-
tent in a properly naturalistic approach to the mind, Searle 
instead takes it as a reason for rejecting computation as 
the appropriate theory of the mental. So, from the perspec-
tive of the present discussion, it is instructive to explicitly 
cast Searle’s argument in terms of the separability of syn-
tactical structure from its intended meaning. In what fol-
lows I will abstract away from the somewhat picturesque 
details of Searle’s original version and express the logical 
core of the CRA via two premises and a conclusion: 
 
(1) semantical content is an essential feature of the 
mind, 
(2) syntactical manipulations cannot capture this 
content, therefore 
(3) the mind cannot be reduced to a system of syn-
tactical manipulations. 
Preimse (1) is an expression of the traditional conception 
of the mind, and is accepted by both Searle and by his 
opponents in orthodox cognitive science and AI. Classical 
cognitive science and AI view the mind according to the 
model of rule governed symbol manipulation, and premise 
(1) is embraced insofar as the manipulated symbols are 
supposed to possess representational content. Searle’s 
dispute with cognitive science and AI centers on his rejec-
tion of the idea that internal computation can shed any real 
light on mental content, which leads to his conclusion (3), 
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and a concomitant dismissal of the research paradigm 
central to cognitive science and AI.  
In response, a standard line for defenders of this 
paradigm is to try and defuse the CRA by arguing against 
premise (2), and claiming that the manipulated symbols 
really do possess some canonical meaning or privileged 
interpretation. However, I would urge that this is a serious 
strategic error for those who wish to defend the 
computational approach. As stated above, a distinguishing 
mathematical virtue of computational systems is precisely 
the fact that the formal calculus can be executed without 
any appeal to meaning. Not only is an interpretation 
intrinsically unnecessary to the operation of computational 
procedures, but furthermore, there is no unique 
interpretation determined by the computational syntax, and 
in general there are arbitrarily many distinct models for any 
given formal system.  
Computational formalisms are syntactically closed 
systems, and in this regard it is fitting to view them in 
narrow or solipsistic terms. They are, by their very nature, 
independent of the ‘external world’ of their intended 
meaning and, as mentioned above, they are incapable of 
capturing a unique interpretation, since they cannot 
distinguish between any number of alternative models. 
This can be encapsulated in the observation that the 
relation between syntax and semantics is fundamentally 
one-to-many; any given formal system will have arbitrarily 
many different interpretations. And this intrinsically one-to-
many character obviates the possibility of deriving or even 
attributing a unique semantical content merely on the basis 
of computational structure. 
The inherent limitations of syntactical methods 
would seem to cast a rather deflationary light on the 
project of explicating mental content within a 
computational framework. Indeed, they would seem to 
render hopeless such goals as providing a computational 
account of natural language semantics or propositional 
attitude states. Non-standard models exit even for such 
rigorously defined domains as first-order arithmetic and 
fully axiomatized geometry. And if the precise, artificial 
system of first-order arithmetic cannot even impose 
isomorphism on its various models, how then could a 
program, designed to process a specific natural language, 
say Chinese, supply a basis for the claim that the units of 
Chinese syntax posses a unique meaning? 
So I think that the advocates of computation make 
the wrong move by accepting Searle’s bait and taking on 
board the attendant ‘symbol grounding problem’ endemic 
to computational theories of mind. Instead I would accept 
Searle’s negative premise (2) and agree that computation 
is too weak to underwrite any interesting version of (1). 
Hence I would concur with Searle’s reasoning to the extent 
of accepting the salient conditional claim that if (1) is true 
then (3) is true as well. So the real crux of the issue lies in 
the truth-value of (1), without which the consequent of the 
if-then statement cannot be detached as a free-standing 
conclusion. Only by accepting the traditional, a priori 
notion of mentality assumed in premise (1), does (3) follow 
from the truth of (2). And it’s here that I diverge from the 
views of both Searle and orthodox cognitive science. 
3. Representation as Heuristics 
There have been a number of prominent positions ad-
vanced in negative reaction to ‘classical’ cognitive science 
that take anti-representationalism as one their hallmarks, 
including dynamical systems theory (e.g Van Gelder 
1996), behaviour based robotics (e.g. Brooks 1991), ap-
proaches utilizing sensory-motor affordances (e.g. Noe 
2004), who campaign on the platform of ‘intelligence with-
out representation’. In order to locate my position on the 
philosophical landscape, it is salient to note that it is not 
anti-representational in this sense. On my view, there 
could well be internal structures that play many of the roles 
that people would ordinarily expect of representations, and 
this is especially true at the level of perception, sensory-
motor control and navigation – things like spatial encod-
ings, somatic emulators, internal mirrorings of salient as-
pects of the external environment. So, unlike the anti-
representationalists, I do not deny that there may be inter-
nal structures and stand-ins that various people would be 
tempted to call ‘representations’.  
But I would argue that this label should be construed 
in a weak, operational sense, and should not be conflated 
with the more robust traditional conception. To the extent 
that internal structures can encode, mirror or model 
external objects and states of affairs, they do so via their 
own causal and/or syntactic properties. And again, to the 
extent that they influence behaviour or the internal 
processing of inputs to yield outputs, they do this solely in 
virtue of their causal and/or syntactic properties. There is 
nothing about these internal structures that could support 
Searle’s or Brentano’s notion of original intentionality, and 
there is no independent or objective fact of the matter 
regarding their ‘real’ content or meaning.  
The crucial point to notice is that these internal 
‘representations’ do all their scientifically tangible cognitive 
work solely in virtue of their physical/formal/mathematical 
structure. There is nothing about them, qua efficacious 
elements of internal processing, that is ‘about’ anything 
else. Content is not an explicit component of the input, nor 
is it acted upon or transformed via cognitive computations. 
All that is explicitly present and causally relevant are 
computational structure plus supporting physical 
mechanisms, which is exactly what one would expect from 
a naturalistic account. In order for cognitive structures to 
do their job, there is no need to posit some additional 
‘content’, ‘semantical value’, or ‘external referent’. Such 
representation talk may serve a useful heuristic role, but it 
remains a conventional, observer-relative ascription, and 
accordingly there’s no independent fact of the matter, and 
so there isn’t a sense in which it’s possible to go wrong or 
be mistaken about what an internal configuration is ‘really’ 
about. Instead, representational content is projected onto 
an internal structure when this plays an opportune role in 
characterizing the overall processing activities which 
govern the system’s interactions with its environment, and 
hence in predicting its salient input/output patterns. But it is 
simply a matter of convenience, convention and choice.  
From the point of view of the system, these internal 
structures are manipulated directly, and the notion that 
they are ‘directed towards’ something else plays no role in 
the pathways leading from cognitive inputs to intelligent 
outputs. Hence the symbol grounding problem is a red 
herring – it isn’t necessary to quest after some elusive and 
mysterious layer of content, for which these internal 
structures serve as the syntactic ‘vehicle’. Syntactical and 
physical processes are all we have, and their efficacy is 
not affected by the presence or absence of meaning. I 
would argue that the computational paradigm is 
thematically inconsistent with the search for content or its 
supposed vehicles. Instead, computational models of 
cognition should be concerned only with the processing 
structures that yield the right kinds of input/output profiles, 
and with how such structures can be implemented in the 
brain. These are the factors that do the work and are 
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sufficient to explain all of the empirical data, and they do 
this using the normal theoretical resources of natural 
science. Indeed, the postulation of content as the essential 
feature distinguishing mental from non-mental systems 
should be seen as the last remaining vestige of Cartesian 
dualism, and, contra Fodor, naturalized cognition has no 
place for a semantical ‘ghost in the machine’. When it 
comes to computation and content, only the vehicle is 
required, not the excess baggage. 
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Following a Philosopher 
Murilo Seabra / Marcos Pinheiro, Brasília, Brazil 
1. Following rules and following  
philosophers 
What might be to follow a philosopher? According to the 
latter Wittgenstein, rules are fundamentally what philoso-
phers are concerned with, rules are what they write - that 
is, grammatical and not empirical propositions. This idea 
naturally allows us to transpose Wittgenstein's remarks on 
rule-following into the problem of following a philosopher. 
We should keep in mind that this idea applies as much to 
the metaphysicians and analytical philosopher's of the 
author's time as for himself. From his own point of view, 
Wittgenstein applied common rules of language to break 
down the bizarre representation norms - not empirical 
propositions about the inner workings of reality or lan-
guage - proposed by philosophers. For instance, against 
the rule that states the privacy of meanings (sustained by 
Carnap and Russell as if it were an empirical proposition), 
Wittgenstein reminds us of an internal relation between the 
concepts of meaning and explanation, that is, he reminds 
us that meanings cannot be private as long as they can be 
explained. The rule that states the privacy of meanings 
simply takes the concept of meaning out of circulation (or 
else it drastically alters the concept of privacy). 
But we are seldom clear about what it is 'to do the 
same thing' or 'to follow the same rule'. For we tend to 
wrongly generalize excessively simple paradigms of 'to do 
the same thing' as, for example: 
 
(1) A draws a straight line 10 cm long and asks B to 
do the same thing; we say that B has done the 
same thing only if B also draws a straight line 10 cm 
long. 
 
(2) A writes "2, 4, 6, 8, 10" and asks B to do the 
same thing; we say that B has done the same thing 
only if he also writes "2, 4, 6, 8, 10". 
In other words, the paradigms of 'to do the same thing' 
which most of us have immediately present in mind belong 
to the most primitive kinds of repetition ever. We tend to 
think that B only does the same thing as A in case B acts 
as an impersonator. Obviously, if we keep that conception 
of 'to do the same thing' in mind, we will contend that fol-
lowing a philosopher is rewriting what he wrote with differ-
ent (or perhaps even with the same) words; therefore, that 
to be a Russellian means something not much different 
from mimicking Russell. 
Wittgenstein undermined the idea that B's doing the 
same as A must be a case of mimicry by showing that 
there are different criteria for identity. For example, letters 
'C' and 'c', though graphically different, are one and the 
same letter. Many features are left outside the identity 
criteria of letters, as for instance their size - which, in turn, 
is taken into consideration when it comes to the identity of 
other sorts of object. On the other hand, if we rotate the 
letter 'c' at 90 degrees, we might be unable to discern it 
from letter 'u'. The spatial position of letters is relatively 
important to their identity - something that surely cannot be 
said about bats. Letter 'B' and 'b' are also the same, 
though one could contend that from the graphical point of 
view there are more similarities between 'b' and 'p', which 
are different letters. In short, the identity criteria of letters 
are different from the identity criteria of colors, which are 
different from the identity criteria of thoughts, which in turn 
are different from the identity criteria of bats. Identity 
criteria vary according to the kind of object at hand. To 
think that identity criteria always remain the same brings 
about absurd questions such as if two tokens of the letter 
'A' can really be considered tokens of the same kind of 
letter, provided they do not occupy the same spatio-
temporal position - an identity criterion that surely applies 
for bats. 
2. Philosophical propositions 
Let us consider for a moment identity criteria of proposi-
tions - a particularly important subject when it comes to the 
question of what following a philosopher might be. Witt-
genstein has at least two important considerations about 
that in his Investigations. The first one is fairly straightfor-
ward: the same thought - the same proposition - can be 
expressed in different ways. The second consideration, 
though not so straightforward, is as important as the first 
one: there is no single set of identity criteria that holds for 
all kinds of proposition. Poetic propositions (and also the 
religious ones) have identity criteria different from philoso-
phical propositions: 
 
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense 
in which it can be replaced by another which says 
the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be 
replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical 
theme can be replaced by another.) 
In the one case the thought in the sentence is 
something common to different sentences; in the 
other, something that is expressed only by these 
words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.) 
(Wittgenstein 2001, cf. PI 531) 
The statement that a poetic proposition cannot be replaced 
by any other, that it cannot be expressed in different 
words, might be a sign of our understanding of it. However, 
no philosophy teacher would accept a transcription of PI 
531 as a sign of her students' understanding of PI 531. 
This is a specially interesting case, for it shows that (1) and 
(2) are not particularly good paradigms for the identity 
criteria of philosophical propositions and therefore not 
particularly good paradigms for understanding what it 
might be to follow a philosopher. When it comes to phi-
losophy instead of poetry or religion, one and the same 
thought can usually be expressed in different ways. And if 
B contends that A's thoughts can only be expressed in 
exactly the same way as A did, then we have good 
grounds to claim that B takes A's propositions as poetic or 
religious rather than as philosophical. 
Wittgenstein thought that, just as there was nothing 
wrong with regarding 'A' and 'A' as the same letter, so 
there was nothing wrong with regarding "12, 14, 16, 18" as 
a sequel to "2, 4, 6, 8, 10" - therefore that writing "2, 4, 6, 
8, 10" and writing "12, 14, 16, 18" could easily be seen as 
a case of doing the same thing. Transposing identity 
criteria which hold for a given class of objects to a class of 
objects where they do not hold is what brings about 
absurdities such as the idea that writing "2, 4, 6, 8, 10" 
could never be the same thing as writing "12, 14, 16, 18" 
(since the written characters are altogether different), or 
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that 'A' and 'A' could never be tokens of the same letter 
type (simply because they are different tokens of the same 
letter). Extending these considerations to the problem of 
following a philosopher we may obtain interesting results. 
To follow a philosopher might be to do what he did (i.e., to 
do philosophy) instead of rewriting what he wrote (i.e., to 
interpret him). Depending on who is the philosopher, to 
rewrite his thoughts might be precisely not to follow him. 
Perhaps this is the case of Wittgenstein: perhaps 
interpreting him should be something as listening to his 
exhortations that we do philosophy as the cat that stares at 
the finger instead of the direction pointed to. 
3. Philosophers and commentators 
So let us raise the question: did Wittgenstein want to be 
followed? Did he want us to write about his thoughts or to 
make an effort to think for ourselves - just as he did? Per-
haps the difference between the prefaces of the Tractatus 
and the Investigations could shed some light here. It is well 
known that in his first book Wittgenstein believed he had 
solved all philosophical problems once and for all - such as 
announced in the book's preface. Since the Tractatus had 
supposedly put an end to philosophy, it would only be pos-
sible to keep on interpreting its results (in the sense Witt-
genstein talked about interpretation - cf. PI 201). More-
over, these interpretations would never present substan-
tive developments, but only different ways - maybe more 
precise or exhaustive - of saying what the Tractatus had 
already stated. Clearly the Tractatus did not leave enough 
room for thoughts it did not contain. 
The Investigations' preface, on the other hand, was 
written in a much different spirit. There Wittgenstein says 
he hoped "to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" 
(Wittgenstein 2000, cf. PI p.x). The Investigations were not 
supposed to be the last word on philosophy, even though 
they still could have the last word in questions such as 
whether the meanings of words are the objects (either 
public or private) they refer to. After all philosophy had to 
keep moving; it is not even possible to solve all 
philosophical problems at once, but only to master an 
understanding of them that would allow us to stop doing 
philosophy whenever we want (Wittgenstein 2001, cf. PI 
133). 
But do these differences between the prefaces of 
both books really stand for differences in their contents? 
Judging from one of Wittgenstein's observations about a 
pre-war version of the Investigations, the answer seems to 
be affirmative: 
 
One could call this book a text-book. A textbook, 
however, not in that it provides knowledge [Wissen], 
but rather in that it stimulates thinking [Denken]. 
(Wittgenstein apud. Hilmy 1987, cf. p.6) 
What Wittgenstein announced in the preface of his book 
was therefore not something alien to its content. The In-
vestigations were not meant to stimulate thoughts by 
chance; this was rather their main goal. Wittgenstein did 
not want interpreters. The Investigations present a set of 
methods - of Werkzeuge - to the solving of philosophical 
problems, so that it would be pointless to just explain (in-
stead of actually applying) them: 
 
Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by exam-
ples; and the series of examples can be broken off. 
– Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a 
single problem.  
There is not a philosophical method, though there 
are indeed methods, like different therapies. (Witt-
genstein 2001, cf. PI 133) 
The remark refers to the Investigations themselves; it is 
clearly said that not only results are being presented but 
also the means to arrive at the results. At this point Witt-
genstein brings his methods to the foreground and lets go 
of the actual examples by which those methods were pre-
sented. His methods are even more important than the 
particular philosophical problems he addresed. Wittgen-
stein does not direct a large portion of the Investigations 
against the idea that the meanings of words are the ob-
jects to which they refer because this idea is particularly 
difficult to undermine - he wants instead to present through 
his critique a series of methods that could and should be 
directed at other philosophical problems. 
We hope to have left a few footprints on our 
pursuing the question of what it might be to follow a 
philosopher - and specially to have aroused some of the 
subtler issues involved in the very idea of following a 
thinker like Wittgenstein. The whole philosophy of the 
Investigations - and in many ways we are not able to hint 
here by lack of space - can be read as an attempt to 
create philosophers instead of commentators. And the 
unsettling possibility also remains that even a good 
interpretation of Wittgenstein would amount inevitably to a 
misinterpretation. 
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Davidson on Supervenience 
Oron Shagrir, Jerusalem, Israel 
1. Introduction 
Donald Davidson introduces supervenience to the philoso-
phy of mind in his "Mental Events". He famously writes that 
"mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or 
supervenient, on physical characteristics" (1970:214). Cu-
riously, however, there has been little effort to explicate 
what Davidson means by supervenience; philosophers 
typically assume Jaegwon Kim's conception of superven-
ience. My aim here is to explicate the passages in which 
Davidson discusses supervenience. I argue that David-
son's supervenience is very different from the one as-
sumed in contemporary philosophy of mind, and is not 
dependence in the sense of some deeper metaphysical 
relation. 
2. The characterization of supervenience 
Davidson characterizes supervenience in several places. 
In "Mental Events", he writes: 
 
Supervenience might be taken to mean that there 
cannot be two events alike in all physical respects 
but differing in some mental respect, or that an ob-
ject cannot alter in some mental respects without al-
tering in some physical respects (1970:214).  
The first part of the sentence is a characterization in terms 
of indiscernibility, namely, that "there cannot be two events 
alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental 
respect", that is, there cannot be two events that are 
physically indiscernible but mentally discernible. The sec-
ond part is another characterization, one which construes 
it as a type of covariance: "an object cannot alter in some 
mental respects without altering in some physical re-
spects", that is, mental changes co-vary with physical 
changes.  
In later writings, Davidson provides additional 
covariance definitions, the gist of which is that any mental 
difference between objects must be accompanied by a 
physical difference. In "Reply to Harry Lewis", he writes:  
 
The notion of supervenience, as I have used it, is 
best thought of as a relation between a predicate 
and a set of predicates in a language: a predicate p 
is supervenient on a set of predicates S if for every 
pair of objects such that p is true of one and not of 
the other there is a predicate in S that is true of one 
and not of the other. (1985:242) 
And in "Thinking Causes" he makes a similar claim:  
 
The idea I had in mind is, I think, most economically 
expressed as follows: a predicate p is supervenient 
on a set of predicates S if and only if p does not dis-
tinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by 
S. (1993:4)  
On a charitable reading, Davidson’s characterizations are 
all equivalent. Supervenience is a thesis about the rela-
tions between properties or characteristics or respects, 
e.g., mental and physical properties, which Davidson un-
derstand as predicates. These properties are ascribed to 
particulars such as events, objects and entities. To make 
things more explicit, let us take two sets of properties, R 
and S. We can think of R as a set of mental predicates, 
and of S as a set of physical properties. We would say that 
R supervenes on S just in case the following condition 
holds: 
 
For every M of R and for every pair of objects 
(events, entities) x and y, if for every P of S, Px ↔ 
Py (i.e., x and y are S-indiscernible), then Mx ↔ My 
(i.e., x and y are M-indiscernible). 
Let us compare this characterization to Kim's notions of 
supervenience. First, Kim (1984) famously distinguishes 
between a strong and a weak reading of this condition. On 
the strong reading, the condition applies to every pair of 
possible objects x and y, even if they inhabit "different 
worlds". On the weak reading, it applies to every pair of 
objects belonging to the same world (any world), but need 
not apply to objects across worlds. In "Thinking Causes", 
Davidson says that his version of supervenience is of the 
weak sort:   
 
Kim himself (correctly, I think) finds my version of 
supervenience very close to his ‘weak’ superven-
ience, and as not entailing connecting laws. 
(1993:4, n. 4) 
Second, Kim demonstrates that under assumptions of 
closure of S, strong and weak supervenience are equiva-
lent, respectively, to strong and weak entailment P* → M 
principles, where P* is a maximal S-property. Unlike Kim, 
Davidson never explicates supervenience in terms of en-
tailment conditionals P* → M. Third, Kim also introduces a 
notion of global supervenience, which, arguably, fits better 
with the thesis of externalism; Davidson, we recall, is an 
outspoken proponent of externalism. But it turns out that 
global supervenience is an intricate notion that comes with 
very different versions. Instead of invoking global super-
venience, it is sufficient to use the individual notions but 
not limit S to monadic, micro, local, or intrinsic properties; it 
could include causal relations with the physical environ-
ment, and even bits of causal history. S could even include 
physical properties of remote objects if such properties are 
indeed relevant to the ascription of mental properties. 
Davidson's statement about his notion of 
supervenience being weak is puzzling. The problem with 
weak supervenience is that it does not support 
dependence. Weak supervenience is consistent with the 
scenario in which my counterpart and I have exactly the 
same physical properties, but different mental properties. 
But then the mental difference is not due to our physical 
properties, since nothing related to our physical makeup, 
including past and present causal relations with their 
environment, differs. It would thus seem that there are 
mental properties that do not depend on physical 
properties. 
Davidson himself rules out such scenarios. He 
maintains that counterfactual scenarios like the Twin-Earth 
and Swampman thought-experiments, the mental 
differences are accompanied by physical differences:  
 
What I take Burge’s and Putnam’s imagined cases 
to show (and what I think the Swampman example 
shows more directly) is that people who are in all 
relevant physical respects similar (or ‘identical’ in 
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the necktie sense) can differ in what they mean or 
think… But of course there is something different 
about them, even in the physical world; their causal 
histories are different. (1987:32-33)  
Weak supervenience, however, lacks the modal force to 
support these psychophysical dependencies. Why, then, 
does Davidson invoke weak supervenience? One answer 
might be that mental properties do not strongly supervene 
on the intrinsic physical properties of agents, as the Twin-
Earth and Swampman examples show. The mental only 
weakly supervenes on intrinsic physical properties: two 
agents of the same "world" that are physically indiscernible 
are also mentally indiscernible (see Davidson 1995).  
However, this proposal will not do. It is true that the 
mental does not strongly supervenes on intrinsic physical 
properties, but it does strongly supervenes on intrinsic and 
extrinsic physical properties. It thus makes more sense to 
use strong supervenience over intrinsic and extrinsic 
physical properties, which reflects dependence, rather 
than using weak supervenience over intrinsic physical 
properties alone, which does not reflect dependence. One 
way or another, it seems that the weakness of Davidson's 
supervenience does not stem from the usual "across-
worlds" relations.  
3. Supervenience as a philosophical  
concept 
Davidson does not say much about the philosophical im-
port of supervenience, but it is clear that his views on this 
are unique. One respect in which they are unusual has to 
do with the philosophical role of supervenience. Superven-
ience is widely upheld by non-reductive monists: those 
who maintain that every mental event is a physical event, 
but deny psychophysical laws. Many who espouse ver-
sions of this view worry that it is insufficiently "materialis-
tic". The concern is that non-reductive monism says too 
little about the relations between mental and physical 
properties. Although it denies that mental properties are 
physical properties, it imposes no alternative constraints 
on the attribution of mental properties. Monism ensures 
that every object with mental properties also has physical 
properties, but, beyond that, anything goes: monism is 
consistent with the possibility that my physical counterpart 
has no mentality whatsoever, while my cup of coffee does. 
Surely a monistic, to say nothing of materialistic, doctrine 
that allows such wild attributions is worthless. Something 
must be done to close this gap. And this is where super-
venience kicks in. The role of supervenience is to put more 
significant constraints on the psychophysical relations 
between mental and physical properties, without reducing 
mental properties to physical properties. Supervenience, 
on this account, is a secondary thesis that makes non-
reductive monism materialistically kosher.  
"Mental Events" gives the impression that 
supervenience plays this legitimizing role in Davidson's 
philosophy. After presenting the tenets of anomalous 
monism, Davidson immediately introduces supervenience, 
saying that "although the position I describe denies there 
are psychophysical laws, it is consistent with the view that 
mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or 
supervenient, on physical characteristics" (p. 214). From 
this we might conclude that Davidson, too, feels obliged to 
complement his monistic thesis about events with a 
substantive and positive thesis about the psychophysical 
relations between predicates. But later on, in his "Reply to 
Harry Lewis" (1985) and in "Thinking Causes" (1993), it 
turns out that this is not how Davidson sees the role of 
supervenience. Declaring that "supervenience in any form 
implies monism; but it does not imply either definitional or 
nomological reduction", Davidson reveals that he invoked 
supervenience to demonstrate that anomalous monism is 
consistent: "So if (non-reductive) supervenience is 
consistent (as the syntax-semantics example proves it is) 
so is AM [anomalous monism]" (1993:5).  
Contrary to first impressions, then, supervenience is 
not a secondary thesis intended to correct the deficiencies 
of the primary doctrine of non-reductive monism. There is 
no evidence that Davidson deems his anomalous monism 
to be in need of reinforcement, whereas we do have 
evidence that Davidson does not take supervenience to 
provide such reinforcement. Davidson, of course, does 
resist the idea that mental properties float freely, as it 
were, over the physical domain, and does take 
supervenience as asserting that the mental depends on 
the physical realm. But this claim about dependency is not 
made as a substantive addition to anomalous monism. 
Rather, supervenience is used both to help establish 
monism and the consistency of anomalous monism. 
Davidson deploys supervenience once again in "Thinking 
Causes", this time to secure the causal relevance of 
mental properties. The claim made is that supervenience 
entails that an event's mental properties make a difference 
to its causal relations. 
Davidson’s supervenience is also unique with 
respect to the notion of dependence. Most philosophers, 
following Kim, maintain that mind-body supervenience is 
grounded in some deeper metaphysical relation. The idea 
is that any P* → M conditional reflects the dependence of 
M on P*, and this dependence is a metaphysical 
determination relation, e.g., identity, constitution, 
emergence, or realization, which underlies and explains 
the supervenience relations. It is thus not surprising that, in 
the context of supervenience, the notions of dependence 
and determination are often used interchangeably. The 
implicit assumption is that M depends on P* by virtue of 
M's being determined by P*, whereas determination is 
understood as a metaphysical determination. 
Davidson's notion of dependence is different. The 
idea that the application of a mental predicate is grounded 
in some metaphysical determination of the mental by a 
fixed physical basis is foreign to Davidson's approach. He 
never hints that the mental depends on the physical by 
virtue of some metaphysical determination relation; and 
certainly does not introduce the more familiar 
determination relations to substantiate his supervenience 
thesis. In fact, in "Thinking Causes", the main argument for 
the causal relevance of mental properties suggests that 
supervenience is not such a determination relation. He 
asserts: "supervenience as I have defined it does, as we 
have seen, imply that if two events differ in their 
psychological properties, they differ in their causal 
properties (which we assume to be causally efficacious). If 
supervenience holds, psychological properties make a 
difference to the causal relations of an event, for they 
matter to the physical properties, and the physical 
properties matter to causal relations" (1993:14). But it is 
apparent that "make a difference" cannot be understood to 
mean "determine" in a metaphysical sense. For it refers to 
the mental-to-physical direction, whereas the pertinent 
metaphysical relation is in the physical-to-mental direction. 
It is most unlikely that Davidson would take supervenience 
to point to metaphysical determination of the mental by the 
physical, and still claim that supervenience implies that 
mental properties "matter to the physical properties". 
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We see that Davidson does not uphold the idea that 
supervenience reflects metaphysical physical-to-mental 
determination or dependence relation. It seems, moreover, 
that he also rejects the idea that dependence (of mental on 
the physical) grounds or accounts for supervenience. If 
anything, it is the other way around. Davidson says that 
"supervenience gives a sense to the notion of dependence 
here, enough sense anyway to show that mental 
properties make a causal difference" (1993:14). So it is not 
that dependence accounts for supervenience, but, if 
anything, dependence is explicated in terms of the 
supervenience of the mental on the physical. 
Lastly, it is telling that Davidson invokes 
supervenience in causal contexts. In discussing the Twin-
Earth and Swampman cases, Davidson insists that "of 
course there is something different about them, even in the 
physical world; their causal histories are different". He later 
describes supervenience as implying that "mental 
properties make a causal difference". And he links 
supervenience with the causal nature of the mental, stating 
that "Kim, as we noted, thinks my version of 
supervenience implies that all mental properties could be 
withdrawn from the world and this would make no 
difference to causal relations; but this supposition turned 
out to be incompatible with my understanding of 
supervenience" (1993:14); and that "[s]upervenience as I 
defined it is consistent with… the assumption that there 
are no psychophysical laws… It is not even slightly 
plausible that there are no important general causal 
connections between mental and physical properties of 
events. I have always held that there are such 
connections" (1993:14). 
4. Summary 
Let us sum up the distinctive features of Davidson’s super-
venience. Supervenience is not a secondary thesis the 
objective of which is to reinforce anomalous monism. It is 
not explicated by some deeper metaphysical determination 
or dependence relation, but if anything, it is supervenience 
that gives cogency to the notion of dependence. And it has 
something to do with the "causal connections between 
mental and physical properties of events". In addition, 
Davidson characterizes supervenience in terms of indis-
cernibility or covariance and not in terms of the entailment 
P* → M conditionals, and declares that his supervenience 
is of the weak kind. Whether we can we extract from these 
remarks a cohesive notion of supervenience, and whether 
this notion can be reconciled with anomalism is something 
I will discuss elsewhere.  
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Supervenience and ‘Should’ 
Arto Siitonen, Helsinki, Finland 
Introduction 
Concerning any entity or any fact, we may wonder how 
does it fit into reality as a whole. We thus raise questions 
of the type: What is the place of – in the scheme of reality? 
As the placeholders for '–' we may put stars, atoms, popu-
lations, societies, histories, human beings, languages, 
works of art, numbers etc. These are mutually related in a 
variety of ways. In order to account for those multifarious 
relations, we organize them into a system. The guiding 
principle of such an organization is that things and facts 
are not disconnected but depend on each other. Certain 
entities and occurrences depend for their existence on 
certain other entities and occurrences. We are dependent 
for our existence on our ancestors; we are connected to 
them through causal lines of heredity. There is also a more 
conceptual kind of dependence: for instance, to be sen-
tient depends on being alive – non-living beings cannot be 
sentient beings. Stones do not perceive, let alone think.  
This dependence has been expressed in philosophy 
by saying that the property 'sentient' supervenes on the 
property 'alive', or the fact 'a is a sentient being' super-
venes on the fact 'a is a living being'. Supervenience 
means dependence, determination, and necessary condi-
tion; to these relations are added the claims of reducibility 
and explainability. A supervening property or fact can be 
reduced to the property or fact on which it supervenes; and 
by that, it is explained by the latter. Reducibility claim 
means that the former is to be "nothing but" the latter, or-
ganized in a proper way. An adequate explanation makes 
understandable why this is so. 
We may extract from the foregoing consideration the 
question: Could – be removed without removing – 
thereby? If not, then the latter is a necessary precondition 
of the former; thus, for instance, being alive is required for 
being sentient. This gives a partial answer to the above 
question of the "place of –" in the scheme of nature, in 
respect to the facts and properties concerned in the exam-
ple.  
If supervenience is a thoroughgoing universal factor 
in reality – and in our account of reality –, then it sounds 
reasonable to extend its sphere from nature to culture. 
Here reductive explanation meets some challenges. Sport 
clubs, societies, states, etc. may be reducible to psychol-
ogy – and by this, all the way down to physics. Concerning 
numbers, they are conceptual entities that may be reduci-
ble to logic (cf. the logicist program of Frege and Russell), 
but presumably not to counting, or to any other actions. As 
to works of art, one may claim that, e.g., a painting is re-
ducible to the composition of its ingredients, i.e., colour 
spots on a canvas, or an orchestral work to the sound 
waves that vibrate in the air in a certain way, etc. However, 
the question of their aesthetic value is a harder one: would 
not the value that they have, exceed the evaluations given 
to them by various persons? Correspondingly, common 
morality may be reducible to social and psychological 
facts, but what about the claims that being moral presents 
to us – are not these irreducible?  
Let us focus on the issue of values and norms. 
Above, properties and facts were considered as superven-
ing entities. Among facts belong actions performed by 
human beings. Evaluating, esteeming, commanding and 
requiring are human actions. If the idea of supervenience 
is pursued consistently, these actions are traced back to 
facts concerning nervous systems of organisms, and sub-
sequently all the way through to the undulations of ele-
mentary particles.  
However, are the very values and norms thus re-
duced? Challenging this, one may appeal to the gap be-
tween 'is' and 'ought', as seen by David Hume. It may be 
that values and norms are not accountable by superven-
ience. Or, if they are, then they are reducible to facts – 
facts organized in a proper way, whatever that may be. 
Examples of such facts can be certain features in works of 
art, in human actions, in society. One may also try to base 
values and obligations on acts of esteeming and requiring. 
Hume did not exclude the possibility of accounting 'ought' 
through 'is'; he just raised the question of how the produc-
tion of an 'ought' from an 'is' is achieved, and justified.  
Below, the following thesis will be defended: it is 
questionable whether values and norms sui generis are 
reductively explainable – and thus, whether they super-
vene on facts. This worry arises due to the 'is/ought'-gap.  
1. Supervenience accounting for facts 
We construct systems of science with their branching sub-
systems; and we claim that such a system adequately 
represents reality. Thus, there is "the real order of things" 
and the order that we make in order to account for that (cf. 
title of Molander (1982)). This is the basis for the distinc-
tion between reality and research of reality. 
The idea of supervenience is concerned with the 
order and with the ordering of facts. It makes ontological 
and epistemological commitments. It classifies facts 
according to certain evolutionary principles in a 
comprehensive way. 'Supervenience' is a philosophical 
concept that is applied to the methods and results of 
science. Francis Crick, although not employing the concept 
of supervenience, considers the neurobiological account of 
consciousness as a scientific hypothesis; cf. his work 
(1994). On his view of the relation between science and 
philosophy, cf. p. 256 ff of that work. He hopes that 
"philosophers will learn enough about the brain to suggest 
ideas about how it works" (p. 258).    
Building up classificatory schemata and subsuming 
various occurrences under them is the first, basic task of 
scientific research. Carl von Linné accomplished this in the 
area of botany; cf. especially his work 'Species plantarum' 
from 1753. He also contributed to the corresponding 
organizing work in zoology. These studies were 
complemented by researchers who worked on anatomy, 
physiology and ecology. A new question was raised in the 
studies on heredity, and it was Charles Darwin who gave 
the explanation to this phenomenon by the theory of 
evolution (cf. his work 'The Origin of Species by Means of 
Natural Selection', 1859). Finally, the basic factor of life, 
the genetic code, was unravelled by Francis Crick and 
James D. Watson in 1953. This discovery revealed the role 
of nucleic acids in the generation and growth of living 
beings. It thus identified the physical basis of life.         
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The classification of living beings, and the account 
of their development and its core factors, contribute to 
answering the question "What is the place of life in the 
scheme of nature?" This is achieved by revealing the 
physical preconditions of life. Physical basis is a necessary 
condition for life; accordingly, if it were removed, there 
would not be life. However, there could be a lifeless 
physical universe – and there has been, before the 
evolution of life. Thus, the inorganic nature can be 
accounted for without recourse to the organic one; but 
accounting for the latter requires taking the former into 
consideration. For the organization of scientific research, 
this means that biology is built on the foundation of 
physics, but physics not on biology.  
A corresponding situation ensues when mental 
occurrences are added to those of life. Historically 
speaking, consciousness and self-consciousness have 
developed gradually, as living beings have become 
sophisticated enough. Social arrangements have then 
evolved from mutual relations between conscious beings. 
Languages, i.e. signal and symbol systems of 
communication, have developed on this basis.  
In the light of supervenience, nature is a layered 
system that has evolved through aeons and will 
presumably go on in its development – cultural evolution 
building itself on the basis of cosmic and biological 
evolution. We may trace given facts of culture back to their 
origin in forgone human populations, these back to the first 
occurrences of life, and these again to physical facts. We 
may also make projections concerning future: evolution will 
presumably continue, but how?   
As was indicated above, there are occurrences, or 
facts, or things that supervene on something, and 
correspondingly there are occurrences, facts, things, on 
which the former supervene. This implies reduction: the 
former are "nothing but" the latter, organized in a proper 
way. A distinction is thus drawn between (i) what it is that 
does supervene, and (ii) what it is on which the 
supervening content is supervening. The relation between 
(i) and (ii) means that the former is reducible to the latter. 
One may speak of "the content factor" and of "the basis 
factor". For the purposes of explanation, (i) is considered 
as explanandum, (ii) as explanans. Thus, we may explain 
e.g. heat (something felt) by the acceleration of molecules 
(something physical).  
Moreover, the original basis factor can take the role 
of a new content factor, etc. The result is a chain of 
superveniences. For instance, if we start with the fact that 
a is a sentient being, its base is the fact that a is a living 
being (cf. above). Being alive is in turn based on 
biochemical facts, the latter on chemical facts, and these 
on physical facts. This is the downward route; if we change 
direction, contents become bases for further contents, and 
we proceed upwards. 
The structure of reality thus revealed and accounted 
for is grounded on physical facts. These yield the fixed 
starting position for explanations, and the final basis for 
reduction. The systematic order of bases and contents is 
mirrored by the time order of evolution and emergence: the 
birth of cosmos, life, consciousness, culture. The system of 
nature thus has a fixed start position and an open future. It 
has evolved from the birth of stars and planets; where its 
development will lead, is a moot question to which various 
cosmological theories try to answer. These theories have 
their precedent in the work by Pierre Simon de Laplace, 
'Exposition du système du monde' (1796).  
The order of facts that their supervenient analysis 
reveals, may be expected to give a wholesale answer to 
the question concerning the scheme of reality. In the 
Introduction above, this question was given two 
formulations. Its answer should give a proper classification 
of facts, their systematic order, and their time order. 
Classes of facts are strata of reality. The specific content 
of such a stratum is the subject matter of its attached 
branch of research, or branches of research. Thus, for 
instance, a living cell is studied by biochemistry and 
biology. A given stratum can be considered as basis for 
another stratum. The question 'what is the place of life in 
reality?' receives its full answer in the context of the whole 
system; the corresponding is true of other strata. An 
orderly study thus promises to give an all-encompassing 
account of the evolution of cosmos, life and culture. In 
respect to what is achieved, one may say that these are 
the facts, and all of them (cf. Chalmers 1996, p. 86: "That's 
all").    
2. Supervenience accounting for moral 
facts 
One may wonder how supervenience can account for 
moral facts. In a broad sense, these may be understood to 
comprise all facts that are studied in social sciences and 
humanities. Traditionally, the title 'moral sciences' is used 
as the common name for these. Moral sciences are distin-
guished from natural sciences. They are concerned with 
mental, social and cultural facts. The objects of their re-
search are human action and its results: history, societies, 
states, languages, works of art etc.  
In the light of supervenience, moral facts depend on 
social, these on mental, and these on physical facts. 
Moreover, moral facts can be explained on the basis of 
other facts, and be reduced to these.  
As to morality proper, its emergence, development 
and character are examined in the theory of morals. One 
can take the fact 'a is a moral being' as explanandum and 
look for its explanation among the more basic facts that 
account for it. To these belong the facts that a is a social, a 
sentient and a living being. Correspondingly, what is called 
'common morality' is reducible to social and psychological 
facts. One can also make comparative studies of different 
moralities, considered either synchronically (the present 
cultures) or diachronically (the past and present cultures), 
and give explanations to their common and diverging 
features.    
3. Accepted norms and values vs.  
acceptable norms and values  
Morality has an outside and an inside dimension. The out-
side dimension is concerned with facts, such as something 
being done by a person or by citizens in general, or some-
thing being accepted as proper behaviour in a community. 
Morality in this sense comprises factual practices and fac-
tually accepted practices. These may deviate from each 
other; cf. the so-called "double standard morality".  
The inside dimension, in contrast, gives reasons for 
the following questions: is that what is done right? Are the 
principles which are generally followed right? These 
questions concern the issue of morally acceptable 
standards.  
Although the dimensions are clearly distinguishable, 
it is in practice difficult to keep them apart. Thus, the very 
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word 'norm' can be thought to express something generally 
accepted; or it may be understood in the sense of a self-
addressed unconditional duty. One may compare this to G. 
H. von Wright's distinction between the descriptive 
"discourse for speaking about norms" and the prescriptive 
"discourse for enunciating rules of action and other norms" 
((1968), p. 11).  
There is also a second, related difficulty that is 
concerned with attempts to defend one's behaviour by 
appealing to what is generally done, or generally accepted. 
That such a procedure is quite common, is a fact of moral 
psychology. But is it justifiable – and if not, why not? This 
question can be clarified in the light of David Hume's short 
remark in his work Treatise of Human Nature (third 
volume, first part, first section). He distinguishes between 
the expressions 'is' and 'ought'. On the basis of this, he 
makes two claims: (1) because the latter "expresses some 
new relation or affirmation…it shou'd be observ'd and 
explain'd", (2) "a reason should be given, for what seems 
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it." 
(Hume (1992), p. 246).          
The following conclusions can be drawn from 
Hume's analysis: If consent is given to claim (1), then 
reducing 'ought' to 'is' would mean the mistake of 
conflating norms with facts. If consent is given to claim (2), 
but the required "deduction" cannot be given, then an 
'ought', in case that it is not self-evident, can be justified 
only by appeal to some other, more basic 'ought', but 
never by appeal to facts. In the light of this, acceptable 
norms cannot be derived from accepted norms. Moreover, 
there are reasons to suppose that acceptable norms form 
an autonomous area, for which one cannot account by any 
facts whatsoever.   
The expression 'ought', or 'should', can be prefixed 
to the verbs 'be' and 'do'. Then, 'should be' may be 
understood to be the core of value judgements, and 
'should do' the core of judgments expressing a norm. (Cf. 
the traditional German distinction between Seinsollen and 
Tunsollen). These judgments are concerned with values 
and norms as abstract entities (cf. the concept of number, 
to which values and norms are in this respect analogous). 
The theory of values is known as axiology, and the theory 
of norms as deontology.  
Values as abstract entities are to be distinguished 
from valuations, the latter being concrete actions or mental 
dispositions. Correspondingly, norms differ from 
commands. Values and norms thus understood are 
nothing mystical but plain common sense: although their 
explication is difficult, we know quite well how and when to 
employ them in discourse and how to apply them to action. 
We then act as moral subjects inside the realm of morality, 
using normative concepts in the prescriptive sense, 
whether addressing them to ourselves or to others. We 
participate to moral discourse; we do not try to explain it or 
reduce it to facts.  
We can step out and thereby switch off to 
descriptive, fact-stating mode of moral discourse. 
Speaking from this vantage point of accepted values and 
norms, enables us to account for them by appealing to 
facts of culture, society, psychology etc. 
Accordingly, it is the factual side of normative 
utterances, i.e. valuations and commands, that can be 
accounted for by supervenience. Supervenience does not 
concern values and norms in the prescriptive sense. 
Acceptability is not reducible to acceptance.  
Ludwig Wittgenstein made a related point in 
proposition 6.41 of his Tractatus: "In the world everything 
is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it 
no value exists – and if it did exist, it would have no value. 
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie 
outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the 
case."  
In 6.43 he says: "If the good or bad exercise of the 
will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the 
world, not the facts…". This can be interpreted in the 
following way: as seen from the perspective of values, the 
world – the totality of facts – appears in a different way 
than through neutral, non-committed consideration. 
4. Critical remarks     
It is difficult to put in words the dual dimension of value 
and norm expressions: firstly, valuations and obligations as 
accepted, empirical, factual – secondly, values and norms 
as acceptable, conceptual, normative. Wittgenstein even 
thought that the latter dimension exceeds the limits of lan-
guage; cf. Tractatus 6.421, according to which "ethics 
cannot be put into words", and 6.423: "It is impossible to 
speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical 
attributes."  
Also, maintaining the duality in a consistent way is 
difficult. This is exemplified by certain occasionally 
encountered suspicious expressions, such as "value 
facts". If one wants to refer by it to valuations, one should 
then rather speak of facts of valuation; if it is intended in 
the normative sense, it marks a plain confusion. That, for 
instance, the life of a species in nature is intrinsically good, 
is not a fact but a value. The fallacy of metabasis eis allo 
genos can be committed in attribution of properties and in 
reasoning. As to the latter possibility, Hume speaks of an 
"imperceptible change" from propositions containing the 
copula 'is' to those "connected with an ought"; cf. Hume 
(1992), p. 245 f.   
Let us put forward some reminders: values are not 
facts; valuations are facts. Norms are not facts; making 
normative claims is a fact. There is nothing wrong in the 
effort of upholding the fact/value distinction, or the 
factual/normative one. (There is neither anything morally 
wrong in this, nor anything logically wrong).  
Maintaining these dichotomies implies that 
supervenience does not apply to values and norms 
themselves, but it does comprise moral facts (cf. Sec. 2 
above). This is not a loss, because the idea of 
supervenience means explaining facts through reducing 
them to other, more basic facts.   
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Rule-following as Coordination: A Game-theoretic Approach 
Giacomo Sillari, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA 
Make the following experiment: say “It’s cold here”  
and mean “It’s warm here”.  
Can you do it? 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §510. 
 
I can’t say “it’s cold here” and mean “it’s warm here”— 
at least, not without a little help from my friends. 
David Lewis, Convention. 
1. Rule-following, coordination and  
normativity 
The slogan that “meaning is normative” is best understood 
in the context of strategic interaction in a community of 
individuals. Famously, Kripke has argued in (Kripke 1982) 
that the central portion of the Philosophical Investigations 
describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solu-
tion. Solving the paradox involves the element of the 
community, which determines conditions of assertability in 
the language. A battery of argument is used to show that 
meaning (or, in general, rule-following) cannot be ex-
plained by resorting to an individual’s mental states, or her 
past use, or her dispositions. By exclusion, this indicates 
that no descriptive fact is constitutive of meaning, and 
hence that “meaning is normative.” Arguably, the normativ-
ity of meaning stems from the assertability conditions hold-
ing in the society (indeed, membership in the community 
depends on one’s record of compliance.) But how exactly 
is the existence of such conditions sustained in the com-
munity? And is it accurate to say that there is no fact to the 
matter of rule-following? 
I need an important caveat here: To answer these 
questions, I momentarily step back from analyzing 
meaning and elaborate on the more general notion of rule-
following instead. Kripke himself uses the terms meaning 
and rule-following rather interchangeably in (Kripke 1982). 
I will conform to the ambiguous usage for ease of 
exposition, and mention my justification for it in the last 
section of this contribution. 
Wittgenstein states (§§198, 199) that a rule is 
followed insofar as there exists a custom, a convention. I 
argue that this and similar remarks in the Philosophical 
Investigations are illuminated when looked at through the 
lens of David Lewis’s theory of convention. Lewis argues in 
(Lewis 1969) that coordination games (situations of 
strategic interaction in which the interest of the players 
roughly coincide) underlie every instance of convention, in 
that a convention is a regularity in the solution (equilibrium) 
of recurrent coordination games. The agents participating 
in the convention conform to the regularity because they 
prefer conformity over non-conformity, conditional on other 
agents’ conforming. They form the belief about other 
agents’ conformity through some coordination device: 
explicitly—through agreement—or tacitly—because a 
certain action stands out as the one that most likely 
(almost) everyone will pick. Such an action is salient to the 
parties. In the case of a recurrent coordination problem, a 
special kind of salience—precedent—is at play. 
Conventionality in the sense of Lewis is sufficient for 
some degree of normativity to arise. Indeed, in a 
community in which a certain custom is in place—say, the 
custom of going by sign-posts—there is an equilibrium in 
the actions and beliefs of the agents involved such that the 
agents prefer conformity to the custom, provided that all 
other members in the community act according to the 
convention. If I do not go by sign-posts, or I go by them in 
a funny, abnormal way (for instance, going in the direction 
opposite to the one indicated) I act contrary to both my 
preferences—because I will not get where I intend to go—
and the preferences of other members of the community—
because, say, I will end up being late, or not showing up at 
all. My reputation will suffer. This indicates that, in general, 
parties to a convention feel, to a larger or smaller extent, 
the pressure to conform. As Lewis puts it, conventions are 
a kind of social norm. But are we entitled to cast the rule-
following phenomenon in a game-theoretic account of 
convention? 
In its most general terms, the communitarian view 
maintains that, while many interpretations of a given rule 
may arise, there is (roughly speaking) only one correct way 
to abide by the rule, as determined by the community. In 
particular, the customary action is the action that 
accurately corresponds to the rule. The problem with 
arguments of this general form is that the same skeptical 
paradox meant to show the impossibility of solipsistic rule-
following applies to the community. Which is the customary 
action? And why? Past use is no sufficient grounds to 
answer such questions for the community, as it is not 
sufficient grounds in the solipsistic case, since the 
community can come up with a variety of interpretations of 
the rule, just as well as the individual can. However, if we 
introduce a strategic element in the behavior of community 
members, then the skeptical paradox disappears (or, as 
we shall see in the next section, gets “pushed towards 
bedrock.”) If we interpret rule-following as coordination 
equilibrium in a coordination problem, then there is a clear 
and compelling fact to the matter of what “going by the 
rule” consists of. In particular, individuals (and the 
population they interact with) who go by the rule net a 
higher payoff than do individuals who transgress the rule. 
Moreover, transgressing the rule comes at a price, both for 
the transgressor and for the agents interacting with him. 
Non-conformative behavior will end up being sanctioned 
(eventually with expulsion from the community), while 
conformative behavior will perpetuate itself, being based 
on the agreement to act according to given rules. In this 
sense, agreement is the agreement in preferences and 
beliefs that support a specific equilibrium in the recurrent 
coordination game. 
Thus, the “little help” needed by Lewis from his 
friends in the answer to the challenge of §510 reported in 
the epigraph consists then in their agreeing to change their 
preferences and beliefs, switching in so doing from one 
solution of a recurrent coordination game to another. 
Consider §224: 
 
The word “agreement” and the word “rule” are re-
lated to one another, they are cousins. If I teach 
anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use 
of the other with it. 
I believe that the view expressed in this section captures 
the sense in which “agreement” and “rule” are related: A 
custom—and hence a rule—does not hold without an 
agreement in preferences and beliefs—and hence in co-
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ordinative, conventional actions—on part of the members 
of the community. 
2. Precedent and justification 
Although my interpretation of §224 surely appears conten-
tious to many, it should become clear by the end of this 
section that in fact it jibes with the traditional reading. I find 
in §241 the cue to the traditional interpretation of “agree-
ment” in §224: 
 
[Human beings] agree in the language they use. 
That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. 
Lebensform is a rich and profound philosophical concept 
that does not reduce to the preferences and beliefs (to the 
opinions) held in a community. Still, I claim that the notion 
of Lebensform is related to the Lewisian picture of conven-
tional behavior and that preferences and beliefs in the 
community in fact spring from it. 
Precedent lies at bedrock, where the spade is 
turned (§ 217) and one acts blindly (§ 219) conforming to 
the convention and obeying the rule. Without reliance on 
precedent, no conventional strategic interaction in the 
sense of Lewis is possible and, as I have argued in the 
previous section, without strategic interaction the 
community is in no better position than the individual is in 
determining which course of action is in accord with the 
rule. Indeed, as Margaret Gilbert tersely points out in 
(Gilbert 1990), in Lewis’s account of convention practical 
rationality does not yield any justification to act in 
conformity to precedent. She argues that, on the contrary, 
conformative action is blind in the Wittgensteinean sense. 
Consider the two person case: Given their conditional 
preference, one is justified in conforming if she believes 
that the other will conform. But the other will be justified in 
conforming if he believes that the first individual will. Thus, 
she will be justified if she believes that he believes that she 
will, and so on. In the endless replication of each other’s 
reasoning, at no point anyone will come to have sufficient 
reason to conform. 
I have argued elsewhere (Sillari 2005, 2008) that in 
fact precedent gives rise to the series of replications about 
hypothetical future conformity, which, in turn, inductively 
ground for both individuals the first-order belief that the 
other will conform. There is no deductive, infallible 
passage from past to future conformity. There rather is a 
causal, inductive one (cf. the interlocutor in §198: “[…] 
What sort of connexion is there [between the expression of 
a rule and my actions]?—Well perhaps this one: I have 
been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and 
now I do so react to it.[—]But that is only to give a causal 
connexion […]”) Wittgenstein speaks of “blind action”, 
Gilbert speaks of an “a-rational tendency”. For (McDowell 
1984), understanding is “precarious and contingent”, in 
that there is no guarantee that my grasping a concept will 
continue working tomorrow as well. No strong, logical, 
deductive nexus is to be found between precedent and 
future conformity. Rather, the relation between precedent 
and future conformity lies at bedrock, as pointed out in 
§481: 
 
If anyone said that information about the past could 
not convince him that something would happen in 
the future, I should not understand him. […] If these 
are not grounds, then what are grounds? 
As flimsy as the relation might be, we all endorse it since, 
as the traditional interpretation of §224 indicates, we all 
share an agreement in Lebensform. Our systems of con-
cordant beliefs about each other conformity stem (albeit 
not deductively) from such a fundamental agreement. In 
turn, from our concordant beliefs and conditional prefer-
ences stem our conventions and customs, and hence our 
capacity to obey or to go against a rule. 
The game-theoretic analysis of rule-following 
reveals that preferences and beliefs of community 
members strategically determine what course of action is 
in accord with the rule. The formation of beliefs, however, 
is a bedrock notion. Can a game-theoretic analysis help us 
reduce the phenomenon of rule-following any further? It is 
well known that Wittgenstein invites us not to dig under 
bedrock. To ask whether it is possible, and how it may be 
done, I finally tackle the issue of the relation between 
meaning and rule-following and turn to the final section of 
this contribution. 
3. Meaning and rule-following 
In this section I focus on meaning by looking at a special 
case of coordination problems involving communication. 
Rather than attacking the question of meaning in language 
(a question that lies well beyond the scope of this note) I 
will look at the simpler case of meaning in signaling sys-
tems (cf. Lewis 1969). Signaling systems are a special 
case of coordination problems. In a signaling game certain 
actions (performed by the audience) correspond to certain 
states of the world (observed by the speaker.) The speaker 
sends a signal depending on what state of the world she 
observes. The audience performs a certain action depend-
ing on what signal she receives. Both speaker and audi-
ence prefer that the action corresponding to the actual 
state of the world be performed. For that to happen, they 
need to coordinate their strategies (which for the speaker 
are functions linking states to signals for the speaker, while 
they are functions linking signals to actions for the audi-
ence.) When coordination is achieved, then, a signal may 
assume the indicative meaning that “the state of the world 
is such-and-such” or the imperative meaning “perform 
such-and-such action!” depending on further characteris-
tics of the situation that need not concern us here. The 
relevant point is that signaling problems are a special kind 
of coordination problems. 
The builder-assistant language-game of §2 is a 
clear example of a signaling game that one surmises 
Lewis might have had it in mind when characterizing the 
class of signaling games: The builder is the speaker. She 
observes, for instance, the state of the world in which she 
needs a slab and she sends the signal “Slab!”. The 
assistant is the audience. He receives, in this example, the 
signal “Slab!” and performs the action of bringing a slab. 
The caveat issued in the opening section of this paper can 
now be lifted. If rule-following is conventional action, then 
meaning, as the by-product of conventional action 
(signaling) is a special case of rule-following. 
In the case of linguistic coordination, the skeptical 
paradox can be understood as an instance of the problem 
of indeterminacy of meaning. David Lewis, in Convention 
(cf. pp.199-200) as well as in later works, has tackled the 
problem. In particular, in (Lewis 1992) he confronts 
“Kripkenstein’s challenge (formerly Goodman’s challenge)” 
(p. 109) and argues that for sentences never uttered 
before, the rules governing the used fragment of the 
language determine the rules for the unused portion, too. 
The argument is that they do so because although 
extrapolation from used fragment to unused portion is 
“radically underdetermined”, only a minority of 
extrapolations are straight—and acceptable—while the 
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vast majority are bent: gruesome, gerrymandered—and 
disposable. The argument carries over also to the 
extrapolations we all perform daily from precedent to 
current use. “Straightness” of extrapolation, or of grammar, 
is a bedrock notion, on which we all agree. Lewis warns us 
that digging under bedrock—analyzing straightness of 
extrapolation—cannot be a linguistic enterprise, since our 
use of language depends on it in the first place. Digging 
under bedrock points, therefore, to the ontological 
distinction between properties that are natural and 
properties that are not.  
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Science and the Art of Language Maintenance 
Deirdre C.P. Smith, Bergen, Norway 
1. Classical vs. romantic understanding 
In one of many reflections about John, who with his wife 
Sylvia join the I character and his son Chris for the first half 
of a motorcycle trip from the Midwest to Montana, the I 
character comments, “He [John] isn’t so interested in what 
things mean as in what they are.” (p. 59). Here Pirsig’s I 
character intimates a distinction between ‘classical’ and 
the ‘romantic’ modes of seeing the world. The classical 
mode is to see what things ‘mean’, their underlying 
form/structure. The romantic mode is to see the immediate 
surface/appearance of things, what they ‘are’. When the I 
character suggests using part of an aluminum can to ‘shim’ 
John’s handlebars so they stop slipping, John is doubtful. 
John sees an old aluminum can and is seemingly dis-
tressed by using something so base to fix his precision 
piece of German engineering (a BMW). He sees the sur-
face, what it is. The I character sees beyond the surface to 
the properties of aluminum, how well they fit the particular 
demands of a shim (soft, non-rusting), and the appropriate 
thickness of the can’s aluminum. (p.61) The problem, Pir-
sig’s I character concludes, is conflicting “visions of reality”.  
 
“What you’ve got here, really, are two realities, one 
of immediate artistic appearance and one of under-
lying scientific explanation, and they don’t match 
and they don’t fit and they don’t really have much of 
anything to do with one another.” (p.63) 
Both modes of understanding have faults. The I character 
notes that John romantically misunderstands what motor-
cycle maintenance entails. John thinks maintenance is 
working with hard steel parts in an array of shapes and 
sizes. The I character sees ideas and a working on con-
cepts. (p. 102) In short, “That’s all a motorcycle is, a sys-
tem of concepts worked out in steel. There’s no part in it, 
no shape in it, that is not out of someone’s mind […].” (p. 
104) That said for the classical view, it has its own share of 
problems. The first is that understanding e.g. a motorcycle 
from this view presupposes already knowing how it works 
(the underlying system of concepts). Another difficulty is 
the absence of an observer, a subject, someone who 
rides, appreciates or tells stories about the cycle. A third 
limitation is that it only deals with facts, absent are value 
judgments of ‘good’ and/or ‘bad’. And, a final objection, 
perhaps the most important in relation to classical under-
standing’s own claims, is its cutting edge, what he calls its 
“intellectual scalpel: “You get the illusion that all those 
parts are just there and are being named as they exist. But 
they can be named quite differently and organized quite 
differently depending on how the knife moves.” (p. 80) And 
here Pirsig is on to something, how do we decide when 
and in what direction to cut? 
2. Polanyi’s scientific intuition and belief 
Deciding which direction to cut is a question Michael Po-
lanyi was interested in exploring. In Science, Faith and 
Society, he uses the analogy of a burglar in the night. If in 
the middle of the night we hear a noise, a thumping about, 
in a neighbouring room we know to be unoccupied, we 
search for an explanation. Is the family cat going after 
something dangling just out of reach? Has an unlatched 
window been caught by the wind? Polanyi writes, “We try 
to guess. Was that a footfall? That means a burglar!”. (p. 
23) Presented with an array of ‘facts’ we swing the blade of 
our intellect in one direction instead of another. Just as a 
motorcycle can be classified according to different 
schemes (making a ‘part’ difficult to order because differ-
ent motorcycle manufacturers have different motorcycle 
mereologies), for Polanyi,  
 
“scientific propositions do not refer definitely to any 
observable facts but are like statements about the 
presence of a burglar next door—describing some-
thing real which may manifest itself in many indefi-
nite ways.” (p. 29)  
Although it shows a less demanding level of certainty than 
one might expect, the burglar scenario does show “a con-
sistent effort at guessing”. (p. 23)  
One source for this consistency Polanyi terms 
“scientific intuition”, a kind of ‘Gestalt’ we have for 
perceiving contours, arising from an underlying “urge to 
make contact with a reality which is felt to be there already 
to start with”. (p. 35) Another source he offers is found in 
our practices, systems of belief and their embeddedness in 
language. Here Polanyi draws from the work of social 
anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard on the Zande tribe of 
Southern Sudan. When conflicts arise amongst the Zande 
they consult a poison oracle, which consists in 
administering a substance, Benge, to a foul. Both the way 
in which Benge is collected and the address given when it 
is administered are elements crucial to its proper 
functioning as an oracle-poison and it is to these the 
Zande turn for explanation when discrepancies in the 
oracle’s answers arise, rather than to the matter-of-fact 
poisonness of the Benge itself as a European might. For 
Polanyi, Zande witchcraft exemplifies the power a system 
of belief has in determining the outcome of the oracle-
poison and further, “the power of language to embody and 
firmly to uphold a system of not explicitly asserted beliefs”. 
(Polanyi 1952) Here Polanyi concludes:  
 
“So long as we use a certain language, all questions 
that we can ask will have to be formulated in it and 
will thereby confirm the theory of the universe which 
is implied in the vocabulary and structure of the lan-
guage.” (Polanyi 1952)  
Thus for Polanyi, scientific intuition and the system of be-
lief embedded in language are decisive for determining 
which way our intellectual scalpel cuts. 
3. E.M. Forester on anonymity  
Forester writes that “words have two functions to perform: 
they give information or they create an atmosphere.”(p.77) 
His arch example of information is a sign reading “Stop” on 
a tramline. This is an example of pure information. If the 
tram stops, the sign is correct, if it does not, the sign is 
incorrect. A sign in a marketplace reading “Beware of pick-
pockets, male and female.”, however, conjures up Dicken-
sonian images of children having their sweets money sto-
len, old men being hustled and women unawares having 
patches deftly snipped from the backs of their fur coats. It 
produces in us a feeling of foreboding and reminds us of 
any number of things such as the insecurity and fragility of 
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human life, the violent condition of the poor vs. the oblivi-
ousness of the rich, etc., i.e. an atmosphere in addition to 
the information it conveys. Although the beware pickpock-
ets sign is not great literature, for Forester the atmosphere 
it creates is the realm of great literature. Although great 
literature may contain information, e.g. Zen and the Art of 
Motorcycle Maintenance about motorcycles, it is insuffi-
cient to be successfully applied by us to actually repair a 
motorcycle (Pirsig even says so in his author’s note). So 
what is atmosphere and how do we gauge its usefulness? 
Atmosphere stems not from something conveyed through 
particular words, but in their arrangement, their style. In 
this lies their power to elicit dread, mirth and calm, possibly 
even simultaneously. The realm of atmosphere is one that 
“answers to its own laws, supports itself, internally co-
heres, and has a new standard of truth.”(p. 81) The truth of 
information is its accuracy, the truth of a poem whether it 
“hangs together”. (p. 81) “Information points to something 
else. A poem points to nothing but itself. Information is 
relative. A poem is absolute.” (p.81) 
Just as words have two functions, for Forster “each 
human mind has two personalities, one on the surface, 
one deeper down”. (p. 82) The surface personality “has a 
name” such as Robert Pirsig. It is this personality that lives 
in the world, has idiosyncratic habits, relationships, trials 
and tribulations of the everyday variety. The other, is trick-
ier to pin down, for it has no name and its depths are a 
ground spring running through the deep personalities of 
the Pirsigs and Dickenses of this world. It is something 
general to all humans and inspires works general and ac-
cessible to all and often across time. And in this lies the 
anonymity of great literature: “The poet wrote the poem, no 
doubt, but he forgot himself while he wrote it, and we for-
get him while we read.” (p. 83). For Forster a signature 
belongs to the world of information, to the surface person-
ality. The anonymity of great literature belongs to the realm 
of atmosphere, to deep personality. 
4. Wittgenstein, the Life of Words and the 
Literariness of Language  
In the end, the sanity of Pirsig’s I character follows suite 
with the ghost of his previous self. Although Wittgenstein 
does not write much about insanity, some well know 
phrases from Philosophical Investigations about searching 
for hidden essences can be taken as a case in point, such 
as being on slippery ice with no friction (§107) in relation to 
the sublimity of logic and reaching a point when one’s 
spade is turned (§217) in relation to the regress of rule-
following. When Phaedrus continued digging even after his 
spade reached bedrock, he lost friction with reality and 
went spinning away from instead of toward it. Both Pirsig’s 
I character, Polanyi and Forster each in their own fashion 
partake of this error of classical understandings ‘depth’ 
thinking, that meaning itself or its generation are some-
thing that come from inside of us: the I character for hold-
ing that the motorcycle is ‘a system of concepts’ that ‘is 
primarily a mental phenomenon’, the underlying gestalt 
urge of Polanyi’s scientific intuition, and Forester’s depth 
personality as the source of literary anonymity. However, 
they each offer something I think not only in line with Witt-
genstein’s linguistic turn on rationality but can help to illus-
trate it.  
If we are to carry a lesson regarding language and 
reality from Pirsig’s novel, a hands-on metaphor of 
‘tinkering’ is where the I character successfully overcame 
the classical/romantic split he saw in understanding. Yet 
on the scale of language as a whole, tinkering has its 
limits. When confronted with Zande witchcraft, no slight 
adjustment or honing of their intellectual scalpel will lead 
westerners to accept the judgment of the poison oracle. It 
will simply not cut that way due to its mode of fabrication. 
We would need a different scalpel or an altogether 
different instrument to be at one with the Zande’s 
conceptions of the world. But does this not imply that we 
can neither redirect nor expand our rationality? 
This is where Forster’s information – atmosphere 
continuum and connecting anonymity to atmosphere are 
illustrative. I hope the reader can agree that language 
conveys information and atmosphere. Wittgenstein’s 
arguments against private language are in part a defense 
of it also requiring anonymity. Yet we saw above that an 
objection to classical understanding was the lack of a 
subject. Forster’s solution was an internal ‘ur’ subject 
running through us all which finds its expression in 
atmosphere. For Wittgenstein the kind of anonymity we 
find in language comes neither through a depth 
personality, nor a special place where words live in the 
mind. Even though Virginia Woolf in her essay 
“Craftsmanship” claims the later, she also writes the 
following which I think approaches Wittgenstein’s view: 
 
“Words, English words, are full of echoes, of memo-
ries, of associations–naturally. They have been out 
and about, on people’s lips, in their houses, in the 
streets, in the fields, for so many centuries. And that 
is one of the chief difficulties in writing them to-
day—that they are so stored with meanings, with 
memories, that they have contracted so many fa-
mous marriages.” (p. 131) 
Earlier in this essay Woolf writes regarding the ‘usefulness’ 
of words. Making a word useful is to give it a single mean-
ing. Forcing words to be useful is a problem. Doing so 
causes them to mislead us since “it is their nature not to 
express one simple statement but a thousand possibili-
ties.” (p. 127) Put another way, language at the pure in-
formation end of Forster’s continuum conveys neither ac-
curate nor inaccurate information since it is stripped of the 
use generated atmosphere against which accuracy could 
be determined; even a tram “Stop.” sign has atmosphere.  
The linguistic turn of Wittgenstein’s redirection of 
rationality is akin to Forster’s atmosphere and Woolf’s 
depiction of the life of words. Pirsig’s I character makes the 
mistake of attributing this multifarious character of words to 
a mental instrument unlimited in the directions it can cut. It 
is rather the case that we can divide things up differently 
because words, our concepts, do not have single 
meanings. Philosophy which carves concepts intellectually 
or claims they can or should have such single meanings 
goes wrong. Yes, we must know the system, only that the 
system we need to know to ‘tinker’ in language, as Polyani 
recognized, is neither explicit nor explicable hierarchically, 
we must live it. Concepts are anonymous, but not in the 
logical or scientific fashion of generality/universality. 
Meaning is on the surface but, although it sounds strange, 
deeply there, i.e. over time. Although this kind of meaning 
is anonymous, it is not stripped of the subject like classical 
understanding, and therefore, not of value judgments. 
Subjects are vehicles for the reproduction of language and 
in their use of words and phrases tinker with and fine tune 
it. Although we can use language like the poet, forgetting 
ourselves, and the listener hear our words as general not 
subjective statements, we are not being poetic, we are 
simply using words conventionally. But the convention 
came from somewhere and this is where the subject and 
their idiosyncratic position in the world can make a lasting 
contribution.  
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The thoughts in this paper are born of discussions this 
spring with Ralph Jewell, Helle Nyvold and Christian Erba-
cher on Wittgenstein and literature; the notion of ‘tinkering’ 
comes from Jewell’s reading of Pirsig. 
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A Division in Mind. The Misconceived Distinction between  
Psychological and Phenomenal Properties 
Matthias Stefan, Innsbruck, Austria 
1. Chalmers’ division of mind 
According to David Chalmers (Chalmers 1996, 11-13) 
there are psychological and phenomenal concepts of the 
mind. The phenomenal concept of mind expresses that 
there is something it is like to be in a certain mental state. 
The psychological concept of mind is “the concept of mind 
as the causal or explanatory basis for behaviour. A state is 
mental in this sense if it plays the right sort of causal role in 
the production of behaviour [...]” (Chalmers 1996, 11). In 
other words, our mental life can be divided into an aspect 
of the way it feels like to be in that state and into an aspect 
of the role it plays for our behaviour. So far, this distinction 
is conceptual (Chalmers 1996, 12).  
Soon, however, this conceptual distinction turns into 
an ontological one about phenomenal and psychological 
properties (e.g. Chalmers 1996, 16, 22-24). Chalmers sees 
this ontological distinction as exhaustive: Every mental 
property is either a psychological or a phenomenal 
property, though most mental concepts encompass both 
components (Chalmers 1996, 16-17). Take, for instance, 
pain: Pain can be analysed as phenomenal and 
psychological property: The phenomenal one describes 
the way it feels like to be in pain, the pain-experience so to 
say. The psychological property can be identified with the 
pain-behaviour and the accompanied beliefs, desires and 
more. Though according to Chalmers there is a real 
distinction between these kinds of properties, there is also 
a co-occurrence of them (Chalmers 1996, 22). 
Nevertheless, these two properties must be distinguished, 
since there are two explananda. Phenomenal properties 
cannot be defined in functional terms and psychological 
properties are not phenomenal. Therefore, we can imagine 
situations where a phenomenal property is instantiated 
without a psychological property – and vice versa 
(Chalmers 1996, 23). 
A crucial result of the ontological division between 
psychological and phenomenal properties is an 
epistemological division in philosophy of mind: “The 
division of mental properties into phenomenal and 
psychological properties has the effect of dividing the 
mind-body problem into two: an easy part and a hard part.” 
(Chalmers 1996, 24) The easy problem concerns 
psychological properties. As they are definable in 
functional terms, they do not really pose a hard problem for 
cognitive science. Science can explain the psychological 
property with the underlying physical mechanism that plays 
the pertinent causal role (ibid.). So the explanation of 
psychological properties “is a question for the sciences of 
physical systems. One simply needs to tell a story about 
the organization of the physical system that allows it to 
react to environmental stimulations and produce behaviour 
in the appropriate sorts of ways.” (ibid.) Of course, the 
easy problem is only relatively easy, as there remain 
considerable difficulties. However, we know in principle 
how to solve it, how to explain believes, desires, wishes, 
memory, etc. This is not true in case of the hard problem 
concerning phenomenal properties. We don’t know why 
and how psychological functions are accompanied with 
phenomenal states (Chalmers 1996, 25). The explanatory 
gap Levine famously stated some time ago is as wide 
open as ever (Levine 1983). We have no idea why it is 
something it is like to be in a mental state. Chalmers 
therefore writes: “As we saw above, we now have a pretty 
good idea of how a physical system can have 
psychological properties: the psychological mind-body 
problem has been dissolved. What remains is the question 
of why and how these psychological properties are 
accompanied by phenomenal properties […]” (Chalmers 
1996, 25).  
2. Kim’s approximation to physicalism 
Jaegwon Kim adopts Chalmers distinction for reaching an 
interpretation of reality near enough to physicalism (Kim 
2005). Kim declares himself a physicalist: The world we 
live in is physical and so are the human person and her 
mind. Without going into details why the mental realm has 
to be physical, I concentrate on Kim's view how it is. 
According to Kim mental states are identical with 
physical states. The relation of reduction that 
demonstrates this identity relation is functional reduction: 
As the term says, the first step in functional reduction is to 
define the reducible property functionally. Kim brings the 
well-known example of a gene that is defined as “a 
mechanism that encodes and transmits genetic 
information” (Kim 2005, 101). Once we have found a 
definition in terms of the causal role a property plays, we 
can look for the “causal realizer”, that is the property in the 
reduction base that plays the demanded functional role. To 
continue the example given above, it turns out that DNA 
performs the mechanism that defines the concept of a 
gene. In the last step of functional reduction, a theory has 
to be given that explains “how the realizers of the property 
being reduced manage to perform the causal task” (ibid.). 
In case of the gene example, molecular biology provides 
the explanation demanded. 
In asking whether the mental realm is reducible to 
the physical, Kim refers to Chalmers’ distinction between 
psychological and phenomenal properties (Kim 2005, 
162). As shown, for reducing something it first needs to be 
defined in functional terms. Therefore the question 
whether mental properties can be reduced comes up to 
the question which properties can be functionalized (Kim 
2005, 165). Kim adopts Chalmers’ proposal that 
psychological properties, called cognitive properties by 
Kim, can be explained by cognitive science, which is the 
same for Kim as to reduce them (see Kim 2005, 108-112 
and 162). Thus, they can be identified with causal realizers 
in the physical basis (Kim 2005, 165). Even though we 
might not find full causal definitions of psychological 
properties, it is safe to say that they are identical with 
physical states (Kim 2005, 167). 
Furthermore, Kim and Chalmers also agree on the 
irreducibility of phenomenal properties, or qualia (the 
classic term Kim uses). Phenomenal properties are not 
definable by their causal role and therefore cannot be 
functionally reduced: “So qualia are not functionalizable, 
and hence physically irreducible. Qualia, therefore, are the 
‘mental residue’ that cannot be accommodated within the 
physical domain.” (Kim 2005, 170) Kim takes stock: Almost 
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all parts of the mental realm are reducible to entities in the 
physical realm (Kim 2005, 170-171). As there only remains 
a small epiphenomenal residue, according to Kim, we 
have got something near enough to physicalism (Kim 
2005, 174). 
3. The division reconsidered  
I want to reconsider this distinction between psychological 
and phenomenal properties. I argue that this distinction 
circumvents appropriate understanding and explaining 
human behaviour and cognitive capacities. There seems 
to be a fatal flaw in distinguishing between properties that 
play a causal role and those that are just raw feelings. 
To start with, I cannot find proper arguments 
Chalmers and Kim allege for the posed distinction. It rather 
seems they take the distinction between phenomenal and 
psychological properties for granted. Arguments such as 
the argument from qualia inversion (Kim 2005, 169-170) or 
from zombies (Chalmers 1996, e.g. 94-99) are no 
arguments for the distinction itself, but rather presuppose 
it. To make it conceivable that there could be zombies, 
acting like us but feeling nothing, and that there could be 
inverted qualia, you feeling pain and me feeling itching but 
both acting the same, one needs to already have accepted 
the presupposed distinction between phenomenal and 
psychological properties. In order to agree with such 
scenarios one has to accept what is at question here. 
What is there of the presupposed distinction between 
phenomenal and psychological properties? Why should we 
show pain-behaviour, if there was nothing like the feeling 
of pain itself? Or why should we show pain behaviour, if 
there was the feeling of desperation?  
I want to argue against this distinction with two 
arguments: First, in explaining human behaviour we have 
to refer to the phenomenal aspect. Second, human 
cognitive capacities can only be understood properly if the 
distinction in question is given up. 
First argument: It seems wrong to claim, as 
Chalmers and Kim do, that we can explain human 
behaviour appropriately if we only refer to psychological 
properties leaving out what it's like to be in those states. 
According to them, the concept of pain, for instance, refers 
to two kinds of properties: There is a property involved that 
is caused by tissue damage, for instance, and causes pain 
behaviour, certain believes, desires etc. This psychological 
property can be identified with some physical state. Every 
time this property is instantiated there also occurs a 
second property (Chalmers 1996, 17), namely the pain-feel 
that has no causal effects whatsoever. This view on the 
matter, however, is highly artificial. In case of machines 
this assumption might be true. We can explain the 
behaviour of machines in purely psychological terms, i.e. 
by pointing out the physical mechanisms that are activated 
by certain causes and having themselves a causal role. 
Explaining why a robot is behaving the way he does, it 
suffices to point out the causal mechanism that underlies 
its behaviour. 
In case of humans however, we cannot 
understandably explain her behaviour by simply pointing at 
purely psychological properties and leaving out what it's 
like to be in a certain state. We act because of the pain-
feeling, instead of it being some unnecessary adjunct. If 
the feeling of pain did not occur, pain-behaviour also 
wouldn’t. The crucial point is that we would not understand 
why someone behaves the way she does, if we do not 
account for her phenomenal feeling. To give another 
example, we would not understand why a cheated 
husband behaves the way he does in presence of the 
adulterer if we leave out his hate, frustration and jealousy. 
His actions are only comprehensible by knowing what its 
like to be jealous and hating someone. According to Kim 
and Chalmers, in contrast, the poor husband's behaviour 
would be explained by a psychological property and 
therefore ultimately by a physical mechanism: He behaves 
the way he does because there is a causal mechanism 
going on in his physical system. Within such a framework, 
however, rational understanding of human behaviour is 
made impossible. Leaving out what it's like is nothing short 
of obstructing the understanding of human behaviour and 
actions. This is not to claim that we act as we do because 
of the phenomenal feeling instead of the intentional states. 
Rather, in case of humans, there is no distinction here. 
This should become clear if we contrast human 
behaviour with the behaviour of machines. In case of 
machines we understand why they behave the way they 
do if we know what kind of mechanism is at work. In case 
of humans, however, there is a totally different way of 
understanding. We give up rational understanding another 
human person's behaviour if we overlook what it's like for 
someone to be in that state. There might be resemblance 
to human behaviour when a machine reacts in a way that 
is similar to pain behaviour. In fact, however, two different 
things are going on, namely human pain behaviour on the 
one hand and purely mechanical reactions resembling 
pain behaviour on the other. If we talk about “machine 
behaviour”, we are using the concept of behaviour in an 
equivocal way. 
Second argument: Jonathan Lowe criticizes 
Chalmers because he cannot explain human cognitive 
capacities appropriately (Lowe 1995). According to Lowe 
to understand (most) human cognitive capacities one has 
to consider its phenomenal part. Describing the abilities to 
discriminate, categorize, react to the environment, etc. in 
purely functional terms can only explain phenomena 
occurring in case of machines. Explaining machine 
behaviour this way, however, is trivial (Lowe 1995, 270). 
Lowe gives the example of experience to show that 
one cannot distinguish between phenomenal properties 
with no causal role and a psychological mechanism that 
properly explains representation. Experience is not just a 
phenomenal property occurring in case of representing the 
environment. Rather the representation itself is a 
phenomenal representation: “Not only is it ‘like something’ 
to enjoy such an experience, in which the phenomenal 
character of sensed colours impresses itself upon our 
awareness, but also such an experience represents – or, 
better, presents – our immediate physical environment as 
being some way” (ibid.). Representing spatial facts, for 
instance, such as the height of a plain, its shape, etc., is 
always phenomenal representation. So the intentional and 
conceptual content of experience is intimately tied to the 
phenomenal aspect of representation: “The importance of 
all this lies in the fact that how we conceive of physical 
objects is inextricably bound up with how they appear to us 
in perception” (Lowe 1995, 268). If Chalmers and Kim 
define human representation as psychological properties 
and therefore in purely functional terms, they oversee that 
human representation is always given in a certain 
phenomenal way. A purely functional description of 
environmental representation might be appropriate for 
information processing, storage and retrieval of machines, 
but it is not appropriate in the case of humans. 
The example of experience shows that in human 
mind the phenomenal and the intentional aspect are not 
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divisible. There are enough examples in human cognition 
and behaviour that show that the distinction between 
phenomenal and psychological properties is wrong in case 
of human beings. To explain machine behaviour in purely 
functional terms is trivial. But only because such behaviour 
can be explained by the underlying mechanism doesn’t 
mean that this is also true in case of humans. Talking 
about functional explanation of machine behaviour is 
simply to change the subject. In case of humans, I 
therefore conclude, Chalmers’ and Kim’s division of the 
mental cannot be applied. 
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Scepticism, Wittgenstein's Hinge Propositions,  
and Common Ground 
Erik Stei, Mainz, Germany 
1. Introduction 
Traditionally, systematic scepticism states that knowing a 
contingent proposition p, e. g., that I have hands, entails 
that I know the denial of a sceptical hypothesis (sh), e. g., 
that I am a brain in a vat. Because sh is usually formulated 
in a way that apparently makes it impossible for me to 
know its denial on basis of my evidence, it seems as if I do 
not know p. More formally, the sceptical argument looks 
like this1: 
 
(1) a. K(S, p) → K(S, ¬sh) 
   b. ¬K(S, ¬sh) 
   c. ¬K(S, p) 
The notorious Moorean response is to make the sceptical 
modus tollens a modus ponens by affirming the antece-
dent of (1a) in the second step of the inference, concluding 
K(S, ¬sh). Effectively, if we want to maintain epistemic 
closure, (1b) seems to be the crucial step. However, which 
premise we assume—K(S, p) or ¬K(S, ¬sh)—certainly 
needs some further justification. The problem is that in an 
epistemology classroom the sceptic’s story sounds just as 
plausible as our ordinary knowledge-claims, which seems 
to leave us in an epistemically underdetermined situation. 
However, I follow Williams’s (2003) conjecture that 
the justification of either of the two propositions depends 
(at least in part) on the question which other propositions 
we (tacitly) accept in a given context. It is Wittgenstein’s 
notion of hinge propositions that underpins this thought. 
2. Hinge propositions 
The metaphor of hinges (HP) goes back to a famous para-
graph in On Certainty, in which it is employed to illustrate 
the necessity of accepting certain propositions in order to 
make sense of doubting others: 
 
“That is to say, the questions that we raise and our 
doubts depend on the fact that some propositions 
are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on 
which those turn.” 
(Wittgenstein 1984: 186 – § 341)2 
Thus if “I make an experiment I do not doubt the existence 
of the apparatus before my eyes. I have plenty of doubts, 
but not that” (Wittgenstein 1984: 185). This, however, does 
not mean that there is a rigid set of self-evident proposi-
tions, i. e., Wittgenstein does not advocate a strictly foun-
dationalist conception of justification. This is quite obvious 
in the following paragraph: 
 
                                                     
 
1 Where knowledge is symbolized by a two-place relation K, taking an epis-
temic subject S and a proposition (p or sh) as arguments. I will disregard time 
in this paper. 
2 Translation of Wittgenstein quotes by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, 
as found on http://budni.by.ru/oncertainty.html on March, 20th, 2008 
“But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t 
investigate everything, and for that reason we are 
forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the 
door to turn, the hinges must stay put.” 
(Wittgenstein 1984: 187 – § 343) 
Now, how could these ideas help us with respect to the 
sceptical problem? A first rough answer is that i) which 
proposition we are justified in assuming as our second 
premise (1b) depends on certain HP and that ii) these HP 
in turn depend on the inquiry we are interested in. Thus, 
Wittgenstein’s remarks seem to support the idea that a 
given knowledge claim might vary in truth value, depend-
ing on which HP we accept in a conversational context or 
in certain circumstances of evaluation.3 If this is correct, 
then using the notion of HP might strengthen the thesis 
that knowledge claims are sensitive to contextual factors in 
a wider sense. 
3. Sceptical Presuppositions 
Before going on, let me briefly sketch another important 
feature of this view. One dubious point often made in fa-
vour of the sceptic is the Cartesian claim that scepticism 
operates in some kind of neutral context and does not rely 
on any axioms or assumptions. If this were true then the 
sceptic would in fact be in a privileged position. However, 
Williams 2007 offers many arguments for the point that this 
claim is in fact a platitude, arguing that scepticism does 
indeed depend on certain assumptions or HP. Many phi-
losophers from quite a diverse range of positions seem to 
share at least the spirit of this view. From a methodological 
point of view, Timothy Williamson highlights that “the scep-
tic relies uncritically on rules of dialectical engagement 
(…), without questioning their appropriateness to the radi-
cal questions which scepticism raises” (Williamson 2000: 
188). Another point, addressed by Barry Stroud (Stroud 
2000), could be the (traditional) philosopher’s wish to give 
a completely general account of knowledge. However, 
even if this general kind of knowledge is not available to us 
it does not follow that we cannot have any more specific 
kind of knowledge. Still another presupposition of the 
sceptic is that our perceptions are independent of how the 
world really is and that the meanings we assign to words 
and propositions are in our heads only. It is due to this 
internalist worry that scepticism seems so convincing, but 
that is no reason for accepting it. There is of course much 
more to be said on this topic, but let me adhere without 
further argument, relying on Wittgenstein, that there must 
be something the sceptic takes for granted in order to 
make sense of her worries in the first place. 
Obviously, this analysis only transfers the problem 
of underdeterminacy to a meta-level. To see this, let us 
grant for the moment that according to the above picture 
the justification for assuming, say, (1b) is that it can be 
derived from a set of HP operative in a given context. We 
                                                     
 
3 I am deliberately vague on the mechanisms yielding the truth-value of 
knowledge claims as I do not want to enter the debate between Contextualism 
and Subject Sensitive Invariantism. What is important here, however, is that 
both views hold that a given knowledge claim can vary in truth-value. 
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could then deduce (1c) and conclude that S does not know 
any ordinary proposition p. In another context, different HP 
might be taken for granted that are consistent with K(S, p) 
but not with some of the sceptic’s presuppositions outlined 
above. Then (1) would allow us to infer that S knows the 
denial of the sceptical hypothesis. Note, however, that 
even if the sceptic relies on certain HP this is not enough 
to give a direct argument against her. But it is enough to 
restrict the devastating impact on our ordinary knowledge 
claims to contexts in which sceptical HP hold. This is one 
way to make sense of the conjecture that the truth of a 
given knowledge claim can vary with context. 
A point that needs more work is avoiding the 
account to over generate. So far it seems as if any 
knowledge claim could be justified, given that certain HP 
hold, as absurd as they may be. So we need a mechanism 
that i) restricts the admissible HP and that ii) can bridge 
the gap between internal factors like taking something for 
granted and the external factors that allow for the 
implication K(S, p) → p, i. e., the factivity of knowledge. An 
additional externalist conception of justification could solve 
both of these problems. Consider, for the sake of 
illustration, a reliabilist account that incorporates the 
methods by which we form our beliefs about certain 
propositions. This would avoid not only fancyful HP as 
these would be analogous to unreliable methods, but also 
Gettier cases. It would have the further merit of allowing for 
fallibility, as a method of forming beliefs that we thought 
trustworthy might turn out to be false. In the spirit of the 
experiment-example in § 2: Future investigation might 
reveal that the apparatus we used is not as precise as we 
took it to be or even that it does not measure what we 
thought it did. Even though some of the beliefs we based 
on the data the apparatus delivered were in fact true, we 
would no longer consider them as known due to the 
unreliable process by which we formed our belief in them. 
However, nothing hinges on this specific epistemological 
account. The notion of HP is fairly neutral to other 
externalist suggestions. 
4. Conversational mechanisms 
The analysis sketched so far did not address the conversa-
tional application of different HP. One possibility to sys-
tematize the account seems to be the incorporation of a 
Stalnaker-style notion of common ground. The definition is 
as follows: 
 
“It is common ground that Φ in a group if all mem-
bers accept (for the purpose of the conversation) 
that Φ, and all believe that all accept that Φ, and all 
believe that all believe that all accept that Φ, etc.” 
(Stalnaker 2002: 716) 
Acceptance, following Stalnaker, is a propositional attitude 
as well as a methodological stance toward a proposition. 
To accept some proposition Φ is to treat it as true and to 
“ignore, at least temporarily, and perhaps in a limited con-
text, the possibility that it is false” (Stalnaker 2002: 716). 
Applying this idea to the position developed in § 3, this 
means, roughly, that we accept some proposition Φ as true 
in a context C1 in order to undertake a reasonable investi-
gation I1. Given Φ is an essential presupposition in C1, 
then in case we doubt Φ, this shifts the context as well as 
the investigation we are interested in to I2 in C2.4 Thus, 
                                                     
 
4 Stalnaker does not mention context shifts, but only context changes, that 
decrease the set of possible worlds under consideration. I distinguish context-
what depends on contextual factors is the question which 
propositions we are willing to accept as given and thus 
where to stop the regress of justification. The connection I 
propose is that HP determine, at least in part, which 
propositions we are willing to accept. 
In standard cases, conversational contexts are 
dynamic in such a way that they are constantly extended 
by the incorporation of new information—this is a central 
feature of communication and not an instance of context 
shifts. It is captured by the notion of accommodation, 
which can be illustrated by the following example. Imagine 
a conversation between Alice and Bob, where Alice utters: 
 
(2) I can’t come to the meeting – I have to pick up 
my sister at the airport. 
Given that Alice is a competent speaker of English and 
also that the basic pragmatic mechanisms, e. g., a 
Gricean-style Cooperative Principle and some conversa-
tional maxims (Grice 1989), are at work, Bob can infer 
from (2) that Alice believes that it is common belief that 
she has a sister. The latter now common belief (as Bob 
believes it as well after Alice’s utterance of (2)) leads Bob 
to belief that Alice has a sister, which makes Alice’s having 
a sister common belief in the context at issue (cf. Stalnaker 
2002: 709-710). If Bob and Alice are discussing the ques-
tion who is going to the meeting next Friday, Alice has 
merely introduced a proposition to be integrated into the 
common ground by decreasing the set of possible world 
compatible with the state of the conversation. Consider, in 
contrast, the following dialogue: 
 
(3) a. [Alice]: I can’t come to the meeting – I have  
   to pick up my sister at the airport. 
b. [Bob]: You can’t pick up your sister at the 
airport. In fact there is no airport, there is no  
sister, and I’m not here either. You are a brain 
in a vat with all your impressions stimulated by 
a mad scientist. 
In this case, it does not seem as if Bob introduced new 
information. Rather, his answer (3b) reveals a defective 
context. While in a nondefective context “the participants’ 
beliefs about the common ground are all correct” (Stal-
naker 2002: 717), this is not the case in a defective con-
text. Before Bob’s utterance of (3b), Alice believed that a 
proposition like that the external world exists was part of 
the common ground. Bob’s answer, however, made it 
manifest that it was not and thus, that the context was 
defective. Alice now seems to have two options: either she 
accommodates Bob’s utterance and thus accepts the shift 
to a sceptical context, i. e., she accepts entering a new 
conversation, or she rejects the context-shift by refusing to 
accommodate (3b). This leads to the quite natural result 
that in case she accepts the context-shift, we would not be 
inclined to ascribe her knowledge of any ordinary proposi-
tion. If, however, she refuses accommodating (3b) we are 
still willing to ascribe her knowledge of that proposition. I 
think it is the latter option that is more likely to be chosen in 
every-day conversation. 
                                                                             
 
shifts as the result of a defective context in which a given conversational aim 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper I did not address the debate between contex-
tualism and sensitive invariantism. This will be an impor-
tant issue when it comes to deciding whose position is 
decisive for the evaluation of knowledge claims—the as-
criber’s or the subject’s. It will have to be discussed else-
where. 
I did argue for the idea that Wittgenstein’s Hinge 
Propositions support the thesis that the truth of a given 
knowledge claim can vary due to factors other than its 
overt variables. It could be shown how the apparent 
dogmatic deadlock between sceptics and Mooreans can 
be avoided by relativizing the truth of knowledge claims to 
sets of quasi-foundationalist HP. This move does not result 
in relativism, because it was indicated that the higher order 
question of which set of HP is preferable can be linked to 
an externalism of justification. A brief recapitulation of 
Common Ground then gave an idea of how to systematize 
the account in conversational contexts and explain the 
apparently contradicting intuitions about many of our 
knowledge claims. 
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Neutral Monism. A Miraculous, Incoherent, and Mislabeled  
Doctrine? 
Leopold Stubenberg, Notre Dame, Indiana, USA 
Neutral monism (NM) is a general metaphysical doctrine 
about the nature of ultimate reality. It says that ultimate 
reality is, in an important sense, one—that is the monism 
of NM; and it says that this monistic reality is neither 
mental nor physical—that is the neutrality of NM. For the 
most part, the advocates of NM have been preoccupied 
with the mind-body problem. If mind and matter are 
composed of the same neutral reality, the gulf that 
separates them must be more apparent than real.  
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries NM enjoyed 
a brief period of popularity, having been adopted by such 
philosophers as Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand 
Russell. But the doctrine soon dropped out of view, 
possibly because some of the criticisms directed against it 
seemed justified and serious. Prominent among those 
criticisms was (and is) the claim that NM is nothing but a 
thinly veiled versions of idealism or panpsychism. In an 
interesting reversal of things, Galen Strawson—one of the 
leading figures in the current revival of panpsychism—has 
subjected NM to a trenchant critique. According to 
Strawson, NM is either miraculous or incoherent. 
After presenting Strawson’s arguments against NM, 
I argue that Russell’s version of the doctrine is immune to 
Strawson’s powerful objections. But Russell’s way out will, 
in turn, make it all too obvious why it has seemed to many 
philosophers that NM is nothing but idealism or 
panpsychism. I shall end the paper by explaining why the 
Russellian neutral monist rejects the charge that NM is a 
version of mentalism. The upshot of all this is twofold. 
First, NM (of the Russellian variety) is not open to the 
challenge that Strawson tried to raise against all versions 
of the doctrine. Second, this kind of NM must be 
distinguished from mentalistic doctrines like idealism and 
panpsychism.  
The most interesting (and most controversial) 
premise upon which Strawson’s case for panpsychism 
rests is this:  
 
Emergence can’t be brute. It is built into the heart of 
the notion of emergence that emergence cannot be 
brute in the sense of there being absolutely no rea-
son in the nature of things why the emerging thing is 
as it is (so that it is unintelligible even to God). For 
any feature Y of anything that is correctly consid-
ered to be emergent from X, there must be some-
thing about X and X alone in virtue of which Y 
emerges, and which is sufficient for Y.  
(Strawson 2006, 18) 
The emergence of the liquidity of water is unproblematical; 
but the emergence of experience from nonexperiential 
matter is not. If it were to happen, it would be a miracle. 
Only the adoption of panpsychism makes this miracle go 
away. And Strawson argues that the same consideration 
cuts against all forms of neutral monism. If basic reality is 
neutral, i.e. nonexperiential, then the experiential cannot 
emerge out of it, on pain of a miracle. Hence neutral mo-
nism is not an option.  
Strawson’s second objection to NM is this: 
 
[NM] is incoherent, because experience—
appearance, if you like—cannot itself be only ap-
pearance, i.e. not really real, because there must be 
experience for there to be appearance … 
(Strawson 2006, 23) 
If only the neutral (i.e. the nonexperiential) is real, then the 
experiential cannot be fundamentally real, i.e. it must be a 
mere appearance. But that is absurd: there cannot be ap-
pearance without experience. x’s appearing F simply con-
sists in someone’s experiencing x as F. One cannot get rid 
of experience be declaring it to be a mere appearance. 
Because appearance can only exist where there is experi-
ence. 
These objections are powerful. But a closer 
inspection of Russell’s NM seems to show that it is 
immune to these challenges. Guided by the supreme 
maxim of scientific philosophizing—“wherever possible, 
substitute constructions out of known entities for 
inferences to unknown entities.” (Russell 1924, 326)—
Russell adopted NM in 1919, because of the “immense 
simplification” (Russell 1959, 103-4) it affords. The 
unknown entities in need of logical construction are, on the 
one hand, physical objects, and, on the other, the self. The 
known entities that serve as construction material are 
events. And some of these events, the data, are 
immediately given.  
 
Everything in the world is composed of events … An 
‘event’ … is something having a small finite duration 
and a small finite extension in space … When I 
speak of an ‘event’ I do not mean anything out of 
the way. Seeing a flash of lighting is an event, so is 
hearing a tire burst, or smelling a rotten egg, or feel-
ing the coldness of a frog. These are events that are 
“data” … we infer that there are events which are 
not data and happen at a distance from our own 
body. Some of these are data to other people, other 
are data to no one … Particular colours and sounds 
and so on are events; their causal antecedents in 
the inanimate world are also events.  
(Russell 1927b, 222) 
The resulting view does have an idealist ring to it. Speak-
ing of the brain, for example, Russell has this to say: 
 
While its [the brain’s] owner was alive, part, at least, 
of the contents of his brain consisted of his per-
cepts, thoughts, and feelings. Since his brain also 
consisted of electrons, we are compelled to con-
clude that an electron is a grouping of events, and 
that, if the electron is in a human brain, some of the 
events composing it are likely to be some of the 
“mental states” of the man to whom the brain be-
longs. (Russell 1927a, 320)  
“The brain consists of thoughts” (Russell 1959, 18) is Rus-
sell’s most succinct expression of this thought. As for the 
rest of the physical world, Russell is agnostic. But he does 
tell us that 
 
Neutral Monism. A Miraculous, Incoherent, and Mislabeled Doctrine? — Leopold Stubenberg 
 
 
 338 
If there is any intellectual difficulty in supposing that 
the physical world is intrinsically quite unlike that of 
percepts, this is reason for supposing that there is 
not this complete unlikeness. And there is a certain 
ground for such a view, in the fact that percepts are 
part of the physical world, and are the only part that 
we can know without the help of rather elaborate 
and difficult inferences. (Russell 1927a, 264) 
This sketch of Russell’s view shows that Strawson’s objec-
tions to NM do not apply to Russell’s version. Mental 
events do not emerge from nonexperiential matter. On the 
contrary: “mental events are part of the [stuff of the world].” 
(Russell 1927a, 388) And they are not mere appearance; 
on the contrary: they are the only part of the basic reality 
that is given to us. But this sketch of Russell’s view also 
makes it quite clear why so many philosophers—Lenin, 
Popper, Feigl, Nagel, Chalmers—have accused (or at least 
suspected) Russell of endorsing some version of mental-
ism: idealism, panpsychism, phenomenalism, Berkleyan-
ism, etc. Russell himself was quite aware of the mentalistic 
flavor of his view; in fact, he thought that “physics must be 
interpreted in a way which tends towards idealism”. (Rus-
sell 1927a, 7) But unlike his many critics, he thought that 
he had avoided the slide into mentalism.  
Seeing a flash of lightning—Russell’s paradigm of 
an event—is an experience. And experiences are mental 
(not neutral), if anything is. So how can Russell maintain 
that his event monism is a neutral monism? Before 
embracing NM Russell was a dualist. The subject and its 
act of sensing were mental; the sensed object, the sense-
datum, was physical. Once Russell discarded the subject 
as a basic or unconstructed entity, “the possibility of 
distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum 
vanishes;” (Russell 1921, 142) and “the reason for 
distinguishing the sense-datum from the sensation 
disappears, and we may say that the patch of colour and 
our sensation in seeing it are identical.” (Russell 1921, 
143) The resulting entity/event—the percept—is neither 
mental, like the act, nor physical, like the sense-datum.  
Consideration of the percept itself (e.g., seeing a 
flash of lightning) also yields the result that it is neutral. 
The percept is not material in the traditional sense. For 
“matter as it appears to common sense, and as it has until 
recently appeared in physics, must be given up.” (Russell 
1927b, 125) It is replaced by a logical construction out of 
events, among which are percepts. The term “matter” 
applies to a complex logical construction; the elements 
that go into this construction are not properly called 
material. Let us now turn to the controversial claim that 
percepts (and other events that are given to us) are not 
mental. Russell arrives at this conclusion by observing that 
neither one of the traditional criteria of the mental—
intentionality and consciousness—classifies percepts as 
mental. Take intentionality first. The percept, as such, does 
not represent anything; having a percept is not, as Russell 
puts it, a matter of knowing anything: 
 
When, say, I see a person I know coming towards 
me in the street, it seems as thought the mere see-
ing were knowledge. It is of course undeniable that 
knowledge comes through the seeing, but I think it 
is a mistake to regard the mere seeing itself as 
knowledge. If we are to so regard it, we must distin-
guish the seeing from what is seen: we must say 
that, when we see a patch of colour of a certain 
shape, the patch of colour is one thing and our see-
ing of it is another. This view, however, demands 
the admission of the subject, or act … If there is a 
subject, it can have a relation to the patch of colour, 
namely, the sort of relation which we might call 
awareness. In that case the sensation, as a mental 
event, will consist of awareness of the colour, while 
the colour itself will remain wholly physical, and may 
be called the sense-datum, to distinguish it from the 
sensation. (Russell 1921, 141) 
But once the subject (and its act) are given up, the distinc-
tion between the sensing and the sensed collapses, and 
we can no longer understand an episode of seeing as 
intentionally structured, as some sort of representation with 
an intentional object.  
What about the second mark of the mental: 
consciousness, phenomenal quality, what-it’s-likeness? 
Phenomenal quality can serve to distinguish the mental 
from the non-mental events only if the former do and that 
latter don’t have this feature. But, Russell maintains, we do 
not know whether the events that are not given to us do or 
don’t have these features. Russell grants that we can infer 
the existence of events that are not given to us. But he 
insists that our knowledge of these events is limited to their 
structural features; we cannot know anything about their 
intrinsic natures: 
 
Whenever one complex structure causes another, 
there must be much the same structure in the cause 
and in the effect, as in the case of the gramophone 
record and the music. This is plausible if we accept 
the maxim “Same cause, same effect” and its con-
sequence, “Different effects, different causes.” If this 
principle is regarded as valid, we can infer from a 
complex sensation or series of sensations the struc-
ture of its physical cause, but nothing more … (Rus-
sell 1948, 254) 
We cannot infer anything about the intrinsic nature of the 
vast majority of events—those given to other persons and 
those given to nobody. For all we know, their intrinsic qual-
ity is not different from the events that are our experiences. 
Hence we cannot say that your experiences—the events 
that are given to us—must count as mental because they 
have phenomenal quality. They do, indeed, have phe-
nomenal quality; but so may all other events in the uni-
verse.  
We are left with the conclusion that percepts—the 
events Russell is left with upon identifying the act of 
sensing with the sensed object—are neutral. They are the 
stuff out of which matter is constructed; hence they are not 
themselves material. And because they lack intentionality 
or a distinctive phenomenal quality they cannot be called 
mental. Hence they are neutral. This, then, is how Russell 
can acknowledge that 
 
on the question of the stuff of the world [NM] has 
certain affinities with idealism—namely, that mental 
events are part of that stuff, and that the rest of the 
stuff resembles them more than it resembles tradi-
tional billiard balls (Russell 1927a, 388) 
while maintaining that his NM is truly neutral and not 
merely a thinly veiled form of mentalism.  
To sum up. Strawson has argued that NM is either 
committed to a miraculous form of emergence or it is 
incoherent. In reply I have argued that in Russell’s scheme 
of things the mental does not emerge from the nonmental. 
Far from it—mental events form part of the neural material 
from which matter is constructed. Nor is the Russellian 
neutral monist obliged to make the incoherent claim that 
experiences are mere appearances. Far from it—
experiences are among the elements of ultimate reality. 
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And while many passages in Russell’s texts may suggest 
the view that his so-called NM is merely idealism or 
panpsychism in a new guise, I have tried to show that this 
impression is misleading. While acknowledging certain 
parallels between NM and idealism, Russell is careful to 
establish the neutrality of the basic elements of his 
metaphysics.  
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A somewhat Eliminativist Proposal about Phenomenal  
Consciousness 
Pär Sundström, Umeå, Sweden 
1. Introduction 
Let eliminativism about an object, x, or property, X, be the 
claim that x doesn't exist or X is not instantiated. Atheists 
are in this sense eliminativists about all gods, Christians 
are eliminativists about Zeus. More universally, we tend 
these days to be eliminativists about impetus, caloric and 
phlogiston. 
One may wonder how global the threat of 
elimination is. Among the objects and properties that we 
take to exist or be instantiated today, which ones may be 
up for "elimination" tomorrow? This paper focuses on the 
case of phenomenal consciousness, or "what it is like" to 
be in certain mental states. 
It is often claimed that consciousness is secure 
against elimination. Flanagan, for example, urges that 
consciousness differs importantly from objects and 
properties that have been "eliminated" in the past. 
Phlogiston was hypothesised to exist because it could 
explain phenomena that are more immediately present to 
us, like burning and rusting. But consciousness is not, or 
not only, assumed to exist because it explains other, more 
immediately observable phenomena. Consciousness is 
also, and perhaps primarily, assumed to exist because it is 
itself immediately present to us. As Flanagan puts it: 
"consciousness as a phenomenon to be explained has a 
secure place at the observational periphery" (1992, 33; cf. 
also Chalmers 1996, 102). 
It's easy to feel the force of Flanagan's suggestion. 
However, I shall try to cast some doubt on it in what 
follows. 
Section 2 makes some preliminary remarks about 
"eliminativist" and "revisionist" outcomes of theoretical 
developments. Section 3 develops the somewhat 
eliminativist proposal about phenomenal consciousness. 
Section 4 elaborates on the eliminativist character of the 
proposal. Section 5 comments on the relation between the 
proposal and "monitor theories" of consciousness. 
2. Eliminativist and revisionist conclusions 
Every now and then, we realise that things are not quite 
the way we once thought they were. Nothing is quite the 
way Newtonians thought that mass were. The element 
centrally involved in burning and rusting is not the way 
phlogiston was taken to be. The heat of a body is not what 
caloric theorists thought it was. Royalties don't exercise 
power with a divine mandate, and solidity is not a matter of 
being dense all over. 
In some cases where we realise that things aren't 
the way we thought they were, we end up saying 
eliminativist things like, "there is no x". In other cases, we 
end up saying revisionist things like, "x is not quite what 
we thought it was". 
What determines whether, in a given case, we end 
up saying one thing or the other? Presumably the 
magnitude of our change of view – however exactly that 
should be measured – plays some role. If our views on a 
topic change (by some measure) to a significant extent, we 
are presumably more inclined to draw an eliminativist 
conclusion than if they revised to a lesser extent. But it's 
possible that more "pragmatic" factors play a role as well, 
for example, whether researchers judge that they will make 
a greater impact by using one or the other kind of 
formulation (c.f. Churchland 1986, 283-4; and Stich 1996, 
chapter 1). 
However that may be, it seems to me that, whether 
in a given case we end up talking in an eliminativist or a 
revisionist way is not as such of any interest. What is of 
interest is our change of view, and I suggest that we can 
achieve at least an intuitive sense of how significant such 
a change is that is independent of how we end up 
speaking. For example, if Lavoisier had convinced us to 
say things like, "phlogiston exists but it's not what we 
thought it was", I suggest that we could have achieved the 
same appreciation of the theoretical change that he 
contributed to bring about. 
I shall next develop a proposal concerning 
consciousness. Whether accepting this proposal would 
lead us to make eliminativist or revisionist claims, I believe 
that, if one comes from a certain natural and commonly 
occupied starting point, it would amount to a significant 
change of view. 
3. A proposal about phenomenal con-
sciousness 
I shall develop my proposal in three steps. 
Step 1: Sifting out the "Galilean qualities". Consider 
a visual experience of a ripe lemon in good lightning 
condition. Salient in this experience is a certain yellowish 
quality. It's somewhat tricky to make this quality a joint 
topic of conversation, because there are so many 
disagreements about it. For example, while naïve realists 
take it to be a property of lemons, sense-datum theorists to 
be a property of sense-data, some qualia theorists may 
take it to be a property of conscious experiences, and 
others take it to not be instantiated at all. There is also 
disagreement about how we talk, should talk, and can talk 
about this quality. Some find it natural to use the term 
"yellow" to talk about it, but others think that we don't have 
a public language term for it, and even that we can't 
introduce such a term (Thau 2002, section 5.13). 
But despite these obstacles, I think we can make 
this kind of quality a joint topic of conversation. Whatever 
instantiates it, and whatever it can and should be called, it 
is the kind of quality that is most salient in our colour 
experiences. I will suppose that we have a shared 
understanding of which type of quality this is. 
I will call these qualities "Galilean", since I take it to 
be the kind of quality that Galileo was concerned with 
when he discussed what qualities belong to the world and 
what qualities belong to the mind. (I shall later distinguish 
these from alleged qualities of another type.) I use 
"Galilean quality" broadly, for qualities that are salient in 
various sense perceptions like sight, smell and taste, and 
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bodily sensations like pains and itches. However, for 
brevity I shall focus on the Galilean qualities that are 
displayed in colour experiences. 
My first proposal in working towards a somewhat 
eliminativist view of phenomenal consciousness is that 
Galilean qualities are not constitutive properties of 
phenomenal consciousness. Galilean qualities may be not 
instantiated at all, or they may be properties of objects like 
lemons. In either case, they don't contribute to constitute 
what it is like to have a conscious experience. I call this 
The Separation Thesis, since it says that consciousness 
and the Galilean qualities are, in a certain sense, 
separate.1 
The Separation Thesis is presumably somewhat 
controversial. But it is surprisingly hard to say how contro-
versial it is. Even though it is quite central to our under-
standing of what consciousness is, few philosophers who 
discuss consciousness make clear whether they accept or 
reject it. (No doubt the difficulties in talking about the qual-
ity, noted above, contribute to this unclarity.) However, my 
impression – largely based on an admittedly non-scientific 
selection of conversations – is that few philosophers would 
deny The Separation Thesis out of hand. Moreover, and 
more importantly, I'm inclined to think there are good rea-
sons to accept the thesis. Space does not allow an elabo-
ration of these reasons however, and here The Separation 
Thesis will be just assumed. 
Step 2: Noting the elusive character of whatever is 
left. Suppose The Separation Thesis is right. What then is 
phenomenal consciousness like? If what it's like to 
experience a ripe lemon is not in part constituted by a 
Galilean quality, what is it like? It seems that whatever is 
left is pretty elusive. In fact, once the Galilean qualities are 
assumed to not be part of consciousness, one may start to 
wonder whether there is much or anything left of the 
phenomenon at all. Perhaps consciousness doesn't have 
such "secure place at the observational periphery" after 
all? 
It has been suggested to me in this context that 
consciousness may be constituted, wholly or in part, by a 
set of non-Galilean qualities. The suggestion is that an 
experience of a ripe lemon displays both a Galilean quality 
and a quality of another kind. Even if the former doesn't 
constitute what the experience is like, the latter does. 
However, even if I search really hard, I fail to find in 
my experiences a set of qualities over and above the Gali-
lean ones. Granted, this may be because my introspection 
is deficient, or because I'm blinded by some prejudice. 
However, it may also be because there are no extra quali-
ties there, and that those who seem to find them are pro-
jecting on the basis of some prejudice. My present case 
assumes that the latter view is the right one. 
Step 3: Identifying whatever is left with first-person 
awareness. One might think that, even if steps 1 and 2 
above are taken, there remains a robust and salient 
phenomenon of consciousness. For compare your typical, 
familiar visual experience of a ripe lemon with a subliminal 
experience of a ripe lemon. There is a striking difference 
between the two. The subliminal experience goes on "in 
the dark" while the other one has a vivid phenomenology. 
                                                     
 
1 In Sundström (2007) I invoke The Separation Thesis to argue that the prob-
lem is often mischaracterised; I also suggest that eliminativism about con-
sciousness should be taken seriously (section 5). The present paper traces a 
somewhat different route from The Separation Thesis to eliminativism about 
consciousness. 
The difference is surely salient. However, it seems 
to me that it can plausibly be accounted for in a rather 
deflationary way. The proposal is that the difference is 
simply one of first-person awareness. In the normal case, I 
am aware in a peculiar first-personal way of my visual 
experience, or that I have it. In the subliminal case, I'm not 
aware – or at least, I'm not aware in that way – of my 
experience or that I have it. 
4. The eliminativist character of the  
proposal 
It is natural to think of phenomenally conscious states as 
somehow "shining" or "glowing". From that perspective, 
the present proposal seems to "deflate" our conception of 
consciousness. A tree doesn't shine any more when it is 
perceived than when it is not perceived; what comes and 
goes is only the relational property of being perceptually 
registered. According to the present proposal, the differ-
ence between a typical, familiar perception and a sublimi-
nal perception is of just the same kind. 
The deflationary character of the proposal can also 
be brought out by contrasting it with certain suggestions 
about what "phenomenal realism" entails. According to 
Block, for example, you are a phenomenal realist only if 
you accept that consciousness resists a priori or armchairs 
analyses in "non-phenomenal terms" such as 
"representation, thought or function" (Block 2002b, 392). 
The present proposal would seem to qualify as non-
realism about phenomenal consciousness, by Block's 
lights. It says that, if there is phenomenal consciousness at 
all, it is nothing other than a kind of representation, to wit, 
first-personal awareness; and, while it is presumably 
advisable to take into account everything you know about 
the world when you assess the proposal, I suspect it 
qualifies as an "armchair analysis", by Block's standards. 
In addition to being deflationary, there is a further 
way in which the present proposal opens up space for an 
eliminativist-style development about phenomenal 
consciousness. Our understanding of the peculiar kind of 
first-person awareness we have of certain of our states is 
not terribly advanced, and it is certainly a live possibility 
that we will eventually distinguish rather different types of 
such awareness. For example, it is not obvious that one 
and the same process is in play when I am (i) aware that I 
experience a ripe lemon, (ii) aware that I want to marry my 
girlfriend, and (iii) aware that one of my tacit beliefs is that 
Winston Churchill had a kneecap. If consciousness is 
nothing other than a peculiar kind of first-personal 
awareness, and if there are several different kinds of such 
awareness, we may well end up judging that what we once 
thought about in terms of "consciousness" was many 
things. 
5. Relation to monitor theories 
There is a family of views according to which the phe-
nomenal consciousness of a state is, at least in part, a 
matter of that state being "monitored" in some special way. 
On some such views, the consciousness of a state is a 
matter of the state being, in part, a representation of itself 
(e.g. Kriegel 2003). On other such views, the conscious-
ness of a state is a matter of it being represented by an-
other, "higher-order" state, which may be either percep-
tion-like (e.g. Lycan 1996) or belief-like (e.g. Rosenthal 
2002). 
A somewhat Eliminativist Proposal about Phenomenal Consciousness — Pär Sundström 
 
 
 342 
What is the relation between the present proposal 
and these views? Two remarks are in order. 
First, many or all monitor theorists take monitoring to 
constitute only a part of phenomenal consciousness. For 
example, Kriegel distinguishes "two aspects" of what a 
conscious experience of blue is like: a "qualitative" aspect 
and a "for-me aspect" (2005, 23). Monitoring is supposed 
to account only for the second, for-me aspect. The 
qualitative aspect gets a separate treatment. The present 
proposal is different. It suggests that consciousness 
doesn't have a qualitative aspect at all. Whatever qualities 
are displayed in conscious experience are not constitutive 
properties of what it is like. 
Second, even with respect to the "for-me aspect" of 
consciousness, I believe the present proposal differs from 
at least some monitor theories. At any rate, I think there's a 
difference in what the views purport to explain. The 
present proposal is emphatically deflationary about 
consciousness. Monitor theorists don't always or even 
standardly advertise their view as such, and it may not be 
how many or all of them regard the matter. It may be 
noted, though, that critics often emphasise the deflationary 
character of monitor theories, and complain that the 
theories reduce consciousness to a triviality (e.g. Block 
2002a, 214; and Chalmers 1996, section 4.5). If the 
present proposal is right, these critics may well be right 
that monitor theories are seriously deflationary, but wrong 
to suppose that this tells against them. 
Literature 
Block, Ned 2002a "Concepts of consciousness", in: David 
Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, Oxford UP, 206-18. 
Block, Ned 2002b "The harder problem of consciousness", The 
Journal of Philosophy 99, 391-425. 
Chalmers, David 1996 The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fun-
damental Theory, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Churchland, Patricia 1986 Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified 
Science of the Mind/Brain, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Flanagan, Owen 1992 Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
Kriegel, Uriah 2003 "Consciousness as intransitive self-
consciousness: Two views and an argument", Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy 33, 103-32. 
Kriegel, Uriah 2005 "Naturalizing subjective character", Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 71, 23-56. 
Lycan, William 1996 Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press. 
Rosenthal, David 2002 "Explaining Consciousness", in: David 
Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, Oxford: Oxford UP, 406-21. 
Stich, Stephen 1996 Deconstructing the Mind, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Sundström, Pär 2007 "Colour and consciousness: Untying the 
metaphysical knot", Philosophical Studies 136, 123-65. 
Thau, Michael 2002 Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford 
UP. 
 
 
 
  343
Impliziert der intentionale Reduktionismus einen psychologischen 
Eliminativismus? Fodor und das Problem psychologischer  
Erklärungen 
Thomas Szanto, Wien & Graz, Österreich 
1.  
Eines der wenigen Kriterien für die Akzeptierbarkeit der 
Psychologie als legitimer Einzelwissenschaft unter ande-
ren Naturwissenschaften, auf das sich die meisten nicht-
reduktiven Naturalisten einigen können, ist ihre Kompatibi-
lität mit einem Naturalismus in Bezug auf jene mentalen 
Zustände, die wesentlich durch Intentionalität charakteri-
siert sind. J. Fodor hat diesem Minimalkriterium seine ka-
nonische Form verliehen: Was wir Fodor zufolge brau-
chen, ist eine Theorie, die in nicht-semantischen und nicht-
intentionalen Kategorien hinreichende Bedingungen für 
das Vorliegen einer Repräsentationsbeziehung zwischen 
zwei Teilstücken („bits“) der natürlichen Welt, nämlich ei-
nem mentalen und einem physikalischen Zustand, angibt 
(vgl. Fodor 1987, 98).  
Fodors kognitivistisches Gesamtprojekt fußt auf zwei 
– scheinbar gegenläufige – metatheoretischen Prämissen: 
Fodor zufolge werden wir keine ernstzunehmenden 
psychologischen Erklärungen erzielen, wenn wir 1.) keine 
verallgemeinerbaren Gesetzmäßigkeiten bezüglich der 
intentionalen Verursachung von Verhalten beschreiben 
können, die mit den grundsätzlichen Erklärungsan-
sprüchen der Volkspsychologie vereinbar sind; 2.) müssen 
diese alltagspsychologisch relevanten Gesetzmäßigkeiten 
wiederum zumindest prinzipiell in den kausalen 
Erklärungsrahmen nach dem Modell empirischer Wissen-
schaften übersetzbar sein. Wenn wir also die Realität 
intentionaler Zustände nicht bezweifeln und sie auch aus 
einer seriösen Psychologie nicht eliminieren wollen, 
müssen wir die intentionalen Gesetzmäßigkeiten natu-
ralisieren (vgl. Fodor 1994, 3). Nur wenn das gelingt, 
haben wir Aussicht auf eine wissenschaftlich akzeptable 
Psychologie. Psychologie als genuine Wissenschaft wäre 
demnach eine Erklärung der gesetzmäßigen Struktur und 
der formalen Prozesse intentionaler Systeme; und genuin 
psychologisch wäre die Erklärung, sofern sie sich nicht auf 
Verallgemeinerungen anderer empirischen Einzelwissen-
schaften (wie etwa die Neurobiologie) reduzieren lässt. 
(vgl. Fodor 1990, 5) 
Sollten wir eine solche Theorie nicht zustande 
bringen, müssten wir unsere Alltagspsychologie in die 
historische Senkgrube intellektueller Fehltritte verbannen – 
was aber nach Fodor der „greatest intellectual catastrophe 
in the history of our species“ (Fodor 1987, xii) gleichkäme. 
S. Stich hat diese besorgniserregende Ansicht Fodors 
ironisch als „die Katastrophentheorie“ diagnostiziert (Stich 
1996, 92ff.). Fodors Katastrophentheorie wird durch die 
fragwürdige Annahme gespeist, dass ein Versagen auf 
dem Feld der Naturalisierung des Intentionalen eo ipso die 
„furchtbare Konsequenz“ hätte, dass wir unseren festen 
Glauben an die Realität des Intentionalen aufgeben und 
das Feld den intentionalen Irrealisten räumen müssten. 
Fragwürdig ist diese Annahme, da gar nicht klar ist, 
inwiefern und ob überhaupt aus dem Versagen auf dem 
Feld der Naturalisierung der intentionale Irrealismus folgen 
soll.  
Fodor nimmt an, dass die Widerlegung des 
intentionalen Irrealismus nur durch eine endgültige, und 
das heißt vollständige Naturalisierung des Intentionalen 
möglich ist. Dabei setzt er jedoch die methodologische 
Grundprämisse der zu widerlegenden Position voraus, 
wonach nämlich nur das real ist, was prinzipiell natu-
ralisierbar ist (vgl. Fodor 1994, 5).  
Bevor man jedoch irgendwelche Zugeständnisse an 
den intentionalen Irrealismus macht, müsste man zunächst 
zeigen, dass dieser eine wahre ontologische These oder 
zumindest eine brauchbare Doktrin bezüglich des 
spezifischen Gegenstandsbereichs jener Wissenschaft ist, 
die sich mit intentionalen Zuständen beschäftigt. Die 
Katastrophentheorie impliziert, dass die Gültigkeit inten-
tional-psychologischer Erklärungen notwendig von der 
Wahrheit des intentionalen Irrealismus abhängt. Die Wahr-
heit des intentionalen Irrealismus hängt wiederum von der 
Wahrheit ihrer ontologischen Behauptungen und deren 
wissenschaftstheoretischen Konsequenzen ab.  
2.  
In seiner ontologisch starken Version behauptet der inten-
tionale Irrealismus, dass solche Zustände, mit denen sich 
die intentionale Psychologie beschäftigt, in Wirklichkeit – 
nämlich in jener, welche die seriösen Wissenschaften mo-
dellieren – gar nicht existieren. Der starke intentionale 
Irrealismus basiert auf der Ontologie des eliminativen Ma-
terialismus. Entitäten, mit denen sich Psychologen be-
schäftigen wenn sie intentionales Verhalten oder intentio-
nale Zustände analysieren, haben dieser Ansicht zufolge 
den gleichen Realitätsgehalt wie jene Zustände, die etwa 
mittelalterliche Exorzisten einer Hexe zugeschrieben ha-
ben. Intentionale Psychologie ist demnach durch und 
durch Volkspsychologie und hat als solche ebenso wenig 
Platz im Kanon ernstzunehmender Wissenschaften wie 
religiöser oder sonstiger Aberglaube. 
Demgegenüber ist die ontologisch schwächere Ver-
sion des intentionalen Irrealismus rigider, was den psycho-
logischen Erklärungsrahmen betrifft. Die schwächere 
Version trifft zwar keine Behauptung bezüglich der 
Existenz der fraglicher Entitäten und stellt lediglich fest, 
dass die Eigenschaften, die intentionalen Zuständen 
zugeschrieben werden, keinerlei Wirksamkeit innerhalb 
der kausalen Gesetzmäßigkeiten ausüben, welche das 
Untersuchungsfeld seriöser Wissenschaften konstituieren. 
Nun wäre dies noch insofern unproblematisch, solange 
man gelten lässt, dass die intentionale Psychologie es gar 
nicht mit Kausalerklärungen zu tun hat. Die fodorsche 
Version macht jedoch eine weitere Annahme, welche den 
Zusammenhang betrifft zwischen der kausalen 
Wirksamkeit, der Realität intentionaler Zustände und der 
Möglichkeit, psychologisch informative Aussagen über 
diese zu machen. Die Zusatzprämisse besagt, dass 
intentionale Zustände nur insofern als reale Entitäten 
interpretiert werden können, als sie kausal wirksam sind. 
Sofern intentionale Eigenschaften keine kausale Wirksam-
keit ausüben, können auch Erklärungen, die auf solche 
Eigenschaften rekurrieren, keine Rolle bei der Erklärung 
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der Ursachen von intentionalem Verhalten spielen und 
müssen folglich aus dem Untersuchungsgebiet einer 
seriösen Psychologie ausgeschlossen werden.  
Diese ontologisch schwächere Version des 
intentionalen Irrealismus führt also zu einem bestimmten 
Typ von Eliminativismus, den man mit Blick auf den 
psychologischen Erklärungswert der betreffenden 
Entitäten psychologischen Eliminativismus nennen könnte. 
Der psychologische Eliminativist lässt offen, ob 
intentionale Zustände nun existieren oder nicht; sofern ihre 
charakteristischen Eigenschaften aber keine empirisch 
verifizierbare, kausale Funktion ausüben, müssen wir aus 
methodologischen Gründen auf diese Entitäten verzichten 
–, zumindest sofern wir uns mit ihnen als wissenschaftlich 
akzeptable Kandidaten für eine seriöse Psychologie be-
schäftigen. Der psychologische Eliminativismus ist eine 
heuristische, oder besser, wissenschaftspragmatische 
These bezüglich der Brauchbarkeit intentional-psycho-
logischer Erklärungen innerhalb der Logik naturwissen-
schaftlicher Aussagensysteme und impliziert – anders als 
der Eliminative Materialismus oder der Instrumentalismus 
– nicht notwendig eine ontologische These bezüglich der 
Realität intentionaler Zustände und Eigenschaften.  
Obwohl Fodor qua intentionaler Realist Anti-
Reduktionist hinsichtlich der Ontologie intentionaler 
Zustände ist, ist seine Theorie hinsichtlich des Typs 
intentional-psychologischer Erklärungen wesentlich reduktiv. 
Insofern ist sie dem intentionalen Instrumentalismus eines 
Dennett entgegengesetzt: Ein Instrumentalist à la Dennett 
schließt zwar intentionale Eigenschaften aus der Menge 
real-existierender Phänomene aus, garantiert einer inten-
tionalen Einstellung („intentional stance“) zu kognitiven 
Systemen jedoch eine explanatorische Legitimität inner-
halb psychologischer Aussagenssysteme. Der Kognitivist à 
la Fodor schlägt den umgekehrten Weg ein und räumt den 
Eigenschaften, auf die intentionalistische Erklärungen 
referieren, eine ontologische Realität ein, beraubt jedoch 
den Typ von Erklärung jeglicher wissenschaftlicher 
Legitimität. 
Das Dilemma, das sich hier abzeichnet, ist 
folgendes: Während der Eliminativismus hinsichtlich einer 
psychologisch informativen Wissenschaft in der onto-
logisch stärkeren Lesart des intentionalen Irrealismus 
trivialerweise wahr ist, macht er in seiner schwächeren 
Lesart als psychologisches Programm gar keinen Sinn. 
Wenn man annimmt, dass intentionale Entitäten nichts als 
physische Entitäten sind, so sind sie trivialerweise nicht die 
relevanten Untersuchungsgegenstände für die (Alltags-) 
Psychologie, sondern für die Physik. Wenn man 
intentionale Eigenschaften umgekehrt auf kein ontologisch 
eindeutig abgezirkeltes Gebiet festlegen bzw. auf dieses 
reduzieren will, so wird die vermeintliche Notwendigkeit 
einer Naturalisierung dieser Eigenschaften hinfällig. Der 
intentionale Eliminativismus macht für eine Psychologie 
keinen Sinn, solange man nicht über ein Kriterium für eine 
erfolgreiche Naturalisierung intentionaler Eigenschaften 
verfügt, über ein Kriterium nämlich, das unabhängig von 
der kausalen Doktrin des intentionalen Irrealismus gültig ist 
–, oder aber er ist trivialerweise wahr, sofern die Entitäten 
einem im Vorhinein festlegten Untersuchungsgebiet zuge-
schrieben werden und quasi je nach Bedarf aus be-
stimmten Forschungsprogrammen ausgeschlossen werden 
können.  
3.  
Der Kognitivismus kann grob als der Versuch charakteri-
siert werden, unter alleinigem Rekurs auf die operationale 
Ebene mentaler Prozesse psychologisch relevante Aussa-
gen über das Verhältnis zwischen der Realisierung menta-
ler Zustände und ihrer kausalen Rolle bei der Erklärung 
von Verhalten zu treffen.  
Der Kognitivismus ist (zunächst) neutral hinsichtlich 
der Frage, ob die zu untersuchenden kognitiven Funk-
tionen auf physikalisch gesehen niedrigere Abstraktions-
niveaus reduzibel sind oder nicht. Hinsichtlich des 
Explikationsradius kognitivistischer Beschreibungsmodelle 
ist es sinnvoll, drei ontologisch verschieden gewichtete 
Ebenen zu unterscheiden: die Ebene der Implementierung 
kognitiver Prozesse, die Ebene ihrer Realisierung bzw. 
Instantiierung und schließlich die funktionale Ebene des 
Zusammenhanges zwischen den ersten beiden. Aussagen 
über die Ebene der Implementierung betreffen die 
material-ontologische Verfasstheit mentaler Systeme und 
Prozesse. Fragen nach der tatsächlichen Implementierung 
kognitiver Prozesse sind also empirische Fragen nach den 
Konstitutionsbedingungen menschlicher und oder künst-
licher Kognition. Beschreibungen hinsichtlich der 
Realisierung bzw. Instantiierung auf der operationalen 
Ebene kognitiver Prozesse sind an und für sich ge-
nommen ontologisch ebenso neutral. Was die funktionalen 
Ebene betrifft, ist die Sache nicht mehr ganz so eindeutig, 
handelt es sich doch dabei um Behauptungen hinsichtlich 
der Übersetzbarkeit bzw. der kausalen Dependenzen der 
beiden Ebenen. Ziel des Kognitivismus ist jedenfalls, bei 
der Erklärung der Interaktion zwischen Implementierungs- 
und Realisierungsebene – also auf der funktionalen Be-
schreibungsebene – auf ontologische Prädikate gänzlich 
zu verzichten.1 Die Frage ist freilich, inwieweit und ob dies 
gelingt. 
Wenn für den Kognitivisten die Frage nach den 
Realisierungsformen und Realisierungsbedingungen inten-
tionaler Zustände für die Naturaliserbarkeitsbehauptung 
irrelevant ist, so muss doch die Form der Erklärung ihrer 
Funktion naturalistischen Kriterien entsprechen.  
Zu unterscheiden ist hierbei zwischen Typen 
psychologischer Erklärungen und Typen psychologisch 
relevanter Explananda einerseits und entsprechend 
zwischen der Reduktion bestimmter psychologisch 
relevanter Entitäten und der Reduktion bestimmter 
Erklärungsmodelle andererseits. In seiner eingehenden 
Analyse verschiedener Typen reduktiver Erklärungsmo-
delle innerhalb des Kognitivismus argumentiert auch J. 
Haugeland zu Recht, dass durchaus nicht jedes 
Erklärungsmodell, bei dem die Möglichkeit einer wissen-
schaftlich respektablen Erklärung abhängig gemacht wird 
von der Zurückführung des Explanadums auf eine nieder-
stufigere bzw. fundamentalere, gesetzmäßig spezifizierte 
Ebene, die selbst unerklärt bleibt, zwangsläufig in einer 
vollständigen (sprich: physikalistischen) Reduktion münden 
muss („complete reduction [all the way to physics]“; 
Haugeland 1978, 251). Der Kognitivist hat den – 
metaphysischen – Traum einer einheitswissenschaftlichen 
Reduktion psychologischer Konzepte ausgeträumt; 
kognitivistische Reduktion ist eine hierarchische Korrelation 
verschiedener funktional spezifizierter Systeme, bei der 
nicht die Physik die Hierarchie der Systeme festlegt, 
sondern das jeweilige Erklärungsmodell (vgl. Fodor 1974). 
                                                     
 
1 Vgl. auch Fodors (1965) frühen Versuch, verschiedene Phasen der Theorie-
bildung mit verschiedenen Ebenen hinsichtlich der Explanandums zu korrelie-
ren. 
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Welche Systeme auf welche reduziert und wie diese 
spezifiziert werden, d.h. welche Systeme welche funktionale 
Rolle bei der psychologischen Erklärung spielen, ist relativ 
zur jeweiligen Heuristik der Erklärung. Entsprechend chara-
kterisiert Haugeland die funktionalistische Erklärungsmo-
delle von Kognition als Typen systematischer Reduktion 
(„systematic reduction“) (Haugeland 1978, 249ff.). 
Systematisch-reduktive Erklärungen unterscheiden sich von 
nomologisch-reduktiven Erklärungen, bei denen Brücken-
gesetze zwischen den verschiedenen Ebenen voraus-
gesetzt und nach quantitativen Gleichungen beschrieben 
werden. Systematische Reduktionen setzen nach 
Haugeland hingegen keine solche psychophysischen (oder 
allgemein gesprochen: ‚meta-funktionalen’) Brückengesetze 
voraus und suchen auch nicht nach solchen –, wie 
Haugeland mit einem Seitenhieb auf Fodors Naturali-
sierungsstrategie vermerkt. Der wesentliche Punkt, auf 
den Haugeland mit seiner Konzeption systematischer 
Erklärungen hinauswill, ist, dass dieser spezielle Typ 
kognitivistischer Reduktion entgegen der Annahme vieler 
Kritiker weder die Explananda (die spezifisch kognitiven 
Zustände) noch das Explanans (die funktionale Beschreib-
ung kognitiver Systeme) zugunsten anderer Entitäten und 
Erklärungen überflüssig macht bzw. eliminiert.   
Trifft Haugelands Charakterisierung des Kogniti-
vismus als einen Typ systematischer Reduktion zu, so 
wären – jenseits der Unterscheidung der Ontologie der 
Explananda und der verschiedenen Erklärungstypen – drei 
Thesen zu unterscheiden: 1. Die Kompatibilitätsthese 
hinsichtlich der Gültigkeit verschiedener Erklärungs-
modelle (wie alltagspsychologische, physikalische etc.), 2. 
die Übersetzungs- oder Übersetzbarkeitsthese hinsichtlich 
des Vokabulars, mit dem die Explananda beschrieben 
werden und 3. schließlich die Zuordnungsthese hinsicht-
lich der Brückengesetze, welche die Gültigkeit der Kompa-
tibilität und die Adäquatheit der Übersetzung regeln. Sofern 
der Kognitivismus die Kompatibilitätsthese bezüglich 
alltagspsychologischer und physikalistischer Erklärungen 
vertritt, sofern er nur eine Koextensionalität bezüglich der 
zu übersetzenden Vokabulare und keine Synonymie 
einfordert und solange er sich hinsichtlich der Zuordnungs-
these nicht festlegt, wären kognitivistische Erklärungs-
modelle nicht notwendig reduktiv (bzw. eliminativ) 
hinsichtlich ihrer Explananda.     
Doch – pace Haugeland und Fodor – droht die 
Demarkationslinie zwischen ontologisch neutralen Be-
schreibungen der psychologischen Funktion mentaler 
Eigenschaften und dem Kognitivismus als ontologischer 
These bezüglich der psychophysischen Typen-Identität 
freilich überall dort zu verschwimmen, wo es um eine 
exklusive bzw. beste Beschreibung („unique best 
description“) der betreffenden psychologischen Systeme 
geht (Block/Fodor 1972, 84f.). Das ist der Fall, wenn die 
Adäquatheit der psychologischen Beschreibung an die 
Bedingung geknüpft wird, dass die psychologischen 
Prädikate, die einem System attribuiert werden – 
zumindest prinzipiell – eins zu eins in das Vokabular 
übersetzbar sein müssen, mit denen nicht-psycholo 
 
gische/physikalische Systeme beschrieben werden. Dabei 
spielt es keine Rolle, ob die psychologischen Zustände als 
Einzelvorkommnisse (Tokens) selbst ontologisch spezi-
fiziert, d.h. bestimmten physikalischen Prozessen 
zugeordnet werden oder nicht bzw., ob der Kognitivist 
ontologisch neutral ist bezüglich der Implementierung 
psychologischer Einzelvorkommnisse oder nicht. Denn, 
selbst wenn von Kognitivisten konzediert wird, dass es 
sich bei der Übersetzung des psychologischen in das 
physikalische Beschreibungsmodell nicht um eine 
ontologische Reduktion handelt, ist nicht zu sehen, wie 
diese Korrelation – unter Vorraussetzung einer exklusiv 
besten Beschreibung, welche den physikalisch 
festgelegten, kausalen Gesetzmäßigkeiten entsprechen 
muss –, nicht ipso facto zu einer solchen Reduktion führen 
soll. Das heißt, selbst wenn der Kognitivist annimmt, dass 
die verschiedenen Phasen der Theoriebildung 
verschiedenen irreduziblen Beschreibungsebenen ent-
sprechen, ist nicht einsichtig – wie unter Annahme des 
Ideals einer physikalisch adäquaten Spezifikation des 
Verhältnisses zwischen mentalen und nicht-mentalen 
Zuständen – eine reduktive Erklärung vermieden werden 
soll.2  
Das Ideal einer besten Beschreibung vereitelt mithin 
die Neutralität des Kognitivisten bezüglich der 
Zuordnungsthese. Die vermeintlich gleichberechtigte Kom-
patibilität von Erklärungsmodellen weicht damit einer 
Hierarchie von Beschreibungsebenen, bei denen die 
Übersetzungsregeln von Zuordnungsregeln ersetzt und 
diese wiederum von nicht-psychologischen Theorien 
vorgeschrieben werden. Wenn man, wie Fodor, einfordert, 
dass die Ergebnisse der funktionalen Analyse psycho-
logischer Zustände mit den Ergebnissen des Neurologen 
vereinbar sein müssen, andernfalls „unakzeptabel“ seien, 
und eine solche empirische Falsifizierbarkeit gar zu einem 
„Prinzip“ psychologischer Erklärung erhebt, dann ist damit 
mehr als nur eine „flagrant empirische Annahme“ in das 
Erklärungsmodell „eingebaut“. „Wenn Übereinstimmung 
mit der neurologischen Wirklichkeit eine Bedingung für die 
Adäquatheit“ von kognitivistischen Erklärungsmodellen ist 
(Fodor 1965, 430f.), so haben wir es hier weniger mit einer 
genuin psychologischen Erklärung, als vielmehr mit einer 
genuin reduktiven Erklärungsstrategie zu tun. 
Was folgt aus all dem? Es folgt jedenfalls keine 
Katastrophe –, weder theoretisch, noch praktisch: Wir 
müssen weder unsere kognitivistischen noch unsere 
intentional-psychologischen Theorien in die wissenschafts-
historische Finsternis der Pseudowissenschaftlichkeit oder 
gar des Aberglaubens verbannen. Wir müssen aber auch 
nicht unsere alltagspsychologischen Praktiken bei der 
Interpretation unseres normalen Selbstverständnisses 
bzw. der typischen sozialen Interaktionsmuster rundheraus 
eliminieren. Worauf wir – soweit ich sehe – allerdings ver-
zichten müssen, ist die Hoffnung auf eine genuin psycho-
logische Wissenschaft unserer intentionalen Zustände, die 
nicht-reduktiv ist und gleichwohl auf die Absolution des 
Naturalismus zählen kann. 
                                                     
 
2 Siehe dazu auch die Kritik N. Blocks (Block 1978, insbes. 159-163). 
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Structure of the Paradoxes, Structure of the Theories: A Logical 
Comparison of Set Theory and Semantics 
Giulia Terzian, Bristol, England, UK 
1. Introduction 
F. Ramsey famously argued that the “logical” and the “se-
mantical” paradoxes should be studied separately. Those 
of the first kind “involve only logical or mathematical terms 
such as class and number, and show that there must be 
something wrong with our logic or mathematics”. On the 
other side are those contradictions which “cannot be 
stated in logical terms alone, for they all contain some 
reference to thought, language, or symbolism, which are 
not formal but empirical terms.” (1925, p.353) 
With the development of modern set theory and 
semantics over the 20th century, many have rejected this 
classification, arguing that there is a unique shared 
structure underlying most of the known paradoxes, and 
that therefore a joint solution is also to be expected. 
Arguments to this effect can be found for instance in 
Herzberger 1970, Feferman 1984, Priest 1994; in the next 
section, we will devote some attention to the second of 
these papers. 
2. A simple sophisticated story 
In 1984, S. Feferman carries out a parallel reconstruction 
of Russell’s Paradox and the Liar Paradox, to show that 
both derive from the combination of three features in the 
background theory: 
 
1. The language has enough syntactical resources 
to allow self-reference; 
2. Classical logic is assumed; 
3. The following unrestricted schemes are respec-
tively assumed as basic principles (for φ a formula 
of the language): 
(CA)  ∃x∀y(y ∈ x ↔ φ[y]) 
(TA)   T( φ ) ↔ φ. 
Restriction of each of these accordingly corresponds to a 
possible solution strategy for the paradoxes. Russell and 
Tarski pursued the first option, developing typed formal-
isms which “were early recognized to be excessively re-
strictive” (1984, p.75). To test the second strategy, Fefer-
man constructs a common formalism for set theory and 
semantics, making use of three-valued logical schemes 
(the primary references in semantics are of course Martin 
and Woodruff 1975, Kripke 1975). However the resulting 
theory is argued to be again too restrictive, insofar as 
“nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning can be carried 
out in [three-valued] logic.” (p.95) But it should also be 
noted that restriction of logic does not constitute a stan-
dard option for set theorists, and this on its own diminishes 
the prospects of obtaining a parallel solution of the para-
doxes. 
The rest of the paper is then devoted to the strategy 
of restricting basic principles: since it has been successful 
in ZF theory, where Russell’s paradox is blocked, the aim 
is to prove a similar result for semantics. Although this 
conjecture is not supported by a direct argument in the 
paper, this can be made explicit as follows: 
 
(1) Set-theoretic and semantic paradoxes bear a 
structural similarity. 
(2) ZF set theory is both a faithful account of set 
theorists' notion of set membership, and it success-
fully deals with the set-theoretic paradoxes. 
 
Therefore: 
 
(C) Any adequate solution to the semantic para-
doxes is to be expected to bear a structural similar-
ity to ZF set theory. 
A solution strategy for the paradoxes is a particular appli-
cation of the theoretical framework of set theory and se-
mantics; thus acceptance of (C) is presumably dependent 
on the soundness of a more general argument which 
should show that a structural similarity holds between set 
theory and semantics themselves. The upshot of the re-
sulting account (hereafter analogy account) would be that 
set theory can inform semantics in the choice of the nor-
mative principles which would underlie a successful (axio-
matic) theory of truth. 
Is the analogy account sound? If the paradoxes do 
have a joint solution and thereby constitute evidence that a 
deeper analogy holds, then a structural analogy ought 
surely to hold at the level of the foundations of the 
theories. Hence the first condition on accepting the 
analogy account is that there exist semantic counterparts 
of the normative principles underlying the choice of the ZF 
axioms. 
3 Why the ZF axioms? 
The literature is unanimous in identifying two conceptions 
which enshrine the pre-theoretic intuitions concerning the 
notion of set, and which moreover acted both as motiva-
tions and normative constraints in the development of 
modern set theory.  
These are limitation of size and the iterative 
conception: 
 
(LIM) The axioms ought to entail that the set-
forming operation applies to a collection of objects if 
and only if the collection is small enough; or more 
formally, if and only if its objects are not in one-one 
correspondence with all the objects of the universe 
of sets. 
(IT) The axioms ought to entail that a collection of 
objects is a set if and only if it is produced in a proc-
ess of the following sort: at stage 0 we have the 
empty set Ø; at stage 1, Ø and its singleton set {Ø}; 
and so on, into the transfinite; crucially, every set 
appears at some stage of this cumulative hierarchy. 
In the standard formalization:  
V0 = Ø; Vα+1 = P (Vα); Vγ = Uα<γVα for limit γ. 
Remarks: 
 
(a) Historically, LIM influenced set theorists long be-
fore IT, which was first explicitly mentioned only in a 
1947 paper by Gödel (cf. Potter 2004). 
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(b) A logical analysis of the two conceptions favours 
IT, insofar as it involves only intuitive notions, while 
LIM presupposes an understanding of more sophis-
ticated concepts of set theory (cf. Boolos 1989). 
 
(c) Boolos 1989 shows that IT on its own does not 
entail the axioms of replacement and extensionality; 
these follow from LIM, but other axioms of ZF do 
not. The upshot is that it is possible to bridge the 
gap between the historical and the logical recon-
structions of ZF set theory by understanding LIM 
and IT as jointly necessary, individually not sufficient 
premises to a full explication of the notion of set: in 
Boolos' words, “there are at least two thoughts ‘be-
hind’ set theory” (1989, p.103). 
4 Too simple? 
In order to assess the soundness of the analogy account, 
the key question to be answered is the following: Are there 
any semantic principles that could be identified as coun-
terparts to IT and LIM? 
The first part of this section addresses this question; 
the second part raises two more issues of methodology. 
A semantic limitation of size principle LIMT should 
e.g. guarantee the assertability of some sentences of the 
form ∀x (P(x) → T(x)) for some predicate P. To this end, 
LIMT should presumably place a cardinality constraint on 
the extension of P, so as to ensure that problematic (Liar) 
sentences do not end up in the extension of T. 
Suppose the extension of P is ℒT, i.e., the set of all 
sentences including those which contain the truth 
predicate. Then among these will be many (Liar-like) 
sentences we would not want in the extension of T: so it 
might seem reasonable to invoke a principle LIMT requiring 
the cardinality of the extension of T to be smaller than that 
of ℒT. 
Now suppose the extension of P is ℒarith (the 
language of arithmetic): applying T to purely arithmetical 
sentences does not lead to any inconsistency, so this 
choice should be allowed by LIMT. However ℒT and ℒarith 
are both countably infinite: hence LIMT gives contradictory 
verdicts for languages with the same cardinality. 
Finally suppose the extension of P is simply λ . In 
principle LIMT should obviously apply in this case: insofar 
as λ  should definitely not be in the extension of T, the 
minimal language which it forms is already ‘too big’. This is 
an undesirable result which makes it starkly clear that the 
quantitative constraint in LIMT is inadequate for the 
semantic context, where instead the key question is about 
which sentences are put inside the extension of T. 
It is fairly natural to understand IT as embodying “a 
fundamental relation of [...] dependence between 
collections." (Potter 2004, p.36) In semantics, too, one can 
talk about a fundamental relation of dependence between 
some sentence φ and a set of sentences of the language. 
Semantic dependence subtends the notion of semantic 
groundedness1: a sentence containing T is grounded if its 
truth value ultimately depends on non-semantic states of 
affairs, so that working back along the dependence 
relation leads to a sentence which does not contain T. Liar 
                                                     
 
1 First formally discussed in Kripke 1975; a more thorough analysis is found in 
Yablo 1982 and Leitgeb 2005. 
sentences are ungrounded, because their dependence 
path is not linear but circular; in standard truth-gap 
accounts, this is equivalent to saying that they lack a truth 
value in the least fixed point of the (Kripkean) jump 
operator2. 
Dependence seems to provide a more promising 
case for the analogy account. To follow up this conjecture, 
we look at the features of a typical construction in both 
contexts. Take Ø as the starting point. At each level of the 
cumulative hierarchy, all individuals and sets appearing at 
all previous levels are collected into a new set: the iterated 
power-set operation produces a strictly increasing 
progression of sets, from which no element of the universe 
is left out. 
On the other hand, the iterated jump operation 
produces a ‘semi’-hierarchy of extensions (anti-extensions) 
of the truth predicate, but in this case not all sentences of 
the language are guaranteed a place. Specifically, only the 
grounded sentences will make a regular appearance at 
each level (and will also be consistently part of the same 
semi-hierarchy); so the iterated collecting operation is here 
constrained to filter out the ungrounded sentences. 
Thus on closer inspection dependence actually 
appears to be a fairly weak link between set theory and 
semantics, and moreover reveals further differences 
between them. Set-theoretic dependence is central to the 
construction of the hierarchy, in the sense that a set exists 
in virtue of being made up of lower-level elements: it is so 
to speak a by-product of IT. But in semantics there is no 
question about the ‘existence’ of a sentence: what matters 
instead is whether the correct ones are put inside the 
extension of T. The key relation here is groundedness, 
which determines whether a sentence can be evaluated 
for truth; moreover, this can only be established once we 
reach the least fixed point – while the existence of a set is 
‘determined’ at every level at which it appears. 
Finally, groundedness not only presupposes 
dependence, but on some accounts (e.g. Yablo 1982) also 
an understanding of partial predicates, non-classical 
logics, etc.: so there is the additional worry that the 
relevant set-theoretic and semantic relation are 
mismatching in another respect, namely that the former but 
not the latter underlies a natural conception (cf. Section 3). 
In giving a formal theory of truth, the central aim is 
to explicate this fundamental semantic notion so as to 
account for its non-problematic use in everyday speech. 
For any such theory, a ‘sample basis’ of sentences 
containing the truth predicate should thus naturally be 
expected to be as broad as possible. Paradoxical 
sentences, which constitute an extremely restricted 
sample, could then be used to test the formalism, as a 
measure of its efficacy. 
One could also choose a different approach: start 
from some pre-existing formalism and subject it to 
successive revisions, constrained primarily by the rule: 
“avoid contradictions”. 
These diametrically opposite strategies might be 
called respectively ‘constructive’ and ‘regressive’; the 
choice of these terms is intended to parallel the distinction 
made by Potter 2004 between “intuitive” and “regressive” 
methodologies in set theory. As in the case of set theory 
                                                     
 
2 Let (A+;A-) be a partial interpretation of T; then the jump is a monotone 
inductive operator defined by j (A+;A-) = (j + (A+;A-); j - (A+;A-)), where j 
+(A+;A-) = {φ: (A+;A-) ⊨ φ} and j - (A+;A-) = {φ: (A+;A-) ⊨ ¬φ}. 
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(cf. Potter p.34), it seems desirable to adopt a constructive 
rather than a regressive strategy, to ensure the higher 
reliability of the resulting theory. 
However most accounts in the literature appear to 
start from an analysis of the Liar paradox, and then 
proceed to develop a suitable formalism which 
accommodates this phenomenon as well as our intuitions 
about truth. This is also clearly the case in Feferman 1984; 
but by adopting such a plainly regressive strategy, the 
resulting theory is also much more exposed to the danger 
of misrepresenting our positive intuitions about truth. 
One of the reasons for which the analogy account is 
attractive is that it would allow for semantics to be informed 
by set theory; but a genuine structural analogy should also 
entail that semantics can inform set theory, so that set-
theoretic norms can be imported over to semantics, and 
vice versa. 
A closer look at concrete theories shows that the 
analogy is invariably left lopsided. For instance, the axiom 
system proposed in Feferman 1984 is not only shown to 
be an unsatisfactory account of truth, but it is also clear 
that it is not inter-translatable with ZF, which leaves the 
analogy account to stand on even shakier grounds. 
5 Conclusion 
Feferman and others3 have shown that the set-theoretic 
and semantic paradoxes can be reconstructed to follow a 
common principle. On the other hand, the discussion in 
Section 4 shows that set theory and semantics are based 
on structurally mismatching guiding principles, and more-
over that their respective end-products – the axiom sys-
tems – do not correspond to each other, as a genuine 
structural similarity should guarantee. 
Although the analogy account remains very 
attractive, this paper should hopefully have shown that it 
must be supported by a stronger argument if it is to resist 
these problems. 
                                                     
 
3 E.g. Priest 1994. 
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The Origins of Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology 
James M. Thompson, Halle, Germany 
While it is certainly true that the manuscripts comprising 
Wittgenstein’s “middle” phase have enjoyed more attention 
since the publication of the Nachlaß, neither his 
conception of phenomenology, nor its origins have 
captured the interest of many within Wittgensteinian 
studies. The reason(s) for this situation are not fully clear 
and probably involve several, more or less, related factors, 
which I will not go into now. However, where little interest 
existed early on amongst Wittgenstein’s interpreters, 
several thinkers associated with the phenomenological 
tradition were eager to take up the challenge of 
investigating these issues. This paper represents a brief 
overview of the possible origins of Wittgenstein’s sudden 
and unexpected use of the term “phenomenology.”1 
While certainly not the first person to take note of 
Wittgenstein’s use of the term “phenomenology” and 
“phenomenological grammar,” Herbert Spiegelberg’s initial 
article “The Puzzle of Wittgenstein’s Phänomenologie 
(1929-?)” generated a great deal of attention, and marks 
the first serious attempt to take Wittgenstein’s proclaimed 
phenomenology seriously. The “puzzle” began with the 
publication of the Philosophical Remarks in the original 
German. With this work, as Spiegelberg relates, came the 
“unexpectedly rich confirmation” to various allusions about 
a phenomenological theory and language that Wittgenstein 
had briefly entertained in 1929. Unfortunately, due to the 
lack of access to the unpublished manuscripts belonging 
to this period, Spiegelberg was not in a position to solve 
this riddle. However, his initial research and speculative 
efforts have significantly influenced later research 
regarding this topic, including my own efforts. 
What Wittgenstein meant by the term 
“phenomenology” is certainly linked to the question of its 
origin. Although his use of the term is not entirely 
dependent upon its originary source, clearly, such 
information would be of great assistance in understanding 
what he wanted to associate himself with as well as 
distance himself from. 
The most obvious question is whether or not 
Wittgenstein acquired the term from Edmund Husserl, 
either directly through his writings or indirectly via 
discussions, articles, and the like. Complicating the matter 
further, no comprehensive record of Wittgenstein’s 
personal library exists. Aside from the authors Wittgenstein 
himself mentions, we have only second hand reports from 
friends and colleagues regarding books Wittgenstein had 
obviously been reading. 
Even though we do not have any direct evidence of 
Wittgenstein having read Husserl, there are several 
anecdotes that prevent us from completely closing off this 
possibility or simply dismissing it out of hand. The first 
reference stems from notes taken during Wittgenstein’s 
visits to the Vienna Circle between 1929 and 1930 by 
Waismann, which can be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and the Vienna Circle. 
                                                     
 
1This paper is a modified version of a section from my book Wittgenstein on 
Phenomenology and Experience: An Investigation of Wittgenstein’s ‘Middle 
Period.’ Also, the quoted passages from Wittgenstein are my translation from 
the German original. 
During the course of their conversation on 
December 25th, 1929 the topic of Phänomenologie 
unexpectedly makes an appearance under the title 
Physics and Phenomenology. Paralleling comments in the 
Philosophical Remarks, here, Wittgenstein distinguishes 
his project – the logical investigation of phenomena in 
order to determine the structure of what is possible – from 
that of physics – which is only interested in establishing 
regularities. Toward the end of their discussion, in a 
section entitled Anti-Husserl – a title attributed to 
Waismann – Moritz Schlick poses the question to 
Wittgenstein: “What could one reply to a philosopher, who 
thinks the statements of phenomenology are synthetic a 
priori judgments?” (Wittgenstein 1980). Although 
Wittgenstein’s response is rather condemning, as 
Spiegelberg points out, it is unclear whether or not 
Wittgenstein is rejecting this position with actual 
knowledge of Husserl or simply the position presented by 
Schlick. If the latter, we can hardly attribute an accurate 
and unbiased portrayal of Husserl's work by Schlick 
considering their on-going debate at that time. 
Although not a member himself, Wittgenstein was 
certainly well acquainted with several of the Vienna Circles 
most influential patrons. The obvious question is: might 
one of members have been responsible for bringing 
Wittgenstein into contact with phenomenology? Felix 
Kaufmann would seem to be an obvious candidate, except 
there is no evidence that the two had anything to do with 
one another. And while Wittgenstein’s relationship to 
Waismann was much closer, given that his disdain for 
Husserl was comparable to that of Schlick, Waismann 
would also seem to be an unlikely candidate. 
If we are to hypothesize that Wittgenstein’s sudden 
use of the term phenomenology is traceable to the Vienna 
Circle, then the most likely person to have influenced him 
would have been Rudolf Carnap. In his work, The Logical 
Structure of the World (1928), Carnap’s conception of 
phenomenology reflects a certain influence of Husserl. 
This influence is almost certainly attributable to the contact 
he had with Husserl as Carnap was working on the first 
draft of his book. He had been staying in nearby 
Buchenbach between 1922 and 1925, and had attended 
several of Husserl’s seminars in Freiburg from the summer 
semester of 1924 till the summer semester of 1925 
(Spiegelberg 1981). While it cannot be said that Carnap 
was convinced of Husserl’s position, his text nevertheless 
contains several non-critical references to the Logical 
Investigations as well as Ideas I &II, not to mention the 
adoption of Husserl’s epoché. There are, however, two 
good reasons for doubting Carnap as a source for 
Wittgenstein’s sudden use of the term phenomenology: 
First, their accounts of phenomenology are not very similar 
(although, as Spiegelberg points out, they are closer to 
each other’s position than either is to Husserl’s). This 
alone does not rule Carnap out, but in conjunction with 
Carnap’s own admission that his relationship to 
Wittgenstein was quite strained during this time, the 
possibility of influence dwindles. 
Another incident, which seems to lend circumstantial 
support for Wittgenstein’s acquaintance with Husserl’s 
work, involves a chance meeting between Wittgenstein 
and J. N. Findlay in 1939. Findlay mentioned to Wittgenstein 
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that he was working on a translation of Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations, to which Wittgenstein “expressed some 
astonishment that he (Findlay) was still interested in this 
old text” (Spiegelberg 1981). While this by no means 
represents definitive proof, this anecdote keeps the 
possibility of Wittgenstein’s first-hand knowledge of 
Husserl’s phenomenology open. 
Frege represents another potential source of contact 
between Wittgenstein and Husserl. Given that the Frege 
and Husserl corresponded with one another and were 
working on related problems, it is not unreasonable to 
think that Husserl’s work or perhaps his ideas might have 
been mentioned. While I have, as of yet, not found any 
direct evidence for this connection in the correspondence 
between Wittgenstein and Frege, it nevertheless remains a 
promising avenue for further investigation. 
Another figure who we should not leave 
unconsidered is Heidegger. Over the course of several 
years, Wittgenstein makes at least two references to his 
work. The first stems from a discussion with Waismann 
and Schlick, where Wittgenstein appears to make an 
unsolicited remark regarding Being and Time and the 
concept of Angst: 
 
I have a pretty good idea of what Heidegger meant 
by Being and angst. Man has the urge to run up 
against the limits of language. Think, for example, of 
the wonder that something exists. This wonder can-
not be expressed in the form of a question, and 
there is not answer (Wittgenstein 1980)  
In the passage, Wittgenstein continues to develop the 
connections between his notions of “wonder” [Erstaunen] 
and “the ethical” with those of Heidegger and Kierkegaard. 
This admission on the part of Wittgenstein that certain 
aspects of his early thought, i.e. the mystical experience of 
the world and the ethical, are moving in the same direction 
certainly indicates at least a partial familiarity with Heideg-
ger’s work. 
Wittgenstein’s second encounter with Heidegger is 
not as obvious as the first. During an early explication of 
language-games and the grammar of word usage, 
Wittgenstein is concerned with preventing “the 
philosopher” from “straying down hopelessly wrong paths.” 
He then provides an example of just such a dangerous 
and misleading path present in language: 
 
If we want to deal with a sentence like ‘the Nothing 
nothings’ or the question ‘what was earlier, the 
Nothing or the negation?’ to be fair we must ask 
ourselves: what was the author thinking regarding 
this sentence? From where did he take this sen-
tence? ... He who speaks about the opposite of Be-
ing and the Nothing as well as the Nothing as hav-
ing priority over the negation, he thinks of – I believe 
– an island of Being surrounded by the endless sea 
of the Nothing (Wittgenstein 1998). 
Although not named as such, the passage (and the ac-
companying pages) clearly points to Heidegger’s lecture 
What is Metaphysics, in which the relationship of Dasein to 
“the Nothing” is treated. While Wittgenstein’s attitude to-
wards language such as “the Nothing nothings” is, indeed, 
critical, the passages do certainly suggest the provocative 
idea that Wittgenstein had first hand knowledge of Hei-
degger’s work, even if the latter passage betrays a lack of 
understanding regarding Heidegger’s point concerning “the 
Nothing” as a positive aspect of Being – and not as a mere 
negation of beings. When taken together, the two pas-
sages do seem to make Heidegger a promising candidate. 
However, the purpose of this section is not merely to 
establish points of contact, but rather to investigate the 
origin of Wittgenstein’s use of the term phenomenology. Or 
more precisely, was Wittgenstein’s initial use of the term 
and corresponding project of a phenomenological 
language directly influenced by other phenomenologists? 
Keeping this distinction in mind, and given the time frame 
of these two references, the possibility that Wittgenstein 
was influenced by Heidegger begins to dwindle. 
The first passage stems from the end of December 
1929, and although that does not exclude the possibility 
that Wittgenstein had read Being and Time prior to his 
return to Cambridge, thus prior to his introduction of the 
term phenomenology, the comment alone is inconclusive. 
The second passage stems from the beginning of January 
1932. Given that the lecture What is Metaphysics? was not 
even held until July 24th, 1929, and published later that 
same year, it cannot have been the impetus for 
Wittgenstein’s phenomenology. Thus, while the possibility 
remains open whether or not Heidegger had any direct 
influence on Wittgenstein, the search for the source of his 
phenomenological project in all likelihood lies elsewhere. 
As intriguing and provocative as these possibilities 
might seem, there are certainly other potential sources for 
Wittgenstein’s use of phenomenological language, which 
may have little or no real connection to Husserl or 
Heidegger. Although now most prominently associated 
with the term phenomenology, Husserl by no means 
invented the term. Many individuals, prior to and even after 
the turn of the century, laid claim to the term 
phenomenology, among them: Hegel, Goethe, Mach, and 
Mauthner. And although Wittgenstein had read the work of 
the latter three thinkers (especially Mauthner), we do not 
find any real matches regarding Wittgenstein’s “new” form 
of philosophizing. 
Lastly, I would mention a theory that is neither 
glamorous, nor really even a theory, but more of an 
educated guess. On the one hand, the “theory” implies the 
least “causal” interaction, but, on the other, by ridding 
ourselves of the need for a “smoking gun” agent of 
change, we are probably closer to the truth of the matter. 
The theory contends that the term “phenomenology” was a 
part of the Viennese cultural landscape; that the term was 
simply floating freely within this uniquely charged and 
fertile atmosphere. Having been born and raised in Vienna 
to one of the wealthiest families in Europe, Wittgenstein 
was certainly in a position to absorb the vibrant cultural 
atmosphere existing at this time. 
Continuing with the theme of a more general 
influence, it is even possible that his sister Margarete had 
a hand in the introduction of the term. She was the one 
who introduced the adolescent Ludwig to Schopenhauer’s 
The World and Will as Representation, and thus to 
philosophy. Within the family, she was considered the 
most academically and culturally astute, and with her 
wealth she was able fully to immerse herself in the culture 
of that time. Margarete certainly had the opportunity to 
have discussed such topics with him, and even provide 
access to a great deal of philosophical literature. Perhaps, 
after his return to Cambridge (from Vienna), in order to 
distinguish his present phenomena-logical investigations 
from his earlier work, he simply adopted a familiar term 
without any concrete source in mind. 
As I mentioned at the beginning of the section, the 
question regarding the origin of the term “phenomenology” 
in Wittgenstein’s work will probably never be definitively 
answered. None of his known writings or notes mentions 
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anyone specifically, and portions of his Nachlaß from 
around this time, which might have shed some light on the 
issue, were later destroyed per Wittgenstein’s instructions. 
That having been said, I would like to elaborate further my 
contribution to this speculative endeavor. 
When one considers the kind of thinker Wittgenstein 
was, I would contend that the notion of any specific 
influence quickly evaporates. As Spiegelberg writes, 
“‘influence’ [is] a very complicated affair… [and in 
Wittgenstein’s case] could hardly ever amount to anything 
more than a stimulant and a trigger for his own thinking” 
(Spiegelberg 1981) With the notable exceptions of 
Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell and possibly Mauthner, talk 
of traceable influence in Wittgenstein’s writings would be, 
at best, an uphill fight. 
Here, the problem of origin is analogous. 
Wittgenstein’s thought is so tightly wound around or within 
itself that to speak of an origin for his use of 
“phenomenology,” more likely than not, only misleadingly 
complicates the issue. By this, I am not proposing that 
Wittgenstein’s thought developed sealed up in some 
hermetic chamber; for obviously, he had been “influenced” 
by different thinkers and writers, even by his own 
admission. On several occasions, he even characterizes 
his own thought derogatorily as “reproductive” rather than 
creative or original (Wittgenstein 1977). However, the point 
is not whether Wittgenstein has been influenced by others, 
but rather how do these influences manifest themselves in 
his work, or concerning the question of origin, to what 
extent can something be regarded as being the source? 
A characteristic of Wittgenstein’s work is the degree 
to which he has internalized the various voices presented. 
This is most apparent in his later works, but is actually 
present at every stage of his development. What this 
means is that Wittgenstein rarely engages in a discussion 
with another thinker; rather he has either so thoroughly 
taken over a particular viewpoint or abstracted the main 
tenets of a position (and continued their development) that 
notions of authorship begin to blur. The various positions  
 
encountered in his texts and notes are usually his own. In 
other words, he has personalized them to such a degree 
that it is not Descartes’ dualism against which Wittgenstein 
is arguing, but Wittgenstein himself representing this 
dualism – Wittgenstein contra Wittgenstein. An example of 
this aspect of his thought can be seen in his later critique 
of philosophy in the Investigations. While the critique is 
directed towards the philosophic tradition, in going about 
his task, Wittgenstein actually criticizes his own earlier 
views (mostly those contained in the Tractatus). Here, the 
faults and weakness of philosophy, he believes to be 
embodied in his earlier thought. Thus, by critiquing the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein understands himself to be affecting 
a critique of philosophy as a whole. 
In closing, I would point out that even if he acquired 
the term “phenomenology” in a more open and non-
specific way, similar to what I have suggested above, it 
would be incorrect to conclude or simply insinuate that the 
term held no special significance for him. Quite to the 
contrary, had he been neutral with respect to calling his 
project “phenomenology,” it would never have survived the 
open and continuous hostility by certain members of the 
Vienna Circle, nor Moore’s repeated criticism of the term 
during Wittgenstein’s lectures. 
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Objects of Perception, Objects of Science, and Identity Statements 
Pavla Toráčová, Prague, Czech Republic 
I would like to present a brief investigation into the nature 
of theoretical identifications, in which we identify an object 
of our pretheoretical understanding with an object of 
scientific discovery. Traditional examples of such 
theoretical identifications are the following: „light is a 
stream of photons”, “water is H2O”, “lightning is an 
electrical discharge”, “gold is the element with the atomic 
number 79”, etc.  
Kripke: identity statements 
I will start with the account of the nature of identity state-
ments as provided by Saul Kripke (Kripke 1980). Accord-
ing to this account, identity statements like “light is a 
stream of photons”, “heat is molecular motion”, etc., are 
statements that involve two rigid designators that desig-
nate the identical natural phenomenon. A rigid designator 
is a term that designates the same object in every possible 
world. The key point is that the reference of the rigid des-
ignator is not determined by the description expressed by 
or associated with the term as it was suggested by the 
traditional theory of reference. According to that traditional 
theory, the referent is any object that fulfils the description 
expressed, possibly in a disguised form, by the term. 
Kripke shows that we often use terms (especially proper 
names, but also terms of natural species and natural phe-
nomena) in a different way: we use them to refer to the 
particular object or phenomenon in its necessary exis-
tence, which doesn’t involve the contingent properties the 
objects actually bears. Thus, the name “Kurt Gödel” desig-
nates a man who, providing his life had gone differently, 
might not have achieved all the things that he achieved. 
The name “evening star” designates the object—i.e., the 
planet—that, in a different possible world, is not seen in 
the evening sky. And similarly, term “heat” designates the 
natural phenomenon that, in another possible world, 
doesn’t cause the characteristic sensations in sensitive 
creatures, and the term “gold” designates a natural spe-
cies that might not have been yellow. The properties ex-
pressed by the term (or associated with it)—in the above 
examples they might be: “to have proven the incomplete-
ness of arithmetic,” “to be seen as the first bright object in 
the evening sky,” “to produce the specific sensations in 
people”—are only contingently true of the objects and 
phenomena designated by the terms.  
Now it is exactly this feature that makes the 
theoretical identifications possible. The structure of the 
identifications then may be explained as follows: Initially 
we identify the natural phenomenon by phenomenal 
qualities that are true of it in our world, and are true of it 
only contingently; heat, for example, we identify by the 
characteristic sensations it causes in us; gold by the color, 
brightness and solidity; water by the characteristic look, 
taste and feel, etc. Later in the scientific inquiry, we 
discover the essential properties of the phenomenon, i.e., 
the properties that are necessarily true of the 
phenomenon. In the statement of identity we then state the 
identity of the very object that is referred to by both 
terms—initially we refer to it without knowing its essential 
properties that we later scientifically discover.  
Kripke says: 
 
„What characteristically goes on in these cases of, 
let’s say, ‘heat is molecular motion’? There is a cer-
tain referent which we have fixed, for the real world 
and for all possible worlds, by a contingent property 
of it, namely the property that it’s able to produce 
such and such sensations in us. Let’s say it’s a con-
tingent property of heat that it produces such and 
such sensations in people. It’s after all contingent 
that there should ever have been people on this 
planet at all. So one doesn’t know a priori what 
physical phenomenon, described in other terms—in 
basic terms of physical theory—is the phenomenon 
which produces these sensations. We don’t know 
this, and we’ve discovered eventually that this phe-
nomenon is in fact molecular motion. When we have 
discovered this, we’ve discovered an identification 
which gives us an essential property of this phe-
nomenon. We have discovered a phenomenon 
which in all possible worlds will be molecular mo-
tion—which could not have failed to be molecular 
motion, because that’s what the phenomenon is. On 
the other hand, the property by which we identify it 
originally, that of producing such and such sensa-
tion in us, is not a necessary property but a contin-
gent one.” (Kripke 1980, 132-133) 
When we say “heat” we actually mean the phenomenon 
that is the same in every possible world, the phenomenon 
that possesses the essential property “to be molecular 
motion”. When we use the term “heat” we mean this phe-
nomenon from the very beginning although we have no 
knowledge of the essential property and the only way we 
are initially able to identify it is by the contingent property 
“to produce such and such sensations in us.” 
Kripke says:  
 
“In general, science attempts, by investigating basic 
structural traits, to find the nature, and thus the es-
sence (in the philosophical sense) of the kind. /.../ 
Note that on the present view, scientific discoveries 
of species essence do not constitute a ‘change of 
meaning’; the possibility of such discoveries was 
part of the original enterprise.” (Kripke 1980, 138) 
The ability of terms to refer to an object not by virtue of the 
object’s properties which are known to us (and that are 
often expressed by the term)—indeed, to refer to the ob-
ject, as it were, despite of these properties—is the crucial 
point of Kripke’s theory of reference of proper names. It 
also contributes to our understanding of the theoretical 
identifications that have been discussed in this paper and 
that enjoy considerable interest among philosophers. 
However, there are some questions that arise: If the rigid 
designator designates the phenomenon independently of 
the description that goes with the term, be it the descrip-
tion of the contingent properties or the description of the 
essential properties, how can we know the scientifically 
discovered property is the essential one? Indeed, how 
could science have ever begun its enterprise, if the once 
available properties are regarded as not relevant for the 
necessary existence of the phenomenon that science aims 
to discover? To be sure, at the beginning of the scientific 
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enterprise, the so-called “contingent” properties provide 
the only available knowledge of the object.  
Another question that comes to one’s mind is 
whether the scientific term really expresses the essential 
properties of the phenomenon—it can still be replaced by 
a better, and completely different, description as science 
proceeds forward in the analogical way the phenomenal 
term was replaced by the scientific one. Isn’t, here, the role 
of the essential properties the same as the role of the 
phenomenal properties—i.e., to be regarded as the 
contingent property? To accept that doesn’t necessarily 
bring any unsound relativity about the scientific truth—we 
can maintain that real natural phenomena posses certain 
essential properties, which after all makes one of our 
descriptions to be more adequate or true then the other, 
and at the same time to admit that none of our descriptions 
of the phenomena is perfectly adequate and absolutely 
true.  
Strawson: objects of perception and  
objects of science 
Now I would like to turn attention to ideas of P. F. Straw-
son, who provides an explanation of the identification of 
objects as scientists describe them with the objects as we 
know them by sense perception in his article “Perception 
and Its Objects” (Strawson 2002). Sense perception is, in 
Strawson’s view, the way we initially or pretheoretically 
identify objects in the world—as having phenomenal quali-
ties presented to us by our senses. Later on, when we 
achieve scientific descriptions of the objects in the world, 
we replace the phenomenal properties with the scientific 
ones. The traditional account of this changeover (i.e., the 
representative theory of perception) considers the phe-
nomenal properties to be merely subjective sensations 
caused in us by the real objects that science truly de-
scribes. According to this traditional account, science 
teaches us that the objects in fact don’t have the phe-
nomenal qualities, that they, in fact, are not of the pale 
green color as we see them and of the rough surface as 
we touch them and of the sweet scent as we smell them 
and of the warm quality as we feel them. It’s true that in 
our sense perception we perceive the objects as being 
green and fragrant and soft and tasty, but we are, as it 
were, the victims of a persistent illusion—these qualities 
don’t belong to the objects themselves but to our experi-
ences; they are nothing but our sensations (or sense data) 
which are caused by the real objects. They can be said to 
represent the outer objects, but the outer objects don’t 
posses them as such, they just cause them in us.  
In his article, Strawson argues against this 
representative approach and proposes an alternative 
picture of what’s going on when we perceive objects and 
when we come to know the very same objects in a 
scientific investigation. First, he points out that the 
representative account is unconvincing. We live in a world 
of objects that are phenomenally propertied, where the 
properties belong to the objects, and not to my 
experiences. The book remains green even when I put it in 
my bag, the heat stays in the room even when I leave it. 
This phenomenal world is the public world, accessible to 
observation by others. Strawson writes:  
 
“Consider the character of those ordinary concepts 
of objects on the employment of which our lives, our 
transactions with each other and the world, depend: 
our concepts of cabbages, roads, tweed coats, 
horses, the lips and heir of the beloved. In using 
these terms we certainly intend to be talking of in-
dependent existences and we certainly intend to be 
talking of immediately perceptible things, bearers of 
phenomenal (visuo-tactile) properties. /.../ Surely we 
mean by a cabbage a kind of thing of which most of 
the specimens we have encountered have a charac-
teristic range of colours and visual shapes and felt 
textures; and not something unobservable, mentally 
represented by a complex of sensible experiences 
which it causes.” (Strawson 2002, 103–104) 
Strawson thereby presents a common-sense realistic view 
with which we all pretheoretically live. In this view, phe-
nomenal qualities belong to the objects and are consid-
ered to be the real properties existing independently of our 
experience of them. Its only later, when we are to explain 
the identity of the phenomenally propertied object and the 
scientific object, that we are willing to accept the illusory 
character of the phenomenal world: only then we can have 
a reason to say that the scientific description matches the 
real object whereas the phenomenal properties are mere 
subjective appearances of it, mere contingent effects of 
the real object. For if we don’t accept the illusory character 
of phenomenal properties, how could we explain the ques-
tion of identity?  
Strawson doesn’t accept this “illusionary” step and 
suggests his own explanation of the identity question: he 
uses the relativity of points of view that is present in our 
perception and in our ordinary ascription of the 
phenomenal properties to things: 
 
“The mountains are red-looking at this distance in 
this light; blue-looking at that distance at that light; 
and, when we are clambering up them, perhaps nei-
ther. Such-and-such a surface looks pink and 
smooth from a distance; mottled and grainy when 
closely examined; different again, perhaps, under 
the microscope.” (Strawson 2002, 107) 
We are used to shifting our point of view and so the differ-
ent quality ascriptions are not seen as conflicting. Straw-
son suggests seeing the scientific descriptions as one of 
those shifts of point of view, though a more radical one. 
Scientists then can be seen as carrying out the original 
pursuit but by different means.  
The pragmatic approach to identity  
statements 
We can understand Strawson’s view as the view that, in 
using phenomenal terms, we ordinarily mean objects as 
essentially phenomenally propertied, because we mean 
them as existing independently of us and our perception. 
In perceiving the object, we make the distinction between 
the object existing independently of us and our perceiving 
of it, for example between the seen object and our seeing 
it; this distinction is, according to Strawson, essentially 
embedded in our sense perception.  
According to Kripke, however, terms that express 
phenomenal qualities designate objects that posses the 
phenomenal properties only contingently, as the effects in 
sensitive beings like us. The essential properties of the 
objects are, in Kripke’s view, expressed only by the 
scientific descriptions.  
The views of both philosophers are quite convincing, 
but, at the same time, both could also be challenged. 
Strawson’s view can be challenged from the scientific point 
of view: We have scientifically discovered that the 
phenomenal properties are not the properties of the real 
objects, but they are the properties that the real objects 
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cause in us. Kripke can be challenged if we are, for 
example, interested in the genetic question of knowledge: 
where does the drive for the knowledge of the essential 
properties come from if the phenomenal properties are 
irrelevant to the reference of phenomenal terms?  
I believe we can reconcile these two views if we 
bring into play the pragmatic current present in both 
Kripke’s and Strawson’s accounts. It seems it must be the 
agent (or the speaker) who uses the term as referring to 
the properties out there, and who therefore makes the 
difference between the perceived thing (independent of 
perceiving) and the perceiving of the thing. Strawson 
claims there is a difference between the perceived and the 
perceiving present in the perception from the very 
beginning, and this feature points to the agent. As to 
Kripke’s take on reference, we can ask how the term fixes 
the referent if it doesn’t do it in virtue of its sense—and we 
don’t have to go far to find the answer that it is the agent, 
who uses the term, that fixes the referent.  
The question of the status of the descriptions of both 
the phenomenal and the scientific properties—i.e. the 
question if they pick out the necessary properties of the 
object, or if they refer to its contingent properties—then  
 
can be understood as a matter of the manner of use of the 
term. The identity statements then may be seen as 
consisting in the dynamic alteration of those manners of 
use. We are acquainted with the objects in the world as 
having certain properties that are essential for them; at the 
same time we are ready to abandon this belief and take 
those properties as mere appearances (or mere tentative 
descriptions) if another set of properties that we can take 
as the essential one—perhaps it allows better 
predictions—is available, where this shift is allowed by the 
other manner we use the terms—i. e., that we use them as 
fixing the referent independently of the properties 
expressed by the term or associated with it.  
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The Reduction of Logic to Structures 
Majda Trobok, Rijeka, Croatia 
Introduction 
The structuralist account of logic endorsed by Koslow 
(Koslow 1992, 2007) is one of the most appealing contem-
porary formulations of structuralism in logic. 
But, what does structuralism in logic amount to? Is it 
analogous with structuralism in mathematics or other 
domains? And if yes, in which sense? 
In this paper I try to answer these questions by 
presenting the basic tenets of Koslow’s theory; I then 
analyse his views and offer reasons for holding that some 
aspects of his structuralist account are flawed. Finally, I try 
to show that Koslow’s theory of logic fails to achieve a 
satisfactory answer to the question of a possible reduction 
of logic to structure(s).   
One of the fields that is paradigmatically about 
structures is mathematics. This can be read in two ways: 
mathematics is about different structures such as the 
vector space structure, the natural number structure, the 
group structure etc., while the possibility of reducing 
mathematical theories to set theory, gives sense to viewing 
mathematics as about the (common) set-theoretic 
structure. Philosophically speaking, the (ontological) 
reduction of mathematical objects to structures leads to 
interesting results that aim to solve some ontological, as 
well as epistemological, problems in the philosophy of 
mathematics (see (Resnik 1997), (Shapiro 1997), (Hellman 
2001)), even though it also brings to the surface some 
difficulties such as the problem of structures that admit 
non-trivial automorphisms (for more details see for 
example (Hellman 2001, p.193)).  
What about logic? Is there any analogy with 
mathematics, in the sense of being about (different) 
structures? Or is it maybe the case that logics share a 
universal structure? As is well known, different logics are 
based on different principles. Examples are legion. Let us 
just mention the case of relevance logic and its constraint 
of a necessary relevant connection between the premises 
and the conclusion in any argument, absolutely absent in 
classical logic. 
Does it mean that the proposal of a common logical 
structure and, consequently, of a universal logic, is 
destined to fail? In this paper I will try to answer this 
question through a discussion of the tenets of the 
structuralist account of logic.  
Koslow’s structuralist account of logic 
The lynch-pin of Koslow’s structuralist account of logic is 
the notion of implication structure and the definition of logi-
cal (and modal) operators relative to an implication struc-
ture. Let us see what these definitions amount to and what 
results they imply.  
An implication structure is any order pair: ((S, ⇒); 
where S is a non-empty set, while “⇒” is an implication 
relation. 
An implication relation is (implicitly) defined as any 
relation that satisfies the following conditions: 
 
(1) Reflexivity: A ⇒ A, for each A in S 
(2) Projection: A1, A2, …, An ⇒ Ak, for every k = 1, …, n, 
and for each Ai in S (i = 1, …,n) 
(3) Simplification: If  A1, A1, A2, …, An ⇒ B, then  A1, A2, …, 
An ⇒ B, for all Ai (i = 1, …,n) and B in S 
(4) Permutation: If A1, A2, …, An ⇒ B, then Af(1), Af(2), …, 
Af(n) ⇒ B, for any permutation f of {1, …,n} 
(5) Dilution (or Thinning): If A1, A2, …, An ⇒ B, then A1, A2, 
…, An, C  ⇒ B, for any Ai (i = 1, …,n), B and C in S 
(6) Cut: If A1, A2, …, An ⇒ B, and B, B1, B2, …, Bm ⇒ C, 
then A1, A2, …, An, B1, B2, …, Bm ⇒ C, for any Ai, Bj, B 
and C (i, j = 1, …,n) 
Someone might object that a different choice of constraints 
would be more fruitful and economical since clearly Reflex-
ivity follows from Projection, and Dilution follows from Pro-
jection and Cut. Nevertheless, Koslow keeps the list of 
constraints for the sake of greater articulateness, based on 
Gentzen’s theory.  
Given the constraints, there are examples of 
implication relations that immediately come to mind, such 
as the notion of (semantic) consequence or the (syntactic) 
notion of deducibility for a set of sentences of some first-
order logical theory. But, interestingly enough, these 
examples do not even remotely exhaust all the 
possibilities. Either in the sense of getting unusually 
defined logical operators, given a set of propositions of 
first-order logic or certain examples of logical operators 
defined on elements of S that are either not syntactic 
objects or truth bearers.  
 
The logical operators can act in a broad variety of 
settings, sentential and otherwise. In particular, the 
actions of the operators on structures of sets, 
names, and interrogatives, to cite just some non-
standard examples, are mentioned because the 
items in these cases fail in an obvious way to be 
syntactical or fail to be truth-bearers.  
(Koslow 1992, p.9) 
Set inclusion, for example, given any set of subsets of a 
non-empty set S, also fulfils all the mentioned constraints, 
so (S, ⊆) exemplifies the implication structure. Other ex-
amples may be found in the context of the theory of indi-
viduals and erotetic logic (Koslow 1992, p. 209-229). 
Such a definition might seem to be needlessly 
general, especially given its non-economicity, but this point 
is not lost on Koslow since its generality is more a virtue 
than a limitation. Analogously, it is possible to get some 
rather weird group structure examples or mathematically 
uninteresting equivalence relations. Of course, such 
examples might be more or less philosophically, 
mathematically or logically interesting and fruitful. 
Given the definition of implication structures, the 
logical operators are defined relative to such structures, 
i.e. as functions defined on structures. And here again, 
given the possibility of non-standard implication relations, 
the same applies to the operators as well.  
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Let us take the example of the hypothetical operator 
H⇒. For any elements A and B in the implication structure 
(S, ⇒), H⇒(A, B) is the hypothetical having A as the 
antecedent and B as a consequent, if and only if the 
following conditions are fulfilled: 
 
(H1) A, H⇒(A, B) ⇒ B 
(H2) H⇒(A, B) is the weakest element satisfying the  
condition (1). It means that, for any element T of the  
implication structure such that A, T ⇒ B, it follows that 
T ⇒ H⇒(A, B) 
Such a definition leaves open per se the answer to the 
question as to whether the hypothetical, given an implica-
tion structure, may fail to exist or not. And the following 
example solves the dilemma positively. 
Let us take the implication structure (S, ⇒), in which 
S = {A, B, C, D} and the implication relation is given in the 
following way: 
 
n such a structure, the hypothetical H⇒(A, B) does not 
exist (not to be confused with the fact that A ⇒ B); namely, 
H⇒(A, B) is, by definition, the weakest member T of S such 
that: A, T ⇒ B. Since A ⇒ B, the condition is fulfilled by 
any element of S, but there is no weakest element. C can-
not be the weakest element since A, D ⇒ B, while D ≠> C 
(see the condition (H2) above). D cannot be the weakest 
for the same reason. (See Koslow (1992) for more exam-
ples). 
As easily noted, such a definition does not put any 
constraints on truth conditions, syntactic features or others; 
as Koslow points out: 
 
There is no appeal to truth conditions, assertibility 
conditions, or any syntactical features or semantic 
values of the elements of the structure. (Koslow 
1992, p. 78) 
The fact that the elements of an implication structure are 
not necessarily syntactic objects having a special sign 
design or elements having a semantic value, is what make 
the explanation/definition of the logical operators free of 
such constraints. 
The structuralist account of logic – critical 
remarks 
I will concentrate on certain aspects of the structuralist 
account of logic and make a number of quite general re-
marks. 
First, if we have a look at the six conditions (defined 
as (1) Reflexivity,…, (6) Cut) that any relation has to fulfil in 
order to be an implication relation, we may ask how is the 
left-hand side of the expression A1, …, An ⇒ B to be 
construed? In the case in which S is a non-empty set of 
sets and the implication relation is set inclusion, the 
sequence A1, …, An is the intersection of sets (Koslow 
1992, p. 53). Since the intersection of sets is their 
conjunction, it turns out that in order to interpret the 
sequence A1, …, An, i.e. in order to determine that the 
implication relation is set inclusion, we ought to know what 
the intersection, i.e. the conjunction of sets is. It follows 
that in certain cases we ought to know how a certain 
logical operator is defined prior to having determined an 
implication relation on a non-empty set. According to the 
structuralist account of logic, it should be the other way 
round.  
Secondly, one of the most interesting results of the 
structuralist account of logic is the definition of the 
operators for interrogatives: 
 
Let Q be a set of interrogatives 
S — a set of sentences inclusive of the sentential di-
rect answers to the questions in Q 
S' = S ∪ Q. 
A direct answer need not be a true one: 
 
We shall use the term “interrogative” to include any 
question that has a direct answer. The most impor-
tant feature of the direct answers to a question is 
that they are statements that, whether they are true 
or false, tell the questioner exactly what he wants to 
know – neither more nor less. (Koslow 1992, p. 220) 
The implication relation on S' (‘⇒q’) is defined as follows 
(Koslow 1992, pp.218-229): 
 
Let M1?, M2?, …, Mn? and R? be questions in Q,  
F1, F2, …, Fm and G be statements of S (the set of 
M’s or the set of F’s may be empty but not both), 
and 
Ai be a direct answer to the question Mi? (I = 1,…,n).  
Then 
 
(1.) F1, F2, …, Fm, M1?, M2?, …, Mn? ⇒q R? if and 
only if there is some direct  answer B to the 
question R? such that  
F1, F2, …, Fm, A1, A2, …, An ⇒ B 
(2.) F1, F2, …, Fm, M1?, M2?, …, Mn? ⇒q G if and 
only if  
F1, F2, …, Fm, A1, A2, …, An ⇒ G 
Such a definition is problematic. Let us see why. Let the 
set of F’s be empty (for the sake of simplicity), and let us 
examine the case in which a question implies a statement 
(the second condition in the definition). Let the statement 
G be any false statement, e.g. a false answer to the ques-
tion R?. In this case, whether M1? ⇒q G or not depends on 
whether A1 ⇒ G, and the latter depends on what answer 
A1 (to the question M1?) we choose. If the answer we 
choose is a false one, then M1? ⇒q G, otherwise M1? ≠>q 
G. More generally, the same problem appears whenever 
the statement G is false. In this case, given a collection of 
interrogatives Mi? (I = 1,…n), their respective direct an-
swers Ai, and a set of true statements Fi (I = 1,…n), there 
is nothing in Koslow’s definition that allows us to uniquely 
determine whether F1, F2, …, Fm, M1?, M2?, …, Mn? ⇒q G 
or not.  
Thirdly, let us consider a more general difficulty with 
the theory. Even though we might expect that certain 
results that hold given the operators classically defined 
hold in non-standard cases too, Koslow shows it is not the 
case. Let us mention the cases of implication structures in 
which (((A → B) → A) → A) is not a thesis or examples of 
structures in which the hypothetical with false antecedents 
can sometimes be true, and sometimes false (Koslow 
1992, pp. 83-90). 
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These are features of the system, not of the 
structure, so it is not odd that such results are not 
necessarily present in non-standard implication structures. 
Nevertheless, having a true hypothetical whenever the 
antecedent is false (or having certain expressions as 
thesis) is not a marginal result given the operators 
classically defined. Two questions arise at this point: how 
do we get from the semantic-and-syntactic-features-free 
definitions to the syntactic rules for formula formation or 
the (semantic) truth tables, giving results that do not follow 
from the structurally defined operators? And how can a 
system have so many basic features that are not, in some 
form or another, already present in the structure? 
Such problems make us think that the 
characterization of the operators relative to the implication 
structure does not, in itself, obtain the semantic and 
syntactic results we expect to get in the standardly defined 
implication structures. For these reasons Koslow’s 
structuralist account does not satisfactorily solve the task 
of characterizing the logical operators relative to 
implication structures and even though tempting in many 
philosophical and logical aspects, it makes us sceptical as 
to whether a general logical structure might, after all, be 
defined. 
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Reducing Sets to Modalities 
Rafał Urbaniak, Ghent, Belgium 
The ultimate aim here is to provide a modal interpretation 
of the language of set theory. Let us start with the question 
of ontological commitment of plural quantification. First, I 
introduce the language of Quantified Name Logic (QNL) 
and provide it with a set-theoretic semantics. 
The language of QNL is generated by the alphabet 
containing brackets, name variables: 
 
a1, a2, a3,... (as an abbreviation, also a, b, c, d, ... 
possibly with numerical subscripts), 
the constant ε, the existential quantifier (∃a) (the universal 
quantifier (∀) has its usual definition), and two Boolean 
connectives: negation ¬, and conjunction &. 
The set of well-formed formulas of QNL is the 
least set satisfying the following conditions:  
 
(i) If a1 and a2 are name variables, ε(a1, a2) is a 
well-formed formula, 
(ii) If A1 and A2 are well-formed formulas and a is a 
name variable, also ¬(A1), &(A1, A2) and 
(∃a)(A1) are well-formed formulas. 
I also freely move to infix notation for the language. 
Quite an imparsimonious but a fairly standard 
semantics for QNL is given as follows.1 Take the domain 
to be a set of objects and take the range of name variables 
to be the power set of the domain. An S-model of QNL is a 
pair <D, I> such that D is an arbitrary set and I is a total 
function which maps name variables into the power set of 
D (i.e. to each name variable it assigns a subset of the 
domain). Neither D nor I(a) for any a has to be non-empty.  
Definition. Truth in an S-model is defined by the follow-
ing conditions: 
 
<D, I> models ε(a, b) iff |I(a)| = 1 (i.e. I(a) is a single-
ton) and I(a) is a subset of I(b). 
Phrases for negation and conjunction are standard: a 
model models a negation iff it doesn’t model the ne-
gated formula, a model models a conjunction iff it 
models both conjuncts. 
<D, I> models (∃a)A iff <D, Ia> models A for some Ia 
which differs from I at most at a.  
 
A sentence is S-valid iff it is true in any S-model. ∆ 
One of the standard objections against nominalistic ac-
ceptability of the logic of plurals is that it needs a formal 
semantics, the set-theoretic semantics commits the plural-
ist to sets, and the substitutional interpretation of plural 
quantification does not provide the language with the re-
quired expressive power (we “run out of tokens”, if they're 
supposed to be finite strings over a finite alphabet). In 
order to provide an answer to that objection, I give a semi-
substitutional semantics which avoids the objections usu-
ally raised against the substitutional interpretation of plural 
quantifiers. 
                                                     
 
1 QNL is pretty much a variant of Boolos’s logic of plurals - the expressive 
power of both languages (modulo set-theoretic semantics) is the same. 
I develop a Kripke semantics for QNL. It is a 
modal interpretation, where the plural quantifier ‘(∃a)’ 
(suppose A does not contain free variables other than a) is 
intuitively read as ‘it is possible to introduce a name a, 
which would make A substitutionally true’ (the semantics is 
different from that of Chihara). There are good reasons to 
claim that QNL with Kripke semantics has the same 
expressive power as QNL with set-theoretic semantics (as 
it turns out, for any set-theoretic model there is a Kripke 
model which agrees with it on all QNL formulas and the 
other way round: for any Kripke model there is a set-
theoretic model which agrees with it on all formulas). 
Definition. A naming structure is a tuple <I, W> where I 
is a set (of bare individuals) and W is a set of possible 
worlds. A possible world is a tuple <N, d> where I and N 
are disjoint sets and d is a subset of the Cartesian product 
of N and I. A bare world is the possible world where N is 
the empty set  (Φ). The following conditions all have to be 
satisfied: 
 
B = <Φ, Φ> belongs to W (i.e. the naming structure 
contains the bare world). 
For any w in <N, d> different from B, N is non-empty 
and countable. 
The accessibility relation on possible worlds is de-
fined by the following condition. Let w = <N, d>,  
w' = <N', d'>. Rww' if and only if both: (i) N is a 
proper subset of N', (ii) the restriction of d' to N (i.e. 
the set of those d'-related pairs whose first elements 
belong to N) is d.  
Let <N, d> = w belong to W. A naming structure M = <I, 
W> is w-complete if and only if: for any subset A of N 
there exists a w’ = <N', d'> in M such that Rww' and there 
is an x in N' such that for any y in I, d'(x, y) if and only if y 
belongs to A. M is complete iff for any w in W, M is w-
complete. ∆ 
Definition. An M-interpretation is a triple <M, w, v>, where 
M is a naming structure, w = <N, d> is a possible world in 
M and v either assigns to every variable in QNL an 
element of N, if N is non-empty, or is the empty function on 
the set of variables of QNL otherwise. If M is a complete 
naming structure, then we say that this M-interpretation is 
complete. ∆ 
Definition. Let <M, w, v> be an M-interpretation, w =  
<N, d>. Also, let a and b be QNL-variables and A and B be 
QNL-formulas. 
 
<M, w, v> models aεb iff v(a) and v(b) are defined 
and there exists a unique x in I such that <v(a),x> is 
in d and there is a y in I such that both <v(a),y> and 
<v(b),y> are in d.  
The clauses for negation and conjunction are fairly 
standard. A model models a negation iff v isn’t the 
empty function and it doesn’t model the negated 
formula; and it models a conjunction iff it models 
both conjuncts.  
<M, w, v> models (∃a)A iff for some w' in M, Rww' 
and <M, w', v'> models A, where v' differs from v at 
most in what it assigns to a. 
A sentence is true in a naming structure M if and only if it 
is satisfied in its bare world under any valuation. A sen-
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tence is valid if and only if it is true in any naming structure. 
A sentence is complete -valid if it is true in any complete 
naming structure. ∆ 
It turns out that this semantics is in a sense 
equivalent to set-theoretic semantics. 
Theorem. For any QNL sentence A, A is S-valid if and 
only if A is complete-valid. ∆  
Next, let's take a look at the modal factor involved in 
this semantics by comparing it to a certain two-sorted first-
order modal logic of naming (MLN). The language of MLN 
contains two sorts of variables: individual variables 
 
x, y, z, x1, x2, ..., y1, y2, ..., z1, z2, ... 
and name variables 
 
n, m, o, n1, n2, ..., m1, m2, ..., o1, o2, ... 
Besides, it contains quantifiers ranging over objects of 
those two sorts, the classical propositional connectives, 
two modal operators (say, ◊ for possibility and  for neces-
sity), no predicate variables, the identity symbol and one 
two-place predicate constant D. Formation rules are stan-
dard (the only new thing is that D takes name variables as 
first arguments and individual variables as second argu-
ments). Models of MLN are just naming structures. 
Definition. An MLN-interpretation is a tuple <M, w, i>, 
where M = <I, W> is a naming structure, <N, d> = w is in M 
and i is (a) undefined if N is empty, and (b) maps all 
individual variables into I and all name variables into N 
otherwise. Satisfaction of MLN-formulas in interpretations 
is defined as follows: 
 
<M, w, i> models D(n, x) iff i is defined and  
<i(n), i(x)> is in d. 
<M, w, i> models t1 = t2 iff i(t1) = i(t2), where each ti is 
one of the variables (arguments of = don’t have to 
be of the same sort). 
The clauses for negation and conjunction are stan-
dard. 
<M, w, i> models (∃t)A iff there is an interpretation i' 
(mapping individual variables into I and name vari-
ables into N) that differs from i only in what it as-
signs to t and <M, w, i'> models A.  
<M, w, i> models ◊(A) iff there is a w' such that 
Rww’and <M, w', i> models A. 
An MLN-sentence is true in a naming structure if it is satis-
fied in the bare world that underlies it. ∆ 
Intuitively we read ‘◊(A)’ as ‘there is a way names 
could be such that A’ and ‘D(n, x)’ as ‘x is one of the 
objects denoted by n’ or ‘n refers to x’ (where it is not 
assumed that names do not have to refer uniquely). 
Clearly, there is a translation from QNL into MLN 
and QNL with Kripke semantics can be embedded in the 
language of MLN. Since this embedding preserves models 
(i.e. models for QNL and MLN are the same, what changes 
is just the interpretation of symbols), it seems that the 
ontological commitment of QNL with Kripke semantics 
does not go beyond the ontological commitment of first-
order (two-sorted) modal logic (with one relation constant). 
Since it is much less plausible that first-order modal logic 
commits one to abstract objects than that plural 
quantification does, this strengthen the case for the 
ontological innocence of QNL. 
The strategy can be extended to provide an account 
of a cumulative hierarchy of names: 
Definition. A cumulative naming structure is a tuple  
<I, W>, where I is a set of bare individuals and W is a set 
of cumulative possible worlds. A cumulative possible 
world (c.p.w., for short) is a tuple <d, (Ni+)>, where (Ni) is a 
denumerable family of sets of names indexed with positive 
natural numbers, d is the subset of the Cartesian product 
of U(Ni) and I ∪ (Ni) (that is, of the union of all Ni’s and the 
union of I with the union of all Ni’s), and the following 
conditions are satisfied (let i ∈ N+): 
( ) ( ){ },i k
k i
i y x N x y d I N
<
⎡ ⎤∀ ∃ ∈ ∈ ⊆ ∪⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦U  
( ) ( )11 ,i ii x N y N x y d−⎡ ⎤∀ > ∈ → ∃ ∈ ∈⎣ ⎦  
( ),( ) ,  where i iB d N W i N= ∈ ∀ = ∅  
For any i, Ni is countable. 
 
( ) ( )( ),( )i kw w d N i k i N⎡ ⎤∀ = → ∃ ∀ > = ∅⎣ ⎦  
If w = <d, (Ni)> and x is in Ni, we say that x is a name of 
level i in w. ∆ 
The notions of accessibility and of completeness of 
a naming structure are obvious generalizations of the 
notions that we have already introduced. 
Definition. Suppose i ∈ N+. Let <I, W> be a cumulative 
naming structure and let w = <d, (Ni)> and w' = <d', (N'i)> 
belong to W. Then, Rww' if and only if: 
 
( ) i ii N N′∀ ⊆  
( ) i ii N N′∃ ⊂  
( ){ } { }, , , ,i ii x y x N x y d x y x N x y d′∀ ∈ ∧ ∈ = ∈ ∧ ∈   ∆ 
Definition. Let M = <I, W> be a cumulative naming struc-
ture and let w = <d, (Ni)> (I > 0) belong to W. For the sake 
of convenience we fix the notation as follows. Ni’s with i > 1 
are sets of names, and N0 is just another name for I. 
Clearly, there exists the least natural number k (0 is 
treated as a natural number but not as a positive natural 
number) such that for any I > k, Ni is empty. M is said to be  
w-cumulatively complete (w-complete, for short) if and 
only if for any  
 
0,
n
n n k
A N
≥ <
⊆ U  
there is a possible world <d, (N'i)> = w' in W such that w' is 
at most of level k+1 (that is, (∀i > k) N'i = ∅), both Rww' 
and: 
( )( ) ( )1
0,
,k n
n n k
x N y y N x y d x A+
≥ ≤
⎛ ⎞′∃ ∈ ∀ ∈ → ∈ ↔ ∈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠U  
M is said to be cumulatively complete iff for any w in W, 
M is w-cumulatively complete. ∆ 
If w is of level k (Nk is the highest non-empty element 
of w), then the domain of names of w (denoted by DN(w)) is 
the union of of all Ni for 1 ≤ I ≤ k, and the domain of 
objects of w (denoted by DO(w)) is the union of DN(w) and I. 
Now, I will define a language that resembles the 
language of set theory, and the satisfaction relation for this 
language. The language of cumulative naming logic 
(CNL) contains the standard (first-order) logical symbols 
(including identity), variables xi that (under an 
interpretation) will take pure individuals as values, 
Reducing sets to modalities — Rafał Urbaniak 
 
 
 361
variables ai that (under an interpretation) will take either 
names or pure individuals as values, quantifiers that can 
bind variables of both sorts. Besides, the language 
contains one primitive symbol D - a two-place predicate 
(which can take variables of both sorts as arguments in 
arbitrary combinations) that in the intended reading means 
‘denotes’. A CNL term is either an individual variable, or an 
ai variable (I will use the standard simplifications regarding 
dropping indices and writing a, b, c, d instead of a1, a2, a3, 
a4 and u, v, x, y, z instead of x1, x2, x3, x4, x5). 
Definition. Complete cumulative name structures are 
intended models of the language of CNL. A CNL 
interpretation is a tuple <M, w, v> such that M is a 
complete cumulative naming structure, w is a c.p.w. which 
belongs to it, and v (i) maps individual variables into I if I is 
not empty, and is undefined on individual variables 
otherwise, and (ii) maps the variables ai into DO(w) if this set 
is non-empty and is undefined on ai variables otherwise. 
Let A, B be CNL formulas and let a, b be CNL terms. The 
satisfaction under an interpretation is defined by: 
 
<M, w, v> models D(a, b) iff <v(a), v(b)> is in d. 
<M, w, v> models a = b iff v(a) = v(b).  
The clauses for Boolean connectives are standard. 
<M, w, v> models (∃a)A iff <M, w', v'> models A, for 
some w' such that Rww' and for some v' which dif-
fers from v at most at a. ∆ 
We can introduce a constant U (Urelement) which in any 
possible world under any possible valuation will refer to all 
and only elements of I. Also, instead of (∃x)x = a I will write 
U(a). Instead of D(a,b) I will just write a ∈ b (so ‘∈’ here 
has a different meaning than it has in set theory).  
Certain (translations of) principles that hold for sets 
in ZF (with urelements) hold also for possible names. 
Some of them are: 
 
( ) ( )( )( ) ~a U a b b a∀ → ∃ ∈  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )~ ( ) ~ ( ) & ( )a U a b U b c c b cϕ⎡ ⎤∀ → ∃ ∀ ∈ ↔⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( )( )( )( ) & ( )a U a b b a U b∃ ∀ ∈ ↔   
( ) ( )( )~ ( )& ~a U a b b a∃ ∃ ∈  
( )( ) ( ), &a b c a c b c∀ ∃ ∈ ∈  
If we write Ua b∈  for ( ) ( )&c c b a c∃ ∈ ∈  the following 
also holds:  
 
( )( )( )( ), &a b c d c d d a c b∀ ∃ ∀ ∈ ∈ → ∈ . 
Let’s abbreviate ( )( )( )( ), &a b c d c d d a c b∀ ∃ ∀ ∈ ∈ → ∈  
by ( )a∅ . Then the following is valid: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )~ ( )& ~ ( ) & ~a U a a b b a c c b c a⎡ ⎤∀ ∅ → ∃ ∈ ∀ ∈ → ∈⎣ ⎦ . 
There are, however certain axioms of ZF whose render-
ings fail miserably.The CNL rendering of the axiom of 
extensionality: 
 
( ) ( )( )( )( ), ~ ( )& ~ ( )a b U a U b c c a c b a b∀ → ∀ ∈ ↔ ∈ → =  
and the axiom of power set in its name-theoretic transla-
tion is: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )a b c d d c d a c b∀ ∃ ∀ ∀ ∈ → ∈ → ∈ . 
The axiom of extensionality fails because it is 
possible that there are coextensive and yet different name 
tokens. The axiom of power set fails because in the case 
of an infinite domain it would require that a possible world 
contains non-denumerably many name tokens. The first 
problem can be fixed easily: we just define identity symbol 
in a non-standard way so that coextensive possible names 
are identical ex definitione. The second problem requires a 
more elaborate move that lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. Let me, however, just indicate what this strategy 
would look like. 
First, we start off with a cumulative naming 
structure. Then we stratify the possible worlds according to 
how high in the semantic ascent the tokens that exist in 
them are. For instance, if a possible world contains only 
names that name individuals, it is a world of level 1. If it 
also contains names that name names in a world of level 1 
but no names of “higher” type, it is of level 2, etc. (formal 
definitions are easily available). Then, the crucial move is 
that we allow the reference relation of a name in a possible 
world w “reach” outside of that world, that is a name x in w 
is now allowed to “refer” to objects that don’t exist in w. 
What x can refer to instead are all those objects that exist 
in worlds of lower level than w. That way we still have a 
cumulative hierarchy and don’t run into any paradoxes, but 
also we validate the axiom of power set because now 
there is no problem with a name referring to non-
denumerably many name tokens, as long as those tokens 
don’t exist in a single possible world. 
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Are Lamarckian Explanations Fully Reducible to Darwinian ones? 
The Case of “Directed Mutation” in Bacteria 
Davide Vecchi, Vienna, Austria 
One of the striking features of the debate on directed 
mutation is that it was largely based on semantical 
quibbles generated by the idiosyncrasies on the 
interpretation of the crucial terms “random”, “directed”, 
“Darwinian” and “Lamarckian”. I am not claiming that this is 
an atypical situation in science. On the contrary, it is quite 
ubiquitous. But, of course, only part of the controversy 
rotated around semantics. The rest was about substantive 
scientific and philosophical issues. 
The official Neo-Darwinian line on bacterial mutation 
crystallised in the 40s and 50s thanks to Luria’s and 
Delbrück’s and then the Lederberg’s “crucial” experiments. 
For those who thought that Duhem had established once 
and for all that there cannot be crucial experiments, it is 
sufficient to take a look at D. Futuyma’s “Evolution” 
textbook, where such experiments are presented as the 
ultimate and definitive demonstration that genuine directed 
mutation in bacteria cannot happen. According to the 
“received view” bacterial mutation is not a Lamarckian 
response to need; mutants arise at a constant rate during 
growth, independently of any selection pressure and 
environmental influence. 
The Modern-Synthesis had hardened too much by 
discounting possible Lamarckian phenomena and 
processes in one stroke, by trivialising the Lamarckian 
position and by simplifying too much the Darwinian picture 
of bacterial evolution. A classic Kuhnian paradigm was 
build.  
The odd thing is that Delbrück himself readily 
admitted in 1946 that the fluctuation test had limited scope, 
as it could not rule out the existence of adaptive 
mechanisms of mutation, the reason being that the 
selective pressure applied to bacteria in the test was too 
strong. Experimental anomalies contradicting the received 
view accumulated in the 40 years or so that climaxed with 
Cairns et al. 1988 paper. But such anomalies were simply 
written off as mere noise by referring to the crucial 
experiments. The story is quite interesting and also quite 
typical of science. History was edited and falsity 
transcribed in the biology textbooks by omitting crucial 
details, by referring to supposedly crucial experiments of 
limited scope, by using obscure terminology. But 
eventually the bubble burst. The Lamarckian idea of 
directed mutation was suddenly back from limbo, and 
thanks to just one authoritative paper published in an 
authoritative journal. 
The “received view” on bacterial mutation was 
based on a series of tenets that started to be assessed 
independently. Some tenets can be deemed central to the 
Neo-Darwinian view, while others are possibly more 
peripheral. The central tenet is that mutations are not more 
likely to be beneficial than not. Lenski and Mittler (1993) 
provide possibly the clearest definition: 
 
We define as directed a mutation that occurs at a 
higher rate specifically when (and even because) it 
is advantageous to the organism, whereas compa-
rable increases in rate do not occur either (i) in the 
same environment for similar mutations that are not 
advantageous or (ii) for the same mutation in similar 
environments where it is not advantageous.  
Other tenets of the Neo-Darwinian view included the auxil-
iary hypotheses that mutations are never environmentally 
induced, that mutations are solely due to replication errors, 
that mutation rates are constant, that mutations do not 
target specific parts of the genome, and that mutations are 
due to the breakdown of the cellular machinery of DNA 
repair. 
Even though the partial “blindness” of bacterial 
mutational response to need has been substantially 
vindicated, all the other tenets of the Neo-Darwinian view 
have been partly or totally rejected. What can safely be 
said is that there has been a softening of the Neo-
Darwinian perspective in many respects (Brisson 2003). 
The softening is so extensive that one can sensibly ask 
whether to call the emerging view on adaptive 
mutagenesis “Neo-Darwinian” instead of “Lamarckian” 
makes sense at all (Jablonka and Lamb 2005).  
One of the most intriguing explanatory models of 
adaptive mutagenesis, generally considered to be 
essentially correct (cf. e.g. Foster 2004), is the 
hypermutable state hypothesis (HSH). The HSH was 
originally proposed by Hall (1988) and provides an 
explication of the puzzling fact that some process seems to 
generate purely beneficial mutations in the genes under 
selection that allow environmentally stressed cells in 
stationary phase to resume growth. The main idea of the 
HSH is that most bacteria under stress-induced conditions 
are mutationally inert, but that an unspecified but relatively 
small number of cells enters an hypermutable state. Those 
bacteria that do not mutate appropriately die (are selected 
against), so that their deleterious and neutral mutations 
are wiped out and un-retrievable, while those striking a 
“lucky jackpot” resume growth and reproduce, while the 
beneficial mutations carried become heritable by escaping 
the correction mechanisms (e.g. mismatch repair editing, 
or MMR). 
Focusing on HSH, we can now ask a number of 
specific questions. Consider that the history of the 
discovery of phenomena of apparently directed generation 
of variation is always surrounded by a first attempt to 
resurrect the ghost of Lamarck, followed by a call for 
restraint and a process of “Darwinisation” of the 
phenomenon. I will now assess whether such second level 
reaction is justified in the case of HSH. Can we explain 
HSH in purely Darwinian terms? The HSH surely provides 
a selective explanation of the supposedly Lamarckian 
phenomenon of “preferential mutation” first highlighted by 
Cairns et al. But the HSH does not fully vindicate a Neo-
Darwinian perspective at all, given that most auxiliary 
hypotheses surrounding the view have been rejected or 
substantially revised. Clearly HSH does not rely on the 
hypothesis of constant mutation rates (cells that enter the 
hypermutable state can mutate at rates 800 times higher 
than normal), nor on the hypothesis that mutations do not 
happen in stationary phase (in fact, mutations accumulate 
in stationary phase, that is, in that period of the bacterium 
life cycle, somehow equivalent to development, when it 
does not replicate), nor on the hypothesis that 
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environmental factors are irrelevant to mutational 
responses (it has been established that there exist very 
specific processes of mutational response triggered by 
environmental stresses like starvation), nor on the 
hypothesis that there is no targeting of specific genomic 
regions, while growing evidence is accumulating in favour 
of seeing mutational responses as evolved adaptive 
responses of the organism. What can be safely said today 
is that random variation is not the norm. Mutational 
processes are highly biased and targeted affairs. Still, can 
a revised and softened version of Darwinism suffice to 
dispel the ghost of Lamarck? As Hall (1998) argues, 
adaptive mutation is a different process from growth-
dependent or “normal” bacterial mutation, even though it 
clearly is a Darwinian process. The important questions on 
this score are: how is the hypermutation state triggered? Is 
it triggered by the environmental stress or by the selective 
pressure? Is it regulated by specific genes, or rather by 
some unspecified and unknown, possibly innate, capacity 
of the organism? We still don’t know. For the same 
reasons, I contend, we cannot answer the question of 
whether we need an explanation of HSH in terms couched 
via the language of intentionality and choice, or whether a 
Darwinian explanation couched in terms of chance and 
selection is all we need. Or so I will argue. 
It could be argued that the phenomenon of adaptive 
mutagenesis is purely Darwinian. From this perspective it 
could be asked: what does the Lamarckian language of 
intentionality, purpose and choice add to explanations 
concerning adaptive mutations? Nothing is the answer: 
Lamarckian concepts are simply redundant. To say that 
organisms choose to mutate in particular ways, that they 
deliberately try to reach a particular adaptive goal, that 
they intend to change and adapt in specific ways, is 
equivalent to invite inappropriate teleological talk. Even 
though emphasis on the phenomenon has highlighted the 
need to discriminate between mutations with different 
characteristics concerning their basic properties 
(environmental conditions, time and site of occurrence), it 
is clear that the directional outcome is a product given by 
the extreme reduction of design search space, by the 
temporal and local increase in efficiency of the search, and 
by a more general strategy of mutation rate increase.  
A variant of the same dismissive attitude could 
instead stress that instead of explanatory redundancy 
(based on the application of Ockham’s razor), Lamarckian 
explanations are reducible to Darwinian ones. This would 
vindicate the hypothesis that Darwinism is a more 
fundamental process than Lamarckism. In fact, it seems 
that the “intentionality” of Lamarckian systems like those 
supposedly governing adaptive mutational responses must 
arise either by means of the cumulative effects of past 
natural selection acting on ultimately random mutations, or 
more simply by a more error-prone pathological response 
of cells. Therefore the epistemic reducibility of Lamarckian 
explanations seems to be achievable. So, even though the 
orthodox and hardened Neo-Darwinian views on directed 
mutation has been revised and updated, the revision of the 
Darwinian view has not touched certain residual and 
crucial elements constitutive of some meaning of 
“randomness”, which make an appeal to the Lamarckian 
language of intentionality inappropriate. This alternative 
seems to illustrate the sensible view shared by most 
practitioners. 
However, I think that this epistemological move 
cannot shed any light on the ontological issue pertaining to 
the nature of mutation, and on the basic question con-
cerning the existence of genuine Lamarckian processes. 
What could a genuine Lamarckian phenomenon be like? 
Genuine intentionality would perhaps involve the 
preferential environmental induction of useful and 
beneficial mutations, which is not happening, or the 
targeting of specific genes, which is still quite controversial. 
But an equally promising avenue would be to consider 
genuine intentionality as involving the choice of starved 
and stresses cells to enter the hypermutation state. I think 
that at this juncture lies the best chance to vindicate some 
genuine Lamarckian credentials. If the hypermutation state 
is triggered by some as yet unspecified and unknown 
capacity of the organism, then Lamarckism could be 
vindicated. Or better it would be if we were unable to find a 
mechanistic basis for the cell response.  
Intentionality does not seem to be needed to provide 
explanations that save the known phenomena of adaptive 
mutagenesis. Still, this could be simply appearance. The 
crucial question remains: how do we explain the fact that 
only a subpopulation of bacteria hypermutates? It seems 
that some element in the environment triggers such a 
state, or perhaps it is a cell that chooses to do so? Where 
is the evidence in favour of the first “mechanical” 
hypothesis? And is the first hypothesis simpler than the 
second? And why is it simpler to hypothesise that the 
bacterium senses an environmental signal rather than 
hypothesising that it chooses to hypermutate? In the first 
case we need a sensory mechanism, in the second just 
agency of some kind. Furthermore, even a sensory 
mechanism could be sufficient to phagocyte a slice of the 
intentional cake. 
The position of the reductionist and materialist rests 
on the adoption of the argument from parsimony. But 
voiced have been raised to argue against this adoption of 
Ockham’s razor, and against a more general ontological 
conservatism (Sober 2001), especially when the 
intentionality hypothesis is ontologically as economical as 
the alternatives. The issue is that as there are no 
arguments in favour of the reification of intentionality as a 
distinct and emergent quality, so there are no arguments 
against. 
So it could be that the more one digs into the 
subject the more the Lamarckian language of choice 
makes sense. In this sense it is not enough to point out 
that polymerase IV and the down regulation of MMR are 
involved in the process of hypermutation, that is, an error-
enhancing and a less efficient error-editing process. The 
question remains of what triggers the state, of whether it is 
the bacterium that “decides” to hypermutate.  
Also note that in many ways a panpsychist 
hypothesis, with the postulation of all its monads, is not 
clearly more complex and therefore amenable to be 
chopped off with one stroke of Ockham’s razor. Even 
bacterial chemotaxis is nowadays described somehow in 
terms of cells’ intentionality (cells are analogised to 
nanobrains). The panpsychist perspective according to 
which intentionality is everywhere remains simpler that any 
emergentist view. If mentality and intentionality are basic 
and primitive, then ascriptions of mentality are, despite the 
risk of anthropomorphism, always justifiable. The idea that 
there exists a continuum of levels of intentionality, rather 
than an abrupt emergence of something totally new, 
remains appealing.  
The great appeal of the Darwinian account (e.g. 
based on a blind variation and selective retention formula) 
is that it offers a very general mode of explanation, and a 
clear recipe to dispense of epiphenomenal intentionality 
(Hull 1988). The active agent easily disappears from 
selectionist accounts. But can we get rid of agency so 
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simply? Perhaps some people would be more prone to get 
rid of bacterial intentionality than of human cultural agency, 
but this could reflect an unjustifiable bias. 
I conclude that there still remains the open question 
regarding the existence of truly Lamarckian processes, 
whose workings can only be accounted via intentional and 
mentalistic terms, even without assuming foresight on the 
part of cells, and even without assuming a universe of 
monads. My main point is merely that we have no 
evidence to reject the intentionality hypothesis, nor 
principled theoretical reasons based on simplicity 
considerations, and even less so on dubious metaphysical 
fiat. I suspect that the available evidence cannot 
adjudicate between the “sensible” scientific hypothesis 
based on mechanism, selection and chance, and the 
“awkward” intentional alternative couched in terms of cell’s 
choice and intentionality. And probably we will never know 
for sure. 
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A Note on Tractatus 5.521 
Nuno Venturinha, Lisbon, Portugal 
Introduction 
Wittgenstein scholars have long been puzzled by §5.521 
of the Tractatus. It reads as follows:  
 
I separate the concept all from the truth-function. 
Frege and Russell have introduced generality in 
connexion with the logical product or the logical 
sum. Then it would be difficult to understand the 
propositions “(∃x).fx” and “(x).fx” in which both ideas 
lie concealed.  
We shall best get to the heart of the puzzle by considering 
the way Bertrand Russell treated the matter in his “Intro-
duction” to the Tractatus. Indeed, Russell made a particu-
lar assumption which seems on the face of it to be inco-
herent. He alludes to “Mr Wittgenstein’s theory of the deri-
vation of general propositions from conjunctions and dis-
junctions” (TLP, 15), a perspective Wittgenstein ascribes to 
Frege and Russell himself. In fact Wittgenstein explicitly 
says that both “Frege and Russell have introduced gener-
ality in connexion with the logical product or the logical 
sum”, thus deriving “(x).fx” from “fa.fb.fc. …” and “(∃x).fx” 
from “fa ∨ fb ∨ fc ∨ …”, a procedure he rejects. 
However, astonishingly as it may seem, after 1929 
Wittgenstein criticized his earlier conception of generality, 
which took “(x).fx” to be a “logical product” and “(∃x).fx” to 
be a “logical sum”. In his record of Wittgenstein’s lectures 
of 1930-33, G.E. Moore writes that “[h]e said that there 
was a temptation, to which he had yielded in the Tractatus, 
to say that (x).fx is identical with the logical product 
‘fa.fb.fc. ...’, and (∃x).fx identical with the logical sum  
‘fa ∨ fb ∨ fc ∨ …’”, assuming that “this was in both cases a 
mistake” (MWL, 89). Further, Moore notes that “[h]e said 
that, when he wrote the Tractatus, he had supposed that 
all such general propositions were ‘truth-functions’”, 
recognizing that “in supposing this he was committing a 
fallacy, which is common in the case of Mathematics, e.g. 
the fallacy of supposing that 1+1+1 ... is a sum, whereas it 
is only a limit” (ibid.). And, in the same vein, G.H. von 
Wright reports that “[i]n one of the first conversations [he] 
ever had with Wittgenstein (in 1939), he said the biggest 
mistake he had made in the Tractatus was that he had 
identified general propositions with infinite conjunctions or 
disjunctions of singular propositions” (von Wright 1982, 
151, n.28).  
It looks, therefore, as though there is a 
contradiction, even if Wittgenstein’s remark at §5.521 of 
the Tractatus clearly suggests that Russell’s interpretation 
cannot be right. Thus H.O. Mounce, who is one of the most 
lucid interpreters of the generality issue in the Tractatus, 
even arguing that Russell misunderstood it, emphasizes 
that “we can be certain, from Wittgenstein’s own remarks 
on the subject, that he was confused on this matter at the 
time of the Tractatus”; and he goes on saying that “[w]hat 
is not at all easy to determine, however, is where precisely 
his confusion lies” (Mounce 1981, 67). In this paper, 
following the lead of Mounce, I shall try to make clear that 
Wittgenstein’s criticism in the 1930s is directed at his 
earlier view that the content of general propositions can be 
enumerated, not at the way in which he introduced such 
propositions. But, on the basis of the third of the wartime 
notebooks that survived and the so-called Prototractatus, I 
go deeper into Wittgenstein’s alleged ”confusion”, analys-
ing some hitherto neglected aspects. 
I 
Section 73 of the “Generality” chapter of the Big Type-
script, which bears as title “Criticism of my Earlier Under-
standing of Generality”, begins with a remark deriving from 
the first entry of 1 August 1931 in MS111. Wittgenstein 
says: 
 
My understanding of the general proposition was 
that (∃x).fx is a logical sum, and that although its 
terms weren’t enumerated there, they could be 
enumerated (from the dictionary and the grammar of 
language). (…) (TS213, 326: BT, 249e) 
And the next remark of the section, deriving from the first 
entry of 1 December 1931 in MS113, runs as follows: 
 
Of course, the explanation of (∃x).φx as a logical 
sum and of (x).φx as a logical product cannot be 
maintained. It was linked to a false view of logical 
analysis, with my thinking, for instance, that the 
logical product for a particular (x).φx would most 
likely be found some day. – Of course it’s correct 
that (∃x).φx functions in some way as a logical sum, 
and that (x).φx functions in some way as a product; 
indeed for one use of the words “all” and “some” my 
old explanation is correct, namely, in a case like “All 
the primary colours can be found in this picture”, or 
“All the notes of the C major scale occur in this 
theme”. But in cases like “All people die before they 
are 200” my explanation is not correct. (…) (TS213, 
326-7: BT, 249e) 
The examples given by Wittgenstein illustrate the singular 
character of our universal statements, that some refer to a 
simple set, which is thinkable as belonging to a totality that 
is presupposed (all colours, all musical notes), and that 
others refer to a whole whose particularity is manifest. In 
this latter case, there is not, therefore, any logical product, 
the dots in “fa.fb.fc. ...” being dots of innumerability, not 
“dots of laziness”, as Wittgenstein called them in his lec-
tures, the sort we use to speak, for example, of the alpha-
bet in terms of “A, B, C …” – that is, when the enumera-
tion, though possible, is not carried out (cf. MWL, 90; also 
AWL, 6). 
It is noteworthy, however, that the reason why the 
enumeration of an “infinite series”, say “1, 2, 3 ...”, is 
impossible is not our inability to complete it; it is rather that 
it belongs to the concept of infinite its innumerability  
(cf. MWL, 90; also LWL, 90). In a conversation on  
22 December 1929 with Moritz Schlick and Friedrich 
Waismann recorded by the latter, Wittgenstein actually 
alludes to the whole that is made up by the four primary 
colours as a “finite conjunction”, constituting it a “finite 
logical product” - a contradictio in adjecto, since there can 
be no infinite logical products (cf. WVC, 45). What is 
projected in such cases is simply a horizon of vagueness.  
Let us consider the example Wittgenstein gives in 
the opening of the conversation alluded to above, which is: 
“All men in this room are wearing trousers” (WVC, 38). 
A Note on Tractatus 5.521 — Nuno Venturinha 
 
 
 366 
What is at stake here? That “Professor Schlick is wearing 
trousers, Waismann is wearing trousers, Wittgenstein is 
wearing trousers, and no-one else is present”, that is to 
say, that “Mr. Carnap is not in this room, Mr...., etc.” (ibid.). 
But do we really think of an infinite number of propositions 
about what is not the case? Wittgenstein now holds, 
contrary to his original idea, that this constitutes, rather, an 
“incomplete picture”, which the symbolism “must show [to 
be] incomplete” (WVC, 39-40). The question is: how to do 
that? How can we represent in a propositional scheme that 
“There is no man is this room” except by means of 
“~(∃x).fx”, which, being equivalent to “(x).~fx”, immediately 
yields a logical product “~fa.~fb.~fc. ...”, thus requiring an 
enumeration? Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that we should 
translate existential propositions such as “x is in the room” 
or “There is someone in the room” by means of “fx”, 
corresponding its negation solely to “~fx” (cf. WVC, 40, 
44). What he claims is that the variable at issue is not an 
“apparent variable” but a “real variable”, one that does not 
require individual constants (cf. WVC, 39). Note also that 
in the case of the existential proposition “(∃x).fx” we have a 
similar case of enumeration, since it corresponds to the 
logical sum “There is in the room either this person or that 
person or that person, etc.”, an expression that, according 
to Wittgenstein, is nonsensical. Obviously, this does not 
happen with propositions like “In this square there is one of 
the primary colours”, to use one of the examples Moore 
mentions, because there the expression “fa ∨ fb ∨ fc ∨ …” 
is conclusive, being equivalent to “In this square there is 
either red or green or blue or yellow” (MWL, 89). But in all 
the other cases, including of course the negative ones, viz. 
“(∃x).~fx”, we would have infinite remissions. Now, in 
rejecting (Frege’s and) Russell’s notation, which he had 
previously adopted, Wittgenstein not only avoids the 
indefinite enumerability problem, but also the “twofold 
negation” problem, i.e. that “(∃x).fx” does not have the 
“right multiplicity” (WVC, 39-40). This shows, in truth, that 
“There is no man who is not in the room” is nonsensical 
and that “~(∃x).~fx” cancels the meaningfulness of 
“(∃x).fx”.  
Wittgenstein’s conclusion is that, as Moore reports, 
“the cases to which the Principia notations (x).φx and 
(∃x).φx apply [...] are comparatively rare”, given that 
“oftener we have propositions, such as ‘I met a man’, 
which do not ‘presuppose any totality’”; moreover, 
Wittgenstein goes as far as to argue that “the cases to 
which the Principia notation apply are only those in which 
we could give proper names to the entities in question”, 
something that “is only possible in very special cases” 
(MWL, 91). All the others require, in effect, a concrete 
grammatical analysis. They cannot be seen in the light of a 
predefined scheme but in what they really involve. 
II 
We are now in a position to reconsider Wittgenstein’s “con-
fusion”. The problems identified appear to conflict with 
important Tractarian themes. However, Wittgenstein’s 
early view actually withstands the criticisms that he himself 
later identifies. In fact, what he contests at §5.521 of the 
Tractatus is merely the extralogical way in which Frege 
and Russell “have introduced generality”.  
Let us briefly examine Wittgenstein’s procedure for 
deriving general propositions, which is presented at §5.52. 
He writes: 
 
If the values of ξ are the total values of a function fx 
for all values of x, then N( ξ ) = ~(∃x).fx. 
His idea is that the N operator can be applied to “fx”, an 
existential proposition, which can be written in the form of 
“(∃x).fx”, obtaining “~(∃x).fx”, i.e., “~fa.~fb.~fc. …”, that is to 
say, all the propositions of ξ being false, which results in 
“(x).~fx”. The application of N to this gives us “~(x).~fx”, 
which in turn is equivalent to “(∃x).fx”. If we then apply N to 
“~fx”, we get “~(∃x).~fx”, that is, “(x).fx”, and by the same 
operation again we obtain “~(x).fx”, which is equivalent to 
“(∃x).~fx”. According to this proposal, the universality is, 
paradoxically enough, derived from existentiality, from 
what we do have indeed, even if it is also true that we do 
have an original relation to the idea of “all”. Still, to derive 
“(x).fx” from “fa.fb.fc. …” is a big step, one that can only be 
taken extralogically. 
This became apparent to Wittgenstein at the time of 
composing the third of the surviving notebooks from the 
First World War. The opening entry of 13 July 1916 
provides a clue: 
 
One keeps on feeling that even in the elementary 
proposition mention is made of all objects. (MS103, 
23r: NB, 76e) 
And in an entry from 20 July, omitted in the Notebooks 
1914-1916 along with quite a few remarks on the same 
subject sketched in the previous days (cf. MS103, 25r-27r), 
Wittgenstein observes:  
 
The My old division of all propositional forms was 
fundamentally correct, only another mode of gener-
ality will be required. (MS103, 27r: my translation) 
This is the reason why, as we read in the Prototractatus 
manuscript, where the original version of §5.521 of the 
Tractatus was formulated, Wittgenstein “separate[s] the 
concept all from the logical product. the truth-function” 
(MS104, 87, §5.3201: my translation, adapted to Ogden’s). 
It is true all the same that he holds it as a “logical product” 
– and this is the core of his later criticism. But it is one 
thing to hold it and another to derive it.  
The way Russell understood “Mr Wittgenstein’s 
theory of the derivation of general propositions”, while 
proceeding, in fine, as his own, “from conjunctions and 
disjunctions”, is thus incomprehensible, all the more since 
a few lines above he had written that “Wittgenstein’s 
method of dealing with general propositions […] differs 
from previous methods by the fact that the generality 
comes only in specifying the set of propositions 
concerned”, so that “when this has been done the building 
up of truth-functions proceeds exactly as it would in the 
case of a finite number of enumerated arguments p, q, r…” 
(TLP, 14). Russell will have not noticed, therefore, the real 
innovation of such a methodology, which lies, precisely, in 
the specification of “the set of propositions concerned”, not 
being needed an enumeration of them. 
This, as a matter of fact, had already been pointed 
out by Wittgenstein to Russell in the postscript to a letter 
dated 19 August 1919. There, replying to a number of 
questions raised by Russell in a letter from 13 August (cf. 
CL, 121-3), Wittgenstein states: 
 
I suppose you didn’t understand the way, how I 
separate in the old notation of generality what is in it 
truth-function and what is purely generality. A gen-
eral prop[osition] is A truth-function of all 
PROP[OSITION]S of a certain form. (CL, 126) 
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And he goes on saying, referring to the symbol “N( ξ )” and 
to Russell’s feeling that “the duality of generality and exis-
tence persisted covertly in [his] system” (CL, 122): 
 
You are quite right in saying that “N( ξ )” may also 
be made to mean ~p ∨ ~q ∨ ~r ∨ ~... But this 
doesn’t matter! I suppose you don’t understand the 
notation of “ ξ ”. It does not mean “for all values of 
ξ...”. But all is said in my book about it and I feel un-
able to write it again. (CL, 126) 
In short, Russell will have seen in Wittgenstein’s method 
simply another way of obtaining all the quantifiers, not a 
truly alternative way of deriving generality, avoiding the 
“old” recourse to “fa.fb.fc. …” and “fa ∨ fb ∨ fc ∨ …”. Yet, 
only by means of an extralogical procedure we may turn 
round the singular nature of our point of view. It is the N 
operator that makes it possible to realize that our relation 
to the universal is constitutive, even though the epistemo-
logical status of that relation is problematic, amounting 
propositions such as “All men are mortal” to mere “variable 
hypotheticals”, in the phrase of F.P. Ramsey (1931, 237). 
Wittgenstein’s refusal of an inductive logic, expressed at 
§6.31 of the Tractatus, turns out, in this light, to be clearer. 
What is not at all clear is why Wittgenstein followed 
§5.3201 in the Prototractatus notebook by a remark, which 
he crossed out, saying that “[e]thics is not one of the natu-
ral sciences” (MS104, 87: my translation). This, however, I 
cannot go into.1  
 
 
                                                     
 
1 Many thanks to Andrew Lugg for helpful comments and suggestions. Work 
on this paper was made possible by a postdoctoral fellowship from the Portu-
guese Foundation for Science and Technology. 
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The Place of Theory Reduction in the Models of Interdisciplinary 
Relations 
Uwe Voigt, Bamberg, Germany 
1. Introduction: Why Theory Reduction is 
Not Yet Considered in Connection with  
Interdisciplinary Relations – And What can 
Be Done About It 
In the first place, this approach has to deal with the ques-
tion why interdisciplinarity is not a topic for the philosophy 
of science. The answer to this question could be, accord-
ing to Wittgenstein, that a certain picture has taken hold of 
the philosophers of science, or even a whole bulk of such 
pictures. These pictures obviously are implicit models 
about the way sciences do relate. The implicitness of these 
models prohibits their philosophical reflection. Hence, the 
best philosophy of science can do in this case is to make 
them explicit. 
One way to make them explicit is demonstrating the 
fundamental decisions which lead to the different models. 
So it can be shown how they differ from one another and 
how they make up more or less similar “families”. It can 
also be shown where the place of theory reduction in the 
according “family tree” can be found and which branches 
of this tree are cut off if one chooses theory reduction. The 
purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the different 
decisions in a conclusive manner but simply to name them 
and to list their advantages and their disadvantages. 
2. A Model of the Models of  
Interdisciplinary Relations 
By tracing the basic decisions that bring about models of 
interdisciplinary relations, a kind of “model of models” of 
these relations is constituted. The most basic decision 
within such a model is whether there are irreducibly many 
disciplines or not. Only if we answer this question posi-
tively, we face the problem of interdisciplinary relations in a 
strict sense, because only then there are – and forever will 
be – different disciplines which can relate. But do they 
really relate? This is the next basic decision to be made. 
If we go for a “No”, we reach the realm of what can 
be called pluralist models. According to these models, 
there are many disciplines, at least many types of 
disciplines, but there are no relations between them. This 
is the classic “solution” to the problem of interdisciplinarity 
which prevailed until the second half of the 20th century, 
e.g. as the separation between the “hard” sciences and the 
disciplines of the humanities. Such models succeed in 
describing the demarcation between disciplines, but they 
do this at the price of an equivocal concept of science. 
They are also, from their very foundations, unable to 
explain the real cooperation which is going on between 
disciplines of different types (Fauser 2003). 
If we say, yes, there are relations between different 
disciplines, we choose contact models. The next question 
is then: What kind of contact is there between the different 
disciplines? How is this contact mediated? In the literature, 
three alternatives can be found: Contact is mediated either 
by common objects or by common methods or by 
cooperation. Accordingly, we can distinguish between 
object-contact models, method-contact models and 
cooperation-contact models. 
Object-contact models are the “classical” model of 
interdisciplinary relations. It implies that different 
disciplines are linked by identical objects to which every 
single discipline has its own access, mediated by its own 
method. The contact which is supposed to be mediated 
this way can come about in two different forms: a 
hierarchical form in which one central discipline has a 
privileged access to the objects in question, as physics 
does in the model of a non-reductive naturalism (Schurz 
2006, 38); or a non-hierarchical form in which the several 
disciplines form a cluster around their objects (Mc Cormick 
2003). In both cases, object-contact models are hard to 
integrate into a post-Kuhnian philosophy of science which 
takes it for granted that science, at last in some cases, 
does not access but create its objects so that objects are 
not prior to disciplines and therefore cannot guarantee 
interdisciplinary contact. 
Method-contact models have been popular in the 
second half of the 20th century when there was hope for 
one method to bring together all disciplines. This method 
was conceived of as a formal one describing dynamic 
structures; it was (and still is) called “cybernetics”, “theory 
of systems” and the like. Again, there is a hierarchical 
(Schneider 1966) and a non-hierarchical (Meister/ 
Lettkemann 2004) variation of such models, depending on 
the decision whether there is one central discipline 
providing all others with its method or whether there are 
independent but coordinated developments of the same 
method in different disciplines. Again, these models run 
contrary to an insight of current philosophy of science: 
Feyerabend’s remark that methods are not of huge 
importance for science and that it would not be desirable 
to give them such an importance (Feyerabend 1983). 
Cooperation-contact models are a very young – and 
promising – brand of contact-models. They even have 
been developed as an alternative to models of 
interdisciplinarity as such (Gläser et al. 2004), but only 
because of the – unnecessary – assumption that these 
models are limited to the types discussed above. 
According to cooperation-contact models, interdisciplinary 
relations are brought about just by the cooperation 
between scientists from different disciplines. This 
cooperation is not based on common objects or common 
methods but precedes their discovery or creation and 
development. Since cooperation does not start with 
common criteria, it cannot be conceived of as hierarchical. 
Rather, it is an action which implies mutual recognition – 
notwithstanding the fact that, as a human action, it is also 
coined by political, social and other conditions (Bordieu 
1988; Münch 2007). Cooperation-contact models have the 
advantage of working without the presuppositions found in 
object- and method-contact models. They also fit in with 
the trend to understand science as action (Gläser et al. 
2004). Obviously, they have little normative power. In 
contrast to their “object” and “method” colleagues, they do 
not say how disciplines are supposed to relate, but this 
can turn out to be a strenghth rather than a weakness. 
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So far we have examined the “Yes”-branch of the 
model of models of interdisciplinary relations. But if we 
have to consider theory reduction, it obviously is to be 
found on the other side. The basic decision to be made, 
then, is that there are not irreducibly many disciplines. If 
we decide this way, we do not face a problem of 
interdisciplinary relations but rather the problem how to 
make the pseudo-problem of interdisciplinary go away by 
making all disciplines collapse into only one. So we are on 
the side of models which can be named as “monist”. 
The advantage of monist models is that they 
guarantee – or at least claim to guarantee – a single, 
univocal concept of science, based on the promised unity 
of science. At the same time, such models somehow have 
to deal with the (in their view apparent) plurality of 
disciplines which even is increasing evermore (Poser 
2001, 279-287). Hence, monist models are challenged by 
the question: If there is only one discipline, can the single 
members of the apparent plurality of disciplines be in some 
way identified with that one and only discipline? The 
answer “No” leads to eliminative models, because given 
monist presuppositions non-identity with the one and only 
discipline just means being no scientific discipline at all. To 
eliminate here means to demonstrate that the kind of 
objects with which a pseudo-discipline claims to deal 
simply do not exist and that therefore the terminology used 
by that pseudo-discipline is meaningless. This strategy can 
be – and has been – successful in single cases, as e.g. in 
the elimination of astrology from the realm of the sciences. 
The recent relevant discussion is focusing on the question 
whether disciplines of cognitive science can be eliminated 
in favor of neurobiology and in the final analysis of physics 
(e.g., as a classical attempt, Churchland 1986). As an 
overall strategy for tackling the problem of 
interdisciplinarity it is not very popular, though, because it 
flies in the face of the intuition that there are many 
disciplines which at least have a partial and temporal 
justification (Charpa 1996, 96). 
Therefore the most promising answer in the monist 
branch seems to be “Yes”: At least some members of the 
apparent plurality of disciplines can be identified with the 
one and only discipline and, through this identification, are 
also justified. This is the strategy of theory reduction which, 
as such, but without this context, is well researched in the 
philosophy of science. Theory reduction can come along in 
various kinds, depending on which discipline one takes to 
be the goal of reduction. In our time, the most popular 
version is physicalist theory reduction (Wilson 1998); but 
there also is its sociological counterpart (Luhmann 1990), 
and the list could be continued. The final goal here, too, as 
in elimination always is to end up with just one scientific 
discipline, but before the goal is reached, the different 
existing disciplines at least can be tolerated since their 
differences from the one and only science are only 
apparent ones. Reductive models face similar problems as 
eliminative ones: They also do not seem to do justice to 
the given plurality of disciplines (Margolis 1987; Rosenberg 
1994). Nevertheless, this plurality is just a fact and facts 
can change. The hard problem of theory reduction, in my 
view, seems to lie elsewhere, and can be found by a look 
at the whole model of models of interdisciplinary relations. 
3. The Hard Problem of Theory Reduction 
The hard problem of theory reduction can be seen in its 
contrast to the cooperation-contact models which are the 
most important plural models: Contact-models, as has 
been shown, imply mutual recognition between the coop-
erating disciplines. This recognition is withdrawn by monist 
models. Eliminative models do so immediately, which 
makes them so little attractive. Reductive models are more 
cautious in this respect, they even promise to give a spe-
cial discipline the dignity of the one and only discipline in 
the way of identification. But this identification is a one-way 
affair. The identity of the goal-discipline of reduction is 
supposed to be unchanging and well-known; the identity of 
the discipline which is to be reduced just is an apparent 
one; it has been falsely taken to be something apart from 
the one and only science. So, in the recognition of a theory 
which is to be reduced, the goal-theory of reduction simply 
recognizes itself in a disguise which soon is to be re-
moved. However, as Hegel has shown throughout his 
Phenomenology of Spirit, recognition from its very concept 
always must be mutual; it presupposes two parties recog-
nizing one another. This problem is getting even harder as 
we tend to take for real only what science tells us to be 
real (Quine 1979). So, if there is only one scientific disci-
pline, no one can recognize it as such, neither from the 
outside – for only science has the authority to do so – nor 
from the inside – for there can be no mutuality here. The 
hard problem of theory reduction, at least as a global 
strategy facing the problem of interdisciplinarity, therefore 
is: If it is successful, it leads to a situation in which the 
supposed one and only discipline can get no recognition at 
all. Hence, contact models, and especially cooperation-
contact models do not only seem to be a better description 
of the reality of science in our days; they also seem to be a 
better way to deal with interdisciplinarity without endanger-
ing the whole concept of science as such. 
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Ethik als irreduzibles Supervenienzphänomen 
Thomas Wachtendorf, Oldenburg, Deutschland 
1. Der Ursprung der Ethik 
Die Frage nach der Irreduzibilität der Ethik setzt allererst 
die Klärung der Frage voraus, in welchem Sinne hier von 
Ethik die Rede ist. Erst danach kann anhand einer anzu-
gebenden Definition von Supervenienz die eventuelle 
Nichtreduzierbarkeit von Ethik diskutiert werden. 
Wittgenstein, dessen Einlassungen zur Ethik recht 
marginal sind, bestimmt deren Ursprung dennoch: “[Ethik] 
ist ein Zeugnis eines Drangs im menschlichen 
Bewußtsein” [VüE: 19]. Dieser Drang erscheint als ein 
Antrieb, der den Menschen werten lässt: “Ich habe die 
Welt zu beurteilen, die Dinge zu messen.” [Tb: 2.9.1916] 
Zwar bleibt, was dieses wertende Ich genau ausmacht, 
unklar: “Das Ich, das Ich ist das tief Geheimnisvolle.“ [Tb: 
5.8.16] Allerdings ist an dieser Stelle auch keine 
diesbezügliche Erörterung erforderlich. Genau so wenig 
wie eine Erklärung des Ursprungs dieses Dranges möglich 
ist. Es bleibt lediglich zu konstatieren, dass dieser Drang 
im Menschen vorhanden ist. Somit bleibt als Ursprung der 
Ethik ein nicht weiter erklärbarer Drang im Menschen, die 
Welt zu beurteilen oder zu werten. So wertet der Mensch 
seine Umwelt, zu der auch die Handlungen und das 
Verhalten der anderen gehören. Vorsprachlich wird sich 
dies Verhalten etwa in einer ablehnenden oder 
zustimmenden Reaktion ausdrücken, sprachlich als 
Äußerung, was selber bereits eine Handlung darstellt. 
Ethik ist folglich nichts, was eigenständig in der Welt 
existiert, ein Sachverhalt etwa (So in VüE: 13 f: “Das 
gleiche gilt für das absolut Gute; wäre es ein 
beschreibbarer Sachverhalt, müßte ihn jeder – unabhängig 
von seinen eigenen Vorlieben und Neigungen – notwendig 
herbeiführen oder sich schuldig fühlen, weil er ihn nicht 
herbeiführt. Ein solcher Sachverhalt, möchte ich 
behaupten, ist ein Hirngespinst.”), sondern sie ist an 
wertende Handlungen gebunden (vgl.: “Die Bedeutung des 
Wortes »gut« ist an die Handlung, die es qualifiziert, 
gefesselt“ [V: 191]). Diese werden von Subjekten 
vollzogen und also gilt: “gut und böse [sind] Prädikate des 
Subjekts, nicht Eigenschaften in der Welt.” [Tb: 2.8.16] 
Grundlage der Ethik sind also die wertenden Tätigkeiten 
der Sprachspielenden. 
 
2. Ethik ist sprachvermittelt und entsteht 
erst durch Sprache 
Der im Menschen angelegte Drang zu werten hat ver-
schiedene Möglichkeiten der Äußerung: nichtsprachlich als 
bloß tätliche Reaktion, sprachlich als Äußerung. 
Für die Ethik und die Verständigung gelten jedoch 
dieselben Muster, die Wittgenstein in der Spätphilosophie 
aufzeigt. Zur Verständigung bedarf es für die Verwendung 
von Wörtern gemeinsamer Regeln, denen auch gefolgt 
wird. Diese Regeln entstehen in Sprachspielen, wie am 
Beginn der Philosophischen Untersuchungen vorgeführt 
wird. Das besondere des Sprachspiels ist es, dass in ihm 
die Sprache und die “Tätigkeiten mit denen sie verwoben 
sind” [PU: §7] als zusammengehörig aufgefasst werden. 
So kann aus nichtsprachlichem Verhalten durch regelhafte 
Korrelation mit Lauten (sprachliches) Handeln entstehen. 
Durch die Tätigkeiten der Menschen und die je spezifische 
Art, mit der sie diese durchführen, bekommen die Wörter 
durch ihren mit den Tätigkeiten verbundenen Gebrauch in 
der Sprache ihre spezifische Bedeutung [PU: §43]. Wichtig 
sind in diesem Zusammenhang zwei Aspekte der 
Sprachspielkonzeption: Die Sprachspielenden bringen sich 
erstens gegenseitig durch Bestätigung oder Sanktion 
einzelner Tätigkeiten die geltenden Regeln bei (sie richten 
sich darauf ab [Z: Nr. 419]). Das entzieht ihnen jedoch 
zweitens zugleich den alleinigen Zugriff auf die geltenden 
Regeln. Es entsteht ein Wechselverhältnis zwischen dem 
Unterworfensein des einzelnen Sprachspielenden unter 
die Regeln auf der einen und andererseits seiner 
Möglichkeit zu deren Veränderung und Beeinflussung auf 
der anderen Seite. 
An dieser Stelle ist die strukturelle Ähnlichkeit des 
Funktionierens von Sprache mit dem Funktionieren von 
Ethik nicht zu übersehen. Genau wie bei jeder anderen 
sprachlichen Regel betont Wittgenstein, dass es immer 
eine Sprachspielgemeinschaft geben müsse, damit – in 
diesem Falle ethische – Regeln ihre bindende Kraft 
erhalten: “Ein Soll hat also nur Sinn, wenn hinter dem Soll 
etwas steht, das ihm Nachdruck gibt – eine Macht, die 
straft und belohnt. Ein Soll an sich ist unsinnig” [WWK: 
118]. Diese Macht ist zweigestalt: einerseits besteht sie 
zweifelsohne aus den Mitgliedern der Sprachspiel-
gemeinschaft, die die Einhaltung der (sprachlichen) 
Regeln überwachen. Andererseits ist damit aber auch das 
eigene Gewissen gemeint: “Wenn mein Gewissen mich 
aus dem Gleichgewicht bringt, so bin ich nicht in 
Übereinstimmung mit Etwas. Aber was ist dies? Ist es die 
Welt? [...] Zum Beispiel: es macht mich unglücklich zu 
denken, daß ich den und den beleidigt habe. Ist das mein 
Gewissen?“ [Tb: 8.7.1916] Die Motivation, sich gemäß 
bestimmter ethischer Regeln zu verhalten, hat so einmal 
einen äußeren, einmal einen inneren Grund. In beiden 
Fällen ist gleichwohl schon vorausgesetzt, dass es bereits 
in einer Sprachspielgemeinschaft entstandene Regeln 
geben muss, deren Nichtbefolgung überhaupt als ethisch 
schlecht – und damit sanktionsfähig – empfunden werden 
kann.  
Es bleibt, dass sich Ethik nur in einer Gemeinschaft 
von Sprachspielenden entfalten kann, wo und indem sie 
durch ihre sprachliche Form den Sprachspielenden erst 
bewusst werden kann. Denn analog zum 
Privatsprachenargument kann es keine privaten, sondern 
bloß öffentliche ethische Begriffe geben. Folglich gibt es 
nur eine öffentliche Ethik. Dies folgt außerdem aus den 
Überlegungen zum privaten Regelfolgen, wonach einer 
allein die Richtigkeit seiner eigenen Regelbefolgung nicht 
garantieren kann. Jeder hat ja bloß seine Erinnerung an 
ein vormaliges Regelfolgen, die er nun als Vorbild für ein 
erneutes Folgen verwendet. Eine Erinnerung ist jedoch 
immer für Täuschungen anfällig [vgl.: PU: § 265, 
Wachtendorf 2008: 220 f].  
Genau wie die übrigen Regeln des Sprachspiels 
sind auch die ethischen Regeln als ein Produkt der 
Sprachspielgemeinschaft durch den Prozess des 
gemeinsamen Sprechens und Tätigseins – also beim 
gemeinsamen Lebensvollzug – entstanden. Genau wie auf 
die übrigen Regeln richten sich die Sprecher gegenseitig 
auf die ethischen Regeln ab. Jemand handelt und aus der 
billigenden oder ablehnenden Reaktion der anderen ergibt 
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sich die notwendige Rückkoppelung, die den einzelnen 
jeweils in seinem Tun bestärkt oder nicht. So steht hinter 
dem Soll die erforderliche strafende Macht und so ist 
gleichzeitig die Objektivität der ethischen Regeln innerhalb 
der jeweiligen Sprachspielgemeinschaft sicher gestellt. 
Ist also der Drang zu werten zwar im Menschen 
angelegt, kann er sich über das Maß eines bloß reaktiven 
Verhaltens hinaus erst entfalten, wenn der Mensch über 
eine Sprache verfügt – es entsteht die Ethik. Wenn man 
von Ethik in diesem Sinne spricht und damit also nicht bloß 
den immanenten Drang zur Wertung sondern etwas wie 
eine ethische Theorie meint, spricht man deshalb immer 
über ein Phänomen, das erst durch eine Sprache möglich 
wird.  
Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie stellt ein sehr gutes 
Konzept zur Erläuterung der Funktionsweise von Ethik dar, 
weil sie lediglich von der Faktizität bestimmter 
menschlicher Eigenschaften ausgeht (sie setzt 
beispielsweise bloß die Sprachfähigkeit voraus) und in 
diesem Rahmen die Möglichkeit bietet, Ethik zu 
analysieren, ohne (hypostasierende) Annahmen wie etwa 
diejenige eines eigenständigen ethischen Reichs oder die 
Existenz ethischer Tatsachen machen zu müssen. Da man 
zudem zeigen kann [Wachtendorf: 163 ff], dass 
Wittgensteins frühe Vorstellung von Ethik auch noch in 
seiner Spätphilosophie besteht und deshalb mit dieser 
kompatibel ist, bietet sich die Spätphilosophie für ethische 
Betrachtungen auch in Wittgensteins Sinne geradezu an. 
3. Ethische Sätze 
Ethik findet ihren Ausdruck in Sätzen, denen die Sprach-
spielgemeinschaft zustimmt oder die sie ablehnt. So ent-
steht eine Klasse von ethischen Sätzen. Ethische Sätze 
sind beispielsweise: “[...] ’Du sollst das tun!’ oder ’Das ist 
gut!’ aber nicht ’Diese Menschen sagen das sei gut’. Ein 
ethischer Satz ist aber eine persönliche Handlung. Keine 
Konstatierung einer Tatsache. Wie ein Ausruf der Bewun-
derung. Bedenke doch daß die Begründung des ’ethischen 
Satzes’ nur versucht den Satz auf andere zurückzuführen 
die Dir einen Eindruck machen. Hast Du am Schluß keinen 
Abscheu vor diesem keine Bewunderung für jenes so gibt 
es keine Begründung die diesen Namen verdiente.” [DB: 
43 f ] Hier ist sehr schön die Eigentümlichkeit von Ethik, 
die sich auch in den ethischen Sätzen niederschlägt, zu-
sammengefasst: Es geht immer um Wertungen und dar-
um, Abscheu oder Bewunderung zu erzeugen. Da das 
Äußern eines ethischen Satzes eine Handlung ist, ist die 
Ethik selbst eine Praxis, bestehend aus Wertungen und 
dem Äußern von Werturteilen. 
Den ethischen Sätzen eignet eine Besonderheit: sie 
gehören ähnlich wie die grammatischen Sätze zu den 
selbstverständlichen und unhinterfragten Grundlagen aller 
Tätigkeiten [Wachtendorf 2008: 184 ff]. Da man im 
Allgemeinen Regeln blind folgt, folgt man auch ethischen 
Sätzen blind. Das heißt, dass man auch solchen Regeln 
folgt, die in dem jeweiligen Sprachspiel in Kraft sind, 
obwohl man ihnen nicht explizit, sondern nur durch 
Teilhabe zugestimmt hat. Das eigene Verhalten ist also 
immer auch von ethischen Regeln geleitet, die im 
jeweiligen Sprachspiel Geltung haben. Es ist aus 
sprachlogischen Gründen gar nicht möglich, auf alle 
basalen Regeln zu reflektieren. Demgegenüber ist dies 
jedoch oftmals ein Kriterium von ethischem Verhalten: “Nur 
solches Verhalten unterliegt einer moralischen Billigung 
oder Missbilligung, das der jeweilige Akteur hätte 
vermeiden können und das er deshalb verantworten 
muss.” [Birnbacher 22007: 15] Ein Kriterium für das 
Vermeiden-Können ist laut Birnbacher “größere Vorsicht” 
[Birnbacher 22007: 15]. Kann man aber überhaupt 
vorsichtig genug sein? Zweifelsohne gilt das für dezidiert 
ethische Fragen, die man in einer konkreten Situation 
bewusst zu lösen versucht. Hier kann man etwas anders 
machen, weil man die anderen Möglichkeiten kennt. Die 
bereits unbewusst in die ethische Überlegung 
eingehenden, grundlegenden Regeln sind jedoch 
ihrerseits einer Reflexion entzogen (oder nur sehr schwer 
zugänglich). So verstanden bekommt die Klasse der 
ethischen Sätze eine die Tätigkeiten der einzelnen 
unbewusst beeinflussende Funktion, wobei sie gleichzeitig 
dem aktiven direkten Zugriff eines einzelnen entzogen ist.  
4. Supervenienz und Reduzierbarkeit 
Es ist nun unschwer zu erkennen, dass die Klasse der 
ethischen Sätze (fortan E), wie sie bis hierhin dargestellt 
worden ist, in einem Supervenienzverhältis zu den 
Sprachspielenden steht. Klassisch wird Supervenienz 
definiert als: eine Eigenschaftsfamilie A superveniert über 
einer Eigenschaftsfamilie B, genau dann wenn man A 
nicht verändern kann, ohne B zu verändern. Es ist offen-
sichtlich, dass diese Definition hier erfüllt ist, weil E keiner 
Änderung unterliegt, sofern nicht eine Änderung im Han-
deln der Sprachspielenden eintritt.  
Somit ist die Ethik (selbstverständlich) abhängig von 
den Sprachspielenden; aber nicht von jedem einzelnen, 
sondern von allen in ihrer Gesamtheit. Sie ist das Ergebnis 
der Interaktion der Sprachspielenden untereinander und 
der Interdependenz zwischen diesen und den Sätzen aus 
E. Die einzelnen Sätze aus E haben unterschiedliche 
Wirkung auf die verschiedenen Sprachspielenden. Die 
Wechselwirkung ist hyperkomplex, das heißt, es gibt keine 
eindeutige reversible Relation zwischen Sätzen und 
Handlungen, sondern die Interdependenzen der einzelnen 
Sätze untereinander und ihre jeweilige Wirkung auf die 
Sprachspielenden sind derart komplex, dass überhaupt 
keine Zuordnung möglich ist. Denn jede Handlung kann 
auf unterschiedliche Weise beschrieben werden und für 
jeden ethischen Satz gibt es verschiedene Möglichkeiten 
der Befolgung. Letzteres hängt insbesondere auch von 
den Sitten und Gebräuchen der jeweiligen 
Sprachspielgemeinschaft oder von den besonderen 
Eigenschaften des Einzelnen ab. Außerdem kann ein 
ethischer Satz Konsequenzen für andere haben, die sich 
beispielsweise erst in der konkreten Praxis seiner 
Anwendung zeigen, wodurch er eine praktische Wirkung 
entfaltet, die wiederum sofort Konsequenzen für die Sätze 
der Klasse E hat. Wittgenstein deutet dieses Verhältnis in 
folgenden Bemerkungen an: “Was man eine Änderung in 
den Begriffen nennt, ist natürlich nicht nur eine Änderung 
im Reden, sondern auch eine im Tun.” [BPP: I-910] Und 
“Ich will sagen: eine ganz andere Erziehung, als die 
unsere, könnte auch die Grundlage ganz anderer Begriffe 
sein.” [BPP: II-707] Klarer kann man die enge 
Verwobenheit von Handlungen und Sprache nicht 
machen. In dieser Konstruktion kommt die Präreflexivität 
grammatischer und damit auch ethischer Sätze als 
Mythologie [vgl.: VüE: 38] deutlich zum Ausdruck. Erst auf 
der Basis einer zumindest rudimentären Klasse E kann 
anschließend auf einzelne ethische Sätze aus E reflektiert 
werden. 
Gemäß dieser Darstellung ist zugleich klar, dass die 
Sprachspielenden nicht als kollektiver Akteur im 
herkömmlichen Sinne aufgefasst werden sollten. Die 
Frage ist hier nicht, ob die Gemeinschaft der Sprach-
spielenden eine eigenständige Entität ist, deren Vollzüge – 
sofern sie tatsächlich welche hat – zusätzlich und 
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unabhängig von denen ihrer Mitglieder ethisch bewertet 
werden können, so wie etwa bei einer spontanen 
Demonstration sowohl das Verhalten der Demonstration 
insgesamt (etwa friedlich oder gewaltbereit) als auch die 
Handlungen der einzelnen Demonstranten jeweils 
eigenständig moralisch bewertet werden können. Die 
Sprachspielenden handeln nicht kollektiv, sondern 
lediglich gemeinsam. Demnach geht jeder Sprach-
spielende seinen eigenen Interessen nach, muss dabei 
jedoch zwangsläufig den gemeinsamen Regeln folgen und 
übt dadurch Einfluss auf diese aus. Spieltheoretisch 
betrachtet bekommt dadurch das Handeln der einzelnen 
zwar durchaus kollektive Züge. Dies ist für den hier 
verfolgter Zweck allerdings nicht relevant. 
Aus der obigen Darstellung der Entstehung der 
supervenienten Klasse E folgt zugleich eine Antwort auf 
die Frage nach einer möglichen Reduktion der Ethik. 
Versteht man als Reduktionismus, dass ein System durch 
seine Einzelbestandteile vollständig bestimmt ist, kann 
davon im Zusammenhang mit Ethik keine Rede sein. Eine 
Reduktion ist letztlich immer entweder die Rückführung 
einer Theorie auf Beobachtungssätze oder von Begriffen 
auf Dinge oder von (mentalen) Zuständen und Zusammen-
hängen auf kausal-deterministische Ereignisse. In allen 
drei Fällen wird ein wie auch immer gearteter, (quasi-) 
naturwissenschaftlicher Atomismus unterstellt. Demgemäß 
gibt es letzte Entitäten, auf die alle von ihnen verschiedene 
reduziert werden können, weil sie bloß als Konfigurationen 
oder Beschreibungen dieser Grundentitäten verstanden 
werden. Im Falle der Ethik kann man entweder versuchen, 
die Sätze der Klasse E und die Handlungen der 
Sprachspielenden auf Beobachtungssätze zurück-
zuführen, oder man betrachtet die ethischen Sätze nur als 
sprachliche Darstellung mentaler Zustände. Beide Wege 
sind nicht gangbar. Zwar lässt sich bei der Gemeinschaft 
der Sprachspielenden bis zu einem gewissen Grad mit 
Beobachtungssätzen arbeiten. Im Falle von einzelnen 
Sprachspielenden ist das aufgrund der Hyperkomplexität 
der Ethik (die ja auch die Intentionalität einschließt) nicht 
möglich. Ähnlich wie beim berühmten Gavagai-Beispiel 
von Quine ist niemals klar, ob der im Beobachtungssatz 
ausgedrückte Sachverhalt wirklich dem beobachteten 
entspricht. 
Auch der zweite Weg ist nicht zielführend: Vielleicht 
ist es möglich, bestimmte Werthaltungen eines konkreten 
Sprachspielenden mit bestimmten seiner Zustände 
(beispielsweise neurologisch oder psychologisch) zu 
identifizieren. Aber selbst wenn es gelänge, dies für alle 
Beteiligten zu tun, entsteht doch aus den ethischen 
Werthaltungen aller die supervenierende, von den 
einzelnen unabhängige Klasse E. Da die ethischen Wert-
haltungen und die Handlungen eines einzelnen von dieser 
Klasse interdependent abhängen, ist hier wegen der 
fehlenden Möglichkeit, eine eineindeutigen Zuordnung 
vornehmen zu können, keine Reduktion möglich. Man 
müsste eine vollständige Determination unterstellen, um 
das zu erreichen. Dagegen greifen die einschlägigen 
Argumente gegen einen solchen holistischen Standpunkt.  
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Das ‘schwierige Problem’ des Bewusstseins – oder wie es ist,  
Person zu sein 
Patricia M. Wallusch, Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland 
1. Zwei Arten von Bewusstsein und ein  
altes Problem 
Beckermann unterscheidet im ersten Kapitel seiner Analy-
tischen Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes fünf 
charakteristische Merkmale des Mentalen: Bewusstheit, 
Unkorrigierbarkeit, Intentionalität, Nicht-Räumlichkeit, so-
wie Privatheit. Mit Blick auf das Merkmal der Bewusstheit 
bemerkt er weiterhin, dass es sich um zumindest zwei 
voneinander verschiedene Merkmale handeln könne. Zum 
einen könne es bedeuten, dass eine Person, die sich in 
einem mentalen Zustand M befindet, auch weiß, dass sie 
in M ist. Er schließt mit Blick auf Freuds ´Entdeckung des 
Unbewussten´ aus, dass es sich – so verstanden – um ein 
Merkmal handelt, das sich auf alle mentalen Zustände 
erstreckt. Als zweites Charakteristikum mentaler Zustände 
führt er ihren phänomenalen Charakter an, d.h. die Tatsa-
che, dass es sich für eine Person, die sich in einem menta-
len Zustand M befindet, irgendwie anfühlt in M zu sein. 
Beckermann betrachtet es als ´zumindest zweifelhaft´, 
dass dies für alle mentalen Zustände gilt (Beckermann 
22001, 9).  
Gerade das letztgenannte Merkmal ist meiner 
Ansicht nach ein fundamentales Charakteristikum des 
Mentalen. Täglich befinden wir uns in unterschiedlichsten 
bewussten Zuständen, die diesen Charakter besitzen, 
haben wir Absichten und Wünsche, dringen auf uns 
Eindrücke verschiedenster Art ein, erleben wir die Welt als 
unsere Welt, – die urtümlichste Art des Bewusstseins ist 
die, sich des eigenen Lebens bewusst zu sein: nur ich lebe 
mein Leben, mein Leben fühlt sich (nur) für mich auf eine 
ganz spezifische Weise an. Sich seines eigenen Lebens 
und Erlebens bewusst zu sein, sehe ich als 
fundamentalstes Charakteristikum an, das mein – und ich 
unterstelle, das jedes anderen Menschen - geistiges 
Leben auszeichnet, – nämlich das es irgendwie ist es als 
solches zu erleben. Auch das Unbewusste im Sinne 
Freuds ist ein Teil dessen, was uns prinzipiell bewusst ist, 
weil es zu jeder Zeit (wieder) bewusst werden kann: der 
un- oder unterbewusste Teil unserer Selbst ist lediglich 
nicht aktuiert, kann aber durch einen Akt der (Wieder-
)Erinnerung aktuiert werden, sei er bewusst gesetzt oder 
durch äußere Einflüsse ausgelöst. Was also ist das 
Problem? Warum scheint es so schwierig, jenen 
fundamentalen Bestandteil unserer Existenz zu erklären? 
Warum drängt es uns überhaupt dahingehend, ihn 
erklären zu müssen? 
Seit Descartes’ Trennung von Körper und Geist 
verstand die Philosophie es als eine ihrer Aufgaben, diese 
Trennung zu bewahren oder ihre Verfehltheit 
nachzuweisen, indem sie Bemühungen um plausiblere 
Alternativen anstellte. Die Absicht, jene Trennung zu 
wahren, verfolgten seit jeher solche, die sich – in 
Anlehnung an die Cartesianische Unterscheidung – als 
´Dualisten´ bezeichnen, ihre Verfehltheit nachzuweisen 
war das erklärte Ziel von Vertretern monistischer 
Positionen, die entweder in idealistischer oder 
materialistischer Ausprägung auftraten.  
Der Dualismus hat zwar bis heute noch Bestand, 
doch er wird nur noch von ganz wenigen Philosophen 
vertreten; der Materialismus, dessen moderne 
Bezeichnung ´Physikalismus´ ist, hingegen erfreut sich 
einer großen Anhängerschaft. Dass der materialistische 
Ansatz zunehmend an Einfluss gewinnen konnte, lag 
sicherlich am zunehmenden Erfolg, den die empirischen 
Wissenschaften hinsichtlich der Erklärung der Phänomene 
der natürlichen Welt erzielten, und daran, dass eine 
philosophische Theorie, deren Erklärungsgrundlage also in 
den Gesetzmäßigkeiten einer empirisch ergründbaren 
Natur liegt, im Gegensatz zu anderen Ansätzen mit der 
Annahme einer durch Naturgesetze beschreibbaren und 
durch Gesetzmäßigkeiten determinierten Welt eher 
kompatibel ist. Dass der Physikalismus heute die 
einflussreichste und meistdiskutierte Position im Rahmen 
der Philosophie des Geistes (und nicht nur dort) ist, erklärt 
sich also aus dem Umstand, dass in ein solches von 
Wissenschaftlichkeit, Empirie und Rationalität 
beherrschtes Weltbild eine geistige Substanz nicht passt, 
– ein dualistischer Zugang setzt sie aber voraus, insofern 
er sich nicht nur auf Aussagen über Eigenschaften 
beschränkt. 
Die Annahme einer ´res cogitans´ erschien dem 
immer aufgeklärteren Menschen zu mystisch, – zu sehr in 
einem religiösen Weltbild verhaftet, das im Hinblick auf 
seine Erklärungskraft als immer unzureichender und 
immer weniger adäquat erschien. Recht bald wurde das 
Projekt programmatisch, die mentalen Phänomene nach 
naturwissenschaftlichem Vorbild zu erklären, um sie so mit 
dem Bild einer kausal geschlossenen und determinierten 
Welt kompatibel zu machen, – sie in die natürlichen 
Vorgänge aufzulösen, aus denen sie hervorgehen. Die 
Position, die sich im Gefolge dieser Entwicklung 
herausbildete, war die des Eliminativismus. 
Charakteristisch für diese Position war sowohl die 
Leugnung einer geistigen Substanz, als auch das 
Bemühen darum, sämtliche geistige Eigenschaften 
wegzuerklären. Doch stellte sich heraus, dass es mit ihrer 
Hilfe nicht möglich war, alle mentalen Phänomene 
vollständig in physikalische Prozesse aufzulösen, sodass 
die Position des eliminativen Physikalismus bald von einer 
ihm gegenüber gemäßigteren, reduktionistisch 
ausgerichteten Variante abgelöst wurde. Sein Bestreben 
richtete sich darauf, mentale Phänomene auf die 
physikalischen Prozesse zu reduzieren, die ihnen 
zugrunde zu liegen scheinen. 
Allerdings geriet auch dieser Ansatz in den 
vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten zunehmend in eine 
Sackgasse: zwar gelang es mit seiner Hilfe tatsächlich, 
einen großen Teil mentaler Phänomene zu erklären, doch 
das phänomenale Bewusstsein gehörte zu der Art von 
Phänomenen, die sich einer Reduktion widersetzten. Die 
Lösung muss also in einem davon verschiedenen Ansatz 
liegen, – doch wird es durch einen nicht-reduktiven Ansatz 
keinesfalls einfacher; so beklagt Kim, dass mit dem 
Scheitern des Reduktionismus auch die Verstehbarkeit 
mentaler Verursachung in unerreichbare Ferne rückt (Vgl. 
Kim 1996, 237). Die Lage scheint aussichtslos. 
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2. David Chalmers Ansatz zu einer Theorie 
des Bewusstseins (consciousness) 
An diesem Punkt des Scheiterns jener Theorien, knüpft 
Chalmers an und versucht einen nicht-reduktiven Ausweg 
zu weisen. Er diagnostiziert das Problem, das bisherige 
physikalistische Ansätze bei der Erklärung des Bewusst-
seins hatten, zum einen darin, dass sie reduktionistisch 
ausgerichtet waren und dass es sich bei den erklärten 
Merkmalen um die ´leichten´ Probleme handelte, – dass 
also entgegen dem Anspruch, den diese Theorien hin-
sichtlich ihrer explanativen Kraft hegten, das wirklich 
´schwere´ Problem von ihnen nicht berührt wurde.  
Die ´leichten´ Probleme umfassen „the ability to 
discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental 
stimuli; the integration of information by a cognitive 
system; the reportability of mental states; the ability of a 
system to access its own internal states; the focus of 
attention; the deliberate control of behavior; the difference 
between wakefulness and sleep.” (Chalmers 1995, 200) 
Diese bilden den Bereich des Bewusstseins im Sinn von 
´awareness´. Ihnen sei mit einem reduktionistischen 
Ansatz leicht beizukommen, da sie mittels computationaler 
oder neuronaler Mechanismen prinzipiell erklärbar seien, – 
auch wenn dies noch eine längere Phase schwieriger 
empirischer Forschung durch die Kognitions- und 
Neurowissenschaften bedeute. „If these phenomena were 
all there was to consciousness, then consciousness would 
not be much of a problem. Although we do not yet have 
anything close to a complete explanation of these 
phenomena, we have a clear idea of how we might go 
about explaining them. This is why I call these problems 
the easy problems.” (Chalmers 1995, 201)  
Das eigentliche und schwere Problem, dem 
scheinbar nicht beizukommen ist, ist hingegen das der 
Erfahrung: „When we think and perceive, there is a whir of 
information-processing, but there is also a subjective 
aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is 
like to be a conscious organism.” (Chalmers 1995, 201) 
Um diesem Problem beizukommen, konzipiert Chalmers 
eine Theorie, in deren Zentrum der Begriff der Information 
bzw. des Informationsraums steht. Diese Theorie basiert 
auf drei Prinzipien, zwei nicht-grundlegender und einem 
grundlegender Art. Das Prinzip struktureller Kohärenz und 
das Prinzip funktionaler (´organisational´) Invarianz sind 
Prinzipien nicht grundlegender Art, die es ermöglichen 
sollen, Entsprechungen zwischen Bewusstsein im Sinn 
von awareness und Bewusstsein im Sinn von 
consciousness sowohl auf globaler als auf struktureller 
Ebene herzustellen. Hinzu kommt das Doppel-Aspekt 
Prinzip, als grundlegendes Prinzip. Es besagt: „whenever 
we find an information space realized phenomenally, we 
find the same information space realized physically.“ 
(Chalmers 1996, 284) Dieses Prinzip gibt in Verbindung 
mit den erstgenannten Prinzipien Anlass zu der Hoffnung, 
nun endlich eine Grundlage in der Hand zu haben, mittels 
derer dem ´schweren´ Problem beizukommen ist. Der 
daraus resultierenden Theorie zufolge wird jegliche 
Information, die bewusst erlebt wird, zugleich physisch 
verkörpert. Sie basiert also auf der Annahme einer 
strukturellen und inhaltlichen Entsprechung zwischen 
diesen beiden Informationsräumen. 
3. Das Problem des Bewusstseins  
(revisited) 
Was mich bezüglich der von Chalmers vorgeschlagenen 
Vorgehensweise skeptisch stimmt, ist, dass in ihm dem 
Begriff der Information bzw. des Informationsraums eine 
zentrale Rolle zukommt. Mir scheint unser eigentliches 
Problem wiederholt nicht berührt zu sein, geht es bei dem 
eigentlichen Problem des Bewusstseins (consciousness) 
doch gerade um ein Phänomen, das jenseits aller bewuss-
ten Zustände mit bestimmtem (Informations-)gehalt (awa-
reness) auftritt, – wie Chalmers selbst feststellte „but there 
is also a subjective aspect“ (Chalmers 1995, 201).  
Wacome stellt einen Punkt heraus, der eine Intuition 
meinerseits trifft. Ihm stellt sich unser Problem 
folgendermaßen dar: „reducibility was conceived as a 
logical relation between linguistic items... but type 
reducibility was taken as having ontological implications.“ 
(Wacome 2004, 323) Ansätze des Physikalismus 
unterscheiden sich also lediglich hinsichtlich der Art, wie 
sie über die zu erklärenden Phänomene reden, – nicht 
hinsichtlich des Ziels, dass sie unterschiedslos auf der 
ontologischen Ebene verfolgen: „Physicalism, whether 
reductionist or nonreductionist, denies the existence of the 
immaterial mind.“ (Ders., 325) Doch wie könnte eine 
Alternative aussehen? 
Kein Zweifel dürfte dahingehend bestehen, dass 
auch Erklärungen, die einer dualistische Intuition 
entstammen, nicht ignorieren können, dass auf 
physikalischer Ebene etwas passiert, wenn eine Person 
bewusst ist, – also ein minimaler Physikalismus als Basis 
vonnöten ist, um die Verstehbarkeit mentaler 
Verursachung prinzipiell zu ermöglichen. Dieser Aspekt ist 
es auch, der selbst den Neurowissenschaften noch 
Kopfschmerzen bereitet. Wolf Singer stellte sich in einem 
Vortrag, den er im März dieses Jahres hielt, der Frage 
„Wer regiert im Gehirn?“. Dabei betonte er, dass es zwar 
mehrere Zentren im Gehirn gibt (also keine Zentrale einer 
´res cogitans´ wie sie Descartes noch vermutete), jedoch 
unabhängig von deren Aktivitäten noch eine weitere 
jederzeit messbare Aktivität vorhanden sei, die keinem der 
bisher lokalisierten Zentren zugeordnet werden kann. In 
dieser nicht-lokalisierbaren Aktivität könnte eben jene 
minimale physikalische Basis subjektiven Erlebens 
vorliegen, – allerdings ist die Annahme eines solchen 
Zusammenhangs nur eine rein spekulative Vermutung 
meinerseits, die plausibel erscheinen mag oder nicht, in 
jedem Fall aber noch der Bestätigung durch Ergebnisse 
interdisziplinärer Bemühungen bedürfte. 
Sollte meine Vermutung jedoch nicht völlig verfehlt 
sein und bewusstes Erleben tatsächlich in einer nicht 
weiter lokalisierbaren physischen Aktivität korreliert sein, 
so steht dem nichts mehr entgegen, das Bewusstsein (im 
Sinn von consciousness) als eine fundamentale 
Eigenschaft anzunehmen, die sich nicht weiter erklären 
lässt (dies wäre nach dem Vorbild der 
Naturwissenschaften die klassische Gangart im Hinblick 
auf Phänomene, die sich über einen längeren Zeitraum 
der Rückführung auf einfachere Bestandteile widersetzen). 
Stellt sich dieser Weg als gangbar heraus, so wäre er mit 
neuen Perspektiven für mindestens ein weiteres Problem 
verbunden, nämlich der Frage danach, was Personen 
wesentlich sind. Im Zusammenhang mit dieser Frage lässt 
sich auch der dualistischen Intuition Rechnung tragen, die 
bereits angeklungen ist. 
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Der besondere ontologische Status des 
Bewusstseins, seine Nichtreduzierbarkeit, liegt laut Searle 
darin begründet, „because consciousness has a first-
person, or subjective, ontology, and is thus not reducible to 
anything that has a third-person or objective ontology.“ 
(Searle 2007, 50) Dieser erstpersönliche Charakter 
zeichnet eine Äußerung wie ´Ich habe Schmerzen´ in dem 
Moment, in dem Schmerzen tatsächlich empfunden 
werden, in zweifacher Hinsicht aus. Darin wird etwas 
ausgedrückt, wovon nur derjenige wissen kann, der den 
Schmerz empfindet. Ein solcher Satz drückt Selbstwissen 
de re aus, d.h. in dem Moment der Äußerung weiß nur das 
äußernde Subjekt selbst um das in diesem Satz zum 
Ausdruck gebrachte Gefühl. Es ist ein Satz direkt Bezug 
nehmender Referenz, in dem das ´Ich´ sich als alleiniges 
Subjekt dieses Schmerzes weiß, – weiß, dass es seine 
Schmerzen sind (Vgl. Lowe 2006, 183f.). Diese beiden 
Kriterien, die direkt Bezug nehmende Referenz und das 
Selbstwissen müssen erfüllt sein, damit von einem Selbst 
oder einer Person als Subjekt der Erfahrung die Rede sein 
kann (Vgl. Lowe 2006, 194). Was aber ist das Selbst oder 
die Person? 
Zwei Gründe sprechen gegen die Annahme, dass 
Personen mit Körpern identisch sind. Zum einen ist es 
vorstellbar, dass zwei Personen einen Körper haben (wie 
es bei siamesischen Zwillingen der Fall ist oder wie es das 
Brain-Split Argument nahelegt). Zum anderen ist es 
durchaus denkbar, dass ein Selbst auch dann existiert, 
wenn ihm die Fähigkeit sinnlicher Wahrnehmung 
vollständig fehlt und es somit nicht in der Lage ist, 
festzustellen, ob es einen Körper hat, geschweige denn, 
welcher seiner sein könnte. Dennoch wäre es dieser 
Person weiterhin möglich, um sich selbst zu wissen und 
auf sich selbst Bezug zu nehmen (Vgl. Lowe 2006, 184). 
Dass ein Selbst mit einem Körper identisch ist, darf also 
ausgeschlossen werden, „bodies cannot themselves be 
selves, since they could not in principle satisfy the 
condition of self-knowledge that selfhood entails: for even 
if a body could in some sense ‘know’ that a certain thought 
or experience ‘belonged’ to it, it could not be guaranteed 
(as a self is) to know that it itself was the unique subject of 
that thought or experience, since it could not even be  
 
guaranteed to ‘know’ that that thought or experience 
‘belonged’ to it alone. Therefore, I know a priori that ‘I am 
this body’ is necessarily false. (The same conclusion 
follows if ‘bodily part’ is substituted for body throughout.)” 
(Lowe 2006, 196) Ebenso ausgeschlossen ist, dass eine 
Person identisch ist mit einem Gehirn. 
Aus dem Gesagten könnte man nun durchaus zu 
dem Schluss gelangen, dass eine Person eine 
Cartesische ´res cogitans´ ist, – doch scheint er mir wenig 
überzeugend. Eine Person ist vielmehr eine 
psychologische Substanz, die psychologischen 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten unterliegt (Vgl. Lowe 2006, 34). Eine 
solche Substanz ist weit davon entfernt, immateriell zu 
sein. Sie ist eng verbunden mit einem Körper – durch 
seine Teile, derer sie sich bewusst ist, „namely, those over 
which it can exercise direct voluntary control and those in 
which it can phenomenologically localize bodily 
sensations“ (Lowe 2006, 13). 
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The Supervenience Argument, Levels, Orders, and Psychophysical 
Reductions 
Sven Walter, Osnabrück, Germany 
Nonreductive physicalism (NRP) dominates current 
discussions of the mind-body problem. According to NRP, 
all scientifically respectable entities which are not 
straightforwardly identical to physical entities are at least 
(asymmetrically) dependent upon physical entities, for 
instance by supervening upon them. Jaegwon Kim has 
argued for decades that NRP collapses either in 
epiphenomenalism, or in reductive physicalism. The punch 
line of his famous Supervenience Argument (SA) is that if 
mental properties indeed supervened upon physical 
properties without being reducible to them, then they 
would be causally otiose; since epiphenomenalism is 
absurd, mental properties must thus be reducible to 
physical properties. 
SA is one of the most important arguments against 
NRP. Kim has formulated various versions since the late 
eighties, and in Kim (2005), he has defended it against 
various criticisms. The current paper assesses Kim’s re-
sponse to one of the most important criticisms, viz., the 
Generalization Argument according to which, if sound, SA 
would not only show that there is no mental causation, but 
also that there is no biological, no chemical, no geological 
causation etc. 
1. The Supervenience Argument 
Suppose that (an instance of; I will omit this qualification 
from now on) mental property M causes mental property 
M*. Given psychophysical supervenience, there must be a 
physical property P* which is (non-causally) sufficient for 
M*. Why does M* occur? Given supervenience, as long as 
P* is there, M* will be there, no matter what happened 
before—even if M*’s alleged cause, M, had not been pre-
sent (Kim 1998, 42). According to Kim, if M is to cause M*, 
it must do so by causing P* (Kim 2005, 40). Hence, men-
tal-to-mental causation is possible only if mental-to-
physical causation is possible; yet, it seems, the latter is 
possible only if mental properties are reducible to physical 
properties. The reason is that P* will also have a sufficient 
completely physical cause P, since the physical world is 
assumed to be causally closed. But then, how can M 
cause P*, if P (which is allegedly distinct from M) is already 
a sufficient cause of P*? If P is a sufficient cause of P*, 
then there seems nothing left for M to do, unless M is iden-
tical to P (barring genuine overdetermination). The alterna-
tive is thus: “reduction or causal impotence” (Kim 2005, 
54). NRP is no longer a serious option. 
2. The Generalization Argument 
It has been argued that the argument just sketched cannot 
be sound since, if so, it would render all macroproperties 
causally impotent (Block 2003). What deprives mental 
properties of their causal status, according to SA, it is said, 
is their relationship to physical properties, viz., superven-
ience without reduction, and it seems that all macroproper-
ties stand in this relationship to the properties below them 
in the micro-macro-hierarchy. Hence, if sound, SA would 
generalize, rendering all macroproperties causally otiose. 
This, Kim’s critics allege, shows that it cannot be sound. 
3. A Reductio of What? 
Kim’s first response is to stress that SA is intended as a 
reductio. Epiphenomenalism concerning mental properties 
is the absurdity that allegedly forces us to give up the irre-
ducibility of mental properties. Hence, if this epiphenome-
nalism would indeed cover all macroproperties, that would 
only add to the force of SA because it would provide “us 
with one more reason to perform a reductio against the 
irreducibility premise” (Kim 2005, 69). 
Yet, although one thing to dismiss as a result of the 
reductio is the irreducibility premise, another one obviously 
is Kim’s assumption that M and P cannot both be causes 
of M*, and from the point of view of Kim’s opponents, it is 
this assumption that is reduced to absurdity. 
4. Levels, Orders, and Supervenience 
Kim’s second response draws on a distinction between 
levels and orders (Kim 1998). There are, he said, two 
kinds of macroproperties: higher-level and higher-order 
properties. SA does not apply to higher-level properties 
because they do not supervene upon lower-level proper-
ties. And since most higher-order properties can be re-
duced to lower-order properties, SA does not apply to 
them either. The only macroproperties threatened are irre-
ducible higher-order properties, and since phenomenal 
properties of conscious experience are the only properties 
of this kind, the Generalization Argument fails. 
Two issues are important here: supervenience and 
reduction. This section tackles supervenience, section 6 
reduction. 
SA, Kim claimed, would apply to higher-level 
properties only if the subvenient/supervenient distinction 
mirrored the relation between fundamental and higher-
level properties, and this is not the case. A property’s level 
depends upon what object it is a property of—properties of 
objects with parts are higher-level properties, properties of 
objects with no parts are fundamental properties. Yet, 
since supervenience is necessarily a relation between 
properties of the same objects, it only generates an 
intralevel hierarchy of lower- and higher-order properties. 
Higher-level properties, in contrast, are structural or 
microbased properties of the form R(P1o1, …, Pnon) which 
do not supervene upon the properties P1, …, Pn, and the 
relation R that make up their microbase. Therefore, SA 
does not apply to them (Kim 2005, 57). 
In an earlier paper, Kim himself characterized a 
relation between properties of objects in domains D1 and 
D2 that are coordinated by a mapping relation R such that 
for each object x in D1, R/x is the image of x in D2 (Kim 
1988, 124). However, if R is the part/whole relation, his 
characterization amounts to an interlevel notion of 
mereological supervenience between the properties of 
wholes and those of their parts. The result is that SA would 
apply to higher-level properties, too. 
The Supervenience Argument, Levels, Orders, and Psychophysical Reductions — Sven Walter 
 
 
 378 
5. Determination 
What prevents a microbased property P from being caus-
ally preempted by other properties? P cannot be pre-
empted by the structural property R(P1o1, …, Pnon), be-
cause it is identical to it (Kim 1998, 117–118). But what 
prevents P from being preempted by the (appropriately 
related) properties P1, …, Pn? Kim’s answer is that micro-
based properties are not determined by the properties in 
their microbase: 
 
We clearly cannot think of P1, …, Pn, and R taken 
together as determining P. For to say that the prop-
erties ‘determine’ P, in the usual sense, is to say (at 
least) that necessarily any object that has them has 
P. But this condition is at best vacuous in the pre-
sent case: an object that has P cannot be expected 
to have any of the Pis or R. The reason of course is 
that the Pis are the properties of the object’s proper 
parts, and R is a relation, not a property.  
(Kim 1999, 117) 
Hence, microbased properties fail to be determined by the 
properties in their microbase for the same reason they 
allegedly fail to supervene upon them: they are exemplified 
by distinct objects. And just as in the case of superven-
ience, the question is why a notion of determination which 
restricts determination to properties of the same object is 
the (only) correct notion to adopt. There seems to be a 
straightforward sense of “determines” in which microbased 
properties are determined by the properties in their micro-
base: a table’s having a mass of ten kilograms (Kim’s ex-
ample) seems to be determined by its consisting of a six 
kilo top and a four kilo pedestal. (For further, more de-
tailed, discussion see Walter 2008.) 
6. Reduction 
What remained to be addressed after section 4 was the 
possibility of an intralevel causal drainage, where the 
higher-order properties at each level are preempted by the 
first-order properties of that level. Kim’s response was that 
higher-order properties immune against SA because they 
are reducible, and where there is only one property, there 
can be no competition, and thus no preemption: “Reduc-
tion is the stopper that will plug the cosmic hole through 
which causal powers might drain away” (Kim 2005, 68). 
But how are these reductions to be accomplished? 
Kim (1998) held that most higher-order properties are 
reducible by means of functional reductions (Kim 1998, 
98–99), so that each level contains (except for a few non-
functionalizable exceptions like phenomenal properties) 
strictly speaking only first-order properties. Allegedly, this 
dissolved the problem of intralevel causal drainage. 
Kim (2005) still defends the functional account of 
reduction, but he seems to have abandoned the explicit 
distinction between orders and levels, arguing that 
reduction is also the key to stopping interlevel causal 
drainage: 
 
Let us say that the property of being H2O is the total 
micro-based property of water at the atomic level L 
(so having ML = being H2O). So we have:  
 
(1) Being water = having ML. 
 
At the next level down, L-1, say the level of the 
Standard Model, hydrogen atoms have a certain mi-
crostructural composition as do oxygen atoms, and 
water has a certain microstructural composition at 
this level; call it ML-1. Then by the same reasoning 
that led us to (1), we have:  
 
(2)  Being water = having ML-1. 
 
At the level L-2, the one below the Standard Model 
(if there is such a level), water is again going to 
have a certain microstructure at this level; this is  
ML-2. We then have:  
 
(3)  Being water = having ML-2. 
 
And so on down the line, to ML-3 and the rest. These 
identities in turn imply the following series of identi-
ties:  
 
ML = ML-1 = ML-2 = ML-3 ...  
 
Voilà! These are the identities we need to stop the 
drainage. (Kim 2005, 68–69)  
6.1 Reduction and Higher-level Properties 
One problem with Kim’s attempt to block causal drainage 
by appeal to reductions is that microbased properties 
seem to have “multiple compositions” (Block 2003, 146). 
Kim says the table’s having a mass of ten kilograms is the 
microstructural property of being composed of a six kilo top 
and a four kilo pedestal, but it seems that the table could 
have the same property in virtue of being composed of a 
five kilo top and a five kilo pedestal. This raises two prob-
lems. First, if microbased properties are multiply compos-
able or realizable, the multiple realizability of mental prop-
erties does not seem to prevent them from being micro-
based properties in Kim’s sense. Second, the identities 
Kim appeals to in order to stop causal drainage would be 
impossible: “Kim’s plugging the draining with micro-based 
properties depends on assuming identities (such as ‘water 
= H2O’) and multiple composition will exclude such identi-
ties” (Block 2003, 146). 
In response, Kim insists that multiple composability 
does not preclude identities: 
 
First, in spite of jade’s multiple composition, each 
instance of jade … is either jadeite or nephrite, and I 
don’t see anything wrong about identifying its being 
jade with its being nephrite (if it is nephrite) or with 
its being jadeite (if it’s jadeite). … All we need is 
identity at the level of instances, not necessarily at 
the level of kinds and properties … [Second, we 
can; S.W.] … identify jade with a disjunctive kind, 
jadeite or nephrite (that is, being jade is identified 
with having the microstructure of jadeite or the mi-
crostructure of nephrite). … On the disjunctive ap-
proach, being jade turns out to be a causally het-
erogeneous property, not a causally inert one. … To 
disarm Block’s multiple composition argument, 
adopting either disjunctive property/kind identities or 
instance (or token) identities seems sufficient. (Kim 
2005, 58–59) 
First, if token-identities can secure the causal efficacy of 
jade, despite its multiple composability, then why can they 
not secure the causal efficacy of irreducible mental proper-
ties, despite their multiple realizability? If all we need is 
identity at the level of instances, not necessarily at the 
level of kinds and properties, then where is the problem for 
NRP? Second, one wonders why Kim thinks he himself 
can have instance-identity without type-identity. After all, 
for him property-instances are events, whose identity con-
ditions entail that the instances are identical only if the 
types are identical. 
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Concerning Kim’s second option, suppose that 
being jade is identical to a disjunction of two 
microstructural properties. Given what Kim acknowledges 
elsewhere, the causal powers of the properties in the two 
microbases that form the disjunction determine the causal 
powers of being jade. Ascribing these properties to an 
object thus exhaustively fixes its causal potential, so that 
nothing is left for being jade to do, even though it is 
identical to a disjunction of two microstructural properties. 
Although being jade cannot be preempted by the 
disjunction of the two microstructural properties to which it 
is identical, it can still be preempted by the individual 
disjuncts. 
Can multiply composable microbased properties be 
functionally reduced? No, because functional reductions 
are a non-starter for microbased properties, given that they 
are eliminative—as Kim has admitted in Kim (1998, 106), 
the property that is functionally reduced doesn’t survive the 
reduction process. 
Hence, the causal efficacy of multiply composable 
microbased properties can neither be vindicated by 
disjunctive identities, nor by token-identities, nor by 
functional reductions. 
6.2 Reduction and Higher-order Properties 
What about Kim’s original suggestion that functional reduc-
tions can secure the causal efficacy of higher-order proper-
ties? As said above, functional reductions are eliminative. 
A functionally reduced property F has to be given up as a 
genuine property which can be exemplified in different 
species, and we retain only the predicate “x has F” and the  
 
concept F by which we equivocally pick out different prop-
erties in different species (Kim 1998, 106). It is thus a red 
herring to think that functional reductions can vindicate the 
causal efficacy of the properties reduced, because these 
get sundered into many different species-specific proper-
ties during the process of reduction. It is these that are 
identical to first-order properties. Hence, even if interlevel 
causal drainage could somehow be stopped, they, i.e., the 
first-order properties at each level, would be the only 
causally efficacious properties. If this is the only kind of 
causally efficacious property that the proponent of SA can 
protect from her own argument, her position will hardly 
look attractive—and definitely not like “a plausible terminus 
for the mind-body debate” (Kim 2005, 173). 
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No Bridge within Sight 
Daniel Wehinger, Innsbruck, Austria 
1 The explanatory gap 
In his 1983 paper „Materialism and Qualia: The Explana-
tory Gap“, Joseph Levine states that there is – the title 
already says it – an „explanatory gap“ between the physi-
cal and the mental. Neuroscience has revealed many of 
the processes that take place in our brains when we en-
gage in mental activities. Nevertheless, it is still kind of a 
mystery why, say, pain feels the way it does. Having 
learned which neural processes give rise to the experience 
of pain we are still left asking why and how they do so. 
Phenomenal properties, i.e. mental properties with a dis-
tinct phenomenal feel such as being in pain, cannot, so it 
seems, be fully explained in physical terms. There is a gap 
here. As a result, it seems perfectly conceivable that there 
is a world which is physically indiscernible from ours but 
lacking any phenomenal properties – the zombie world. 
This scenario was forcefully elaborated by David Chalmers 
in his “The Conscious Mind” (1996, 94-99). Chalmers 
draws explicitly dualist conclusions from the problem of the 
explanatory gap and the resulting conceivability of the 
zombie world. He claims that in addition to the lots and lots 
physical properties such as being six feet tall or weighing 
100 pounds there are also some mental properties that 
cannot be reduced to the physical, namely the phenome-
nal properties introduced above. Therefore, physicalism is 
false and a dualism of properties must be assumed. It is 
this kind of dualism – property dualism – that I will be deal-
ing with in the following.  
Now, property dualism as such of course doesn’t 
close the gap between the mental and the physical. It is 
rather a possible conclusion from it. Chalmers, however, 
claims that his theory provides him with the tools 
necessary for building a bridge. He aims at solving the 
“hard problem”: the question of how phenomenal 
properties arise from the physical. (Chalmers 1995) This, 
according to Chalmers, cannot be done by appeal to 
physical facts. “[I]nstead, we have to look for a “Y-factor,” 
something additional to the physical facts that will help 
explain consciousness. We find such a Y-factor in the 
postulation of irreducible psychophysical laws.” (Chalmers 
1996, 245) These laws are expected to be general and 
simple, i.e. they do not correlate particular types of neural 
processes (e.g. the firing of C-fibers) with particular types 
of phenomenal properties (e.g. the experience of pain). 
They rather have to be conceived of as the fundamental 
underlying laws that explain these correlations. A look at 
physics tells us that there are only a few fundamental 
physical laws. The same can be expected in the case of 
consciousness. (Chalmers 1996, 214-215) From the 
conceivability of the zombie scenario and other arguments 
for dualism, Chalmers concludes that the fundamental 
properties these laws invoke cannot be physical. They 
rather have to be phenomenal or protophenomenal, i.e. 
constituting phenomenal properties. And, just as is the 
case with fundamental psychophysical laws, only a few 
fundamental phenomenal or protophenomenal properties 
are to be expected. (Chalmers 1996, 126-127) By now we 
don’t know these fundamental phenomenal or 
protophenomenal properties. It is the task of a future 
science of consciousness to discover them. A 
systematization of the correlations between types of neural 
processes and types of phenomenal properties should 
guide us there. And after many years of long, hard work 
we shall eventually come to know the fundamental 
psychophysical laws and the fundamental phenomenal or 
protophenomenal properties that underlie these 
correlations. The arisal of consciousness will then be 
explained and there will be no mystery left. 
2 Why Bennett is not a dualist 
In an unpublished draft of August 2006 called “Why I am 
Not a Dualist” Karen Bennett criticizes Chalmers view. Her 
aim is to establish thereby that the Chalmers-style dualist 
is not any better off than the physicalist: It is just as difficult 
for her to solve the hard problem as it is for the physicalist. 
Taking into account additional criteria such as ontological 
economy, the unification of science and so forth, physical-
ism wins. (Bennett unpublished, 24)  
Bennett puts forward two arguments to support her 
view. The first argument focuses on the dualist’s research 
strategy. The dualist believes that scientific investigation 
will one day reveal how phenomenal properties arise from 
the physical. On her way there she uses exactly the same 
scientific methods and tools as the physicalist: “Both will 
do a lot of serious neuroscience, and both will pay 
attention to introspective phenomenology in order to get a 
better understanding of ‘phenomenal space’. Both will run 
a lab, employ postdocs, and apply for NSF funding.” 
(Bennett unpublished, 12) Nevertheless, the dualist is sure 
that there will never be a fully satisfying explanation of 
phenomenal properties in physical terms. That is, the 
dualist assumes that the physicalist cannot in principle 
close the explanatory gap. This a priori prediction is 
rendered suspect by the fact that the dualist expects 
important insights from the scientific investigation of 
consciousness: “If the dualist thinks that scientific research 
can uncover hitherto unsuspected truths about the 
fundamental laws governing psychophysical connections, 
why should she not also think that it can uncover hitherto 
unsuspected truths about the physical?” (Bennett 
unpublished, 13) There’s a real tension here, Bennett 
remarks: “The more you can see how research in the 
cognitive sciences can tell us how consciousness arises 
from the physical, the less secure you should be in your 
intuition that no purely physicalist story could ever work.” 
(Bennett unpublished, 14) 
In her second argument Bennett puts her finger on 
the dualist’s claim that her theory allows her to close the 
gap between the physical and the mental. Bennett 
stresses the fact that “[a]ny dualist who accepts the burden 
to systematize the macro-correlations [i.e. the correlations 
between certain types of neural processes and certain 
types of phenomenal properties] is committed to 
something in the ballpark of protophenomenalism.” 
(Bennett unpublished, 14) The generation of our everyday 
phenomenal properties cannot be explained by appeal to 
themselves. Rather, it must be assumed that the few 
fundamental properties out of which our conscious life is 
woven are quite unlike the phenomenal properties we 
know and had therefore better be called protophenomenal 
properties. (Bennett unpublished, 15) “Systematizing the 
relationship between the physical and the phenomenal”, 
Bennett goes on, “is a matter of figuring out what those 
elements [or properties] are, and what general laws govern 
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their relations both to the physical and to each other.” 
(Bennett unpublished, 15) Now, the fundamental 
protophenomenal properties can again be either 
phenomenal or nonphenomenal. If they are 
nonphenomenal, it is hard to see how they can generate 
the phenomenal properties we are familiar with. “[W]e now 
need a story about how the phenomenal arises from the 
protophenomenal. […] The explanatory gap has not been 
closed; it has just been shunted into the space between 
the protophenomenal and the phenomenal. The hard 
problem rearises there.” (Bennett unpublished, 16-17) If, 
on the contrary, protophenomenal properties are 
phenomenal themselves, then we need to explain how the 
physical can give rise to them. “More precisely, we have 
lost out on the attempt to systematize and unify the 
relationships between the physical and the phenomenal.” 
(Bennett unpublished, 17) Bennett sums up the problem 
as follows: “The more similar the protophenomenal 
properties are to phenomenal ones, the less headway can 
be made on the project of systematizing the macro-
correlations; we may as well take each and every 
phenomenal property, each and every macro-correlation, 
as fundamental. And the more removed the 
protophenomenal properties are from phenomenal ones, 
the less point there is to postulating them at all. We still 
cannot see how human experience – genuine, full blown 
consciousness – arises from complicated relations among 
such fragmentary shadows of phenomenality.” (Bennett 
unpublished, 17) By postulating a third category of 
properties the dualist “only answers the letter of the hard 
problem”. (Bennett unpublished, 18) The spirit of the hard 
problem – the question of how the phenomenal arises from 
the nonphenomenal – is as pressing as ever. (Bennett 
unpublished, 18) 
3 The subjectivity of the mental 
I believe that Bennett is right with her criticism of 
Chalmers’s position. I believe that, just like the physicalist, 
the dualist cannot solve the hard problem. I disagree, 
however, with Bennett’s claim that this amounts to an im-
peachment of dualism. Therefore, I will first explain why a 
fully satisfying explanation of how the mental arises from 
the physical is not to be expected and second why the 
prospects for dualism are nevertheless intact. 
Mental properties1 can be characterized as 
essentially subjective, in the sense that, while every 
physical property is in principle accessible to everyone, 
every mental property is principally accessible only from a 
certain subjective perspective. (Nagel 1974, 442) A tree’s 
height can be measured by everyone around. No one is 
privileged here. A person’s pain, however, can be 
experienced only by the person herself. Even though we 
can adopt the person’s point of view, we cannot actually 
feel her pain. Therefore, the instantiation of mental 
properties brings with it a change of perspective. It is this 
change of perspective that makes the occurrence of 
mental properties such a mystery. In contrast, there is no 
big mystery involved in explaining how one neural process 
generates the other and how one thought follows the 
                                                     
 
1 So far, I have restricted the discussion to phenomenal properties, following 
the terminology of the authors discussed. Phenomenal properties are mostly 
seen as one kind of mental properties, the other kind being psychological 
properties such as learning. Psychological properties, it is assumed, can be 
functionalized, whereas in the case of phenomenal properties this is ques-
tioned. (Chalmers 1996, 11-31) Since I have doubts about the phenome-
nal/psychological-distinction I will from now on be speaking of mental proper-
ties only. On the ontological level, of course, this doesn’t have any conse-
quences. The position discussed remains dualist all the same. 
other. Here the entities involved are on a par, so to say: 
They are both objective in the first case and both 
subjective in the second case. Therefore, all we need to do 
in order to achieve a fully satisfying explanation is to keep 
track of every turn they take. When trying to explain, on the 
contrary, how neural processes give rise to mental 
properties and how thoughts yield neural changes we have 
a much harder time. Here the entities involved are tied to 
different perspectives. A fully satisfying explanation, 
however, would have to lead us all the way from the 
physical to the mental, or conversely from the mental to 
the physical without changing the perspective. In view of 
the subjectivity of the mental and the objectivity of the 
physical such an explanation is not to be expected. Adding 
up objective facts doesn’t seem to get us any nearer to 
something essentially subjective. It is only by changing the 
perspective that we come to know there are mental, and 
therefore subjective, properties. Hence, a bridge between 
the physical and the mental is not within sight: Such a 
bridge would again have to be either subjective or 
objective and either way the hard problem, which can by 
now be reformulated as the question of how you get 
something essentially subjective out of something 
essentially objective, rearises. 
Many physicalists concede that mental properties 
indeed appear to be subjective in the sense described 
above. If, however, they really are subjective in that sense, 
then they cannot be physical, for the physical is certainly 
objective. Therefore, the physicalist is confronted with the 
difficult task of having to point out how the mental, contrary 
to appearance, can be objective without thereby turning it 
into something it is not. Admittedly, it is not quite clear by 
now how this could be done and, thus, how the physicalist 
claim that everything there is, including mental properties, 
is physical could be made true. But this, it is argued, does 
not ultimately rule out the possibility of its truth. The 
following quote from Thomas Nagel is revealing here: “If 
we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must 
account for the subjective character of experience, we 
must admit that no presently available conception gives us 
a clue how this could be done.” But, as Nagel goes on, 
“[n]othing is provided by the inadequacy of physicalist 
hypotheses that assume a faulty objective analysis of 
mind. It would be truer to say that physicalism is a position 
we cannot understand because we do not at present have 
any conception of how it might be true.” (Nagel 1974, 445-
446) Such a line of argument, however, puts physicalism 
at risk of becoming something close to an article of faith. 
Dualists, on the contrary, claim that mental 
properties are indeed the way they appear to be, i.e. 
subjective, and therefore nonphysical. This claim, of 
course, does not solve the hard problem. But this must not 
be seen as a lack of the dualist position. The dualist is not 
committed to solving the hard problem. All she is 
committed to is the thesis that, in addition to the lots and 
lots of physical properties, there are at least some mental 
properties that are not physical. In fact, I believe that, if the 
mental is essentially subjective, the insolubleness of the 
hard problem follows: A fully satisfying explanation of the 
arisal of mental properties from physical processes does 
not allow for a change of perspective. We are not satisfied, 
if the explanans does not lead us straightly to the 
explanadum. If, however, the mental is essentially tied to a 
certain subjective perspective, objective facts won’t guide 
us there. Therefore, the insurmountability of the gap 
between the physical and the mental is part of the dualist 
claim.  
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On the Characterization of Objects by the Language of Science 
Paul Weingartner, Salzburg, Austria 
1. The Objects Described by the Laws of a 
Scientific Discipline 
In the natural sciences we usually make use of a twofold 
picture for the description of the observed phenomena: the 
objects of experience and the laws of nature, where the 
behaviour of objects is governed by the laws of nature. To 
give some examples: Newton’s laws of motion describe 
the spatio-temporal behaviour of mass points. Kepler ’s 
laws determine the trajectories of planets in the solar sys-
tem. The fundamental law of Quantum Mechanics, the 
Schrödinger equation, governs objects like atoms, elec-
trons, neutrons … etc. Mendel’s laws rule the transmission 
of genes into the next generation.  
These objects (mass points, planets, electrons, 
genes … etc.) the behaviour of which is described by the 
laws of nature cannot be individualised. For instance mass 
points are not individualised objects, but stand for any 
object possessing mass; also the trajectories of Kepler ’s 
laws are not individualised, they stand for any trajectory 
belonging to a certain category which obeys certain 
conditions like being periodical and having a certain type 
of stability1; further the objects like neutrons or electrons 
cannot be individualised by the Schrödinger equation, 
since this equation describes the behaviour of kinds of 
elementary particles for example of electrons and of 
neutrons. Similarly Mendel’s laws do not distinguish 
between individual genes transmitted but are concerned 
with classes or categories of genes.  
From this consideration it seems to follow that the 
objects of science which are governed by the laws are 
always incomplete in the sense of Meinong. Even if this is 
correct, we have to point out however, that the 
incompleteness is only relative here.  
These objects are incomplete w.r.t. to the 
individualised object, but they are not incomplete w.r.t. 
what laws of nature describe. Thus for example it holds for 
the laws of Quantum Mechanics (for Schrödinger’s 
equation) that they are permutational symmetric 
(invariant). That means that “different individual” particles 
of the “same kind” are treated identical by the law. Thus 
the laws and the respective physical reality described by 
these laws remain the same if we interchange any two 
particles of the same kind, for example two electrons. The 
same holds for protons, neutrons, neutinos and photons. 
Concerning physical systems or states permutational 
invariance holds only for bosons not for fermions because 
the latter obey Pauli’s exclusion principle.  
What has to be underlined here is, that invariance 
properties of laws of nature are just the essential 
characteristics of what a law is. So let us move further to 
the most important invariance of laws of nature: It is that 
the laws of nature are space time invariant. That means 
that the laws do not change with time, i. e. they abstract 
from any particular point of time (translational invariance or 
translational symmetry) and they do not change from one 
space point to another, i. e. they abstract from any 
                                                     
 
1  For a detailed discussion of the conditions for dynamical (and also: statisti-
cal) laws see Mittelstaedt-Weingartner (LNt, 2005) ch. 7. 
particular space point. 2 From this it follows that laws of 
nature do not describe individualised objects. However a 
dynamical law describes the time development from an 
individual state of the system at t1 to an individual state of 
the system at t2. But this individual state at t2 is only 
derivable from the law (as a special solution of the 
differential equation) if the state at t1 is known and 
instantiated; i.e. the later state is a definite function of the 
earlier. In the case of statistical laws even this is not 
possible. Individual microstates cannot be used as an 
instantiation: Statistical laws describe and predict only the 
states of the whole system, the macrostates, which can be 
realised by a huge number of different microstates; i.e. no 
particular individual microstate is required, anyone of the 
huge number will do. This means also that although the 
microstates cause the macrostate, no particular microstate 
is a necessary condition for the macrostate.  
The result of this section is that the objects 
described by laws of nature3 are not objects which satisfy 
uniqueness in the sense of Russell. Relative to individual 
objects satisfying uniqueness they are incomplete. But 
they are not incomplete w.r.t. laws, since laws have to 
have invariance (or symmetry) properties as their essential 
characteristics. The question whether real particular 
objects of modern physics are complete in the sense of 
Meinong or are individualised in the sense of satisfying 
uniqueness, will be treated below. 
2. Russell’s Ontological Presuppositions 
Concerning the Objects of Reference in the 
Sciences 
 
2.1  
Names directly designate an individual (object) which is its 
meaning.4 That is the relation of denoting, designating or 
referring is a two-place relation and reference is identified 
with meaning. Russell drops the middle part of the Medie-
val Theory (also adopted by Meinong): 
 
     name               concept        reference 
description   conceptual construction    object 
              meaning, content 
 
2.2  
In Russell's understanding, the relation of denotation (des-
ignation) or reference is the same if the objects of refer-
ence are mathematical (conceptual) entities or physical 
objects; i.e. this relation is independent of whether the 
relata are conceptual objects (which are neither spatial, 
nor temporal) or physical objects /(in space and time). 
 
                                                     
 
2  If instead of space point we speak of invariance w.r.t. moving reference 
systems the things get more complicated. For details see Mittelstaedt-
Weingartner (2005, LNt) ch. 6.  
3  For a detailed discussion see Mittelstaedt-Weingartner (2005, LNt) ch. 10. 
4  Cf. the quotation from Russell (1919, IMP), p. 174, note 3. 
On the Characterization of Objects by the Language of Science — Paul Weingartner 
 
 
 384 
2.3 
Mathematical entities are always rigid in the sense that 
they either (sharply) satisfy uniqueness or do not. Physical 
entities on the other hand are not always rigid. But in Rus-
sell's understanding all objects of reference are rigid.  
To substantiate 2.2 and 2.3 one has to know first 
that according to Russell "all the objects of common-sense 
and developed science are logical constructions out of 
events"5. 
Secondly, that these logical constructions which are 
built from physical objects are like conceptual entities and 
thus rigid and impenetrable: "The events out of which we 
have been constructing the physical world are very 
different from matter as traditionally understood. The 
matter that we construct is impenetrable as a result of 
definition."6 
Under "matter as traditionally understood" Russell 
understands matter as a permanent indestructible 
substance.  
The further presuppositions or principles listed 
below cannot be substantiated directly by giving quotations 
in the literal sense from Russell's works. But they seem to 
be hidden by Russell's treatment of objects of reference 
and by consequences of such treatment. 
 
2.4 Value-Completeness 
If (⎫x)φx satisfies uniqueness, then the object of reference 
is a bearer of value-definite (or value-complete) properties. 
This presupposition is accepted and defined already 
by Kant: 
Of all possible predicates (of an object as a bearer 
of predicates) one of each pair of opposite (contradictory) 
predicates must belong to it. In Kant's words: "Everything 
as regards its possibility is likewise subject to the principle 
of complete determination according to which if all possible 
predicates are taken together with their contradictory 
opposites, then one of each pair of contradictory opposites 
must belong to it."7 
A physical consequence of 2.4 is that every 
individual (physical) object possesses always a well-
defined position in space. This holds also for Russell 
according to whom the most elementary physical objects 
are his "events": "The matter in place is all the events that 
are there, and consequently no other event or piece of 
matter can be there. This is a tautology, not a physical 
fact"8. The above consequence is however typical for the 
domain of Classical Mechanics and does not hold 
generally (cf. 3 below).  
 
2.5 Mechanical Object 
If (⎫x)φx satisfies uniqueness, then the object of reference 
is a bearer of such (essential) properties like mass, 
charge, geometrical shape, which transform covariantly 
under the transformation of the Galilean Group. That 
means that the object remains rigid under translation in 
space, under orientation in space, under translation in time 
and under inertial movement (with arbitrary velocity). In 
                                                     
 
5  Nagel (1944, RPS), p. 331. 
6  Russell (1927, AMt), p. 385; cf. (1925, ABC), p. 185. 
7  Kant (1787, KRV) B600. Cf. the discussion in Mittelstaedt/Weingartner 
(2005, LNt), p. 268, 271f and 276f.  
8  Russell (1927, AMt), p. 385. 
this sense "mechanical object" or "mechanical system" can 
be characterised by the Galilean symmetry group.9 
From this it will be clear that the opposite implication 
does not hold: it does not hold that an object which 
satisfies the Galilean group, satisfies (⎫x)φx. Since it is a 
whole class of objects (the objects of Classical Mechanics) 
which satisfy the Galilean Group and not a single object 
only. 
 
2.6 Uniqueness 
If (⎫x)φx satisfies uniqueness, then the object of reference 
is unique according to Classical Mechanics by his definite 
(accidental) properties: by position (p), momentum (q) and 
point of time (t).  
This holds under the additional assumption of the 
impenetrability of the object in a space-time point (which 
does not follow from the dynamical laws). But also this 
assumption seems to be hidden in Russell's view of event 
and place (see the quotation in 2.4 above). 
The question whether Newton has already proved 
the uniqueness is difficult. It is the question whether he 
has shown that besides the one there does not exist a 
different, second trajectory satisfying the same initial 
conditions along which the body can move obeying his 
laws including his law of gravitation. According to Arnold, 
Newton showed by checking many solutions of the laws 
that they depend smoothly (continuously) on the initial 
data. But the theoretical proof seems to have been given 
first by Johann Bernulli.10 
 
2.7 Reidentifiability 
If (⎫x)φx satisfies uniqueness, then the object of reference 
is reidentifiable through time, i.e. has temporal identity. 
This reidentifiablity in turn requires two conditions to be 
fulfilled: 
 
(a) There has to be a dynamical law which connects 
the object in state S1(p, q, t1) with the reidentifi-
able object in state S2(p, q, t2). 
(b) The objects have to be impenetrable such that 
there can be only one object in a space-time 
point.  
 
2.8 Observer-Invariance 
If (⎫x)φx satisfies uniqueness, then all observers of the 
object of reference (or in other words: all laboratories with 
rods and clocks in which the object is investigated) are 
equal; i.e. there is no designated observer or laboratory. In 
other words: all observers will arrive at the same result 
concerning the unique object of reference.  
 
2.9 Trans-World-Identity 
According to our understanding of "Law of Nature", the 
laws of nature are valid in all (physically) possible worlds 
which differ from our world only with respect to individual 
states or initial conditions.11 Thus individual states or initial 
conditions are not designated by any law either in this 
                                                     
 
9  Cf. Mittelstaedt (1986, SRM), p. 219f. A more detailed and precise definition 
for "classical physical object" or "object of Classical Mechanics" is given in: 
Mittelstaedt/Weingartner (2005, LNt), p. 271f. 
10  Cf. Arnold (1990, HBN), p. 31f.  
11  For a detailed justification cf. Weingartner (1996, UWT) ch. 7 and Mittel-
staedt/Weingartner (2005, LNt), p. 181ff. 
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world or in another (physically) possible world. Therefore it 
is not determined by any law whether some individual ini-
tial state of our world can be found in any of the (physi-
cally) possible other worlds. What has been said is particu-
larly true of the dynamical laws of Classical Mechanics. 
Consequently, although a dynamical law connects two 
individual states of this (our) world and although it will con-
nect two individual states in another world, it does not 
connect two individual states of two different worlds.  
From this it follows immediately that trans-world-
identity of individual states is not guaranteed in Classical 
Mechanics.  
The same holds for the objects of reference of 
Classical Mechanics: for any such object (⎫x)φx satisfying 
uniqueness, its identity cannot be guaranteed in any other 
possible world, independently of how the accessibility 
relation is defined. Although such an object is reidentifiable 
in one world, it is not from one world to another one.12 
From this it follows that an application of Kripke's 
semantics to Classical Mechanics will lead only to a 
redundant extension; since its interpretation of "possible" 
and "necessary" reduces to factual (true or false) in this 
(our) world.  
3. Are the Principles about the Objects of 
Reference (Listed in Ch. 2) valid when  
applied to the Microlevel (Quantum  
Physics)? 
3.1 Value-Completeness 
Applied to stable elementary particles like electrons, pro-
tons and neutrons (or to stable composed systems) there 
is no general value-completeness or value-definiteness; 
i.e. the object of reference is, in general, not a bearer of 
value-definite (value-complete) properties (cf. 2.4 above). 
At time t the object, as known through measurement re-
sults, can be the bearer only of a selected or limited num-
ber of properties, i.e. those which are mutually commensu-
rable.  
The conceptual construction of the object as it is 
known by measurement results (Russell's logical 
construction) is necessarily incomplete. Therefore the 
description (⎫x)φx of such an object, since it is not value 
definite (cf. 2.4), will not satisfy uniqueness. As a 
consequence of that, the conceptual construction (or the 
logical construction) which is incomplete cannot – in 
general – be identified with the reference. Thus if we 
interpret the conceptual construction as the meaning, it 
should not be identified with the reference (in 
contradistinction to Russell).  
 
3.2 Permutation Invariance 
The Schrödinger equation holds for kinds of objects, not 
for single individual objects. In general: the laws of Quan-
tum Mechanics (QM) are permutationally invariant, i.e. 
they are invariant with respect to an exchange of particles 
of the same kind. This means that different individual (nu-
merically different) particles of the same kind are treated 
identically by the laws. The laws do not distinguish be-
tween two electrons, two protons… etc.; they remain the 
                                                     
 
12  For a detailed justification cf. Mittelstaedt (1986, SRM), p. 241ff. 
same laws when we exchange two electrons, two protons, 
two neutrons or also two photons.13 
From this it follows that one of the conditions for 
(⎫x)φx – the condition that at most one x satisfies φx – is 
violated since more than one object (a whole class of 
objects of he same kind) satisfies the law. Thus 
uniqueness of the QM-object is not satisfied. 
 
3.3 Uniqueness 
A QM-object can also not be uniquely described as an 
individual object by accidental properties. Recall (2.6 
above) that an object of Classical Mechanics can be so 
described, namely by the three magnitudes of position (p), 
momentum (q) and time (t). The reason that this is not 
possible for the QM-object is because the totality of acci-
dental properties which were needed for the individualisa-
tion (uniqueness) is not available at the same time. That is 
the description by accidental properties is never complete 
and thus we cannot get uniqueness for the respective ob-
jects if they are understood to be permanent in some (rea-
sonable) way (cf. 3.4 below). 
 
3.4 Reidentification 
The QM-object is not identifiable through time, there is no 
temporal identity. In fact there are the following two possi-
bilities: 
 
(a) There is a position measurement at t1, that is 
we can have uniqueness of the object (or state 
of the system) – impenetrability presupposed – 
only at the time point t1; in this case the object 
(or state) dissolves later at t2 such that we do 
not have uniqueness anymore, i.e. no perma-
nent object. 
(b) The two states ψ(t1) and ψ(t2) are connected 
by a law of QM through time (t1, t2). But in this 
case only ψ(t1) is unique w.r.t. one object or 
state (or system); since ψ(t2) can then be sat-
isfied by more than one object (state or sys-
tem), it therefore does not guarantee to desig-
nate the original unique object (state, system). 
Although there is permanence given by the 
connection of the law, there is no guarantee 
that what is connected is the original object 
(system) at a later time.14 
 
3.5 Trans-World-Identity 
For quantum mechanical objects or systems uniqueness 
(the condition for using (⎫x)φx) is not satisfied. The reason 
is this: the characterisation by their essential and perma-
nent properties fails because with them only classes of 
objects or systems (like electrons, protons, photons) can 
be determined. But also a characterisation by accidental 
properties like position and momentum at a certain time is 
impossible since only a part of such properties are simul-
taneously available. Still another possibility for a unique 
characterisation would be a description of a sufficiently 
complete historical development of the object (instead of 
giving only the actual properties at a certain point of 
time).15 However, it is an unsolved problem how such a 
                                                     
 
13  For more on permutational symmetry cf. Mittelstaedt/Weingartner (2005, 
LNt), p. 74, 77, 82. 
14  For more details see Mittelstaedt (1986, SRM), p. 227ff. 
15  The idea to use the history of the human actions and decisions as a 
principle of individuation of human souls (after separation from human body – 
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description can be obtained and used for the individuation 
of quantum mechanical objects. Since trans-world-identity 
of objects implies reidentifiablity of one unique object in 
different worlds, it follows that trans-world-identity of quan-
tum mechanical objects is not possible. There may be 
however a kind of weak analogy of trans-world-identity if 
the following restrictions and deviations with respect to a 
Kripke style semantics are made: 
 
(1) Possible worlds are replaced by measuring 
processes. 
(2) "There is a world W' (different from the actual 
world W) in which the proposition A' about sys-
tem S' is true" is replaced by: "There is a meas-
uring process M' (different from the actual (or 
earlier) measuring process M) with the result 
that proposition A' about system S' is true." 
(3) The accessibility relation R(S, S') is satisfied, 
when A(S, M) = A'(S', M'). 
(4) There is a non-zero probability for reaching re-
sult A' about S' by measuring process M' from 
the earlier result A about S by measuring proc-
ess M.  
(5) If (4) is satisfied, there is a non-zero probability 
for a weak temporal identity of the system (ob-
ject) S. 
4. Are the Principles about the Objects of 
Reference of Ch. 2 valid when applied to  
SR and GR? 
4.1 Value-Completeness 
Special Relativity (SR): Value-completeness or value-
definiteness of properties of an object (reference system, 
cf. 2.4) is not satisfied for an observer at every point of 
time. But in this case (we have just inertial movement and 
no acceleration or gravitation and Minkowski space-time) 
the observer may always wait until the object appears in 
his past light cone.  
General Relativity (GR): As soon as acceleration or gravi-
tation is taken into account, there are always some do-
mains in space-time with objects that will never appear in 
the past light cone of the observer. This is so even if the 
observer moves on a geodesic, i.e. free from forces. It is 
plain then that the description of such objects cannot be 
value-complete. 
 
4.2 Permanence 
SR and GR: The essential properties of the object of ref-
erence (as the bearer) are no more permanent, although 
with one exception: charge. The other properties like 
mass, length and geometrical shape change in case of fast 
inertial motion in accordance with the Lorentz-
Transformation; this holds also in local inertial reference 
systems of Rimanean space-time (GR). 
 
                                                                             
 
which could not serve anymore as individuating) was proposed by Thomas 
Aquinas (Ver), 19, as one, though not the only possibility, since it is not suffi-
cient in all cases (like children who die immediately after birth). 
4.3 Uniqueness 
According to 2.6, uniqueness of objects of Classical Me-
chanics can be satisfied by special values of the accidental 
properties position (p), momentum (q) and point of time (t). 
But in 3.3 it was shown that uniqueness is no more satis-
fied on the microlevel (in QM). Concerning SR, uniqueness 
w.r.t. p, q, t holds only partially; namely it holds only for 
objects appearing in the past and future light cone of the 
observer (dynamical laws presupposed). With respect to 
GR, uniqueness is dependent on the space-time curva-
ture. 
 
4.4 Reidentifiability 
With respect to both, SR and GR, the object of reference is 
not in general reidentifiable through time; this is so be-
cause essential properties of the object like geometrical 
shape and mass may change depending on movement. 
Therefore reidentifiability holds only approximately in local 
reference frames of space-time. 
 
4.5 Time and Simultaneity 
With respect to both, SR and GR, there is neither a univer-
sal time, nor universal simultaneity. Each different ob-
server (each different laboratory or reference system) has 
its own time and simultaneity. Therefore the object of ref-
erence is not the same for all observers. 
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The Functional Unity of Special Science Kinds 
Daniel A. Weiskopf, Tampa, Florida, USA 
1. Reduction vs. elimination redux 
Realization is a relation between a property Φ at one level 
of organization and a property Ψ or family of properties  
Ψ1-Ψn at a lower level of organization. According to the 
Multiple Realizability (MR) thesis, psychological properties, 
as well as the properties in the domain of many other spe-
cial sciences, are multiply realizable. MR is true of proper-
ties that are defined by some purpose, capacity, or contri-
bution they make to some end—generally, by their func-
tional role. Where there are interestingly different ways of 
playing the role that defines the property Φ, then Φ has 
different realizations. For Φ to be multiply realizable, the 
Ψs must belong to distinct kinds, as defined by some in-
dependent taxonomy. 
Against this consensus, Shapiro (2000) argues that 
the MR thesis is not even coherent. Consider the Ψs that 
realize Φ. Either: 
 
(1) these realizers differ in their causally relevant 
properties, or 
(2) they do not. 
‘Causally relevant properties’ are those that enable 
something having Ψ to perform the function of a Φ. If (1) is 
the case, then the Ψs are different kinds. “But if they are 
different kinds then they are not the same kind and so we 
do not have a case in which a single kind has multiple 
realizations” (Shapiro, 2000, p. 647). That is, if the Ψs 
possess different causally relevant properties, then Φ itself 
does not constitute a kind, and hence one higher-level kind 
isn’t being multiply realized. But if (2) is the case, then they 
are not different realizations and the thesis is false in this 
instance. 
I agree that if Ψ1 and Ψ2 are different independently 
certified kinds then we have genuine MR. But I deny that 
their being different kinds entails that Φ is not a kind. 
Whether Φ is a kind or not depends on whether there is a 
sufficiently large and interesting body of empirical 
regularities in which Φ itself is implicated. Kindhood 
depends on there being a rich cluster of properties that 
reliably co-occur with something’s being Φ, where these 
properties do not cluster together by chance but by the 
operation of some governing principle or mechanism. 
It might seem that if Ψ1 and Ψ2 are causally different 
ways of bringing about Φ that this would automatically 
show that they did not participate in any (nonanalytic) 
common regularities. But this isn’t obviously true, since 
distinct mechanisms can still give rise to shared properties 
and generalizations. We can see this by looking at an 
example that Shapiro himself discusses: the case of 
compound vs. camera eyes. 
2. The eyes of others 
Arthropod compound eyes and vertebrate camera eyes 
are all eyes in virtue of falling under the functional descrip-
tion ‘organs for seeing’. But different mechanisms are in-
volved in the production of sight in each kind of eye; 
hence, by the anti-MR argument, eyes should not be a 
single kind. However, both kinds of eyes can display simi-
lar psychophysical phenomena despite having different 
optical properties. 
The main phenomenon of interest is the perception 
of Mach bands: regions of especially high or low 
brightness that occur at the high or low ends of a 
brightness gradient. While perception of Mach bands 
occurs in many organisms, including primates, cats, and 
horseshoe crabs (Limulus polyphemus), the neural circuits 
that underlie it differ radically across species. This can be 
illustrated with respect to the Limulus eye and the 
mammalian eye. 
The lateral eyes of Limulus are composed of ~1000 
cones that terminate in ommatidia (Battelle, 2006). 
Ommatidia contain photoreceptive cells that depolarize a 
central eccentric cell, the axons of which form the optic 
tract. Eccentric cell axons also distribute collaterals to their 
neighbors in adjacent ommatidia. These interwoven 
branching collaterals form the lateral plexus of the eye, 
which enables one ommatidium to be inhibited by activity 
in adjacent ones (Hartline and Ratliff, 1957). Lateral 
inhibition enhances contrast and sharpens perception of 
edges, and also explains the perception of Mach bands. 
Mammalian eyes, while physically and optically 
different from compound eyes, also contain inhibitory 
mechanisms that produce Mach bands. In contrast to the 
loose organization of the lateral plexus, mammalian retinas 
are tightly organized into distinct layers. They also use a 
vastly greater range of cell types than does the Limulus 
eye. Photoreceptive cells feed into a network containing 
horizontal, amacrine, and bipolar cells, finally terminating 
at ganglion cells that project to higher regions. While there 
are many loci for lateral inhibition in the retina, it occurs 
initially in the horizontal cells linking adjacent rods and 
cones. These cells have highly specific connectivity 
patterns, as opposed to the near-random wiring of Limulus 
(Field and Chichilnisky, 2007; Sterling, 1998). 
So we have two distinct mechanisms for producing 
lateral inhibition, and therefore two ways of constructing 
visual systems that can perceive Mach bands. Yet both 
eyes share more extensive causal properties than just 
enabling sight. Implementing lateral inhibition and 
producing Mach bands are two such interconnected 
properties. While these are not exhaustive of the possible 
kinds of eyes, they illustrate the point that distinct kinds at 
one level can have numerous other common causal 
properties, and therefore constitute a higher-level kind. 
Thus Shapiro’s inference from different causal properties 
to the absence of a higher-level kind is not generally 
sound. Whether a functionally defined property also 
constitutes a kind is something to be decided on a case-
by-case basis. 
3. Unity through constraint? 
Interestingly, Shapiro considers the case of lateral inhibi-
tion, but draws the opposite conclusion from it (Shapiro, 
2004, pp. 117-120). Rather than concluding that the use of 
this common strategy of visual processing in different spe-
cies shows its multiple realizability, he suggests that it 
shows that the evolution of visual systems occurs under 
tight constraints. These constraints mean that there will 
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likely be only one (or at most a few) ways of building an 
organic system that can process visual images. And this is 
contrary to MR, which predicts that there should be a wide 
diversity of evolved mechanisms for each functional capac-
ity. 
Lateral inhibition serves a useful function in vision: it 
sharpens contrasts and aids in discrimination of closely 
spaced stimuli. Undoubtedly this accounts for its 
recurrence in evolution. But this recurrence does not 
undermine MR, since it’s also clear that different species 
carry out lateral inhibition using physiologically distinct 
mechanisms (eccentric cell collaterals versus horizontal 
cells, for instance). Indeed, lateral inhibition occurs in 
multiple sensory modalities within single species (human 
vision, touch, and audition, for example), and it involves 
distinct cellular mechanisms in all of these cases. 
What this suggests is that there is a common 
functional characteristic that recurs across different 
species as well as within individual species. But the 
presence of a functional characteristic does not 
necessarily entail the presence of any particular physical 
mechanism. That isn’t to say that there might not be 
physical constraints on how nervous systems must be 
constructed if they’re going to realize terrestrial 
psychological capacities. Many constraints, however, are 
organizational or functional, and these can’t be assumed 
to be physically identical in all cases; at least not unless 
we simply adopt a taxonomy of physical mechanisms that 
co-classifies as physically similar anything that satisfies the 
relevant functional specification. But this is just to beg the 
question against the MR thesis. 
Shapiro’s other examples of constraints on the 
realization of cognition support this point. For instance, he 
argues that humanlike cognition requires sensory systems 
that transduce information into usable neural signals, 
receptors that tile sensory surfaces in varying densities, 
topographic maps in primary sensory areas, and broadly 
modular organization in the brain itself (Shapiro, 2004, pp. 
105-138). But it is clear that there are at best rather 
abstract similarities among, say, the diverse 
photoreceptors in the retina and the various tactile, 
thermal, and chemical receptors that mediate touch. Even 
if they possess broadly similar receptive field organization 
and project to topologically organized regions of primary 
sensory cortex, the fine-grained detail of these neural 
structures will differ. 
So one can agree with Shapiro that there are 
constraints on constructing terrestrial psychologies, but 
also maintain that these constraints are mainly functional. 
Since it is possible to build many different kinds of neural 
mechanisms within these constraints, this is compatible 
with multiple realizability. 
It might seem, however, that this claim runs afoul of 
an argument advanced by Bechtel and Mundale (1999). 
They suggest that the MR thesis only appears plausible 
because we allow Φ to be individuated coarsely and the 
various Ψs to be individuated finely. “But if the grain size is 
kept constant, then the claim that psychological states are 
in fact multiply realized looks far less plausible. One can 
adopt either a coarse or a fine grain, but as long as one 
uses a comparable grain on both the brain and mind side, 
the mapping between them will be correspondingly 
systematic” (Bechtel and Mundale, 1999, p. 202). 
Whether we should adopt a fine grain at the higher 
level or not, though, depends on whether these fine 
grained properties are independently certified as being 
theoretically ‘interesting’ in the relevant domain. Suppose 
we decide that Limulus eyes and cat eyes do not really 
both perform lateral inhibition. Rather, there is inhibition1 
and inhibition2, two different fine-grained psychophysical 
capacities had by creatures with correspondingly different 
visual mechanisms. 
Anything that performs inhibition1/2 performs 
inhibition, since they are related as determinate and 
determinable. But inhibition and inhibition1/2 play different 
explanatory roles. Explaining why a system perceives 
Mach bands may involve adverting to inhibition. Explaining 
why it perceives bands with these precise characteristics, 
though, may involve adverting to inhibition1/2, since those 
constitute the particular psychophysical capacities the 
system has. Explaining how a system instantiates 
inhibition1/2 may involve referring to the particular fine-
grained neurobiological mechanism at work, and thus may 
involve matching fine-grained taxonomies. But explaining 
how a system instantiates inhibition might involve drawing 
attention either to the particular fine-grained mechanism at 
work in that organism, or to the range of possible 
mechanisms that can bring about that sort of capacity. 
The latter involves a ‘grain mismatch’ of the sort that 
Bechtel and Mundale warn against. But it is hard to see 
why adopting this mixed taxonomy is a mistake. It can 
prove heuristically useful, for example, once one has 
characterized the general function of a cell type or brain 
region to then propose a range of possible lower level 
mechanisms that might realize that function, then proceed 
to rule them out on the basis of side effects, predicted 
responses to intervention, predicted anatomical 
consequences, and so on. Grain ‘mismatches’ of this sort 
can serve a crucial heuristic role in discovering 
mechanisms. So long as there is a unified field of inquiry 
that works with both taxonomies simultaneously, the MR 
advocate can do so as well. 
4. Explanatory taxonomy and the special 
sciences 
I’ve argued that diverse lower-level mechanisms can con-
verge on common functional traits at various levels of or-
ganization, and that this assumption can play a heuristic 
role in discovering mechanisms. Now I will briefly sketch 
one way in which these functional groupings might be 
seen as kinds. 
On Shapiro’s view, special sciences categories have 
a fundamentally taxonomic function: they “collect and 
order the domain of a special science in a way that 
facilitates its investigation” (2000, p. 654). Functional 
concepts fix a range of ‘analytic’ truths about things that 
fall under them (e.g., eyes are for seeing). But not all 
functional concepts pick out categories that are equally 
interesting. Shapiro’s view leaves us with no way of 
explaining why there should be such a difference. This 
difference shows up in theory construction because 
discovering the right functional components out of which to 
build an organism’s control systems is non-trivial. Much of 
the work of building theories, models, and simulations 
involves finding the appropriate concepts to analyze a 
system. 
Consider central pattern generators (CPGs). CPGs 
are units that produce regular oscillations endogenously or 
in response to input. There are many different ways to 
assemble such circuits (e.g., out of either multi-neuron 
arrays using inhibitory interneurons, or out of local den-
drodendritic connections). These structures differ in their 
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size, location, temporal characteristics, and many other 
physical/neural properties. 
Clearly, the concept of a CPG is a functional con-
cept. But it is still explanatory: positing such circuits illumi-
nates how certain kinds of behavior and observed neural 
activity might take place. These abstract structures play an 
explanatory role independent of information about their 
realizers. Knowing that an organism’s control systems 
contain a CPG in a certain location helps to explain certain 
of its capacities Two examples are control of swimming in 
the lamprey and the stomatogastric ganglion of the lobster, 
which regulates digestion. In virtue of producing certain 
sorts of effects, these functional units can be situated 
within a larger system of control structures. 
Understanding how an organism possesses a range 
of capacities depends on seeing its inner organization as 
containing such units. The same is true of lateral inhibition, 
which is an abstract device for producing a range of effects 
in sensory processing. I suggest that, in the behavioral 
sciences, it is by recurrently playing this sort of role in ab-
stract control systems that functional categories earn their 
status as kinds. 
The interesting functionally defined categories, then, 
constitute recurrent building blocks of cognitive systems. 
They explain the possession of various capacities of those 
systems without reference to specific underlying mecha-
nisms. They may in turn be explained by the presence of 
further functional units at lower levels, or by physical 
mechanisms. One major task in understanding cognition is  
 
finding the right decomposition of a system into abstract 
control units and constituents. Logic, computation theory, 
cybernetics and control theory, and neural network theory 
provide examples of how the theory of such control units 
might be developed. And insofar as such functional cate-
gories can usefully be applied to modeling cognition, they 
count as kinds. 
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Transcendental Philosophy and Mind-Body Reductionism 
Christian Helmut Wenzel, Puli, Taiwan 
In Wittgenstein on Language and Thought, Thornton gives 
an account of naturalization that he calls “repre-
sentationalism”: “Representationalism attempts to explain 
linguistic content as resulting from mental content and then 
to give a reductionist account of the latter. Mental content 
is ‘naturalised’ through the provision of a causal 
explanation of content” (p. vii). Thus we have a two-step 
reduction, first from linguistic content to mental content, 
then from the mental to the physical. Mental content is 
seen in representations, “internal mental representations 
that stand in causal relations to things in the world” (viii). 
Fodor’s “descriptive causal theory” and Millikan’s 
“teleological, or natural selective” account are given as 
examples of such representationalism. Wittgenstein, on 
the other hand, Thornton shows, opposes such 
reductionist theories already in the first step: 
Representations and mental content so understood would 
be too isolated and internal, too detached from the outside 
world. Linguistic content and meaning cannot be 
understood this way. Instead, they should be seen as 
being more “outside” from the start, making sense only 
within language and its use in society.  
How would Kant fare in such current discussions? 
Certainly he has much to say about representations, 
Vorstellungen, Latin representationes. He also has read 
Locke and Hume and is aware of their empiricist accounts 
of impressions and ideas, as well as of Descartes’ res 
cogitans. Yet Kant does not take the same route they do. 
He is usually not mentioned in current discussions of 
naturalization and reductionism of the mental to the 
physical. Nevertheless, although he does not – returning to 
Thornton – talk about linguistic content, he has much to 
say about judgments and representations. Certainly 
representations must have meaning, and they often arise 
from perceptions. Objects appear to us, and we don’t 
make them up. Kant was not an idealist like Berkeley. He 
even distanced himself from Descartes, whom he also saw 
as an idealist (A 226/B 274). Unlike them, he never 
doubted the existence of the outside world. He saw himself 
as an “empirical realist” instead. So how would Kant react 
to current physicalist-reductionist accounts of 
representations and meanings?  
When looking at his early writings, such as his 
“General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, or An 
Attempt to Understand the Structure and Mechanical 
Origin of the Whole Universe According to Newton’s 
Principles”, one might think he has a liking for 
naturalization. But when thinking of his Critique of Pure 
Reason, one starts to have doubts. Why is that? 
Central to Kant’s transcendental philosophy from his 
Critique of Pure Reason are the categories, imagination, 
understanding, schemata, and these can easily appear to 
be mental in some way. Not without reason, Kantian 
faculty-talk is sometimes seen as psychological. In any 
case, one might want to call Kant a representationalist of 
some kind, simply because the notion of Vorstellung, Latin 
representatio, holds a central place in his theoretical 
transcendental philosophy.  
But somehow Kant cannot be a representationalist 
of the kind Thornton has in mind. He does not understand 
his theory as giving an account of “mental” content in an 
individual person’s head, and he certainly does not try to 
reduce mental representations to causal stories.  
Such an undertaking would undercut his 
transcendental project from the start, or, rather, it would 
not touch it, but miss it altogether. Kant is not interested in 
an individual person’s head and in how empirical concepts 
arise and are acquired, as Locke was. To the contrary, he 
wants to establish a priori concepts that make such 
experience possible. These concepts, the categories, are 
not understood as mental in opposition to the physical. 
They are very special concepts. They make the physical 
as such possible, and the naturalists do not talk about 
them at all. In a sense, transcendental philosophy 
undercuts the mind-body naturalist’s project. Kant does not 
start with a mind-body dualism, with categories in the head 
and objects out there to be schematized. He also does not 
go in for the Cartesian res extensa – res cogitans 
distinction. 
For Kant, the categories underlie the world we 
experience, because objects are nothing but appearances 
brought under schematized categories. Not only objects, 
but even time and space are not out there, independently 
of us. The forms of time and space are subjective and 
make objectivity possible. If there is a “head” in the sense 
of transcendental philosophy, then the world has to be in it 
– at least the a priori aspects of it.  
Kant distinguishes between an inner and an outer 
sense, but not between an inner world of representations 
in the head and an outer world next to it.  
In particular, it is empirical causality that is seen, 
within transcendental philosophy, to depend on a priori 
causality, and therefore it would not make any sense to try 
to reduce the transcendentally mental to the empirically 
causal. Empirical concepts and representations might be 
naturalized, but not a priori ones. Transcendental 
philosophy and the Copernican revolution go the other way 
around. They are independent of any philosophical project 
in which causality is taken for granted, as Fodor, Millikan 
and others do. It is not that such projects do not make any 
sense. The point here is that even if they succeed, they 
will not answer Kant’s question about the possibility of 
experience and objectivity. Naturalizing projects take 
objectivity and the physical world for granted.  
It is as Barry Stroud says, in contrast to Jay 
Rosenberg’s historicizing, evolutionary and naturalizing 
accounts (Rosenberg, 616-20) of the Kantian minimalist 
“conceptual core” (615): “The absence of any interesting 
necessary conditions of thought and experience must be 
established, and not simply asserted as likely on general 
historical or ‘evolutionary’ grounds. Even the most 
uncompromising ‘evolutionary’ attitude would not preclude 
us from asking what it is that makes thought or experience 
possible – how it is possible for thought and experience to 
have ‘objects’, or be ‘of’ or ‘about’ something. It remains to 
be seen that that very general question itself must be 
given an historical or ‘evolutionary’ answer, even if an 
historical or ‘evolutionary’ answer must be given to the 
quite different question of who and why in the development 
of homo sapiens those conditions ever in fact came to be 
fulfilled.” (Stroud 1977, 81-82) 
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Doubting causality in the way Hume did is mistaken 
in Kant’s eyes. We need an a priori concept of causality 
from the start to have any of the coherent experiences that 
we as a matter of fact do have. Particular empirical 
causalities can be learned about in experience, but not 
causality in general, universally, as such, which we need in 
order to have any meaningful experiences to start with.  
To have an apparently simple experience such as 
the perception of a ship, we need to see the ship as a unit, 
and for that we need the category of substance. That the 
parts of the ship stay where they are and do not float 
around chaotically and dissolve, and that I distinguish the 
ship from my perceiving it, presupposes a priori causality. 
Thus just to perceive a ship, without even invoking the 
question of empirical causality by asking whether it is 
going downstream or upstream, the categories are 
needed.  
Even deeper, it is I who perceives the ship and I am 
conscious of this act. It is I who gives it unity and meaning 
in perception and judgment. Already here I do something 
that requires a priori concepts. (For accounts of Kant on 
the I and the soul, the ‘unity of thought argument’ and the 
‘inner sense argument’, and on the complexities of various 
kinds of immaterialism of the soul, see Ameriks 2000, 
especially pp. 27-47. For a defense of the view that the 
categories go “all the way out”, see Wenzel 2005.) 
We might be tempted to see even these a priori 
concepts and their application as being something mental 
again. After all, Kant thinks of the categories as subjective. 
But the Kantian subject is not a mind-brain that is causally 
affected. In the framework of his transcendental 
epistemology, the subject even comprises time and space, 
as forms of all appearances. If we think of ourselves as 
being affected by things “outside of us”, außer uns, then 
these things are understood, transcendentally, as nothing 
but simply different and distinct from (logically außer) us 
and, empirically, as objects that are always already 
subjected to those subjective conditions of time and space 
and the categories (spatially außer uns). 
The Kantian transcendental subject is not a mere 
res cogitans. It is more. It comprises time and space as 
forms of intuition. Kant holds this against Descartes. A 
pure science of the res cogitans, the “I think”, would not 
get us anywhere. No rational knowledge of the outside 
world, even of ourselves, could be obtained from it. Also 
no limits of our empirical knowledge could be pointed out 
in this way, which is something important for Kant, but not 
for the naturalist today.  
Kant distinguishes his transcendental idealism from 
what he calls “transcendental realism”, which is the view 
that time and space are things in themselves, independent 
of us. Common sense takes this view. If one starts in this 
way, one can depict oneself as some kind of mind-brain-
body at one location and the tree one perceives as being 
“outside”, ten meters away. Then one can start to give a 
causal story of sense perception, even look into the brain 
and try to give a causal account of consciousness and our 
having representations as well, maybe with the addition of 
evolutionary and social aspects. Reductionism lives here, 
and Kripke and Putnam for instance have given accounts 
of what we mean by “water” and H2O in this way. 
Transcendental realism starts with a picture of the world 
that is independent of us, with water as H2O already out 
there. But if we then place ourselves in this world, how can 
we be sure that this is how it really is? How can we avoid 
skepticism? Thus with Putnam we run into a problem 
similar to Descartes’ doubt. We might be a brain in a vat, 
nay even the whole world might not exist. 
But according to transcendental idealism, neither my 
brain, nor the tree, nor time and space are independent of 
representational conditions. It is only as appearances that 
they are in time and space, and it is only as being subject 
to the categories that they are objects. This is an instance 
of the general view that any third-person account 
presupposes a first-person perspective. Cassam’s criticism 
that “Kant’s mistake was to conclude … that the unity of 
consciousness does not involve being presented to 
oneself as an object at all” might still be within this view (p. 
198). 
Experience requires an act of synthesis, which in 
turn requires unity. It must be my experience. For the 
materialist it might be the brain or the object that gives this 
unity. For Kant it is the act that must provide it. In 
meaningful perception and in judgment we take something 
as something and the “taking” itself must have unity 
(Allison 1996, pp. 95, 102). For Kant it is transcendental 
consciousness (Reflexion 5661, AA 18, 318-9) and the 
original synthetic unity of apperception (CpR, B 134) that 
provide this unity, and they do this a priori, that is, prior to 
experience. When the materialist points to the brain, our 
sense organs, and their evolutionary adaptations to their 
functions and the environment, and the socio-linguist 
points to our language and society, Kant will point out that 
they take time and space and empirical objects for 
granted, as things in themselves, and thereby beg the 
question. If they also want to naturalize the act of taking 
something as something, we may respond with Allison that 
“taken in an investigation of its causal conditions, any 
token of the act of thinking is itself something represented, 
an object for an I, which, considered as such, is not itself 
an object in the world. In short, we return in the end to the 
ineliminability and systematic elusiveness of this 
ubiquitous ‘I think’” (Allison, 1996, p. 104). Furthermore, 
we can add that the materialists will run into the problem of 
skepticism, because they cannot be sure that the objects, 
which for them exist independently of us, are correctly 
represented by us whenever we have representations of 
them, that is, when they appear to us. In Kant’s words, the 
transcendental realist then “plays the empirical idealist” (A 
369).  
In Kant’s picture the object is nothing but its 
appearance, and so the correspondence problem does not 
arise. Truth is in judgment, not in appearance. Ironically, 
one may also say that in the view of transcendental 
philosophy appearance already gives truth, a-letheia, as 
Heidegger wanted it, insofar as appearance and its object 
are not two separate things (contrary to the transcendental 
realist’s view). The object does not need to be “deduced” 
from its appearance (A 372). It exists only as appearance. 
It is its appearance. Appearance is not something extra. 
Imagine the following conversation between a 
transcendental realist (TR) and a transcendental idealist 
(TI): 
 
TR: “I think representations are generated in the 
brain.” 
 
TI: “You mean processes happening in the brain? 
Well, they happen in time and space. You imagine 
them as appearances.” 
 
TR: “But are they not caused? Are not our repre-
sentations, imaginations, perceptions all caused?” 
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TI: “Well, according to their matter, materialiter, yes. 
But according to their form, formaliter, no. That I see 
a hand with five fingers, of a certain size, with a cer-
tain color, hue and shade, in a certain light, and un-
der a certain angle, yes, there is a causal story to be 
told for this. But that the hand appears in time and 
space at all, and that it has parts, for these facts 
there is no causal story to be told. You can reduce 
material properties to their causes, but not the for-
mal ones (for which you need the categories and 
time and space). Furthermore, it is these formal as-
pects that make your causal stories possible. 
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From Topology to Logic. 
The Neural Reduction of Compositional Representation 
Markus Werning, Düsseldorf, Germany 
When we look at the structure of thought, what we find is 
logic. No matter what our starting point is: the semantic 
analysis of linguistic expressions, the psychology of 
cognition, or a philosophical theory of reasoning, we 
usually arrive at some variant or extension of first order 
predicate logic that characterizes the underlying structure 
of thought. However, when we look at the cortex, what we 
find is topology. The functional role of neurons is 
determined by topological neighborhood relations. Given 
that the various kinds of neurons are by and large 
homogenously distributed over the cortex, the major 
difference in the functional role of neurons is grounded in 
which neurons are connected to each other, and which are 
not. In topological terms: Who’s in the neighborhood of 
whom. If we presuppose the materialist assumption that 
the cortex is what brings about thought, any reductive 
explanation has to show how the logical structure of 
thought is necessitated by the topological organization of 
information in the cortex.  
Unfortunately, classical textbook mathematics is of 
little help here, even though there are some theorems that 
link topology to logic. Stone’s representation theorem, e.g., 
famously asserts the duality between the category of 
Boolean algebras and the category of totally disconnected 
compact Hausdorff spaces. We thus know how 
propositional logics is to be represented topologically. 
When our primary interest is in thought, though, first order 
logic rather than propositional logic ought to be our main 
concern. For, only first order logic (and its extensions) 
provides the means to represent and categorize objects. 
However, when it comes to first order logic, the 
mathematical links to topology are sparse. Building on 
previous work, this paper provides an explanation of how 
the topological organization of the cortex yields a structure 
expressible by (some intuitionist variant of) first order logic. 
The explanatory bridges are the Gestalt principles of 
perception and the physiological principles governing 
object-related neural synchronization. 
The Composition of Thought 
The view of thought I appeal to characterizes the triangle 
between language, mind and world roughly as follows: 
Linguistic utterances are expressions of meaning. Mean-
ings are mental representations. More specifically, the 
meanings of sentences are thoughts composed of con-
cepts by logical connectives. Concepts again have an 
external content and this content is responsible for an ut-
terance having reference or denotation. The relation be-
tween concepts and their content is some relation of co-
variation – a causal-informational relation of sorts (Fodor, 
1992). The denotation of an utterance is identical to (or 
otherwise determined by) the content of the concept the 
utterance is an expression of. This view is captured by our 
first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (Covariation with Content). An expression 
has the denotation it has because the concept it ex-
presses reliably co-varies with a content that is identical 
to the expression’s denotation.  
Since languages and fore and foremost first order 
languages have a rich constituent structure, it is rather 
plausible to assume that the structure of their meanings is 
complex, too, and that the structure of meanings in some 
way or another resembles the structure of their 
expressions. Now, the most simple way to spell out this 
relation of resemblance is by means of a structural match, 
in technical terms: a homomorphism. This homomorphism 
is spelled out by the principle of the compositionality of 
meaning: 
Hypothesis 2 (Compositionality of Meaning). The mean-
ing of a complex expression is a syntax-dependent func-
tion of the meanings of its syntactic constituents. 
It would be surprising, furthermore, if the covariation rela-
tions between primitive concepts and their contents should 
not in some way or another contribute to the covariation 
relations between complex concepts and their contents. 
The quest for simplicity again leads us to the hypotheses 
that the contents of the primitive concepts are the sole 
factors to determine the content of a therefrom combined 
complex concept. Again, this is just what the principle of 
compositionality says for contents: 
Hypothesis 3 (Compositionality of Content). The con-
tent of a complex concept is a structure-dependent func-
tion of the contents of its constituent concepts. 
The aim of this paper is to make out a neuronal structure 
that fulfills the three hypotheses. The neuronal structure 
shall consist of a set of neuronal states and a set of 
thereon defined operations. Since the three hypotheses 
may serve as (minimal) identity criteria for concepts, their 
fulfillment by a neuronal structure will justify us in identify-
ing the neuronal structure with a structure of concepts. The 
three hypotheses hence form the adequacy conditions for 
a neuronal reduction of concepts. 
The Topology of the Cortex 
For many attributes (color, orientation, size, speed, etc.) 
involved in perceptual processing one can anatomically 
identify cortical correlates. Those areas often exhibit a 
twofold topological structure and justify the notion of a 
feature map: (i) a receptor topology (e.g, retinotopy in vi-
sion, somatotopy in touch): neighboring regions of neurons 
code for neighboring regions of the receptive field; and (ii) 
a feature topology: neighboring regions of neurons code 
for similar attribute values. Due to physiological facts, this 
twofold functional topology is reflected in the topography 
(the physical distance relations) of the cortex. 
With regard to the monkey, more than 30 cortical 
areas forming feature maps are experimentally known for 
vision alone (Felleman & van Essen, 1991). In fact, the 
majority view among neuroscientists now is that the corti-
cal processing of vision below hippocampus is entirely 
organized in the topological way described above. The 
attributes involved can be very complex, though. Fig. 1 
shows a number of neural maps that relate to perceptual 
attributes. 
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The fact that values of different attributes may be 
instantiated by the same object, but are processed in 
distinct regions of cortex poses the problem of how this 
information is integrated in an object-specific way: the 
binding problem. How can it be that the color and the 
orientation of an object are represented in distinct regions 
of cortex, but still are part of the representation of one and 
the same object? A prominent and experimentally well 
supported solution postulates oscillatory neural 
synchronization as a mechanism of binding: Clusters of 
neurons that are indicative for different attribute values 
sometimes show synchronous oscillatory activity, but only 
when the values indicated are instantiated by the same 
object in the perceptual field; otherwise they are firing 
asynchronously. Synchronous oscillation, thus, might be 
regarded to fulfill the task of binding together various 
representations of attibute values to form the 
representation of an object with these values (Singer, 
1999, for review). Using oscillatory networks as biologically 
motivated models, it can be demonstrated how the 
topological organization of information in the cortex, by 
mechanisms of synchronization, may yield a logically 
structured semantics of concepts (Maye & Werning, 2004). 
Oscillation functions play the role of object concepts. 
Clusters of feature sensitive neurons play the role of 
attributive concepts – or predicates. 
Oscillatory Networks 
From Gestalt psychology the principles governing object 
concepts are well known. According to some of the Gestalt 
principles, spatially proximal elements with similar attribute 
values (e.g., similar color/similar orientation) are likely to 
be perceived as one object or, in other words, represented 
by one and the same object concept. The Gestalt princi-
ples are implemented in oscillatory networks by the follow-
ing mechanism: Oscillators that select input from proximal 
stimulus elements with like attribute values tend to syn-
chronize, while oscillators that select input from proximal 
stimulus elements with unlike values (e.g., red and green 
for color or horizontal and vertical for orientiation) tend to 
desynchronize. As a consequence, oscillators selective for 
proximal stimulus elements with like values tend to exhibit 
synchronous oscillation functions when stimulated simulta-
neously. The oscillation in question can be regarded as 
one object concept. In contrast, inputs that contain proxi-
mal elements with unlike values tend to cause anti-
synchronous oscillations, i.e., different object concepts. 
In our model (Fig. 2) a single oscillator – marked as 
a cubicle – renders the statistical electrical discharge be-
havior of 100 to 200 biological cells and codes for an attib-
ute value (z-coordinate) for a stimulus in the relevant re-
gion of the receptive field (x,y-coordinates). Differential 
equations describe the dynamics of the i-th oscillator as 
the temporal evolution of a variable xi(t). The oscillators for 
an attribute are arranged on a three-dimensional grid form-
ing a module. Two dimensions represent the spatial do-
main, while the attribute values are encoded by the third 
dimension. Thus the twofold topology of biological feature 
maps is reflected in the network architecture. Spatially 
close oscillators that represent similar values synchronize. 
The desynchronizing connections establish a phase lag 
between different groups of synchronously oscillating clus-
ters. Modules for different attributes can be combined by 
establishing synchronizing connections between oscillators 
of different modules in case they code for the same stimu-
lus region 
Stimulated oscillatory networks (e.g., by stimulus of 
Fig. 3a), characteristically, show object-specific patterns of 
synchronized and de-synchronized oscillators within and 
across modules. Oscillators that represent attributes of the 
same object synchronize, while oscillators that represent 
attributes of different objects de-synchronize. We observe 
that for each represented object a certain oscillation 
spreads through the network. The oscillation pertains only 
to oscillators that represent the attributes of the object in 
question. 
Semantic Interpretation 
An oscillation function x(t) of an oscillator is its excitatory 
activity as a function of time during a time window [0,T]. 
Mathematically speaking, activity functions can be con-
ceived of as vectors in the Hilbert space L2[0,T] of func-
tions that are square-integrable in the interval [0,T]. Thus, 
a precise measure of synchrony can be established and a 
powerful algebraic framework for the semantic interpreta-
tion of the network is provided. The degree of synchrony 
between two oscillations lies between −1 and +1 and can 
be defined as the their normalized inner product 
 
 (1) 
a) 
 
b) 
 
Figure 1: Cortical realizations of attributes. a) Fragment (ca. 4mm2) 
of the neural feature map for the attribute orientation of cat V1
(adapted from Crair et. al., 1997). The arrows indicate the polar
topology of the orientation values represented within each hyper-
column. Hypercolumns are arranged in a retinotopic topology. b)
Color band (ca. 1 mm2) from the thin stripes of macaque V2
(adapted from Xiao et. al., 2003). The values of the attribute color
are arranged in a topology that follows the similarity of hue as de-
fined by the Commission Internationale de l’Eclairages (xy-
cromaticity). The topology among the various color bands of V2 is
retinotopic. 
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The dynamics of complex systems is often governed by a 
few dominating states, the eigenmodes. The 
corresponding eigenvalues designate how much of the 
dynamics is accounted for by that mode. The two stable 
eigenmodes of a stimulated network are shown in Fig. 3b. 
Only the stable eigenmodes, i.e. those eigenmodes whose 
characteristic function does not converge to zero, will be of 
concern to us when it comes to semantic interpretation. 
The overall dynamics of the network is given by the 
Cartesian vector x(t) = (x1(t), ...,xk(t))T. The network state at 
any instant is considered as a superposition of the 
temporally constant, but spatially variant eigenvectors vi 
weighted by the corresponding spatially invariant, but 
temporally evolving characteristic functions ci(t) of Fig. 3c: 
 
(2) 
 
The eigenmodes, for any stimulus, can be ordered along 
their eigenvalues λi so that each eigenmode can be 
signified by a natural number i beginning with 1 for the 
strongest. 
The Hilbert space analysis allows us to interpret the 
dynamics of oscillatory networks in semantic terms. Since 
oscillation functions reliably co-vary with objects, they may 
be assigned to some of the individual terms a,b, ... ∈ Ind of 
a predicate language by the partial function  
 
(3) 
 
The sentence a = b expresses a representational state of 
the system (i.e., the representation of the identity of the 
objects denoted by the individual terms a and b) to the 
degree the oscillation functions α(a) and α(b) of the system 
are synchronous. The degree to which a sentence φ ex-
presses a representational state of the system, for any 
eigenmode i, can be measured by the value di(φ)∈[−1,+1]. 
In case of identity sentences we have: 
 
  (4) 
 
When we take a closer look at the eigenvector of the first 
eigenmode in Fig. 3b, we see that most of the vector com-
ponents are exactly zero (gray shading). However, few 
components in the greenness and the horizontality layers 
are positive (light shading) and few components in the 
redness and the verticality layers are negative (dark shad-
ing). We may interpret this by saying that the first eigen-
mode represents two objects as distinct from one another. 
The representation of the first object is the characteristic 
function +c1(t) and the representation of the second object 
is its mirror image −c1(t) (Because of the normalization of 
the Δ-function, only the signs of the eigenvector compo-
nents matter). These considerations justify the following 
evaluation of non-identity: 
 
  (5) 
 
Feature layers function as representations of attribute val-
ues and thus can be expressed by predicates F1, ...,Fp, 
i.e., to every predicate F a diagonal matrix β(F) ∈ {0,1}k×k 
can be assigned such that, by multiplication with any ei-
genvector vi, the matrix renders the sub-vector of those 
components that belong to the feature layer expressed by 
F. To determine to which degree an oscillation function 
assigned to an individual constant a pertains to the feature 
layer assigned to a predicate F, we have to compute how 
synchronous it maximally is with one of the oscillations in 
the feature layer. We are, in other words, justified to evalu-
ate the degree to which a predicative sentence Fa (read: ‘a 
is F’, e.g., ‘This object is red’) expresses a representational 
state of our system, with respect to the eigenmode i, in the 
following way (the fj are the components of the vector f): 
 
 (6) 
If one, furthermore, evaluates the conjunction of two sen-
tences by the minimum of the value of each conjunct, we 
may regard the first eigenvector v1 of the network dynam-
ics resulting from the stimulus in Fig. 3a as a representa-
tion expressible by the sentence 
This is a red vertical object and that is a green horizontal 
object. 
We only have to assign the individual terms this (=a) and 
that (=b) to the oscillatory functions −c1(t) and +c1(t), re-
spectively, and the predicates red (=R), green (=G), verti-
cal (=V) and horizontal (=H) to the redness, greenness, 
verticality and horizontality layers as their neuronal mean-
ings. Simple computation then reveals: 
 
 (7) 
Using further methods of formal semantics, the semantic 
evaluation has been extended to sentences comprising 
disjunction (∨), implication ( →), and existential as well as 
universal quantifiers (∃, ∀). Co-variation with content can 
always be achieved if the individual assignment α and the 
predicate assignment β are chosen to match the network’s 
perceptual capabilities. Theorems that prove the composi-
tionality of meaning and content have been provided 
(Werning, 2005). Werning (2003) extends this approach 
from an ontology of objects to an ontology of events.  
 
Figure 2: Oscillatory network. The network topology reflects the receptor topology (xy-plane) and the feature topology (z-axis) of the neural maps. 
Each module realizes one attribute. The layers in each module realize the attribute values. Oscillators activated by neighboring stimulus elements 
with similar attribute values synchronize (light gray). Oscillators activated by neighboring stimulus elements with unlike attribute values de-
synchronize (dark gray). The layers of different modules are connected in a synchronizing way that respects the common receptor topology. 
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Conclusion 
Oscillatory networks show how a structure of the cortex 
can be analyzed so that elements of this structure can be 
identified with mental concepts. These cortical states can 
be regarded as the thoughts expressed by some first order 
logic. They form a compositional semantics for such a 
logic. The cortical states can themselves be evaluated  
 
compositionally with respect to external content and thus 
provide denotations. The approach formulated in this pa-
per is biologically rather well-founded. It is supported by a 
rich number of neurophysiological and psycho-physical 
data and is underpinned by various computer simulations. 
The eigenmode analysis of the network enables the reduc-
tion of the logical structure we encounter in thought to the 
the topological organization of the cortex. 
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Figure 3: a) Stimulus: one vertical red bar and one horizontal green 
bar. It was presented to a network with 32×32×4 oscillators. b) The
two stable eigenmodes. The eigenvectors v1 and v2 are shown
each in one line. The four columns correspond to the four feature
layers. Dark shading signifies negative, gray zero and light shading
positive components. c) The characteristic functions for the two
eigenmodes. 
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The Calculus of Inductive Constructions as a Foundation for  
Semantics 
Piotr Wilkin, Warsaw, Poland 
Since Frege started his work on formalizing natural 
language semantics, the framework for those semantics 
has been set-based. First, most theories have been based 
on type theory, later replaced by Zermelo-Fraenkel’s set 
theory. Today, this paradigm is rarely questioned and even 
if some attempts are made to circumvent ZFC, for example 
to eliminate some paradoxes in quantified modal logic 
(Oksanen 1999), most of the development is done within 
that framework. This raises two major problems: set theory 
is structuralistic and extensional in nature. The latter needs 
no explanation, the former can be explained this way: in 
set theory, one expresses structures, not functionality. This 
is well seen in the definition of the ordered pair – in ZFC, 
one defines <a,b> as {{a},{a,b}} and only later proves that 
this construct satisfies the properties we require of the 
ordered pair – namely, to be able to construct an ordered 
pair from two elements and to retrieve, respectively, the 
first or second element. 
What I propose here is to switch to a certain 
intuitionistic setting to express semantics, namely, the 
Calculus of Inductive Constructions. I am aware that the 
term “intuitionistic” will make some people, and especially 
philosophers, wary of the idea, since this instantly 
suggests a connection with Brouwer’s philosophical 
concept of intuitionism as a philosophy of mathematics. 
However, I believe that while intuitionism might be 
questionable as a framework for mathematics, it is well-
suited as a framework for natural-language semantics. 
This is because the subjects of both disciplines are 
fundamentally different. With natural-language semantics, 
we want to describe not an idealized area such as 
mathematics, but a very real one – how people use the 
language. While in mathematics it is often advisable to 
abstract away from the specific means of obtaining some 
result (namely, the calculation), it is hardly plausible to 
suggest that we can do the same with language 
expressions, as there are clearly some cases (as in the 
case of intensional contexts or, more specifically, 
propositional attitudes) where we cannot abstract from the 
way a specific human being reconstructs a language 
expression.  
From Frege’s times, the accepted and widespread 
form of a logical assertion has been C A ϕ, where C stands 
for the context and ϕ represents the expression to be 
asserted (in the given context). This is true for provability, 
as well as for logical consequence in a model (obviously, 
the two relations differ in nature, but a common 
characteristic is shared – they are both binary relations 
between a context and an evaluated expression, whether 
the context be a model or a theory). However, a 
counterproposal to this form can be submitted: C A ϕ : t, 
which reads: in context C, the expression ϕ is of type t. 
This is called a typing judgement. The concept of types 
dates back to the theory of types from Principia 
Mathematica, but this specific idea owes its roots to 
Church’s theory of simple types (Church 1940), which was 
based on the lambda calculus and proposed as an 
alternative. 
Once we enter the area of semantics, one can see 
the usefulness of the typing assertion over the traditional 
logical one. In semantics, we are often interested not only 
in information about true sentences, we also want to know 
whether a given expression is a properly constructed 
sentence or whether some expression is actually a definite 
description. Indeed, various solutions like the Montague 
grammar (Montague 1974) exploit this concept with the 
use of semantic categories, which is a concept parallel to 
the one by Church but designed specifically for natural 
language analysis in the early XX century by Polish 
logicians Stanislaw Lesniewski and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz 
(Ajdukiewicz 1935). However, the interesting modification 
here lies not only in the adding of the type, but also in 
modifying the way we read the expression. This was first 
noticed by the logician Haskell Curry (Curry 1934), who 
recognized that in case of simply typed combinators (an 
analogon to Church’s simple type system), if we only 
assign types to basic lambda terms, the proper types 
correspond exactly to tautologies of a minimal (consisting 
only of the implication, without the other connectives) 
intuitionistic propositional calculus. Thus, for example, the 
K combinator (λxλy.x) becomes a proof of the known 
tautology α → (β → α). How so? According to the functional 
interpretation (known as the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov 
interpretation (Sorensen and Urzyczyn 2006)), a proof of 
implication is a function transforming a proof of the LHS to 
a proof of the RHS. So in this case, we want the function in 
question to take an argument being a proof of α, then 
return us an argument which itself is a function from β to α. 
The K combinator is exactly that – it takes an x (of type α), 
then returns us λy.x, which is itself a function – that takes 
an y (of type β) and returns the previously taken x (of type α). 
This approach, while generally interesting, is hardly 
revolutionary. However, this has to be coupled with a 
different idea – Church designed his simple type system 
not with this intuitionistic reading in mind, but to avoid a 
form of Russell’s Paradox for his untyped lambda calculus, 
which is represented by the Omega term: (λx.xx)(λx.xx) – 
a self-applying function applied to itself will never reduce to 
a normal form. It can be easily proven that any term that 
can be typed in the simple type system has the SN (strong 
normalization) property – any path of reductions of that 
term will terminate. The question raised by Curry’s 
discovery was – can one construct a more advanced logic 
than the one represented by the simple type system, but 
one that is still based only on strongly normalizable terms? 
We now know that the answer is positive, and highly so: 
one can represent higher-order intuitionistic logic using this 
sort type system, and add inductively defined predicates to 
the logic to make it easier to formalize certain concepts. 
One such system is the Calculus of Inductive 
Constructions (CIC), which is the theoretical basis for an 
interactive proof assistant program named Coq (Herbelin 
et al. 2006). For a sample of the expressive power of the 
system, one can point to the formalized version of the four-
color theorem proof – since the proof itself is a tangible 
mathematical object, this removes the need to “believe” a 
computer-based check of each of the hundreds of cases – 
one only has to believe the theory behind the prover, 
namely, the CIC itself. For a more logically interesting 
example, a (constructive) proof of Gödel’s incompleteness 
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theorem is also available (O’Connor 2005). Indeed, the 
expressive power of CIC is not far from that of ZFC. 
There is not enough space here to describe in full 
extent the theory behind CIC. Suffice it to say, one very 
important distinction between CIC and the simple-type 
theory (STT) is that there is no longer any clear distinction 
between a term and a type. Therefore, we can have both  
A ϕ : 2+2 = 4 and A 2+2 = 4 : Prop - the first one states 
that ϕ is a proof of 2 + 2 = 4, the other – that 2 + 2 = 4 is a 
well-formed proposition. The type hierarchy in CIC is 
infinite and stratified, with two base types: Set being the 
type of object domains and Prop being the type of 
propositions. One example of a proposition we have 
already seen, an example of a Set typing assertion is and 
A Nat : Set, saying that the natural numbers form an object 
domain (I did not want to use the terms “set” or “universe” 
since they seem to have various connotations, but since 
the term “set” is used as the type designation internally in 
Coq, I will adopt this and use the name “set” as short for 
“object domain” – this is however not to be understood as 
a set in the set-theoretic sense). Another important 
difference is that apart from non-dependent products 
(which can be understood as functions and thus, via the 
Curry-Howard isomorphism, implications), we now have 
dependent products (which can be thought of as 
generalized products and via the Curry-Howard 
isomorphism – represented as universal quantification). 
For example, the assertion A ϕ : (∀n:nat(n ≥ 0)) can be 
read as “ϕ is a member of a generalized product over 
natural numbers of domains “n ≥ 0”, which for each n 
contain proofs that n ≥ 0”. 
Presenting this entire concept would have been 
pointless without showing why this can be useful for 
semantics. Indeed, I can believe that using this framework 
can significantly increase the clarity of describing non-
extensional contexts in semantic uses. For one quick 
interesting demonstration, note that this approach allows 
us to formally explain the difference between Frege’s 
notion of “function” and its “value-range”. In CIC one 
cannot generally deduce A f = g from A ∀x.fx = gx; 
extensionality is not assumed. However, this does not 
mean that we use some vague notion of identity – 
functions are constructive objects and they are the same if 
the constructions themselves are the same.  
Now, here the inductive types come in. Inductive 
types are generally an extension of the intuitive notion of 
inductive constructions to the type system. That is: you 
provide ways of constructing base elements of the type, as 
well as inductively constructing new elements from 
previously constructed ones. What the type system 
guarantees is that the construction is unique – objects of 
an inductive type cannot be created in any other way than 
by the respective constructors and the various constructors 
are assumed to be provably different from each other. For 
example, the type Nat of natural numbers is defined as  
Nat := O : Nat | S : Nat → Nat. This corresponds to the 
traditional view from Peano Arithmetic: natural numbers 
are either 0 or an iterated successor of 0. They are also 
only that: for example, you can prove in the system (with 
just the above definition) that 0 is different from any 
successor.  
We can use all of the mentioned instruments to 
illustrate how this framework can help us in formalizing 
semantics. For example, we can construct the operator 
Believes in the following way: Believes := BArith :  
∀n:nat, (n = n) → Believes(n = n). This inductive definition 
means that what is “believed” is arithmetical equalities, but 
nothing else. Note that in this definition, both the truth 
value and the form of the expression is used – we accept 
only proven expressions, and only of the form n = n. We 
could widen the operator, for example, to ignore the truth 
value: take a definition of Believes := BArith :  
(∀n m:nat),Believes(n = m). This is a correct definition, but 
it no longer takes into account the logical validity of the 
equality. Now, we “believe” any arithmetical equality, true 
or not. 
Note that we are not taking a model-theoretic 
approach here – there is no need to construct a specific 
intensional model to formalize such a semantics. We gain 
the benefit of a framework especially suited for analyzing 
intensional constructions, but one that already possesses 
all the “standard” logical concepts built in. One can even 
add the axiom of excluded middle if needed – it is 
consistent with CIC. There is, however, no need for the 
tedious task of building a specific model for formalizing an 
intensional fragment of the natural language – one needs 
only to define the proper inductive types and predicates. 
All this is coupled with a system for annotating the syntax 
much richer than standard categorial grammars – for 
example, we can now assign a type to the operator very as 
follows: (∀s:Set),(s → Prop) → (s → Prop), which allows us 
to uniformly type very for predicates of any object category 
(as in very young with young : LivingBeing → Prop and 
very fast with fast : Car → Prop, so that we can both 
subdivide the object category and not worry about having 
problems with uniformly assigning categories to higher 
order operators). 
This proof-theoretic (or constructive, as you prefer) 
approach to natural-language semantics seems to me 
more suitable. After all, what we are after when formalizing 
a natural language is being able to express all the 
constructs from the natural language easily and not having 
to worry whether adding this or that construct will 
complicate the resulting model beyond manageability. 
Also, it places more emphasis on the functional way of our 
language use. I believe that the presented framework 
might be a viable and reasonable alternative to current set-
theoretic based approaches. 
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The Four-Color Theorem, Testimony and the A Priori 
Kai-Yee Wong, Hong Kong, China 
1. Computer proof as experiment 
The computer played an essential role in providing a key 
lemma, which requires certain combinatorial checks too 
long to do by hand, in the proof given by Kenneth Appel 
and Wolfgang Hanken of the Four-Color Theorem (4CT). 
The proof of the 4CT has generated a flurry of philosophi-
cal discussions about its significance. Some of them fo-
cused on the arguments put forth by Thomas Tymoczko 
1979. According to Tymoczko, the argument for the 4CT is 
like ‘an argument in theoretical physics where a long ar-
gument can suggest a key experiment which is carried out 
and used to complete the argument’ (Tymoczko 1979: 78) 
because there is an unavoidable reliance on computers to 
produce the proof of the theorem. Since belief in the reli-
ability of computers ultimately rests on empirical consid-
erations, the proof establishes the 4CT on grounds that 
are in part empirical. So the 4CT, Tymoczko concludes, is 
a substantial piece of knowledge which can be known only 
a posteriori. Almost three decades on, the issues raised by 
Tymoczko’s paper are still of great interest to many. (For a 
recent discussion see, see Arkoudas and Bringsjord 2007. 
See also Brown 1999, Burge 1998, Coady 1992: ch. 14.) 
In this paper I shall examine the central thread in Tymoc-
zko’s reasoning and Michael Detlefsen and Mark Luker’s 
(1980) contention that it in fact leads, rightly, to the much 
more drastic conclusion that mathematical proof is typically 
empirical.  
Tymoczko argues that the appeal to computers, in 
the case of the 4CT, involves a claim of this kind:  
 
(1) If computer C running program P produces re-
sult R, then mathematical statement M is true.  
The truth of (1) turns on the reliability of C and P, which in 
turn involves the claim that  
 
(2)  C does what it is supposed to do, namely, to 
correctly execute P.  
Evidently (2) may turn out true or false, depending on a 
complex set of empirical factors and thus its truth is ‘ulti-
mately a matter for engineering and physics to assess’ 
(Tymoczko 1979: 74). Mathematical knowledge obtained 
by computer proof is therefore grounded on a ‘well-
conceived computer experiment’. So, Tymoczko con-
cludes, accepting computer-assisted proof means giving 
up the traditional notion of mathematical proof as some-
thing surveyable, non-empirical and a priori.  
2. Proof, archives, and testimony 
Expressing this argument in terms of testimony can help 
us articulate a problem for Tymoczko. What he argues for 
is that since testimony is empirical in character and the 
proof of the 4CT is based partly on the testimony of a 
computer, accepting the 4CT as a theorem requires 
changing the concept of proof.  
Indeed, it seems arguable that testimony has a 
significant role in the transmission of mathematical 
knowledge and this in turn may have interesting bearing 
on the notion of proof. Mathematics investigation, of 
course, builds on past results. Now suppose Kodel, a 
mathematician, has produced with great care a proof with 
gaps filled by a set of established, ‘archived’ results. It is 
implausible to think that Kodel’s proof therefore fails to be 
a proof in the proper sense, otherwise much of 
mathematics as we know it would go down the drain 
because mathematical investigation has always involved 
appeals to, so to speak, testimony of archived results. 
Reliance on such testimony is part and parcel of a 
mathematician’s work. Thus, in a crucial respect, Kodel’s 
proof, or for that matter, much of traditional mathematical 
investigation is relevantly similar to the proof of the 4CT in 
their reliance on testimony. If we adopt Tymoczko’s view, 
we must say that the use of testimony injected into Kodel’s 
proof empirical ingredients and rendered the theorem 
proved a piece of a posteriori knowledge, just as the 4CT 
is. Notice whether or not Kodel can survey the archived 
proofs has no bearing on this point. To see this, we can 
imagine that another mathematician, Podel, produced a 
proof with gaps filled by a vast set of archived results. 
Surveying the enormously complex and numerous proofs 
for these results is such a mammoth task that no 
mathematician can finish. (If this sounds far-fetched, 
consider the now accepted proof of the classification of all 
simple finite groups. The proof, carried out over many 
years by a large number of mathematicians, spans across 
about 15,000 pages on journals. This example is from 
Brown (1999), p. 158). The fact that these proofs have 
been surveyed in the past will not change the situation. For 
without a first-hand survey of each proof, Podel must rely 
on empirical evidence that the archives are a reliable 
source of mathematical results. It is arbitrary to claim that 
Kodel’s theorem does not rely on any empirical evidence 
because his proof is not as extensive as Podel’s in its 
appeal to the archives.  
If so, one should find puzzling if not inconsistent 
Tymoczko’s claim that the appeal to computers in the 4CT 
forces a change of the traditional concept of proof. For if 
this claim is to be true, it must be the case that 
mathematical proof had not come to include empirical 
elements before the proof of the 4CT. But by dint of 
reasoning similar to Tymoczko’s own, as shown by the 
case of Kodel and Podel, it should be held, albeit in my 
view implausibly, that traditional mathematics is mostly 
empirical.  
Yet one may think that such a conclusion is not 
implausible. As a matter of fact, some have argued that 
much of traditional mathematics is partially empirical. 
Detlefsen and Luker (1980) argue that if one follows the 
logic of Tymoczko’s reasoning where it leads, one is forced 
to see empirical ingredients in proofs that are generally 
held to be paradigms of a priori mathematical arguments, 
such as the following one attributed to the young Gauss. 
Gauss proved that the sum of the first one hundred 
positive numbers was 5,050 in the following way: write 
down the following pairs: <1, 100>, <2, 99>, …, <50, 51>, 
observe that the numbers of each pair together make 101 
and that there are 50 pairs, and then conclude that the 
sum of the first one hundred numbers is 5,050. According 
to Detlefsen and Luker, the episode of calculation by which 
we determinate that 101 multiplied by 50 is 5,050 is 
needed in the reasoning from the ‘observation’ to the 
‘conclusion’. Among the assumptions, they add, required 
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for confidence in the result of any computation is the 
following:  
 
(3) The computing agent correctly executes the pro-
gram.  
Since the validity of (3) rests on evidence of an empirical 
sort, the reasoning embodied by Gauss’s proof must be 
seen as utilizing empirical premises. Furthermore, they 
argue, (3) is analogous (2); so, Gauss’s proof is straightly 
analogous to the 4CT in its appeal to experience. They 
then conclude that Tymoczko’s reasoning, which they en-
dorse, forces us to hold that traditional mathematics typi-
cally utilizes empirical evidence. Let’s call the form of rea-
soning behind Tymoczko’s and Detlefsen and Luker’s 
views the Empirical-Reliability-of-X Principle (ERXP):  
 
If X is something we must rely on in order to see the 
correctness of a proof, then the empirical evidence 
for the reliability of X is part of the proof, or, in 
slightly different terms, the proof must be seem as 
utilizing empirical premises.  
On this principle, no knowledge acquired on the basis of a 
proof obtained, partly or fully, through testimony of any 
kind can be a priori because the empirical evidence re-
garding the reliability of the source of testimony would 
have to be part of the evidence for what is claimed to be 
known. The problem with ERXP is that it commits us to a 
highly restrictive account of a priori proof, and more seri-
ously, demonstrative reasoning in general. (Though some-
one like Chisholm would say that such an account is the 
correct one, see Chisholm 1989, 28-30). For in any infer-
ence involving more than a few steps, we need to rely on 
our memory and perception to store and retrieve premises. 
But the reliability of our memory and perception, and ulti-
mately the proper functioning of our brain, is not amenable 
to demonstration by reason alone. One would then have to 
conclude that mathematical argument and demonstrative 
reasoning typically utilize empirical premises and are thus 
a posteriori. Why would Tymoczko and others take ERXP 
seriously, despite its implausible consequences? They 
seem to think that we cannot but hold that the appeal to 
computers must force our warrant for the 4CT to be em-
pirical because there is no way for an agent to obtain in an 
a priori way any knowledge through testimony. This, how-
ever, shows that ERXP is ill-motivated because, as I shall 
argue, with a proper explication of the a priori we can claim 
that it is possible to obtain a priori knowledge through the 
testimony of a rational source. Space does not allow me to 
argue for the rational source of testimony in computer 
proof (but see Tyler 1998 and Arkoudas & Bringsjord 
2003). Instead I shall outline an account of the a priori 
which shows that the empirical character of a testimony 
need not render the knowledge obtained through it empiri-
cal.  
3. Apriority and two roles for experience 
The key idea here is a broad construal of the non-
justificatory role that experience is held to play in knowl-
edge and cognition. The standard view distinguishes a 
non-justificatory role from a justificatory role of experience. 
We are familiar with the idea that sense experience is 
needed to enable us to acquire the concept of, say, trian-
gle, before we can be said to know a priori that a triangle 
has three sides. In general, sense experience needed for 
the acquisition of a concept does not thereby become part 
of any warrant one may have that would make a belief 
expressed with the concept knowledge. I think the non-
justificatory role of experience should not be limited to the 
acquisition of concepts. A non-justificatory role for experi-
ence in this broader sense I shall call an ‘enabling role’. 
Burge’s discussions of computer proof and content preser-
vation illustrate very well how one can have a very broad 
construal of the enabling role of experience provided that 
one is prepared to bring into question a whole lot of widely 
held opinions about rationality, content preservation, and 
testimony. (His ‘Acceptance Principle’ is a case in point, 
see Burge 1993: 469, see also Burge 1998).  
To further explain the notion of an enabling role of 
experience, let us consider the appeal to memory. It is 
often the case that memory constitutes a part of the 
warrant of a remembered belief, as in the case in which I 
remember vividly that I was convinced by someone’s 
demonstration of a certain logical statement p (call this 
episode of remembering M). Contrast this with the case 
where I remember a certain logical statement q and utilize 
it to fill a gap in a proof for a certain conclusion c (call this 
episode M*). In the first case, as Steffen Borge puts it 
(Borge 2003: 109), my cognitive attention is not merely 
focused on p but also on the attitude of my earlier self 
towards the proposition. Here M makes a substantive 
contribution to the justification of a remembered belief. In 
the second case, my memory serves not to supply 
propositions about particular mental events. Rather its role 
is to supply for the derivation a certain step, q, that is part 
of the demonstration that entitles me to believe c. c is 
underwritten by the demonstration consisting of, among 
other steps, q. The memory that supplies q, M*, is not what 
the demonstration is about, neither does it make any 
substantive contribution to the warrant provided by the 
demonstration. My belief that c is warranted because I 
have proved it. My warrant needs no further justificational 
forces to be supplied by M*. The role of M* is only 
enabling, not justificatory. It serves to give me access to 
that warrant, but not part of my entitlement to c. Typically, 
in a complex demonstration (a proof or a deduction) 
memory is called upon to play an enabling role. Contingent 
propositions about what we happen to remember do not 
thereby become part of the premises or make a 
substantive contribution to the warrant provided by these 
premises. The use of paper and pencil extends our means 
of checking of longer deductions. (See Teller 1980 for a 
related idea.) So I think precisely in the case of hand 
calculation the same reasoning can be used to argue for 
the mere enabling role of sense experience and perceptual 
belief. In the context of computer proof we can see the 
appeal to computers as a yet further extension of the 
means of checking and executing a formally sound 
algorithm which serves mainly to enable our access to the 
a priori warrant for a mathematical result. One might say 
that whereas the justification provided by a first-hand proof 
is not dependent on experience essentially, the justification 
provided by the proof of the 4CT is dependent on 
experience essentially because it is too long for any 
human to check. I can agree with this if ‘essentially’ is used 
here just to mark out the complexity of the computer’s 
proof. But the epistemic significance of ‘essential 
dependence on experience’ in this sense can be doubted. 
Given that it makes epistemic sense to see computers as a 
way to extend our means of checking proofs, it is difficult to 
see why the kind of dependence on experience involved in 
a warrant provided by a computer proof should be 
accorded special epistemic significance merely because of 
the complexity involved. Since the relevant notion of 
apriority pertains to the independence from experience in 
its justificatory, not enabling, role, the above 
considerations, if correct, allows us to hold that the appeal 
to computers does not force the warrant for relying on the 
testimony of a computer to be essentially dependent on 
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experience. Of course, a detailed account of the a priori on 
the basis of a broad conception of the enabling role of 
experience would be beyond the scope of this paper.  
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The Comprehension Principle and Arithmetic in Fuzzy Logic 
Shunsuke Yatabe, Toyonaka, Osaka, Japan 
1 Introduction 
Shapiro and Weir showed that Hume’s principle has a 
finite model (so it can not deduce Peano arithmetic PA) in 
Aristotelian logic which does not admit the existence of the 
empty property [Shapiro, Weir 2000]. This shows that 
Hume’s principle itself is not enough to develop arithmetic, 
and we should have a certain theory of properties to real-
ize Frege’s program [Hale 2008]. In this paper, we investi-
gate a theory of property which satisfies what Myhill called 
Frege’s principle [Myhill 1984], that “every formula with one 
free variable determines a property (not a set) which holds 
of all those and only those things which satisfy the for-
mula”, and we examine how much arithmetic we can de-
velop by it. 
It is well-known that it is impossible in classical logic: 
the comprehension principle, )]()}(:{[ xPyPyxx ≡∈∀  for 
any P, implies a contradiction by the Russell paradox. 
However, in non-classical logic, the situation is slightly 
different. Many first order logics, including fuzzy logic, have 
been known to imply no contradiction when the 
comprehension principle is assumed. So we can regard 
any singular term as an object in such logic (and this plays 
an important role in Fregean Platonism). Therefore, as 
Myhill, we can say:  
 
So if we want to take Frege’s principle seriously, we 
must begin to look at some kind of non-classical logic. 
Let us consider the case of the set theory H with the com-
prehension principle in Lukasiewicz infinite-valued predi-
cate logic L∀ . It is a version of fuzzy logic, and is a non-
classical logic weaker than classical logic which only has a 
weak fragment of the contraction rule. White showed that 
H is consistent [White 1979], and it is known as the 
strongest theory among set theories with the comprehen-
sion principle. We highlight two special features of sets (or 
properties) in H which might provide a clue of analysis: 
non-extensionality and full circularity. 
First, the basic law V does not hold in H. Let us 
remember the case of classical logic: Frege’s basic law V,  
)]]()()[()()()[)(( xQxPxQextPextQP ≡∀≡=∀∀  
and the definition of membership relation imply the com-
prehension principle and it implies a contradiction. Neo-
Fregeans modified the basic law V and adopted Re-
stricted-V (RV) when they developed a set theory in classi-
cal logic [Shapiro 2003]. In H, the basic law V is equivalent 
to the axiom of extensionality (which insists the extensional 
equality is equivalent to the Leibniz equality), and it implies 
a contradiction (it is called Grisin’s paradox [Grisin 1982]). 
Furthermore, any version of RV has not been known to be 
consistent to H yet.  
Second, H forgives circular definitions. It is because 
H proves a general form of recursive definition, which is a 
circular definition of a very strong shape, is permitted: 
)],()[)(( zxzxzx φ≡∈∃∀  
 
for any formula φ [Cantini 2003]. Here, we define a set z by 
using z itself. Since the recursive definition is an essence 
of computation, a certain amount of arithmetic can be 
developed: we can define a graph of any recursive 
function in H. However, the arithmetic developed in H is 
not a conservative extension of PA: the mathematical 
induction scheme implies a contradiction in H [Yatabe 
2007]. In fact, we can show, in any model of H, the 
sentence which can be interpreted as “ω contains a non-
standard natural number” is truth-value 1. 
On a final note we remark about an adaptation of 
non-classical logic. As for an antecedent, Dummett lapsed 
classical logic for his own philosophical purposes, anti-
realism. In this sense, adherence to classical logic is not 
what is should be. Furthermore, this suggests that, we may 
argue that some rule (the law of excluded middle in his 
case) of classical logic corresponds a certain philosophical 
viewpoint (as realism). We might ask what kind of a 
philosophical assumption corresponds to the contraction 
rule as a future task1. 
2 The set theory H, extensionality and the 
basic law V 
The comprehension principle will derive a contradiction in 
classical logic. However, the contraction rule is essential to 
derive it. Grisin proved that the comprehension principle 
derives no contradiction in the system Grisin logic which is 
classical logic minus the contraction rule [Grisin 1982].  
So, the next question is, where the limit is: what is 
the strongest logic, between Girisin logic and classical 
logic, which does not derive a contradiction? Currently, the 
strongest logic is known to be Lukasiewicz infinite-valued 
predicate logic L∀  [White 1979]. This system is known to 
be impossible to recursively axiomatize, so we introduce 
the definition of its model (because of the luck of space, 
here we introduce the quite informal one: we note that, this 
is a simplification of ( )1,0,*,],1,0[ ⇒ -structure where ( )1,0,*,],1,0[ ⇒  forms a standard MV algebra [Hajek 
2001]). 
(1) The truth value set is [0, 1] of real numbers (it is 
a kind of fuzzy logic). 
(2) 0=⊥ , )1,1min( ϕφϕφ +−=→  
(3) }:)(inf{)()( Maaxx ∈=∀ ϕϕ  
The rest connectives are defined by using ⊥→,  (for exam-
ple A¬  is →⊥A  and BA ∧  is ))(( BAA →¬→¬ ). We 
note that, we have the multiplicative conjunction ⊗  in L∀ : 
}1,0max{ −+=⊗ BABA . It is easy to see that 
AAA ⊗→  is truth value 1 if and only if A is truth value 0 
or 1. We write BA ≡  instead of )()( ABBA →⊗→ . 
Let H be a set theory whose only axiom scheme is the 
comprehension principle (i.e. )]()}(:{[ xPyPyxx ≡∈∀  is 
truth value 1 for any P in any its model). We introduce two 
kinds of equality in H. 
Leibniz equality: x = y if and only if ])[( zyzxz ∈≡∈∀ , 
Extensional equality: yx ext=  if and only if 
])[( yzxzz ∈≡∈∀  
                                                     
 
1 To answer this, we note that the contraction rule plays an essential role to 
imply a contradiction not only in the Russell paradox but also in the liar para-
dox and in the sorites paradox. Therefore we seem to need a unified frame-
work to analyze them. 
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Clearly yxyx ext=→=  holds, but the converse does not 
hold in H. 
Theorem 1 The axiom of extensionality, 
])[,( yxyxyx ext=≡=∀ , does not hold in H. 
For the proof, see [Hajek 2005]. Here, we introduce the 
outline: this is by the following lemma. 
Lemma 1 H proves that Leibniz equality is a crisp relation. 
We note that formula P(x) is crisp (Crisp(P)) if, for any 
object a, the truth value of P(a) is either 0 or 1. Since =ext 
can have a fuzzy truth value for fuzzy sets in H, = and =ext 
are different. 
As for the basic law V, it implies that = is not the Leibniz 
equality. For V defines = as the extensional equality, and if 
= is Leibniz equality then the axiom of extensionality holds, 
and this implies a contradiction in H. However, Frege’s 
intension seems to define = as Leibniz equality. In this 
sense the basic law V does not hold in H. 
In this proof, we imply a contradiction when x =ext y  
has a fuzzy truth value: this is possible when not less than 
one of x and y is a fuzzy set. As for another paradox, it is 
known that we can imply a contradiction if we assume the 
empty set }:{ ⊥= xφ  satisfies the extensionality axiom 
[Cantini 2003]. So it has been unknown that the following 
scheme is consistent: 
)]]()()[()}(:{)}(:[{
))())}(:(({))())}(:(({
xQxPxyQyxPx
QCrispxQxPCrispxPx extext ≡∀≡=→
∧≠∧∧≠ φφ  
for any formula P(x), Q(x). This means that, the following 
law might hold (this is a version of the RV [Shapiro 2003]): 
)]]()()[()()([))()(( xQxPxQextPextQGoodPGoodQP ≡∀≡=→∧∀∀  
Therefore if this is consistent, we can think that RV gives 
an implicit definition of crisp sets, badness means fuzzi-
ness, and any fuzzy set can be regarded to represent in-
definitely extensibility. 
3 Circularity and arithmetic without the in-
duction scheme 
When we mention the formalization of arithmetic, we often 
come to axiom systems with the induction scheme as PA, 
but it is not a unique way. We also have type systems 
which are widely used in computer science. For example, 
Gödel’s system T2 is a simple type theory [Girard et al. 
1989]. T has two types, Int (integers) and Bool (booleans). 
As for Int, it has two type constructors, 0 (constant symbol) 
and s : Int → Int (successor function). And T does not 
have the induction scheme. Instead, it has a recursion 
operator R for recursive definition whose type is 
UUUIntUUR →→→→→ )(:  for any type U. It satis-
fies uvuR =0  and nnvuRvnsvuR )()( =  (if we substitute U 
for Int). This operator enables us to have the primitive 
recursion on integer numbers: for example, the addition  
x + y is defined by yzszzxR IntInt ).'.( λλ . For, we can calcu-
late as follows: 
)())(..()(
0)..(0
yxsyyxzszzxRysx
xzszzxRx
IntInt
IntInt
+++
+
aa
aa
λλ
λλ  
Here st a  represents that s is a result of the computation 
whose input is t. So, the above computations show that 
xx =+ 0  and )()( yxsysx +=+  hold. In this way, we can 
                                                     
 
2 We note that Gödel’s original system T has the induction scheme. 
represent primitive recursive functionals in T without using 
the induction scheme.  
The arithmetic developed in H is very similar to the 
system T in that they do not have the induction scheme. H 
allows the circular definition3 (as in section 1), and it 
enables us to use the general form of the recursive 
definition as R. Here we introduce three points (for more 
details, see [Cantini 2003][Hajek 2005]). First we can 
define ordinal numbers in Zermelo style: φ=0  and 
}:{ nxxns ==  for any finite ordinal n. It is easy to see, we 
can define Fregean term “the number of the conception P” 
(NxPx) by the comprehension principle if P is crisp and 
finite. Second, the set ω of all finite ordinals can be defined 
as  
]})[(0:{ ysxyxxext =∈∃∨== ωω  
(Because of the luck of extensionality, we can not 
require the uniqueness of ω). Third, any recursive 
function’s graph can be defined. In other words, any partial 
recursive function is numerically representable in H 
Let us give an example of the generalized recursive 
definition in H. For example, we can define the graph P of 
the addition as follows4: 
PzyxPzsysx
zxPzx
∈⇔∈
=⇔∈
,,,,
,,0,  
Both xx =+ 0  and )()( yxsysx +=+  are guaranteed by 
very simple way. However, we do not know P satisfies the 
following conditions: 
 
1. P is a crisp relation, 
2. P defines a function p(x, y) = z  
(i.e. ]')',,(),,()[,( zzzyxPzyxPyx =→∧∀ ), 
3. p(x, y) is a total function. 
If x and y are standard natural numbers, then we can cal-
culate the unique value z satisfying P(x, y, z). However we 
have a trouble when one of x, y is a non-standard natural 
number: P(x, y, z) might be a fuzzy truth value. We neither 
know, whether ω or any graph defined by recursion be-
comes crisp or not. If ω is fuzzy, then we might think this is 
another expression of Dummett’s “ω is indefinitely extensi-
ble”. 
H develops a fair degree of arithmetic; however it 
can not deduce Peano arithmetic PA. In fact, the following 
theorem holds. 
Theorem 2 H proves that the induction scheme implies 
inconsistency. 
This means that H is ω-inconsistent: in any model of H, the 
sentence which can be interpreted as “ω contains a non-
standard natural number” is truth-value 1. For more details, 
see [Yatabe 2007]. 
Contrary, Girard showed that the weak version of 
mathematical induction scheme is provable in LAST, a set 
theory with the comprehension principle in light linear logic 
[Girard 1998] [Terui 2004]. In LAST, the definition of 
natural numbers is quite different: such definition seems to 
enable to prove the weak induction. 
                                                     
 
3 Meanwhile, the comprehension the principle can be thought as a special 
case of the recursive definition. Since it is the foundation placed in the calcula-
tion, so we had better to say that it is the generalized recursive definition that 
is essential principle in this theory. 
4 For the definition of the ordered pair in H , see [Cantini 2003]. 
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Let us summarize: H is not a conservative extension 
of PA. The induction scheme implies a contradiction in H 
nevertheless any partial recursive function is numerically 
representable in H. This is a non-standard arithmetic, 
different to PA, but it itself is a generalization based on the 
concept of recursion, and that is not ad hoc. 
4 Conclusion 
We investigated a theory of property which satisfies what 
Myhill called Frege’s principle, and we examine how much 
arithmetic we can develop by it. It is known that, in many 
logics, the comprehension principle (which represents 
Frege’s principle) does not imply a contradiction. We con-
centrated the case of the set theory H, in Lukasiewicz infi-
nite-valued predicate logic L∀ , which is known as the 
strongest theory among set theories with the comprehen-
sion principle. 
We pointed out two features of sets in H: non-
extensionality and full circularity. First, the basic law V 
does not hold in H and any versions of RV has not been 
known to be consistent to H yet. Second, H forgives 
circular definitions. It is because H proves a general form 
of recursive definition, and a certain amount of arithmetic 
can be developed: we can define a graph of any recursive 
function in H. However, the mathematical induction 
scheme leads to a contradiction in H, so the arithmetic 
developed in H is not a conservative extension of PA. 
These results showed that we do not know about 
arithmetic developed by the comprehension principle 
enough. The problem how we can develop mathematics in 
H seems to be interesting enough from the perspective of 
the analysis of the broad sense of Fregean intent. 
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Intentional Fundamentalism 
Petri Ylikoski / Jaakko Kuorikoski, Helsinki, Finland 
1. What is Intentional Fundamentalism? 
In the social sciences, most debates about reductionism 
are related to methodological individualism. There is a 
wide variety of arguments for this doctrine. This paper 
discusses one assumption often associated with methodo-
logical individualism. We call this assumption intentional 
fundamentalism. According to intentional fundamentalism, 
the proper level of explanation in social science is the level 
of intentional action of individual agents. Intentional fun-
damentalist assumes that explanations given at the level 
of individual action are especially satisfactory, fundamental 
or even ultimate. In contrast to explanations that refer to 
supra-individual social structures, properties or mecha-
nism, there is no need to provide micro-foundations for 
intentional explanations. French social theorist Raymond 
Boudon (1998, 177) expresses this idea clearly: ”When a 
sociological phenomenon is made the outcome of individ-
ual reasons, one does not need to ask further questions”. 
The idea is that in the case of supra-individual explana-
tions there is always a black box that has to be opened 
before the explanation is acceptable, but in the case if 
intentional explanation there is no problem of black boxes: 
” … the explanation is final” (Boudon 1998, 172).  
We argue that the thesis of intentional 
fundamentalism is not acceptable. Although intentional 
fundamentalism can take various forms, we will discuss it 
only in relation to rational choice theory (RCT). We claim 
that the special status of (rational) intentional explanation 
is not compatible with the causal mechanistic account of 
explanation supported by many intentional 
fundamentalists. We will also make the case that the 
explanatory regress arguments presented against the 
possibility of non-individualistic social explanations rely on 
mistaken assumptions about the nature of explanation.  
It is important to recognize the limited scope of our 
arguments. We are not arguing against the legitimacy of 
intentional explanations nor are we presenting a wholesale 
argument against the RCT. We only argue against a 
special explanatory status given to explanations expressed 
in terms of rational intentional action. We do not dispute 
the heuristic usefulness and practical necessity of 
explanations in terms of folk psychology. Adequate 
intentional explanations are fully legitimate causal 
explanations – they just do not have a privileged status. 
Furthermore, our argument should not be read as an 
argument against the idea that there exists a division of 
labor between the social sciences and psychology and 
neurosciences. This idea is unobjectionable as long as 
intentional fundamentalism is not the only argument 
supporting it. 
Our argument will proceed as follows. First we will 
show the connection between intentional fundamentalism 
and the explanatory regress argument for methodological 
individualism. We argue that the proper understanding of 
the mechanistic account of explanation does not lead to an 
explanatory regress. If the regress does not exist, the 
intentional fundamentalism loses its main motivation. In 
latter part of the paper we will attempt to explain the 
appeal of intentional fundamentalism by showing how it is 
based on overemphasis on one particular dimension of 
explanatory power: cognitive salience. Intentional 
fundamentalists assume that different dimension of 
explanatory power go hand in hand when in fact there are 
important trade-offs between them. These trade-offs 
provide the basis for the argument that intentional 
fundamentalism is a hindrance for the search of causal 
explanations in the social sciences.  
2. The Regress of Explanations-Argument 
Methodological individualists usually argue for their posi-
tion by making the case that non-individualist explanations 
are either explanatorily deficient or not explanatory at all. 
At most, the individualists allow that explanations referring 
to macro-social facts are placeholders for proper (individu-
alistic) explanatory factors. The explanatory contribution of 
supra-individual explanations is at-best derived: they are 
explanatory because they are (in principle) backed up by a 
truly explanatory story. This is the regress of explanations 
argument: unless grounded at the lower level, explana-
tions at macro level are not acceptable. The underlying 
general principle [P] is the following: a genuine explanation 
of X by Y requires that Y is itself explained or is self-
explanatory. The explanatory buck has to stop some-
where. 
In principle this argument is general, and it raises 
the possibility that the regress would continue until the 
level of fundamental physical particles. This would be 
highly unintuitive, but for the intentional fundamentalist the 
buck stops at the level of (self-interested) rational 
intentional action. This level is treated as inherently 
understandable, as shown in the above quotations from 
Boudon. The special status of intentional explanation 
makes the explanatory regress argument safe for 
methodological individualist: he can use it with its full force 
against non-idividualist, but it does not challenge the 
legitimacy of his favorite explanatory patterns. In contrast, 
structural explanations seem suspect as they do not have 
a similar privileged status. The inherent intelligibility of 
intentional action explains why the reductivist search for 
microfoundations should stop at the level of the individual.  
In our view, this argument fails. First, the 
explanatory regress argument does not work as the 
methodological individualist assumes. Second, intentional 
explanation does not have the special properties the 
intentional fundamentalist presumes it to have.  
The regress argument does not work because the 
presupposed principle [P] is not true. The explanatory 
relation between X and Y is independent from the question 
whether Y is itself explained. Belief in [P] might arise from 
the confusion of between justification-seeking and 
explanation-seeking why-questions. However, it might also 
arise from other (false) intuitions about explanation. One 
such intuition is that total understanding is not really 
increased if the puzzlement concerning the original 
explanandum is simply replaced with new puzzlement 
concerning the explanans. Some fifty years ago, Stephen 
Toulmin appealed to this intuition to argue that all sciences 
must presuppose an inherently understandable “ideal of 
natural order” (Toulmin 1961, 42). For methodological 
individualists the rational (self-interested) action serves in 
the role of ideal of natural order (Coleman & Fararo 1992, 
xiv). The same intuition underlines Michael Friedman’s 
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argument that explanatory understanding cannot be based 
on a local dyadic relation between the explanandum and 
the explanans. Instead, understanding has to be a global 
property of the whole belief system. (Friedman 1974; 
Schurz and Lambert 1994) 
This global conception of understanding is based on 
an attribution error. The fact that an explanation fits well 
into a systematic web of beliefs usually makes it easier to 
understand, but it is not what constitutes understanding. A 
more natural way to interpret understanding is to regard it 
as an ability to answer counterfactual what-if-things-had-
been-different-questions. (Woodward 2003, 191; Ylikoski 
2008). Explanations show what made a difference to the 
explanandum. Here understanding is a local affair: 
understanding is attributed based on ability make correct 
counterfactual inferences about the phenomenon. It does 
not matter for the understanding of a particular 
phenomenon whether the things that made a difference to 
it are themselves explained. That is a different, partially 
independent question. There is no need of a fundament. 
Most intentional fundamentalists are in principle 
committed to the causal-mechanistic conception of 
explanation: they are trying to explain the properties of 
social wholes by laying out the causally relevant properties 
of their parts (individuals) and the pattern of their 
interaction. However, the causal-mechanistic conception of 
explanation and the global, fundamentalist conception of 
understanding do not fit together: there is no reason to 
expect that the putative fundament would always pick out 
the causally relevant factors. First, in many cases, the 
causally relevant factors in RCT-models are actually 
structural or institutional factors. Individual behavior may 
be institutionally constrained so as to be rational only in an 
“as if” –sense, or the explanandum may be robust with 
respect to the behavioral assumptions. The details of 
intentional level can thus be explanatorily irrelevant. (Satz 
and Ferejohn 1994; Lehtinen and Kuorikoski 2007) 
Second, reconstructing the behavior in terms of rational 
intentional action might misdescribe the actual causes of 
behavior. A growing body of social psychological research 
on behavior priming and post-hoc rationalization supports 
this claim (Wilson 2004). Hence, intentional description 
can be misleading. This is not the age-old argument that, 
on purely conceptual grounds, intentional explanation 
cannot be causal explanation, but an empirical claim about 
the relationship between folk-psychology and human 
behavior. 
As Carl Craver (2007, Ch. 4) has pointed out, 
although the search for mechanistic explanations involves 
opening black boxes, complete mechanistic explanations 
are not really eliminative, because they incorporate factors 
in multiple different levels of mechanisms. The goal of 
mechanistic explanation is not to reduce different levels to 
single bedrock, but to understand the systematic 
dependencies between entities in different levels of 
organization. Neither does mechanistic explanation regard 
the lower levels as somehow sacrosanct: lower level 
concepts and conceptions may be altered in the face of 
new empirical discoveries or conceptual changes 
concerning upper (or even lower) level phenomena. These 
are bad news for the intentional fundamentalist.  
3. The Dimensions of Explanatory Power 
We have argued elsewhere (Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2008) 
that the intuitive notion of explanatory power is related to 
five distinct dimensions that can be in conflict with each 
other. The five dimensions of explanatory goodness are 
non-sensitivity, precision, factual accuracy, degree of inte-
gration, and cognitive salience. All other often cited criteria 
for evaluating explanations, like simplicity, unification or 
mechanistic detail, are derivate of these basic dimensions. 
Could some of the appeal of intentional fundamentalism be 
explained in terms of these dimensions? 
The appeal of intentional fundamentalism derives 
from the cognitive salience of our folk psychological 
practice. Cognitive salience refers to the ease with which 
the reasoning behind the explanation can be followed, how 
easily the implications of the explanation can be seen and 
how easy it is to evaluate the scope of the explanation and 
identify possible defeaters or caveats. To the extent that 
RCT belongs to the family of folk psychological theories, 
and once its technical concepts are internalized, people 
can be extremely fluent in its use. It only requires the 
translation of everyday folk psychological accounts to the 
more abstract language of beliefs and preferences. The 
ease of use and the broad scope of application of 
intentional vocabulary give rise to the impression of a 
strong theory. If RCT is a formalization of our everyday 
intentional explanatory practice, the feeling that intentional 
explanations are final and do not give rise to additional 
question is easily explained: in our everyday explanatory 
practice we do not usually attempt to go beyond the 
intentional scheme of explanation. In fact, people have 
difficulties in figuring out what these explanations would 
look like. The mistake here is to assume that cognitive 
salience is a reliable indicator of overall explanatory power. 
What the intentional fundamentalist does not recognize is 
the fact that in the case of RCT there are important trade-
offs between the dimensions of explanatory power. To 
show this, we will next consider how well intentional 
rational explanations measure up against some other 
dimensions.  
Let us start with the non-sensitivity. It refers to the 
sensitivity of the explanatory relationship to the changes in 
the background conditions. The less sensitive the 
explanation is to these changes, more robust and powerful 
it is. A robust explanation can answer a wider set of what-
if-things-had-been-different -questions. If we focus on 
individual explanations, rational choice explanations can 
be extremely sensitive in that sometimes a small change in 
the beliefs or desires of the agent can bring about a drastic 
change in behavior. However, sometimes these 
explanations can also be robust, so everything depends on 
the kinds of changes in background assumptions we are 
talking about. Therefore it does not make sense to make 
generalizations about the sensitivity of rational choice 
explanations. However, one might be tempted to make 
such generalizations if one considers the robustness of 
RCT as an explanatory scheme. Like folk psychology in 
general, RCT provides extremely flexible vocabulary for 
describing behavior and for revising explanatory accounts. 
If one intentional description of behavior is shown to be 
false, it can always be replaced with a new one that 
incorporates the problematic observations. This flexibility 
gives an impression of a general and strong explanatory 
theory, although these are really properties of the 
explanatory vocabulary, not of the substantial theory. 
Explanatory power, understood as non-sensitivity, is in this 
case illusory. 
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The second dimension to be considered is factual 
accuracy. An explanation with less idealizations and 
abstractions is usually judged to be better than one with 
more. However, factual accuracy is often in conflict with 
the other dimensions of explanatory power: it is difficult to 
have an explanation that is both factually accurate, non-
sensitive, integrated with other explanations and 
cognitively salient. The technical precision of RCT 
concepts can give rise to an impression of precise 
descriptions of psychological phenomena, but in reality it 
does not score highly in terms of factual accuracy. Not only 
does RCT significantly abstract away from the details of 
psychological phenomena, it also quite often factually 
distorts the descriptions of these phenomena. For 
example, the RCT reconstruction of psychological process 
can give a causally misleading account of it by describing 
as purposive behavior what was habitual or unconscious, 
or rationalizing decision-making processes that were 
everything but rational. 
The final dimension we want to consider is the 
degree of integration with existing knowledge. It 
contributes to explanatory understanding by expanding the 
set of explanatory questions that can be answered by 
them separately. As RCT is just a formalization of 
everyday folk psychology, it is relatively well integrated 
with it. However, it is an open question how much this 
expands their joint explanatory reach. RCT fares even 
worse with respect to integration with other scientific 
theories. The difficulties of integrating RCT with the results 
of empirical research in psychology and social sciences 
are well known. When RCT is further strengthened with 
intentional fundamentalism, the problems become even 
greater. As suggested above, the ideas underlying 
intentional fundamentalism are not compatible with causal 
mechanistic explanatory ideas that motivate other 
sciences. Largely because of the very idea of a 
fundament, the fundamentalist RCT has extremely low 
degree of integration with other bodies of scientific 
knowledge.  
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New Hope for Non-Reductive Physicalism 
Julie Yoo, Easton, Pennsylvania, USA 
The Problem 
Non-reductive physicalists want to hold on to the idea that 
higher-level properties – mental properties, especially – 
have an autonomous ontological standing, and hence, 
their own distinctive causal powers. But their equal com-
mitment to physicalism threatens to undermine this com-
mitment to the autonomy of higher-level properties. This is, 
in effect, Kim’s dilemma for non-reductive physicalism: it is 
inherently unstable because the physicalism denies the 
irreducibility thesis, while the irreducibility thesis denies 
physicalism (Kim 1989, 1993, 1998, 2005). In this paper, I 
shall to propose a novel way of solving this dilemma.  
The Way Out of the Bind: Reducing  
Higher-Level Properties While Retaining 
their Powers 
My argument, in a nutshell, is this. A property exists if and 
only it can confer causal powers upon its bearers. Proper-
ties are individuated in terms of the distinctive range of 
causal powers each of them are capable of conferring. 
Now, mental properties confer causal powers completely in 
virtue of the physical properties on which they logically 
supervene, but no mental property is identical with a 
physical property. The concept of property realization ren-
ders possible the consistent conjunction of these two 
strands – irreducibility and physicalism. 
Let us get started with a picture of multiple realiza-
bility to get us oriented with respect to its sister notion of 
property realization. On standard accounts of multiple re-
alizability, it is believed that different physical properties – 
different physical types of kinds – P1, P2, … Pn, can each 
necessitate one and the same type of mental M (or higher-
level) property:  
 
Fig. 1                M 
 
 
 
R1        R2     …     Rn 
While this picture isn’t wrong, the schematic nature of the 
diagram engenders an oversimplified way of thinking about 
realization that is misleading. It is misleading in that it gives 
the impression that a given realization R is a single physi-
cal property. But this convenient simplification obscures an 
important detail, much attended to by the emergentists, to 
their credit, and it is that a mental property is a property of 
a system made up of concrete aggregates and whose 
micro-physical properties and relations make the opera-
tions of the whole system or mechanism possible.  To say 
that a property is multiply realizable is to say that a number 
of different kinds of systems or mechanisms – ones that 
are not only made up of different kinds of materials, but 
that also have different kinds of architectural configurations 
– can execute one and the same function. Think of the 
indispensible corkscrew: there is the rack and pinion 
model, the waiter’s corkscrew, and the rigid coiled wire 
with a convenient handle. Each of these different kinds of 
mechanisms counts as a distinct type of realization; that is, 
the rack and pinion model is R1, the waiter’s corkscrew is 
R2, and so on. A more careful look at what’s going on sug-
gests that a concrete instance of a given realization is best 
represented as being made up of inter-related micro-
physical aggregates a1, a2, …, an, having micro-physical 
properties P1, P2, …, Pn, whose causal powers “constitute” 
the causal powers of M:  
 
Fig. 2                M 
 
 
 
       R1          R2       . . . Rn 
  a1  a2 an         b1   b2   bn    
  P1 P2 Pn      Q1   Q2     Qn 
The realizing base of M is the micro-physical properties P1, 
P2, …, Pn of the constituent aggregates a1, a2, …, an, which 
they instantiate in virtue of being the type of material or 
substance they are.1 Now, if physicalism is true, then each 
of these properties have causal powers that fully deter-
mine the causal powers of M. M, to use an emergentist 
term, is a resultant of each of the micro-physical properties 
P1, P2, … Pn. The question, then, is how M is capable of 
having its own distinctive causal powers, given that M’s 
powers are fully derived from its realizing base. The an-
swer lies in drawing a connection between two things: a 
causal power conception of the nature of properties 
(Shoemaker 1984), now often called the “Eleatic theory of 
properties,”2 and the phenomenon of universalizability, as 
described by Robert Batterman (2000, 2001). I begin with 
universality.  
To the extent that each mental property, by all 
appearances, has a unique array of causal powers (the 
total facts about which a complete empirical functionalist 
analysis of mental properties would deliver) it satisfies a 
necessary condition for being a distinctive genuine 
property. Now, one of the remarkable things about nature 
is that there are higher-level regularities that are realized 
by very heterogeneous mechanisms. That is, wildly 
different kinds of systems manage to accomplish the same 
kinds of tasks. This phenomenon is what Jerry Fodor 1997 
has called a “metaphysical mystery” – how, in essence, 
things that are so different can still give rise to things that 
are the same: 
 
                                                     
 
1 Actually, Fig. 2 may also be too schematic.  Depending on how we want to 
individuate the a’s, it is possible for a given a to have many properties P, not 
just a single property in the way Fig. 2 represents.  Take a particular cork-
screw x and say that x is the rack and pinion kind.  The individual x has the 
macro-property M of being a corkscrew in virtue of x’s being composed of two 
handle bars, a flange, spindle, metal spiral, etc..  These are the a’s that have 
the P’s whose collective instantiation makes it possible for the a’s to constitute 
x and enable it to do its thing.  Now, the handle bars alone would have the 
properties of being handle-bar shaped, being rigid, being made of metal, and 
so on, so a given a is most likely to have properties P.  I won’t be too fussy 
about this detail, as Fig. 2 is sufficient as a working model.) 
2 The Eleatic theory of properties is so called because the conception goes 
back to Plato’s Eleatic stranger in the Sophist, who suggests that the mark of 
being is power.  This idea is also codified in what Kim calls “Alexander’s 
principle,” named after the emergentist, Samuel Alexander, who argued that a 
property must have causal powers to exist. 
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The very existence of the special sciences testifies 
to reliable macro-level regularities that are realized 
by mechanisms whose physical substance is quite 
typically heterogeneous. - - Damn near everything 
we know about the world suggests that unimagina-
bly complicated to-ings and fro-ings of bits and 
pieces at the extreme micro-level manage somehow 
to converge on stable macro-level properties.  
On the other hand, the ‘somehow’ really is entirely 
mysterious, … [for we don’t] see why there should 
be (how there could be) [macro-level regularities] 
unless, at a minimum, macro-level kinds are homo-
geneous in respect of their micro-level constitution. 
Which, however, functionalists in psychology, biol-
ogy, geology, and elsewhere, keep claiming that 
they typically aren’t. (Fodor 1997, pp. 160 – 61) 
We see the mystery across the special sciences: an ani-
mal’s fitness, for example, can be realized by its reproduc-
tive success, lack of predators, abundance of food, and 
the good fortune of not suffering odd accidents; pain, to 
use everyone’s favorite example, can be realized by C-
fiber stimulation, silicon chips, or hydraulic mechanisms – 
all at least in principle. With all the heterogeneity at this 
lower level, it is indeed mysterious how they manage to 
give rise to stable, recurring, patterns and regularities that 
appear to hold with nomological force. (The converse is 
equally mysterious, namely, how such few types of funda-
mental particles, laws, and forces, give rise to the com-
plexity and heterogeneity of our world, but this is a slightly 
different matter that will not be addressed here.) 
In his “Multiple Realizability and Universality,” 
Batterman explains how the mysterious phenomenon, 
called “universality,” is explained in physics. Multiple 
realizability is an instance of universal behavior. Universal 
behavior is where vastly different systems – systems with 
different microstructures, different architectures, different 
properties – exhibit identical behavior when characterized 
at some level of description: 
 
To begin to get an idea about the concept of univer-
sality as well as its ubiquity, consider the following 
homely example. One wants to explain the ob-
served common behavior of pendulums – one 
wants, for example, to understand why pendulums 
with bobs of different colors, rods of different 
lengths, different masses composed of diverse ma-
terials, etc., all have periods (for small oscillations) 
that are directly proportional to the square root of 
the length of the rod from which the bob is hanging. 
At one level the explanation is quite straightforward: 
one solves the very simple equation of motion for 
such a system. - - But there is another why-question 
which is far from simple. Why, one might ask, are 
factors such as the color and (to a large degree) the 
constitution or micro-structural makeup of the bobs 
irrelevant for answering our why-question about the 
period of the pendulums? Why is this equation, 
rather than one in which, say, a color parameter 
plays a prominent role, explanatory? In other words, 
what allows us to bracket, or set aside as ‘noise’ 
these other features of the individual pendulums as 
inessential or irrelevant for the explanation of the 
behavior of interest? These latter questions concern 
the explanation of universal behavior.  
(Batterman 2000, pp. 120 – 121) 
As Batterman explains, physics has managed to identify 
universal behavior in all kinds of systems – systems of 
thermodynamics near their critical points, certain limit theo-
rems of probability – and construct very detailed explana-
tions of those variables that are relevant for the behavior of 
a system’s macro-level behavior (the length of the bob of 
the pendulum) and those that are mere negligible to the 
salient macro-level properties of the system (the color of a 
pendulum). The lesson to take away from this, according 
to Batterman, is that there are “physical reasons why the 
details of the makeup of the individual realizers may be 
largely irrelevant for the upper level behavior of the sys-
tem” (Batterman’s emphasis, 2000, p. 124).  
Now, while it is interesting that some of explanatory 
methods are sophisticated enough to handle universal 
behavior, our question is how our world is constructed so 
that it can display universal behavior while being 
composed of such a diverse heterogeneity of more basic 
physical (micro-physical) constituents. The question is 
decidedly about the metaphysics of the phenomenon, the 
“truth-makers” in the world that make our explanations of 
universality true. On my view, we need to look to the 
Eleatic theory of properties to lay out that metaphysics.   
On the Eleatic theory, properties are those things in 
virtue of which the objects having them can enter into 
causal relations. Thus, a property X is not the thing that 
has causal power K. Many people speak this way, but 
what they really mean is that a property confers causal 
powers. The things that have causal powers are 
individuals, like physical objects or events or other kinds of 
concrete particulars. A property, then, is individuated in 
terms of the unique array of causal powers it confers upon 
the individuals that have it. Its unique array is what I call its 
causal profile (see also Gillett 2002). The notion is drawn 
from two observations. First, that a property in isolation 
from other properties is not enough to confer its bearer 
with a causal power, as many other contributing properties 
must also be instantiated. A property, then, is one among 
many others that contribute to the causal power of an 
object:  
 
(α) A property X contributes to a causal power K in 
a given circumstance just in case  
i. X is necessary for K, and 
ii. X, together with a set of properties Γ, is 
minimally sufficient to confer K. 
Thus, the relationship between a property and a causal 
power is not one-to-one. And this is the second observa-
tion: it is, in fact, many-many. For any property X, its in-
stantiation in different circumstances can confer different 
causal powers, and for each type of causal power, differ-
ent individuals can have that type of causal power though 
it instantiates different properties. 
 
(β) Possibly, for any property X, Xi contributes to Ki 
and Xj contributes to Kj and Xi = Xj, but Ki ≠ Kj. 
 
(χ) Possibly, for any causal power K, Xi contributes to 
Ki and Xj contributes to Ki and Ki = Kj but Xi ≠ Xj. 
The individuation conditions for a property can be stated 
thus: 
 
(δ) X and Y are the same property just in case they 
have exactly the same causal profile: for all ac-
tual and possible Ki and Kj, X contributes to Ki 
and Y contributes to Kj and Ki = Kj.  
The basic idea of (δ) is that X and Y are the same property 
if under all possible circumstances – all possible sets of 
properties Γ with which they can be conjoined – they con-
tribute to all and only the same causal powers. For in-
stance, if the property of having heat contributes to various 
causal powers in various circumstances – melt wax, boil 
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water, bake brownies, … – and the property of having a 
mean kinetic energy contributes to exactly the same 
causal powers in those same circumstances, then heat 
and mean kinetic energy are the same property. But given 
that mean kinetic energy is only one realization of heat 
among other realizers, this means that there is a circum-
stance where heat and mean kinetic energy contribute to 
different causal powers and thus count as different proper-
ties. 
This theory about the nature of properties and their 
conditions for individuation gives us a very intuitive way of 
explaining the phenomenon of universality. On my view, 
the capacity to behave in universal ways is built into the 
profile of each physical property. That is, the things that 
make up the profile of a higher-level property are the 
profiles of many lower-level properties acting in concert. 
This is not emergentism. Let us return to the theological 
story about our cosmology to see why. A physicalist says 
that to create our world, God created physical particles, 
physical properties, and their governing laws, and nothing 
more. I would add that God also created ways for those 
physical properties to combine with each other in 
universal-behaving ways, ways that the special sciences 
are so adept at describing. These higher-level properties 
are genuine because higher-level predicates refer to 
entities that have unique causal profiles. The comparison 
with fractals may be instructive here: larger patterns, which 
are made up of smaller patterns, have properties that are 
unique to them. But those properties are entirely derived 
from or are “resultants” out of the properties of the smaller 
constituent patterns; it just so happens that the smaller 
patterns are constructed in such a way that they generate 
the larger patterns with their distinctive properties. So we 
get the higher-level properties and regularities because of 
the complex ways that physical systems can behave, and 
solely due to their physical nature.  
Perhaps another example will be helpful here. A wall 
will have certain properties that its individual component 
bricks do not have. An obvious property will be its mass m. 
For the purposes of illustration, let’s say that all bricks 
have somewhat different masses. Now supposed that the 
wall were to engage in universal behavior with respect to 
its mass. Then bricks of different masses would regularly 
combine to create a wall with mass m, in a variety of 
different contexts (inside, outside, during the day, during 
the night, … ), and in a number of different ways (the left 
side gets done first, then the right, or the layers get added 
one level at a time, or diagonally, … ). They all lead to 
instances of wall-of-mass-m. This is quite remarkable, but 
there is nothing but physical ingredients and physical laws 
at work here. There need be no irreducible wall-of-mass-m  
property that imposes its causal powers from above. All 
the causal powers for the wall with its mass come strictly 
from the causal powers of the individual bricks and their 
mode of combination. Emergence doesn’t come into the 
picture. It is a part of the nature of these bricks to form an 
object with the property of being a wall-of-mass-m. But this 
is no more mysterious than the fact that it is a part of the 
nature of an electron to attract protons. Insofar as the 
property of being wall-of-mass-m makes a causal 
difference, and makes it in its uniquely distinctive ways, 
then by the theory of properties I have laid out, this is a 
genuine property, as genuine as the properties at the 
fundamental level.   
The Eleatic theory is purely democratic when it 
comes to determining which properties exist. The level 
doesn’t matter. What matters is its profile. If my approach 
to the metaphysics of universality is right, then a whirl of 
many properties P1, P2, … Pn and their corresponding 
profiles can give rise to a “larger” stable property M and 
with its corresponding profile, all thanks to nothing but the 
nature of the properties P1, P2, … Pn.  
Non-Reductive Physicalism and Downward 
Causation 
One would be right to wonder whether my view preserves 
the original non-reductive physicalist conception of the 
world as having different “layers” or “levels” that are hierar-
chically arranged. On one way of looking at it, my view 
places everything in one grand level, so that there is no 
hierarchy of different levels that exist in a metaphysically 
robust way. Instead, all the entities and properties postu-
lated by the sciences, special and micro-physical, are 
equally fundamental and mutually irreducible, living side by 
side, and running in and out of each other’s lives. This 
picture is consistent with my view. As long as it does not 
violate the supervenience relations between properties 
that belong to traditionally different levels – the biological 
supervening upon the chemical, and mental supervening 
upon the biological, and so on – it certainly does not force 
us to alter our ways of how the sciences are related to 
each other.  
The important part of this proposal is that the 
supervening properties do indeed have their own causal 
powers, and hence, ultimately brings about physical 
changes when the supervening properties are instantiated. 
But it does so, not by exercising downward causation as 
on the classical emergentists view, but by constraining 
how the physical changes come about. The view, then, 
that I present, may better be described as an account of 
downward determination.  
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Are Tractarian Objects Whitehead’s Pure Potentials? 
Piotr Żuchowski, Łódź, Poland 
Without doubt Whitehead and Wittgenstein construct their 
philosophies from different perspectives. It’s enough to 
consider the way they treat language: for Whitehead 
language is not transparent as it is for Wittgenstein – 
there’s no any isomorphism or homomorphism between 
the world and language as one can find it in Tractatus. 
One cannot reveal ultimate constituents of reality by 
process of logical analysis of language. Basically such an 
analysis can disclose no more than fundamental 
presuppositions, prejudices trenched in scientific and 
common-sense minds of a given epoch. However, despite 
all the differences there’s striking parallel between both 
systems. What may be astonishing is that one can find just 
a few works exploring these parallels (if any concerning 
ontological aspects of both systems). 
I assume that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contains a 
kind of ontological system. To put it other words: 
Wittgenstein wanted to say something about the very 
structure of reality. Hence Fact Ontology which is stated in 
the thesis that the world divides into facts is not mere 
counterpart of logical analysis of language but it is an 
explicit ontological position, though analysis of language is 
the only way we can apply to get to that position. One can 
find, however, various interpretations of the thesis 1.2. 
There are two main: the first - let me name it “extensional” 
- is based on the assumption that facts merely determine 
the scope (extension) of the world but facts are not the 
final constituents of reality – these are objects which are 
usually supposed to be kind of substances. Thus 1.2 says 
no more than to know all facts is to know all objects that 
are included in the world – all facts determine all objects 
but not conversely [1.11, 1.12]. The second interpretation - 
“contentual” - holds that facts are the final constituents of 
reality, the reality is made of facts. Then the problem what 
Tractarian objects are immediately arises to its fullest 
extent. In this case one can also find opposite views. 
Nominalistic interpretation (which is supplied by the 
extensional interpretation mentioned above) holds that 
objects are individual things, while realistic interpretation 
holds that there are not only individual things among 
objects but also properties and relations (ie. traditional 
universals). Neither of above interpretations presupposes 
that we can point out examples of objects or that we have 
direct acquaintance with them. 
I would like to propose the third probable 
interpretation of Tractarian objects according to which 
there are no individual things among objects (substances 
that bear qualities) but just entities that philosophical 
tradition generally considered to be universals (i.e. 
properties and relations). This is what ontology of facts 
holds – the world consist of facts, not of things. Objects are 
derivative beings, they exist only as constituents of facts, 
though they are not parts of facts. Facts do not have any 
material, concrete parts they could be spilt into. This is why 
one can find two modes of existence in Tractatus: the first 
(primary) that belongs to facts, which are existing state of 
affairs [2], the second (derivative) is proper to the 
substance of the world and is indicated as subsistence 
[2.024]. Objects can enter into the world only as elements 
of facts. They are thus abstract aspects of facts. It follows 
that there are no substances or other entities, which 
endure their existence on the successive moments of time. 
Momentary facts are thus ultimate bricks of reality, and 
objects are their necessary elements but they are not 
primal, they do not build the reality. However strange it 
may seem at first sight, this kind of antisubstanialistic 
position is developed in Whitehead's process metaphysics, 
it also corresponds better to the view of reality derived 
from modern physics.  
In Process and Reality Whitehead introduces eight 
categories of existence, of which so called actual 
occasions (referred here as facts) are fundamental. They 
are the final realities (the only reasons). Entities that 
belong to remaining seven categories exist only as 
elements of facts. This applies primarily to eternal objects 
(referred further as EO), which are also described as forms 
of definiteness or pure potentials and which seem to me 
correspond directly to Tractarian objects. 
Now, if we admit interpretation introduced above all 
striking parallels between Whitehead’s and Wittgenstein 
ontologies shall emerge. Due to the lack of space I shall 
confine myself in this paper basically to discussing those 
parallels which are related to characteristics of Tractarian 
objects and Whiteheadian EOs, though some other 
relevant similarities will also be mentioned. 
In the first place let’s consider the problem of 
change. As it was mentioned above since facts should be 
momentary they cannot be subject of change. Momentary 
does not mean that they are not time-extended, 
geometrical point-like, since it is impossible to construct 
extension from unextended parts. Facts are out of time, 
they cannot remain identical in the successive moments. 
Time is derivative from the succession of time moments 
constituted by facts coming into being. They become and 
perish. Thus the slightest “change” means we are dealing 
with another fact. For both philosophers some kind of 
(eternal) objects are necessary to provide the stability of 
world-structures and to avoid heraklitean consequences of 
a total flux of all things [2.026]. What undergo changes 
then is the structure, configuration of objects, ie. state of 
affairs, or to use Whiteheadian terms, the pattern made of 
EO which differs in successive facts by some of its 
elements. The change consists in adding or loosing an 
object to some state of affairs leading by necessity to a 
new situation. Hence if we talk about subject of change, 
we have to refer to complex which is identical in the 
successive facts. This complex, however, does not endure, 
since it is not in time, it can be said to “haunt” time - or to 
use more proper Whiteheadian term - it just ingresses into 
successive facts (it is thus connected to time in a different 
manner than facts). It seems an inevitable consequence 
for Fact Ontology to conceive time as atomic, quantified, 
consisting of discrete epochs constituted by facts (in 
opposition to substance ontologies for which continuous 
time seems to be more natural) and hence it is bluntly 
absurd on the ground of Fact Ontology to ask what is in 
time. According to Whitehead internal relations between 
facts provide that common characteristics can be inherited 
by effect from the cause. This element of mutual relations 
of facts is absent in Tractatus and exposed in process 
metaphysics, nevertheless in both systems the totality of 
objects with their internal relations constitutes the 
substance of the world conceived as enunciated above. 
It follows also that no new objects become, the 
substance is given once for ever. In this respect it is 
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independent of what is the fact, facts cannot affect the web 
of objects (though even here one could find some points 
for discussion). More, since the substance comprises all 
possibilities, every possible world, no matter how different 
from ours, should have the same substance.  
The congruence of both ontologies seems even 
deeper when we consider characteristic of (eternal) 
objects. 
Whitehead gives twofold characteristics of EO: 
Individual essence of EO determines its particular, unique 
individuality; for example red colour (particular shade of 
red) is what it is without any reference or relation to other 
beings whatsoever (facts, objects). The same colour may 
determine entities in many different ways staying identical 
self. To put it other words, no matter how given EO 
ingresses into actuality, how it is realised, each time it 
provides identical unique contribution to reality. EO is thus 
transcendent in respect to every actual entity, its relations 
to facts are external to it. In this sense EO is abstract – but 
to be abstract does not mean to be disconnected from a 
fact. 
Transcendence described above is a reason why we 
should think of EO as relations rather than properties (be-
side the fact that Whiteheadian facts are not substances 
that may gain or loose properties). Relations, contrary to 
properties, cannot be ascribed to one object, thus EOs are 
relations with many arguments that transcend each of 
them. Now, one of the main points of Whiteheads philoso-
phical objection is so called theory of simple location, ac-
cording to which all entities are related to space in a simple 
manner, that is one and only one location can be ascribed 
to them (no matter whether we take absolute or relative 
space). For Whitehead ingression of EO into actuality 
yields complicated web of their relations to space (different 
for example in a mirror image or in a simple perception of a 
red object). Whitehead stresses that relations are primal to 
properties. EO’s ingression into actuality is not embodi-
ment of a property in a thing (since there are no things) but 
it relates facts. It does not mean that EOs are relations as 
such (at least) not all of them, but that they are by their 
nature relational, contrary to properties which are private 
(excluding) in character. To point location of EO one has to 
point the whole web of relations (ex. I see here a green 
leaf being there). 
EOs as pure potentials for determination have to be 
in mutual relations among themselves. It stems from their 
pure potentiality that all possible relations to other EOs 
should be included in it - every relationship, which is 
possible, is thereby in the realm of possibility. It belongs to 
their essence that they can jointly determine facts. There 
are two types of EOs: simple and complex. Ingression of 
simple EOs does not necessarily imply ingression of other 
EOs, though “in fact” EOs always determine facts as 
patterns. There have to be simple EOs that are the 
fundaments of each hierarchy of patterns. Similarly in 
Tractatus there have to be objects which are simple, they 
do not comprise other objects. The web of mutual relations 
of EO is their relational essence. Its function is twofold: it 
determines all relations of given EO to all other EO and it 
also includes general possibility of determining facts. 
General means here that no EO simple or complex could 
be a cause of how matters really happen. So it belongs to 
EO’s nature to be generally realizable, otherwise they 
would be nonentities.  
The above characteristic corresponds almost 
entirely to Wittgensteinian characteristic of objects. On the 
one hand they have form which consists of relations to 
other objects. It is essential for objects that they should be 
constituents of possible states of affairs, and the form 
consists of all possible configurations, no other possible 
configurations are left to be found or added later, there is 
nothing accidental in the form. Relations to other objects 
are then internal to the object. Object have relational 
essence, it is their internal structure. This structure is 
independent of what is the case, the actual flow of things 
cannot affect the structure, otherwise there would be 
nothing stable in the reality. On the other hand the 
substance of the world is not only form but also content 
[2.025]. The content should consist of some internal 
qualities other than the logical structure: for example 
redness as a first-order internal quality and being a color 
which could be conceived as a second-order quality i.e. 
internal structure determining what composition may the 
red color come into (Stenius 1981: 79-81). These internal 
qualities could correspond to individual essence of EO. 
But there is a problem with the above characteristic. 
As 2.0231 states, if two objects have the same logical 
form, the only distinction between them, apart from their 
external properties, is that they are different (external 
properties mean here being a component of existing sate 
of affairs). It follows that the form excludes other individual 
characteristic of an object whatsoever. All properties of an 
object are relational, object possesses them only with 
respect to other objects, being a component of all possible 
states of affairs. An object as such is undifferentiated from 
other objects. How then objects obtain their individuality? 
Are they to be conceived as points of geometrical plane – 
each point is individual only due to infinite boundle of 
relations to other points (ie. due to its relational essence). 
This consequence is accepted by nominalistic 
interpretation mentioned above (Wolniewicz 1968: 85). 
Similarly Whitehead holds that in isolation EOs are 
undifferentiated nonentities. More, according to Whitehead 
relational essence is not unique to a given EO, each EO 
stands in a uniform web of relations. No matter which 
system we consider one can ask then, what determines 
which relations are possible and which are not? Could 
laws of reality, of logic be different? How “rich” is the 
structure: are there only logical relations of exclusion, 
implication and are objects only kind of logical variables in 
these relations?  
Another difficulty I should point out is connected with 
the interpretation of Fact Ontology according to which 
primary mode of existence belong exclusively to facts, 
other entities are derivative beings. If it is so, then one can 
protest that there could not be any unalterable substance 
of the world, which after all seems to be necessary 
element. That’s the reason why Whitehead postulates that 
there should be a primordial fact that valuates whole 
multiplicity of EOs, establishing all possible connections 
among mere multiplicity of EOs. Whitehead describes it as 
a kind of primordial God’s vision and regards such an 
entity indispensable element of any sound metaphysics. It 
seems to me however that this primordial valuation can be 
conceived as an act of establishing Laws of Nature for a 
given reality, setting up boundary conditions by some 
quantum fluctuations from which our reality begins as it is 
described in some multiverse cosmological scenarios. It 
follows that this primordial fact introduces a matrix that 
would serve as a substance by providing a stable structure 
determining facts coming into being. However, if substance 
of the world is to be something common to all possible 
worlds, it requires that objects, which are to be connected, 
should have some content - internal qualities other than 
the logical structure, as I tried to argue. 
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Both systems may be called Fact Ontologies, 
though while Whitehead’s philosophy is procesualism, 
Wittgenstein’s is not. Wittgenstein does not have much, if 
anything, to say about the process facts become and how 
they can be bounded together; for Whitehead – contrary – 
these are main questions. Undoubtedly Wittgenstein would 
treat Whitehead’s description of process of facts’ becoming 
as “improper” metaphysics, nonetheless structurally both 
ontologies are deeply similar. 
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